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February 13, 2025 — No Comments

The Entrance of the Gulf States to the Global Space Race

by Alice Elizabeth Strophair - Middle East Team 

Introduction 

Space exploration has historically been dominated by the USA and the USSR. It was one of the many arenas in which they competed to demonstrate their superiority. Today, although the USA and Russia are still major players in space exploration, they have been joined by a host of other countries. China and India immediately come to mind with their recent space initiatives. However, the Gulf states have also started to demonstrate their ambitions. At first, the Gulf states investment in the space sector was limited and inconsistent, but recently their space programmes and policy have been included in broader initiatives such as national plans - Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 plan, the UAE 2031; Qatar National Vision 2030; and Oman’s Vision 2040. For the UAE this has included, in 2023, sending their first astronaut, Sultan Al Neyadi, into space, completing “the longest ever Arab space mission”. The Gulf states' significant investments in the commercial space sector has been part of a broader strategy to diversify their economies, build national cohesion, and develop their national branding. In addition, in the 21st century, the notion of military power has also been redefined by new technologies, including space-based assets. Gulf states are aware of their geostrategic position and consequently are competing among themselves to become regional leaders in space programmes and advanced technologies. 

The Need for Economic Diversification

Over the past century, the Gulf states have built their economy through the exploitation of their natural resources, mainly oil and gas. As a result, their GDP per capita has been second-to-none: Qatar $119K, the UAE $82K, Bahrain $67K, and Saudi Arabia $66K. However, in the future, their economies could be jeopardised by factors such as the reduction of crude oil prices (due to the development of fracking and shale gas), the global shift toward renewable energy (as concerns over climate change increase), and, ultimately, the depletion of their natural resources. Although powerful relative to their size and population, the Gulf states are rentier states, and represent the most oil-dependent countries in the world. Their investment in the space sector is an important part of their ongoing economic transition to address these factors.

The UAE has established a national space agency (2016-2022), which is aimed to create “a vibrant commercial space sector.” To that end, the UAE has  launched several funding campaigns: the “Space Means Business” campaign, the Emirates Mission to the Asteroid Belt (EMA), and the National Space Fund. These campaigns generated more than $800 million (USD) for “groundbreaking programs [supporting] international and Emirati companies cooperating in space-sector engineering, sciences, and research applications” - and the Space Economic Zones Program “intended to support space startups and other small- and medium-sized enterprises”. 

In 2016, as part of its economic diversification strategy, Saudi Arabia unveiled its Vision 2030 plan. The plan seeks to achieve Saudi Arabia's energy transition goals via the development of a competitive commercial space sector. In 2018, Saudi Arabia set up its own space agency, which, in 2022, was followed by the Saudi Space Accelerator Program, to which it will allocate up to $2 billion by 2030.

Both the UAE and Saudi Arabia want to ensure the long-term resilience and competitiveness of their economies. They perceive their investment in the space sector as a means of developing a knowledge-based society, in which their citizens contribute to the national prosperity through innovation and entrepreneurship. In both countries, young generations are actively encouraged to pursue careers in the space sector.

Opportunities of New Partnerships & Potential Military Applications

The ambition to be the regional leader in the space sector has seen the different states seek out partnerships with established and emerging players in space exploration. For example, the UAE is committed to developing international partnerships with emerging players such as China, India, and Israel. In 2023, the UAE and China agreed to build a joint research and development centre in Abu Dhabi to work on several aspects of space exploration.

In the context of the increasing tension and rivalry between the USA and China, the Gulf states have “to manage a difficult balancing act”, simultaneously maintaining their traditional ties to the USA, while engaging with China on space exploration - with its ambition to establish “a new space diplomacy” with the Global south. This situation is reflected in the ratification of the USA led Artemis Accords in 2020 by the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, while also taking part in talks with China at the China-Gulf Cooperation (G.C.C) summit in 2022.

Photo by SpaceX on Unsplash

The UAE has shown even greater pragmatism in being both a member of the Artemis Accords and cooperating in the International Luna Research Station (IRLS), co-founded by China and Russia. However, due to the UAE’s and Saudi Arabia’s military dependence on the USA, there are limits to their cooperation with China. In 2022, the USA International Traffic in Arms Regulations “prevented the Emirati rover “Rashid 2” from joining a Chinese Chang’e 7 mission to the moon”. The Chinese Chang’e 7 programme, which will be launched in 2026, aims at exploring the moon’s environment and its available resources. China’s rapid progress in space research and development is viewed by the USA as a direct threat to its own interests. 

In the 21st century, the adoption of new and advanced technologies coming out of space research programmes for military purposes is reshaping military power. Space systems provide countries with strategic advantages, with the possibility of conducting ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) missions over disputed territories. To decrease its military dependency on satellite imagery from foreign countries, the UAE “partially manufactured its own high-resolution imaging satellites” (KhalifaSat and MBZ-SAT) for use in its territorial dispute over the islands of Abu Musa, and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, with the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI).

Conclusion 

The investment and development related to the space sector is now an integral part of each of the Gulf states respective national visions. Its importance is part of the economic, social, and military aspirations for the future. However, it requires maintaining a balance in relationships with both old and new partners, along with risk management of new technologies and their utilisation. The development of military applications from these space programmes could jeopardize the security and stability of the region. To contain these risks and maintain a broad range of collaborations, the use of diplomacy will be paramount. The development of space exploration treaties, establishing common rules and norms, potentially even a space governance. In response to these risks, Saudi Arabia and the UAE appear to be in favour of agreeing on common rules and norms. Iran has looked to enter into a space treaty with Russia and China. 

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June 17, 2024 — No Comments

The Spread of Weapons Among Civilians in Ukraine: Context, Impact, and Future Outlook

By Alexandra Tsarvulanova, Alessandro Macculi, and Arslan Sheikh - Human Security Team

Introduction

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has had a significant impact on the distribution and possession of weapons among civilians. The population now possesses a significantly higher number of firearms, according to data from the Small Arms Survey. Much of this growth can be attributed to the conflict, which has made self-defence tactics necessary and increased societal militarisation. A thorough examination of the historical background as well as the present data is necessary to determine the scope and consequences of this trend. 

Historical Context

According to estimates, Ukraine is considered to be home to a total of 4 to 5 million firearms, of which 2 to 3 million belong to the illicit sphere. The Maidan Square uprising and the subsequent outbreak of civil war in Donbass in 2014 dramatically exacerbated the spread of small arms and light weapons.

Among the sources of weapons of the first armed factions formed in the aftermath of the uprisings, the most relevant ones stem from the storage of weapons traditionally kept in households and military stocks of obsolete weapons. This phenomenon has much to do with the armed conflicts that plagued present-day Ukraine in the last century, as well as the Ukrainian SSR's function as a Soviet military stockpile. Moreover, vast arsenals were secured in the country following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe after the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact. This resulted in a disproportionate surplus following the downsizing of the Ukrainian Army.

Thus, the most crucial dynamic of arms proliferation after 2014 seems to be the leakage of weapons from state and civilian stockpiles.

Institutional and Legal Framework

It is necessary to note that Ukraine's legal framework for civilian firearm possession is notably underdeveloped and fragmented. Despite a substantial number of firearms in civilian hands, comprehensive national legislation regulating these arms is absent. Instead, firearm ownership is primarily governed by bylaws, specifically Order No. 622 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from 1998, which outlines conditions for the acquisition, storage, and use of firearms. The Constitution of Ukraine requires that ownership regimes be subject to parliamentary legislation, which this regulatory gap contravenes. 

Efforts to formalise firearm regulations have seen multiple drafts submitted to the Ukrainian Parliament over the years; the way to consensus has been long. Notably, Draft Law No. 5708, proposed in June 2021, aimed to establish a legal framework for civilian firearm ownership, including the creation of a Unified State Register of Civilian Firearms. This draft law sought to address issues such as the classification of firearms, the rights and responsibilities of firearm owners, and statutory limitations on certain types of weapons.  

The Ministry of Internal Affairs plays a pivotal role in firearm regulation and, amid the ongoing conflict, has adapted procedures to facilitate the issuance of arms to civilians participating in defence efforts. This adaptation underscores the urgent need for a comprehensive and updated legal framework to manage the proliferation and use of firearms among civilians effectively. On March 9, 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law providing for a wartime exemption for civilians to confront occupiers, allowing the use of several types of firearms for self-defence and for the protection of their property.  

 Picture 2. Potential Future Flow of Weapons 
(Source: Global Initiative, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Mark-Galeotti-and-Anna-Arutunyan-Peace-and-proliferation-The-Russo-Ukrainian-war-and-the-illegal-arms-trade-GI-TOC-March-2023.pdf) 

Impact of the War on the Spread of Weapons Among Civilians

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has significantly impacted the spread of weapons among civilians, exacerbating an already complex issue. Prior to the war, Ukraine had a notable number of both legal and illegal firearms in civilian hands. Even before the outbreak of the war, Ukraine was at the top of the list of European countries with the highest number of non-registered firearms in civilian use. The war has intensified this situation, as the government has taken steps to arm civilians to bolster defence efforts against Russian aggression. 

One immediate consequence has been the increased availability of firearms to the general population. With the invasion in 2022, the Ukrainian government began distributing weapons to civilians willing to join the defence efforts, leading to a surge in armed civilians. This was a necessary measure to ensure national defence, but it also raised concerns about long-term implications for public safety and order. The distribution of weapons has also resulted in a rise in the black market for arms. The urgency and scale of arming civilians have made it difficult to maintain strict and official control over weapon distribution, leading to leaks into illicit channels. This proliferation poses risks not only for immediate security but also for future crime rates and internal stability. Moreover, the increased weaponisation of the civilian population has heightened the potential for human rights abuses. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has highlighted the risks associated with increased civilian access to firearms, including heightened violence and insecurity. These issues underscore the need for robust mechanisms to monitor and regulate civilian-held arms to prevent misuse and ensure they do not contribute to further instability. 

To sum up, while the arming of civilians has been a critical component of Ukraine's defence strategy, it presents significant challenges that need to be addressed through comprehensive legal frameworks and effective control measures to mitigate long-term risks.

Possible Impacts on Crime Rates

Illegal firearms are increasingly involved in crime in both Ukraine and nearby Russian regions. According to the Ukrainian General Prosecutor’s Office, firearm-related offences in Ukraine surged from 720 in 2021 to 7,003 in 2022. In Russia, violent crimes involving firearms rose by 30% in the first ten months of 2022, with the Kursk and Belgorod regions, bordering Ukraine, seeing increases of 675% and 213%, respectively. Moscow saw a 203% rise in the same period.

Most illegal weapon flows in Ukraine are within the country, although some are exported through Odesa. Eastern Ukraine sees weapons diverted from military arsenals or brought back by soldiers. Larger deals involve crates of AK-74s, while smaller, opportunistic smuggling occurs via the personal belongings of injured soldiers.

Future illicit weapons transfers will likely follow established smuggling routes used for other contraband. The demobilisation of forces will create new routes, especially involving mercenaries and volunteers from the Western Balkans. These fighters may return with their weapons and establish transnational trafficking networks. An EU security official noted discussions among Ukrainian fighters about potential post-war illicit business ventures, indicating a complex and expansive future for illegal weapons flows from Ukraine.

Proliferation of Self-Defense Groups

A key feature of the conflict in Ukraine is the proliferation of territorial self-defence groups following the progressive deterioration of the Ukrainian security apparatus. As early as December 2013, Self Defence Forces (SDF) began to form in the context of the Maidan Square protests, supported by political movements opposed to former President Yanukovich. The SDF soon acted as a link between far-right groups and the protesters, contributing to the escalation by distributing weapons among civilians. Meanwhile, a parallel proliferation of self-defence groups took place in Donbass. Indeed, the intertwining of extreme right-wing and self-defence groups that emerged from Euromaidan triggered the creation of territorial defence forces in Donetsk and Luhansk in order to counter the perceived nationalist threat. 

Although the territorial self-defence groups were soon integrated into an institutional framework through the creation of state-sponsored territorial defence battalions and their incorporation into state forces, these groups retained considerable autonomy in the following years. Initially formed in a context of deep political crisis and coexisting with state security apparatuses, the battalions thus managed to gradually establish a monopoly on the use of force over territories.

The legitimisation of self-defence groups relies on their ability to step in where state security forces have faltered. As these groups gained influence and autonomy, they filled the void left by the breakdown of the state security apparatus. This process often involves seizing state arms stockpiles, which leads to the proliferation of weapons among civilians and group members. Therefore, there is a clear link between territorial control and the consolidation of authority, as well as between the latter and the ability to acquire arms.

Conclusions

In conclusion, the need for self-defence and societal militarisation have significantly increased civilian weapon possession during the conflict in Ukraine. This surge, alongside weak legal frameworks and the proliferation of self-defence groups, poses long-term risks for public safety, crime rates, and internal stability. Comprehensive regulation and effective control measures are urgently needed to mitigate these challenges.