European Union Archives – Page 2 of 2

January 4, 2022 — No Comments

The Far Right’s Threat On and Offline

By: Zachariah Parcels and Lucia Santabarbara.

*Image Source*: https://unsplash.com/photos/efrRLPZukCQ?utm_source=unsplash&utm_medium=referral&utm_content=view-photo-on-unsplash&utm_campaign=unsplash-ios

A United Nations (UN) report in July 2020 by the Security Counterterrorism Committee (CTED) showed a 320 per cent increase over the past five years in attacks by individuals and groups holding right-wing (RW) extremist ideas. The phenomena known as right-wing or far-right extremism is evidently becoming ubiquitous in nature, accelerated by the ever-increasing exchange of online content on social media platforms and imageboards. This article, thus, intends to briefly explore far-right extremism, how it might be defined, the role of the Internet, and the so-called “Lone Wolf” factor. There are various international initiatives that will be touched on to combat this cancerous, heterogeneous movement.

What is far-right extremism?

Scholars and policymakers amalgamate ethnically-, racially-, and gender-based political violence, and various anti-liberal ideologies to define right-wing extremism (RWE). RWE’s heterogeneity translates to problematic umbrella definitions that are not necessarily categorically helpful. Nevertheless, many have attempted to address these conceptual challenges. For example, it might be conceptually useful to frame transnational RWE networks as internal revisionist challengers to the Liberal International Order.

Right-wing extremism (RWE) includes a swath of actors with differentiating beliefs and subcultures; these actors do not necessarily agree with one another or converge. Brenton Tarrant, who carried out the terrorist attack in Christchurch, New Zealand, exemplified the transnational nature of RWE. He wore a patch representing the Azov Brigade, a white supremacist paramilitary group fighting in Eastern Ukraine. He also supposedly interacted with and was evidently inspired by the Norwegian terrorist, Anders Behring Breivik, who carried out a car bombing in Oslo and a mass shooting on Utøya at a Labour Party youth camp.

RWE incorporates ideas such as ultra-nationalism, radical traditionalism, and neo-Nazism. In the United States (US), the Anti-Defamation League (ADL ) perceives RWE dichotomously: there is the white supremacist sphere (the “alt-right,”neo-Nazis, and “racist skinheads”) and the anti-government extremist sphere like the radical militias and the sovereign citizens. ADL also highlights various single-issue movements on the fringes of mainstream social conservative movements that adopt extreme stances, such as anti-immigrant and Islamophobic sentiments. However, there is some intersectionality in the RWE phenomena that is helpful in conceptualising and addressing these ideologies.

Generally, RWE are anti-democratic and anti-liberal (hence, the revision challenger concept). Supremacy is an underlying foundation in RWE streams, which inherently opposes equality. RWE is associated with antisemitism (not necessarily anti-Israel stances; e.g., Anders Behring Breivik), racism, xenophobia, and authoritarianism, to name a few.

There also appears to be shared catalysts in the rise of and a distinguished modi operandi among the various streams of the far right. The far right narratives share a collective memory of infamous events that justify their anti-government positions, namely the Ruby Ridge Standoff (1992), the Waco Seige (1993), the Brady Bill (1994) under former President Bill Clinton (perceived violation of their second amendments), and the Oklahoma City Bombing (1995) carried out by Timothy McVeigh. Two watershed moments further catalysed the rise and normalisation of various far-right notions, possibly unwittingly through political pandering. The election of President Barack Obama (2008-2016) created a nativist and white supremacist counter-reaction while the Presidency of Donald Trump (2016-2020) witnessed the normalisation of nativist, anti-government, anti-liberal, and antisemtic notions, individuals, and groups. For example, Trump infamously refused to denounce the far right and right-wing militia: “... Proud Boys, stand up and stand by…” The Proud Boys, one of many emerging organisations propagating far right notions, was founded by Gavin McInnes and have adopted various misogynistic, Islamophobic, transphobic, anti-immigrant, and, recently, antisimitic stances. The far-right have seemingly embraced Louis Beam’s notion of the “leaderless resistance” - a modi operandi known as “Lone Wolf” terrorism today was discussed as an alternative to a centralised hierarchy at an notorious RWE meeting at Estes Park, Colorado in 1992. This meeting is also perceived as the birthplace of the modern American militia movement.

The Internet and the “Lone Wolf” Risk

Individuals and groups espousing RWE ideologies have an exponentially growing online presence. This growth is being catalysed by the dissemination of conspiracy theories and disinformation that form or galvanise “enemies” in the COVID era’s anti-government zeitgeist. As illustrated through Raffaello Pantucci’s study of Breivik, the internet plays a focal role in disseminating extremist ideologies. The internet actualised Beam’s dreams of a “leaderless resistance” by inciting or mobilising individuals to violence, specifically to act as “lone wolf” terrorists. This was exemplified by Breivik in Norway, Alek Minassian in Toronto (2018), and Brenton Tarrant in New Zealand (2019). Boaz Ganor defines the latter as when one perpetrates a terrorist attack on their own or with the assistance or involvement of others, but without operational ties to any terrorist organisation. Beyond the essentiality to impede online mobilisation to violence to curb this “leaderless resistance,” studies have found that the far right are more likely to learn and communicate online than Jihadist-inspired individuals. Thus, there is plenty of impetus to combat far-right extremism online.

International Initiatives to Combat RWE Content Online

The events before, during, and after the storming of the US Capitol building on 06 January 2021 further illuminates the crucial role the cyber domain is playing in RWE recruitment and propaganda initiatives. The planning and logistical organisation behind the Capitol Hill violence were via social media platforms. They were supported by the spread of disinformation and nationalist propaganda, such as through Telegram, Twitter, and Facebook. Operational information - namely the best times and methods to conduct the attack - were shared on social media months before. Precise details about the streets to take and paths to tread to avoid police checks were disseminated beforehand.

Many governments, and public and private entities have undertaken initiatives and practices to counter RWE online extremism to avoid such expressions of far-right extremism. One such initiative to counter RWE online content followed the abhorrent events in Christchurch in March 2019. New Zeland Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern’s government together with French President, Emmanuel Macron, launched the Christchurch Call with high-tech companies and social media platforms to eliminate terrorist and violent content from social media sites. This initiative was followed also by a severe condemnation by United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) towards “acts of violence based on religion or belief,”alluding to Tarrant’s targeting of Muslim worshippers in Christchurch. On the 2 April 2019, the UNGA released the Resolution Combating terrorism and other acts of violence based on religion or belief, denouncing “the heinous, cowardly terrorist attack.” On 09 October of the same year, after the deadly attack on a synagogue and murder of a regional Christian Democrat (CDU) governor by far-right extremists, Germany approved the Network Enforcement Act. This act aims at preventing the dissemination of far-right online content and combating online hate speech and fake news. A provision also requests social media networks (with more than 100 complaints) to publish biannual reports to clarify how they dealt with complaints about illegal content. Lastly, the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) - a partnership between the European Union (EU) Internet Forum, Meta, Microsoft, Twitter, YouTube, civil society and academia - was initiated in 2017. The GIFCT adopts a global synergic technological approach based on knowledge sharing and joint research to prevent terrorists and violent extremists from exploiting digital platforms.

However, recent studies consistently show the increasing ubiquity and mobilisation of right-wing extremism networks that make current measures less effective. Recent COVID-19 emergency measures have inaugurated changes entailing limitations on personal freedoms for collective public safety. These pandemic-induced changes have created an anxiety-rich online environment with an abundance of conspiracy theories, disinformation or “fake news,” and memes that normalise violence.

In conclusion, it appears that these challenges to liberal values and public safety demand innovative and persistent approaches. The cyber domain is continuously being exploited to radicalise and propagate far-right, anti-government narratives. Therefore, effective governmental responses - especially in the form of counter-narrative and public resilience initiatives - need to continuously adjust to these dynamic and adaptive revisionist challengers.

December 14, 2021 — No Comments

Andrej Movchan on the influence of the Russian Federation on today’s Geopolitics.

Today, with our guest Andrej Movchan, we had the chance to probe today's geopolitical situation, so that we can understand as best as possible what our future holds. We discussed the contrasts between Russia and Japan, its relations with Ukraine and Afghanistan, the northern development and how the Federation is facing the large demand for gas from European states.

Andrej Movchan is a Russian economist and a nonresident scholar in the Economic Policy Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center. His research focuses on Russia's economy, the Eurasian Economic Union, and the future of Russia's economic relations with the EU. Movchan has been a top executive for Russian and international financial institutions since 1993. He was an executive director of Troika Dialog for six years. From 2003 to 2009, Movchan headed Renaissance Investment Management Group, which he founded, and from 2006 to 2008, he was the CEO of Renaissance Credit Bank. He also founded the Third Rome investment company, and was its CEO and managing partner from 2009 until the end of 2013. Movchan has also authored numerous publications on economics and finance. His op-eds and commentary regularly appear in the media. He won two PRESSzvaniebusiness journalism awards in 2011 and 2013.

Interviewers: Alessio Calzetti and Igor Shchebetun.

July 23, 2021 — No Comments

Jasmine El-Gamal on Middle East Relations, ITSS Verona

Jasmine M. El-Gamal talks about the shifting relations between the Middle East and the EU. El Gamal discusses with our ITSS members the approach of the EU to the Middle East. She also talks about the aftermath of the Syrian War, non-violent Islamism and terrorism. Jasmine el Gamal is a political analyst, writer and speaker, currently working at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue.

Interviewers: Giovanni Rasio, Alessandro Spada and Sonia Martínez

This is ITSS Verona Member Series Video Podcast by the International System Team, UK & EU Team.

ITSS Verona - The International Team for the Study of Security Verona is a not-for-profit, apolitical, international cultural association dedicated to the study of international security, ranging from terrorism to climate change, from artificial intelligence to pandemics, from great power competition to energy security.

July 1, 2021 — No Comments

European Security Challenges II: Russia

By: Alessandro Spada

Picture via West vs Russia: the Clash of Narratives | Madan

The tensions between the European Union (EU) and Russia have considerably increased over the last years. In this context, Ukraine has become a crucial geopolitical flashpoint. Ever since the annexation of Crimea and Russian military intervention in Ukraine in 2014, the relations between Russia and the EU have deteriorated progressively with the adoption of severe sanctions by the latter.

In addition to the Ukrainian crisis, both the Russian intervention in the Syrian war and the attempted poisoning of the former Russian military intelligence officer Sergei Skipral and his daughter by Kremlin agents in 2018 are worth recollecting. Besides, the use of targeted actions to influence and to destabilise European countries such as disinformation, cyber-attacks and support for pro-Kremlin political parties and NGOs, and in the end, the attempted murder by poisoning of Alexei Navalny, one of the most fearsome opposition leaders of Vladimir Putin, have imposed EU to take further countermeasures.

The Russian threat can be subdivided into the following three categories:

Military threat: The high-risk level of Baltic States to be invaded by Russian troops in just a few days and short-range Iskander missiles stationed in “the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad” with high capacity to deliver nuclear warheads attack and to reach Poland and Eastern Germany in 2013. In this regard, it is worth highlighting that the repeated NATO airspace and sea space violations have often provoked several skirmishes between the Russian and NATO planes and warships in the Black and the Baltic Seas. In addition, more than 100,000 Russian troops have been deployed to the border between Russia and Ukraine and Russia’s navy presence around the whole Crimean Peninsula, including also the Sea of Azov, are not absolutely less alarming for Ukraine, NATO and European allies.
Hybrid threat: This is meant as financial and political support for pro-Kremlin parties and NGOs, also spreading disinformation. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning the cyber-attacks to influence and cause instability within European Countries and borders. For example, Moscow was able to build strong ties with populist and mostly far-right political parties such as Rassemblement National (RN) in France, Lega in Italy, Alternative für Deutschland(AfD) in Germany, Vlaams Belang (VB) in Belgium and Catalan independence movement in Spain. Among Russian hybrid tools, the state-owned RT news channel and Sputnik news agency, are considered propaganda instruments, which disseminate anti-establishment conspiracy theories, aim at creating divisions on sensitive issues such as migration and Islamic terrorism. At last, it is worth recalling the Internet Research Agency (IRA), the St. Petersburg-based “troll factory”, specialized in fake social media profiles on Facebook and Twitter.
Energy threat: Russia supplies a third or more of EU oil and gas demand and “a large share of this is delivered via pipelines crossing Ukraine, a country whose relations with Moscow are even more problematic than the EU's, raising the possibility that Europe's gas supplies could be held hostage to geopolitical tensions”. Indeed, the energy crisis in 2006 and 2009 created serious warnings for gas supplies.

In reaction to these threats, 4500 troops have been stationed on a rotational basis in Poland and Baltic countries by NATO since 2017 and Lithuania approved the reintroduction of compulsory military service in 2015. The three Baltic countries have significantly raised their defence budget and two neutral countries as Finland and Sweden strengthened partnership with NATO. Furthermore, this year, many European countries took part in DEFENDER-Europe 21, “an annual large-scale U.S. Army-led, multinational, joint exercise designed to build readiness and interoperability between U.S., NATO and partner militaries”. Last May, 600 NATO and non-NATO forces, including troops from Ukraine and Georgia, were involved in the "Trojan Footprint" military exercise across five Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Georgia, and Romania). The drill took place “alongside much larger Defender-Europe 21 NATO joint exercises”, mentioned before, which had “some 28,000 forces participating from 26 different countries”.

Numerous countermeasures have been taken by EU countries to counter Russian disinformation. For example, media literacy training has been introduced in school curricula by several countries and “regulators have clamped down on pro-Kremlin outlets such as RT for failing to comply with media standards”. In 2015, EU created a special task force as East StratCom Task Force for a weekly publication of Disinformation Review identifying and unmasking disinformation from pro-Russia sources. Moreover, it has the purpose to cooperate with Eastern Partnership countries for building resilience to pro-Kremlin disinformation, for example explaining EU policies to audiences from the region by producing Russian-language materials and training journalists. In 2018, the disinformation Code of Practice and the Action Plan were both adopted by the European Union. Several media companies signed the Code of Practice, committing to remove fake profiles and allowing users to see who pays for online political adverts.

The EU has taken meaningful measures to mitigate energy shortage. For example, it has started to build new energy infrastructures - such as interconnecting pipelines enabling EU Member States to share gas, building terminals to import LNG from USA and Qatar and storage facilities to keep gas in reserve. In this context, NATO plays a fundamental role as well, establishing “three main priorities regarding energy security. The first is to enhance allies’ strategic awareness of the security implications of energy developments. The second goal is to support the protection of critical energy infrastructure, including tankers and offshore energy installations. Third, NATO has prioritized enhancing energy efficiency in the military”.

The EU will have to support Eastern European member countries politically, military and economically to counter Russian threats. It will have to promote major policies of economic development, social inclusions fighting inequalities created by pandemic, more cooperation and investments in counter-intelligence and cybersecurity technologies. Additionally, it will have to invest more financial resources to rebuild the economy based on renewable energies, being less hostage by the Russian oil and gas. In the end, it will need to be more independent from the American influence and speaking with a common and single voice. If Europe does not follow this path, it would put at risk the foundations of European democratic institutions, causing their disintegration, paving the way to antidemocratic and populist political parties and lastly it would continue to be subject to energy blackmail of the Kremlin.

What is sure for now is that Russia is still perceived as a real threat to the whole Western world, as also demonstrated by the UK and USA. Indeed, concerning this last one, in spite of the constructive U.S.-Russia Summit in Geneva on 16th June 2021, the deep underlying tension between the superpowers seems less than solved.

Here you can read the first part of this article.

June 3, 2021 — 1 Comment

European Security Challenges I: The footprint of power rebalancing

By Sonia Martínez and Giovanni Rasio.

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Currently, there exists no popular support to equip the Union with substantial military capabilities to defend itself against common threats. There is no consensus among leaders regarding European Strategic Autonomy, the key aspect of European defence planning. And if this decision is made, European leaders need to craft a common strategy. This query would entail questions such as what the risks are, who would join, or what are the next steps.

Unless the United States abruptly decided to abandon its commitment embodied in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European defence configuration is unlikely to vary. Since the beginning of the Cold War, the United States has always acted as the security guarantor of Europe. In particular, the long-standing American support for the Old Continent's defence and security has pivoted around NATO. As a full-fledged multilateral security alliance, NATO has provided an effective shield against the threats arising in Europe’s Eastern neighbourhood. The Organisation also represented the main framework through which Member States’ forces have engaged in military operations under American guidance.

Approaches to Security

Nonetheless, as positions concerning defence diverge, propelling European self-defence would put the unity of the block under pressure. Europe should not stand solely on its feet, as transatlantic support has and will prove crucial. However, it must undoubtedly increase its defence autonomy to a great extent. According to Chancellor Merkel, the ‘task of the future’ for Europe is to take destiny into its own hands.

After a rather unipolar age, the EU should use the global power rebalancing scenario to its benefit. New challenges are compelling the US to shift its focus and resources from Europe and the Middle East towards the Indo-Pacific. This rebalancing dynamic, which partially began with the so-called Pivot to Asia during the Obama Administration, culminated with the Indo-Pacific Strategy introduced by President Trump. The attention required by the US posture in the Pacific, combined with Trump’s proneness to threatening European allies to withdrawal the American troops, have somehow pushed Washington and Europe far from each other.

The Union beyond question needs a more autonomous security approach. This is certainly the viewpoint of President Macron, who advocates for ‘European autonomy’ in defence matters, based on the principle of interoperability. This approach evokes a Union capable of delivering both soft and hard power. The German approach is comparatively different. It is based on cooperation, support, and it emphasises the importance of strong transatlantic relations. A coordinated European approach is needed to secure the continent in an unprecedented environment marked by COVID-19 and a complex setting on the East wing.

Impact of European Security Approaches on Strategy

Given the ever-changing uncertain global outlook, observing strategic moves conducted by other global actors is paramount. After Brexit, the UK pivoting from Europe to a global strategy adds complexity to the EU’s defence strategy. In January 2021, the European Union officially lost an important partner for its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Other than holding one of the most powerful militaries in the world, the United Kingdom, together with France, has historically proved essential in nuclear deterrence and expeditionary capabilities for the European Union.

After leaving the EU, the UK aims to revive a more global dimension of its foreign policy. This would allow London to regain a leading role on the international stage. The Integrated Review 2021 offers a first glimpse of the new ‘Global Britain’, conveying that the UK will be the first European country to tilt to the Indo-Pacific region, thus inevitably shifting its focus away from a continental perspective.

Further crucial points need to be addressed in common security matters of the EU. The EU's internal and external security issues are becoming increasingly intertwined. An updated version of the 2016 EU Global Strategy and the implementation of tailored policies are required to counter potential security threats.

Moving forward

Initiatives such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PeSCo) and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) are turning points for a coordinated approach to security. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) comprises both assets and capabilities of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), dealing among others with crisis management. And yet, this task remains a vital milestone to secure Europe.

This is even more essential concerning the EU's southern and eastern neighbours. In this regard, Karrenbauer highlights the need to pay attention to the four cardinal points. The CFSP, in fact, is a model based on multilateralism that aims to demonstrate that this sort of international order functions. However, European multilateralism will not prove successful without coordination and agility. The unanimity factor implies that if member states do not arrive at a consensus other states might make a move to solely benefit themselves.

Conclusion

Member States should work together concerning security matters in the direction of strategic autonomy. The region should take on its hard power responsibility in an uncertain multipolar environment. There is an inevitable overlap between internal and external security threats. Exchanging information is crucial to achieve an effective defence strategy.

As Kramp-Karrenbauer, German Minister of Defence, wrote, Brexit exhibits the results of a European policy that feeds on sentiment instead of devising ideas for a common European future. Brexit has possibly fissured relations between the UK and the EU, as press biases indicate.

Europe needs to cooperate to bring forward a common defence framework that rises above politics. The way ahead should be a combination of more strategic autonomy and stronger transatlantic relations; while the former will be critical, the latter has proved crucial. The US rebalance of power, the pandemic and Brexit are increasing the temperature of the stove. European leaders should know that a watched pot never boils.

Here is an in-depth analysis of Russia’s motivation in the region.

May 20, 2021 — 1 Comment

Security and Cooperation: Egypt’s role between Regional and International Powers

The ITSS Africa team interviews Muhammad Musaad Alaraby, from Biliotheca Alexandrina’s Center of Strategic studies, analysing Egypt’s role in the international cooperation in the security field. Together we discussed the current situation in Egypt, and its position between Europe and Africa. Finally, we concluded with a snapshot of possible future scenarios regarding Egypt’s security and cooperation internationally.

Interviewing Team: Alessandra Gramolini, Rebecca Pedemonte, and Michele Tallarini.

May 5, 2021 — 1 Comment

Sir Lawrence Freedman on UK-EU Relations, Strategy and International Security under Coronavirus

Sir Freedman is Emeritus Professor of War Studies at King’s College London. He has written predominantly on international security and strategy. The Future of War: A History (2017) is one of his masterworks.

In this session, he offers relevant insights on the impact of covid-19 on strategy by assessing relations between the European Union and the UK.

Interviewers: Alessandro Spada, Giovanni Rasio and Sonia Martínez.

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