By Leif Niendorf and Eline Stensen Gulliksen - UK & European Affairs Desk

Has the European Union aimed too high in trying to establish itself as a multi-dimensional power? And is it a weakening project? As the EU is being put to the test by Donald Trump’s re-election and a war on the European continent, its identity has once again become a subject of debate. Created as an economic union after World War II, the EU has expanded its power beyond the purely economic sphere, driven by integration and path dependency, into a comprehensive political union with growing military capabilities.

The EU wields multi-dimensional power, manifesting as a normative power, market power, and, notably, an emerging realist power that is currently a significant topic of discussion in Europe. The Union’s economic power is substantial and is often used to pursue policy goals; it uses its market power as “carrots and sticks” to influence countries to comply; hence, the EU’s market power can be a tool for achieving normative goals. However, what happens when the two perceptions of the Union’s identity clash, and the EU must choose between them? What identity wins, and what is the main factor that shapes EU foreign policy?

Having started as a peace project and as an advocate of the rule of law, human rights, and liberal values in Europe and worldwide, it makes only sense that the EU also seeks to maintain its position as a normative power. Since the early 2000s, the EU has also opened increasingly loud debates about its capacities in the realms of security and defence, culminating in the establishment of the common security and defence policy (CSDP). However, it can be argued that ever since Russia started its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Donald Trump’s re-appropriation of power in the US, traditionally the primary provider of military security for many EU members, it was no longer a mere desire, but an actual necessity to become a realist power as well.

Now, the EU finds itself stuck in a complex situation: it is a market power, wants to be a normative power, and needs to become a realist power. In reality, due to serious inherent obstacles, it is highly challenging to fulfil a credible role across all these interlinked dimensions of power simultaneously.

Not only are there different pledges of allegiance to NATO, strategic cultures, and threat perceptions within the EU, all of which are long-known impediments to the EU as a unified realist power alongside domestic politics, but different foreign policy approaches nowadays even actively undermine the EU's efforts to be recognised as such. The most apparent is this in differing stances on sanctions and weapons deliveries in the context of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

As a realist power, the EU pushes to support Ukraine with military equipment (partly also to sustain its values, thus holding up the flag as a normative power, indicating how intertwined the realms really are), yet Hungary, as the prime example, vetoes such decisions regularly. Simultaneously, Hungary is put under pressure by the EU for its rule of law violations. The situation illustrates the difficulty: Firstly, it underscores the inability of the EU to speak with one voice as a realist power. Secondly, and maybe even more dramatically, it undermines its assumed role as a normative power when Hungary uses its veto to pressure the EU —for example, in the context of funding held back due to the transgression of EU values —and succeeds. If the EU needs to grant exceptions in the normative realm to pursue goals in the realist realm, an inextricable dilemma emerges, where it can’t be both a full normative and a realist power at the same time. In the case of sanctions, a realist tool that market powers can apply, the situation is similar. With Prime Minister Robert Fico in Slovakia and the recent electoral success of Andre Babiš in the Czech Republic, the number of EU members inclined to torpedo harsh measures on Russia has risen.

Notwithstanding, even outside Eastern and Central Europe, some instances can potentially hamper the EU’s triad of being a market, normative and realist power all at once. For example, did Belgium veto the use of frozen Russian assets to aid Ukraine due to large parts of these currently being custodied in the country? Moreover, Spain’s reluctance to raise its defence budget significantly, as demanded by its allies, given its location far from Europe’s frontlines and strategically contested areas, shows that the perception of urgency is not necessarily equally distributed across Union members.

The picture of the EU’s power is confused in a time that calls for unity and stringent action. How unhandy it comes in presently; at large, it alludes to the complexity that the EU, as an object “sui generis” and with all its heterogeneity, has always lived with. These current, challenging times will therefore be a real test of the extent to which the EU can be a plausible power beyond markets. 

The EU’s evolution into a multi-faceted power highlights both its aspirations and inherent contradictions. Though it seeks to promote normative values worldwide, the situation in Hungary underscores the limitations of these ideals when confronted with complex political and economic realities. Amid the current geopolitical landscape—characterised by Trump’s re-election and a nearby conflict—the EU faces a significant identity crisis. Pressures for defence integration and strategic autonomy intensify, but they encounter institutional blockages and varying national priorities.

To exceed its role as merely an economic powerhouse with fragmented political will, it must align its values with its actions and move beyond half-measures. The Union is now at a pivotal point: it can either establish itself as a unified strategic actor or remain a more economically motivated Union with political ambitions. The next few months will reveal whether the notion of being “stronger together” is a genuine commitment or merely a catchphrase.