March 8, 2022No Comments

Taras Kuzio on the Russia-Ukraine Crisis and the War in Donbass

Professor Taras Kuzio from Henry Jackson Society and Kyiv Mohyla Academy shares his insights on the Russo-Ukraine crisis, Russian invasion of Ukraine, the conflict in Donbass and Ukraine’s membership of NATO and EU. 

Interviewers: Igor Shchubetun, Fabrizio Napoli and Davide Gobbicchi.

March 2, 2022No Comments

Understanding Putin’s Russia

Authors: Davide Gobbicchi, Igor Shchubetun and Fabrizio Napoli.

After months of diplomatic efforts and mutual misunderstandings between Russia and the West, Vladimir Putin finally invaded Ukraine. Although the attack was predicted by experts throughout the world, its ferocity and scale did surprise the majority. Most analysts expected Moscow to enter the Donbass region, conquer it rapidly, and grant it independence from Kiev, in a repetition of what happened to Abkhazia and South Ossetia following the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. Yet on the 24th of February, Putin ordered a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, unleashing the biggest military attack that Europe has witnessed since WWII. After 4 days of fighting a tougher-than-expected Ukrainian resistance and an increasingly involved West, on February 27th Russia’s president put nuclear forces on high alert, in what could be seen as a propagandistic attempt to “flex muscles” at a conflict whose duration and ending seem increasingly uncertain. 

To assess the strategic significance of Ukraine for Russia and motivation behind Putin’s actions, it is imperative to understand how Russia perceives itself. Historically, it has been afflicted with two existential dilemmas. First,  with regards to its position in the East-West dichotomy, where Russia’s geographic position between Europe and Asia creates a unique culture which is neither of both, and allows the country to shift between periods of affinity to the West and periods of closeness to the East; as Dostoevskij famously said, “In Europe we were Tatars, but in Asia we too are Europeans”. Second, the debate of nation-state vs. multinational state, where Russia’s size creates a highly heterogeneous country in which the Russian majority needs to coexist more or less peacefully with the many different minorities having separated languages, religions, and cultures. 

Historically, the Imperial Era, beginning with Peter the Great and ending with the Russian Revolution of 1917, solved the first dilemma by promoting Europeanism. This was represented with the shift of the capital from Moscow to Saint Petersburg. The second dilemma was resolved by choosing between Russianism and multi-nationalism, i.e., Pan-Slavism.Imperial Russia therefore perceived itself as a European power deeply rooted in its orthodox tradition. 

The Soviet Era (1922-1991) provided different solutions to the two dilemmas. The East/West dichotomy was solved by assigning Russia (now USSR) the unique role of Eurasian superpower in between the two worlds, belonging to neither of the two and yet extending its influence on both. The second dilemma was addressed through the policy of коренизация (korenizatsiya), because of which USSR became, at least officially, a multi-nation state of equally important nations. The victory during the WWII further strengthened these two discourses of a Eurasian, multinational state. 

However, the early post-Soviet years of Yeltsin (1991-1999) once again changed Russia’s approach to the two dilemmas, orienting Russia towards the West and promoting Russian identity over that of the minorities (causing backlashes in the Caucasus and central Asia such as the Chechen War and the quasi-independence of Tatarstan). Modern Russia now had to become a Western, nation-state. 

When Putin took power in 2000, Russia in the midst of a strong identity crisis. Its rapid westernization did not grant it the role of equal partner to the USA, but instead relegated Russia to a vassal state which faced economic hardships. The loss of its status in the international arena and the absence of perceived economic gains deriving from it created a resentment throughout the population that a portion of the Russian elite started channeling towards the West; Putin was the leader of such a group. Being a former KGB spy whose childhood had been marked by the horrors of WWII-besieged Leningrad, Vladimir Putin used his private life and the growing popular sentiments to rebuild Russia’s identity from scratch, mainly on two pillars.

First, the worship of WWII (The Great Patriotic War – in Russian); the ultimate expression of Russia’s greatness.  The war was previously used by the Soviets to keep the USSR together (for everyone, from Bishkek to Vilnius, fought in the war). Putin, influenced by his own childhood, continued “exploiting” the war to promote conservative and patriotic values able to legitimize his political orientation and to keep the country together. This is why Putin tried to legitimize the Ukrainian invasion by claiming to “denazify” the country. 

Second, the soviet Nostalgia. Putin’s bittersweet feeling towards the USSR reflects that of a wide portion of the country’s older generations (of which the president himself is part) and derives from the too-rapid transition of Russia from “protagonist in a bipolar world” to “supporting actor in a multipolar one”. This sentiment is used by Putin to promote the reappropriation of Russia’s great power status and justify the actions that “need” to be taken to achieve this goal. Several of Putin’s speeches regarding Ukraine reflect this, where he focuses on Ukraine’s role as “little Russia” and “founding member of the USSR”. 

The two historical dilemmas that afflicted Russia throughout the centuries were reframed by Putin to his own advantage. The East/West dichotomy was deconstructed into two parallel positions, Russia’s relations with the West and the East.

With the West, it changed from an inferiority complex to a principle equality in which Russia no longer had to imitate the West, but could follow its own path of values (those produced by the worship of WWII and Soviet Nostalgia). Hence granting Putin more freedom of action. This was proven in a speech given by Russia’s president in 2013, where he stated that “it is evident that it is impossible to move forward without spiritual, cultural and national self-determination...We can see how many of the Euro-Atlantic countries are actually rejecting their roots, including the Christian values that constitute the basis of Western civilization. They are denying moral principles and all traditional identities: national, cultural, religious and even sexual.” With the East, it shifted from perceiving Asia as a place to teach European values, to perceiving it as a place from which to learn alternative ones. This change helped Putin justify Russia’s approach to China and its simultaneous shying away from the West. 

The multinational state/nation-state dilemma was solved by orienting the country towards becoming a nation-state, promoting discourses aimed at homogenizing the country (such as “Russia for Russians”) and reviving pre-Soviet Russian cultural traits (an example is the gradual social prestige that Putin has granted to the Patriarch of Moscow in the past 15 years). The importance given to Russian ethnicity allows Putin to intervene in foreign countries with Russian minorities without the risk of appearing illegitimate in the eyes of Russian society (the 2014 invasion of the Donbass serves as the best example). 

Having illustrated the pillars of Putin’s conception of Russia, it’s easy to understand the importance of Ukraine to him: Ukraine is currently the transfiguration of WWII Europe that needs to be saved from an enemy whose ideals and values are rotten - that is, the West. Keeping Ukraine away from the West would then be morally tantamount to winning WWII, and it would not only provide Putin’s discourses new strength, but also validate Russia’s identity of a great power by preventing (even if momentarily) the post-Soviet space from disintegrating. 

Vladimir Putin has spent the last 20 years slowly shaping his country into what he believed “Mother Russia” to be, and it is highly unlikely that any agreement will stop him from pursuing his ideals. This however, does not mean that this is what Russia needs to be, and it is for the Russian people to prove.

February 28, 20221 Comment

The Civilian Impacts of the Conflicts in Eastern Ukraine

Authors: Esther Brito Ruiz, Ludovica Brambilla, Reka Szabo

Note: due to the rapidly developing situation in Ukraine, we clarify that the information included in this article is actualized up until the date of the 23rd of February, and primarily covers the human security scenario prior to the evolving Russian invasion.

Image Source: https://www.vox.com/22917719/russia-ukraine-invasion-border-crisis-nato-explained

The escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, triggered in the spring of 2021 with the beginning of a progressive massing of thousands of Russian military and equipment near the border with Ukraine, marked the early months of 2022. As of the last few days, the ongoing invasion of Ukraine has triggered a geopolitical crisis dividing major international players and raising concerns for the security balance of Eastern Europe. 

These developments raise questions on the impact of the conflict's dynamics on civilians, who have been suffering the consequences of instability for years. This article will set aside political and military analysis to disclose how the crisis has been playing out at the local level in Eastern Ukraine, particularly, its effect on the civilian populations of the non-government-controlled areas (NGCA) of Donetsk and Luhansk prior to the invasion. A comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this piece, but we present some core human security dynamics sometimes excluded from mainstream coverage,  many of which were further exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic. 

Civilian casualties and threats to fundamental rights

Since 2014, civilians in the Donbas have been directly affected by the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and have often been victims of war crimesby both Russian-backed separatist armed groups and Ukrainian forces. The region is characterized by one of the highest concentrations of armed actors in the world - as such, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are as much a cause of civilian casualties as active hostilities. Between 2014 and 2019 for example, “over 1,000 individuals were known to be killed by land mines or other explosives”. Estimates of the conflict in July 2021 already registered at least 3,393 deaths within civilian populations and more than 7,000 injured.

Moreover, arms fire and shelling have also caused serious damage to civilian housing and infrastructure, endangering the population by limiting access to water, food, schools, and health services. The Covid-19 pandemic further deteriorated the situation and intensified the need for humanitarian in the region. In fact, even before the escalation of the conflict in 2022, it was calculated that at least 3,4 million people needed humanitarian aid in Eastern Ukraine as the result of the six years of conflict, coupled with the effects of the health crisis. These individuals and families suffer from physical and mental issues related to violence and from the indirect effects of the conflict and pandemic on the economy and their living standards.

The situation regarding political rights and civil liberties is well depicted by the 2020 and 2021 Freedom House reports. The 2021 report on government-controlled Ukraine explores how attempts to maintain democracy are hindered by resistance to crucial reforms, endemic corruption and limited freedom of expression due to an increasing number of attacks against activists and journalists.

The situation drastically worsens in the Eastern Donbas, where authority is in the hands of the People’s Republic of Donestk and Luhansk. These administrations rose to power in 2018 through what are considered to have been deeply fraudulent elections. Associational rights are severely compromised, even organizations politically allied to the ruling leadership are banned. The control over the population’s right to freedom of thought is implemented through a complex system of influence by Russia and adomination of public local institutions and media by people close to the separatist leadership.  Furthermore, it has been noted that pro-Ukrainian advocates face non-transparent trials and long prison sentences. In this line, detainees often appear to face torture and psychological abuse.  Members of minorities are effectively victims of unpunished persecutions and the justice system seems to lack any mechanism to prevent and punish the crimes reported during the conflicts.

Displacement, travel restrictions & forced migration

Covid-19 has complicated a situation already dramatic for internally displaced persons (IDP).  Since 2014, a “contact line” separates areas controlled by the Ukrainian government and those under Russian influence, dividing families and communities that have been dangerously crossing the border. These people often reside in poor settlements close by, where Ukraine’s social services struggle to provide assistance. As of 2020, the conflict had caused around 734,000 IDPs

In the last two years, arbitrary pandemic-related travel restrictions have been severely limiting access to healthcare, basic services, and income -  further separating families. The closing of crossing points in March 2020 affected thousands of civilians that would usually cross the line to receive their pensions and humanitarian assistance.

The ongoing invasion is likely to cause unprecedented, forced displacement, and since only two entry points are currently open along the contact line, it is likely that IDPs will seek refuge in neighboring countries. In their forecast on this matter at the beginning of February, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) picks up the Ukrainian Minister of Defense’s prognosis of 3 to five million possible refugees in case of a Russian invasion and notes that: “though it’s unclear where these figures were derived from, his prediction that a major war in Ukraine would plunge the whole of Europe into crisis seems entirely plausible”.

Image Source: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-60220422

Threats to education and students

The toll of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine on children has been extremely high in the last years. Hundreds of schools were damaged during the fights, which made proper education impossible. In Russian-controlled territories, not only physical threats are present. The identities of Ukrainian children are endangered as well. In the Donbas region, children do not have Ukrainian classes anymore and the language can be learnt solely as a subject for an hour per week. Textbooks in Russian were transported to the schools by the Russian ‘humanitarian’ convoys, and teachers have to use the Russian grading system

History also has to be taught in a way favoring the Russian side and depicting the occupation of Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk regions as a legitimate move by Russia. Because of the linguistic differences, Ukrainian students have difficulties when it comes to admissions in any higher education systems, either in Russia or in Ukraine. In the latter case, the different way of learning history also makes it more challenging for Ukrainians from the occupied territories to perform well in state tests. Furthermore, border crossing, in order to be able to participate in such tests or enroll at universities in the Ukrainian territory, can be restricted and dangerous

The progression of gendered violence and discrimination against the LGBT+ community (H2) 

Since the beginning of 2021, Ukrainian civil society groups have denounced a noted increase in attacks against LGBT+ and women’s rights activists. Attacks and threats have mainly been carried out by far-right groups, but opposition from religious organizations has also been on the rise. This is part of a broader regression of LGBT+ and women’s rights across Eastern Europe but has been tied in Ukraine to nationalization discourse in line with Russian political ideas. 

On one hand, domestic violence in Ukraine has remained “widespread, under-reported, and ineffectively addressed”, and has been worsening as the conflict in eastern Ukraine advances. Systemic flaws in protection mechanisms have been exacerbated by political and social tensions, and Amnesty International event referred to it as an epidemic of domestic and sexual violence against women. There is a potential for increased gender-based violence to derive from the mobilization of military personnel in the area and few protections in place to mitigate the rising abuse. 

On the other hand, the LGBT+ community in Ukraine - especially nearing the Russian and Bielorussian borders - has been in high alert. Attacks against young transgender individuals have been reported with noted violence. These crimes tend to recieve little support from police, and perpetrators face few or no charges. At a broader level, draft laws to include sexual orientation and gender identity elements more firmly in hate crime law have been pushed back against. 

Activists fear that continued Russian aggressions and the progression of the invasion will lead the situation to further deteriorate, with LGBT+ and women’s rights regressing further. 

Conclusions

As the situation in Ukraine continues to escalate, we can expect worsening conditions for human security across the country. Continued mass displacements, evolving conditions of gender and homophobic violence, and the interruption of basic freedoms and education will undoubtedly have severe impacts on the lives and future of the Ukrainian people. 

February 10, 2022No Comments

Fuel Price Spike in Kazakhstan: Straw that broke the camel’s back?

By: Elena Bascone, Michele Mignogna, Miguel Jiménez and Sofia Dal Santo.

Holiday seasons often trigger unexpected crises, as the last two years proved: after the 2020 pandemic, a new global threat is on the rise - a global energy crisis. This new emergency is so severe that even Kazakhstan, the biggest central Asian country and one of the major producers of fossil fuels, was unable to escape it. At the beginning of January, the price per liter for liquified petroleum gas (LPG) more than doubled, increasing from 50 to 120 Tenges (about $0.27), and violent protests exploded in the country. LPG is mainly used for vehicles, but even for cooking and warming up during the severe Kazakh winter, making it a primary necessity. Energetic scarcity then fostered the explosion of violent protests all over Kazakhstan. Resulting in the death of 225 people, these demonstrations are unprecedented. The outbreak took place in Zhanaozen, in the southwest of the country, known as the capital of oil and gas, and spread all over the country in a few days. Peaceful demonstrations soon escalated into violent aggressions such as dangerous attacks on government buildings and clashes against police officers. However, rising energy prices are only the tip of the iceberg.

The Roots of the Protests

The country can attract millions of dollars of foreign investment due to its apparent political stability. Nevertheless, this political stability has been characterized by an authoritarian government led for three decades by Nazarbayev, eventually substituted by the current Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, by most regarded as his hand-picked successor. The relationship between them is confirmed by the fact that the latter appointed the former president as Head of the Security Council, and declared him Yelbasy, i.e., “the Father of the Nation.” This lack of democracy, combined with the over-rising income inequality due to a drop of GNI and further worsened by the pandemic, explains the protests’ origins. As of now, a quarter of the central Asian republic’s population is considered chronically poor.

This is ironic since, as a significant oil and gas producer, Kazakhstan produces much more LPG than its less than 19 million inhabitants can consume. However, existing domestic energy companies prefer to export it rather than sell it to the domestic market. Accordingly, the country’s authorities have tried to increase the supply of LPG through purchases from Russian companies, which sell it at prices 3-8 times higher than the domestic ones. Moreover, these gas supply contracts with the Russian companies are undisclosed and untransparent, thus encouraging corruption and the enrichment of the Kazakh and Russian elites.

The Government Response

All in all, given the growing anti-Nazarbayev sentiment, it is understandable why the song “Old man, go away!” soon spread among the protestors. Even the bold concessions given by Mr. Tokayev, such as the removal of his predecessor from his place as Head of the Security Council and the acceptance of the government’s resignation, substituting it with an ad-interim administration, has not proved to be sufficient to calm down the protestors. Moreover, the absence of pluralism and the intolerance of opposition in the political life of Kazakhstan prevents protestors from finding representation on an institutional level. This lack of opposition allows Mr. Tokayev to blame, although without evidence, “foreign-trained terrorist gangs” for the protests to justify a punitive response; notwithstanding, while the use of force may crush protests, it can only amplify the underlying anger.

Punitive responses immediately occurred: from the shutdown of the internet to the president’s public declaration addressing the special forces to “fire without warning”, as reported by BBC news. This declaration triggered the critics of the international community, from the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to the chairman in office of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Polish lawyer Zbigniew Rau. Overwhelmed by demonstrators, President Tokayev, following the soviet style of dealing with civil unrest, made a formal request for assistance to the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance headquartered in Moscow. 

The peacekeeping mission was speedily approved. Alongside Russia, even Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan sent contingents to Kazakhstan for a total of almost 3000 soldiers. The mission has been defined by Andrei Kortunov, head of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), a Kremlin-linked think tank, as “less an armed intervention than a police operation.” As it is common knowledge, it is always risky to welcome home foreign troops, especially considering the assertive policy perpetrated by Russia on the European side. Nevertheless, the paratroopers made their way back as soon as the order was re-established. Still, it is essential to highlight the significance of this intervention for the future of international relations in Asia, considering the growing influence of China and its resulting possible conflict of interest with Russia.

Conclusion

The intervention of the CSTO led to a stabilization of the protests, at least for the moment. Moreover, according to The Guardian, Mr. Tokayev said that the ad interim government would re-introduce a price cap of 50 tenges per liter on LPG in Mangistau province, considering that it is a socially necessary consumer good. In addition, it is essential to bear in mind that it is likely that this crisis will have consequences in the context of future relations between Russia and Kazakhstan. The intervention of Russia might undermine the hard-won independence of the central Asian republic. However, we will have to wait to see the long-term effects of these events on the power dynamics of Central Asia. One thing remains certain: this region is crucial now more than ever. Indeed, as Alexander Cooley indicated, this region, which used to be disputed between Russia and the UK, is now at the center of a new great game - a power contest that sees the US, Russia, and China involved.

February 2, 2022No Comments

Sergey Markedonov on Georgia’s Political and Social Polarisation

Sergey Markedonov is an Associate Professor at Russian State University for the Humanities based in Moscow (Russia). From May 2010 to October 2013, he was a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, DC, USA). In April-May 2015 he was a visiting fellow at the Center for Russia and Central Asia Studies, Institute of International Studies (IIS), Fudan University (Shanghai, China). 

He shares his insights on Georgia's political and social polarisation; its use as a field for NATO-Russian confrontation and its key role in the Caucasus region. 

Interviewing Team: Igor Shchebetun, Fabrizio Napoli and Davide Gobbicchi.

January 28, 2022No Comments

Why is it vital for Russia to restore the USSR Borders?

By: Igor Shchebetun, Fabrizio Napoli, Alessio Calzetti and Davide Gobbicchi.

Image Source: https://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/UsefulNotes/SovietRussiaUkraineAndSoOn

Russian ships are trailing NATO in the Black Sea, and Putin is threatening to knock the teeth out of foreign aggressors which has given rise to serious disagreements. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia lost the gains of hundreds of years of territorial expansion. The country has crossed the threshold of the millennium licking its wounds and is under threat of further disintegration. Today, the post-Soviet states are facing a familiar unease; many are looking back at the past and cautiously awaiting Moscow's future actions. Faced with a cornered bear, the best strategy is to do nothing to anger it. 

Stretched from west to east, Russia is Goliath on the world stage. The country has 20,000 km of common borders with seventeen states, twelve of which were part of the Soviet Union. Having such a long land border seriously complicates security. As early as the 15th century, the Grand Duchy of Moscow was immediately confronted with a geopolitical problem at the dawn of its restoration. Surrounded by enemies on all sides, Russia began to expand its territory and take possession of geographical barriers that could protect it. Be it rivers, lakes, mountains, or seas. In the first century of its existence, the country expanded annually by an area equal to the entire area of Belgium. By the early 18th century, Russia had grown to its present borders. Even today, the country's geography offers significant advantages. The frozen crown of Arctic ice that adorns Russia's territory makes land invasion from the north impossible. Even the most experienced admirals will not be able to approach Murmansk and Arkhangelsk by water, two serious obstacles will stand in their way: the Faro-Icelandic frontier and the Bear Frontier. The first is an open-ocean defense line between Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom, and the second is between Spitsbergen and northern Norway. 

Image Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Union#/media/File:Cold_War_border_changes.png

These narrow passages are easily defended by submarines, of which Russia has plenty. To the east, the rugged coastlines of Siberia adjoin the Bering Strait, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the Sea of Japan. The short distance between Alaska and Russia may seem passable, but the Arctic climate: strong tidal waves and the presence of heavy firepower on both sides limit the movement of armed forces in this area. By controlling the Kamchatka Peninsula and the Kuril Islands, Russia can deter hostile actions in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan. At the same time, the Stanovaya Ridge and the Sayan Mountains strengthen Russia's position in the Far East. The harsh climate further restricts movement even in places where passage is possible. Most of Russia's eastern borders give the country's armed forces an advantage in any conflict, but the situation looks more complicated in the eastern European part of the country. 

Central Russia stretches from St. Petersburg to Kazan and Volgograd. About 80 percent of the population lives in this geographic area. Almost every decision the Kremlin makes is based on these people's needs and interests, but the center shares its periphery with six other former Soviet republics: Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. Their territories are among the most troubled regions of the world. Two anomalies, the Crimean Peninsula and the exclave of Kaliningrad, are a start. They are both strategic military bases, preventing hostile forces from entering the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea. Both regions house heavy weaponry and assets to prevent access and maneuvering. Other powers have to think twice before approaching Crimea or Kaliningrad. Near the borders of the Russian Federation, the European Plain is more than 2,000 km wide, making it the largest open stretch of landscape in the world. The terrain here is flat, open, and defenseless. The main battle tanks provide some protection on this type of terrain, so Russia has about 13,000 of them-almost a fifth of the world's tank fleet. Still, no amount of weaponry can fully protect 2,000 km of flat terrain. For 750 km east of the Ukrainian border to the city of Astrakhan on the shores of the Caspian Sea there is a continuous hilly landscape called the Volgograd Corridor. The German military attempted to break this line in both world wars. Both times Russia hung on by a thread until the offensive was repelled. The collapse of the Soviet Union put the Baltics in the hands of NATO, which gave the three republics the confidence to negotiate with Russia as equals. The loss of Eastern European possessions took a heavy toll on Moscow, both politically and financially. The country had to fortify its borders with one of the most advanced weapons on the planet. Meanwhile, control of the Baltic would allow Russia to push its border as far as Kaliningrad. Thus, by restoring Soviet borders, Moscow would reduce the length of its unprotected flank to.

January 18, 2022No Comments

Kazakhstan: Putin’s New Geopolitical Victory?

By: Carlotta Rinaudo

Image Source: Flickr

A few months after Russia’s occupation of Crimea in early 2014, President Vladimir Putin sent another shockwave through another former Soviet state. Kazakhstan, according to a comment made by President Putin, was an artificial nation that “never had any statehood” - a vast land that historically belonged to the Russian empire. These remarks alarmingly recalled a similar statement made by Putin in 2008 when he claimed that Ukraine was “not even a state.” The questioning of Kazakhstan’s legitimacy promptly triggered an angry reaction in the arid steppes of Central Asia, where the Kazakh population called for the need to “send a history textbook to Putin”. 


Since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Kazakhstan has actively sought to protect its hard-won autonomy from the looming threat of Russia’s expansionism. Yet, the prompt arrival of over 2000 Russia-led troops on Kazakhstan’s soil in early January 2022 may well pose a threat to such autonomy. As Russian military forces helped President Tokayev restore order, amidst domestic turmoil, Moscow gained a new opportunity to exert influence in its own backyard. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan’s political fate could now be tightly and irreversibly intertwined with the aspirations of President Putin. 

Kazakhstan’s desire to preserve its autonomy from Moscow is no secret. Over the past three decades, the oil-rich country has embraced a so-called “multivector” foreign policy, weaving a web of positive political and economic relationships, not only with Russia, but also with the other Great Powers engaged in the region – mainly, China and the United States (US). In the early 2000s, Kazakhstan quickly capitalized on China’s thirst for energy resources, and the first Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline was inaugurated in 2005 to transport oil from the Caspian Sea to the Xinjiang region. It was also in Kazakhstan in 2013, that Chinese leader Xi Jinping announced his ambitious megaproject, widely known as the Belt and Road Initiative. The country also attracted billions of dollars of investment from a wide array of American energy companies such as ExxonMobil and Chevron. Maintaining positive economic and political relationships with both China and the US has played an essential role in counterbalancing Russian influence and preserving Kazakhstan’s autonomy over time. 

To strengthen its national identity and further distance itself from Moscow, Kazakhstan sought to depict Russian and Kazakh civilizations as two separate cultural universes. In 2014, the government opened a new National Museum that emphasizes Kazakhstan’s century-long history as the cradle of the great steppe civilization, and in 2017 it shifted the national alphabet from Cyrillic to the Latin script. 

Despite these significant efforts, the unprecedented levels of violence raging across Kazakhstan largely proved that a hardly-won autonomy can be easily dismantled by structural corruption and internal power struggles between the kleptocratic élite. Kazakhstan sits atop massive reserves of oil, minerals, natural gas and uranium, yet these resources have always served the interests of the very few, rather than the needs of the Kazakh wider population. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many businessmen effectively took ownership over the country’s energy resources, accumulating massive wealth. Today, only 162 individuals account for 55% of Kazakhstan’s total wealth - with many of them living in lavish apartments in London - while some Kazakh citizens sole earnings are one hundred US dollars per month. It is in this context of stark income inequality that an increase in fuel prices triggered a series of anti-government peaceful demonstrations on January 1st. From January 4th to January 7th, these peaceful protests in several large cities were allegedly hijacked by violent criminal gangs. Human-rights activist Galym Ageleulov recalls that “an unruly mob of thugs” started to storm public buildings - a group of criminals that “did not look like students, bookish dissidents and middle-class malcontents who usually turn out for protests.” After January 4th, Kazakhstan’s largest city Almaty was transformed into “something from an apocalypse film,” with violence raging across the streets, burned buildings, incinerated cars, food shortages, massive internet outages and ultimately, the President ordering security forces to “fire without warning.” 

Image Source: Flickr

According to Russian expert Danil Kislov, this chaos was not the result of popular discontent, but the product of a “desperate struggle for power” between two political clans – those loyal to President Tokayev on one side, and those loyal to his predecessor, Nursultan Nazarbayev, on the other. As the former dismissed the latter from his position as head of Kazakhstan’s security council, members of Nazarbayev’s political clan may have exploited the anti-government demonstrations in an attempt to remove Tokayev from power and restore Nazarbayev as President. Other reports reveal that between January 4 and January 6, the paramilitary groups encountered no resistance from security forces. Police seemed unable or unwilling to stop the ongoing violence, leading to President Tokayev requesting the support of Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization.

Clearly, the intervention of Russia came as a double-edged sword. Although it helped President Tokayev restore order and secure his grip on power, it also compromised Kazakhstan’s hard-won autonomy. Although the Russian military forces began withdrawing from Kazakhstan on January 13, it is clear that President Putin secured an important geopolitical victory in Russia’s near abroad, linking Kazakhstan’s political fate to Russian interests. As political expert Dimash Alzhanov said, the intervention of these troops “has its own price and will not be forgotten.” Their counterparts, Kazakhstan’s political élites, may have learned a valuable lesson. Three decades of foreign investments and multivector foreign policy won’t protect Kazakhstan from Russia’s long tentacles – not so long as the country is weakened by structural corruption and internal Cold War-style power struggles between kleptocratic élites. 

January 7, 2022No Comments

Gonzalo Pozo Martin on the Nord Stream 2

In this ITSS Verona Member Series Video Podcast by the Political Economy, Development, and Energy Security Team, Gonzalo Pozo Martin talks about Nord Stream 2 and its consequences on EU-Russia relations, touching upon the Ukrainian crisis, the European sanctions, the EU taxonomy, and the context following German elections. Gonzalo Pozo Martin is Lecturer in International Relations, with a specialization in International Political Economy at Stockholm University, Sweden.

Interviewer: Elena Bascone

December 10, 2021No Comments

Geopolitical Implications of Finland’s H-X Program

By: Arnaud Sobrero and Romain Gallix

Image Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/77821971@N07/48909659726/

Finland is currently seeking to replace its aging F-18 with a global competition dubbed H-X worth $11 billion. It is expected that a decision will be made public before the end of 2021. Arguably, fighter jets represent a crucial component of States’ security and a decisive hard power asset in every conflictual context. This article aims at uncovering the underlying dynamics of the Western defense industry implied by the evolution of the Finnish tender. 

As of December 2021, the Finnish Ministry of Defense has received responses for its request for information from the European Eurofighter Typhoon, the Swedish Saab Gripen, the French Dassault Rafale, and the American Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and Lockheed Martin F-35. 

Divided European contenders open the way for American offers

The Finnish request for information received answers from all major Western fighter jets producers; hence the comparison of contenders allows us to identify several factors shaping the evolutions of the industry. The very fact that Finland launched its fleet’s renewing process very close to the expected decommission date for its current Hornets, as their “structural fatigue” denounces, exemplifies how procurement programs are not at the top of policy-makers agenda (Finnish Ministry of Defense).

The cost borne by single states with limited expenditure margins is becoming increasingly untenable, especially where political pressure on taxpayers’ spending is large (e.g., the United Kingdom). Moreover, countries may not dispose of design and production capacity over the entire technological spectrum, such as Italy and Spain. The relative political frenzy generated in recent decades made transnational fighter jets’ fleets a common feature of Western air forces. However, the pan-European Eurofighter Typhoon underwent difficulties showcasing the complexity of such projects, with reluctant transfers, unclear directions, and soaring costs due to fragmented production. 

Meanwhile, the individual offers from France and Sweden do not seem greatly superior. The Dassault Rafaleand the Saab Gripen offer suffer from their limited interoperability and relatively isolated stance in the current geopolitical equilibrium. Indeed, the political logic of defense procurement programs vastly supersedes the economic aspects of the choice. Was Finland to purchase the Saab Gripen underdog from its neighbor, its strategic prospects would be very limited and centered on Russian containment. The Rafale, in turn, would signify Finland’s alignment on the French posture of European strategic autonomy from the U.S. The 1,340km-long border Helsinki shares with Russia makes this perspective impossible. Therefore, although the Rafale has recently been sold to Croatia and Greece, Dassault’s offer seems compromised.

The American bidders consequently benefit from the lack of unity of European actors and put forward the geopolitical continuity they represent as a sales’ argument. The Boeing F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet proposal would minimize the H-X program costs due to pre-existing maintenance and operating capacities while selecting the F-35 would guarantee the acquisition of new, cutting-edge capacities

A degrading security environment

In recent years, we have witnessed a degradation of the international security environment with Russia’s resurgence and the growing assertiveness of China’s behavior. Primarily concerned with Russia, Finland finds itself in a delicate position as it is the E.U. member that shares the largest border with Russia. Russia has been particularly active in recent years by bolstering its military, as demonstrated by its intervention in the Syrian front, its attempts to upset the status quo, and its destabilization of NATO from within. Growing tensions between Russia and Ukraine are fueling a sense of regional insecurity with a Russian troop buildup as well as creating some levels of uncertainty regarding Russia’s intentions. Amid a large scale rearmament program, Russia has been able to field the SU-57, a modern stealth fighter aircraft, and develop lighter fifth-generation aircraft, the Checkmate, focused on export markets and somewhat reminiscent of the F-35.

Given the growing insecurity of its regional environment, Finland may be looking to maintain its strategic relationship with the U.S. and reinforce its indirect relationships with NATO. A critical political and strategic factor to consider is the interoperability of weapon systems within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although Finland is not a member of the Alliance, the Lockheed Martin’s F-35 and Boeing’s F-18 Super Hornet would expand the reach of NATO and its ability to share data, engage in secure communication, and increase interoperability capabilities between the U.S. and other U.S.-allied European assets. Thus, beyond the interoperability aspect of those deals, acquiring the F-35 or the F-18 does bring diplomatic benefits and strengthen relationships with the United States.

The case of buying a strategic relationship with the U.S.

When it comes to large military hardware procurement, countries’ decisions are influenced by the prospect of a future strategic relationship with the procuring country. Buying U.S. material implies future interoperability, a valuable prospect in a world of growing tensions. In addition, the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) framework is largely seen as a political instrument by Washington to deepen relationships with key allies. As such, the F-35 initially developed to replace aging F-16s, is poised to become one of America’s biggest exports. By strengthening military interoperability with U.S. allies across the globe and elevating their airpower capabilities, the F-35 is instrumental to America’s containment military strategies. Furthermore, some experts argue that the F-35 program acts as America’s Belt and Road Initiative, at least from a strategic and military standpoint. It provides a network and a platform acting as ‘a generator of wealth and peaceful co-existence on a global scale.’

Even soaring costs do not prevent countries from buying the F-35. Small players such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Poland have already chosen to buy the F-35 jets, notwithstanding questionable financial dispositions. This perfectly illustrates the underpinning political challenge at stake. For example, Switzerland agreed to buy 36 F-35As in July 2021 and Patriot air defense systems, even though the decision was controversial and considered overkill.

Thus, buying American-made fighter jets does bring significant commercial, industrial, and geopolitical benefits. Indeed, by buying American fighter jets, Finland would essentially strengthen its strategic relationship with the U.S.

Conclusively, given the degrading security environment Finland finds itself in and the growing importance of the U.S. strategic relationship, Finland is more likely to acquire U.S. technologies to replace its aging F-18s. Arguably, the F-35 appears better suited to meet Finland’s short and long-term requirements by strengthening its military and political relationship with the U.S. and acquiring an aircraft that could address the existing and emerging military threat as Russia deploys additional advanced stealth combat airborne platforms. 

October 1, 2021No Comments

Crimea faces a Water Disaster

By: Igor Shchebetun and Alessio Calzetti

Six years after Crimea's annexation to Russia, the Peninsula faces a new threat - a serious shortage of water. Ukraine has cut off Crimea's access to the Dnieper River, and in recent years Crimea's water supply has fallen to such an extent that major cities are now limiting consumption, as 2020 was considered the most waterless year in the history of Crimea. The impending drought is already hurting agriculture, cities and preventing the use of military infrastructure; Crimea can be expected to see more severe restrictions in future. The speculated water wars of the twenty-first century might start with Crimea.

The Crimean Peninsula has great strategic importance due to its link to the Black Sea, therefore, whichever state controls Crimea, can exert influence beyond its national borders. The Crimean Peninsula has been a foothold for the empires of the past such as the Scythians, Greeks, Slavs, Mongols, Tatars, Turks, and Cossacks, all have claimed the Peninsula at different points in history. Russia gained control of the Crimea in 1783, and it instantly became its gateway to the world economy. During the Soviet era, Crimea was given to Ukraine, and when the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine inherited the region. However, Ukrainian sovereignty proved to be a temporary phenomenon that lasted only from 1991 to 2014. In 2014, Putin signed a law that accepted Crimea as part of the Russian Federation despite the risk of an economic and diplomatic backlash because of the annexation. The move remains legally disputed and not recognized by the international community. 

In this zero-sum game, Russia is likely to do all it takes to preserve its national interests. The control of the Crimean Peninsula ensures the security of Russia's Black Sea coast and Caucasian territories. Moreover, Russia can use Crimea to protect its territorial integrity and security by means of restricting, denying access and maneuvering prevent the enemy from occupying or crossing land territory or airspace in and near Crimea.

Sevastopol, Crimea's largest city, has a significant Russian population and also home to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Without Sevastopol, Russia would not have been able to conduct foreign military operations in Syria and Libya. Moreover, the military infrastructure in and around Sevastopol provides Russia with exceptional opportunities to restrict and deny access and maneuver. 

Annexation has brought the added responsibility of providing for the two million inhabitants of Crimea with all possible services and benefits. However, since the Peninsula is not directly connected to the main territory of the country, the initial goal was to maintain the existing Ukrainian infrastructure: power lines, energy distribution system and so on, which could not materialize when Kiev cut off the Peninsula from its infrastructure. 

Russia laid new cables across the Sea of Azov and provided Crimea with new sources of energy and communications. In addition, a new bridge was erected over the Kerch Strait, making road and rail connections between the main territory of Russia and the Crimean Peninsula possible. Though Russia stepped in, it was unable to meet Crimea’s water needs. Crimean local water sources meet only 15% of consumption. The remaining 85% came through the North Crimean Canal, which runs through Ukraine.

The North-Crimean Canal takes water from the Dnieper. It pumps billions of cubic meters of water to Crimea every year. The Dnieper itself originates in the Smolensk region of Russia, so, legally speaking, the Dnieper is an international, transboundary river running through Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. However, after the annexation, Kiev suspended the flow of water from the Dnieper. 

Politicians from Moscow held several stages of negotiations trying to persuade their Kiev counterparts to resume the flow of water through the canal, claiming that Ukraine's actions were illegal and inhumane. At the same time, it is not very fair of Russia to reason about international law after annexing territory of another state. The Ukrainians, however, did not give in, and this political stalemate created a looming drought for Crimea. 

As of today, Crimea relies on only one thing to provide itself with fresh water: precipitation, an element it has no control over. Even rainfall in the Crimea has decreased significantly in recent years due to climate change. Since the beginning of last year, local water reservoirs have emptied by one-third, and 2020 was the driest year since rainfall records began about 150 years ago.

The result of this drought is significant: two-thirds of the Peninsula is severely water-stressed. In north and east of the Peninsula, people have started to relocate. According to Russian statements, the population of Crimea has almost doubled by 2020, and part of this increase is due to the migration of Russians. The greater presence of people helps consolidate Russian control over Crimea, but it has also doubled the need for water resources.

The migrants from Russia in addition to the new infrastructure has put a serious strain on water supplies. Water shortages have increased in proportion to population growth. Taking agriculture as an example, during the best period of the Soviet Union, about 400,000 hectares of Crimean land were cultivated. By 2013, after years of mismanagement of water, the amount of cultivated land had dropped to 140,000 hectares. In 2014, when Russia gained control of Crimea, that number dropped to a modest 17,000 hectares. Based on this data, Crimea's agricultural sector has shrunk by a factor of 8 since joining Russia, and by a factor of 23 from its highest point. The local farmers have been forced to stop growing crops like rice and soybeans, which consume a lot of water. The Russian leadership calls this ecological adaptation, but it is a sign of decline at best.

Though Crimean water shortage was inevitable, the Russian annexation exacerbated the problem. Moscow has developed a plan to counter Crimea’s water crisis which is set to be fully implemented by 2024. Russia plans to build new dams, new desalination plants and drill new wells to extract water from the ground. It also intends to build new water pipelines and connect the Crimea to the Don and Kuban. There is even a plan to use airplanes to artificially increase rainfall, but this is only a temporary solution. It is unknown what the ultimate cost of this is, but Russia has already earmarked at least $650 million for the plan. 

However, due to the illegal annexation, the execution of any project in Crimea can only be done by Russian companies, as international partners would not risk doing business in Crimea. This creates difficulty in executing the Moscow plan for Crimea as, for example, building a desalination plant requires support of international partners and Russia itself never invested in desalination technology due to lack of need. 

If the plan to provide water to the Crimea does not work, Moscow may switch to more radical measures. Depending on the criticality of the water situation, Russia could either destroy the Ukrainian platypuses on the Dnieper River, blocking the flow of water, or try to occupy more territory in southern Ukraine along the North Crimean Canal. Such a military operation would force Russia to entrench itself about 60 kilometers from Crimea near the banks of the Dnieper River. Neither of these actions will be easy. Russia will use troops only if any other options are completely exhausted. However, wars have also been started for lesser reasons. Geopolitics is the art of choosing the unpleasant to avoid the disastrous.