By Joshua Yow Yin & Matteo Baldassari - Crime, Terrorism & Extremism Desk

Introduction

In February 2025, US military airstrikes targeting the Islamic State (IS) in Somalia, hit the semi-autonomous region of Puntland in the northern part of Somalia, a branch often overlooked in comparison to other more prominent IS affiliates.  Established in 2015, IS-Somalia’s objective is to extend IS’s self-proclaimed caliphate in Africa, advancing and abiding by IS’s strict interpretation of Sharī'ah law. According to interviews conducted by the International Crisis Group, the organization consists of approximately 500 militants and operates mainly in the Golis mountains and the Bari region in semi-autonomous Puntland. Yet, other sources estimate a significantly higher number, ranging between 700 and 1,500 militants, demonstrating the challenge of accurately estimating the size of a covert and elusive faction.

IS-Somalia has assumed a central role in the dynamics of the Islamic State as a logistical and financial hub for the network in the African continent and beyond. Furthermore, it has proven capable of resisting the offensives of its opponents: the Somali National Army (SNA), the Puntland Security Force, and its jihadist rival Al-Shabaab.

This article seeks to ascertain the trajectory of IS-Somalia’s rise in influence while assessing the potential threat they pose to the Somali Federal Government. A significant portion of existing literature on the topic indicates that IS-Somalia’s menace to the country originates more from its prospective development rather than its present capacity. This article will explore the group's history, the role of its leader, and its tactics.

Historical Background

In October 2015,  a group of defectors in the Puntland region of Somalia led by Abdul Qadir Mumin left Al-Shabaab, an Al-Qaeda-affiliated group, and pledged allegiance to IS — creating IS-Somalia. Despite previous efforts by IS Central to incorporate Al-Shabaab into its network, it appears that the impetus for IS-Somalia’s formation was predominantly influenced by Mumin's aspirations of power and the impediments he faced in ascending within Al-Shabaab as an outsider to the dominant Warsengeli clan.

The group’s first significant attack was carried out in October 2016, when IS-Somalia fighters captured the city of Qandala. In their first foray into governance, IS-Somalia sought to impose its version of Sharī'ah law through administration and taxation. However, on 7th December, a counteroffensive by the Puntland Security Force pushed IS militants to withdraw from the city to the mountains.

Later in 2017, IS-Somalia was elevated to the status of wilaya (or “official province”) by IS Central. By 2018, it was officially designated by the US Department of State as a foreign terrorist organisation. Militant operations continued, with IS-Somalia clashing with Al-Shabaab fighters for the first time. Despite the difference in extent of power between the two groups, IS-Somalia has progressively succeeded in increasing its influence by infiltrating the neighborhoods of Bosasso and Mogadishu to conduct illicit activities, domains previously exclusive to Al-Shabaab. Likewise, since its inception, IS-Somalia has increased the number of militants while attracting foreign fighters. Yet, their leadership continues to stay in the hands of Puntland clan members.

Between 2023 and 2024, IS-Somalia carried out a small number of operations, succeeding in seizing control of several villages from Al Shabaab. Nevertheless, IS-Somalia retains broad ambitions and remains difficult to eradicate due to the geography of the territory where it operates, its connections with local clans, and the difficulties of its opponents in defeating it militarily due to divisions or more important priorities.

Leadership

Abdul Qadir Mumin, the founder and current leader of IS-Somalia, has quickly become a central figure in jihadist circles. In a development that underscores his rising influence, Mumin may now serve as the Islamic State’s global leader, a remarkable shift for what has long been viewed as a relatively marginal offshoot of the wider Jihadist network, though some observers remain skeptical. Born in Puntland around 1950, Mumin’s journey from a regional ideologue to a leader of international significance mirrors both his personal ambitions and broader strategic realignments within the Islamic State's structure. Mumin later moved to the United Kingdom and Sweden in the early 2000s, where he became known for delivering sermons infused with hardline Islamist views — growing his notoriety as a radical preacher within diasporic communities. By 2010, he had solidified his reputation as a staunchly conservative and influential imam.

Upon his return to Somalia, Mumin initially aligned with al-Shabaab and gained prominence within its Puntland branch. However, his upward mobility within the organisation was likely constrained by Somalia’s rigid clan-based political and militant hierarchies, which limited leadership roles to individuals from dominant clans. Facing these barriers, Mumin opted to break away by pledging allegiance to the Islamic State, bringing a small but loyal group of followers with him and formally establishing IS-Somalia in October 2015. Under his guidance, the Somali branch has reportedly gained heightened significance within the Islamic State’s international network.

Tactics and Activities

Conventionally, IS-Somalia has conducted attacks on an asymmetric basis, typically involving close-range assassinations and the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Its operational footprint also includes extorting local businesses and staging small-scale raids to acquire funding and resources in surrounding areas. In recent years, IS-Somalia has refined its strategies and tactics, increasingly asserting itself in Puntland and the broader Horn of Africa.  One of the clearest examples of this shift came in early 2025 with the Shabelle offensive. During this campaign, IS-Somalia orchestrated coordinated and sophisticated attacks on military outposts, notably deploying vehicle-borne and motorbike-based explosives in an assault on the Dharjale base and military positions in the Cal Miskaad mountains. These strikes marked a move toward more sophisticated and synchronised operations in an effort to directly challenge Somalian state authority, while also holding a dual function: testing the resilience of Puntland’s security forces, and concurrently allowing IS-Somalia time and space to reinforce its hold over areas between the Cal Miskaad and Al-Madow Mountain ranges, entrenching itself within this difficult and highly strategic terrain by building a network of fortified positions and supply corridors.

This territorial strategy has been supported by classic insurgency methods. IS-Somalia frequently uses IEDs to harass military movements and disrupt logistics. A clear instance occurred on 20 January, when a roadside explosion claimed the lives of thirteen soldiers. These asymmetric attacks serve to drain government resources and sap the morale of frontline units. IS-Somalia also engages in deliberate terror operations aimed at eliciting overwhelming responses. Suicide bombings, targeted killings against state figures, and drone attacks are employed to provoke military retaliation, which in turn helps the group’s recruitment and propaganda drives. During the Shabelle campaign, IS militants deployed drones packed with explosives: an emerging tactic in Somalia that signals the group's evolving technical capabilities.

Conclusion

Altogether, these actions reveal IS-Somalia's broader ambition: to transform from a local insurgent faction into a credible rival to al-Shabaab in the Puntland region, capable of destabilising and pressuring the federal government into unsustainable military engagements. IS-Somalia may be positioning itself for a greater international role driven by decentralised warfare and strategic media outreach. At the same time, its broader role in generating revenue and distributing it across other branches of the ISIS network must be closely monitored in an effort to effectively counter the financing of international jihadist terrorism. Even if IS-Somalia may face difficulties in expanding their territorial control, this economic function is likely to ensure that IS-Somalia and Mumin continue to play a pivotal role within the decision-making processes of central ISIS and the wider jihadist network.