July 5, 2021No Comments

A Comparative Perspective of women and children under ISIS and Al-Qaeda: A Conversation with Cecilia Polizzi.

ITSS Verona's Extremism, Crime and Terrorism group interviews Cecilia Polizzi, President, Founder & Executive Director of the CRTG Working Group, the only existing I/NGO dedicated to protect children affected by terrorism and member of the ITSS Verona Scientific Expert Committee. Ms. Polizzi talks about the plight of women and children under ISIS and Al-Qaeda.

Interviewing Team: Adelaide Martelli & Francesco Bruno.

June 7, 202110 Comments

How lonely are the “Lone wolves”?

By: Adelaide Martelli, Francesco Bruno and Shahin Modarres.

Regardless of how violent, inhuman, and detestable terrorism is, it is a social phenomenon. Hence, like other social phenomena, it is a dynamic body that undergoes changes and transforms to adapt to the constantly changing socio-political sphere in different parts of the world. After the major paradigm shift of terrorist organizations from vertical structures to horizontal ones, the third wave of terror attacks was formed based on individuals carrying out terrorist attacks. These individuals are known by the colloquial "lone wolf" and they represent a growing concern due to the complexity of detecting them.

The term "lone wolf" has opened the stage for controversy in defining it. The basis of this controversy mostly manoeuvres on either if the individual radicalized and carried out the event like the famous case of Ted Kaczynski, or he/she has radicalized as the result of an agent-based mechanism of socialization. According to Prof. Mark Hamm, the distinction that differentiates the "lone wolf" phenomenon is based on the executive phase of a terrorist attack. "lone wolf" is the individual who might have been radicalized as the result of group socialization or self-indoctrination but acts alone. Prof. Peter Neumann adds: "a lone wolf is not necessarily a member of a terrorist organization but an individual who has an affinity with them".

In this article, we will discuss two cases of "lone wolf" terrorism to show both the executive phase of "lone actor" and pre-attack radicalization. It is important to recognize that even though the final act in lone wolf terrorism is performed as a solo, it is not an individual effort that has led to that moment. Many lone actors have received logistic and material support from terrorist cells, including explosives and instructions to build devices, safe passes, and even safe homes for the post-op phase (Schuurman, 2017).

Besides the operational level in the case of Younes Tsouli, we will see the importance of "lone actor" radicalization and recruitment on online platforms. And in the case of Mohammed Bouyeri, we will discuss how the term "Lone wolf" can overstate the degree of isolation these individuals go through.

Case of Younes Tsouli

It has sparked a controversial debate on the nature of the “Lone Wolf” as an individual with a focus on both psychological and personality factors, and external in terms of environment, friendships, and family ties. This part of the paper in relation to “Lone Wolves” will be using a different theoretical approach argued by Marc Sageman in Leaderless Jihad and characterized by the development of a new environment and processes of radicalization primarily based on the Internet. The importance here is the interaction between members on online portals and forums accessible exclusively by invitation, where complete anonymized strangers interact expressing their views on their hopes for Islam. What is interesting in this case is the fact that such forums provide a community for these individuals to interact with each other “this mutual sharing makes them feel even closer to each other in a virtual process similar to the one previously described as in-group love with face-to-face interactions. This provides them with a sense of belonging to a greater community on the basis of what they have in common, Islam” (Sageman, 2008). This perspective provides an alternative view on Lone Wolf, as this article argues, it is possible to define as “Lone Wolf” someone who acts are characterized by “lone” actions, but in reality, there is a variety of social interactions which made such cases less “lonely”.

The example that will be used to shed some light on the action of a Lone Wolf is the case of Younes Tsouli, also called Terrorist 007, and the “most wanted cyber-jihadist” according to the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). He began by appearing on websites such as “Islamic Terrorists” where he came across as an agitator, following that in 2004, he began to reach popularity as an expert cyber-jihadists providing not only terrorist material to online forums where he could directly radicalize youths, but he also was able to provide inside of US military bases in Iraq. More importantly, Younes was able to become a pillar for Al-Qaeda’s propaganda in Britain, despite, as the judge at his trial pointed out that he never himself came close to a firearm or committed a crime physically according to ACPO. His role alone had indirectly created a space for jihadist propaganda gaining support by the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Musab Al-Zarqawi facilitating the contacts across thousands of “lone wolves” across the globe (Jacobson, 2010). Therefore, to answer the question, are “Lone” wolves really lonely? They are not as demonstrated by the case of Younis Tsouli.

Case of Mohammed Bouyeri

The case of Mohammed Bouyeri, the 2006 Amsterdam attacker who killed Theo Van Gogh, is peculiar to analyze lone wolves’ networks during their radicalization and plotting process. He is considered as the first European Islamic lone wolf (Zogno, 2018), and, contrarily to what is generally thought, he was not so detached from social interactions. Bouyeri was born in Holland to Moroccan parents, and reportedly both he and his family were well integrated into the Dutch Community (Nesser, 2005)

Thanks to the documents retrieved from his computer after his arrest we have information regarding his radicalization and indoctrination processes (Sageman, 2008). In 2001 he went to prison, and there he started reading the Quran, which may be suggested by other prisoners, faith became his light during this dark period (Peters, 2016). The second event that influenced him towards a stricter interpretation of Islam was the death of his sick mother, since then he appeared increasingly isolated from the larger society (Cottee, 2014).

However, the biggest turning point was in 2003 as a consequence of two major events: Firstly, Dutch authorities refused Bouyeri’s proposal to open a youth club for immigrants; secondly, he entrenched a tight relationship with the fundamentalist Imam Abou Khaled (Nesser, 2012). Bouyeri started attending the meeting held by Abou Khaled, where he learned how to conduct his life following Sharia law so that he completely changed his previous lifestyle (Peters, 2016). Not only, but he also met several like-minded people with whom he established the Dutch Islamist group called the Hofstadgroup (Adjiembaks, 2016). Except for the people inside his network, he was very isolated from the larger society and he used to spend his time writing and disseminating extremist beliefs online (Kaplan et al., 2017;De Koning, 2013). In this period, he changed his name to Abu Zubair, in memory of the homonymous Al-Qaeda commander. 

The triggering event before the attack was the documentary “Submission” produced by Theo Van Gogh and Hirsi Ali in 2004, perceived by him and many other Muslims as offensive to Islam (Peters, 2016). Simultaneously, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) promoted a campaign in favor of kidnapping and decapitation, that apparently influenced Bouyeri’s attack plan (Nesser, 2012) . In fact, on the 2nd of November 2004 Mohammed Bouyeri, alias Abu Zubair, shot Theo Van Gogh eight times, tried to behead him, and then pinned on him with a knife an Open letter against Hirsi Ali (Nesser, 2012; De Koning, 2013) . Shortly after the attack, Bouyeri was arrested and sentenced to life in prison (Finseraas et al., 2011)

Both mentioned cases show an inpatient process of labeling these terrorist actors as with the term "Lone wolf". Mostly these actors have interpersonal, ideological, and operational ties to larger groups. (Gartenstein-Ross, 2017) Thinking of them as isolated individuals can develop conceptual confusion. The reason behind their solo act in some cases usually roots from a sense of secrecy and fear of being trapped into leakage behavior. A considerable number of these actors have expressed violent intention across the border of human norms, long before executing their plans. Their posts and socialization have been a clear cry for attention months and even years before the planning phase. (Gill, Horgan, and Deckert, 2020) This behavior, known as the "leakage behavior" has been a tremendous help for intelligence agencies and counter-terrorism professionals to detect them and surveil their activities. (Meloy and O'Toole, 2011) In some cases, the main reason behind acting alone has been their incapability of recruiting other members to the potential terrorist cell that they had in mind.As the result of a cost-benefit estimation, certain actors during recent years showed more tendency to cut their ties and communication from their niche in order to secure the required secrecy needed for the optimization of their plans. These actors preferred to reduce their vulnerability towards detection and infiltration by cutting ties with other members and their cells before executing their plans. (Bakker and De Graaf, 2012) Both elements of detection and infiltration have successfully neutralized many terrorist plots in advance and this has become a warning for more skill-developed actors to isolate themselves from their peers while planning a terrorist plot and later during the execution phase. This of course does not mean that all these actors were originally isolated individuals with anti-social behavior by their choice of acting alone was indeed the result of a strategic decision-making process. 

This article has been rectified on June 9th, 2021. Younes Tsouli has already served his sentence.

June 7, 2021No Comments

International Cooperation against Illicit Activities in the Tri-Border Area: the Operation Triple Border

By: André Carvalho and Bianca Ferrazza.

Due to its distance from modern centres of conflict, South America is often seen as a peaceful region. This is not entirely false when taken into consideration security in a conventional way. There are very few disputes still pending in the region, and since the process of ‘redemocratization’ during the 1980s, they are much less inclined towards solutions through force. Nevertheless, the implausibility of conflicts in South America is limited to "classic" conflicts, seen through the lens of conventional warfare between nation states

In this context, it is important to highlight that, although conventional threats no longer are a reason for incommensurate concern, the region is still affected by a considerable number of critical irregular threats, such as domestic conflicts, drug trafficking and even terrorism. These threats characterized as irregular and sub-strategic have a higher incidence in poorly controlled border regions. A good example is the borders of the Amazon Rainforest between Brazil and Colombia, where guerrilla activities are constant. However, it is in the Tri-Border Area where these problems combine into a cauldron of non-conventional threats.

The Tri-Border Area (TBA) consists of a zone situated between three cities in three different countries: Ciudad del Este in Paraguay, Puerto Iguazú in Argentina and Foz do Iguaçu in Brazil. The area is well known because it represents a hive for the development and implementation of various illicit activities, including money laundering, drug trafficking, theft, terrorism and other illegal activities. Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America

Geographically speaking, the area represents a key domain to conduct illicit activities, given the fact that the two rivers that mark the borders between the three states, the Paranà and the Iguazù, offer many, unsurveilled entry points. 

Something worth noting about this area is its international character, which makes it a major territory in which transnational criminal organizations operate. Thus,by taking advantage of the vulnerabilities of the public institutions, these groups have been operating in the area for decades, taking root in a radical way in the territory. 

Within the three countries of Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina, the involvement of criminal activities from non-state actors is of huge scale. The three of them, in light of the massive proportion of the illegal activities that take place there, have been developing tools to mobilize their national efforts together to fight and stop illicit activities from being carried out. Due to the small percentage of Muslim population in the region, South America ended up being further “isolated” from the regions that are the focus of action of Islamic terrorist groups. However, it would be wrong to say that terrorist groups do not operate in the region, and it is within the TBA that the presence of Islamic terrorist groups have been identified. According to U.S. documents and research papers from the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, groups such as the Islamic Jihad, al-Qaeda, and Hezbollah are currently operating in the region. 

The Inter-American Committee against terrorism (CICTE) coordinates efforts to assist the members of the Organisation of American States (OAS) to combat, prevent and defeat terrorism, intellectual theft, drug trafficking and other issues within its boarders. The basic objectives of CICTE, stated in their statute, are, among others, establishing a database on terrorism issues, enhancing the exchange of information between states and helping member states to compose counterterrorism legislations. CICTE tries to facilitate communication between the states by bringing together governments of the region in order to proceed with the discussion of certain topics of interest for the region. During the 2019 meeting, high level officials agreed on proceeding with a strengthening of the prevention of terrorism by training personnel on distinctive investigative techniques. 

In 2016, Interpol coordinated “Operation Triple Border” during which more than 600 police officers were deployed in the region’s key sites establishing checkpoints. 

Besides the officers, many experts in counterterrorism were also brought in in the region to help organise the operations taking place in the area. Among these, were experts in the trafficking of drugs and human beings, drug trafficking and document security. The action, that took place between the 18th and 22nd of November, culminated with the seizing of several products that objected to the illicit economy, among which are vehicles, firearms and drugs and with the arrest of 24 people involved in the crimes. 

What emerges from this operation is the strength and the ultimate efficiency of coordinated operations between local governments and the international support of Interpol. Operation Triple Border has played a key role in offering support to local officers and institutions to address the issues that have been characterizing the area in the past decades. Interpol has allowed local law enforcement to access their databases in order to monitor the connections of crimes in between the countries.   

April 4, 2021No Comments

Webinar With Dr Boaz Ganor on Drivers and Definitions of Terrorism

Webinar with Dr Michele Groppi (ITSS-Verona President) and Dr Boaz Ganor (ICT Herzliya), who elucidate and discuss drivers and definitions of terrorism.

April 4, 2021No Comments

Major Conceptual, Legal, Ethical, and Democratic Dilemmas in Counterterrorism

Dr Michele Groppi, KCL, ITSS Verona President, on major conceptual, legal, ethical, and democratic dilemmas in counterterrorism.