March 2, 2023 — No Comments

Cybersecurity: the Nexus Between Public and Private Sector

For the third Webinar of the 2022/2023 season, we had the pleasure to host three top experts in the field of Cybersecurity: Luca Nicoletti from the Italian National Cybersecurity Agency, Andrea Rigoni from Deloitte, and Antonello Vitale, a former Executive of the Italian Intelligence Community.

These experts explored the complex relationship between the public and the private sector in the context of cybersecurity - a relationship with countless challenges as well as opportunities. The event was chaired by our very own Martina Gambacorta, a member and researcher of the ITSS team.

March 2, 2023 — No Comments

Dr. Stephen J. Blank on Power competition in the Caspian Sea region

Dr. Stephen J. Blank, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, discusses power competition in the Caspian Sea region.

The European Union is searching for energy sources around the world to replace the role that Russia once played. They are looking towards Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia, including Azerbaijan. A trans-Caspian pipeline would need to be built to get energy from Central Asia to Europe. However, this would be met with opposition from Russia and Iran, who would try to destroy it, making a security guarantee necessary.

Interviewers: Fabrizio Napoli & Davide Gobbicchi - Russia & the Post-Soviet Team

February 28, 2023 — No Comments

Anisa Abeytia on the Human Security implications of Colonial Antecedents in Migration

Ms Abeytia explores the impact of colonial antecedents on migration and asylum policy, the implications of limitations in policy formulation, and the next steps in advancing toward human-security based migration frameworks.

Anisa Abeytia is the Think Tank Coordinator of the Global Research Network and a migration researcher and policy professional specializing in digital bordering, active social inclusion, and colonial antecedents in integration policy. A leader in the field, she has worked with the United States Congress, the Department of Homeland Security, and the US State Department to shape USโ€“Syria policy, with a focus on immigration and humanitarian advocacy. Her research has been published internationally, including with the University of Cambridge, UNESCO, and The Hill, among others.ย 

Interviewer: Esther Brito, Human Security Team

February 27, 2023 — No Comments

You may now go in peace and charity. How the legacy of Pope Benedict XVI can shape Australian foreign policy (and that of the world)

Author: Leigh Dawson

โ€œWithout truth, without trust and love for what is true, there is no social conscience and responsibility, and social action ends up serving private interestsโ€ฆ resulting in social fragmentation, especially in a globalised society at difficult times like the present.โ€ย โ€“ Pope Benedict XVI,ย Caritas in Veritate[1]

As the dawn of the New Year approached, the world lost one of the greatest theologians in history. Pope Benedict XVI, born Joseph Aloisius Ratzinger, died aged 95 after years of ill health. It was a โ€œlack of strength of body and mindโ€ that ultimately led Benedict XVI to become the first Pope in more than 800 years to resign as head of the Catholic Church in 2013. 

Arguably his most significant theological contribution, the 2009 Papal Encyclical Caritas in Veritate, continues to get overlooked by international relations scholars and government bodies globally for its potential to shape future foreign policy strategy. In Caritas in Veritate, Benedict XVI asks: can foreign policy have a human face? Can human life be placed at the core of all government decision-making? 

This article, which is based on a broader research project, contributes to the growing field of international relations scholarship by investigating the importance of religion in creating a more egalitarian global community. This is the first body of work, of which the author is aware, that investigates and applies fundamental principles of Catholic scholarship to the foreign policy strategy of a nation, in this case, Australia โ€“ a nation struggling with declining rates of Catholicism and to define its purpose amidst global pressure for action on climate change, approaches to conflict, and attitudes towards migration.ย 

Source: https://unsplash.com/photos/Eq0LwAfwHDI

Caritas in Veritate  

Delivered in Rome, Italy, on 29 June 2009 in the fifth year of his Pontificate, Pope Benedict XVI cited Caritas in Veritate as the cornerstone of his Papacy. It laid out a template by which all people could show leadership on human development in charity and truth. Caritas in Veritate, simply โ€˜charity in truthโ€™, is the principal driving force behind the authentic development of every person and all of humanity.

Love drives peace. To find love, and subsequently peace, one must also find truth and defend it โ€“ only then can one become the โ€˜face of foreign affairsโ€™ and begin to understand โ€˜the otherโ€™. Charity is at the heart of the Catholic social doctrine.

Benedict XVI recognised charity as both an authentic expression of humanity and an element of fundamental importance in human relations, including those of a public nature. He believed the meaning of charity had been corrupted by secular forces including the media, politicians, and business groups who equated charity as merely helping others in need. Caritas in Veritate is the doctrine by which this perspective shifts. 

Within the backdrop of ongoing cases of religiously motivated violence, it seems fair to ask how people could possibly consider religion or religious principles, such as charity, to be a guiding light for the future Australian foreign policy? 

Implications for Australian foreign policy

Australiaโ€™s foreign policy strategy is not only severely outdated but has been met with a mixed response by nations across the world. Complicating matters further, religion and politics have a long and often controversial history in Australia, most of it associated with Christianity.

Reflecting this conundrum, the 2021 Australian Census revealed a nation that is more divided than ever. For the first time in history, fewer than half of Australians identified as Christian, though Christianity remains the most common religion in Australia at 43.9 per cent of the population. The number of Australians who declared โ€˜no religionโ€™ rose almost 10 per cent in five years to 39 per cent.[1] Hence, Australia is partly a Christian country, partly a multifaith country, and partly a secularist country โ€“ this makes speaking or generalising about religion in Australia complicated. 

The 2017 Australian Foreign White Paper โ€“ the most recent document by the Australian Government outlining its foreign policy strategy โ€“ outlined five core objectives to deliver Australian security and prosperity โ€“ protection of a rules-based international order; environment; migration; poverty and human rights; and global business and protectionism.[2]

A major criticism of the White Paper is there are no clear directions or methodology outlining how Australia is going to achieve these goals. Australia has been scrambling to meet climate goals set out by the Paris Agreement; criticised globally for its lack of humanitarian foreign engagement; and generally seen as an unfriendly and hostile nation for welcoming refugees. 

Despite Australia becoming a more secular nation, active rejection of religion in Australia hasย notย become the norm. Australians will typically accept the religious views, spiritualities and commitments of others, if no one tries to impose their teachings on them. This is an important insight to understand if and howย Caritas in Veritateย could influence Australian foreign policy, and whether the Australian population would welcome this new approach.ย 

Can โ€˜Charity in Truthโ€™ shape foreign policy strategy in Australia?

In short, yes it can. And, in fact, some of the lessons learned could guide other nations across the world to make similar adjustments to their foreign policies, with the view to placing โ€˜the humanโ€™ at the centre of all decision-making. This point can be illustrated using three examples:

Firstly, Caritas in Veritate can help Australia achieve a rules-based international order in the Asia-Pacific and adhere to the Just War Theory all the same. Findings in the Brereton Report about the conduct of Australian Special Forces in Afghanistan across a 10-year period disclosed 39 unlawful killings by Australian defence members. The outcomes shocked a once proud defence unit โ€“ and the Australian public โ€“ to the core as these alleged crimes took place outside the heat of battle. A โ€˜warrior cultureโ€™ had infiltrated the Australian Special Forces raising questions about the legitimacy of the conflict, and in fact, whether it fit the Just War Tradition. 

In Caritas in Veritate, Benedict XVI states that without a fresh moral heart, the past remains unhealed and can cause even greater harm in the future. Therefore, if charity is an act of practicality, and the quest for truth delivers authenticity and love, Australia should consider input from its returning service personnel in any future foreign policy strategy on conflict intervention.

Secondly, it can advance Australiaโ€™s climate policy substantially as policy begins to consider those across the world who are facing displacement due to drought, rising sea levels, and changing ecosystems. Caritas in Veritate states nature expresses a design of love and truth: โ€œit was prior to us and has been given to us by God as the setting for our lifeโ€.[3] Estimates suggest that by the year 2050, up to 700 million people may be displaced because of climate change.[4] By comparison, the aftermath of the Second World War saw anywhere from 40 to 66 million people displaced. Climate change will also impact the journeys these populations will take, with rising sea levels and drought adding to the treacherous paths to freedom, which is antithetical to Benedict XVIโ€™s desire. 

Lastly, Caritas in Veritate will drive a complete rethink in Australian Government border policy towards refugees, asylum seekers, and other migrants arriving in the country. Boat-turnback policy initiated by the Australian Government caused international condemnation and considerable deaths at sea of vulnerable people that could have been avoided.  Caritas in Veritate reminds governments that the primary capital to be safeguarded and valued is the human.

Implications for future scholarship and policy development

Some possible policy recommendations for the Australian Government to consider, which are grounded in and inspired by Benedict XVI, include:

  • Seek mandatory input from returned Australian Defence Force representatives on shaping policy regarding Australian involvement in international conflict that has no direct threat to national security. And, subsequently, establish a policy that vests action through international agencies such as the United Nations to seek a humanitarian response to conflict. 
  • Australia should further its commitment to reduce carbon emissions by developing policy forcing mining companies operating within Australia that have projects in developing nations to either cease operations in those nations or deliver profound rehabilitation and financial benefits to those countries to reduce the human and environmental cost that climate change is likely to have.
  • Take an approach to resettlement in the regions, where community spirit and inclusion is high, and jobs are abundant. This will give refugees a chance at gaining stability in their new home country. 
  • Foreign aid should be directed towards global projects including school construction, regenerating soils for food growth, building new roads, or enhancing industry capabilities. 
  • Australia should establish an Office of Religion and Global Affairs to further increase an understanding of religious dynamics and engagement with religious actors, as well as โ€˜the otherโ€™. 

Further research could apply this strategy to the rich religions of Judaism and Islam, as well as Hinduism and others, to ascertain whether a โ€˜newโ€™ theory โ€“ possibly, โ€˜Religious Global Peace Theoryโ€™ โ€“ could become commonplace in academic scholarship and international governance.

Conclusion

People must be at the centre of all diplomatic action. If charity is love given and received as Benedict XVI intended, then charity must be of benefit, bipartisan, demonstrate reciprocity, and be from good natured intentions.

Australian foreign policy strategy needs an urgent rethink as geopolitical challenges rise in the Indo-Pacific, and globalisation exacerbates the impact of international issues in domestic affairs. Caritas in Veritate could offer guidance for Australia on how to advance human-centered leadership in foreign policy. Foreign policy can have a human face after all. 


[1] Markus Mannheim, โ€œCensus 2021 Data Shows Australians are Less Religious and More Culturally Diverse than Ever,โ€ ABC News Online, June 28, 2022, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-06-28-census-2021-data-shows-a-change-australia/101177152.

[2] โ€œ2017 Australian Government Foreign Policy White Paper,โ€ Australian Government (2017): 3, https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/minisite/2017-foreign-policy-white-paper.

[3] Pope Benedict XVI, โ€œCaritas in Veritate,โ€ 32.

[4] Alex Alvarez, โ€œIntervention III,โ€ CrossCurrents 67, no. 3 (2017): 635, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26605840.

[1] Pope Benedict XVI, โ€œCaritas in Veritate,โ€ Encyclical Letter of the Supreme Pontiff on Integral Human Development in Charity and Truth (2009): 3, https://www.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/encyclical/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate.html.

February 20, 2023 — No Comments

Diletta Huyskes interviewed on AI and Human Rights

Diletta Huyskes, Head of Advocacy in Privacy Network, talks about the latest developments regarding Artificial Intelligence. In particular, this episode deals with the challenges that AI poses to the protection of Human Rights and how this issue is tackled in the upcoming AI Act.

Interviewers: Ilaria Lorusso and Luca Mattei

February 14, 2023 — No Comments

Space Warfare: How are offensive military operations conducted in Space?

This is a transcript of an indepth interview with Paul S. Szymanski who has a 49 year experience conducting military operations research analyses for the United States Air Force and Space Force, Navy, Army and Marines. These include outer space program analysis, management, and development of space warfare theory, policy, doctrine, strategies, tactics and techniques. He has worked with the Air Staff at the Pentagon (Secretary of the Air Force), the Space and Missiles Systems Center (Now SSC) in Los Angeles, and the Air Force Research Labs (AFRL) in Albuquerque, New Mexico, along with experience in operational field testing of missile systems at China Lake, California. He is the author of several publications. This transcript is last in a three-part series of content extracted from an interview with Mr. Szymanski.

Interviewed and Edited by: Danilo delle Fave.

Based on your experience in the field and the expertise that you have acquired, you have developed a set of rules to fight and win the next space war, could you explain these?

Preconflict Positioning: Since it is very difficult to change orbits at the last minute (especially changing orbital inclination), immediate space combat can only be fought with the current resources on hand in the local area, for quick space wars. There will be no transconflict redistribution of space forces to help those forces under immediate attack, unless the space war continues for months on end if a decisive space attack is not accomplished in the beginning. Thus, preconflict positioning of space assets is possibly the most important aspect of space strategies. This principle is related to the other fundamental principle of maximizing high maneuvering abilities of space assets. Dominating and survivable preconflict satellite positioning and extensive satellite on-board maneuvering fuel is of most importance.

Space Situational Awareness and Weapons Range: It does not matter how plentiful or how brilliant your adversary space weapon systems are if they cannot find or reach your critical space systems. If you are constantly maneuvering so that he cannot find you, or your satellites are in hard to reach orbits, or have low observables, or you possess many believable satellite decoys, then he can never dominate you. Perceptive space situational awareness (SSA), Space Domain Awareness (SDA) and predictive battlespace awareness (PBA) will dominate any offensive weapons capabilities. Because of the inherent instability of offense vs. defense in space warfare, the most important tool for senior military and political space leaders is space surveillance and identification sensors with corresponding automated assessment algorithms, particularly those that provide PBA.

Decisive Political Will: Having space forces that are superior in numbers and technological quality are useless if there is not the political will to fully and quickly use them. This principle may imply dictatorships are more at an advantage than democracies. Hesitation and uncertainty can rapidly lead to failure in space warfare. Effective doctrine and decisive and confident political will is most necessary to counter adversary military actions in the space environment. However, letโ€™s be frank โ€“ mistakes will be made regardless of full domain awareness.

Maneuver: A satelliteโ€™s ability to frequently conduct large, small, or continuous maneuvers, especially just before and during a space conflict, might be the best capability to keep your adversaries guessing as to your space control intentions and planning, besides complicating his targeting solutions, especially when said adversary may lack worldwide space surveillance sensor coverage.

Unusual Orbits: Unusual orbits increase the difficulty of your adversaries to determine your intentions or target you quickly.

Value of Space: Due to the newness of space warfare, your adversary probably does not fully understand the value of space both to himself and to his adversaries. This complicates his ability to prioritize his targeting plans, and may contribute to him wasting precious maneuvering fuel and limited โ€œshotsโ€ from space weapons going against low-value satellites, along with ceding time and tempo advantages to the other side. Ultimately, space warfare is actually information warfare, so it is difficult to mathematically assess the value of the information generated or transmitted by satellites to the commandersโ€™ minds with timely and decisive decision-making processes.

Political Consequences: Due to the newness of space warfare, our adversary and probably ourselves do not fully understand the political, diplomatic, economic, and international ramifications of employing space weapon systems, especially post conflict.

Effective Doctrine: Due to the newness of space warfare, our adversary and probably ourselves do not fully understand the best theory, doctrine, strategies, tactics, and techniques for conducting optimized space warfare. Big mistakes will be made by both sides.

Mistakes Will Be Made: Due to the newness of space warfare, most carefully laid plans, doctrines, strategies, tactics, techniques, political, technological, and correlation of forces assumptions will prove false and be immediately thrown out (or worse, be so dearly held, they lead to immediate defeat). This rule equally applies to both sides of the conflict, unless one side is lucky enough to have gotten space doctrine slightly more correct than the opposing side.

Image Source: pexels.com

Vary Space Weapon Types: Due to the newness of space warfare, it might be best to possess different phenomenology space weapon systems with varied basing options to increase the chance you developed your preplanning and space doctrine right for a type of conflict that has never occurred before. Remember, in all previous wars the first casualties are most, if not all, of the preconflict plans.

Define Winning: The concept of โ€œwinningโ€ in space warfare is not clearly defined. Its definition may be made by political leadership with limited technological or military knowledge and may be based on purely political, propagandistic, or failed doctrinal principles. Your adversary will certainly have a very different definition of winning, which means both sides may perceive they have โ€œwonโ€ the space conflict and derive quite different conclusions that will dominate their military, political, diplomatic, and economic (commercial and procurement strategies) thinking for decades to come. Oneโ€™s space strategies employed during the conflict should take this into consideration to place your nation into a favorable position post conflict.

Space Debris: Creation of too much space debris during space conflicts may make losers out of all sides after the conflict, in the long term, and lead to global political consequences.

Future Political Impacts: You may be assured that after the conduct of a major space war, national and international protocols, treaties, rules of conduct, insurance claims, and alliances will be radically changed for space. Oneโ€™s space strategies employed during the conflict should take these into consideration to place your nation into a favorable position post conflict.

Adversary Postconflict Reactions: You may be assured that after the conduct of a major space war, your adversaries and other nations will learn from this war and probably build up their own space weapon capabilities, even if necessarily covertly. Oneโ€™s space strategies employed during the conflict should take these into consideration to place your nation into a favorable position post conflict.

Space Escalation Ladder: Due to the remote nature of space systems, the worldโ€™s populace may be kept in the dark (especially for low-level space conflicts) on what is truly happening, which provides additional, more subtle rungs, on the conflict escalation ladder, allowing nations to privately exhibit resolve and will while transmitting determined political messages.

Space Warfare Inherently Conflict Destabilizing: Because a small, relatively inexpensive space mine can take out a large billion-dollar satellite critical to the conduct of your military operations and actual satellite point defense is problematic due to probable ASAT hypervelocity closing speeds, offense is better than defense in space warfare, making it inherently unstable for conflict escalation.

Quick Space Attacks Possible: Due to the remote nature of satellites in space, small-scale space attacks may be initiated, executed, and completed before the recipient even knows he is under attack, who is attacking, what are their attack strategies and goals (end states), and when an uncomprehending senior political leadership can validate the attack and respond in a military, political, diplomatic, or economic manner. Large-scale space attacks may be initiated, executed, and completed within 24โ€“48 hours. Without adequate and timely SDA/SSA and determined political will, an adversary can easily get within your Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) command-and-control loops for space and shock and confuse you in space, and on the ground.

Space Exhibits Escalation Imbalances: Due to the remote nature of satellites in space and the difficulty for space surveillance assets to determine the true nature of space attacks, and because space attacks may be initiated, executed, and completed within 24โ€“48 hours, there is a good chance that the side that initiates space attacks first will be the side that wins the space war.

Covertness and Surprise of Prime Importance: Due to the remote nature of satellites in space and the difficulty for space surveillance assets to determine the true nature of space attacks, and because space attacks may be initiated, executed, and completed within 24โ€“48 hours, covertness and surprise will significantly contribute to winning the space war.

Joint Military and Commercial Space Use: Mixing military and commercial systems on the same satellites increases the chances of space conflict escalation due to the general populace immediately becoming aware of the effects of satellite loss and placing pressure on political leadership to take precipitous actions. Thus, the nuances of steady and reasoned escalation control are lost.

Space Only Benefits Terrestrial Systems: Space conflict is all about denying satellite support to military forces or civilian populations on Earthโ€”not simply the elimination of satellite systems for destruction sake or as a space โ€œscorekeeper.โ€ Currently, there are no colonies that the United States Space Force needs to protect in space. Itโ€™s all about space support to the terrestrial battlefield.

Small Space Forces Can Beat Larger: As in many other conflicts past and present, having space forces that appear superior in numbers and technological quality on paper does not guarantee a โ€œwinโ€ under all circumstances. There are many examples throughout thousands of years of military history of numerically inferior forces beating their โ€œbetters.โ€ Many times, it is the forces with better doctrine, planning, morale (political will), or positioning that win. This can only be truer for a new area of conflict in space that has little, if any, past military examples and experiences.

Public Opinion Will Limit Military Options: Even though space wars entail very few, if any, human casualties, international public opinion values space wars as more politically unacceptable compared to terrestrial destruction and loss of human life from traditional warfare on Earth. In addition, space wars will fire the imaginations, good or bad, of your citizens, along with much of the rest of the world that is not actively participating in the conflict.

Allies Count Little Militarily for Space Wars: Due to the limited number of countries with future space weapons systems and their attendant need for covertness along with international political sensitivities, each adversary will probably have to go it alone, and his allies cannot or will not significantly help them openly in the coming space conflict. In addition, more than likely, allied space systems will be in the wrong space defense regions, and incapable of maneuvering closer for mutual defense in a timely manner.

Space Treaties Will Be Violated: Most space treaties will be violated in the first few hours of the coming space war. International treaties have usually been violated in most previous major terrestrial conflicts, and due to the remoteness of space, treaties concerning the military use of space are easier to ignore, especially when the world populace may not even be aware of this ongoing space conflict, and the United Nations does not possess space surveillance assets.

Data Relay Satellites Are Prime Targets: Possibly the most important space targets will be those satellites that relay data and commands directly to other satellites in remote orbits, making them choke points for critical space systems. This is particularly true for those countries without extensive worldwide satellite ground control stations.

Defense vs. Offense: Those nations that have more space systems being used by their military also have more space systems to defend and probably must emphasize defense over offense in their technology developments and in their military planning. If your adversary has few space systems, then there are fewer targets for your offensive space weapons, and you must emphasize defense, unless you believe that you have perfect SDA/SSA and you know all your adversariesโ€™ and their alliesโ€™ offensive space weapons and believe you can target and neutralize these early in the space conflict before he can fully implement his offensive space warfare plans.

Space Warfare Systems Are Untested: If your adversariesโ€™ space warfare systems are untested in real, sustained combat, then their true abilities against you are uncertain and they probably possess โ€œcracks in their armor.โ€ Unfortunately, the same is probably true of your space warfare systems (whether you believe this or not), but the true vulnerabilities and failure points of both sides may not be obvious or believable. However, be assured, due to the new nature of space warfare, they do exist in plenitude, and the quickest way to defeat is possessing overconfidence.

Differing Cultures and Military Traditions: Because your adversaries probably come from different cultures and military traditions than your own, they have a higher probability of detecting your space warfare systems nonobvious โ€œcracks in their armorโ€ than you do, and vice versa.

You Are Always Vulnerable: As in all military matters since time immemorial, due to the cleverness of human beings, especially under stressful combat conditions, your adversaries will ultimately find your vulnerabilities and get through any defenses you may fool yourself into thinking are โ€œinvulnerable.โ€

Decisive Commander: For those countries at war with roughly equal space warfare forces, the main decisive factor would be which country may be lucky enough to discover and believe in the one decisive commander who is a genius in space warfare organization, training, doctrine, strategies, and tactics. This is especially true for the nontraditional nature of space warfare. In addition, those countries with the least meddling in military matters by their politicians might be the decisive factor in winning the war (though possibly โ€œlosingโ€ the peace afterward).

Little to No Human Casualties: Because space warfare involves little to no human casualties, commanders can be particularly decisive and coldhearted in their planning and execution compared to terrestrial warfare. As the late Maj Gen Roger G. DeKok, USAF, stated, โ€œSatellites have no mothers.โ€ In addition, morale and courage on the battlefield is of less importance, though command decisiveness remains a critical factor.

Low-Cost Offensive Weapons: Due to the hypervelocities of space orbits, one cannot adequately armor your spacecraft, and a small, relatively inexpensive space mine can take out a large billion-dollar satellite critical to the conduct of your military operations.

Space โ€œFog of Warโ€: The potential for confusion known as the โ€œfog of warโ€ is well-documented for terrestrial battlefields; it will be even worse for space warfare, due to the newness of this theater for conflict, the tremendous distances involved, and the global nature of space.

Commercial Satellites Are on Their Own: Commercial satellite operators whose expectations are that the military will protect their space systems during conflicts will have a rude awakening.

Checklist Vulnerability: Operators who are trained to respond to unusual situations by rout โ€œchecklistโ€ actions can be easily spoofed and manipulated by a clever adversary, especially in a contested environment with denied or degraded communications to higher headquarters (rule suggested by Paul Day).

February 13, 2023 — No Comments

The Ba-looming crisis

Author: Gianluca Catucci

Introduction

The undisturbed incursion by the Chinese balloon into American territory and over military sites captured the attention of analysts worldwide, climaxing in a spectacular battle between an F-22 fighter jet and a balloon. After some hesitation by American leadership, the downing was authorised and live-aired but raised many legal and political issues.

Vintage Balloons

The first question is why China, a technological giant, would need balloons to spy on US territory.Compared to drones and satellites, balloons are infinitely less expensive and preferable in an operation at a high risk of loss of the device. Furthermore, balloons float at an altitude significantly lower than satellites, thus potentially capturing audio that the latter cannot intercept, and providing higher-quality imaging. Balloons also allow constant surveillance whilst being much less detectable, as they can hover for long escaping radars, and can even deploy their drones. Lastly, whilst subject to wind patterns, they are more manoeuvrable and their flight altitude can be modified.

The test of International Law

Before addressing the political consequences of the balloonโ€™s destruction, it is important to put the operation to the test of international law. According to the Chicago Convention (ICAO, 1944), articles 1-3, โ€œevery state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.โ€ Commercial airliners and balloons both qualify as civilian airships, and thus cannot fly over the territory of another country without permission.

But what constitutes sovereign airspace?

International law is very clear about the horizontal limits of sovereignty, which is established in the 1982 UNCLOS: it extends until the territorial waters of a state (12nm from the baseline). Conversely, there is no agreement over what constitutes the vertical boundary of sovereignty, a matter on which the Montego Bay Convention, the Chicago Convention, and the Outer Space Treaty are silent. States have thus used divergent standards to draw the line between national airspace and outer space. Technically, states could claim as sovereign territory up to 100 km of space above ground (62 mi, the Kรกrmรกn line).

Image Source: https://unsplash.com/it/foto/GOX3FMgcWK4

The consequences of this distinction cannot be overstated: states have sovereign authority and jurisdiction over their airspace, but no one has authority over outer space, which is an international commons.

China contends that the balloon was a civilian device conducting meteorological research in outer space, while the most credible accounts report the UAV flying at 60.000 feet above the ground. According to US practice, this would be considered within American airspaces, like all aircraft flying below 100.000 feet, and its transit would thus be conditional upon permission by state authorities. Article 3(bis) of the Chicago Convention proscribes the use of force against civilian aircraft. Nonetheless, in the case at hand, international and domestic rules were violated, giving the US the right to restore its domestic law & order via countermeasures and the use of internal force, as long as proportionate and necessary, a test facilitated by the absence of human personnel on the airship.

Moreover, if it were proven that the balloon was a spy device - increasingly likely while it is being dismantled and studied - its status would not be regulated by the Chicago Convention, which deals only with civilian aircraft. Indeed, a spy balloon is considered a state military aircraft. A violation of sovereign airspace by such an airship would thus amount to a use of force in violation of โ€œthe territorial integrity or political independenceโ€ of the United States, as per art.2(4) of the UN Charter. As similar past episodes showed, the US was entirely within its rights in neutralising the possible threat, again provided that the response was necessary and proportionate.

The Communist Party answered in dismay, alleging a force majeure justification in a note by the Foreign Ministry. Top diplomats have harshly criticized President Biden for his aggressive tone in the State of the Union address. Nevertheless, the official response was not excessively confrontational, and a final answer on the nature of the incursion is yet to arrive. Furthermore, evidence is emerging concerning a larger swarm of Chinese balloons over all five continents, and of a case where China, on the receiving side of a surveillance balloon, shot it down in 2019 alleging similar justifications.

Political Consequences

After having established the legality of the shooting, the next step requires analyzing its political context and consequences. This incident inserts itself into a string of tensions between the two superpowers, the zenith of which consisted in Nancy Pelosiโ€™s visit to Taiwan last August.ย 

Biden and Xiโ€™s meeting in Bali helped thaw out the situation, with both leaders agreeing on the need for open and direct diplomatic channels to communicate. However, top American military officials have criticized the Chinese leadership for not fulfilling their promise in the case at hand, leaving calls by the Defense Secretary unanswered. Fears are that a lack of communication may make misunderstandings and flare-ups more likely; crisis hotlines during the Cold War with the Kremlin proved vital for averting open hostilities.

While the significance of the data collected is poor, the undisturbed penetration of a Chinese balloon within the US mainland caused a few headaches to American officials. It is a clear signal from the CCP that it has the capacity to trespass on American territory, and not only small atolls in the South China Sea. Moreover, through a grey-zone operation, Beijing has successfully used non-violent means for a clear political goal: destabilising its main adversary while averting an overt military response.

Hence, not only has the incursion shown the disruptive potential of Chinese technology, but it has exposed the vulnerability of American intelligence services, fuelling chaos in American public opinion and halls of power. Hawkish members of Congress, notably Republicans, have lashed out at President Biden for having failed to prevent or act quicker. The live coverage of the balloonโ€™s destruction sought to remedy this fiasco but contributed to exacerbating tensions and Anti-Asian rhetoric, already high in the country, and to fan the flames of a spiralling escalation not only of words.

Conclusion

The balloon incident is just another episode of a saga of a looming US-China crisis. It highlighted the lack of true communication hotlines between the two nuclear powers and the threat this poses to international peace and security. Indeed, misunderstandings between nuclear powers and poor crisis management could lead to apocalyptic scenarios.

While the Peopleโ€™s Republic tested US tolerance, the latter responded by showing that it means business, by annihilating the balloon with a $400.000 missile fired by the most advanced fighter in the world. This adds to its muscle-flexing through a chip embargo and a deal with the Philippines for the use of four military bases.

Overall, both sides seem to ignore conciliatory avenues and through unscrupulous violations of sovereignty, grey-zone operations, discordance in crucial international fora, and muscle-flexing, they keep fanning the flames of strategic competition. Even worse, aggressive rhetoric bounces from Beijing to Washington with little consideration for its consequences.

Through belligerent discourse and the antagonization of the other, the US and China contribute to constructing the idea of the enemy and convincing stakeholders and citizens of the inevitability of conflict, potentially exposing the world to a self-fulfilling prophecy and global catastrophe. While the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists considers this only 90 seconds away, hope is that de-escalation efforts and the Bali agenda return to the central stage.

February 7, 2023 — No Comments

Space Warfare: How are offensive military operations conducted in Space?

This is a transcript of an indepth interview with Paul S. Szymanski who has a 49 year experience conducting military operations research analyses for the United States Air Force and Space Force, Navy, Army and Marines. These include outer space program analysis, management, and development of space warfare theory, policy, doctrine, strategies, tactics and techniques. He has worked with the Air Staff at the Pentagon (Secretary of the Air Force), the Space and Missiles Systems Center (Now SSC) in Los Angeles, and the Air Force Research Labs (AFRL) in Albuquerque, New Mexico, along with experience in operational field testing of missile systems at China Lake, California. He is the author of several publications. This transcript is second in a three-part series of content extracted from an interview with Mr. Szymanski.

Interviewed and Edited by: Danilo delle Fave.

Image Source: pexels.com

What are some of the potential threats in Space?

Cyber Attacks: The most popular means of attack against space systems where the entire spectrum of space systems is vulnerable to these attacks. Each country is vulnerable to such hacking. A smaller/poorer country can purchase a surplus satellite (or critical parts thereof) and then conduct hacker contests against these test satellites with significant cash prizes to the teams that cause the best effects against these space system. The same techniques can be employed to train individuals on how to penetrate space ground systems. All of these space systems, including space jammers, are readily available on the commercial market for installation in your country of choice.

Terrestrial Attacks: Any country on Earth has special forces that can penetrate adversary ground systems (satellite control stations, RADARS, Optical Space Tracking Telescopes, etc.). These special forces can insert cyber codes into critical systems, install mines, etc. In addition, spy networks can be employed to โ€œturnโ€ the loyalties of adversary space technicians to influence them to insert threat cyber codes and sabotage critical adversary space systems on the ground.

Space Surveillance Systems: In order to achieve smart space control, a country needs to better understand the orbits, status and capabilities of their adversary space systems. This can readily be achieved through ground-based RADARS and optical imagery/tracking systems. Optical tracking systems can be assembled using amateur astronomy telescopes, and many amateurs employ these around the World in this role. They do not cost that much, are fully automated, and can be placed on the rooftops of country embassies around the World, particularly in countries that have good weather conditions and visibility to space. With such situational knowledge, a poorer country can attack an adversary satellite at the same time a third country is โ€œvisitingโ€ the targeted space system with an inspector/rendezvous satellite in order to place the attack blame on another country.

Laser Attacks: Currently, consumers can openly purchase hand-held 7.5-watt laser systems. Attach one of these to the above-mentioned astronomical telescope, and with the proper alignment techniques, a poorer country can blind an adversary imaging satellite, or maybe even spoof its Earth limb sensors. With even much more powerful and better collimated industrial lasers, a second world country may even be able to permanently damage these sensors. In the least, one should be able to initiate satellite self-defense mechanisms (close sensor shutters, roll satellite) that will take the attacked satellite systems offline for hours if not days, rendering it ineffective during some critical time during a terrestrial battle.

January 30, 2023 — No Comments

State Supremacy: Can it be Achieved?

This blog article is written following an indepth interview with Paul S. Szymanski who has a 49 year experience conducting military operations research analyses for the United States Air Force and Space Force, Navy, Army and Marines. These include outer space program analysis, management, and development of space warfare theory, policy, doctrine, strategies, tactics and techniques. He has worked with the Air Staff at the Pentagon (Secretary of the Air Force), the Space and Missiles Systems Center (Now SSC) in Los Angeles, and the Air Force Research Labs (AFRL) in Albuquerque, New Mexico, along with experience in operational field testing of missile systems at China Lake, California. He is the author of several publications. This blog article in the first in a three-part series of content extracted from an interview with Mr. Szymanski.

Interviewed and Edited By: Danilo delle Fave.

Space superiority debate borrows from postulates of sea (maritime) and air superiority but vastness, obscurity, and complexity of space making it near impossible for any country to achieve space supremacy. 

The vastness of space could be understood by a simple thought-experiment: imagine taking a basketball and hiding it somewhere on Earth, and then challenging someone to find it. To further elaborate, Earthโ€™s oceans contain 329 million cubic miles of water, both on and below the surface, the volume of space between the Earth and the Moon is 4.81097E+16 cubic miles. Therefore, to achieve space supremacy, a country has to โ€œcontrolโ€ 146,230,091 times the volume of the Earthโ€™s oceans; a near impossible task for this century. 

Similarly, the notion that since there is no geographic feature in space, satellites cannot hide from Earth or space-based sensor networks is false. Satellites are โ€œlostโ€ all the time; often space objects are classified as โ€˜analyst objectsโ€™, simply because their characteristics and ownership is not known. This is a challenge when identifying targets for space weapons systems. How can a country be sure it has identified the correct asset? How can certainty that a potential satellite is really a threat be achieved? 

Lastly, space is complex with multitude of space systems of interest to military targeteers. This adds to the complexity because possible adversarial attacks could be terrestrial-based, space-based, cyber or physical attacks, etc. and must be accounted for. 

Beyond the basic characteristics of space that may create obstacles for outer space warfare, are other more complex issues of lawfare and defence. Whilst treaties exist to limit outer space weapons, the vastness and obscurity of space makes implementation of these treaties very difficult. This is because very few countries have space surveillance sensors โ€“ which fall short of the ability to adequately identify satellites, their capabilities and make up in an environment where they are rapidly moving and spinning. Furthermore, to verify a space treaty the United Nations would have to possess an extensive world-wide network of sensors, which would be very expensive to build and maintain, and would ultimately be imperfect anyway.

Outer space wars are likely to be very rapid and could conclude in 24-48 hours before a country can realise who attacked, for what intent and how to best defend. Any actual "fighting" can only occur with assets in the immediate area, because the ability to make large manoeuvres in space takes a lot of fuel and a lot of time. More than likely, an ally's space assets will be in places around the Earth that are far removed from the immediate conflict. Also, Rules of Engagement will be different, due to differing value systems. In Europe, causing human deaths to preserve equipment is not allowed, whereas in the US, it is different. For examples would Europeans allow bombs on a manned Earth station controlling an adversary space weapon?

In conclusion, perhaps space supremacy might be achievable in in a specific orbital regime and a specific, limited time. However, hypervelocity attacks can come from any other orbit in a rapid manner and upset this โ€˜superiorityโ€™. But it is important to consider this: Satellites are worthless if they cannot communicate back to Earth to receive controlling instructions or download their data. If a country can cut off most, if not all, communications to a countryโ€™s space systems, then maybe they have achieved space supremacy. This denial of space communications would not only have to be effective within the countryโ€™s boundaries, but for other satellite control sites around the world that this country may employ, or for friendly satellite tracking ships on the worldโ€™s oceans.

January 23, 2023 — No Comments

The Middle East in 2023: From Revolution to Survival

Author: Omri Brinner and Chantal Elisabeth Hohe.

2022 brought about several game-changing developments in the Middle East and beyond. These events - from domestic political instability, through the weakening of American influence in the region, to the protests in Iran - will all leave a mark in 2023, a year that is shaping to be decisive for the Middle Eastโ€™s future.

Of the many things to monitor in the region during 2023, four issues stand out the most, largely due to their international significance. These are the American involvement in the Middle East; climate change and the regionโ€™s efforts - or lack of - to counter it; the domestic upheaval in Iran and its global impact; and the economic situation across the region, with a growing number of countries in economic disarray (Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt and Yemen).

Image Source: https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/protests-in-iran-the-regime-s-trail-of-blood-a-8775e064-e031-4f80-8a87-5ec4cb59246cย 

The US in the Middle East

Going into 2023, the United Stateโ€™s role in the Middle East is undefined. Had it been clear and obvious, American officials wouldnโ€™t have to reiterate that their country will remain pivotal as it once was. The facts on the ground suggest less American physical involvement. There are less American troops in the region; American diplomacy has been weakened; and one is much more exposed to alternative soft power than before. In that sense we are expected to see declining American presence across the region. Diplomatically, the US is losing grip as well. While it largely has Israel on its side in its competition with China and Russia, other allies - most notably Saudi Arabia - are becoming less and less dependent on the US, fueling a multipolar world where the US is now one of many, rather than the one. The US can stay assured that it will continue to have leverage over several individuals and countries in the coming year, but all in all - and much due to the multipolar inertia across the region - this leverage is not infinite, and further distancing from American policies are likely to follow. This dynamic played out in the relations between President Biden and the Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin-Salman, where the latter refused to give-in to American pressure on oil prices, proving that the American leverage on him and his country is limited. In other words, American superiority will not only continue to be challenged from afar, but also from within the region itself.

Iran

2023 might very well be the year of the Persian Spring. The revolutionary protests that began in September have the potential to spin the regime out of control and to create a new reality in the country, and the region. What started as a social protest against the stateโ€™s brutality and the killing of Masha Amini has developed into a full regime-change movement, with the slogan โ€œdeath to Khameneiโ€ gaining momentum and legitimacy on social media. It is of course possible that the harsh and lethal crackdown by the state will break the back of the revolution, but these past few months and the ones to follow will certainly change Iran and affect the region as a whole, whichever way the wind blows.

Furthermore, in light of the internal turmoil and the fact that the Iranian nuclear deal is all but alive, it is likely that Iran will push to both enrich as much uranium as possible and to create destabilizing chaos across the region in the coming months. All in all, what happens in Iran during 2023 will determine the near future of the Middle East.

Climate

After a rather unsuccessful COP27 failed to produce actionable policy solutions or real commitments from the international community, a decisive year lies ahead for the Middle East, where people will continue suffering from the consequences of the climate crisis. Most prominently, water scarcity will lead to an increasingly dire situation, fueling food insecurity, economic downturn, civil unrest, and violent extremism. That said, several innovative start-ups and promising technologies are on the rise, with the GCC countries upping the funding to accelerate developments in the field. Hope now lies upon the Abu Dhabi COP28, set to take place in November and, ironically, hosted by UAEโ€™s National Oil Company CEO, with civil society organizations and academia urging for serious action.

Economy

A cleavage in economic performance is increasingly visible among Middle Eastern countries, with the oil-based GCC monarchies witnessing continuous growth - whereas others are facing economic decline, leading to or exacerbating existing socio-political turbulences. The economic outlook for 2023 indicates that inflation is likely to surpass 30% in numerous countries, with Syria at 63% and Lebanon at a staggering 167% . Further regional actors, such as Iran, Turkey, Egypt, and Yemen, face economic hardship while also having to tackle political challenges, civil unrest, and violent conflicts. Overall, domestic and international factors - such as the war in Ukraine - are likely to deepen a looming recession and the energy crisis. While it is likely that wealthy GCC countries will continue to support struggling regional allies, countries such as Yemen, Libya and Lebanon will continue to be used as arenas for proxy wars, further deepening their economic troubles.