How often do we consider nations with glorious histories tend to live under the constructed shadow of their past and continue a collective sense that is tangible yet sophisticatedly laying behind layers of time? Is it correct to assume the roots of Iran's nuclear program are somehow attached to reviving its past? What are the main differences between pre and post-1979 Iran and its nuclear development policies?
The issue appeared in the public debate a few years after Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi came to power in 1944. The latter, who studied in Switzerland, developed a western attitude enriched by power aspirations and ideals of modernization. In this project, the nuclear program has always been present. For Shah, modernization necessarily passed through the implementation of a nuclear program. First, Shah intended to give his country a real energy alternative, not forgetting that nuclear weapons could give a strong international legitimacy: a powerful state, a state capable of defending itself, is a compelling state and a state which is able to develop its regional influence. Moreover, the program could give birth to a process of technological and scientific progress, increasing the power of the country through investments in new researchers. With the 1979 revolution and the change in the alliance system, Iran remained isolated and the nuclear program was suspended.
The decision of resuming the nuclear program has been guided by the will to conserve independence from other powers, intensify the distances from the United States, and start the first net of relations with its neighbours from a strong position of power. The government started gradually to intercept the feeling of the elite and of the public that the nuclear strategy crystallized the regional position. In other words, nuclear power could give to Iran not only a decisive international bargaining leverage but mostly a stabilizing tool in domestic politics. In some way, the perception that the Iranian people could have of the government and of its action could have been influenced by the ideal of a political elite capable of taking strong decisions. The Iranians would see the development of a nuclear program as an ambitious project enabling the country to develop a strategic aim and enhance its regional influence. From this element, some scholars have claimed that a new uniting consensus aroused around the nuclear pact, allowing the executive power to gain a wider leeway. Scholars have argued that the main reason that pushed Iran toward a nuclear program was deterrence. In this reconstruction, a primary role is played by the War against Iraq, which must be analyzed in a wider context. The war broke out after 1979 when Iran was isolated, and Iraq exploited the opportunity to improve its relations with the US. Such an attack, which engaged Iran all of a sudden, found it unprepared and taught to Iran the importance of appearing strong and resistant.
However, it could be claimed that deterrence is a dangerous strategy and that Iran in this way could face enormous risks in challenging the international community in such an open approach. Nonetheless, among the political elite, a decisive idea has spread and motivated the choices of Iran: if Iran goes beyond the imposed threshold, the international community will accept it. This has been a compelling argument that animated the internal debate about the nuclear program. In the international non-proliferation agenda, Iran’s nuclear program has been placed as a priority security issue: the consequences of a nuclear Iran, in the fragile region of the Middle East, could trigger threatening outcomes. To counter such a threat and identify the main efforts to be undertaken to address it, studies have focused on understanding the causes behind Iran’s nuclear aspirations. Realism has been the predominant international relations theory for this purpose. Yet, an opposite analysis has placed constructivist interpretations at the center of the debate.
In constructivist views, the revolutionary values associated with the regime are linked to the development of the nuclear programme. As such, normative factors have been proposed as the elements behind the Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign policy. Mahdi Mohammad Nia has argued that, since 1979 brought the clerical regime under Ayatollah Khomeini to power: The Iranian nation has been dominated by a revolutionary ethos and this has been translated into its foreign and security policy. Consequently, Iran's nuclear aspirations should be looked at through the lens of this discourse.
On April 3, 2022, Fox News released an article about the failure of the Pentagon to find evidence proving the military is a hotbed of extremism, reporting less than 100 cases in 2021. The article then presented comments from current and former service members, who all seemed to dismiss the problem as non-existent considering the low number of extremist-affiliated instances and thus not a priority for the Armed Forces, blaming the media for exacerbating the issue. Historically, although policies have been implemented, the US military has struggled to identify and manage radicalised personnel, and this trend seems to continue today. The DoDI 1325.06 was implemented in 2009, listing the prohibited activities in the Armed Forces such as active participation in supremacist, extremist or criminal gang milieus and giving recommendation for preventive measures. In the aftermath of the Capitol attack, the Instruction 1325.06 was reviewed in December 2021, clarifying the definitions of “extremist activities” and “active participation” in an effort to better address the threat of extremists within ranks. However, the policy still presents an important loophole, as membership in extremist groups such as the KKK or white supremacists is still not prohibited, only active participation is limited, failing to account for racism in the ranks and reflecting the bias of the US government.
This article aims to show that the danger of domestic terrorism posed by current and former military personnel with links to far-right extremist groups (FREGs) is often underestimated and discarded as an uninfluential phenomenon by lawmakers and the wider community of defence specialists and academics. However, despite the issue of extremists in the US military may only apply to a handful of individuals, dismissing it as non-existent can make military and law enforcement underestimate the security threat posed by the far-right fringe due to their ability to conduct high-impact events, such as the 2021 Capitol insurrection. This article will explore three aspects: the actual extent of the problem, the security concerns posed by anti-government militias, and the symbiotic relationship between military personnel and FREGs.
Image Source: unsplash.com
Current scope of the issue
The recent global increase of the involvement of the military in far-right groups needs to be highlighted. Indeed, one in five applicants of the white supremacist group Patriot Front belongs, or has belonged to the US military. In 2020, 6.4% of domestic terrorist attacks and plots were committed by US military personnel. This is a dramatic rise in number since 2019, when only 1.5% of domestic terrorist attacks were committed by the same, is alarming. For instance, 20% of the people prosecuted for various crimes committed during the US Capitol attack on 6 January 2021 are members of the US military. Therefore, the downplaying of the issue by the Armed Forces, as relayed by the studied article, is problematic because it does not allow for a common awareness that would lead to the adoption of more effective measures and legislation.
Anti-government militias and security concerns
Although the American far-right is ideologically diverse and fragmented, according to the National Security Council the main threat to domestic terrorism comes from anti-government and anti-authority violent extremists. Various data shows that active-duty personnel, veterans, and reservists make up about 25% of active militia groups such as the Proud Boys, the Oath Keepers, and the Three Percenters, groups which have taken part in the incursions of January 6th. Conspiracy theories are at the core of militias’ ideology. They believe the US government is part of a conspiracy to create a new world order, a socialist one-world government which will be the downfall of the white race starting with stripping Americans of their gun ownership. The military is also part of this conspiratorial worldview, and militias legitimise their violence against the government, military, and law enforcement by positioning them as corrupt. One possible contributor to the radicalisation of military personnel could be the socio-political polarisation prevalent in the country and narratives such as the fraud in the election, the Covid pandemic, and Black Lives Matter, which have provided an excuse to ramp up the violence. The combination of narratives and conspiracy theories on the US’s tyrannical government and the increased interest in recruiting military members and veterans suggests an increase in activity of militia and anti-government movements in the next few years. This development is concerning because the law enforcement has a history of underestimating the threat from the far-right dating back to Timothy McVeigh and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. Paul Eaton, a retired US army general, believes the US is not keeping up with domestic terrorism, the growing rise of extremism in the US military, and all the “McVeighs” still active today.
An historically interconnected relationship
The symbiotic relationship between FREGs and military personnel helps understand the domestic security risk posed by them. Historically, far-right groups have always had ties with the US military, starting from the founding members of the KKK, confederate officers and soldiers were, to active-duty soldiers and veterans recruited after the Vietnam war by white power activists. A handful of these individuals has been involved in domestic terrorist attacks and plots, with the attack on Capitol Hill being just the latest incident, with 81 out of 727 charged defendants with ties to the military, 66 veterans, and 5 active-duty service members.
This interconnected relationship is powered by the need for mutual assistance between FREGs and military personnel. Indeed, FREGs direct their propaganda and actively recruit military personnel for their notable abilities and skills, such as their proficiency in firing weapons, training personnel, and conducting surveillance. Meanwhile, FREGs members are seeking access to military training and their recruitment has been facilitated by the relaxation of military recruitment standards due to the War on Terror. Moreover, members or former members of the US military may find refuge in FREGs after a traumatic experience in combat, because these groups operate on a similar structure, and share some cultural aspects with the military.
Conclusion
Right-wing extremism in the US military is an issue of relative size but of considerable importance. Indeed, neither military training nor service are instruments of radicalisation of individuals. Nevertheless, they are subject to a number of factors such as PTSD or return to civilian life that could make them more susceptible to FREGs’ propaganda. Consequently, it is essential to consider military or veteran extremists as a special category and to increase vigilance because of their involvement in institutions dedicated to the protection of the US population. Indeed, their skills for violence and the symbolic value of service members being involved in terrorist groups and acts, as well as the rise in terrorist acts committed by members of the US military, justify the urgency of improving legislation and implementing effective measures.
Today, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) is an intergovernmental military alliance among the US, Canada and 28 European countries – but it has not always been this large. Indeed, when Nato was first conceived in 1949 it was made up of just 12 members: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the UK and the US. The creation of the Alliance pursued three essential purposes: “deterring Soviet expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration”. The accession process is regulated by Article 10 of the Treaty and other European Countries can be invited to participate. The aspiring member countries must meet key requirements and implement a multi-step process including political, economic, defence, resource, security and legal aspects. In case they are experiencing any issue, they can request assistance, practical support and the advice by a NATO programme, which is called the Membership Action Plan (MAP).
After the end of the Cold War, we can witness four different waves of NATO expansion to Eastern Europe. The first important wave of expansion to the East was launched by the reunification of Germany in 1990. On 12th September 1990, the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, commonly known as Two Plus Four Treaty, was signed by the foreign ministers of the Federal Republic of Germany, the GDR, France, Russia, the UK and the USA. The Treaty regulated all the foreign policy aspects of German reunification, including the membership to Nato, and imposed the withdrawal of all the foreign troops and the deployment of their nuclear weapons from the former East Germany and also the prohibition to West Germany’s possession of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. On October 3rd 1990, the German Democratic Republic and Federal Republic were reunited again.
As to the second wave, the new member countries were Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. First, on 15th February 1991 they formed the Visegrad Group. Then, on 1st January 1993, Czechoslovakia split into two independent countries: Czech Republic and Slovakia. In 1997, Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary took part in the Alliance’s Madrid Summit and on 12th March 1999, the three former Warsaw Pact members joined NATO. The main reasons were: “to ensure thecountry’s external security”, to impede “the possibility of a greatwar in unstable Central Europe” and for Poland also “to advance its military capabilities”.
In May 2000, a group of NATO candidate countries created the Vilnius Group (Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia). The Vilnius Group resorted to the Membership Action Plan which was introduced by NATO for the first time at the 1999 Washington Summit. In addition, Croatia joined the Vilnius Group in May 2001. The Summit of the NATO Aspirant countries “Riga 2002: The Bridge to Prague” started the path towards the alliance’s membership which took place in Riga, Latvia, on July 5-6, 2002, where the leaders of NATO member and aspirant countries gathered for the last time before the NATO 2002 Prague Summit in November. On 29th March 2004, the largest wave of enlargement in alliance history materialized, except for Albania and Croatia. For Baltic states and Bulgaria, NATO membership symbolized their wish to be part of the European family. NATO was perceived not just merely as a military alliance with security guarantees under Article 5, but as a symbol of higher development, where Baltic states could find their proper place. Moreover, it was the attempt to escape Russian influence, in favor of the protection provided by the American strategic nuclear umbrella and a collective defence.
The same path of the Vilnius Group was followed by the Adriatic Charter of European countries. The Adriatic Charter was created in Tirana on 2nd May by Albania, Croatia and Macedonia and USA for the purpose to obtain their North Atlantic Alliance admission. Albania and Macedonia were previous participants of MAP since its creation in 1999, while Croatia joined in 2002. Moreover, Macedonia also took part in Nato's Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1995. On 1st April 2009, the North Atlantic Alliance officially annexed Albania and Croatia after their participation in the 2008 Bucharest Summit. Macedonia accession was postponed because of a dispute on the formal name with Greece. Macedonia became NATO's 30th country on 27th March 2020. Montenegro emulated the same path of the latter, but joined three years before on 5th June 2017, after the Accession Protocol signature in May 2016. For Montenegro itself, the major incentives to join NATO were the future eventuality of EU membership, the highest prestige of the Atlantic Alliance and to achieve “Nato’s security guarantee”.
Future enlargements
Bosnia Herzegovina is the only potential candidate which joined the Membership Action Plan on 5th December 2018. In spite of Georgia and Ukraine expressing the will to start their path to the North Atlantic Alliance, their situation is still uncertain. The primary reason remains the need to meet all necessary requirements through important reforms focused on key areas; and, the current Russia-Ukraine war.
Consequences for the European Security
On one hand, many consequences, which were the main reasons for NATO expansion to the East, materialized in reality. For example, the inclusion of Eastern Europe nations in the military agreement have promoted democratic reform and stability there, provided stronger collective defense and an improved ability to address new security concerns, improved relations among the Eastern and Central European states, fostered a more stable climate for economic reform, trade, and foreign investment, and finally, improved NATO's ability to operate as a cooperative security organization with broad European security concern,” as stated in the clear purposes contained in a prepared statement of the Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright on 23rd April 1997.
On the other hand, in spite of NATO's open door policy with Russia, the latter constitutes the largest threat for European security once again in the energy, political and military field. Indeed, the current conflict in Ukraine shows the evident ambition to create a new Russian empire by the Russian President, Vladimir Putin. Many warnings about Russia’s reaction were expressed in the declarations of Biden’s CIA director, William J. Burns, when he worked as counselor for political affairs at the US embassy in Moscow in 1995. On 26th June 1997, a group of 50 prominent foreign policy experts that included former senators, retired military officers, diplomats and academicians, sent an open letter to President Clinton outlining their opposition to NATO expansion”. In the end, the father of the Cold War containment doctrine, George F. Kennan described the NATO expansion as a “tragic mistake”.
Conclusion
The current Russian invasion in Ukraine puts in clear evidence the necessity for the EU countries to accelerate the formation process of the European Army. They will have to achieve energy independence by using Russian gas, diversifying their own supplier countries and to invest massively in the green economy. Moreover, the EU must strengthen its common foreign policy, implementing an effective diplomatic action and speaking with one voice to cope with the great tensions around Europe and the rest of the world. If not, the European project will risk crumbling.
Admiral Lee Hsi-min (retired) is a Senior Fellow at the Project 2049 Institute. He previously served as the Chief of the General Staff of the Republic of China (Taiwan) Armed Forces from 2017 to his retirement in July 2019 after 42 years of service in the ROC Navy. Before his retirement, he was awarded the Order of the Cloud and Banner with Special Grand Cordon by President Tsai Ing-wen in recognition of his service in enhancing the overall capabilities of Taiwan’s military. He has authored articles in The Diplomat and War on the Rocks on issues related to Taiwan.
He answers a series of questions regarding Taiwan’s preparedness against potential Chinese invasion, lessons for Taiwan’s Territorial Defence Force from the Ukrainian experience and the edge it may or may not have as an island state against China when compared to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict.
Interviewing Team: Sandra Watson Parcels and Carlotta Rinaudo
In this interview, Dr Maxim Alyukov explores how political engagement in authoritarian states affects the ways in which its citizens interpret the news, particularly focussing on the Russia-Ukraine War. How does the media in Russia document the conflict in Ukraine? What is the response from the Russian community? This discussion centres on research by Dr Alyukov on how citizens living in authoritarian regimes interpret political information in a heavily regulated media landscape.
Dr Maxim Alyukov is a postdoctoral fellow at King’s Russia Institute, King's College London. He is also a researcher with Public Sociology Laboratory (St Petersburg). His research has been published in a variety of disciplinary and area studies journals, such as Politics, Qualitative Psychology, and Europe-Asia Studies. He holds a PhD in social sciences from the University of Helsinki and an MA in sociology from the European University at Saint-Petersburg.
Interviewers: Leigh Dawson, Julia Hodgins, and Sofia Staderini.
Alessandro Vivaldi talks about the main challanges for intelligence and geopolitical analysts in our times. He is president at AIAIG - Associazione Italiana Analisti di Intelligence e Geopolitica. In this session, Alessandro Vivaldi talks about the role of the analyst in Italy and Continental Europe in the public and private sector. He also explains the most common mistakes committed by analysts and how they can overcome them in the era of infodemic and fake news.
Interviewer: Danilo delle Fave.
This is ITSS Verona Member Series Video Podcast by the Intelligence and Military Strategy Team ITSS Verona - The International Team for the Study of Security Verona is a not-for-profit, apolitical, international cultural association dedicated to the study of international security, ranging from terrorism to climate change, from artificial intelligence to pandemics, from great power competition to energy security.
Italian state security has become evermore intertwined with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region in recent days, as the invasion of Ukraine by Russia has highlighted the need for Europe to secure a renewable, multi-origin energy supply, as well as the importance of European food supplies in North Africa. The impact of war on Ukrainian and Russian harvests has not only caused wheat shortages in European markets, but also devastated grain imports across the MENA region, such as in Tunisia, Morocco and Libya. European sanctions on Russian oil and gas have also sent the cost of energy soaring, leading European leaders to seek other sources of fuel, including in the Middle East. War in Eastern Europe could see Western Europe and the EU seeking out a stronger partnership with the MENA region in both trade and diplomacy. However, Europe and the MENA region would have to overcome historic and contemporary tensions in order to achieve closer collaboration.
However, in order to establish mutual food and energy security, Italy and the MENA region would have to build stronger ties in both the trade and diplomatic spheres, working through historic and contemporary tensions. To this day, Italy’s relations with the MENA region are still damaged by the country’s legacy of colonization in Libya and the Horn of Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries, as well its support for France’s colonization of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco.
La sicurezza dello stato italiano è diventata negli ultimi giorni sempre più legata alla regione del Medio Oriente del Nord Africa. Infatti l’invasione dell’Ucraina da parte della Russia ha evidenziato, da un lato, la necessità per l’Europa di assicurarsi un approvvigionamento energetico rinnovabile e diversificato, dall’altro ha posto l’accento sull’importanza delle forniture alimentari europee in Nord Africa. L’impatto della guerra sui raccolti ucraini e russi non solo ha causato carenze di grano nei mercati europei, ma ha anche colpito duramente le sue importazioni in tutta la regione MENA, così come in Tunisia, Marocco e Libia.
Inoltre, le sanzioni di Bruxelles sul petrolio e sul gas russo hanno causato un’esponenziale crescita del costo dell’energia, portando i leader europei a cercare nuove fonti di carburante, in particolar modo anche in Medio Oriente.
A tal proposito, la guerra in Ucraina potrebbe spingere l’Europa occidentale e l’Unione Europea a formare una partnership più forte con la regione MENA sia a livello commerciale che diplomatico. Per raggiungere un livello di collaborazione più stretta, è necessario tuttavia che l’Europa e i paesi del MENA superino le tensioni storiche e contemporanee che pervadono nei loro rapporti internazionali.
Questa situazione rappresenta un’opportunità per numerosi paesi dell’UE di coprire il vuoto lasciato da Russia e Ucraina. La Francia, per esempio, è un grande produttore globale di grano con 30,1 milioni di tonnellate raccolte nel 2020, meno delle 85,9 milioni di tonnellate russe, ma più delle 24,9 milioni dell’Ucraina nello stesso anno. Anche la Germania, seppur in modo minore, contribuisce alla produzione europea di grano, avendo prodotto nel 2020 circa 22,2 milioni di tonnellate. Un altro paese che potrebbe giocare un ruolo importante nella regione si tratta dell’Italia. Nonostante questa abbia raccolto “solo” 6,7 milioni di tonnellate, il paese ha esportato oltre 24,8 milioni di dollari in grano nel 2020. Il sostegno dei paesi europei garantirebbero quindi ai paesi del Medio Oriente e del Nord Africa la possibilità di attingere dal mercato europeo e di soddisfare la propria domanda interna.
Tuttavia, al fine di stabilire una reciproca sicurezza alimentare ed energetica, l’Italia e i paesi del MENA dovrebbero perseguire nuove forme di collaborazione economica e diplomatica. Ad oggi le relazioni dell’Italia con la regione del MENA risentono ancora del passato imperialista di Roma, in particolare della colonizzazione della Libia e del Corno d’Africa nel XIX-XX secolo, e del sostegno alla colonizzazione francese di Algeria, Tunisia e Marocco.
Ad aggravare lo status diplomatico tra Italia e paesi del Medio Oriente e del Nord Africa si aggiungono anche eventi più contemporanei come la recente crisi migratoria. Questa, iniziata nel 2010 e intensificatasi nel 2015, ha visto milioni di rifugiati provenienti dall’Asia, dall’Africa e dal Medio Oriente fuggire in Europa in seguito alle guerre scatenatesi nei loro paesi. In alcuni momenti della crisi, la maggior parte dei migranti stava attraversando l’Italia dal Nord Africa, partendo specialmente dalla Libia. Questo ha creato una situazione di tensione e sfiducia tra i due paesi e a livello internazionale, dal momento che ai migranti stranieri veniva spesso negato l’ingresso in Italia e lasciati annegare in mare, oppure detenuti e maltrattati nei centri di detenzione in Libia. I politici italiani come l’ex Primo Ministro Matteo Salvini hanno spesso lanciato commenti infiammatori sugli immigrati provenienti dal Medio Oriente e dal Nord Africa, aumentando le tensioni e suscitando forti attriti tra le diverse comunità multietniche. Un esempio è la dichiarazione con cui Salvini difese un collega reo di aver sparato a un immigrato marocchino, oppure il processo che l’ex Primo Ministro ha dovuto affrontare per le accuse di rapimenti di 147 rifugiati, impossibilitati a scendere in Italia dalla barca della ONG Seawatch.
Mentre questi eventi hanno indebolito le relazioni diplomatiche tra l’Italia e i paesi del MENA, alcune ostilità di recente memoria sono in realtà servite a rafforzare i loro legami strategici. Nonostante non abbiano raggiunto i loro obiettivi strategici, le truppe di pace italiane a Beirut durante la guerra civile libanese negli anni ’80 sono state lodate per la loro “neutralità sostenuta, il comportamento rispettoso e il minimo uso della forza”.
By: Riccardo Bosticco, Lorenzo Caruti, Sofia Dal Santo, Miguel Jiménez, Michele Mignogna.
Introduction
The Russian invasion of Ukraine started on February 24, is already showing significant effects on a global scale. As most States and international organizations have officially condemned the war - from West to East between America, Europe, and Africa - openly criticizing Putin's behavior and deciding to sanction Moscow heavily, the biggest problem concerns the aspect inherent to energy supplies. "Europe depends on Russia for about 40% of its natural gas, with most of it transported by pipeline", explains Reuters. Luckily for them, most European countries have cut reliance on Russian gas in recent years. Yet dependency is still weighty, and the most recent sanctions on Moscow caused a further growth of gas prices. European states and companies have acknowledged the danger of relying too heavily on Russian energy, and also those countries that had a commercial, yet controversial, understanding of energy relations with Russia, like Germany, decided to act firmly.
The United States proposes solutions to Europe, while oil and gas producers in the MENA act controversially, and China remains cautiously in the background, carefully observing the evolution of the situation without intervening directly or taking a clear position. Where will the current energy decisions drive us?
The European Union
The EU is a substantial energy importer, largely reliant on Russia's supply. Accordingly, due to sanctions imposed to punish Russia, the EU has set about to make a significant course correction. The European Commission has proposed an outline of a plan to make Europe independent from Russian gas before 2030: REPowerEU. The main goal of this ambitious plan is to diversify to the greatest extent possible the gas suppliers of the EU by increasing LNG Imports and constructing alternative pipelines. To do so, a strong political will by the Member States to follow the correct route and avoid uncoordinated actions is needed.
Currently, there are not sufficient LNG terminals in the Eastern EU, although growing investments have been undertaken in recent years by the Union; it is, therefore, crucial that such countries have access to regional gas hubs. In addition, even the construction of alternative pipelines prompts some issues. Unsurprisingly, European customers are unwilling to commit financially to long-term gas purchase contracts, which would be necessary to sustain pipeline development, due to EU green obligations. Furthermore, authoritarian governments like Azerbaijan's, Turkey's, and the Gulf monarchies' influence on the gas trade would remain, leaving the door open for political exploits of energy flows. Besides, the existing alternative sources of natural gas to the EU appear to be already at the highest production level. Therefore, the most likely option seems to import from the Caspian Sea.
Overall, an emphasis is placed by the Commission on boosting energy efficiency and increasing the use of renewables. This is essential since it contributes to terminating the EU's overdependence on a single supplier, even though it does not provide a suitable solution in the short term. Last but not least, the Commission has even undertaken initiatives to mitigate high energy prices.
Conclusion As soon as the shock of the Ukrainian war arrived, the West discovered a hard truth: even in a globally interdependent world, it is not safe to be heavily dependent on a single country. As mentioned above, Europe is moving towards making plans to become energetically independent. Nevertheless, West leaders are conscious that the road to independence will be long and winding, indeed taking years to make it. However, the problem is not only a European matter: as previously said, even a solid Russian ally like China is facing the effect of the energetic crisis. On the other hand, Beijing will probably be seen as the only winner at the war's end, mainly for its ambiguous position. At the same time, the United States is dealing with a different situation: even though it does not depend on energy imported from Moscow, its role as a leader is put to the test. Washington needs to help its allies and, simultaneously, avoid the MENA Region ending up in the hands of China. Therefore, what is at stake is not only the energy question: the current world order could become very different at the end of the day.
It was the 5th of January 2015 when a wanted man of Ugandan nationality turned himself after a long hiding. He surrendered to a US military base, located in the Central African Republic. His name was Dominic Ongwen and its name was already notorious well beyond the national borders of Uganda. Namely, he was known for its commanding role inside the Lord Resistance Army (LRA): one of the deemed most violent terrorist organization in all the African continent:
The LRA was founded in 1986 by its ongoing supreme leader Joseph Kony, as an opposition force to the government of Uganda led by Yuweri Museveni. Since then, the paramilitary organisation has been the perpetrator of brutal crimes against the civilian population. Notably, among the most contested of these acts, there is the kidnapping of children from their family, with the purpose to turn them into faithful soldiers through torture and indoctrination. Until his escape, Dominic Ongwen covered a central position in this terrorist scheme. As referred by prosecutor Benjamin Gumpert to the International Criminal Court (ICC), ‘Dominic Ongwen was one of the most senior commanders in the LRA’.
Today, more than a decade later, Joseph Kony is still on the run, while Dominic Ongwen decided to turn himself to international forces, triggering his prosecution before the ICC – which received jurisdiction on from Museveni in 2003. However, despite the large amount of evidence against the accused, the case has proven to be controversial since the onset. The problem lied in the fact that Dominic Ongwen was not part of LRA by his own volition, as he was abducted in 1988 when he was still 9 years old. Only after years of violent indoctrination in the values of the LRA, he become an asset for the group; eventually rising among the ranks and becoming commander of the LRA Sinia Brigade.
The proceeding before the ICC focused on this latter period, when Ongwen committed, directly and indirectly, crimes against the civilian population as a senior LRA officer. At the time Ongwen was not a minor anymore (around 21 years old), therefore formally he was legally a fully liable adult.
But really an entire childhood spent inside a violent terrorist organisation was meaningless in the eyes of the law? This question proved to be troubling for the sitting judges at the ICC. Ongwen’s trial was extremely important for setting a precedent on the legal treatment of child soldiers who have become adults.
The definition of ‘duress’
During the trial before the ICC it was invoked by the defence counsel the s.c. ‘duress’, which is understood as an exception to the general regime of criminal responsibility. Already in the eighteenth-century William Blackstone defined it in his ‘Commentaries on the Laws of England’ as ‘threats and menaces, which induce a fear of death or other bodily harm, and which take away for that reason the guilt of many crimes and misdemeanors’.
As we can see indoctrination is not taken into consideration in the latter definition. Nonetheless, the question is far from settled and there are multiple interpretations. For instance, the French Code provides that ‘a person is not criminally liable who acted under the influence of a force or constraint which he could not resist’. This provision is larger in scope than the one provided by Blackstone and seems focused on the free will of the perpetrator.
Instead, in the German Code states that ‘if someone commits a wrongful act in order to avoid an imminent, otherwise unavoidable danger to life, limb, or liberty, either to himself or to a dependent or someone closely connected with him, the actor commits the act without culpability’.This definition doesn’t mention free will, while it is evident a balance between – using the words of Blackstone – ‘the menace’ and the wrongful act.
The element of ‘duress’ has been analysed also by the International Military Tribunal (IMT), in the aftermath of World War II, where it was detached by the similar defence of the ‘hierarchical order’. The issue was then debated again fifty years later, by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Erdemovic case, which concerned a footman soldier that had killed 70 civilians during the siege of Srebrenica. Notably, in the latter case the defence counsel raised ‘duress’ before the ICTY, as Erdemovic was threatened with death by his superior if he was not to comply with the orders.
Nonetheless, after a debate between the sitting judges, Erdemovic was convicted for his deeds – with the notable dissenting opinion of Judge Cassese. The judgement was based on consequentialist considerations. Namely, that Erdemovic should not be acquitted since this could provide a defence to future perpetrators of international crimes and even harming the deterrence of international rules.
Even Cassese did not entirely disagree with the outcome of the majority, concluding that a general prohibition on resorting to ‘duress’ can be established in the case of the killing of innocent civilians. But with the notable exception in the case that ‘it is highly probable, if not certain’ that the person under ‘duress’ is fated to die along with his victims if he does commit the crime, which will be carried out in any event.
In the end, the argument of ‘duress’ was not accepted for Erdemovic by the ICTY. However, the dissenting opinion of Cassese proved to be hugely influential, years later, on the future definition of ‘duress’ enshrined in the Rome Statute, the treaty establishing the ICC.
The International Criminal Court and Dominic Ongwen
We finally go back to the case of Ongwen, an ex-child soldier who has been indoctrinated for a good part of his life. The reasoning of the ICC was bound by Art. 31(1d) of the Rome Statute, which states that for ‘duress’ is necessary a threat of ‘imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm against that person or another person’.
After hearing hundreds of witnesses and wiretaps the ICC established that this requirement of ‘duress’ was not met. The element of ‘imminence’, inside the first criteria, has been interpreted restrictively as otherwise, the ICC feared it could ‘provide a blanket immunity to members of criminal organisations which have brutal systems of ensuring discipline’. The specific conditions in which Ongwen grew was taken into consideration by the Court, but in a limited way.
Indeed, from a legal perspective, this outcome is legitimate. The ICC used ‘duress’ on the basis of what was established plainly in the Rome Statute. However, some uncertainties remain. As we have shown in this brief exposition, ‘duress’ is not homogenously justified in legal practice. Rather, we have witnessed that it is a rather relativistic, often rhetorical, concept.
This is even more controversial in a case concerning the actions committed by an abducted child. Ongwen did commit horrific crimes, but at the same time international law recognize undisputedly the particular vulnerability of younglings and the prohibition of their conscription under a certain age. Does international law really not recognize methods of coercion – such as a lengthy indoctrination – outside of the most obvious ones such as the threat of death?
In the end the discomfort of the Court in setting the final stone on this case was reflected in the final judgement. For 61 charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes, the ICC sentenced Dominic Ongwen to 25 years of imprisonment. A rather light penalty given the heavy accusatory load. Perhaps, showing that the peculiar history of the defendant could not deflect responsibility, but was taken instead as an extenuating circumstance.
For its forth event of the 2021/22 Webinar Series, entitled "The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict: What's Next?", ITSS Verona members Ludovica Brambilla, Davide Gobbicchi and Fabrizio Napoli (from the Russia and Post-Soviet Space Team) discuss with Dr Tracey German (KCL) - one of Europe's main experts on Russian affairs - the status of the conflict in Ukraine, narratives, strategies, winners and losers, and political, social, cultural, economic implications for all actors involved.
Do not miss on the other ITSS Verona webinars, which are available at the following link: https://www.itssverona.it/activities