May 14, 2025No Comments

Drivers of Chronic Unrest in Eastern Congo

By Andrea Sau - Africa Desk

In April 2025, the Eastern Congo unrest seemed to have shifted timidly toward the end of major conflicts. First, on 23 April 2025, the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”) and, alleged by DRC and some international observers, the Rwanda-backed militia M23 released a joint statement in which they pleaded to cease hostilities that have soared since January 2025. Subsequently, on 25 April 2025, the DRC and Rwanda signed an economic cooperation and peace agreement. The accord was brokered by the United States, which, in return, was promised access to the mineral resources of the country.

At the beginning of April, before the most recent developments, ITSS interviewed Professor Koen Vlassenroot to better understand the possible drivers of the unrest in the region. In this article, a timeline of the events will be drawn from the Rwandan genocide to the recent escalation of 2025. Furthermore, the origin of M23 will be analysed, including what the movement has been in the last 15 years and what motivations have fueled the group. Finally, these insights will be used to infer what the future of the Eastern DRC might look like after the signing of the agreements.

From the Rwandan genocide to the rise of M23

Between April and July 1994, at least 800,000 ethnic Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed by the Hutu majority in Rwanda. The Rwandan genocide has heavily characterised the history of Rwanda and its neighbouring countries for the past 31 years. In July 1994, a coalition of exiled Tutsi called the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which had attempted to gain control of Rwanda since 1990, managed to take over the country and put an end to the genocide. The DRC was remarkably affected in the wake of the Rwandan genocide and civil war, as between 1993 and 1996, almost 2 million Hutus emigrated to the neighbouring regions of North and South Kivu in the Eastern Congo.

In 1996, a coalition of countries led by Rwanda, which included Uganda, Burundi, and Angola, launched an invasion into the Eastern DRC, then called Zaire and led by Dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. The First Congo War stemmed from two major elements: on one side, the Congolese opposition, led by Laurent Kabila, attempted to overthrow the Mobutu regime, and on the other hand, the surrounding countries wanted to deal with the security concerns generated by the Mobutu-backed militias active in the region. Unfortunately, it is to be noted that most of the victims were civilians and refugees inhabiting North and South Kivu territories.

In the years after he came to power, Laurent Kabila faced a complex conundrum. He needed to gain ground in local Congolese civil society, but to do that, he had to take a distance from the country that helped his accession to power, Rwanda. The Second Congo War was triggered by the decision from Kabila to expel the Rwandan and allied troops from the Eastern Congo. This resulted in support from Rwanda and Uganda to the rebel group Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (“RCD”), composed of various ethnicities part of the macro group of the Banyarwanda. The war was concluded by a lengthy peace process that started in 2001 and ended in 2006 with the election of Joseph Kabila as president of the DRC. Joseph was the son of Laurent Kabila, who died in 2001.

The peace process and the UN peacekeeping mission MONUC (later MONUSCO) were not enough to bring lasting peace in the Eastern DRC.  The process was rejected by the still active Tutsi groups in North and South Kivu, the most prominent example being Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (“CNDP)”. According to CNDP and other military groups, backed by Rwanda, the 2006 election did not guarantee sufficient representation for the Tutsi groups in North and South Kivu. After fights escalated, the civilian death toll increased even further between 2006 and 2009. A new peace process started in 2009, attempting a brassage which was intended to be a progressive integration of the armed groups into the DRC army. The agreement was signed by CNDP and the other groups on 23 March 2009.

The results of this renovated peace process did not fully satisfy part of the CNDP members; therefore, in 2012, the failure to implement the March 23 agreement resulted in mutiny by a group that called itself the March 23 movement, or in short, M23.

M23 drivers and motivation for its accomplishments

The rise of M23 in 2012 was short-lived but somewhat rapid. By November 2012, the movement managed to conquer the city of Goma, North Kivu's major city. International pressure managed to push M23, and especially its allegedly main sponsor, Rwanda, to bring the movement within the Rwandan and Ugandan borders.

The unrest in the DRC, and Eastern Congo especially, did not cease after 2012, but the country experienced in 2018 the first peaceful transition of democratic power as Etienne Tshisekedi took over the presidency. However, M23 apparently claimed that Tshisekedi was not committed to existing peace agreements and decided to return to action in November 2021. In the early 2020s, M23 gained momentum rapidly again, with - according to UN reports and regional observers - the support of Rwanda, even with troops on the ground. M23 managed to defeat the DRC troops several times, both because of external support and due to the Congolese army persistent corruption and structural weakness.

However, the distrust toward Tshisekedi cannot be pinned as the sole or main reason for the return of M23. While their objectives cannot be surely identified, the movement has a plethora of motivations that may have fueled the return to arms. Firstly, M23 had a more grounded approach since 2021, and while still targeting civilians, it aimed at controlling territories in North and South Kivu. In 2012, it was only a question of fighting against the power that the reckon was not respecting the accords. In the 2020s, the motivations had morphed, and since its return, M23 has established outposts, electing majors and administrators, and governed cities and territories. Furthermore, one important element is that M23 is part of the Alliance Fleuve Congo (“AFC”). AFC is a more politically involved movement with large overlaps with M23 in its leadership, and contrary to M23 itself, it has national ambitions. It is under the AFC umbrella that the April 2025 accords have been signed.

According to some sources, the Rwandan support has also changed; it has increased its direct involvement and reportedly has aided in the propaganda and recruitment. Rwandan president Kagame has often justified the involvement of Rwanda in the region and the M23 presence as a way of protecting Tutsi in North and South Kivu. While this claim is often refuted, there is also a general discredit and hate speech towards speakers of Kinyarwanda, Rwanda’s national language, in Eastern Congo, aggravated by decades of conflict.

Foto di Safari consoler da Pixabay

The control of the mineral wealth of Congo is often cited by international publications as one of the key factors. The Eastern region is rich in gold and coltan, which is key for the sustainable transition. It is worth noting, however, that M23 has, for the most part, only gained from smuggling rather than the mining itself, and only in April 2024 gained direct access to a Coltan mine in Kabaya. During the period between November 2021 and April 2024, M23 conducted a campaign funded by alternative means. Rwanda has, in recent years, widely increased its export of minerals. However, although coltan exports are increasing, gold remains the country's main mineral export. According to multiple independent reports, there are credible concerns that this gold originates from the eastern part of the DRC. Additionally, one factor that needs to be taken into consideration is whether the presence of active conflict benefits or not the gold smuggling and extraction business. Academic studies indicate the opposite: the gold smuggling system does not necessarily benefit from active conflict.

Finally, Congo has the largest reserves of cobalt in the world, also extremely important for tech and clean energy purposes. This stockpile is located in the South of the country, which is, on the contrary, relatively more stable (although the Tigres movement has had some traction over the years). Therefore, it is important to understand that minerals do have an important role in the instability; however, they are not the main drivers of the conflict, but one of the many complex elements that fuel the fights in North and South Kivu.

What now?

The April 2025 agreement is not the first ceasefire attempt signed between M23 and the DRC. In July 2024, they signed a pact, mediated by Angola, that was quickly broken with mutual accusations of not respecting the accord. The aftermath of this fallout resulted in the most successful M23 campaign to date, in terms of territorial gains. What we can observe is however that this time the agreement came a few days after the agreement with Rwanda, and this may limit the option to come back to fighting for M23.

Thus, is this series of agreements going to solve the situation? The main issue, also underlined by Professor Koen Van Klassenroot in the interview with ITSS, is the fragmentation of the movements. The Alliance Fleuve Congo and M23 are only one part of the wider puzzle, Eastern Congo is plagued with smaller and as deadly armed groups. Other active armed factions involved in the increasingly complex fighting in eastern DRC include the DRC army-aligned Nyatura in North Kivu, the Islamic State-backed Allied Democratic Forces, which has recently increased attacks in Uganda, and CODECO and Zaire, who are in dispute in Ituri province.

International interest, such as US corporations have also pushed to access the mineral wealth of the DRC, and they could benefit from a situation more under control, and therefore, spend political capital on the US foreign policy in central Africa. The role of international players is going to be key to understanding how civilian massacres could be mitigated in a region that has been characterised by conflict for a long time.  

April 18, 2025No Comments

Professor Koen Vlassenroot on the Eastern Congo conflict

Professor Koen Vlassenroot talks about the origin and current state of the Eastern Congo conflict. Koen Vlassenoot is a professor of Political science at the University of Ghent where he directs the Centre On Armed groups.


In this session, he discusses the ethnic and historical origins of the Eastern Congo conflict and describes the role, or lack thereof, of natural resources in the current clashes between the DRC and M23.

Interviewers: Andrea Sau, Leonardo Pesci, and Massimiliano Dosmo - Africa Desk

October 14, 2024No Comments

Mpox Crisis in the DRC: Healthcare Challenges Admist Conflict 

By Michela Mansoldo - Human Rights Team

Introduction

On August 14, 2024, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the Mpox crisis a public health emergency of international concern. This declaration comes as the outbreak spreads broadly across the overall Western and Central African region, with two-thirds of the cases recorded in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This situation exacerbates the already existing challenges within the country’s internal political system and deteriorates the ongoing human rights crisis. The Congolese population faces enormous aggravations due to ongoing armed conflict, high food insecurity, and continuous human rights abuses, particularly in the mining sector. This article will examine how the Mpox outbreak in the DRC highlights broader social challenges in the country, including the impact of the mining industry on the already burdened healthcare system.

What is Mpox?

Mpox is an infectious disease that spreads through close and/or sexual contact, and it poses a significant risk to individuals with weakened immune systems, especially pregnant women and children, whose contractions can be fatal. While the initial outbreak was identified in 2022, Mpox has been reported in the DRC for over a decade. The situation worsened in 2024 with the emergence of a new strain, resulting in over 26,000 cases and 833 deaths to date.

In response to the outbreak, vaccination campaigns commenced in September 2024, but the rollout faced delays, making it challenging to keep up with the rapidly increasing case numbers. This situation raises critical questions on equitable access to healthcare in the country, where over 7 million people are internally displaced and around 25 million face food insecurity. Among the most vulnerable populations are children, especially those who are undernourished and live in refugee camps, where sanitation and access to clean water are limited.

According to the Global Director of Health and Nutrition at Save the Children, the DRC records some of the highest levels of child insecurity globally and in 2023, violence, displacement, and killings reached alarming peaks, as reported by UNICEF. Furthermore, issues such as lack of sanitation, sexual abuse and child labour, significantly affect the contraction rate of Mpox amongst another vulnerable group in the DRC: miners.

Cobalt Mines and Human Rights Issues

Owning approximately 70% of the world's cobalt resources, eastern DRC has become a hotspot for conflict and exploitation. The mining industry has caused significant human rights violations in the country, triggering numerous interventions and peacekeeping efforts. The exploitation of Congolese labour dates back to the Belgian colonial period, and both internal and international actors have profited from it ever since.

The demand for cobalt has intensified with advancements in technology and the production of batteries, yet this surge has not been accompanied by a secure and sustainable approach to extraction. In fact, cobalt is highly toxic to inhale and leads to a number of healthcare complications for artisanal workers. Although mining may appear to be one of the better-paid jobs for locals, it comes with significant social and medical obstacles.

In mining areas, the risk of injuries is high due to the constant collapse of pits, often burying workers alive, including children. Reports indicate that tens of thousands of children are involved in the cobalt industry, which often leads them to abandon their education. Moreover, their prolonged exposure to toxic substances can severely damage internal organs, further aggravating immune responses to infections, which are very common in mining communities. Besides the rare access to sanitation facilities in mines, another issue is related to sexual abuses, which often results in the contraction of sexually transmitted and debilitating diseases. 

This situation underscores the vulnerability of individuals with already compromised health, further exacerbating the spread of mpox in Eastern DRC, where most mines are located.

Challenges for Healthcare

Despite ongoing efforts to deliver vaccines, the WHO remains optimistic about eradicating Mpox. However, the situation in mining areas poses significant challenges to this vision. Key obstacles include the remote locations of some communities and a lack of awareness about Mpox among local populations. Many individuals lack basic knowledge about the diseases they may contract and the preventive measures necessary to limit their spread. In fact, with the fourth-largest population in Africa and a substantial number of displaced people, the DRC faces an even more complex health burden. Many diseases affect the population - including malaria, HIV, and tuberculosis - and only a portion of these are transmittable. Apart from Mpox, vaccination efforts against other infectious diseases remain insufficient, with geographical coverage remaining low. According to the WHO, the lack of childhood immunisation in the DRC has reached alarming levels, with nearly 2 million children classified as zero-dose or under-immunised.

In times of emergencies, it is important to not only highlight the challenges in ensuring timely responses but also to examine the underlying causes of these issues. In the DRC, limited access to healthcare is influenced not only by geographical barriers or population density but also by the ongoing conflict. Insecurity, high population mobility, and resource exploitation are contributing factors to the spread of Mpox in the country, and they point to gaps in both governmental efforts and regional cooperation.

Source: Russell Watkins/Department for International Development'. (https://shorturl.at/C142R)

Root Causes and Systemic Failures

The underlying causes of conflict in the DRC contribute to various challenges affecting healthcare stability. For instance, displacement, food insecurity, and economic uncertainty can lead to behaviors such as transactional sex, which may increase the spread of diseases. Additionally, difficulties in establishing accountability among political actors can hinder efforts to strengthen community resilience. The country's high level of militarization has also contributed to local distrust of both internal and external actors, which may extend to healthcare and humanitarian personnel.

Effectively addressing the Mpox crisis requires a multifaceted approach. Beyond implementing measures to control the spread of the disease, integrating conflict resolution strategies into healthcare efforts is essential. To restore a system facing significant challenges and improve human rights protections in the DRC, a comprehensive reevaluation of societal issues is needed.

Although finding definitive solutions is highly complicated, there is a large space for improvement. For instance, involving the local population in the management and participation of health programs is essential. As proposed by Bashwira, Mihigo and Duclos from the Social Science in Humanitarian Action Platform (SSHAP), initiatives such as mapping conflicts and assessing organisational patterns could prove beneficial for larger-scale responsiveness.

Conclusions

Access to healthcare is a fundamental human right, and global accountability plays an important role in advocating for those with limited means to voice their needs. Promoting equitable healthcare access, while also addressing the socioeconomic factors that contribute to health disparities, is essential. Implementing community-led programs can help create sustainable solutions to the challenges faced by vulnerable populations. Collaborative efforts between local actors and international NGOs can support the delivery of essential services and resources.

In conclusion, the Mpox emergency is not solely a medical issue but is closely connected to broader societal challenges. Addressing it from a wider perspective can provide not only immediate health interventions but also contribute to reducing the underlying factors that increase population vulnerability. Through comprehensive efforts, there is potential to improve health outcomes for the Congolese people and uphold their fundamental rights.