By Arslan M. Sheikh - South Asia Team

The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), executed in 1960 between India and Pakistan, is widely regarded as one of the most robust water-sharing accords globally. The World Bank facilitated the allocation of six rivers in the Indus River Basin (IRB): the three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab) were assigned to Pakistan, while the three eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej) were designated for India. Notwithstanding wars and conflicts, the IWT has persisted – until the present. While it was a water-sharing agreement, experts believe it was more of a divorce settlement. This article aims to present the vulnerabilities of IWT in today’s geopolitical and climate landscape and attempts to present a conceptual reframing of IWT based on academic literature on the subject. More importantly, it highlights the need to put a basin-wide, bottom-up approach into focus rather than a top-down approach. 

The  IRB rises in the southwestern Tibet Autonomous Region of China and flows northwest. It continues north-westward through the contested Indian and Pakistani areas of Jammu & Kashmir and then turns south into Pakistan. The basin has six main tributaries – one of them Sutlej, like the Indus itself rises in China’s Tibetan Plateau while another tributary Kabul rises in Afghanistan, and the remaining Ravi, Beas, Jhelum, and Chenab rises in India. 

India's recent decision to put IWT into abeyance, citing ongoing difficulties in bilateral relations due to cross-border terrorism in the Indian Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir, has undermined its streak of being able to stand political ruptures. The IWT is intended to be an enduring accord. It lacks an expiration or unilateral withdrawal provision. However, under international law, specifically Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), suspension or termination is potentially permissible due to a "fundamental change of circumstances." India contends that ongoing cross-border terrorism represents a significant alteration. The interpretation of the IWT is governed by customary international law, as it predates the Vienna Convention. Practically, unilateral withdrawal or suspension would be exceedingly complex, inviting international censure and making sustainable governance of IRB more challenging in a politically volatile region—especially for the populations residing along the rivers whose livelihoods are intricately connected to these river systems.

Vulnerabilities of the Indus River Basin

The Indus Water Treaty has substantially enhanced regional stability; nonetheless, it currently exhibits serious challenges in light of contemporary zero-sum affairs, especially for the populations residing throughout the expansive IRB in the Himalayan region.

Human-induced climate change presents a significant challenge in achieving water security while simultaneously increasing the difficulty and costs associated with its protection. Water security is not solely defined by the availability of water resources; it also depends on the quality of these resources. Variability and extreme events present significant challenges to water security, particularly in low-income countries that face limitations in institutional capacity for managing water resources. The situation regarding IRB is no different. 

The glaciers of the Himalayas, Karakoram, and Hindu Kush—Asia's "water towers"—are rapidly melting as a consequence of climate change. For the inhabitants of hilly areas such as Ladakh, Baltistan, the Kashmir Valley, and the Chenab belt of Jammu, glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs) pose a risk to settlements and arable land. Alterations in snowmelt timing are undermining conventional irrigation and agricultural practices. The IWT was engineered for rather stable hydrological conditions. It fails to include abrupt or severe variations in river flows, rendering mountain populations particularly susceptible.

The IRB exhibits a complex hydrological system and is characterised by significant hydro-political tensions among its riparian states. The water security of the region is increasingly jeopardised by various factors, including being an international transboundary river and overarching global issues such as pollution, rapid population growth and urbanisation, diminishing surface water availability, declining groundwater quality and quantity, and the intensifying effects of climate change.

At the time of the signing of IWT, the geopolitical landscape was bipolar and less complex. Apparently, in today’s multipolar landscape, IRB spans four sovereign nations. The establishment of infrastructure capable of influencing river flows would affect the overall health of the river system. The inhabitants of Jammu and Kashmir, encompassing all regions, may exhibit heightened sensitivity to any disturbances spanning political boundaries, as even little alterations in flow patterns can impact agriculture, water accessibility, and local ecosystems. Nevertheless, the IWT persists as a bilateral accord, incapable of accommodating the escalating multilateral dynamics of the basin.

Since 1960, the populations of the IRB areas have also experienced substantial growth. Economic shifts have introduced additional pressures. The reliance on river systems for hydropower, potable water, tourism, and agriculture has increased. Treaties with inflexible allocations and methods lack the adaptability to address these changing local demands.

Conceptual Reframing of IWT

Recommending changes to IWT is not under the scope of this article. Rather it is an attempt to present some guiding principles based on available academic literature on how to rethink or strengthen IWT. Reimagining the governance of the IRB  needs to go beyond its traditional characterisation as a geopolitical and techno-legal issue. Jamie Linton emphasises that water is not just a physical resource; it is a socio-natural construct influenced by relationships, institutions, landscapes, and daily practices. This reconceptualisation of water does not regard rivers as apolitical conduits separate from the communities, cultures, and ecosystems they traverse. This framework has been meticulously enhanced by the hydro-heritage lens which highlights the symbolic, spiritual, and affective aspects of water.  This framework intricately links water to memory, heritage, and legitimacy. According to it, springs, canals, and rivers serve not only as means for irrigation and power generation but also as repositories of heritage, traditional knowledge, and sustainable practices, often acting as silent witnesses to political transformation. Recognizing these aspects of water creates opportunities for governance that is inclusive, oriented towards justice, and rooted in historical context.

Postcolonial hydropolitics frequently exhibits fragmentation and zero-sum dynamics; however, prior initiatives for managing the IRB, exemplified by extensive canal planning during the British era, temporarily functioned at the basin-wide level. Despite their origins in colonial mandates, these interventions demonstrate that hydrological interdependence was historically recognised at an administrative level, albeit without equitable implementation. This moment, analysed critically, makes visible the potential benefits of basin-level coordination when viewed through a participatory governance lens.

Efforts to reimagine the IWT should not focus exclusively on legal amendments or institutional changes. They should adopt a broader and more innovative approach that integrates hydro social realities, recognises local and Indigenous water cultures, and promotes dialogue across ecological zones. Water diplomacy in the Indus Basin has the potential to transition from division and securitisation to collaborative stewardship, emphasising heritage, culture, and equity alongside flow volumes and engineering considerations.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the IWT has historically functioned as a robust framework for water-sharing between India and Pakistan; however, its contemporary limitations are clearly apparent due to evolving geopolitical dynamics, increasing climate vulnerabilities, and shifting socio-economic demands within the IRB. Reevaluating the treaty necessitates more than mere institutional adjustments; it demands a fundamental shift that recognises water as both a hydro-social and cultural resource, as highlighted by Linton and the hydro-heritage literature. Reframing the IWT through inclusive, basin-wide, and historically grounded perspectives presents a viable approach to sustainable water governance that makes IRB resilient to current challenges and addresses the realities of all riverine communities.