February 12, 2025 — No Comments

Unraveling ISIS: Islamic Stateโ€™s Offices across Africa

A Comparative Analysis of the Cases of ISWAP and ASWJ in Nigeria and Mozambique

By Massimiliano Dosmo and Leonardo Pesci - Africa Team

Since its inception in 2014, the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS) has become a transnational Jihadist movement whose ideology and practices inform insurgentsโ€™ strategies and objectives across the world. One after another, movements pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, elevating ISIS as a structuring force for many religious-based factions in Africa. This article investigates the proliferation of ISIS-affiliated groups on the continent, comparing how the Islamic State operates in Nigeria and Mozambique. Specifically, the article seeks to understand how the strategic, operational, governance, and ideological practices of ISIS affiliates converge - or diverge - from the ones of ISISโ€™s core group.

Origins and formation of the groupsย 

Starting with the origins and group formation, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) originated as a splinter faction of the Jihadist group Boko Haram, which was established in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria, in 2002 by Muhammad Yusuf. After Mohammed Yusuf was killed in an unsuccessful uprising in 2009, the movement, under the new leadership of Abubakar Shekau, began an insurgency against the Nigerian government to create a Caliphate in the Lake Chad Basin area. In 2016, Boko Haram split into two groups: Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'adati wal-Jihad (JAS), commanded by Abubakar Shekau, and ISWAP, led by Abu Musab al Barnawi. The separation was the outcome of internal disputes within Boko Haram that were brought on by some skepticism shown by ISIS's higher authority following Shekau's decision to break with Al-Qaeda and join ISIS. This skepticism was given by the fact that, although Shekau had been designated as Waly (leader) of ISWAP and had pledged his loyalty to ISIS, his leadership skills and doctrinal beliefs were a major source of worry for Al-Baghdadi. These worries were subsequently confirmed when Al-Baghdadi received grievance letters from Shekau's subordinates. Specifically, Shekau was accused of being too violent against the Muslim population, using indiscriminate violence against them, which represented an ideological clash with the ISIS view. This resulted in Al-Baghdadi's decision to not trust Shekau as the legitimate leader of ISWAP. From ISWAPโ€™s inception, it is evident how ISIS actively influenced the groupโ€™s leadership due to an ideological clash with the previous leader. 

On the other hand, Ansar al-Sunna, also known as al-Sunna wal-Jamaatโ€™s (ASWJ), history in Mozambique can be traced to 2015, when the group started as aย religious organisationย in Mocimboa da Pria, one of the districts of Cabo Delgado Province in northern Mozambique. It emerged as an armed group in 2017, taking advantage of socio-economic issues such as widespread poverty, the exclusion of Muslim populations, and official indifference. In 2019, it started operating under the umbrella of theย Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP), which also included the Islamic Stateโ€™s affiliate in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and joined ISIS, having previously adhered to Salafi-jihadist theology. The primary connections between ASWJ and ISIS are the ideological foundation, based on Salafi-jihadism, and promotional backing. However, it has much autonomy compared to more disciplined ISIS branches. Despite adopting ISIS's rhetoric on the establishment of anย Islamic caliphate, its operational framework and governance are representative of the local reality. While ASWJ employs ISIS-style recruitment tactics, such as appealing to local concerns, it does not adopt the organisational rigor that ISIS has previously enforced on its branches.

Territoriality, governance and engagement with the population

A crucial element of this analysis is the territoriality, governance, and engagement strategies that the two groups employ. ISWAP takes on a methodical approach to administration, drawing inspiration from the administrative framework of ISIS. The organization manages commercial activity, collects taxes, and offers a few social services, including food distribution and dispute resolution. In contrast to Boko Haram's previous indiscriminate cruelty, ISWAP has immediately tried to gain local support by presenting itself as an alternative to the Nigerian government. Its governance model, aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the local population, has allowed  ISWAP to sustain its insurgency and maintain control over key territory surrounding Lake Chad. ISWAP's governance structure is one area where ISIS has a direct influence. Similar to ISIS, ISWAP uses a structured governance model, establishing a Sharia-law-based judicial hierarchy, designating governors for captured areas, and implementing financial measures to support its operations. ISWAPโ€™s success in controlling the area demonstrates ISIS's preference for long-term administration as opposed to just gaining territory. Its capacity to offer services, including agricultural help and medical assistance, stands in stark contrast to the Nigerian government's neglect of rural communities. 

In contrast, ASWJโ€™s governance approach is less structured. Although it has exercisedย authorityย over certain parts of Cabo Delgado, it lacks a strong administrative framework. While they struggle to deliver basic services, the organisation enforces Sharia rule in conquered territory. Instead of using organised taxation, it engages in extortion and looting, and it frequently has coercive relationships with theย local population. This lack of structured governance has hindered its ability to maintain sustained legitimacy among people. For these reasons, ASWJโ€™s governance is severely hampered by its excessive reliance on external funding and illicit activities, such asย drugs and rubiesย smuggling. Consequently, unlike ASWJ, ISWAP has developed a more structured logistical network, securing a steady supply of weapons, food, and fuel directly fromย ISIS. It has also integrated foreign fighters into its ranks, benefiting fromย trainingย provided by ISIS operatives in the region. ASWJโ€™s patchy and fluctuating implementation of Islamic governance initiatives, combined with its leadershipโ€™s short-term strategic objectives, has made long-term territorial control more challenging. This has prevented ISIS from fully sustaining the groupโ€™s operations, unlike in the case of ISWAP.

Funding Activities and Financial Revenuesย 

The current analysis cannot overlook the financial and fundraising practices of ISWAP and ASWJ within their respective contexts. Despite the notorious difficulty in pinpointing direct financial connections, there are nonetheless converging similarities between ISIS, ISWAP, and ASWJโ€™s fundraising practices. ISISโ€™s core group in Syria and Iraq has largely benefitted from a different range of revenue sources. These included oil extraction and trade, taxation, lootings, robberies, kidnapping for ransom, extortion of local communities, and tariffs on import/export within their territories. Additionally, private donors and international fundraising networks generated a substantial part of ISIS's financial revenues. 

While tracing direct financial links between ISISโ€™s core leadership and its Mozambican affiliateย remains speculativeย due to limited evidence, the same cannot be said for ISWAP. During the first years of activities, ISIS's financial support was instrumental to the group's territorial and logistic affirmation. Evidence demonstrates ties between ISIS and ISWAP consisting of regularย triangulations of moneyย - up toย USD 782.000ย between 2015 and 2016. On the other hand, the closer engagement with local communities allowed the group to imposeย Zakat, a taxation system representing one of the primary sources of financial entrances. Leveraging the Quranic obligation, the group legitimises its authority in collecting taxes from private and business communities including farmers, traders, and fishermen. The practice avoided predatory actions characterising other Nigerian groups such as Boko Haram and JAS, creating patterns of predictability within communities. Despite this, ISWAPโ€™s financial system is anyway reliant on the ransoms of local elites and international workers.

On the other hand, ASWJ's economic sustainment seems primarily reliant on illegal local trade and local and external donations. The region has historically represented a notorious hotspot of illicit trafficking and smuggling routes. The centrality of the port of Mocรญmboa da Praia elevates Cabo Delgado as a central hub for insurgents to trade and contraband goods, including timber, charcoal, rubies, and ivory. Notably, drug trafficking of heroin and methamphetamines from South Asia has become one of their main sources of income. A substantial part of ASWJ's financial entrances arises from local entrepreneurs demanding protections, as well as taxed loans borrowed to small businesses. While the above-mentioned appeared as the main financial revenues of the group, alternative fundraising activities confirm the tendency to rely on kidnapping for ransoms and the participation in human and organ trafficking routes of the Horn of Africa. Finally, although financial connections between ASWJ and ISIS are not sustained by verifiable evidence, it is nonetheless conceivable that links between the group and external funders from smaller ISIS cells in South Africa around the continent exist.

Source: Think Tank Experts Warn of Growing Islamist Financing Network in South Africa; Photo by ZUMA Press, Inc.

Groupโ€™s Objectives and Evolutions

Despite initial analogies, Nigerian and Mozambican territorial dynamics, logistical capacities, and counter-insurgency strategies have not only differentiated the evolutions of the groups but also their ideological and practical closeness to ISIS. 

Both groups started with low-profile activities. Between 2015 and 2017, ASWJ was mainly composed ofย religious leaders, managing religious spaces and spreading Salafist doctrines, delegitimising secular institutions and state law. Similarly, ISWAPโ€™s first steps in 2016-2018 are defined as the โ€œconsolidationโ€ย phase, characterised by a few activities and attempts of the group to define themselves from Boko Haram.

Between 2019 and 2021, both groups pledged allegiance and received formal recognition from the Islamic Stateโ€™s core group, simultaneously intensifying the violence and frequency of attacks. ASWJย expanded its territorial presenceย to the four main coastal districts of Cabo Delgado.ย Approximately 16โ€“20 monthly attacksย targeted cargo transports, contractors, and security forces, spreading in neighboring Tanzania.ย ISWAP structured its internal composition, expanded its territorial control, and improved its engagement with the population acquiring notable legitimacy. The incursions remained targeted towards Nigerian security forces and military bases expanding to international workers and organisations in rural areas around the Lake Chad Basin.ย 

With opposed outcomes, ย 2021 represented a turning tide for two groups, directly reflected in their relation and closeness to ISIS. Mozambican counter-insurgency strategy included contractors and international interventions to recapture major urban centers. Militants were forced toย change their strategies, the number of attacks decreased, and tactics shifted to guerrilla actions, targeting civilians in smaller and rural villages. Meanwhile, ISWAP reinforced its bureaucratic organisation, and expanded its numerical basis, and territorial control, benefitting from theย Sambisaย offensive and the killing of JAS leader Shekau. Its territorial presence spilled over the Lake Chad Region, and at least 10 otherย Nigerian states.ย 

Therefore, while pledging allegiance to ISIS brought both groups under the broader Islamic State umbrella, they did not necessarily adopt ISISโ€™s ideological and strategic framework. While ISWAP followed ISISโ€™s structured governance and military strategy, ASWJ opted for a more localised approach adapted to the Mozambican context. Its affiliation with ISIS provided it with branding, logistical, and financial support, but it did not transform ASWJ into a fully ISIS-controlled entity.ย 

Conclusion

All in all, the overall structure and actions of the two ASWJ and SWAP reflect a varying degree of convergence from ISIS's core ideology. While the closer relationship between ISIS and ISWAP has informed the evolution of the latter, the looser approach toward ASWJ is enshrined in the group's relatively independent actions. However, it is important to notice how in both cases the groups still showed, even if in a different manner, a high degree of independence in the choice of their local strategy due to the different nature of the socio-political context of their territories, toward the application of ISIS core ideology.

January 31, 2025 — No Comments

Loredana Teodorescu on Womenโ€™s Rights in International Conflict

In this session, Dr. Teodorescu delves into the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, exploring approaches to advancing womenโ€™s rights in international conflict and the critical role of womenโ€™s integration in achieving sustainable solutions. She highlights the importance of holding countries accountable through international frameworks like the WPS agenda and shares insights on how empowering women is essential for building long-term peace and security.

Dr. Teodorescu is a distinguished expert in European policies, migration, and gender issues. She serves as the Head of European and International Affairs at Istituto Luigi Sturzo in Rome and is the President of the Italian chapter of Women in International Security. She also leads the Mediterranean Women Mediators Network, focusing on women's roles in peace and security.

Interviewers:ย Hanorah Hardy and Sofia Sutera - Human Rights Team

January 20, 2025 — No Comments

Assessing the Cybersecurity Challenges of Smart Citiesย 

by Wesley Issey Romain & Giulia Saccone - AI, Cyber Security & Space Team

Introduction

The emergence of the โ€œsmart cityโ€ as a concept in the 1980s and a reality in the mid-2000s coincided with the rapid development of technology and internet worldwide. Two decades later, in 2024, growing urbanisation, environmental concerns, social and governance issues, shifting lifestyles, and economic and residential attractiveness contribute to deeper reliance on digital tools and emergent technologies, such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices and artificial intelligence (AI). Consequently, protecting smart citiesโ€™ infrastructures, networks and IoT devices against data theft, sabotage, surveillance, ransomware, terrorism, and other cybercrimes โ€“ whether from state-sponsored hacker groups or non-state actors โ€“ is crucial for government, private businesses, and civil society stakeholders.

This paper argues that despite the constant and multifaceted cybersecurity threats smart cities encounter, holistic and long-term solutions exist to maintain and enhance the security of their infrastructures and prevent any potential massive disruption. Our article mainly uses qualitative and quantitative data from secondary sources. It will be organised into five parts in the subsequent order:

Firstly, it will provide a brief understanding of the concept of a โ€œsmart cityโ€ and a presentation of its interpretations, strengths, opportunities, and primary stakeholders. The second part (II) will discuss the leading cyber security challenges smart cities face and demonstrate how the advent of emerging technologies and new threat actors will continue to impact smart citiesโ€™ overall safety and integrity. Finally, the third, fourth, and last parts (III, IV, and V) will each present an existing and potential solution to strengthen the security of intelligent citiesโ€™ IT infrastructures against cyber threats and disruptions.

A brief presentation of the concept of the smart city

The concept of โ€œsmart cityโ€ started appearing in academia around the 1990s; however, the notion has been popularised through IBMโ€™s Smart Cities Challenges. Although nowadays there is not a univocal definition of a smart city, for this article, we may define them as an urban area where ICT and IoT occupy a pivotal role in data collection, anonymisation and analysis for the improvement of citizensโ€™ quality of life, addressing contemporary challenges on a multi-stakeholder partnership. It is hence characterised by the use of diverse IoT-based systems (from smart grids to garments with sensors), which change from city to cityโ€“which implies the diverse definition of smart cities. Therefore, connectivity is the indispensable trait that every IoT device should have to join the smart cityโ€™s network, and scalability is what ensures that every project can be initially implemented on a small scale and then expanded in the wide urban landscape. Furthermore, usersโ€™ participation is vital for concretising the effects of a smart city and spotting new challenges1.  

The main sectors involved are the ones of mobility, where IoT devices, AI and 5G optimise citizensโ€™ transportation both on private vehicles and public transportation; energy, where smart grids allocate energy efficiently based on demand; and health, where IoT timely communicates through 5G the physiological state of individuals to provide timely responses and targeted therapies. IoT implementation in housing is important not only for this latter aim but also for improving lifestyle, with a house capable of responding to our daily necessities in a timely manner. IoT paired with AI can be functional for improving surveillance and predicting crime. Recently, smart citiesโ€™ R&D has also focused on public administration and citizenship participation, boosting the efficiency of public administration and creating smart communities for boosting citizens' engagement in local politics2.

Smart cities aim to improve citizensโ€™ quality of life by addressing urbanisation challenges through energy efficiency and responsive systems enabled by IoT devices. However, only 16% of cities can independently afford these projects due to high costs and diverse program requirements. To attract investors and drive innovation, cities use their smart city mission as a branding strategy, fostering advancements in underdeveloped but essential areas and consequentially creating long-term investments and competitiveness on the international stage. Partnerships with international bodies, research institutions, and other smart cities have proven effective for acquiring cutting-edge technology and best practices, mainly through city-to-city collaborations that bypass traditional bureaucratic channels.

The success of a project in a smart city resides in the coordination of the multiple stakeholders, which play simultaneous roles as planners, developers, implementation agents and follow-up responsible. The main actors involved are public stakeholders - namely national and local governments, administration and political institutions โ€“ that enable the coordination, monitoring and compliance of other players through policy formulation. Following, we have the private sector โ€“ composed of companies and start-ups primarily focused on the ICT field, investors, and in specific contexts, energy suppliers and property developers โ€“ that, in the case of cybersecurity, provide ICT infrastructures and investments in cutting-edge technology to boost the system readiness for cyberattacks. The Academic group has emerged as knowledge brokers, concurring with private counterparts in offering solutions in the implementation stage. Civil stakeholders โ€“ namely press, NGOs, and private citizens - play a dual role as recipients and contributors of projects, dispensing continuous feedback to the abovementioned categories thanks to advocacy and data sharing. 

The digital challenges of smart cities with emerging technologies.

Due to its incorporation of mixed technologies, software, and hardware, a smart city would inevitably be exposed to multiple cyber attacks by various threat actors. Experts have suggested that smart cities necessitate novel and inventive approaches to safeguard devices and applications, taking into account factors such as resource limitations, the nature of distributed architecture and geographic dispersion while confronting issues such as unreliable communication, insufficient data, and privilege safeguarding. Regardless of whether the cyber attack is conducted on the perception layer (sensor, actuators, RFID or GPS), on the network layer (Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and LAN), or on the application layer (Smart Home, Health, and Grid), most common cybersecurity risks associated with smart cities can be summarised into four types.

First, the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is perhaps the most documented practice of cyber attacks against a service or a network. DDoS is a malicious attack restricting digital traffic by inundating a target with excessive internet traffic, utilising compromised computer systems and IoT devices as sources. A cybercriminal could, for example, launch a DDoS attack to gain a smart cityโ€™s charging station, traffic light, or public transportation network, which could become a component of a botnet employed to disable another system. In 2018, CISCO indicated that the number of DDoS attacks worldwide was 7.9 million and had forecasted a substantial rise to 15.4 million in 2023. Additionally, most recent statistics data showed that DDoS attacks increased by 46% in the first half of 2024 in comparison to 2023, with peak attack power jumping from 1.6 Tbps to 1.7 Tbps, in which online gaming, technology, financial services, and telecommunications were the most targeted industries with 49%, 15%, 12%, and 10% respectively. 

Secondly, data exfiltration from devices such as traffic lights, CCTV cameras, parking meters, or public services servers is another significant challenge for smart cities as they gather extensive data from citizens. Public data theft violates the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of public data, as cybercriminals can use compromised information to perpetrate ransomware or other fraudulent transactions with third parties on the dark web. Privacy violations, financial loss, legal problems, and loss of trust from citizens are just a few of the damaging effects of data leaks from a cityโ€™s IoT devices. Such incidents have happened and are more frequent than one may think. For example, in July 2024, a large-scale data theft conducted by a cybercriminal group was reported in the United States in Columbus, Ohio. After the breach of private data stolen from over a hundred thousand ordinary people stored in public IT infrastructures and municipal agencies, a ransomware operation was launched, and sensitive information was divulged on the dark web. This type of incident will likely occur again as cities rely more and more on technology.

Thirdly, device hijacking is another threat associated with smart cities. Hacker groups often seek to control a device to influence the myriad of technological equipment constituting a smart city infrastructure and network. IT experts argue that IoT devices frequently possess default credentials that malicious actors can use, and weak data encryption, absence of periodic software updates, and interconnectedness render them easily compromised by hackers. 

Fourth, Permanent Denial of Service (PDoS) is documented as a devastating cyber risk to any technologically advanced and dynamic city. IT experts have noted that, in contrast to sporadic DDoS, which results in ephemeral cyber disruptions, PDoS causes permanent hardware damage and substantial economic consequences, potentially endangering human life in healthcare and critical infrastructure sectors. 

Urban areas are projected to accommodate 68% of the global population by 2050, propelled by urbanisation and demographic expansion. Consequently, such prevision, coupled with the advancement and availability of devices and digital tools, the participation of state-sponsored and non-state actors groups in malign cyber-attacks is undoubtedly a source of concern for developed and emerging countries, global cities and their inhabitants. At the same time, it should be observed that cities worldwide do not share the same level of cyber threat. As Cesar Cerrudo mentioned, while most cities possess technology, the effectiveness of smart cities varies based on the extent of technological advancements implemented. Some cities have implemented more technology while others have less.

Smart cities are expected to face several digital challenges with the availability and advent of new technologies; nevertheless, solutions and measures exist to enhance security and prevent disruptions.

Source: Illustration generated by AI

Threat detection and investments in advanced technology

Existing measures are primarily concerned with ensuring data and privacy protection based on trust, integrity, and confidentiality to prevent leaks from sensors, cameras, other IoT devices, and critical infrastructures. To support them and address the main concerns raised by industry and academia on privacy and data protection, the cybersecurity sector has focused on the mitigation of breaches in IoT for privacy protection, improving device authentication, access control, and firmware updates to provide better data anonymisation, secure data sharing and analytics for safe decision-making.ย A smart city is a goldmine of personal data due to its pivotal role in enhancing the quality of life of citizens and the interconnectedness through IoT. This provides criminals with a myriad of access points on devices with limited.

Blockchain technology has demonstrated a high potential solution thanks to its capacity to transmit information securely and directly. Specifically, this technology can be applied to cybersecurity to protect personal data. In the case of e-governance, it enables individuals to manage their credentials independently, bypassing centralised controlling authorities. Seoul is a fitting example: in 2018, the city started applying blockchain in its public administration, and during the same year, it developed a metaverse secured by blockchain for document issuance and citizen participation.

AI application is another game-changing technology that can boost smart citiesโ€™ cybersecurity thanks to their high computational and predictive qualities, which, applied to the fog computing layer, could protect them from cyberattacks despite their resource constraints โ€“ i.e. limited storage and RAM3.ย In particular, the fog layer managing the data transfer between the IoT devices and the Cloud layer provides a higher amount of computing load than those two extremes, lower latency in the communications between the IDS and the IoT, and lower energy consumption. This enables the operators to isolate the attack, repel it, and avoid its spread throughout the network, allowing an interrupted flow of smart city services. In particular, ML can be applied to both SDIS and AIDS. On the other hand, it can ease the time-consuming characteristics of updating the signature database. Regarding the latter, it can enhance the precision of attack detection, lowering the rate of false positives.

Biometrics is already used to facilitate authentication thanks to the uniqueness of individual features, addressing the constant concern for privacy and security.ย They have already found wide applications in the smart economy field, like the fingerprint and face recognition used by Apple Pay, face recognition for video surveillance devices of Amazon Web Services, and voice recognition employed by Amazon Alexa for telemedicine in the UK.

Strengthening and facilitating public-private partnerships

It is already visible from these few examples how private and public sectors coexist in the development of smart citiesโ€™ security, acting in synergy for optimising the outcomes of their projects thanks to risk and resource sharing and the relative reduction of costs; access to the privateโ€™s technical and management skills and the innovation enhancement for effective, creative and real-time solutions. An example is the collaboration between Barcelonaโ€™s Municipal Institute of Informatics and CISCO to implement a communication protocol for CERT and CSIRT to detect, share, respond and recover from cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities in IoT devices.

Indeed, Barcelona is a perfect example of a smart city where public and private partnerships (PPP) can thrive thanks to companies with a sound knowledge of the local market, the involvement of all the stakeholders โ€“ citizenship included โ€“ to commit them towards the same type of projects and ease the tensions through transparency and responsibility, and trust-building practices, which are paramount in the initial phases. The cruciality of trust building is visible in the failure of the PPP of Sidewalk Labs and Waterfront Toronto, where the lack of involvement of the citizens led to tensions that resulted in boycott protests of the project. 

However, it must be pointed out that this factor is crucial in democracies, where citizenship plays an active role in shaping smart cities. Nevertheless, transparency is a value that benefits all smart cities regardless of the ongoing regime since it communicates the reliability of the projects and the worth of investing in this transformation.

Strengthening and facilitating regional and international cooperation, information sharing and dialogue among experts

PPPs are not the only method to transform and strengthen the security of smart cities; international fora, capacity-building projects, and collaboration among cities play fundamental roles. At the international level, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the UN-HABITAT coordinate the global platform "United for Smart Sustainable Cities" (U4SSC) to encourage the transition from traditional to smart cities, which has also developed a set of key performance indicators (KPIs) for sustainable cities, a valuable instrument for agenda setting and performance evaluation adopted by more than 50 cities worldwide.

The ITU, thanks to the Smart Sustainable Cities program, supports the development of stable, secure, reliable and interoperable ICT devices for sustainable cities. The Smart Cities Council is a network of experts providing capacity building and investment programs, which, among all the objectives, aim to ensure cyber, privacy, and data protection. At the regional level, for instance, the EU provides the Smart Cities Marketplace: a platform for the various stakeholders involved in the field to improve citizensโ€™ quality of life and increase the competitiveness of European cities and industry with respect to EU climate targets.

While at the level of bilateral agreements, Singapore has exploited its expertise to catalyse agreements from distant poles, such as China and the US, for mutual cyber capacity-building projects. Those multilevel initiatives have a common effect that addresses one of the biggest challenges of smart cities intra and interoperability: the normative and standard differences between cities, which makes PPP challenging and prevents effective data protection, the biggest concern in the research field.

Conclusion

In conclusion, despite the persistent, increasing, and diverse cybersecurity risks faced by smart cities, comprehensive and sustainable solutions are available to safeguard their infrastructures and avert significant disruptions. Firstly, it has been shown that the notion of a smart city originated in academic circles throughout the nineties. The concept emphasises mobility, energy, and health, with research and development concentrating on public administration and citizen participation. It was argued that successful projects necessitate the collaboration of several stakeholders, including planners, developers, implementation agents, and follow-up measures, to enhance the quality of life for citizens.

The second part of the article sought to demonstrate that smart cities incorporate various technologies, including software and hardware, making them vulnerable to multiple cyber-attacks from a wide range of threat actors. DDoS and PDoS attacks, data exfiltration, and device hijacking attacks are common cybersecurity dangers. The involvement of both state-sponsored and non-state actors in malicious cyber-attacks is a cause for concern for both developed and emerging nations, as well as capital cities around the globe and their populations.

Thirdly, it has been observed that investments in cutting-edge technologies to prevent cyber threats are deemed pertinent and practical. For instance, tools such as blockchain technology provide a safe and direct method for information transmission, positioning it as a viable option for cybersecurity. Besides, artificial intelligence applications can improve cybersecurity in smart cities through their computational and predictive abilities. Lastly, biometrics, characterised by its distinctive attributes, is employed for authentication, mitigating privacy and security issues.

The successful example of the city of Barcelona, introduced in the fourth part of the paper, confirmed that public-private collaborations improve security and optimise project results via risk and resource sharing, cost reduction, access to private technical and managerial expertise, and innovation. Additionally, it has been demonstrated that transparency is essential for smart cities.

Lastly, multilateral forums are part of the solution. International forums and initiatives to increase capacity building are essential to strengthening the safety of smart cities. Developing reliable, secure, and stable information and communication technology devices must be encouraged within forums such as the ITUโ€™s Smart Sustainable Cities. Only through the listed solutions can government, public, and private stakeholders ensure that smart cities remain safe.


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Gatlan, Sergiu. โ€œCity of Columbus: Data of 500,000 stolen in July ransomwareโ€. Bleeping Computer. November 4, 2024. Retrieved from: <https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/city-of-columbus-data-of-500-000-stolen-in-july-ransomware-attack/>

Hamid, Bushra. et al. โ€œCyber Security Issues and Challenges for Smart Cities: A surveyโ€. 13th International Conference on Mathematics, Actuarial Science, Computer Science and Statistics (MACS), Karachi, Pakistan, 2019, pp. 1-7. Retrieved from: <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/9024768>

Houichi, Mehdi., Faouzi Jaidi., and Adel Bouhoula. 2024. โ€œCyber Security within Smart Cities: A Comprehensive Study and a Novel Intrusion Detection-Based Approach.โ€ Computers, Materials & Continua 81 (1): 393โ€“441. Retrieved from:  <https://doi.org/10.32604/cmc.2024.054007>

Iberdrola, โ€œBLOCKCHAIN4CITIES โ€“  Blockchain Technology at the Service of Urban Management.โ€. Retrieved from: <https://www.iberdrola.com/innovation/blockchain-for-smart-cities-urban-management>

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International Telecommunications Union (ITU). โ€œSmart Sustainable Cities.โ€ ITU, 12/21. Retrieved from: <https://www.itu.int/en/mediacentre/backgrounders/Pages/smart-sustainable-cities.aspx>

Jayasena, N.S., H. Mallawaarachchi, and K.G.A.S. Waidyasekara. โ€œStakeholder Analysis For Smart City Development Project: An Extensive Literature Review.โ€ Edited by E. Mohd Ahnuar, R. Mohd Nordin, J. Yunus, and N.A. Abdul Rahman. MATEC Web of Conferences 266 (2019): 06012. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.1051/matecconf/201926606012>

Machap, Kamalakannan. & Hua Qiang. โ€œEvaluating firewall tools and techniques in enhancing network securityโ€. Journal of Applied Technology and Innovation, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2022. Retrieved from: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/357553876_Evaluating_firewall_tools_and_techniques_in_enhancing_network_security>

Md Mamunur, Rashid., et al. โ€œCyberattacks Detection in IoT-Based Smart City Applications Using Machine Learning Techniques.โ€ International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 17, no. 24 (December 14, 2020): 9347. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17249347>

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Mijwil, Maad M. et al. โ€œCybersecurity Challenges in Smart Cities: An Overview and Future Prospectsโ€. Mesopotamian Journal of Cybersecurity. Vol. 2022, pp. 1- 4. Retrieved from: <https://www.iasj.net/iasj/download/6b7ef8fef416253e>

Quan, Xiangyu, and Marte C.W. Solheim. 2023. โ€œPublic-Private Partnerships in Smart Cities: A Critical Survey and Research Agenda.โ€ City, Culture and Society 32 (March):100491. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ccs.2022.100491>

Rapp, Hermann P., and Moebert, Joechen. โ€œSmart Cities: Investing in the urban futureโ€. Focus Germany, Deutsche Bank Research, October 20, 2023. Retrieved from: <https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/RPS_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000530349/Smart_Cities%3A_Investing_in_the_urban_future.pdf?undefined&realload=~FwCKBc6XEJ3FEyBsL5KPmoB9DlvuMggYIE4xFVFd1HD6M6ik7YBEvSN9~iSWgQ~>

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Uyarra, Elvira, Jon Mikel Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, Kieron Flanagan, and Edurne Magro. โ€œPublic Procurement, Innovation and Industrial Policy: Rationales, Roles, Capabilities and Implementation.โ€ Research Policy 49, no. 1 (February 2020): 103844. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2019.103844>

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January 19, 2025 — No Comments

ย The Kashmir Conflict: The Tip of a Dangerous Glacier – Part II

by Davide Gobbicchi - Human Security Team

Having illustrated the regionโ€™s history and political structure, this second part of the article will look at the solutions to the Kashmir conflict proposed throughout the last decades, and the underlying motivations behind their failure to be adopted.

Solutions to the Kashmir Conflict

The debate around Kashmir has offered three major solutions to the current stalemate:

  1. Political Independence

A strand of the academic debate around Kashmir has argued that granting the region independence would lift the burden off the shoulders of India and Kashmir (thus the international community) while simultaneously allowing the Kashmiri people to best safeguard their own unique identity. This approach presents two problems:

  • Fractured Kashmiri Identity: as mentioned in the first paragraph of this paper, the seven decades of war characterizing Kashmir have greatly consumed the Kashmiriyat and the regional identity resulting from it, polarizing communities and fueling division. Within this context, it is hard - if not impossible - to imagine the Kashmiri people being able to agree on independence and on what country to build afterwards.ย ย 
  • Indo-Pakistani opposition: given Kashmirโ€™s importance to both New Delhi and Islamabad (more of this in the next paragraph), it is even harder to believe that either of the two countries would ever grant its part of the region independence.

      2.   Formal Partition 

Several authors such as Wolpert argue that a formal partition of Kashmir based on the Line of Control between India and Pakistan would be the โ€œmost realistic solutionโ€; however, this policy would face two problems:

  • Conflicting views regarding partition: while some of India and Kashmirโ€™s major political actors have accepted the current Line of Control as the new Indo-Pakistani border, Pakistan has several times categorically opposed it without providing feasible alternatives, thereby leaving no margin of political dialogue.ย 
  • Prerequisites for peace are treated as consequences of future peace: the transformation of the LoC into a soft border, and Kashmirโ€™s demilitarization have for decades been seen as the two fundamental initial steps to be taken towards a conflict resolution in Kashmir. However, despite pressures from the international community, both India and Pakistan refuse to take significant measures in that direction, each waiting for the other to make the first move. Within this strategy adopted by both sides in the conflict, it seems unlikely that a common agreement on Kashmirโ€™s formal partition will be achieved any time soon.ย 

       3.   Autonomy

The debate on Kashmirโ€™s autonomy has rotated around two kinds of autonomy:

  1. Separate autonomy: this approach advocates for the establishment of five different autonomous provinces (Kashmir; Jammu; Ladakh; Azad Kashmir; Gilgit-Baltistan) with the following characteristics:
  • free access to one another and to/from India and Pakistan;
  • individual democratic constitution(s) and legislature for all local issues;
  • defense and financial treaties between India and Pakistan for regional defense and foreign affairs;
  • a high-level governing body (comprising India; Pakistan and the 5 Autonomous Provinces) for cross-regional issues and demilitarization;
  1. Joint autonomy: another frequently discussed option, it envisages the creation of a no-borders Kashmir Economic Union with India and Pakistan jointly managing defense and foreign affairs, and the current Line of Control separating the two parts of Kashmirย  being a mere formality.

Despite this third solution being the most popular and feasible (for it would be the one to best balance Kashmiri desire for autonomy and Indo-Pakistani interests), it nonetheless presents - similarly to the other two solutions previously discussed - two major issues:

  • Prerequisites for peace treated as consequences of future peace: (same as in the โ€œformal partitionโ€ solution.)
  • Indian repression of Kashmirisโ€™ attempts to engage in โ€œpolitical building processesโ€: the 2019 abrogation (discussed in the previous paragraph) of articles 370 and 35a of the Indian Constitution led to a centralization of power in the hands of New Delhi; this move hindered local forms of political engagement that would have helped India and Pakistan develop solutions to the conflict accepted by the very people living the conflict. The consequent de-legitimacion and de-responsabilisation of Kashmiri civil society drew locals away from official political processes and pushed them towards underground organizations that provided fertile ground to the Islamization and radicalization of society.ย ย ย ย 

As shown in this paragraph, all three major solutions to the Kashmir conflict offered by the international academic debate present problems that make them unfeasible in the short run. These issues are largely the product of Indian and Pakistani unwillingness to compromise, much to the disadvantage of the regionโ€™s population. It is by now clear that the limbo in which Kashmir finds itself is nothing but a reflection of the critical nature of Indo-Pakistani relations worsened by their respective national interests. The paper will now turn to this.

Map 1: Erstwhile Princely State of Jammu & Kashmir. Currently, Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir are administered by Pakistan, UT of Jammu & Kashmir and UT of Ladakh by India, and Aksai Chin by China.
Source and link: Wikimedia Commons.

ย Indo-Pakistani motivations behind the Kashmir conflictย 

The inability - or unwillingness - to take significant steps towards the resolution of Kashmirโ€™s current state of affairs by both New Delhi and Islamabad conceals deep-rooted interests and discourses on both sides of the conflict: Kashmirโ€™s resource-rich nature and important role as a water supplier make it vital for both countriesโ€™ economy. From a geopolitical point of view, the region serves as a bridge connecting South Asia to Central Asia and China, constituting a major economic corridor for both India and Pakistan. Apart from these obvious reasons, Kashmir plays a bigger role in both countriesโ€™s identity; let us analyze each of the two nationsโ€™ point of view:

  • Indiaโ€™s discourses and interests in Kashmir: there are three major motivations behind New Delhiโ€™s desire to control Kashmir:
  1. Muslim Kashmir as a confirmation of Indiaโ€™s pluralist and secular federalism: Kashmir gradually became the symbol of Indiaโ€™s secular side of the political debate, which saw the regionโ€™s internal and external diversity as the alternative to hindu-nationalism.ย 
  2. Avoid the Balkanisation of the country: granting Kashmir independence would in turn foment nationalisms all over the diverse Indian nation, posing a serious threat to the countryโ€™s stability and unity.
  3. Avoid the radicalisation of the subcontinent: as many analysts claim, an independent (even more Pakistani) Kashmir would likely become a safe haven for islamic fundamentalism, which would then easily spill into India fomenting religious radicalism (islamic in action, hindu in reaction).
  • Pakistanโ€™s discourses and interests in Kashmir: similarly to India, we find three main reasons for the countryโ€™s claims on Kashmir:
  1. Muslim Kashmir as the last piece in the national unification process: Pakistan gradually came to perceive itself as the homeland in which all muslims of South Asia could unite under one common Islamic Republic; given this self-bestowed identity and role, Kashmir - being the only muslim region of the subcontinent not under Pakistani control - represents the ultimate confirmation of the countryโ€™s identity.
  2. Religious sentiment as a means to ensure national unity: given the complex internal problems currently faced by the country, promoting the narration of a jihad in Kashmir against foreign oppressors could unite the people of Pakistan and distract them from bigger looming problems.
  3. The Pakistan Armyโ€™s major role in the country: the historical importance of the army in Pakistan has given it a great amount of political power; any (quasi) conflict increases the armyโ€™s power and legitimacy within society, whereas any stability has the opposite effect. Given the armyโ€™s weight in the decisions of Islamabad, it is no wonder that the government has so far promoted a policy of destabilization across Kashmir.ย 

ย Conclusion

As this paper has shown, Kashmir is a complex region with a unique history and identity. Despite the erosion of Kashmiriyat tolerance and the rise of religious fundamentalism caused by seven decades of war, this identity still exists and should not be ignored by Indo-Pakistani processes of national homogenisation; it should rather be given voice to by official political channels, so as to avoid the proliferation of alternative violent forms of civic engagement - namely terrorism. Granting the region autonomy (as mentioned in the third solution of the third section of this paper) could be a mean to avoid this; however, given Kashmirโ€™s complex political division and the clashing interests and discourses of India and Pakistan, a joint or separate autonomy for the region seems highly unlikely in the short run. While India perceives protests in Kashmir as the product of a Pakistani-backed radical minority, Pakistan sees the turmoils as a natural expression of the popular religious and nationalistic sentiment; consequently, each country believes the other to be the main reason behind the continuation of the conflict, and itself as the only solution to it. Given its position, a prolonged destabilization and radicalisation of Kashmir could bear consequences on the larger Asian region; given the nuclear-power status of both India and Pakistan, a worsening of their relations could have repercussions on the larger international community. It is therefore of utmost importance to avoid the crystallization of the conflict. Three important steps could have positive effects in this direction: 

  • Promote local forms of civic and political engagement (as opposed to Indiaโ€™s abrogation of article 370 and the consequent disruptive effect that it had on Kashmiri society).ย 
  • Take concrete actions tackling regional fundamentalism and terrorism (as opposed to Pakistanโ€™s current ambiguity and past sponsorship of major radical islamist groups).
  • Promote Indo-Pakistani confidence-building measures to reduce fear and mutual mistrust,ย  thereby creating a channel for communication and ultimately cooperation (as opposed to the historically poor Indo-Pakistani relations characterized by 4 major wars and several clashes).

While the international community has since the failed UN mediation of 1947 always regarded Kashmir as a private issue between the two countries, it is by now clear that India and Pakistan alone are unable - or unwilling - to come to realistic solutions. The international community should then change its approach to Kashmir and act as a mediator between New Delhi and Islamabad in order to ensure the fulfillment of the three policies just mentioned, able to constitute a solid basis from which to later achieve a more ambitious regional autonomy; major actors directly affected by the regionโ€™s instability - such as China or Russia - could start working in this direction, consequently dragging the US and the EU (both afraid of leaving the region in the hands of Moscow and Beijing) into the region with the UN supervising cooperation among great powers. The need to change our approach to the Kashmir conflict is drastic and urgent, for it affects not only the regionโ€™s stability and security, but that of the international community as a whole.ย ย ย 

January 14, 2025 — No Comments

Tรผrkiye, the new regional hegemonic power in Africa

by Ilas Touazi, Andrea Sau, & Mira Benucci - Africa Team

Introduction

In a highlyย multipolar world, Tรผrkiye has broken with its traditional cautious,ย inward-looking approach to foreign policy. Indeed, aย โ€˜Turkish modelโ€™ of post-Cold War foreign policyย has been conceptualised with a view to theย โ€˜rebirth of a great Tรผrkiyeโ€™ย in terms of โ€˜anti-imperialism,โ€™ โ€˜regional protection,โ€™ย โ€˜regional leadership,โ€™ and โ€˜defence of the faith.โ€™ย Thus, a long-term, multi-faceted strategy, including political, economic, military, cultural, and humanitarian aspects aimed at extending Tรผrkiye's influence as a key and undeniable player in the court of emerging powers, is indisputably linked to its growing presence in Africa. This will promote Tรผrkiye's emergence as a global power through proactive, multidirectional, and multidimensional diplomacy, combiningย hard and soft power.ย Accordingly, at the 2023 Tรผrkiye-Africa Economic and Trade Forum in Istanbul,ย President Recep Tayyip ErdoฤŸanย declared that he would do his utmost to ensure that the African continent took its rightful place in the global system, within the framework of cooperation based on anย equal and win-win partnership.

The Turkish influence in Africa: A triptych regional strategy between Anti-Westernism, neo-Ottomanism and the Erdogan Doctrine

Tรผrkiye's Africa policyย is one of the pivotal instruments of itsย foreign policyย in its quest for status inย world politics. Historical relations between African countries date back to theย Ottoman Empireย and have been strengthened byย contemporary Tรผrkiye, which has developed a dense network of economic, political, and military relations withย Africa. Ankara has one of the densestย diplomatic networks in Africa: since 1998, the number of embassies has risen from 12 to 44, while the number of African embassies in Ankara has risen from 10 in 2008 to 38 inย 2024.ย Indeed, Tรผrkiye's ties withย the African Union (AU)ย were restricted between 1963 and 2002. Following the implementation ofย the 1998 Action Plan for the Opening Policy towards Africa, Tรผrkiye began attending summits as a guest nation after 2002 and gained โ€œobserver statusโ€ in the AU in 2005; then it became a โ€œstrategic partnerโ€ of the continent in 2008 with โ€œThe Istanbul Declaration on Tรผrkiye-Africa Partnership.โ€ Since then, theย โ€œ2010-2014 Turkey-Africa Partnership Joint Implementation Planโ€™โ€™ย was adopted by the High-Level Officials Meeting, which has paved the path to a new model of partnership under the 2015-2019 Joint Implementation Plan.ย Meanwhile,ย the third Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit, held in Istanbul in 2021, adopted a jointย action plan for the period 2022-2026.ย Simultaneously, theย Turkish-African geopolitical cooperation landscapeย has experienced a significant shift towards multidimensional coordination that transcends traditional partnerships, particularly withย regional governance bodiesย such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Developmentย (IGAD)ย and the East African Communityย (EAC). However, Tรผrkiye has strengthened its institutional relations withย African sub-regional organisations, namely the Economic Community of West African Statesย (ECOWAS).ย That is whyย Ankaraโ€™s many-sided approach to cooperation with Africaย is underpinned by a narrative portraying Turkey as anย โ€œAfro-Eurasianโ€ state.

Tรผrkiye's increased commitment to the African continent as part of theย new Africa policyย reflects, on the one hand,ย Erdogan's leveraged leadershipย since coming to power in 2002 and, on the other hand, a new page for Africa in its foreign policy and active involvement in this strategy with the Justice and Development Partyย (AKP). Conversely, Tรผrkiye is awakeningย its neo-Ottomanist historical heritageย and itsย hegemonic aspirationsย of geostrategic repositioning as a new player andย emerging power. So the pillars ofย ErdoฤŸan's foreign policy doctrine towards Africaย are based on aย dual process of Islamisation with the affirmation of a pan-Islamic identityย that is part of a worldview that incorporates a pragmatic modern model based onย non-interference, respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity andย political non-conditionality. This is the other pivotal axis of the Turkish strategy in Africa: demonisation and discrediting under the guise ofย anti-Westernism. In this context, the absence of colonial history is aย unique asset for Turkey, which presents itself as a viable alternative to the traditional powers of the Western countries under theย regional and global power competitionsย through aย balanced approach involving hard and soft mechanismsย to assert its influence in the great African geostrategic chessboard.

Image by Clker-Free-Vector-Images from Pixabay

Tรผrkiye's military and security strategy: a new projection of domination under the yoke of โ€œhard power

ย Tรผrkiye's growing involvement in Africa's security sector demonstrates its strategy to expand geopolitical influence and establish itself as a key global power through military means. In the last 10 years, it has marked its involvement in Africa with aย multifaceted approach to security,ย using multilateral missions, joint training, bilateral agreements, and army bases to consolidate influence and counter rival powers in key regions. Additionally, the country has enhanced its military footprint through its weapon exports. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI), between 2016 and 2023 Tรผrkiye increased its annual weapons exports to Africa by about 284%. This export surge highlights Tรผrkiyes growing defence industry and its efforts to strengthen political and economic ties with African nations, emphasizing lower costs and a flexible policy as key selling points. Additionally, Tรผrkiye's involvement is exemplified by SADAT, a Turkish private military and security contractor (PMSC). Since its establishment, SADAT has played a significant role in Tรผrkiye's broader strategic interests - hard power - including its operations through Syrian mercenaries in countries such as Libya, Niger, and Mali. This activity aligns with Ankaraโ€™s goals of increasing its influence in the region while maintaining a degree of operational discretion. Tรผrkiye's use of private military contractors like SADAT forms part of a broader strategy focused on expanding its presence in key African regions, namely North Africa, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa, all of which hold strategic importance for the country.

While Tรผrkiyeโ€™s ties to North Africa are rooted in history, its modern focus is driven by maritime security concerns and its Western Mediterranean strategy. During theย Libyan civil war, from 2014 to 2020, Turkey supported the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA). This alliance aimed to gather support for Turkish policies in the Eastern Mediterranean. Assistance to the GNA included the provision of weapons, drones, and military coordination on the field.ย The Horn of Africa, particularlyย Somalia, is a critical region for Tรผrkiyeโ€™s strategy. Mogadishu has a fundamental geo-strategical role as one of the countries facing theย Gulf of Aden, a key point in the juncture of world trade. Tรผrkiye-Somalia cooperation highlights Africaโ€™s role in the Turkish grand strategy, showcasing its focus on both military partnerships and geopolitical objectives. In 2011, Erdogan was the first non-African leader to visit Somalia since the beginning of the civil war. The partnership expanded to military cooperation on the 13thย of April 2012, when Turkey and the Somali government signed an army training cooperation agreement. The agreement was considered by the parties a sizeable success, and as a result, in 2017, Tรผrkiye opened its largest military base outside its territory,ย TURKSOM. The principal objective of the cooperation has been to fight theย Islamist group Al-Shabab, aligning with Tรผrkiyeโ€™s broader goal of stabilizing key regions to enhance its influence. However, the officers trained by Turkey, in Turkish, and with the Turkish army philosophy are increasinglyย meddling with internal affairsย and with the equilibrium of the Somali army.

The Turkish-African cooperation: prioritizing โ€œsoft powerโ€ approach 

After the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, Tรผrkiye emerged as an increasingly prominent actor on the international stage, leveraging an array of soft power instruments to bolster its influence. This is particularly evident in Africa, where Ankaraโ€™s multifaceted engagement includes economic partnerships, cultural and religious diplomacy, and humanitarian initiatives. Economic cooperation is a key feature of Tรผrkiyeโ€™s African policy, with bilateral trade surging from $5.4 billion in 2003 to over $40 billion in 2022, highlighting Ankaraโ€™s strategic priority on deepening economic ties. Turkish companies have undertaken significant infrastructure projects, such as the Awash-Woldia railway project, part of the Djibouti-Ethiopia railway, and the Blaise Diagne International Airport in Senegal. Additionally, Tรผrkiyeโ€™s ambition to become a primary energy hub is observable in its cooperation agreement signed in 2024, which grants Tรผrkiye the right to explore and develop offshore hydrocarbons in Somaliaโ€™s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the 2022 Memorandum of Understanding Between Tรผrkiye and Libya on Cooperation in the Field of Hydrocarbons. Through the Turkey-Africa Economic and Business Forum, Tรผrkiye seeks to promote bilateral partnerships, encourage investments, and facilitate technology transfer. These initiatives underscore Ankaraโ€™s long-term commitment to Africaโ€™s development and signal its intent to establish mutually beneficial partnerships. 

Equally important to Tรผrkiye's African strategy is its focus on cultural and religious diplomacy alongside its well-orchestrated humanitarian efforts. The shared Sunni Muslim identity between Ankara and many African nations represents a valuable foundation for building trust and enhancing theย perception of Ankaraโ€™s projects as legitimate,ย authentic, and mutually beneficial. Institutions such as theย Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet)ย and theย Yunus Emre Instituteย have promoted cultural exchanges and religious services, further strengthening religious relations with African countries. The Diyanet, for example, has supported mosque-building initiatives in Djibouti, Ghana, and Sudan. Similarly, the Yunus Emre Institute has established aย Turkish language and culture centre and facilitated cultural exchange in Senegal. Meanwhile, humanitarian diplomacy remains central to Tรผrkiyeโ€™s engagement in Africa. Theย Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA)ย has been active in over 30 African countries, implementing initiatives tailored to local needs in healthcare, education, and capacity-building. For example, the Recep Tayyip ErdoฤŸan Training and Research Hospital in Somalia serves as a vital healthcare facility and a training centre for Somali medical professionals, while TIKAโ€™s efforts in Mozambique focus onย Sustainable Agricultural Development. Through these efforts, Tรผrkiye aims to consolidate its geopolitical footprint, elevate its international reputation, and cultivate partnerships rooted in solidarity, pragmatism, and mutual benefit. By emphasizing a historical and religious proximity narrative, Ankara aims to present itself as a dynamic and trusted actor, presenting an alternative to Western powers, often associated with political conditionality or perceived paternalism.ย 

Conclusion

Since the end of EU accession negotiations and the rise of the AKP, Tรผrkiye has shifted to a more multidimensional and assertive global strategy, with Africa as a key symbol of this transformation. Ankara's approach combines neo-Ottomanism and non-interference, positioning Turkey as a third way between Western powers and Russia-China. Tรผrkiyeโ€™s support for the GNA in Libya and its multifaceted engagement in Somaliaโ€”combining military training and facilities with economic, cultural, and religious initiativesโ€”highlights its interest in two points of geostrategic juncture, the eastern Mediterranean and the Horn of Africa along with their strategic maritime and trade routes. 

Tรผrkiyeโ€™s African strategy demonstrates how the country aspires to operate on the international arena. On the one hand, through the pragmatic use of hard and soft power, building a narrative, and, on the other, by positioning itself as a non-Western alternative. In this way, Tรผrkiye has extended its influence effectively, slowly but surely. However, this strategy faces major challenges. Tรผrkiye's limited resources risk exaggerating its ambitions and the use of tools such as SADAT or unbalanced alliances can damage its credibility. These factors highlight the delicate balance between Ankara's aspirations and its capabilities.ย 

December 30, 2024 — No Comments

The Hi-Tech Alliance: Big Tech and US Defence

by Francesco Cirillo - USA Team

With Donald Trump's victory, the US Big Tech, with the second Trump administration, could significantly influence and consolidate the strong interconnection between the federal government and American technology companies.

In recent years, the relationship between the military industrial complex and the US tech companies (Amazon, Microsoft and Google in the lead) has strengthened, especially on technology renewal issues coming from the Pentagon in the political-military sphere. This connects the relationship between Silicon Valley and the military-industrial complex in national security matters.

In the context of the future Trump administration, which will take office on 20 January 2025, the latter could grant Big Tech ample room to manoeuvres in exchange for support in national security matters.

The strong concern is the partnership that could emerge in a public-private collaboration. According to a recent 2024 paper by Costs of War/Brown University's WATSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, entitled โ€˜How Big Tech and Silicon Valley are Transforming the Military-Industrial Complexโ€™, the link between the Department of Defence and the tech company sector is gradually influencing and directing the Pentagon's investments and the Defence Budget ($886 billion for the year 2024). In the current context, the role of Tech companies such as Amazon, Google, and Microsoft is increasing dramatically, competing with traditional US defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin. 

Besides the classic Big Tech companies, other companies such as Palantir Technologies also carve out important spaces for themselves. Founded in 2003 by Peter Thiel and Alex Karp to develop software for analyzing large amounts of data, this company is one of the best known cases of start-ups backed by military and intelligence funds that have become key players in providing services and technologies to the Department of Defence (DoD) and other federal agencies.

During its early stages, Palantir received around $2 million in funding from In-Q-Tel, the CIA's venture capital fund, which enabled the start-up to grow rapidly and acquire contracts with various government agencies. This helped Palantir to be able to grow, giving it important resources to be able to strengthen its relationships with major government agencies.

For several insiders, Palantir's role, linked to its potential, would grant it the cards to transform itself into a figure similar to Raytheon or Lockheed Martin, historically dominant companies in theย defenseย sector. Indeed, it isย theorizedย that Palantir and other technology companies, such as Microsoft and Amazon, may soon get to acquire traditional defence contractors, blurring the distinction between the technology industry and the US defence sector.ย 

Image Source:ย Generated with ChatGPT/DALLยทE

The role of tech companies has started to strengthen since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine of growing tensions with China. Linked to these geopolitical tensions, several start-ups operating in the tech sector are receiving significant investments. Among these is Anduril, a company operating in the production of military systems and drones with a focus on AI integration, which recently completed a $1.5 billion funding round, bringing its valuation to $14 billion.

As a matter of fact, the role of Big Tech in the coming years could be consolidated also in view of the geopolitical competition with Beijing.

December 21, 2024 — No Comments

Should the U.S. Back Zelensky’s Victory Plan?ย | Elina Beketova Explains

Elina Beketova discusses if Washington D.C. should support Zelensky's 'Victory Plan,โ€™ where Trump may support the plan, and what can be expected from Biden in these last few weeks of his administration.

Ms. Beketova is a democracy fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis in Washington D.C., where she researches temporarily Russian occupied territories in Ukraine. She also has extensive experience as a journalist where she reported in Crimea, Kharkiv, and Kyiv, which included prominent international high profile interviews.ย 

Interviewers: Samuel Dempsey - USA Team

December 17, 2024 — No Comments

The Empire Strikes back

By Francesco Marchesini - UK & European Affairs Team - editing Valentina Gruarin

Rule Britannia: what remains of the Empire?

The United Kingdom once used to rule the largest Empire in human history. It was the first real superpower; ruling half of the World for a Century. Subsequently, after two World Wars and the Suez crisis of 1956, the UK lost its title of world superpower to the USA.

For decades, Great Britain has been playing the role of a medium-sized power. In fact, the military budget of HM Treasury -UKโ€™s economic and finance Ministry- has been shrinking more and more over the years: from 8.65% of UK GDP in 1956 to 2.25% in 2018. After the Falkland War of 1982, the UK has not led a military campaign by its own initiative.

Despite this condition, the UK has some peculiarities: it is a nuclear power, with a leading role in the Commonwealth of Nations, NATO (being in command of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, which are NATOโ€™s strike forces) and both the G7 and the G20 councils. The UK also takes part to the Five Powers Defence Arrangements -a military alliance with Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore- and the Five Eyes programme -joining the intelligence agencies of UK, USA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Lastly, the UK still holds strategic positions on seas via the control of Dominions, such as. Gibilter, Bermudas and Ascension, as well as through the presence of its military bases set in several key points of international routes.

The UK is thus maintaining a privileged position in matters of diplomacy and soft power, based on its trustworthiness and reliability. This can be witnessed by a British Councilโ€™s study of 2021 showing that the UK is the most attractive G20 Nation. According to the same study, the UK's soft power seems to be strongest in the southern hemisphere, particularly in South-East Asia and the Pacific. Moreover, the Consultancy Brand Financeโ€™s Global Soft Power Index ranks the UK second, just behind the USA.

However, after Brexit, EU countries tend to perceive the UK as less willing to cooperate in terms of economy and security. The UK is not showing cohesiveness on how to implement its foreign policy and relations with the EU. Agreements for leaving the EU have been problematic, led by indecision and incoherence, and have been one of the main factors of the UKโ€™s political instability over the last years.

Nevertheless, the UK and the European Countries are now developing new bilateral and multilateral forms of cooperation. It is still too early to assess their effectiveness. A productive collaboration with the European Union might benefit the UKโ€™s military and economic systems, consequently strengthening both its foreign policy and bargaining power with other European nations.

Per mare, per terram: how strong is the UK?

Considering the UKโ€™s military strength, the 2024 Global Firepower Index ranks the UK at 6th place and it is composed of a total of 230.000 personnel. In 2021 PM Boris Johnson launched the Integrated Review (IR), a programmatic plan for Britainโ€™s security and strategic policies for the following decade. It included a vision of the UKโ€™s future as a cosmopolitan, open and flourishing country, which could lead the โ€œcompetitive Worldโ€ through its soft power and technological advancement; while also increasing the investments in defence. Concerning technological advancement, the IR planned to enhance scientific research around matters related to AI development, cybersecurity, quantum technology, biomechanics and semiconductors -part of the so-called CyberPower Agenda- as well as energy security and environmental protection.

Photo by New Zealand Defence Force from Wellington, New Zealand - MC 10-0422-021.jpg

In the following years, both Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak changed this strategic plan, adapting it to the aggravation and multiplication of challenges and threats that the UK had to face. The most recent version, IR23, shows that the primary threat to the security of Britain is Russia, and that the UK has been in first line since before the mass invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, training Ukraineโ€™s personnel and furnishing military equipment more and before other Western allies (over ยฃ12 billion). These data show that the UK is still a reliable and strong ally for the European countries. The second concern is China, a rising superpower, which is both intensifying its military operations in the South Chinese Sea and the Taiwan Strait and strengthening its armed forces, as well as employing soft power skills, for instance with the Belt and Road Initiative or the financial support to sub-saharan Countries. China can be seen, by some African and Asian countries, as a valid alternative to the so-called โ€œWestern worldโ€ and the UK fears losing control over Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

In 2024 the British PM Starmer declared the commitment of the Kingdom to reform its Armed Forces and increase the defense budget to 2.5% by the end of the decade, reaching ยฃ87 billion in 2030. Despite the former Chief of General Staff Gen. Sir Patrick Sanders declaring in January 2024 that the UK could not stand a conventional war, some work has been done. The UK is financing a new class of aircraft carriers (Queen Elizabeth Class), the new nuclear submarines programme (SSNR Class, included in the AUKUS cooperatio programme with the US and Australia), the new multirole fighter jet (Tempest Class, as a result of the Global Combat Air Programme with Italy and Japan) and the new main battle tank class (Challenger 3 Class).

All these avant-garde war machines will be developed by BAE Systems -a multinational firm with the participation of HMโ€™s Government- as well as the partnership with other leading firms in defence, such as Leonardo, Mitsubishi, Thales and Rheinmetall. Despite its firepower, the UK is relying on Donald Trump's re-election as POTUS could be a game-changing event. He will probably focus its efforts on the internal front, de-prioritising the USโ€™ foreign policy agenda. Indeed, during the electoral campaign, he repeatedly declared his intentions to disengage the US from their current grounds of action abroad, including Ukraine. Without the military and economical support of the USA, NATOโ€™s existence itself could be compromised.

In this scenario, the UK and EU would necessarily have to strengthen their military and economical bonds, both inside and outside of NATOโ€™s framework. Something is already. moving: UKโ€™s Foreign Secretary David Lammy labelled the EU as the most urgent foreign policy priority, and PM Starmer declared that the negotiations for a pact over common security will start in Spring 2025. This could be a historic occasion to build an effective European defence strategy and to reunite the UK and the EU, perhaps even to reform the European Union itself into a more fair and functional confederation, able to play a crucial role in the geopolitical arena.

We should not forget that the UK is facing an unseen economic crisis that could make it impossible for the Government to keep pursuing their programmes, that's why the future negotiations will need to include forms of economic reintegration of UK and EU economies. The United Kingdom has ambitious goals for the future, which appear to be more and more unpredictable every day; only time will tell if their new route will be successful.

December 10, 2024 — No Comments

Dr. Ofer Idels on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflictย ย 

Dr. Ofer Idels discusses the role history has played throughout the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the dangers and opportunities in molding narratives, and his new book,ย Zionism: Emotions, Language, and Experience.

Ofer Idels is a Minerva Postdoctoral Fellow in the History Department at Munich University. His book,ย Zionism: Emotions, Language, and Experience, was recently published by Cambridge University Press (free download here:ย https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009442947)ย 

Interviewer: Omri Brinner - Middle East Team

December 9, 2024 — No Comments

Security Challenges in Rojava

by Angelo Calianno & Jaohara Hatabi - Middle East Team

Introduction

In 2016, after years of struggle and political action, the Kurdish-majority Rojava region, located in northeastern Syria, proclaimed itself an autonomous and independent state.  Kurdish militias, together with an international coalition led by the United States, reconquered territories occupied by the Islamic States (ISIS) -. News agencies were showing photos of the Peopleโ€™s Protection Unit (YPG) fighters, and especially those of YPJ (Women's Protection Unit) troops, who were hailed as the new champions of freedom.

In their fight against ISIS, the Kurds in Northeastern Syria had become the bulwark against terrorism. Rojava's new democracy was laying the foundations of its constitution: an idea of a State where different religions and ethnicities coexist and most people are represented, regardless of religion, gender, or ideology. After 13 years of struggle since the first autonomy movement founded by the PYD (Democratic Union Party), the Syrian equivalent of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), Syrian Kurds also had their own homeland. This democratic experiment captured the attention and interest of diplomats, journalists, researchers, and onlookers from all over the world. After the initial hype, media interest has dropped dramatically for years, with hardly any reports about this region. That changed two years ago, when Turkey's bombing brought the region back to the headlines.

Inside Rojava: present-day reality

In our analysis, we reported the current situation in Rojava, especially in relation to the continuous attacks by Turkey.

The Kurdish population in Rojava findsย itself caught between a rock and a hard place. The southern part of the territory is heavily controlled by the Assad regime, which does not recognize Rojavaโ€™s autonomy. The regime maintains dozens of checkpoints that restrict the flow of essential supplies, including building materials, food, and medical equipment. As a result, many of these goods must be smuggled in from Iraq, in an attempt to avoid Damascus' screening.

Southeast of Rojava, ISIS cells still exist, especially in the rural areas of Raqqa, Kobane, and Deir ez-Zor. While these cells have lost much of their former strength and financial resources, they still pose a threat to local populations by perpetrating attacks and raids.

Conflicts in recent years have caused approximately one million Internally Displaced People (IDP), who have lost their homes and now live in semi-detention camps. The suburbs of these cities teem children working amid mountains of garbage looking for material to sell for recycling. The Al-Hol camp, one of the largest, holds around 55,000 people, the majority of whom are women and children, including many who are related to most radical ISIS terrorists. These families are not formally charged with crimes, but the Rojava authorities have adopted controversial measures, such as confining them in camps, as a preventive measure against the potential reorganization of ISIS cells. While the security rationale behind this approach is clear, it has drawn criticism for the humanitarian implications.

The conditions in the tent-city of Al-Hol are difficult, with many living in overcrowded, unsanitary conditions, surrounded by wire nets and armoured vehicles. There is limited access to basic services like water, electricity, and fuel for heating. These challenges are particularly severe for women and children, who are disproportionately affected by the harsh living conditions. The camp remains heavily guarded, with a large security presence due to concerns about radicalisation and the potential for violence. Despite the difficult circumstances, local authorities have faced pressure from international organisations and human rights groups to improve conditions and provide better support for those in the camp.

One of them told us: 

โ€œThey treat us like criminals, but we have done nothing. Every morning, the military drags us out to search us. Our husbands are in jail, but we are innocent, we do not even know why we are hereโ€. In fact, many of the women here have never committed any crime. Some of them have had no contact with their husbands for years, being in some cases a second or third wife. While they may have been married to members of a terrorist organization, they now face serious consequences for their associations, even if they themselves have not been involved in any criminal activity.

The situation in Rojava caused international responses that are varied and complex, which reflects the intricate web of alliances and conflicts in the Middle East. When Kurdish groups declared the autonomy of Rojava, they were met with a mixture of support and opposition from global and regional powers. The United States, seeking reliable partners in the fight against ISIS, formed a crucial alliance with the YPG, providing military support and training under the broader umbrella of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This partnership significantly contributed to the defeat of ISIS in Syria, garnering international recognition for the Kurdish-led forces.

However, the U.S. support for the YPG strained the formerโ€™s relations with Turkey, a NATO ally, which views the YPG as an extension of the PKK, which is designated by Turkey, the US, and the EU as a terrorist organization. Turkey has repeatedly launched military operations against the YPG, most notably Operation Olive Branch in 2018 and Operation Peace Spring in 2019, aiming to create a "safe zone" along its border free of YPG presence. These actions drew international condemnation, with European countries particularly vocal in denouncing Turkey's incursions, citing humanitarian concerns and potential destabilisation of the region. The EU called Turkey to cease its military actions, while several EU member states imposed arms embargoes on Ankara.

Russia's involvement in Rojava has been pragmatic, balancing its alliance with the Syrian government and its strategic interests in the region. Initially, Russia allowed Kurdish autonomy as a counterbalance to U.S. influence, but once the Syrian government regained territory, Russia facilitated agreements between the Kurds and Damascus, aiming to reintegrate Rojava under Syrian sovereignty while ensuring Kurdish rights. 

Iran, which supports the Assad regime, has opposed any form of Kurdish autonomy that could inspire Iranian Kurds. Thus, Tehran's policy towards Rojava aligns closely with that of Damascus and, to some extent, Ankara. Meanwhile, international human rights organisations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have reported on human rights abuses by various actors in the conflict, urging all parties to respect international law and protect civilians.

As of now, there are no formal high-profile peace negotiations taking place. Although efforts have been made by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) to engage in dialogue with the Syrian government and other regional powers, they have not resulted in any comprehensive peace agreement.

Arguably, the presence of external powers with their own interests such as Turkey, the US, Russia and Iran, further complicates the situation. However, the US continues to engage diplomatically, balancing its support for the SDF with its broader regional interests, including its relationship with Turkey. European countries have also been involved in providing diplomatic channels and humanitarian aid, advocating for a peaceful resolution and respect for human rights in the region.

Picture by Angelo Calianno, Rojava, Northeastern Syria

Final Considerations

In conclusion, the situation in Rojava remains a complex and multifaceted challenge. The region's pursuit of autonomy has led to a diverse set of responses from international actors, highlighting the intricate balance of power and interests at play. The humanitarian crisis, particularly the plight of displaced persons and those in camps like Al-Hol, underscores the urgency of a coordinated international response that prioritises human rights and humanitarian principles. While the Kurdish forces have been instrumental in the fight against ISIS, the geopolitical realities involving major powers such as the United States, Turkey, Russia, and Iran complicate the pathway to a stable and peaceful resolution. Moving forward, it is crucial for the international community to support dialogue and negotiations, respecting the rights and aspirations of all parties involved while ensuring the protection of civilians and the adherence to international law. The future of Rojava will depend significantly on the ability of these various actors to navigate the delicate political landscape and work toward a sustainable and inclusive solution.

* This article was written before the events of December 8, 2024.