December 9, 2024 — No Comments

Chinaโ€™s Belt and Road Initiative: A Double-Edged Sword for the Pacific Region

by Dejvi Dedaj - SouthEast Asia & Oceania Team

Introduction

Theย Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)ย is an initiative adopted by China in 2013 to strengthen connectivity and cooperation among Asia, Europe, and Africa โ€“ and even extending to some regions in Latin America and Oceania โ€“ making its influence felt as the reinvigorated and wider Silk Road. The BRI establishes an extensive network of infrastructure projects to facilitate international trade and accelerate economic growth. Ranging from railways, highways, ports, and electricity power plants, the initiative is committed to rendering the movement of goods, services or resources more efficient.

The BRI stands upon two fundamental pillars, namely the Silk Road Economic Belt, which uses railways, roads, and pipelines to connect China to Europe via Central Asia, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, a maritime route that links China to Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, and Europe via strategic ports and shipping lanes. 

Notably, under the BRI, China allocates funding to the countries participating in infrastructure projects, mostly in the form of loans. Accordingly, notwithstanding the general interest in the BRI initiative, the project hasย attracted considerable criticism. Although proponents of the BRI assert that it boosts development, employment, and trade within participating countries, critics counter that BRI projects may elevate some countries into high debt levels, thus increasing their economic dependence on China and raising issues of sovereignty and environmental impact and sustainability. Indeed, the BRI is often viewed as aย double-edged sword, both filling gaps in infrastructure and improving trade routes, but also positioning China as a leading financier in the global arena.

BRI Economic Benefits in Southeast Asia and Oceania

The BRI has provided a forum for investing in improving infrastructure, which, in turn, enhances connectivity and the interchange of goods among Southeast Asia and Oceania. For example, the China-Laos Railwayโ€”completed in 2021 and spanning 1000 kmโ€”facilitates the cheaper export of goods by connecting Laos to Chinaโ€™s southern Yunnan province, helping to spur economic growth in Laos by improving its access to international markets. In addition, the deep-water port in Gwadar, which is part of the much-discussed BRI despite being located in Pakistan, is relevant for Southeast Asian and Oceania trade as it significantly boosts maritime linkages with the Indian Ocean.

In addition, BRI investments have provided employment and stimulated sectors such as construction and manufacturing in developing regions. For instance, BRI projects such as the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway, in Indonesia not only bring new transportation possibilities but also foster job creation and knowledge transfer that advances and reinforces local industries while expanding economic capabilities.

Financial Challenges and Debt Risks

The biggest challenges faced by the BRI are debt vulnerabilities. Most of the projects involved are financed by loans, imposing significant burdens to smaller economies. Indeed, massive Chinese loans used to fund contemporary megaprojects have landed entire countries in aย debt trapโ€”Laos today stands burdened by a substantial debt relative to the countryโ€™s GDP. Similarly, in Malaysia, the East Coast Rail Link raised doubts about the viability of Chinese loans, causing the Malaysian government to renegotiate project terms amidst worries they would not be able to pay back such large loans, thus reducing the countryโ€™s financial strain.

Besides, the reliance on Chinese financing for BRI projects has created economic dependence of some Southeast Asian and Oceanian countries. Such dependence threatens to undermine the countriesโ€™ political and economicย independence and sovereign controlย over their infrastructure and natural resources, as they become more and more beholden to Beijing. Fears emerge that these nations may become even more entangled with Chinese interests, thus helping China to gain more control over their policy decisions. For instance, Papua New Guinea faces akin challenges, since reliance on Chinese-funded ports and mining ventures, could make the country highly vulnerable, if revenues generated from these investments are not as expected.ย 

Picture by Joe Shlabotnik, "Cargo Ship" - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/

Strategic and Geopolitical Implications

The establishment of Chinese capital is remaking strategic and geopolitical realities in Southeast Asia and Oceania, as countries increasingly align their economic policies with Chinese interests. Nowhere has this been truer than in countries that rely on BRI investments as the primary conduit for infrastructure financing. Among the more prominent beneficiaries are Indonesia, home to some of China's most considerable BRI investmentsโ€”as well as Pakistan, a key player in the initiative through its participation in CPEC and various infrastructure projects spanning energy and transportation. Laos, Kenya, and Sri Lanka are other countries that have raised substantial amounts via BRI-financing, which has supported necessary development in areas such as transport and energy, but this has come at the cost of taking on sizable levels of debt to the Chinese government.

The newly emerging Chinese presence is therefore regarded as a counterbalance to the USโ€™ traditional influence, subsequently shifting the scale of power in an area usually perceived as fostering and perpetuating the conventional paradigm of the status quo. Indeed, several local communities have objected to BRI-related projects owing to the fear of ceding sovereignty over resources and strategic assets. 

For example, the East Coast Rail Link in Malaysia has raised serious alarm about the possible adverse impact on the habitats along the coastline, as well as the control exerted by China over sensitive infrastructure. In Indonesia, critics have condemned Chinese-funded mining projects in Sulawesi due to environmental degradation, illegal logging, and displacement of locals. Sri Lankaโ€™s leasing of Hambantota Port to a Chinese firm as a way of repaying a debt has likewise fuelled such fears that China could gain strategic leverage in the region. These cases show a hidden conflict between the general benefits that some countries get from infrastructure investments and threats to national sovereignty concerns.

Although BRI has also led to closer collaboration between Southeast Asian nations and China on shared infrastructure projects, promoting regional integration, it can also create tensions, as countries compete for Chinese investments or respond to public pressure to resist perceived Chinese overreach. For instance, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand are negotiating BRI projects cautiously, trying to strike a reasonable balance between economic benefits and potential national security risks.

Conclusion

Evidently, the impact of the BRI has been substantially felt across Southeast Asia and Oceania, with the participating countries witnessing critical improvements in connectivity and infrastructure. Indeed, BRI projects have presented unique economic advantages, especially in the fields of transportation and employment in developing areas. That said, financial and geopolitical difficulties stemming from funding such BRI projects cannot be dismissed. Heavy economic reliance on Chinese investments poses a significant challenge to national sovereignty and long-term fiscal sustainability for several countries such as Malaysia, Laos, or Papua New Guinea, whose dependence on the Chinese Government has been conducive to burdensome debt-induced obligations and foreign interference with local affairs. What is more, Chinaโ€™s ever-growing presence on the global scene has remodelled the geopolitical landscape, challenging the conventional Western influence in the region.

This intricate relationship between the sought-after economic development in the region and the associated sovereignty risks has often led to local resistance to some BRI projects. However, such nuanced navigation of interstate relationships, particularly with China, is the only way forward to ensure sustainable, independent growth in todayโ€™s rapidly globalising, interconnected world. Indeed, should these economic and geopolitical challenges not be effectively addressed, then the BRIโ€™s success cannot be guaranteed.

December 2, 2024 — No Comments

Tren de Aragua: The Threat of Transnational Crime in Chile

By Sarah Toubman - Central & South America Team

On the 15thย of November 2024, Colombian officialsย announced the captureย of Jeison Alexander Lorca Salazar, the second-in-command of the Venezuelan criminal organisation Tren de Aragua.

Long considered the most pre-eminent and prolific Venezuelan criminal enterprise, Lorca Salazarโ€™s arrest is representative of the increasing transnationalisation of Tren de Aragua, and crime in Latin America more broadly.

Originally founded in Venezuelan prison Tocorรณn in approximately 2012, the organisation has since spread across North and South America, establishing a presence in Colombia, Chile, Mexico, and the United States, among other countries.

Although the organisation began to grow its cross-border network in 2018, it has been internationalising at an increasingly rapid pace in recent years.

In October 2023, earlyย reports from the Cook County Sheriff's Officeย indicated members of Tren de Aragua were present in Chicago, Illinois. Further activity from the organisation in the US in the following months prompted the US Department of the Treasury to designate Tren de Aragua a โ€œSignificant Transnational Criminal Organization,โ€ andย the US Department of State to officially call for membersโ€™ arrests.ย 

Rise of Tren de Aragua in Chile

This year, reports of the groupโ€™s presence in Chile have been growing in particular, with Venezuelaโ€™s political and economic turmoil pinpointed as a driver of this trend. Instability in Venezuela has not only created a humanitarian crisis but also created an opening for organisations likeย Tren de Aragua to engage in human trafficking in and around Chile.

The kidnap and murder of Venezuelan political dissident Ronald Ojeda in Santiago by Tren de Aragua in February 2024 was one of the most prominent incidents over the course of the past year, and a clear signifier of the organisationโ€™s increased criminal activities in the country.

In a May 2024 BBC article, Venezuelan investigative journalist Ronna Rรญsquez named the rise of Tren de Aragua in Chile as the first instance of a transnational organised crime group operating in the country. 

Speaking to Rรญsquez, Mauro Mercado Andaur,  National Head of Organised Crime at Chileโ€™s Investigative Police, explained how in addition to the groupโ€™s transnational character, Tren de Araguaโ€™s activities differ from previous organised crime in Chile due to their level of control and violence. 

โ€œIt was easy for them to take over territories. They took over nearly unpopulated areas to establish their dealings, [and] began to offer services, such as getting migrants across one border to another, providing security to businesses or falsifying identity documents,โ€ he said.

One such example of Tren de Araguaย exploiting a less populated region of Chile includes the installation of Los Gallegosโ€”a local Tren de Aragua cellโ€”in Arica, a coastal region in the north of the country bordering Peru.

Combating another such local cell, Chilean authorities conducted a raid on 69 properties in Viรฑa del Mar on the 29th of August, 2024, and arrested 34 individuals suspected of working with the criminal organisation.

Photo by David Knox on Unsplash

Growing concerns for Chile and Latin America

Rising crime, and particularly transnational crime, is clearly a growing concern for Chileans. At a June 2024 State of the Union address, President Gabriel Boric stated that โ€œcrime and organised crime are the greatest threats we face today.โ€ 

Some experts see the increasing internationalisation of organised crime across Latin America as a paradigm shift in the field, with Will Freeman, a fellow for Latin American studies at the Council on Foreign, dubbing the change the rise of โ€œreorganised crime.โ€

While the exportation of Tren de Aragua abroad is only one of several significant security ramifications of Venezuelan political instability, increasing levels of transnational crime in Latin America will be crucial to monitor moving forward.  With the shape of organised crime in Latin America changing more and more by the day, it is yet to be seen whether authorities can tackle the growing challenges of โ€œreorganised crime,โ€ or whether it will be here to stay.

November 27, 2024 — No Comments

Dr. Baldaro on Counter-Terrorism Challenges in the Sahel

In this session, Dr. Baldaro discusses the root causes of jihadism in the Sahel, focusing on how civil wars, local grievances, poor governance, and corruption have been inadequately addressed by the European Unionโ€™s counter-terrorism strategy in the region, which was heavily securitised. He then expands on Russiaโ€™s current counter-insurgency strategyโ€”an even more hardline and militarised approachโ€”that not only fails to address local grievances but also contributes to increased chaos and violence.

Dr. Baldaro concludes by expressing scepticism about the possibility of a future return of European aid, noting that the military juntas governing the various Sahelian states have adopted a strictly repressive approach to tackling the issue. However, he highlights some exceptions, such as Italyโ€™s presence in Niger and the growing involvement of new actors like Turkey, Iran, and the Gulf monarchies.ย 

Dr. Edoardo Baldaro is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Palermo. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Scuola Normale Superiore, Institute of Human and Social Sciences. He is a leading expert on the Sahel region and themes such as state fragility, jihadism and regional conflict management.ย 

Interviewers: Axelle Bougouma, Angelo Saad Hintermayer and Camilla Cormegna - Africa Team

November 25, 2024 — No Comments

The Impacts of Trump Presidency on Global Economic Relations

by Miguel Jimรฉnez, Ingrid Heggstad, & Dan Ziebarth - Political Economy, Development, & Energy Security Team

Introduction

It was announced on Tuesday, November 5th that Donald Trump, the candidate for the right-wing Republican Party, had won the 2024 Presidential Election in the United States of America and would officially become the President-Elect. Kamala Harris, the left-wing Democratic Party candidate, conceded defeat in a speech on Wednesday, December 6th, urging voters to accept the election results. While Harris and her vice presidential running mate, Time Walz, received significant party support ahead of the election and wereย seenย as a new phase for the Democratic Party, the party will be weakened following the election results. Even though during the campaign sheย lacked a compelling economic narrativeย and often avoided answeringย how to fundย ย any proposal she brought to the table, in terms of global economic relations, a Harris presidency was expected to maintain continuity with the current Biden administration's approach largely.

The second Trump presidency is expected to have major ramifications for global politics, particularly global economic relations, particularly as Trump has been a vocal proponent of protectionist trade policies. The Republican Party, led by Trump, will also control both chambers of the legislature, while conservative justices make up 6 of the 9 seats on the Supreme Court of the United States. These conditions could give Trump a strong mandate for policy change. In particular, economic relations with China, the European Union, and Russia are expected to be affected by a second Trump presidency.

China

Trump hasย announcedย that, if re-elected, he will impose a 10โ€“20 per cent across-the-board tariff on imports into the United States, with anย additionalย 60 per cent tariff on all imports from China. Trump has alsoย pledgedย to terminate the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) passed by the Biden administration, which would be expected to increase domestic production and reduce Chinese imports. This is in contrast to what would have been expected under a Kamala Harris administration, where the usage of tools to inhibit the arrival of Chinese goods would have come from domestic policies with the continuation of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA),ย the single largest climate investment in American history. Based on building domestic champions in the field of energy transition, which is currently dominated by China,ย being the worldโ€™s leader in clean energy production and the refinement of the majority of mineral inputs.ย 

European Union

The second Trump presidency could challenge Europeย throughย an โ€œAmerica Firstโ€ trade policy, focused on reducing the U.S. trade deficit, with tariffs as high as 20 per cent on imports and even more on Chinese goods. These tariffs would increase costs for European exporters and consumers, impacting the EUโ€™s economy. Ongoing disputes from the Biden era, such as steel and aluminium tariffs and green subsidies, may also escalate, while the expiration of paused EU retaliatory tariffs inย 2025 and the Airbus-Boeing subsidy conflict in 2026 could further strain EU-U.S. trade relations,ย adding to Europeโ€™s economic uncertainty. It is noteworthy that during his tenure as president, Donald Trump's imposition of tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from the European Union and China resulted in the implementation of retaliatory tariffs on U.S. agricultural products.

Russia

A renewed Trump presidency could also impact global economic relations with Russia. In his 2024 campaign, Trumpย promisedย to swiftly resolve the Ukraine conflict, asserting he could achieve peace within 24 hours through negotiation. ย However, if Russia resists a settlement, Trump hasย signalledย he would impose tougher economic sanctions, potentially targeting Russiaโ€™s central bank and curtailing energy exports to key markets like India and China. This intensified economic pressure, coupled with increased US energy production to lower global prices, would squeeze Russiaโ€™s vital oil revenue.ย 

Additionally, Trumpโ€™s scepticism toward ongoing US aid to Ukraine, which has amounted to $92.7 billion since 2022, raises concerns over a potentialย reductionย in support, which could compromise Ukraineโ€™s defence and shift the regional balance in Russiaโ€™s favour. Trump has alsoย suggestedย that Europe should shoulder more responsibility for its security, which may lead to a reevaluation of US commitments to NATO. It is possible that a reduction in the US role in NATO could have the effect of weakening collective defenses, which might in turn expose Europe to greater tensions with Russia. This approachย indicatesย a shift toward a more isolationist US foreign policy, with strategic economic measures as leverage to influence Russia's actions.

Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Additionally, Trumpโ€™s expected policies in oil and gas could intensify competition with Russia and reshape global energy markets. Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska has predicted that Trumpโ€™s support for US oil production might drive global prices down to around $50 per barrel by 2025, creating pressure on Russiaโ€™s oil-dependent economy. Trumpโ€™s approach would likely include promoting US LNG exports, reviving paused projects, and further challenging Russiaโ€™s position in Europeโ€™s energy market. 

His stance on projects like the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which he previously sanctioned to limit Russiaโ€™s influence, suggests he might continue efforts to curb Russiaโ€™s global LNG ambitions whileย supportingย policies to maintain affordable oil prices for US consumers. By influencing OPEC+ to stabilise prices favourable to the US, Trump could further impact Russiaโ€™s revenue, potentially reducing its leverage in Europe and heightening competition in the global energy sector.

Conclusion

Taken together, based upon a previous presidency led by Donald Trump and his recent claims on the campaign trail, global economic relations could become increasingly tense between the United States and other nations and political unions.

In particular, trade relations between China and the United States are expected to worsen, with major increases in tariffs on Chinese goods entering into the United States possibly leading to retaliatory tariffs and an intensification of trade competition between the two countries. The European Union could also be affected by the competition between the United States and China, as well as the possibility of increased tariffs on goods from the EU going into the United States. The conflict in Ukraine also casts a shadow over Trumpโ€™s second term and whether the Trump administration continues to provide funding to Ukraine and keep sanctions on Russia in place will affect both the war in Ukraine, as well as economic relations between the United States and Russia.

These considerations will all have ripple effects across the entire world, meaning it is important for policymakers, scholars, and citizens alike to continue watching the effects of the second Trump presidency on global economic relations.ย 

November 25, 2024 — No Comments

The Italian strategic alignment with the EU Chips Act

by Giacomo Bortolazzi (Italy Team) & Marco Verrocchio (Military Strategy & Intelligence Team)

Despite the relative overcoming of the crisis sparked in early 2020, the global shortage of semiconductor chips has precipitated countries and companies into fierce competition on a global scale. This paper examines the potential response of Italy and its strategic initiatives in one of the most strategic issues in the near future. Nonetheless, Italian initiatives are propelled and integrated into the European framework of the Chips Act. By analysing Italy's alignment with the EU's objective, the article provides insights into the nation's efforts in the complex global semiconductor landscape.

Semiconductors' crisis: Europe's role in the global Chip shortages

The world isย not newย to the fierce competition among countries on semiconductors. However, theย demandย forย cutting-edgeย technologies and the massive need for semiconductors in everyday lifeย smart devices are determining insecurities on the endurance of the GVCs. The global chip shortageย duringย the Covid-19ย pandemicย has drawn theย attentionย ofย industriesย andย statesย onย the strategic value ofย semiconductors. While supplies of chips began toย improve in 2022, the already high demand forย advanced chips, such as those for the automotive and military sector, is continuing to intensify: theย global market of semiconductors is projected to scale from $573.44 billion in 2022 to $1,380.79ย billion by 2029 at a compound annual growth rate of 12.2%. However, chips are not so easy toย make: While building factories and clean laboratories requires years, transforming a single siliconย wafer into semiconductorsย takes months. Based on said high demand and the complexity of makingย semiconductors,ย theย latterโ€™sย GVCsย areย highlyย amenableย toย geopoliticalย tensionsย suchย asย theย US-China trade competition. For these reasons, governments are investing to boost domestic production, attract foreign investment, and discourage the export of semiconductor technologies.

While Japan and the US dominated semiconductor manufacturing in the 90s, today Taiwan andย South Korea are leading the market both in terms of volume and of production of theย smallestย nanometer chips. The eruption of the US-China trade competition and the shortage of chips during theย Pandemic,ย onย theย otherย hand,ย ledย theย USย andย Japanย toย adoptย policiesย againstย theย exportsย ofย chips-relatedย technologies,ย encouragingย theย establishmentย ofย factoriesย in the homeland. In thisย scenario, in July 2023 the EU adopted theย European Chips Act, a regulation aimed at strengtheningย the European semiconductor market throughย more than โ‚ฌ43 billionย of investments. Based on theย premises of the Chips Act, in the same year the regulation was implemented by theย Chips Jointย Undertaking (Chips JU), a call for funding based on public-private partnership to bridge the gapย between R&D and the market.

The Italian implementation of the Chips Ju

Among the several European countries that became an active implementer of the Chips Joint Undertaking, Italy certainly represents an actor with an important burden on its shoulders. The first active participation of the country in the JU was in November 2023, when Chips.IT, the new Italian Centre for the Design of Semiconductor Integrated Circuits, and the Italian strategy for microelectronics were presented in Pavia. The two novelties are strongly intertwined: Chips.IT was born as part of the strategy to coordinate and strengthen the microchip design sector with state-of-the-art equipment, all in order to foster an overall development of the sector. The role of public and private entities was also stressed, with โ‚ฌ225 million being allocated and big firms such as Intel, Sony, Infineon and the Italian STMicroelectronics willing to collaborate.

The national efforts in the field of the JU will also foster the birth of further projects that will have a positive impact on the national landscape: after the approval of the Governing Board of the JU, a new advanced microelectronics infrastructure was set up in the middle of the Etna Valley with the main task to build prototype devices for the development of innovative applications in the field of electric mobility and telecommunications. The initiative was strongly supported by the Italian Ministries of Enterprise and Made in Italy, the University and Research Ministry and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) and received an allocation of โ‚ฌ360 million to be divided between the European Union and the participating states (namely Finland, Poland, Sweden, Austria, France and Germany). This investment will certainly have a positive impact on the area by fostering employment, newly established activities and a general blooming of the industrial sector directly related to microelectronics.

Another important presence in the Italian landscape will be that ofย Silicon Box, a Singaporean techย giant has planned to invest โ‚ฌ3.2 billion in the Italian microelectronics industry with a new plantย located inย Novara.ย The role of this company is certainly not to be underestimated, as it couldย contribute to the Italian role in the market of the so-called โ€œchipletsโ€. Sehat Sutardja, one of theย foundersย ofย Siliconย Box,ย introducedย thisย conceptย inย 2015ย asย anย innovativeย andย performance-enhancingย technology.ย Aย chipletย is in fact a processor with multiple cores that isย printed on the same layer with other chiplets: this would consent a more efficient communication,ย thusย erasing the issue of hardware-softwareย data transfer.

Photo by Dan Williams via Pixabay

Italian expectations in the EU scenario

In a nutshell, Italy does not dispose of forgeries equiparable to those of countries such as China, which can hold entire GVCs inside their territory. Even though small enterprises are common in the Italian tech sector, many new important initiatives such as those started in the Etna Valley and in

Novara can be considered as holding a great potential. At the same time, the European Union hasย realisedย theย importanceย andย theย scarcityย ofย semiconductorsย andย ofย theย materialsย neededย toย produceย it. Due to the important influx of investments received by Member States, Italy has experiencedย positive spillover effects, resulting in the transfer of valuable know-how and the creation of moreย job opportunities. In light of these novelties, the future possibility for Italy to start a โ€œsolo projectโ€ย and to become itself a global actor is not to be excluded. Still, itโ€™s important to bear in mind that keyย global actors such as South Korea, China or Taiwan are still a long way ahead and that multipleย efforts will be required to launch Italy among the stars. Still, Italian efforts to be imprinted in theย global semiconductor market are slowly revealing their โ€œdual useโ€: theyโ€™re helping the Europeanย Union to reduce its dependency on external actors while securing the countryโ€™s competitiveness inย the field of semiconductors.

November 23, 2024 — No Comments

The Kashmir Conflict: The Tip of a Dangerous Glacier- Part I

by Davide Gobbicchi - Human Security Team

The return to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan has shed light on Central Asiaโ€™s geopolitics and security issues, with many analysts fearing that Afghanistan would initiate a domino effect of destabilisation and Islamic radicalisation across a particularly unstable region of the world. Kashmir has best symbolised the complexity of South Asia, given its decades of instability, ethnoreligious tensions and major great powers' interests. Assessing this region helps us understand one of the most strategic and complex areas in the world.

This article attempts to uncover the motivations behind the long-standing conflict that turned Kashmir into the worldโ€™s most militarised region, to consequently try providing policy recommendations that could bring Kashmir stability and development, much to the benefit of its people, the larger geographical area, and the international community as a whole.

This article will be divided into two parts: the first will focus on the regionโ€™s historical and sociocultural context as well as its political structure, investigating the factors behind Kashmirisโ€™ unique identity and the developments leading Kashmir to its current state of affairs; the second part will then analyse the solutions to the conflict proposed by the recent international academic literature and try to uncover the motivations behind Indo-Pakistani inability to implement such solutions, finishing by presenting policy recommendations for the actors involved in the conflict.

Understanding Kashmir: history and cultural identity 

Kashmirโ€™s geographical position at the crossroads of empires and its predominantly mountainous nature createdย throughout the centuriesย two conditions common to such regions across the world: a highlyย heterogeneousย population within anย isolatedย territory.ย The centuries-old melting pot resulting from the regionโ€™s location destroyed classic patterns of identity (religion and language)ย and generatedย a society with incongruous religious-linguistic divisions, thus preventing the radicalisation of social groups along ethno-religious lines and instead nurturing a culture of peaceful coexistence among different religions and ethnicities that became known as โ€œKashmiriyatโ€. Simultaneously, Kashmirโ€™s territorial morphology provided a natural barrier- mountains-against excessive foreign influence, thereby preserving a strong regional identity based not on a unique language, culture, or religion, butย rather on the unique coexistence and intermingling of many.

Map 1: Erstwhile Princely State of Jammu & Kashmir. Currently, Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir are administered by Pakistan, UT of Jammu & Kashmir and UT of Ladakh by India, and Aksai Chin by China.
Source and link: Wikimedia Commons.

The establishment of the "Princely State of Kashmir and Jammu" in 1846 marked the beginning of a distinct political entity in the region. The Maharaja of this new kingdom retained control over most internal matters while recognising the suzerainty of the British Empire. During its century of quasi-independent rule (1846โ€“1952), the region saw the cultivation of ideals such as tolerance, secularism, and pluralism, which had long been part of its historical identity. Challenges emerged following the partition of 1947, as ethno-religious tensions in the newly created states of India and Pakistan began to affect Kashmir. The initial neutrality and aspirations for independence within the Princely State of Kashmir and Jammu encountered opposition from both India and Pakistan, each of which viewed Kashmir as integral to their national identities.

In 1947, armed tribal forces from Pakistan entered Kashmir, citing reports of violence against Muslims in the region, and sought to integrate Kashmir with the newly established Islamic Republic of Pakistan. in response to the foreign invasion, the Maharaja of Kashmir and Jammu - being himself a Hindu - requested India to intervene and stop Pakistani incursions into Kashmir, consequently allowing for Jammu and Kashmir to become part of the country. Indiaโ€™s intervention marked the beginning of the First Indo-Pakistani War (1947-1948) and - upon Indiaโ€™s request - the intervention of the UN to settle the dispute. UN Resolutions 47 and 48 called for a ceasefire and proposed a plebiscite to allow the people of Jammu and Kashmir to determine their political future. While a ceasefire was achieved and a ceasefire line established, disagreements between India and Pakistan prevented the implementation of the plebiscite, leaving the region divided and its population in a state of uncertainty.

In the following decades, the political and territorial landscape of Kashmir underwent further changes. The Sino-Indian War of 1962 resulted in China gaining control of the eastern region of Aksai Chin. The Third Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 led to the 1972 establishment of the Line of Control (LoC), a de facto border based largely on the previous ceasefire line, separating Pakistani-administered and Indian-administered territories. Despite a fourth Indo-Pakistani war in 1999 and subsequent smaller clashes, the region remains a point of contention between the two nations.

Kashmir remainsย to this dayย under the fragile division established by the 1972 Line of Control. However, decades of Indo-Pakistani influence and conflict have changed Kashmiri identity, slowly eroding the principles of tolerance and pluralism (Kashmiriyat) on which it had been resting for the previous centuries: Islamic fundamentalism - backed by Islamabad and fueled by New Delhiโ€™s Hindu nationalism - gradually moved away from its historical irrelevance to gain growing importance in political and societal discourses, becoming the pillar of several political and civil society movements within the region. The increasing radicalisation among segments of the Muslim Kashmiri population contributed to the eruption of violence and terrorism, leading to the displacement of several religious minorities, including the Hindu Kashmiri Pandits, who relocated to predominantly Hindu areas of the region; these migrations impoverished the societyโ€™s ethnocultural diversity and consequently led to the alignment of identity with religion, thereby allowing the flourishing of geographical and sectarian divisions within Kashmir. These newly arising divisions greatly worsened living conditions, further fomenting extremism and interreligious hatred.

The political division of Kashmir 

As of today, India controls about 55% of Kashmir, Pakistan 30%, and China roughly 15% of it. Kashmir is now divided into four areas, with two under Indian control and two under Pakistani control, excluding the mostly uninhabited Chinese-controlled part of the region.:

  • Jammu & Kashmir (now โ€œU.T. of Jammu and Kashmirโ€, and โ€œU.T. of Ladakhโ€): This subregion under Indian control was given the status of โ€œStateโ€ and granted a special degree of autonomy over its internal affairs by the Indian Constitution (article 370; article 35a). In 2019 the Indian Government - after decades of debate - approved the โ€œJammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Actโ€, whichย abrogatedย the two articles and split the state into two โ€œUnion Territoriesโ€ that enjoy far less autonomy than States: โ€œthe Union Territory of Ladakhโ€, and the โ€œUnion Territory of Jammu and Kashmirโ€. Such a highly contested Act (justified by the Indian Government as a way to stimulate โ€œfinancial activities, transparency in administration and growth in J&Kโ€™s economy.โ€) de facto marked the end to what was known as โ€œKashmiri Exceptionalismโ€, and was (and still is) met byย widespread protestsย throughout the region (now divided into two different administrative territories), since many saw New Delhiโ€™s centralism as an attempt to colonise theย regionย and alter its unique identity.ย ย 
  • ย Gilgit-Baltistan: this territory controlled by Pakistan is administered by the โ€œGilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order 2009โ€, which officially grants the region self-rule but de facto puts it under the control of โ€œan Islamabad-based council with its Chairman being the Prime Minister of Pakistanโ€. The order further facilitated Islamabadโ€™s policy of ethnic substitution in the region - given Gilgit-Baltistanโ€™s Shia majority in direct opposition to Pakistanโ€™s Sunni tradition - thereby fuelingย tensionsย across the territory and demands for separatism.ย 
  • Azad Kashmir: this second region under Pakistani rule officially enjoys a wide degree of autonomy under its Interim Constitution of 1974, though it de facto is - like the other Pakistan-controlled region -ย completely subject to the will of Islamabad. Major natural disasters andย the resultingย mass emigration rapidly changed the territoryโ€™s demographics, drawing it closer to the rest of Pakistan.ย 

Having explained Kashmirโ€™s sociocultural and political context, the second part of the article will focus on the solutions to its critical state of affairs.

November 20, 2024 — No Comments

Marco Volpe on the role of China in the Arctic

In this episode, Marco Volpe talks about China's current and future role in the Arctic region, China's polar strategy including Antarctica, and academic bridge building between the Arctic and the Third Pole. Marco Volpe is a visiting researcher at the Arctic Centre in Rovaniemi.

In this session, Mr. Volpe lays out the scientific, economic, and geopolitical spheres of China's engagement in the Arctic region. He highlights China'sย long-term planning capabilities and looks at China's overall polar strategy, including Antarctica, through the lens of investments in polar climate science. Mr. Volpe also discusses the efforts of building bridges between Arctic and Third Pole (Himalaya) research, focusing on indigenous peoples and indigenous knowledge.ย 

Interviewers: Irene Senfter and Max Giordanoย - Arctic Team

November 18, 2024 — No Comments

After the Vote: How the 2024 U.S. Election Will Reshape the World

In this timely and thought-provoking discussion, Cristina Ramirez and Gesine Weber, PhD Candidates at King's College London, break down the 2024 US elections and their wide-reaching implications. From domestic shifts to global challenges, their insights are not to be missed.

In doing so, our special guests, moderated by our researcher and Webinar Series leader, Carlotta Rinaudo, will attempt to analyse the situation by answering the following questions:

Agenda: 

00:00 -02:45ย Opening remarksย andย Presentationย by Carlotta Rinaudo (Lead of the ITSS Webinar Series)

02:48ย What does Trump's return to power reveal about American society and identity? Have we misunderstood his appeal to American voters?

12:00ย Is this the era of a new establishment? and if so, what might be its implications for policymaking?

15:18 Are democratic values eroding, and what could his transactional foreign policy mean for the world? Can we expect a rapid peace deal in the Russia-Ukraine war? How could a new Trump administration reshape relations with the EU, China, or impact the war in Gaza?

23:38 ย Q&A session

50:00ย Closing Remarksย by Carlotta Rinaudo

Speakers: 

ย Cristina Ramirez, (Kingโ€™s College London)

Gesine Weber, (Kingโ€™s College London)

Don't miss out - click to watch now!

November 18, 2024 — No Comments

Exploring North Korea’s Society: An Interview with Hyun-seung Lee

In this episode, our experts from the Asia & China desk, organize an incredibly insightful webinar, featuring Hyun-seung Lee, a former DPRK businessman and chair of the Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League branch in Dalian, China. Mr. Lee currently serves as a director for One Korea Network and a fellow of North Korean studies at the Global Peace Foundation. He has also completed an internship with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.ย 

Forced to defect in late 2014 due to a series of purges by Kim Jong Un, Lee offers an insider's perspective on North Korean society, the relationship between North Korea and China, and the impact of US policy on the regime.

Interviewers: Sandra Watson Parcels, Suha Choi, Ho Ting (Bosco) Hung, Skylor Pok Yuen Ko, Carlotta Rinaudo - Asia & China Team

November 14, 2024 — No Comments

Barracuda-M: Could Anduril be a game-changer in modern Warfare and Defense Agility?

By Giulio Civettini - Military & Strategy Team

Introduction about Anduril and their mission 

Founded in 2017 by Oculus co-founder Palmer Luckey, ANDURIL INDUSTRIES is a California-based defense sector company1. As stated by Luckey and reflected in their mission, ANDURILโ€™s products aim to enhance the ability of the United States and its allies to counter both symmetrical and asymmetrical threats, thanks to the companyโ€™s cutting-edge technology and innovative production capabilities2 3. These capabilities stem from the very way the company was founded. Differently from other major companies in the sector, such as Northrop Grumman and RTX, ANDURIL is not dependent on external funders and avoids long-term contracts with the U.S. government4 5. This approach creates a system where the companyโ€™s success relies on its ability to develop cost-efficient, cutting-edge products6. ANDURIL secures the necessary funds through private venture capital investments, providing it with more autonomy compared to companies reliant on external funders7.

The company isnโ€™t incentivised by project delays or increased costs, which is why having an ecosystem outside the traditional defence industry giants could position it to address some of the challenges faced by the U.S. and its allies89. By conducting R&D (research and development) internally and avoiding the typical long-term contracts that often overrun schedules and budgets, ANDURIL remains highly flexible and competitive10 11.

The company has pursued a vertical acquisition strategy to diversify its capabilities. This approach to vertical integration allows ANDURIL to directly adapt its core product, โ€œLATTICE OS,โ€ to various systems1213. By automating processes such as quality checks, ANDURIL can scale production, achieving a competitive position in the industry14. A prime example of this vertical integration is the acquisition of Area-I, a Georgia-based company specialising in small unmanned aerial systems (UAS). This acquisition not only diversifies ANDURILโ€™s portfolio of autonomous systems but also provides a strategic advantage by integrating AI and their software directly into drones.15 As mentioned earlier, ANDURILโ€™s core product is โ€œLATTICE AI,โ€ a software that coordinates the ecosystem the company has created, providing users with complete battlefield awareness and intelligence-gathering capabilities16.

The strategic choice of being independent for R&D and for long-lasting contracts is also reflected in how their supply chain is structured. Thanks to the control and efficiency guaranteed by the vertical integration model, ANDURIL has gained an important edge in the industry, giving them the unique ability in the sector to adapt โ€œfasterโ€ to what are the immediate demands coming from the battlefield. The in-house production and agile nature of the company enable quick scaling up production of both small drones and more complex sensor systems17. What gives ANDURIL this ability to quickly scale production is the modular design, giving them the ability to quickly repair, substitute, and update their systems, giving the important possibility of resisting warfare โ€œATTRITIONโ€ to the U.S. arsenal18. This means that the weapons or systems that are being used are sufficiently autonomous and relatively cheap, and so the problem that could present with the loss of said system would not impact so much on a countryโ€™s arsenal19. The supply chain is built in such a way that the most important components on which the production relies are directly produced in the U.S. or in-house, minimizing third-party dependencies in case of an all-out war20.

So, what emerges from this analysis is that ANDURIL is a uniquely structured company in the defense sector. Its approach to funding, marketing strategies and, more importantly, its engineering capabilities give it an edge in the agility to which the company adapts to emerging scenarios21.

How do Cruise missiles and loitering munitions/UAVs play into American theater level strategy?

One of the most recent additions to ANDURILโ€™s portfolio is the BARRACUDA AAV (autonomous air vehicle) (6). Before exploring how such a system could really change the current power competition happening over the South China Sea, itโ€™s important to understand the role of cruise missiles and loitering munitions/UAVs. For decades, the U.S. has maintained uncontested air dominance wherever it has operated, giving it the possibility to deploy ground forces where needed. This has changed in the last decade; the new power competition that has emerged in the South Pacific is threatening the U.S.โ€™s ability to maintain such a role. With the constant threats to Taiwanโ€™s sovereignty, the United States is concerned about how, in an all-out conflict to protect the island, air superiority could be guaranteed22.

In this sense, the ability to counter Chinaโ€™s A2/AD strategy (Anti-Access/Area Denial)โ€”which includes advanced missile defense systems, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and long-range radar systems capable of detecting and neutralising U.S. forces in the areaโ€”is crucial23. In this scenario, the role played by cruise missiles such as the โ€œTomahawkโ€ or the JASSM is pivotal, as they could target the intricate defense systems of Chinaโ€™s A2/AD network24. Another important feature of these cruise missiles is their ability to perform low-altitude missions; being hard to detect, U.S. forces could potentially overwhelm defenses, penetrate hypothetical defensive shield, and enable amphibious landings or aerial assaults.

In contrast, loitering munitions offer the ability to conduct surveillance and real-time targeting acquisitions while loitering in the air. The strategic advantage of these weapon systems lies in their relative affordability and ease of replacement compared to larger, more expensive cruise missiles. In a potential conflict, it is key not only to have superior hardware, such as the F-35s or cruise missiles, but also to deploy systems that can provide targeting and surveillance in large numbers and at a low cost25. These factors explain ANDURILโ€™s recent efforts to develop the BARRACUDA AAV. This weapon system, supported by the production, acquisition, and supply chain strategies outlined above, is designed to be cost-effective and easily replaceable26.

The features of the BARRACUDA, in its three possible iterations, combine elements of both a standard cruise missile and a loitering munition. The advanced LATTICE AI, integrated with the BARRACUDA, enables the system to operate autonomously, reducing the human workload and enhancing operational speed. Advanced sensors, machine vision, and AI-guided targeting allow the BARRACUDA to alter its target mid-course and remain airborne for extended periods27.

There are several variants of the BARRACUDA. The first iteration, the BARRACUDA 100, is the smallest and lightest version, with an estimated payload of around 35 lbs and an 85-mile range when air-launched. This version is deployable from AH-Z1 helicopters, AH-64, and C-130 variants. The second version, the BARRACUDA 250, has an estimated payload of 85 lbs and a much longer range of 200 miles when air-launched. This iteration can be deployed from a variety of platforms, such as the F-35 (for internal carriage in bombers) or the F-15, F-16, and F/A-18 (for external carriage)28.

Barracudaโ€™s technical role and how it stands out from existing systems

We rapidly talked in the last paragraph about the BARRACUDA-M family, but how does it really compare to the current family of cruise missiles? In the U.S. arsenal now, there are two types of similar systems, which are the TOMAHAWK and the JASSM. Both the JASSM and the TOMAHAWK feature a larger payload and a longer range (both with a payload of 1,000 lbs and a range of 200 miles vs 1,000-1,500 miles). The JASSM is primarily designed for air-launch from bombers and tactical aircraft, specialised in striking high-value targets from a stand-off distance. In contrast, the Tomahawk is a naval cruise missile, primarily launched from ships and submarines, and designed for precision strikes against land targets. Often used in maritime operations, it can engage various targets, including enemy ships and infrastructure.

After this summary of the current U.S. arsenal, itโ€™s time to analyse where the actual competitive edge of the BARRACUDA family lies. With an estimated cost per unit of approximately $1.4 million for the JASSM (the newer JASSM-ER can cost around $2 million per unit) and from $1.5 to $2 million per unit for the Tomahawk, these systems are more expensive than the BARRACUDA in its larger iteration, the -500, which is estimated to be about 30% cheaper29. Another issue with the current U.S. stockpile of both the Tomahawk and JASSM systems is that, during various โ€œwar gamesโ€ simulating an all-out conflict with China, this stockpile could be exhausted in just over a week of sustained combat operations. Given that the current production timeline for some munitions is around 20 months, concerns are raised about the U.S.โ€™s ability to withstand a protracted conflict. This is one of the main reasons why the BARRACUDA-M family, if its premises hold true, could be a real game-changer, acting as a force multiplier and providing much-needed attrition capabilities in the potential conflict30.

Photo by Michael Wambangco: https://www.pexels.com/photo/us-navy-airplane-in-sky-20186687/

Export capability

The U.S. are not the only countries in the NATO alliance to have this kind of cruise missiles. In fact, France, Germany, Spain, and the UK have developed such systems. The UK and France use the โ€œStorm Shadow/SCALP EG,โ€ while Germany and Spain deploy the โ€œTaurus KEPD 350โ€. The current stockpiles of these systems, along with production timelines and cost per unit, suggest that the advent of the BARRACUDA could be an interesting addition to these countriesโ€™ arsenals, providing a valid, cheaper alternative to more expensive and harder-to-produce systems31.

Conclusion

Andurilโ€™s innovative contributions to the defense industry have the potential to significantly reshape global power dynamics in the years to come. With emerging threats like UAVs, loitering munitions, and the broader proliferation of drones, NATO countries such as the United States must recognize that preparing solely for symmetrical warfare is no longer sufficient32. Andurilโ€™s approach becomes crucial in this evolving landscape. Its scalable production capabilities, combined with agility in research and development, position it to meet the rapidly changing demands of modern warfare. By integrating its core product, โ€œLATTICE AI,โ€ Anduril provides real-time, all-domain awareness and coordination, offering operators a comprehensive view of the battlefield. This adaptive technology bridges the gap between traditional military frameworks and the newer, faster-moving technological threats, such as autonomous systems and artificial intelligence. Andurilโ€™s strength lies in its ability to complement the slower, more bureaucratic defense apparatus of conventional forces with its ability to react quickly and at a scale. By leveraging automation, modular systems, and software-driven innovation, Anduril ensures that NATO forces, especially the U.S., are better equipped to handle both large-scale conventional conflicts and smaller, asymmetric engagements.

The flexibility of Andurilโ€™s ecosystem, characterized by fast-paced R&D cycles and a domestic supply chain, allows for rapid deployment of crucial assets and weapons systems33. This ability to respond to emerging threats efficiently, through innovations like the Barracuda family of AAVs or scalable drone production, highlights the significance of Andurilโ€™s role in shaping the modern defence industry. As global power competition intensifies, particularly with rivals like China, companies like Anduril will be essential in maintaining military superiority, ensuring that NATO forces are not only prepared for current challenges but also those of the future. The defense industry, traditionally slow to adapt, is now being pushed to evolve by Andurilโ€™s pioneering model, which balances autonomy, scalability, and technological innovation.

This transformation might ultimately drive a shift in how conflicts are approached, moving from rigid, high-cost systems to more agile, lower-cost, and rapidly deployable alternatives. In this context, Andurilโ€™s innovations could serve as a cornerstone of a new era in global defense strategy, one where agility, warfare-attrition capability, and adaptability become the pillars of power projection34.


  1. Aitoro, Jill. โ€œAs Tech Startups Catch Dodโ€™s Eye, Big Investors Are Watching.โ€ Defense News, August 19, 2022. https://www.defensenews.com/smr/cultural-clash/2020/01/30/as-tech-startups-catch-dods-eye-big-investors-are-watching/.ย  โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  2. Ibidem โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  3. Tamir Eshel, By, Tamir Eshel, Tamir Eshel, News Desk, and Tamir Eshel - Oct 13. โ€œAndurilโ€™s Lattice AI - Defense Update:โ€ Defense Update: - Military Technology & Defense News, January 6, 2024. https://defense-update.com/20231222_lattice-ai.html#google_vignette.ย  โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  4. Cancian, Mark F., Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham. โ€œThe First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan.โ€ CSIS. Accessed October 27, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  5. Gould, Joe. โ€œUS Defense Industry Unprepared for a China Fight, Says Report.โ€ Defense News, January 24, 2023. https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2023/01/23/us-defense-industry-unprepared-for-a-china-fight-says-report/.ย  โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  6. Losey, Stephen. โ€œAnduril Unveils Modular, High-Production Barracuda Cruise Missiles.โ€ Defense News, September 16, 2024. https://www.defensenews.com/air/2024/09/12/anduril-unveils-modular-high-production-barracuda-cruise-missiles/.ย  โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  7. See 3. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  8. See 4-5. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  9. See 5.ย  โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  10. Oberman, Justin P. โ€œRedefining Disruption: A Plan to Upgrade Defense Innovation.โ€ Defense News, August 18, 2022. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/09/09/redefining-disruption-a-plan-to-upgrade-defense-innovation/.ย  โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  11. See 1-4 โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  12. โ€œAnduril Acquires Air-Launched Effects Company Area-I.โ€ Inside Defense. Accessed October 27, 2024. https://insidedefense.com/insider/anduril-acquires-air-launched-effects-company-area-i โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  13. See 3 โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  14. See 6. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  15. See 2-3 โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  16. Tirpak, John. โ€œAnduril Unveils New Low-Cost โ€˜Barracudaโ€™ Cruise Missiles.โ€ Air & Space Forces Magazine, September 12, 2024. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/anduril-unveils-new-low-cost-cruise-missiles/. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  17. See 6. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  18. Schogol, Jeff. โ€œThe Pentagon Seeks to Stock up on Tomahawks and Other Tactical Missiles in $842 Billion Budget.โ€ Task & Purpose, March 13, 2023. https://taskandpurpose.com/news/pentagon-2024-budget-missiles/.ย  โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  19. Shelbourne, Mallory. โ€œRaytheon Awarded $217M Tomahawk Missiles Contract for Navy, Marines, Army.โ€ USNI News, May 25, 2022. https://news.usni.org/2022/05/25/raytheon-awarded-217m-tomahawk-missiles-contract-for-navy-marines-army.ย  โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  20. See 1-4-5. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  21. See 4-10-16. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  22. See 4. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  23. See18 โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  24. See 19 โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  25. See 6 โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  26. See 16 โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  27. See 6-1 โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  28. See 16 โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  29. See 18-19. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  30. See 4-5-16. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  31. See 18-19. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  32. See 4-6-10. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  33. See 3-5-16. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  34. See 10- 5. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ