November 21, 2022 — No Comments

Artificial Intelligence in the World of Art: A Human Rights Dilemma

Author: Maria Makurat.

Artificial Intelligence or โ€œAIโ€ is already being widely used for various purposes whether it be in analysing marketing trends, modern warfare or as of recently: reproducing artwork. Around 2021 and up till now, various articles have been released discussing the issue of AI being developed to reproduce an artistโ€™s style and even recreate new artwork and therefore bringing up ethical issue of whether artists are in danger of losing their copyright claim on their own work. Whilst this issue is very new and one cannot say for sure where this development is going and whether one should be concerned in the first place. This article explains the recent debate and issues that are being addressed while drawing upon classical AI theory from warfare and highlighting possible suggestions.

Artificial intelligence not only in the military realm

โ€œIn April this year, the company announced DALL-E 2, which can generate photos, illustrations, and paintings that look like they were produced by human artists. This July OpenAI announced that DALL-E would be made available to anyone to use and said that images could be used for commercial purposes.โ€

An article by Wired โ€œAlgorithms Can Now Mimic Any Artist. Some Artists Hate It,โ€ discusses how an AI called โ€œDALL- E 2โ€ can reproduce an artistโ€™s style and make new photos, digital art and paintings. In theory anyone can use the programme to mimic another artist, or artists can sue it to make new art based on their old work. This of course brings many issues to light such as whether one can put a copyright on an art style (as is also discussed in the article), what exactly one wants to achieve with using AI to recreate more art and how this will be discussed in the future if indeed art work will be stolen. An earlier article by the Los Angeles Times from 2020 โ€œEdison, Morse ... Watson? Artificial intelligence poses test of whoโ€™s an inventor,โ€ already addressed this issue by discussing who is exactly the โ€œinventorโ€ when AI can develop for instance computer games and other inventions. It is true that a human being must develop the AI programme however, can that person also then be called the inventor if that said programme develops own ideas and perhaps own artwork? In relation to the general debate, one should consider โ€œThe Universal Declaration of Human Rightsโ€ Article 27: โ€œEveryone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.โ€

Some recent debate centres not only around whether it is a question of the โ€œethicsโ€ in artificial intelligence but going one step back to understand the term โ€œintelligenceโ€. Joanna J Bryson writes: โ€œIntelligence is the capacity to do the right thing at the right time. It is the ability to respond to the opportunities and challenges presented by context.โ€[i] Whilst the authors consider AI in relation to law, they do point out that: โ€œArtificial intelligence only occurs by and with design. Thus, AI is only produced intentionally, for a purpose, by one or more member of the human society.โ€[ii]  Joanna further discusses that the word artificial means that something has been made by humans and therefore again brings up a key concept in AI of whether the human or the programme is responsible.[iii] When we consider this in relation to human rights issues and ethics, it may be true that AI in the world of art can be produced with a purpose by humans, but it remains the problematic issue of what the purpose is. We need the clear outline of why this AI programme has been made in the art world and for what purpose in order to then be able to answer further questions.

Itย has been pointed outย that one should consider this development as nothing new since AI has been already used in the 1950s and 1960s to generate certain patterns and shapes. It is seen by many as a tool that helps the artists in these areas to work faster and be more precise however, itโ€™sย been debatedย that one should not be worried at all that the AI can replace humans since it lacks the human touch in the first place. This remains to be seen how far the AI can learn and adapt since it is programmed that way. If one should not be concerned by AI replacing human artists, then why is the debate happening in the first place?ย 

Credits: unsplash.com

The continues need for clearer definitions

It is not only a matter of the AI replicating art, but how we can define whether the system has crossed the line of copyright infringement: โ€œ(โ€ฆ) lawsuits claiming infringement are unlikely to succeed, because while a piece of art may be protected by copyright, an artistic style cannot.โ€ This only shows again that one needs to quickly define more clearly what is an โ€œartistic styleโ€, โ€œartworkโ€ in relation to how AI would be even allowed to replicate the style.

One can draw a comparison to AI in warfare with debates concerning following themes: responsibility gap, moral offloading and taking humans out of the loop (discussed by scholars such as Horowitz, Asaro, Krischnan and Schwarz). Keith argues for example that psychological analyses show that we suffer from cognitive bias and that AI (in terms of military defence) will change our decision-making process.[iv]  If we use the example of drone warfare and the campaign โ€œStop Autonomous Weaponsโ€, it depicts how drones can be used without directly sending humans into battle and shows the system getting out of hand and people distancing themselves from responsibility. Such type of warfare has an impact on the decision-making process, distancing the soldiers and strategists from the battle field. With of course taking into mind that using an AI in the art world does not involve possible casualties, one still can consider how we have a similar distancing from responsibility and moral offloading. It comes back to the recurring issues of who is responsible if an AI system decides by itself which choices to make, how to make them and determine the output. There are no humans involved during the process of making or โ€œreplicatingโ€ the art pieces however, there was an individual present during the development of the AI โ€“ I would like to call it a problematic ethical circle of debate in the art world.

Even though the idea of using AI to copy an art style or artworks altogether is quite new and perhaps even undeveloped, one should consider more strongly certain methods in order to bring a certain control and a managing system into the game. Nick Bostrom for instance discusses what a superintelligence in relation to AI would entail saying that one would need certain incentive methods in order for the AI to learn and adapt to the human society: โ€œCapability control through social integration and balance of power relies upon diffuse social forces rewarding and penalizing the AI. (โ€ฆ) A better alternative might be to combine the incentive method with the use of motivation selection to give the AI a final goal that makes it easier to control.โ€[v]

Conclusion

It is not only problematic for the art world that an AI is able to copy any artistโ€™s style -it is concerning how much further this development could go in terms of taking an artistโ€™s style and creating an entire new series and diluting therefore the line between where the old and fictional artist lies. As has also already pointed out by others then need for better definitions however it needs to be stressed more strongly: one needs clearer definitions of who is an โ€œartistโ€, โ€œinventorโ€, โ€œdigital artistโ€ when AI enters the discussion and is apparently here to stay. One needs to make a clear distinction between a human artist and a โ€˜programme artist (AI)โ€™. Can an artist call himself artist when he or she uses AI to produce art?  All these questions should be discussed further in the near future since it seems to be the case that AI has entered the art realm and will continue to stay playing maybe a larger role in the future perhaps even with the development of the Meta verse.


[i] Markus Dirk Dubber, Frank Pasquale, Sunit Das, (2020) The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of AI Oxford handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 4

[ii] Ibid, pp. 6.

[iii] Ibid, pp. 5

[iv] Keith, Dear, โ€œArtificial intelligence and decision making,โ€ pp. 18.

[v] Bostrom, Nick, โ€œSuperintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies,โ€ pp. 132.

November 14, 2022 — No Comments

The future of European Defence: procurement issues and institutional challenges

Authors: Danilo delle Fave and Justine Le Man.

The current international crisis provoked by the invasion of Ukraine has led to a renewed thrust toward a major integration of European defence initiatives.ย On March, 21stย of 2022,ย the Strategic Compass for security and defenceย was adopted by EU Member States.ย It providesย a plan of action for strengthening the EUโ€™s security and defence policy by 2030. Structured around four pillars:ย act, invest, partner and secure.

Act: Europe needs to be able to โ€œact rapidly and robustly whenever a crisis erupts, withย ย ย ย ย partners if possible and alone when necessaryโ€. To be able to do it, Europe needs to reinforce the interoperability and the cooperation of European civilian and military during CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) missions.

Invest: โ€œWe must resolutely invest more and better in defence capabilities and innovative technologies, both at the EU and national levelsโ€. By agreeing to this condition Member States commit themselves to devoting a larger share of their budget to European defence butย also to taking part in more collaborative European projects along the CARD (to devoting aย larger share of their budget to European defence) recommendations to โ€œdevelop a resilient,ย competitive and innovativeย European Defence Technological and Industrial Baseย throughoutย the Union".

      the Unionโ€.

Partnerย โ€œpartnerships are an essential instrument to support the EUโ€™s ambition to be global strategic playerโ€. The EU needs to reinforce and take into consideration all its partners:international organisations such as NATO, UNโ€ฆ but also, bilateral partners who share the same values as the United-States, Canada, Norway, UK and Japan.

Secureย โ€œenhance its ability to anticipate threats, guarantee secure access to strategic domains and protect its citizensโ€. To be able to anticipate threats, the EU needs to focus on common intelligence capacities by developing common tools and a common policy to face new threats like cyberattacks.

Image Source: https://www.pexels.com/photo/fighter-aircraft-flying-in-sky-during-air-show-5786112/

Over the last few years, the cooperation between European countries increased thanks to collaborative defence agreements. 

In 2017, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was adopted by the Council of the European Union to enable 25 EU Member States to develop their defence and security cooperation for better interoperability and to increase military capabilities. With the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), which provides the correct information flow, the European Defence Fund (EDF) devoting a larger share of their budget to European defence and the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), the aim of EU institutions is to make EU members leading projects together from training on the field to the research projects.

In order to strengthen those instruments, the European intervention initiativeย wasย launched: the French President Macron declared in a speech at theย Sorbonne University in 2017, that Europe needed a shared strategic culture. In order to do so, in the next decades Europe should have a common intervention force, a common defence budget and a common doctrine for action.ย Today there are 13 countries in this initiative (11 EU Member States, Norway, and the United Kingdom). Despite major advances and progress to build European defence based on a better interoperability on the ground and a stronger solidarity and cooperation between army and political leaders, especially since the beginning of the Ukrainian war, Europe faces strong debates about the sovereignty and the place of a European defence with or without NATO.

The focus on a European defence and the adoption of the strategic compass reinforces the principle of the strategic autonomy of Europe which made some countries reluctant on the subject. In fact, for some of them, that means pushing away NATO and focusing only on Europe. For Josep Borell, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security, โ€œthe more Europeans invest in their own defence capabilities, the more they will become as partners for the USโ€ and the implementation of the Strategic Compass โ€œcould boost defence cooperation and strengthen Europeโ€™s military clout, in complementarity with NATOโ€.

The difficulty of building a real entity in Europe is, in a big part, linked to the history of each country which makes Europe a multicultural whole. Some of the eastern countries for example see NATO as the only way to be protected and the invasion of Ukraine reinforces that perception, fearing further Russian expansion. The issue of sovereignty is another constraint factor for the construction of a strong Europe of defence. In fact, some countries are reluctant to cede sovereignty. For some countries this reluctance concerns the budgetary and fiscal fields.ย ย It is mostly the case for Nordic countries:ย the โ€œNew Hanseatic Leagueโ€ created in 2018:ย Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Ireland, which doย not want to be burdened by too costly solidarity with the rest of Europe.ย The deteriorating security in Europe has led those countries to increase their share of budget defence. This is the case of The Netherlands, which has declared that the country will reach the benchmark of at least 2% of their gross domestic products on defence by 2024,ย which represents an increase of 40 percent in its spending.

For the last few years, large progress has been made to build a strong European defence but there are still lots of blockages due to too many political differences between European countries.ย According to General Robert Brieger, Chairman of the EU Military Committeeย โ€œWe (Europeans) should give up some national sovereignty in developing key capabilitiesโ€.ย Now that EU Member States are aware that, to face the actual and future threats, they need to do more, one important point led us to the technical issues and the need a real industrial and economic consortium. One of the major obstacles for a common European defence is represented by procurement. The competition between consortia and firms has prevented the standardization of armaments, from bullets to tanks, and the lack of harmonization in procurement policies by member states has led to aย duplication of programs and weapon systems.ย 

The main reason is based on economic considerations: military technology has a dual use nature now more than ever. The development of high-tech technologies provides a trickle-down effect on a national market: firms that work on the procurement of military technology acquire expertise and know-how capable of being used in civilian projects and technologies. An example is represented by the GPS: born as a military technology, it is now part of everyday life used by firms like Google, Tesla, and so on. 

The stakes are indeed high, and so the competition for the conquest of market niches. Each member state tries to favour its industries and national champions and at the same time does not want to renounce technoscientific diplomacy. The technological offsets, both hardware and software, constitute an important instrument to influence other countries. High-tech armaments or projects could be used to conclude international agreements. For instance the participation in theย US F-35 programย has been used by Washington to pressure the Turkish stance toward Russia. With this in mind, one possible solution for European defence procurement could be the โ€œjuste retour systemโ€,ย as already working in the European Space Agency. Of course this division of labour comes not without shortfalls: the procurement policy will be focused not on the best provider of the requested service but on the distribution system of juste retour. The risk is the development of armaments and projects less efficient and the political pressure by member states, with the consequences that a defective or ineffective technology could have both on the economic and defence field.ย 

November 9, 2022 — No Comments

Michele Tallarini on Radicalization and Extremism in the Sahel

The ITSS Africa team interviews Michele Tallarini, a researcher at the University of Bergamo, analysing Sahelโ€™s and North Africaโ€™s radicalization and extremism dynamics. Through his direct experience in the field, Michele Tallarini offers an insight into the main reasons that lead local people to radicalization in the area and concrete strategies to help local communities to be more resilient to the issue. 

Interviewer: Rebecca Pedemonte.

November 7, 2022 — No Comments

Critical Raw Materials and EU’s Open Strategic Autonomy

Authors: Riccardo Bosticco, Miguel Jimenez and Michele Mignogna.

Introduction

As the energy transition is one of our age's greatest challenges, developments in this direction are likely to exert notable impacts on broader international political and economic processes. In the European Union (EU) case, Russiaโ€™s war on Ukraine has taught the importance of avoiding dangerous dependencies and adapting to an increasingly conflictive world. The EU wants to achieve Open Strategic Autonomy (OSA) for this purpose. Moreover, this is of particular significance to understanding the EUโ€™s policy on Critical Raw Materials (CRMs). Thus, this article explains the EUโ€™s approach to CRMs and its connection to the concept of OSA.

The CRMs Landscape 

CRMs are crucial materials for theย construction of wind turbines and solar panels, batteries for electric storage and cars and the development of technologies for digitalisation. The energy transition cannot be achieved without their availability. Among them, some of the most familiar areย lithium, cobalt, platinum, and tungsten,ย yet the latest Act by the European Commission identifies around 30.ย A distinctive feature of CRMs is their limited and concentrated supply. According to the forecasts of the International Energy Agency, the net-zero equation will be solved with renewables such asย wind and solar, predicted toย account for 70% of power generation by 2050. Those countries where these materials are abundant would becomeย green-commodity superpowers. Indeed, by 2040,ย those nations could pocket an estimated annual revenue of $1.2trn.ย CRMs share some features with fossil fuels. They are unevenly distributed. For instance,ย one-halfย of the worldโ€™s cobalt supply is located in the Democratic Republic of the Congo alone, South Africa possesses around 40% of the worldโ€™s manganese, while lithium is heavily concentrated in Chile, Argentina and Australia.ย Secondly, this endowment is mostly located in recognised autocracies,ย making them uncertain suppliers considering the instability of this type of governments. If there is one country which is way ahead in the race, not only in terms of being the major source to many of them but also by controlling 80% of the processing capacity, that is China. The current arm-wrestling with Russia has made EU countries aware of the vulnerabilities of relying on external sources for indispensable materials in the future. Thus, they have deployed measures to decrease dependency on China for these materials, which currently satisfiesย 98% of the demand for rare earth permanent magnets, a subcategory of rare earths.ย 

The EUโ€™s Approach to CRMs

After the experience of the European Battery Alliance (EBA), in September 2020, European Commission Vice President ล efฤoviฤ and Commissioner Breton launched the European Raw Materials Alliance (ERMA) as part of theAction Plan on Critical Raw Materials. The alliance aims to secure access to CRMs, advanced materials, and processing know-how for EU industrial ecosystems. Equally to the EBA, the ERMA involves relevant industries along the CRMs value chain, Member States and regions, trade unions, research and technology organisations, investors, and NGOs. To better understand the EUโ€™s approach to CRMs, it is helpful to look at previous policy inputs by the EU in this field. In 2008, theย European Parliament (EP) resolutionย on trade in raw materials and commodities made the point that access to raw materials is vital for the EU economy and highlighted the minor involvement of European industries in the exploration of such materials in third countries. The same year, theย Raw Materials Initiativeย proposed an integrated strategy based on ensuring access, proper framework conditions to guarantee supplies, and resource efficiency to reduce consumption and dependencies. Later resolutions extended the actors involved, including the European External Action Service and other relevant stakeholders, to engage in resource diplomacy. In February 2012, aย European Innovation Partnership on Raw Materials proposalย was published. It expressed the need to create a โ€œcritical mass towards the single objective of ensuring sustainable access to raw materialsโ€ by stimulating synergies between different policy instruments and Member States. Moreover, theย Communication on CRMs Resilienceย stressed the strategic priority of securing CRMs and acknowledged their relevance to achieving open strategic autonomy. Hence, ERMA was given birth to create synergies among European CRMs stakeholders to address concentrated global markets, overcome technical barriers to investments and innovations, and ensure public awareness and policy acceptance, thus making the EU autonomous and strategic in this sector. While designing the ERMAโ€™s role, theย Commission Staff Working Document on Strategic Dependencies and Capacitiesย indicated its purposes to create resilient value chains and investment pipelines, identify mining and investment projects and facilitate contacts with investors to compete on global markets. Yet, such developments have to be analysed in the cadre of overall EU policy directions, and for this purpose, the concept of OSA needs further discussion.ย ย 

Image Source: pixabay.com

Expanding Horizons: the EU Open Strategic Autonomy

Theย debateย on the EUโ€™sย strategic autonomyย has been central in the agenda of the EUโ€™s institutions since the 2010s. As the 2016ย Councilย defined it, strategic autonomy isย โ€œthe capacity to act autonomously when and where necessary and with partners wherever possibleโ€. In 2022, theย EPย has been more specific by stating that โ€œtheย EU strategicย autonomy refers to the capacity of the EU to act autonomously โ€“ that is, without being dependent on other countries โ€“ in strategically important policy areas [which] range from defence policy to the economy, and the capacity to uphold democratic values.โ€ย Notably, strategic autonomy expands well beyond the military and defence, with an increasing number of strategic sectors identified, and itย has now evolved into the concept ofย Open Strategic Autonomy. Asย Josep Borrellย has observed, after Covid-19, โ€œstrategic autonomy has been widened to new subjects of an economic and technological nature". In aย recent study by the EP, OSA is defined as โ€œthe ability to act autonomously, to rely on oneโ€™s own resources in key strategic areas and to cooperate with partners whenever neededโ€. Specifically, the new concept deals with emerging challenges and future chances, encompassingย five dimensionsย and looking at them holistically: geopolitics, technology, economy, environment, and society. OSA drives the EU to be economically and geopolitically stronger by reinforcing its economic assets and industries. It strengthens the international role of the Euro to sustain the economy, finance the recovery from the crisis, and stay competitive and connected to the rest of the world. It makes the EU sustainable and responsible by solidifying existing alliances, cooperating with like-minded partners, and increasing its internal political cohesion to lead the construction of a greener and more equitable society. It aspires to act assertively against unfair trade practices, keeping its liberal soul by favouring global cooperation and multilateralism to address complex issues. In this view, the trade dimension of OSA focuses on supply chain resilience and sustainability. For instance, it might encompass the repatriation of strategic industries back to the EU or reshoring. Yet, this should not mean that international trade or partnerships would be jeopardised.ย It gives the opportunity to act more assertively by choosing trade partners more selectively without losing normative ambitions to fight for a healthier society and environment.ย Moreover, it requires the EU to avoid past misunderstandings, for instance,ย by reducing its vulnerability to external sources of supply. Asย argued byย Vice-President Maroลก ล efฤoviฤย at the Raw Materials Security of Europe Conference, this is exactly the case with CMRs.

Conclusion

Global economic developments challenge the ambitions of the EU. Indeed, the prior balance between interdependence and autonomy is being rearranged as a result of structural shifts in the global economy and world order. Some have identified such developments as a geoeconomic turn, namely a shift away from the liberal international order. With a particular focus on a crucial sector at the heart of the green transition, this article has outlined how the EU is trying to adapt to the challenge of a changing environment. As it has demonstrated, the EU looks like it cannot rely on market forces anymore. If this is the case, as the flourishing literature on geoeconomics suggests, then the next challenge for the EU will be to act cohesively and effectively on the global ground without losing its market competitiveness. 

October 31, 2022 — No Comments

The Right to Clean Water: Thoughts in sight of the Environmental Crisis

Analysis on the right to clean water and how climate change could be dangerous in securing enough resources.

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October 24, 2022 — No Comments

Ido Levy on ISIS vs Al Qaeda

Interviewers:ย Anna Lorenzini and John Devine.

Ido Levyย talksย about the deep conflict between ISIS and Al-Qaeda and its possible implications from a strategic point of view, the significance that they believe the West has within this scenario, and whether some recent events such as the war in Ukraine or the upcoming Israeli elections may affect terrorist activities.ย 

Ido Levyย isย an associate fellow working with theย Washingtonย Instituteโ€™s Military and Security Studies Program and a PhD student at American Universityโ€™s School of International Service.ย His work focuses especially onย Near East Policy on counterterrorism and military operations, particularly relating to jihadist groups.

October 24, 2022 — No Comments

Woman, Life, Freedom

The article analyses the recent protests that erupted in Iran following Mahsa Amini's death and the broader debate on women rights in Iran.

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October 10, 2022 — No Comments

Things are not going according to the plan for Russians in Ukraine

Authors: Igor Shchebetun, Fabrizio Napoli, Davide Gobbicchi and Greta Bordin.

A war without logistics is simply an outrage.

At the very beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, the kilometer-long queue of Russian armor entering Ukraine was simply stretched so far that it could not ensure maneuverability, safety and combat effectiveness in terms of deployment in combat formation and readiness to attack or repel attacks. Looking at the first few days, it is clear that the Russian forces have not made as much progress as they originally planned. The reason for this is that the Russian armed forces are primarily an artillery army, but so far they have used some of their available firepower. Russia is essentially trying to carry out a full-scale invasion without the military operations it would require. And as shocking as the scenes from some cities may seem, Russia is looking for a cheap and easy victory with low civilian casualties. In other words, Russia is holding back as they represent themselves. However, as sanctions steadily take effect, Putin escalate the lethality of his war plan. Achieving a breakthrough without getting in the mud. For Ukrainians, this means the worst is yet to come. Like jumping into a pool before checking for water, Russia's invasion of Ukraine is not going according to plan. Technically, Ukraine and Russia have been at war since 2014. The violence has never stopped, but the recent attack is something else.

A new chapter in Ukraine's struggle for statehood. Russia's original plan included a "mad dash" into Kiev, forcing the Ukrainian government to capitulate, while pushing small units to quickly seize strategic transport interchanges to avoid a larger clash with Ukrainian forces. This is a strategy similar to the 2014 seizure of Crimea, when Russian green men forced Ukrainian troops out of their bases but they could not and showed Russia real face in action . Then, as now, the plan of attack was to win with little cost and few civilian casualties. The Russian leadership entered this war knowing that it would be extremely unpopular at home. So they sought to keep death and destruction to a minimum. As a result, the Russian military attempted comes to mass casualties, abuse of civilians, mass rape, destruction of the Ukrainian people and their identity through genocide. What Russia is doing in Ukraine can best be described Putinโ€™s Russia ideology and they values.

Regardless huge experience of military operations Russian army has performed poorly. Ukrainian forces fought back hard, exceeding expectations and playing on Russia's logistical vulnerabilities. For example, by blowing up railroads from and to Russia, Ukraine forced Russian Logistics to switch from rail transport to truck transport. Ukrainian fighters on the ground and Bayraktar drones in the air then targeted these field trucks. Without fuel, tanks and other vehicles are useless. And fuel trucks are an easier target than tanks. Thus, Ukraine played on Russia's self-confidence. At the same time, Russian units are not fighting an all-out war. Instead, in the first few days we saw small units advancing, tanks moving without infantry, planes flying into hostile airspace, and supplies running low. Much of Russia's decision-making seems unnecessary and risky. Instead of operational needs, tactical planning is driven by institutional needs. Probably on the grounds Russians thought they could avoid heavy fighting, at least initially. Moreover, the Kremlin underestimated the Ukrainian will to fight. For example, after several days of fighting in Ukraine and after Russian troops began to suffer casualties, the Russian Ministry of Health mobilized civilian doctors throughout the country.

Image Source: https://www.globsec.org/publications/interim-conclusions-on-the-consequences-of-the-russian-war-against-ukraine-2-2/ Conceptual image of war between Russia and Ukraine with shadow of soldier against wall with national flag background

The fact that the Russians did not do so on the first day suggests that they did not expect things to go so badly. In fact, the Kremlin tried to win the victory at little cost and to do it quickly in order to avoid the worst of the sanctions. Now they find themselves in the worst of all worlds. Putting resources into a bad strategy. That said, Ukraine would not want to celebrate too soon. Although the Russian leadership has underestimated Ukraine's will for war, it would also be a mistake to measure the strength of the Russian army by its territorial gains. The Russian full invasion especially considering the impossibility of providing and supplying all or at least the bare necessities of their mobilized has nothing to boast about so far. But the leadership in Moscow does not have the resources for a prolonged violent occupation. Social and political pressure is already beginning to show inside Russia. The war in Ukraine is unpopular and unexpected, and as the death toll continues to rise, anti-war sentiment in Russia is likely to intensify by the day. Putin needs a resolution to the war, or he will create serious problems at home. However, he cannot back down now without losing face.

Thus, the Kremlin need to intensify the lethality of its military plan and they do that to achieve its goals and achieve some kind of breakthrough. The Russian military started striking public infrastructure and residential areas. Civilian casualties increased, and the goal would be to force Zelensky into negotiations. But as we can see, Russia has forgotten the lessons of Ukrainian history and has drowned in its own illusions that Ukrainians and Russians are one people. Different mentality, values, attitude to people, to hostages and to the enemy, the concept of development, the art of fighting and the will to win appear more and more.

Putin's plank for a negotiated solution is for Ukraine to cede Crimea to Russia and agree to some form of neutrality or federalization and perhaps a constitutional restriction on the Ukrainian army, something like the Japanese situation. Zelensky is unlikely to agree to these demands, which means that the fight will drag on for some time. And this is where predictions become unreliable. The longer the war goes on, the more the Ukrainian battle space becomes similar to the Syrian one, but the opposite is also true: the longer the fighting goes on, the more sanctions will be imposed. A prolonged war will damage Ukraine, but it will also shake the foundations of Putin's power at home. And while a palace coup remains unlikely, as the war reaches home, the odds of success will gradually turn against Putin. So now the Russian leadership is in rescue mode. They need to get out of Ukraine while saving face. It is in Putin's interest to start negotiations as early as possible, while Zelensky would be doing the right thing if he delayed negotiations until sanctions begin to cut into Russia's skin, albeit at the risk of ruining Ukraine.

October 10, 2022 — No Comments

U.S.-China: The New Normal?

Author: Francesco Cirillo.

Tensions between China and the United States seem frozen at the moment, a consequence of domestic commitments of both Beijing and Washington. On the one hand, Xi Jinping will have to pass a Communist Party Congress to secure a third term as General Secretary of the Party, reappointment to the post of Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and reappointment as President of the People's Republic. Xi has several dossiers. The first is the issue of the anti-covid policy that has blocked production chains in recent months due to continuous lockdowns; the second is the delicate relationship with Moscow, which has seen in its Russian partner a greater weakening and consolidation of Beijing's political position in several areas of influence. For Xi, the October Congress is the turning point for the consolidation of his leadership within the Party. The main international dossier facing Beijing during the Congress session will be relations with Washington and the sensitive Taiwan issue. In the previous months several articles have been published by Chinese academics linked to the Party. CSIS, Center for Strategic of International Studies, translated an article by Liu Jieyi, director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council from a seminar on the Taiwan issue held between August 17 and 18. The seminar was attended by several academics close to Communist Party and government positions. Liu Jieyi in the piece titled "Reunification Has Entered an Irreversible Historical Process [็ปŸไธ€่ฟ›ๅ…ฅไธๅฏ้€†่ฝฌๅކๅฒ่ฟ›็จ‹]" described that the reunification process has now entered an irreversible historical process and that not even Taipei's so-called "anti-Chinese forces" and "independence vagueities" will oppose the unification of the Island with the People's Republic.

Image Source: https://pixabay.com/photos/peking-forbidden-travel-china-1908167/

The Diplomatic clash between China and the United States on the Taiwan issue was raised after the visit of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi but two other elements changed the approach of Sino-US relations. The first was the presentation of a new document(Taiwan Policy Act 2022) by the U.S. Senate Foreign Affairs Committee that if approved could allocate some $6.5 billion in aid. If it is approved by both the House and Senate it could further deteriorate Washington-Beijing relations. Another bone of contention is the approval by the U.S. side to sell a $1.1 billion arms package. At the moment, relations between the People's Republic and the U.S. have returned to a certain "new" normalcy, a consequence of the domestic commitments of both Beijing (Party Congress" and Washington ( Mid-Term elections for the renewal of the U.S. Congress) .

On the international context, the war in Ukraine could, in the coming months and early 2023, lead China and the U.S. to engage in consultation given that at the SCO summit in Samarkand a certain Beijing discontent with the war being waged by the Kremlin was noted, a position that after the Party Congress could solidify further reducing Beijing's indirect support for Russia's junior partner.

October 5, 2022 — No Comments

Conversation with Stefano Piazza (Italiano)

A conversation with ย Stefano Piazza on the capabilities of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State since the death of Ayman al-Zawahiri and future developments.

(Una conversazione con Stefano Piazza sulla condizione di Al-Qaeda e dello Stato Islamico dopo la morte di Ayman al-Zawahiri, e uno sguardo agli sviluppi futuri).

Interviewer: Francesco Bruno.