August 27, 2024No Comments

The Italian Military export and its possible implications in the light of the Israel-Hamas conflict

By Alberto Trame, Aline Blanchard, Christian Gaole, Giacomo Bortolazzi - Italy Team

The Military Industry in Italy as a Leading Global Actor

It is widely acknowledged that Italy has a leading role in the European production and export of weapons, a trend that will probably continue to grow in the next years: at the end of March, the annual report to the Parliament on operations authorised and carried out for the control of exports, imports and transit of armament materials estimated that export licenses for a total value of 6.31 billion euros have been issued during the year 2023, causing an increase in Italian military exports from the sum of 5,289 million euros in 2022 to 6,311 million in 2023. The document also included a list of the States with the highest share in the total export of Italian weapons: the list includes countries such as France, the United States, Ukraine (whose ongoing conflict against Russia has resulted in a steep rise in military contributions), several Middle Eastern countries such as Türkiye, Azerbaijan and Kuwait, and Israel as the main beneficiaries.

Has Anything Changed After Al-Aqsa Flood?

The report also highlighted Israel's situation following the attacks conducted by Hamas on 7 October 2023. Although the volume of Italian military exports to Israel increased to a total value of 31.5 million euros, placing the country seventh among the largest importers, the annual report noted the consideration given to the issuing of new authorisations in light of the ongoing conflict. This cautious approach regarding military exports was also confirmed by the Italian Defence Minister, who responded to a Parliamentary interrogation on the issue by stating that no new authorisations have been granted since the attacks of 7 October 2023. The media observed that this statement seemed to differ from those made by other representatives of the Italian Government, including the Italian Prime Minister and, notably, the Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who stated on 20 February 2024 that the dispatch of any kind of weapons to Israel had been suspended since the beginning of the conflict. The distinction between a “total” and a “partial” suspension has been at the center of an intense political debate and several journalistic inquiries conducted in recent months.

The Italian Military Export to Israel Analyzed in Light of Law 185/1990

The ongoing discussion related to the Italian military exportations to Israel, which has not been uniformly addressed by the national political establishment, assumes further importance when considering the potential implications under the Italian legal system, which regulates the import, export, trade, and transit of arms and ammunition through Law 185/1990. Article 1, paragraph 6, of this law prohibits the export and transit of military material towards countries engaged in armed conflict in violation of the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,” as per Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (subject to any exception made through the Council of Ministers’ decision after the approval of the Parliament). The law also prohibits export to countries with policies that conflict with the rejection of “war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other peoples and as a means for the settlement of international disputes,” as per Article 11 of the Constitution, or whose governments have breached international conventions on human rights. Allegations of such violations have been raised in the context of the Israel-Hamas conflict, with concerns expressed about the actions of both belligerent parties.

In this regard, the recent public call by the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court for the arrest warrant of Hamas’ Leader and Commander-In-Chief and of the Israeli Prime and Defence Ministers was issued in response to a series of alleged violations of the Rome Statute, such as “starvation of civilians as a method of warfare,” “intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population,” and “persecution.” The further call by the Prosecutor for adherence to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) gains relevance in light of the most recent report by the International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem and Israel, which suggested that both Hamas and Israel may have committed several “violations of IHL and IHRL” during the conflict. These legal implications remain an open issue, meaning that if the allegations are found to be true, there could be significant legal consequences regarding Italy’s contribution to this conflict, all in light of the requirement to prohibit the export of arms to countries in violation of international human rights conventions as per Law 185/1990.

Foto di Eve Woodhouse su Unsplash

Concluding Remarks: The Importance of Being Earnest

In light of multifaceted debates and of the serious consequences that serious accusations such as those of violating international conventions might imply, the importance of transparent and complete information cannot be questioned. Even though occupying such a self-evident pivotal role, the concern expressed by many is that it may still be jeopardised: the new Parliamentary Bill modifying Law 185/90 could in fact result in the reduction of the kind and quantity of data to be included in the annual report to the Parliament if approved. Given this possibility, it is important to remember the importance of free information.

August 10, 2024No Comments

Iran, the new “progressive” presidency and LGBTQ+ rights

by Ilaria Lorusso (Iran Team) in collaboration with the Human Rights Team

Introduction

Iranian elections following former president Raisi’s death in May 2024 were called rather abruptly for this July and resulted in the appointment of Massoud Pezeshkian. Considered a moderate candidate, he campaigned for his election maintaining progressive stances both in internal and external politics, promising more liberties and equal rights – especially with regards to women’s issues, animating the Women, Life, Freedom movement – on one hand, and advocating for a renewed nuclear deal and relations with Western countries, particularly the US, aimed at relieving the sanctions that have weakened the Islamic Republic to this day. His political positions fuel refurbished hope for social justice in Iran. However, the fact that he does not seem to want to openly disrupt the system in place after 1979 revolution, and the persistence of a conservative parliament and the absolute authority of Supreme Leader Khamenei dilute the expectations of most human rights advocates vis-à-vis the efforts possible to mitigate the oppression of traditionally marginalised groups. The LGBTQ+ community is notoriously part of the latter. Even if the new president has not exposed himself explicitly on this topic yet, this piece aims at retracing the treatment of LGBTQ+ rights in Iran, making evident above all the risks queer citizens undergo in the country in the current status quo.

Sharia and LGBTIQ+ rights 

As an Islamic Republic after the 1979 revolution, Iran abides by the Shari'a system, following a strict interpretation of Islamic religious texts as a base for law norms1. As such, already when it comes to heterosexual relationships, the 2013 Iranian Penal Code2 condemns any form of sexual activity outside of a lawful marriage. Any extra-marital sexual relations, identified as zina, are illegal and subject to criminal sanctions. 

Zooming in, homosexuality – particularly among men – is forbidden (haram) and considered a moral, physical, and psychological disorder, comparable to the heterosexual zina. Article 234-239 of the Penal Code shows that the death penalty is imposed on citizens accused of homosexual acts, particularly for those performing a “passive” role in the relationship. This, combined with the relative indulgence with which homosexuality between women is treated, reveals particularly the will to preserve a certain type of masculinity that Iranian men are supposed to perform3. Lashing, prison and fines are the alternative and almost always applied punishments associated with acts that fall into the interpretation of “sexual deviancy” – lesbian relationships and cross-dressing being among these. Besides legislation, then, the LGBTQ+ community is subject to state violence and police prosecution, with reported mass arrests and torture under custody, and queer activists imprisoned for threatening national security and production of “immoral content”. 

LGBTQ+ community and the Iranian society

More importantly, because homotransphobia is widespread in Iranian society – up to 90% according to Equaldex’s 2022 findings4, discrimination then extends in every aspect of one’s personal and professional life, with limited access to housing, education, employment, judicial system and healthcare. Interestingly, The Islamic Republic of Iran offers limited subsidised support for gender confirmation surgery, hormone replacement therapy, and psychosocial counselling for trans people. This is due to the fact that the latter views are seen through the lens of gender identity disorders. This medicalisation has provided some legal recognition for trans individuals but has also reinforced the stigma that they suffer from psychological and sexual disorders and need treatment to become "normal"5. In a way, gender reaffirmation therapy is also perceived as a way to “correct” deviances related to non-heterosexual sexual orientations. Accordingly, trans individuals in Iran, whether recognised by the state, seeking recognition, or living without it, frequently face discrimination and abuse due to their gender identity, including hostile public attitudes, extreme violence, and the risk of arrest, detention, and prosecution.

Photo by Sima Ghaffarzadeh: https://www.pexels.com/photo/crowd-of-people-protesting-on-street-holding-flags-and-posters-14136859/

Queer activism, Mahsa Amini’s protests and the way forward

The 2022 national unrest related to the death of Mahsa Amini re-fueled not only women’s rights activists but also those belonging to the queer community.  in custody for allegedly wearing her hijab improperly sparked nationwide protests in Iran, met with deadly force by the government. During the protests, young LGBTQ citizens openly defied the regime by removing their hijabs and displaying same-sex affection publicly6. Activists have also used pro-LGBTQ slogans and symbols, increasing visibility but also facing backlash, as the later overturned death sentence to queer activist Sareh Sedighi-Hamadani in that period exemplifies7. Clearly, this shows that queer liberation is to this day a pressing issue in Iranian civil society, and links back to the general discontent that especially younger generation has towards the post-revolution religious élite. Whether the new presidency will be able to appropriately take up the demands of these movements, remains an open question. 


  1. Rehman, J., & Polymenopoulou, E. (2013). Is green part of the rainbow: sharia, homosexuality, and LGBT rights in the Muslim world. Fordham International Law Journal, 37(1), 1-52. ↩︎
  2. Center for Human Rights in Iran (2021, August). Fact Sheet: LGBTQ rights in Iran. https://iranhumanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/LGBTQ-Iran-Fact-Sheet.pdf  ↩︎
  3. Karimi, A., & Bayatrizi, Z. (2019). Dangerous positions: Male homosexuality in the new penal code of Iran. Punishment & Society, 21(4), 417-434. https://doi.org/10.1177/1462474518787465  ↩︎
  4. https://www.equaldex.com/region/iran  ↩︎
  5. OutRight Action International (2016). Human Rights Report: Being Transgender in Iranhttps://outrightinternational.org/our-work/human-rights-research/human-rights-report-being-transgender-iran  ↩︎
  6. Iran protests: LGBTQ community rises up (2023). BBC Website, April 19thhttps://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-64864132  ↩︎
  7. Good news: Sareh Sedighi-Hamadani’s death sentence overturned (2023). Amnesty International Australia Website, May 16th.
     https://www.amnesty.org.au/good-news-sareh-sedighi-hamadanis-death-sentence-overturned/  ↩︎

August 9, 2024No Comments

Iran in Transition: The Implications of the Raisi’s Death and the presidential election

by Shahin Modarres, Ilaria Lorusso, Margherita Ceserani, and Will Kingston-Cox - Iran Team

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi died in a helicopter crash in northwest Iran on May 19, as announced by the government on May 20, with Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and seven other passengers. The crash occurred as he was returning from the inauguration of a dam on the border with Azerbaijan, in adverse weather conditions while the aircraft was flying over a rugged, forested region. The death of Raisi, 63, ushers in a period of political uncertainty in Iran, already shaken by the war between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. 

Raisi, elected in 2021, was considered an ultraconservative and a favorite to succeed the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. According to political analysts, Raisi lacked personal charisma and popular support. During his presidency, Raisi intensified the crackdown on dissent, particularly after the protests following the death of Mahsa Amini, and revived Iran's military nuclear program, after US withdrawal from the historic 2015 agreement. Raisi also strengthened ties with Russia and China and reestablished diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. As such, his death prompted sympathetic reactions from various Arab leaders, such as those of Iraq and Qatar, and Iranian-backed militias, such as Hamas and the Houthis, as part of the "axis of resistance" against U.S. and Israeli influence. At the same time, in some parts of Iran his death was celebrated by the population. 

Following the incident, Vice President Mohammad Mokhber was appointed interim president, with presidential elections scheduled for June 28. Though Ebrahim Raisi was one of the most well-known figures in the Iranian regime, his death is not expected to cause major upheaval in the Iranian system. Despite this, elections for a new president will be held at a time of great instability for Iran, both internally and externally. This article therefore aims to present the profiles of the candidates for the presidential election, and the possible effects of Iran's new political leadership on current international relations. 

Following the passing of President Raisi, the urgent task of arranging snap elections has become the foremost concern in Iran's domestic affairs, prompting the election date to be rescheduled to June 28, 2024, as mandated by the constitution. With only 50 days allowed for elections following a president's demise, the need to fill the vacancy promptly is evident. However, the process is not devoid of controversies. 

The Guardian Council, recognized for its conservative stance, has greenlit only six out of 80 candidates, setting the stage for a pivotal political moment. The 12 members of the Guardian Council — six clerics named by the supreme leader, and six jurists named by the Majlis — have consummate veto power and their decisions on disqualification cannot be appealed. The pool of approved candidates include the mayor of Tehran, Alireza Zakani; member of parliament, Masoud Pezeshkian; former interior and justice minister, Mostafa Pourmohammadi; and head of Iran’s Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs, Amir-Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi. However, the clear frontrunners for victory are Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the parliamentary speaker with ties to the influential Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and Saeed Jalili, a hardliner and former chief nuclear negotiator. Ghalibaf, despite his technocratic approach and connections to the IRGC, faces scrutiny from ultra-conservatives due to his moderate positions and past electoral failures. Meanwhile, Jalili, strongly backed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the IRGC, represents a continuation of Raisi's policies, particularly in opposition to any dialogue with the US.

The Iranian elections carry significance for the country's future direction, especially amid escalating domestic unrest and regional challenges. Low voter turnout in previous elections, coupled with concerns about the regime's legitimacy, represent the broader issues at stake. The regime must find a delicate balance between control and legitimacy, particularly as many Iranians have been disheartened by years of political upheaval and repression. Despite this, ultimate authority rests with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who can still wield influence over policy, making the choice of Raisi's successor critical. 

The current Iranian tense relations with the West, exemplified by Tehran's support for proxy militias targeting Israel in response to the Gaza conflict, emphasise the need for a leader who can manage Iran's foreign policy challenges effectively. Khamenei's speeches frequently indicate satisfaction rather than concern about sanctions and other issues, suggesting a preference for Jalili’s continuity over compromise. Yet, there remains a possibility that Khamenei could astonish observers by supporting a candidate open to dialogue with the West, though such a move would deviate from his usual stance advocating "resistance”. The impending election thus holds significant implications for Iran's domestic landscape and also for its international relations. The chosen successor will likely be expected to continue Raisi's legacy, maintaining Iran's current trajectory and policies. However, the regime faces a critical dilemma in ensuring voter participation and maintaining its legitimacy, given widespread disillusionment among the population. While Iran's electoral process includes democratic elements, key policies and candidate selections are significantly influenced by the clerical leadership, leading to discussions about the extent of democratic choice in the system. The selection of Raisi's successor will shape Iran's path, further impacting its interactions on the world stage. With tensions simmering both at home and abroad, the election outcome will reverberate far beyond Iran's borders, influencing regional dynamics and international relations.

The upcoming Iranian elections will also have significant geopolitical implications. These implications can be seen through two lenses: the international and the regional. Globally, the outcome of the election could see Iran seek to strengthen bilateral relations with China and Russia, in order to compensate for increased Western pressure. Such a solidification of relations could be both geopolitically and economically detrimental, as energy markets and international alliances react. Iran natural resource reserves are pivotal to global energy markets, and an election result that favours continued conservatism could lead to further fluctuations, disruptions, and conflict in and over the energy sector. 

Furthermore, if the conservative faction, as is predicted, remains in power, we can expect to see again, yet another solidification - this time, over nuclear negotiations. It would be likely to see tensions with the West escalate over increased uranium enrichment, rendering attempts to revive the JCPOA redundant and futile continuation of hardline sanctions policies.

Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hamas_leader_Ismail_Haniyeh_meeting_Iranian_Supreme_Leader_Ali_Khamenei.jpg

Regionally, a continuation of conservative dominance could see an increase in support for Iranian proxies in Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. Iranian support for Hezbollah in Lebanon would be expected to continue or intensify if conservative hardliners are re-elected. With Hezbollah increasingly active on the northern Israeli border, this could further entrench Hezbollah’s position within Lebanese politics and bolster its military capacity. 

For Yemen, Iranian support for the Houthis is likely to continue, if conservatives are re-elected. It is plausible that a hardline government in Tehran would provide increased aid, both military and financially, to the Houthis, prolonging the Yemen conflict. This scenario would likely intensify tensions between Saudi Arabia, which would threaten regional security all over the Middle East. 

For the conflict between Israel and Gaza, if the current projections materialise, hardliner governance could see increased support for Hamas. It would not be wrong to assume that hardliners would incite more aggression towards Israel through the proxy network, perpetuating military pressure on Israel without the need for direct Iranian military involvement. Iran does not want an all out war with Israel. To do so would threaten the very existence of Iran’s military, economy, and society. The election is likely to see an intensification of Israel-Iran relations through the proxy network, to both pressurise Israel but defend Iran’s interests, whilst avoiding direct military conflict. 

The sudden death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash has plunged Iran into a period of political uncertainty. Snap elections, scheduled for June 28, 2024, highlight the conservative dominance within the Guardian Council, which approved only six out of 80 candidates. Key contenders include Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Saeed Jalili, with Jalili likely to continue Raisi's hardline policies, particularly in opposing dialogue with the West and strengthening ties with Russia and China.

Domestically, the election underscores the regime's struggle for legitimacy amid widespread voter disillusionment. The conservative grip on the political process raises questions about the authenticity of Iran's electoral system. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's influence remains pivotal, ensuring that key policies and candidate selections align with his vision.

Regionally, a conservative victory would likely intensify Iran's support for proxy militias in Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq, escalating tensions, particularly with Israel. Increased aid to groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis could exacerbate conflicts, affecting regional security.

Globally, Iran's potential strengthening of alliances with China and Russia in response to Western pressures could reshape economic and geopolitical landscapes, particularly in energy markets. The international community remains watchful of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, with the election’s outcome crucial in determining the future of the JCPOA and broader diplomatic engagements.

In conclusion, the election following Raisi’s death is a critical juncture for Iran, influencing its domestic stability and regional dynamics. The regime's ability to manage internal discontent and external pressures will shape Iran's path in the coming years, with significant implications for global geopolitics.

July 22, 2024No Comments

Navigating Norway’s Arctic Frontier: Energy expansion vs. Environmental concerns

by Max Giordano - Arctic Team

Norway has awarded a record number of new petroleum exploration licences despite questions over the environmental risks and Oslo's commitments under the 2016 Paris Agreement. Of the 62 new permits, 29 are located in the North Sea, 25 in the Norwegian Sea and 8 in the environmentally sensitive Barents Sea region. Norway's Ministry of Energy issued grants on the Norwegian Continental Shelf to 24 energy companies, with Equinor ASA and Aker BP ASA holding the majority stake. This marks a 30% increase in total licences from the previous auction 2022. 

Understanding the broader consequences of expanded drilling activities in the Arctic is essential. Looking at the Barents Sea area will highlight how this affects the economy, the environment, and politics. This paper offers a nuanced understanding of the multifaceted factors surrounding Arctic drilling. 

Understanding Oslo's Arctic Policy:

Interpreting Norway's decision to award new exploration licences within the High North framework offers a deeper understanding of its connection and relevance to Norwegian Arctic policy. So perhaps it is in the fitness of things to recall the significance of this concept. High North, integral to Norwegian Arctic policy since the 80s, delineates the expansive Arctic territories Norway seeks to influence, spanning the southern boundary of Nordland County to the Barents and Pechora Seas. Politically, it reflects Norway's efforts to shape Arctic governance, engaging in collaborations through the Arctic CouncilBarents Cooperation, and partnerships with the European Union under the Northern Dimension.

High North was fully implemented in 2003 when Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a department called nordområdene, followed by a strategy in 2006. It represents a concerted effort to position the region as a high-ranking priority, emphasising the significance of the Arctic to Norway. 

Norway's Arctic Energy Strategy: Balancing Resources, Demands, and Environmental Considerations.

Norwegian gas meets the annual household needs of 800 million people. It has become Europe's largest supplier, surpassing Russia in 2022 after the Ukraine invasion. This milestone is critical in discussing new exploration licences, underscoring Oslo's push to boost hydrocarbon access amid energy transitions. Securing low-carbon supplies could advance emission-free blue hydrogen from natural gas, with captured CO2. Discoveries are fundamental in meeting European needs and bolstering local economies. Consequently, there is a heightened focus on developing untapped Arctic resources.

The Government's Northern Area Strategy of 2006 highlights Action Point 3 of 22 points, aiming to "further develop [drilling] in the Barents Sea through an award[s] policy, [increasing exploration acreage and additional geological mapping]," establishing a framework for oil and gas developments in the Barents Sea. Moreover, a 2010 agreement between Norway and Russia on maritime borders unlocked new opportunities (Article 5, Annex II), effectively transforming the place into Norway's latest petroleum province.  

Estimated undiscovered resources in the Barents Sea are 2400 million standard cubic metres of oil equivalent (or 15 100 million barrels), with natural gas comprising 1120 billion standard cubic metres — an area of 1,300,000 square kilometres.

Compared to other exploration sites in the Arctic, the Barents Sea offers low production costs and quicker project start-up times, accelerating extraction and distribution processes to be market-ready. Minimal ice cover, calmer winds, shallow waters, and easy-to-reach resources, collectively reduce drilling costs to around NOK 200 million per well ($21,000,000).

Growing global demand for oil and gas, particularly in Asia — led by China and India — is expected to boost consumption. The IEA forecasts a 3.2 million barrels per day rise in oil demand from 2023 to 2030, driven by increased jet fuel usage and petrochemical feedstocks. Gas demand has also surged, underpinning the importance of secure, flexible energy sources. The IEA predicts a 2.3 per cent increase in natural gas demand in 2024.

Closing infrastructure gaps is crucial for supporting Barents Sea discoveries. Ports like Hammerfest, Honningsvåg, and Kirkenes are integral. However, more infrastructure is needed for better connectivity with distant fields. Logistical and geopolitical challenges pose risks to future developments, but population growth, industry, transportation, and the petrochemical sector necessitate hydrocarbon investments.

Photo by Bit Cloud on Unsplash

Critical Decisions in Arctic Development

Arctic projects require careful planning and smart decisions based on detailed assessments. The Barents Sea has unique geological challenges, like tectonic movements, Arctic weather patterns, and varied soil and rock layers. It encompasses five areas, including the Finnmark platform, the Bjarmeland platform, Nordkappbassenget, Tiddlybankbassenget, and Fedynsky Høgda.

Oil and gas exploration entails identifying suitable rock formations, pinpointing reservoirs to store hydrocarbons, and maintaining secure containment to prevent leaks. Factors like sea depth affect operations, with shallower reservoirs in Bjarmeland and Fedynsky Høgda being more favourable. 

Environmental groups oppose Arctic drilling due to risks to biodiversity, wildlife, and Indigenous communities. Arctic ecosystems are fragile, and accidents can have lasting effects. Indigenous peoples depend on Arctic resources for their traditions and health, making them vulnerable to disruptions caused by drilling. Despite Norway's introduction of regulations like the 2006 Barents Sea policy and the 1996 Petroleum Act, opinions vary on whether these sufficiently mitigate concerns. 

In November 2021, six activists, aged 20 to 27, and two environmental groups, Greenpeace Nordic and Young Friends of the Earth Norway, brought their concerns to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). They filed a case dubbed 'the People vs. Arctic Oil' to challenge Oslo's energy policies. They cite Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which protects the right to life and family, arguing that drilling could pollute ice sheets, accelerating melting. It is noteworthy that the ECHR requires applicants to be directly affected by alleged violations. Its decisions are legally binding on member states. Previously, three Norwegian courts dismissed the claims. In January 2022, the ECHR formally asked Oslo for counterarguments by April 2023. The case is pending a final verdict, with no significant developments reported since.

Oslo faced further headaches when the Sámi Parliament of Norway sued it for constructing a wind turbine farm on traditional Sámi lands. This action is part of Sámi efforts to defend their territorial rights and heritage, criticising renewable energy projects as green colonialism. Situated on the Fosen peninsula, the wind farm encroached on traditional Sámi reindeer herding territories. In 2021, Norway's Supreme Court ruled that the project violated Sámi rights under Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. An agreement was reached this year, 2024, allowing the wind farm to operate under conditions that protect Sámi culture. Provisions include allocating a percentage of generated energy to the Sámi community, designating new reindeer herding areas, and granting NOK 5 million ($473,000) to support Sámi traditions.

Conclusion

The Arctic's importance in both domestic and foreign policy cannot be understated. Drilling can strengthen local economies and secure energy for Europe, but it also disrupts a delicate ecosystem. On the one hand, the Norwegian government seeks to ensure energy supplies for itself and its now-reliant European partners at great financial profits. On the other hand, the distribution of new licences prompts environmental concerns. The environment versus energy security is an ongoing battle. The critical question remains: How will the Norwegian government balance these concerns without compromising their energy security?

July 15, 2024No Comments

On the horns of a dilemma, again! China’s uncomfortable position in the Moscow-Pyongyang Cooperation

by Ho Ting (Bosco) Hung - Asia & China Team

While Russia continues its brutal invasion of Ukraine, its destabilising behaviour has spread further eastward to the Korean Peninsula. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea to seek continued military support, which is surprising since international travel has been rare for Putin since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War. During the trip, Putin signed a new comprehensive strategic partnership pact with Kim Jong-un. The new treaty has not only exacerbated the already high geopolitical instability in the world, but it has also worsened China’s diplomatic dilemma. Despite having some ups and downs in its relations with North Korea, China is ultimately a formal ally of North Korea. With the new treaty, China appears to be increasingly drawn to the whirlpool of conflicts and tensions created by Russia and North Korea. 

As one of the most unpredictable and diplomatically disengaged governments in the world, North Korea has significantly increased its missile tests and applied an assertive rhetoric in the recent decade. Earlier this year, Kim announced a major policy shift towards South Korea, ruling out any possibility of peaceful reunification. Its military actions is further demonstrated by its active assistance for Russia, which is isolated by the West and is desperate for military support during the Russia-Ukraine War.

The signing of a strategic partnership pact is likely to bolster the ambitions of both Russia and North Korea, exacerbating chaos and tensions in Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia, respectively. This move signals to international community that neither country intends to yield to US hegemony. Instead, they prefer to remain diplomatically isolated, relying on their autocratic ally for support.

Although the signing of the new treaty is a bilateral move, China is unlikely to remain uninvolved due to its close relations with Russia and North Korea and the US's strong concern regarding developments on the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea’s destabilising behaviour has long been the US’s top foreign policy concern, especially because of its status as a nuclear power. Therefore, although the actual details of the pact have not yet been released, the expansion of the Russia-North Korean tie is likely to draw the US’s attention. Meanwhile, since China has a mutual defence agreement in the Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance first signed in 1961 with North Korea, in any case of conflict escalation, China could be dragged by its ‘friends’ into the saga and fall vulnerable to Western criticisms or retaliation. The ever-expanding ties between Russia and North Korea could also encourage the US and its allies to expand their presence in the Indo-Pacific region or give them a legitimate reason to do so, which will be unfavourable to Chinese interests.

Image by Tibor Janosi Mozes from Pixabay

This puts increasing pressure on China not to act in accordance with its friends’ interests, even if this may disappoint its Russian and North Korean friends. Admittedly, Russia and North Korea are China’s key allies in counteracting US influence and facilitating China’s revision of the international order. However, Russia is currently engaged in a conflict with Ukraine and facing international sanctions, while North Korea is notorious for its human rights infringement and its reluctance to denuclearise. In an environment with high geopolitical tension and the possibility of American countermeasures, it is advisable to distance itself from both countries to avoid any repercussions that could harm its international reputation and further drag down its economic growth. China’s reluctance to publicly support Russia’s invasion despite having a ‘no-limit’ partnership with Russia is a stark example reflecting such a mentality.

Meanwhile, as China’s economy is slowing down and the US is trying to strengthen its ties with Japan and South Korea, China has an increasing need to improve its relations with the two democratic nations. This is especially important in avoiding the creation of an Asian NATO or further advancing their military capabilities. As North Korea continues to challenge its two Northeast Asian neighbors, China's frustrations will likely increase. Consequently, China has a strong incentive to avoid being perceived as forming a contentious alliance with Russia and North Korea.

Nonetheless, as Japan and South Korea have witnessed China’s growing assertiveness and are developing strategic ties with the US, they will certainly be cautious about any Chinese proposals for cooperation or alleviating tensions. The US is also likely to impose pressure on Japan and South Korea not to side with China. In this sense, siding with North Korea or Russia and fixing ties with the Northeast Asian countries appear unfeasible and risky. Caught in a dilemma, China will find it hard to navigate the complex geopolitical landscape. 

July 8, 2024No Comments

Cold Horizons: The Arctic’s Strategic Role Then and Now

by Isolde Sylvia Hatgis-Kessell - Arctic Desk

The Arctic region played a crucial role in the strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, with its unique geographical and environmental conditions shaping both military and scientific efforts. This article explores the Soviet Union's Arctic strategy, focusing on its dual purposes of showcasing military might and technological superiority; subsequently, it explores the significant changes in the region since the Cold War, namely climate change and increased Chinese involvement, and anticipates how these factors will influence Moscow’s current ambitions in the Arctic.

Overview of the Role of the Soviet Arctic Strategy 

During the Cold War, the Arctic acted as another arena for strategic competition between the United States and Russia, the importance of which was underscored by the unprecedented close proximity between the adversarial states. For the Soviet Union, the Arctic was a critical region as it possessed the “longest Arctic circumpolar coastline” and the largest population of Arctic inhabitants from one state. Moreover, Russia under both the Tsarist and Soviet systems, had a longer history of involvement in the region. 

The Russian Arctic served two key purposes for the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War; firstly, it was home to a significant portion of their advanced military equipment including the nuclear Northern Fleet. Secondly, the High North gave the Soviets a stage to exhibit their technological advancements and military might, a key competition during the Cold War.

However, the Arctic region remained underexplored and underutilised across various sectors due to harsh weather conditions; thus, the utility of the High North was closely tied to the advancement of technology which enabled effective exploration and greater understanding of the area.

A vital component of the Soviet’s Arctic strategy was the use of the region as a theatre to demonstrate scientific and military strength, directly playing into Cold War dynamics. A key example can be seen in the development and testing of the Tsar Bomb, commissioned by Nikita Gorbaschev in a bid to demonstrate Soviet strength. The thermonuclear bomb remains the most powerful nuclear weapon ever detonated; the test took place on the island of Novaya Zemlya inside the Soviet’s Arctic Territory. The Arctic arena became a frequent stage for projects that strengthened the Soviet’s Mutually Assured Destruction strategic doctrine. 

Scientific superiority underpinned by military objectives, an important characteristic of the Cold War, extended to the Arctic as well. The Soviets developed the Severny Polyus drifting research station in the Arctic; while the projects themselves were aimed at scientific goals, the information that they collected was used to help inform the military action and procurement. 

Ultimately, the Arctic provided the perfect theatre for the Soviets to prove their strength in both science and force and therefore cement their position on the international stage and against the United States. 

Key Changes Since the Cold War 

The Soviet’s strategy in the Arctic during the Cold War can serve as a good starting point to understand how Putin and the Russian Federation might use the region now, particularly as relations continue to deteriorate with the West. Nonetheless, three key changes must be considered in any analysis of the region. 

First and foremost are the effects of climate change which has increased sea levels, changed patterns of wildlife, and importantly melted a significant amount of the region's ice. Paradoxically, these devastating environmental consequences open up a breadth of new economic opportunities. As a result, interest in the region from the rest of the littoral Arctic states and beyond has increased drastically; this leads directly to the second defining shift, increased Chinese involvement. 

As the ice continues to melt, opening new possibilities for oil and gas exploration and increasing the feasibility of the Northern Sea Route, China’s interest in the Arctic has developed as well. Generally, Beijing has looked to Moscow for partnerships in the region which has alienated many of the other Arctic states. 

Lastly, all the Arctic countries are now members of NATO except for Russia; as the war rages on in Ukraine and tensions with the West deepen, this reality threatens Arctic exceptionalism which thus far has been dictated by cooperation overriding competition. 

Source - Photo by Bo Eide on Flickr - credits

Understanding Russia’s Current and Future Strategy in the Arctic 

Most recently, the 2023 Russian Foreign Policy Concept gave the international community new insight into Russia’s ambitions in the Arctic. With regards to the High North, the document highlights the importance of possible economic development in the region for the greater Russian economy including oil and gas exploration and the development of the Northern Sea Route. A noticeable change from the 2016 concept was the decision not to address any existing multilateral format such as the Arctic Council, and instead emphasise that partnerships with other nations, most likely with the other Arctic states, would be on a bilateral basis. 

Understanding Russia’s strategy in the high north through the prism of Soviet action in the Arctic indicates that Putin, with the help of the Chinese Communist Party, may use the Arctic as an arena to exert strength in the energy sector, shipping routes, and the military, possibly setting up a parallel system to Soviet times in which these aims become intrinsically linked. 

As the war in Ukraine continues, in turn highlighting the weakness of the Russian military and leadership, the Arctic can again serve as an easy arena to demonstrate strength. Novaya Zemlya remains a key test base for nuclear weapons including the unconfirmed 9M730 Burevestnik, a nuclear cruise missile. The war in Ukraine has emphasised that much of Russia’s military equipment is old and reserves of modern weapons are ultimately too small. Consequently, Moscow may attempt to reaffirm their military prowess by developing weapons for a harsh environment that NATO Arctic states lack. 

Another defining trait of the Ukraine war has been the West’s sanction regime and subsequent consequences for global energy markets. The decision not to purchase any oil from Russia has had serious, though not insurmountable, repercussions, particularly for European countries. As the potential for new energy resources opens up the Arctic, it is possible that Russia looks to establish a strong position in this development to maintain its foothold in international energy. 

Conclusion

The Soviet’s Arctic strategy throughout the Cold War was a critical component of their broader geopolitical and military objectives; the High North provided a strategic platform for the Soviet Union to demonstrate both scientific advancements and military prowess. As Russia continues to build up its presence in the Arctic, parallels to Soviet-era strategies, especially in energy and military domains, are increasingly likely, underscoring the region's ongoing importance for the U.S. and the Nordic countries as well as global power dynamics

June 18, 2024No Comments

Jordan’s Balancing Act in the Israel-Hamas War: 

Since the outbreak of the war on October 7, Jordan has been caught between increasing external and internal pressures.

By Alice Elizabeth Strophair - Middle East Team

Escalating conflict and policy decisions 

In the midst of the Israel-Hamas war, the Middle East witnessed an unprecedented escalation in the ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran, when, on the night of April 13, the Islamic Republic launched a combined missile and drone attack on Israel. Some of  the projectiles were even intercepted above the Al-Aqsa mosque by Israel’s iron dome.  The attack saw the conflict take a new turn, with Iran attacking Israel directly, rather than through its proxies, such as Hamas or Hezbollah. The events of April 13 have also further challenged neighbouring Arab countries in balancing their political and economic ties with Israel, while showing their support for the Palestinian cause. One of these countries is Jordan, which has been a key regional actor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and now, more than ever, is caught between increasing external and internal pressures, both on the diplomatic as well as on the civilian front. The Hashemite Kingdom is walking a tightrope between its peace treaty with Israel, which emphasises its dependency on Israel for natural resources and security versus preventing “a breakdown in the social [contract]” between the population and the regime. King Abdallah II’s decision to join the international coalition MEAD (Middle East Air Defence), to prevent the use of Jordan’s airspace in the Israeli-Iranian conflict is meant, more than anything else, to prevent further escalation in violence, which would jeopardise Jordan’s security.  

The ongoing war in Gaza, “Iron Swords” 

Thirty years after Jordan signed the “Wadi Araba Treaty” (1994), with the expectation that the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinian Authority would be implemented, today’s situation must be a bitter disappointment for Jordan. The Hashemite Kingdom has been in favour of a two-state solution but has gradually seen the possibility of this solution decimate, especially since the establishment of the Israeli far right-wing government in late 2022. Since 1967, the unresolved question of East Jerusalem and its progressive annexation (Jerusalem Basic Law, 1980) by Israel has been a contentious point between both countries. The ongoing “Iron Swords” offensive led by Israel within the Gaza Strip has further deteriorated Israeli-Jordanian relations. On one occasion, two weeks after the beginning of the war during a peace summit that was held in Cairo, King Abdullah II denounced what he termed, “global silence about Israel’s attacks, [...] and urged an even-handed approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”  Even more so, Jordan fears that the displacement of Gaza’s residents to Egypt could set a precedent for a future displacement of Palestinians from the West Bank to Jordan. This fear is based on their concerns over the political agenda of Israel’s cabinet member Itamar Ben Gvir, who promotes the Eretz Yisrael Hashlema (Greater Israel) dream, declaring that “the people of Israel will settle in Gaza”. As a result, since the beginning of the war in Gaza, the West Bank has become a second front with a sharp increase in settler violence and further constraints on the Palestinian economy. These factors could lead to the possibility  of a third intifada and an economic migration from the West Bank to Jordan. These developments pose both a demographic and security threat to Jordan. The Kingdom already has a high population of Palestinians as a result of the 1948 and 1967 wars. A third wave of immigration could turn Jordan into a de facto Palestinian State, which, combined with the increased popularity of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in the West Bank, creates an actual threat to Jordan’s ability to control its borders and ensure internal security

Post-war scenarios are being considered, with the Arab Peace Initiative dating of 2002 re-emerging on the international stage as a potential solution. The American elections in November will also be decisive, as they will determine whether the future administration will prioritise a negotiated peace or adopt a stance more aligned with the current Israeli government, potentially altering its support for Jordan.

Photo de Hisham Zayadneh sur Unsplash

Jordan’s civil and military cooperation with Israel 

Jordan’s shortage of natural resources, namely water and gas, and the growing economic relationship it has with Israel, means it cannot cut its ties with the Jewish state, despite public demand.  In 2016, a fifteen-year deal was signed for Israel to supply it with gas, becoming the most important supplier for Jordan. In 2021, Jordan, being the second most water-poor country in the world, signed a memorandum of understanding with Israel and the UAE on a water project called the “Green and Blue Prosperity Agreement”. Within this agreement, Israel provides Jordan with desalinated water, the project financing coming from the UAE. However, these economic relations with Israel, like diplomatic ones, are not popular with the Jordanian public and protests demanding cutting ties and breaking deals with Israel. 

Jordan’s decision to join the MEAD alliance which includes the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, can be seen as an ideological convergence to counter a common enemy, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and to ensure stability across the region. Historical rivalries between Sunni and Shiite motivate the Arab states, providing Israel with leverage on the question of Palestine within the Middle East Cold War. King Abdullah II defended the decision to join the alliance, by arguing that it would help protect Jordan’s population and the country’s sovereignty. 

Conclusion

Jordan has demonstrated resilience when faced with previous escalations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, partly thanks to its diplomatic ties with the United States. The Hashemite kingdom is perceived by the West as a moderate actor that can help bring stability to the region. Nevertheless, King Abdullah II must be aware that his policymaking and commentary on the ongoing crisis in the Gaza Strip – as well as on  Benjamin Netanyahu’s and his right-nationalist coalition – will have consequences on his government's relationship with the Jordanian public. These past eight months of war could influence the upcoming parliamentary elections in Jordan, scheduled for next September. 

June 17, 2024No Comments

The Spread of Weapons Among Civilians in Ukraine: Context, Impact, and Future Outlook

By Alexandra Tsarvulanova, Alessandro Macculi, and Arslan Sheikh - Human Security Team

Introduction

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has had a significant impact on the distribution and possession of weapons among civilians. The population now possesses a significantly higher number of firearms, according to data from the Small Arms Survey. Much of this growth can be attributed to the conflict, which has made self-defence tactics necessary and increased societal militarisation. A thorough examination of the historical background as well as the present data is necessary to determine the scope and consequences of this trend. 

Historical Context

According to estimates, Ukraine is considered to be home to a total of 4 to 5 million firearms, of which 2 to 3 million belong to the illicit sphere. The Maidan Square uprising and the subsequent outbreak of civil war in Donbass in 2014 dramatically exacerbated the spread of small arms and light weapons.

Among the sources of weapons of the first armed factions formed in the aftermath of the uprisings, the most relevant ones stem from the storage of weapons traditionally kept in households and military stocks of obsolete weapons. This phenomenon has much to do with the armed conflicts that plagued present-day Ukraine in the last century, as well as the Ukrainian SSR's function as a Soviet military stockpile. Moreover, vast arsenals were secured in the country following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe after the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact. This resulted in a disproportionate surplus following the downsizing of the Ukrainian Army.

Thus, the most crucial dynamic of arms proliferation after 2014 seems to be the leakage of weapons from state and civilian stockpiles.

Institutional and Legal Framework

It is necessary to note that Ukraine's legal framework for civilian firearm possession is notably underdeveloped and fragmented. Despite a substantial number of firearms in civilian hands, comprehensive national legislation regulating these arms is absent. Instead, firearm ownership is primarily governed by bylaws, specifically Order No. 622 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from 1998, which outlines conditions for the acquisition, storage, and use of firearms. The Constitution of Ukraine requires that ownership regimes be subject to parliamentary legislation, which this regulatory gap contravenes. 

Efforts to formalise firearm regulations have seen multiple drafts submitted to the Ukrainian Parliament over the years; the way to consensus has been long. Notably, Draft Law No. 5708, proposed in June 2021, aimed to establish a legal framework for civilian firearm ownership, including the creation of a Unified State Register of Civilian Firearms. This draft law sought to address issues such as the classification of firearms, the rights and responsibilities of firearm owners, and statutory limitations on certain types of weapons.  

The Ministry of Internal Affairs plays a pivotal role in firearm regulation and, amid the ongoing conflict, has adapted procedures to facilitate the issuance of arms to civilians participating in defence efforts. This adaptation underscores the urgent need for a comprehensive and updated legal framework to manage the proliferation and use of firearms among civilians effectively. On March 9, 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law providing for a wartime exemption for civilians to confront occupiers, allowing the use of several types of firearms for self-defence and for the protection of their property.  

 Picture 2. Potential Future Flow of Weapons 
(Source: Global Initiative, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Mark-Galeotti-and-Anna-Arutunyan-Peace-and-proliferation-The-Russo-Ukrainian-war-and-the-illegal-arms-trade-GI-TOC-March-2023.pdf

Impact of the War on the Spread of Weapons Among Civilians

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has significantly impacted the spread of weapons among civilians, exacerbating an already complex issue. Prior to the war, Ukraine had a notable number of both legal and illegal firearms in civilian hands. Even before the outbreak of the war, Ukraine was at the top of the list of European countries with the highest number of non-registered firearms in civilian use. The war has intensified this situation, as the government has taken steps to arm civilians to bolster defence efforts against Russian aggression. 

One immediate consequence has been the increased availability of firearms to the general population. With the invasion in 2022, the Ukrainian government began distributing weapons to civilians willing to join the defence efforts, leading to a surge in armed civilians. This was a necessary measure to ensure national defence, but it also raised concerns about long-term implications for public safety and order. The distribution of weapons has also resulted in a rise in the black market for arms. The urgency and scale of arming civilians have made it difficult to maintain strict and official control over weapon distribution, leading to leaks into illicit channels. This proliferation poses risks not only for immediate security but also for future crime rates and internal stability. Moreover, the increased weaponisation of the civilian population has heightened the potential for human rights abuses. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has highlighted the risks associated with increased civilian access to firearms, including heightened violence and insecurity. These issues underscore the need for robust mechanisms to monitor and regulate civilian-held arms to prevent misuse and ensure they do not contribute to further instability. 

To sum up, while the arming of civilians has been a critical component of Ukraine's defence strategy, it presents significant challenges that need to be addressed through comprehensive legal frameworks and effective control measures to mitigate long-term risks.

Possible Impacts on Crime Rates

Illegal firearms are increasingly involved in crime in both Ukraine and nearby Russian regions. According to the Ukrainian General Prosecutor’s Office, firearm-related offences in Ukraine surged from 720 in 2021 to 7,003 in 2022. In Russia, violent crimes involving firearms rose by 30% in the first ten months of 2022, with the Kursk and Belgorod regions, bordering Ukraine, seeing increases of 675% and 213%, respectively. Moscow saw a 203% rise in the same period.

Most illegal weapon flows in Ukraine are within the country, although some are exported through Odesa. Eastern Ukraine sees weapons diverted from military arsenals or brought back by soldiers. Larger deals involve crates of AK-74s, while smaller, opportunistic smuggling occurs via the personal belongings of injured soldiers.

Future illicit weapons transfers will likely follow established smuggling routes used for other contraband. The demobilisation of forces will create new routes, especially involving mercenaries and volunteers from the Western Balkans. These fighters may return with their weapons and establish transnational trafficking networks. An EU security official noted discussions among Ukrainian fighters about potential post-war illicit business ventures, indicating a complex and expansive future for illegal weapons flows from Ukraine.

Proliferation of Self-Defense Groups

A key feature of the conflict in Ukraine is the proliferation of territorial self-defence groups following the progressive deterioration of the Ukrainian security apparatus. As early as December 2013, Self Defence Forces (SDF) began to form in the context of the Maidan Square protests, supported by political movements opposed to former President Yanukovich. The SDF soon acted as a link between far-right groups and the protesters, contributing to the escalation by distributing weapons among civilians. Meanwhile, a parallel proliferation of self-defence groups took place in Donbass. Indeed, the intertwining of extreme right-wing and self-defence groups that emerged from Euromaidan triggered the creation of territorial defence forces in Donetsk and Luhansk in order to counter the perceived nationalist threat. 

Although the territorial self-defence groups were soon integrated into an institutional framework through the creation of state-sponsored territorial defence battalions and their incorporation into state forces, these groups retained considerable autonomy in the following years. Initially formed in a context of deep political crisis and coexisting with state security apparatuses, the battalions thus managed to gradually establish a monopoly on the use of force over territories.

The legitimisation of self-defence groups relies on their ability to step in where state security forces have faltered. As these groups gained influence and autonomy, they filled the void left by the breakdown of the state security apparatus. This process often involves seizing state arms stockpiles, which leads to the proliferation of weapons among civilians and group members. Therefore, there is a clear link between territorial control and the consolidation of authority, as well as between the latter and the ability to acquire arms.

Conclusions

In conclusion, the need for self-defence and societal militarisation have significantly increased civilian weapon possession during the conflict in Ukraine. This surge, alongside weak legal frameworks and the proliferation of self-defence groups, poses long-term risks for public safety, crime rates, and internal stability. Comprehensive regulation and effective control measures are urgently needed to mitigate these challenges.

June 4, 2024No Comments

US Military Aid to Ukraine: A Pivotal Move Amid Ongoing Conflict and Global Implications

By Maida Pollinari - Russia Team

The war between Russia and Ukraine, now in its third year, continues to be intensely volatile and dynamic. Recent developments, particularly the approval of a significant US military aid package, mark a critical juncture in international support for Ukraine. This article delves into the US decision, its ripple effects across Europe, and the broader implications for all parties involved.

US Military Aid Package to Ukraine

On April 24, 2024, US President Joe Biden approved a substantial $61 billion aid package for Ukraine. This decision concluded prolonged and intense negotiations within the US Congress, characterised by a bipartisan struggle. Notably, Republican Mike Johnson, initially a staunch opponent, reversed his stance after a confidential briefing, citing the existential threat posed by an "axis of evil" comprising Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Iran. Johnson emphasised that supporting Ukraine was crucial to US national security and a testament to American leadership in defending democracy.

Strategic and Political Motivations

Analysts suggest that this aid package is not only a pragmatic political move but also a strategic necessity. The aid aims to stabilise Ukraine's frontlines, mitigating fears of a Russian breakthrough or Ukrainian collapse. This stabilisation is crucial as it sets the stage for potential Ukrainian offensives in the coming months. Furthermore, the timing of this aid is significant given the approaching US presidential elections. Prolonging the conflict could adversely affect former President Donald Trump's approval ratings, possibly benefiting Biden among undecided voters.

European Response

The US decision has resonated strongly across Europe, prompting several nations to announce their own aid packages. On April 23, 2024, during a visit to Warsaw, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak unveiled the UK's largest military aid package to date for Ukraine, worth £500 million. Sunak underscored the importance of defending Ukraine not just for regional security but for the entire European continent, warning that a victorious Putin would not halt at Poland's border.

Similarly, Sweden has committed 13 billion kronor ($1.23 billion) in military aid, marking the largest Scandinavian contribution. The Czech Republic has pledged to deliver at least 1.5 million artillery shells by year's end, part of a covert supply strategy involving unnamed countries, likely including some BRICS nations like India and South Africa.

Broader Implications and Russian Reaction

The widespread European support highlights a unified front against Russian offensive and a collective effort towards Ukraine's post-war reconstruction. However, the approval of the US aid package has not been well-received by Russia. Kremlin spokesman Dmitri Peskov condemned the decision, suggesting it would enrich the US at Ukraine's expense and result in further Ukrainian casualties. Former Russian President Dmitri Medvedev expressed hostility, wishing for internal US turmoil, while President Putin acknowledged the increased costs of Russia's military operations and committed to record war spending of 6% of GDP in 2024.

Economic and Military Considerations

Despite current economic stability, bolstered by domestic fiscal policies and import substitution, Russia's financial sustainability remains uncertain. Continued Western support is vital for Ukraine, especially given the critical timing of arms deliveries and their deployment on the battlefield. This window of delay provides the Russian military with opportunities to target Ukrainian infrastructure, particularly its energy sector. Moscow's propaganda leverages these delays to project Western disunity and ongoing internal US discord, which Russia finds reassuring.

Source: Image by Beverly Lussier from Pixabay

Future Outlook

The conflict's trajectory remains uncertain, with the upcoming US presidential elections poised to influence future dynamics and support for Ukraine. The sustained cohesion and determination of Western allies are essential for Ukraine's long-term resilience against Russian aggression. The new aid package from the US represents a pivotal moment, demonstrating substantial international support for Ukraine with profound implications for the global power balance and the conflict's future.

Conclusion

In summary, the approval of the $61 billion US military aid package signifies a crucial step in international backing for Ukraine. The response from European nations further consolidates a collective stance against Russian offensive, highlighting a significant geopolitical shift. Meanwhile, Russian reactions underscore the persistent challenges and the importance of continued, coordinated support for Ukraine. The coming months and years will be decisive in shaping the conflict's outcome and the broader geopolitical landscape.

June 3, 2024No Comments

The viability of small Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) fulfilling conventional battlefield roles

by Joseph Moses - Military Strategy & Intelligence Team

Drone warfare has been one of the salient capabilities of the First World’s futuristic military arsenal through the conflicts of the 2000s and 2010s. The war that broke out in Ukraine in 2022, and the battlefields in Myanmar, Sudan and Gaza have since been the arena for another emerging technology that in tactical situations, proven to be decisive. These are the small drones ranging from the FPV variants, commercial hobby drones like the DJI drones. 

This essay focuses on smaller systems and aerial systems because these grant a force cheap options and also grant significant stealth, mobility, equipment safety, and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) collection capabilities and provide economically cheap tactically offensive capabilities than ground-based or water based systems. Another reason to focus on small drones is their assignment to smaller troop formations which grants these systems a very versatile and efficient [semi]autonomous usage. Furthermore, the integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI), also potentially negates the necessity of connecting the drones to nodal points like bigger drones or nearby aircraft which gives them relative immunity from detection and electronic countermeasures. This essay also focuses on electronic countermeasures (jamming) and not on energy weapons and kinetic countermeasures because this uniquely counters the threat posed by drones while rendering them temporarily inert as opposed to kinetic and energy countermeasures which destroy these systems.

Turkish and Iranian drones had been at the forefront of remotely controlled vehicles for precision strikes, kamikaze strikes and monitoring purposes in the initial months of the Ukraine war, providing cheaper options for drone warfare. However, over the course of the war, smaller drones have not only emerged but have caused major disruptions in the battlefield, dispatching enemy tanks, and armored vehicles, coordinating artillery strikes, and targeting small and mobile targets like combatants and individual vehicles. Initially, they were improvised to carry and drop grenades and mortars over enemy combatants and for surveillance. In recent months, these drones have begun to trickle into the battlefield on an industrial scale, with manufactured “pylons” to attach munitions onto these small drones. Modified FPV drones are used as guided kamikaze weapons. These drones also have increased ranges to increase their surveilling and strike capabilities.

These smaller drones can by no means in the short term, replace the bigger fixed-winged drones that are conventional in militaries nor will they have the costly sensor arrays and range of conventional kamikaze drones and other loitering munitions, but they do provide stealth, loitering and precision strike capability and above all, are expendable. In addition, given their precise nature, these drones also contribute to reducing collateral damage to both life and material which is inevitable with protracted infantry engagements, artillery and air strikes. 

In many ways, they fulfil the roles of snipers, forward observers, provide a good vantage point for observing and calculating firing solutions for artillery and conducting battle damage assessments, and one could argue, that the precision strikes by kamikaze drones and loitering drones are a form of Close Air Support (CAS). Another recent development as of the time of writing, is the emergence of AI being implemented in drone strikes in Ukraine to autonomously identify and strike targets. If developed, this would be a form of highly manoeuvrable and precise fire-and-forget missiles and would provide the drone launcher and operator significant situational awareness by relieving the targeting proces. It is yet to be seen at scale if autonomy is reliable across the ‘kill chain’ of target detection, discrimination, acquisition, and engagement.

While the improvised nature of the first iterations of loitering bomber drones carrying grenades and mortar shells was considered an asymmetrical and unconventional tactic, the new emerging technologies being integrated into these systems with the potential for these smaller and cheaper systems to replace conventional battlefield roles with the same quality of data collection, precision etc., could transform these systems into significant conventional and force multipliers. 

Replacing conventional battlefield roles:

The Drone Swarm: The recent attack on Israel by Iranian kamikaze drones and the number of attacks on oil refineries in Russia by Ukrainian drones are isolated examples of the drone swarm. While these drones can be intercepted, there are yet to be incidents involving swarms of smaller drones used against frontline troops where interceptions are much more difficult and where these drones will have the effect of cluster munitions or rocket strikes. The chief difference would be that these munitions would be far more accurate, and manoeuvrable and can potentially loiter, change course, make quick decisions, change targets etc.

These drones are difficult to intercept because of how small silent and cheap they are. If expensive air defence systems are used to soak these swarms up, this leaves these expensive air defence systems vulnerable to counterstrikes and with a reduced magazine in their positions. If it is included in doctrine, to ignore smaller drones, this would prove to be catastrophic to frontline troops, isolated patrols, and vehicles. The American Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), as of 2016 has already been experimenting with integrating autonomous systems into swarm drone tactics through their OFFensive Swarm-Enabled Tactics program (OFFSET). The US Department of Defense unveiled its “Replicator” program in 2023 and has planned on fielding thousands of autonomous systems across multiple domains by 2025 to counter Chinese military build-up in the Indo-Pacific. It has been confirmed that one of the systems that is a part of this program is the Switchblade loitering munition in association with the Low Altitude Stalking and Strike Ordnance (LASSO) program. The first iteration of the Replicator program aims to tackle the problem of slowing or defeating an invading force with swarms of lethal surface drones and overhead loitering munitions. This would shift the most dangerous battlefield roles of frontline repellence and area denial from manned vehicles and posts to unmanned and semi-autonomous or autonomous swarms, creating a highly fluid, dynamic and unpredictable ‘minefield’ for an advancing enemy force.

With the battlefield potential of swarm strikes, and with the novel usage of AI in Ukraine to discriminate targets and avoid electronic warfare measures, it is only a matter of time before swarm tactics will be implemented in drone swarms of smaller UASs to react, improve and harass frontline troops and significantly attack an enemy’s tactical defensive posturing while not costing the user significantly economically and commercially. This drone could be FPV (disposable) to loitering bombing drones, to drones with attached machine guns, rockets and other anti-drone counter-measures. While these systems can be assigned at squad levels, these can also be assigned at higher levels and be used in fire missions, and joint operations across wider active theaters. 

Source: Image by Pexels from Pixabay

CAS and sniper/precision-strike roles: The mobility and silent nature of drones affords fighting forces in urban settings and open terrain likewise, map out, reconnoiter, stalk and even kill hiding and isolated combatants. Their manoeuvrability can be used to attack fixed encampments as we see in the conflict in Gaza between Hamas and the Israeli IDF. Similarly, we have seen videos of Israeli forces using small copter drones to enter houses and search for Hamas combatants room by room, after which they can either engage through squads or call in an artillery or air strike against the entrenched enemy. While these strikes can be expensive, we can soon expect to see these strikes being taken up by the same reconnoitring drone. This economically relieves artillery batteries, tanks or aircraft while it also frees up the squad can focus on other operations/activities.  

A similar argument can be made for these systems being used in a CAS role. Given the precision, and payloads these drones can now carry and/or drop onto enemy positions and also strike and harass mobile enemies they can fulfill a very versatile CAS role while being assigned to smaller units like squads and platoons. In a swarm scenario or in a dynamic battlefield that is not shaped by shaping operations, while deconfliction could be a challenge for controlled and autonomous systems operated by smaller troop formations, this is already being performed in Ukraine against individual targets and to harass and survey larger formations. While these small drones may not be able to conduct large scale Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) operations, these smaller systems can be used as decoys, perform smaller precision strikes against less guarded enemy air defences, and psychologically de-motivate an infantry fighting force when used strategically. 

The primary advantage of conventional CAS systems is their precision, damage dealt and psychological effect of their munitions/guns with the disadvantage of being vulnerable to enemy ground fire from small handheld systems to surface-to-air missiles. With small drone systems, the advantage primarily is a relative degree of visual and audible stealth, the expendable nature of these systems and the shock-and-awe they provide to an enemy not expecting a highly mobile and smart targeting system. These systems can also drastically reduce the time required for a CAS aircraft to get to the battlefield as these will be at the hands of the squad or platoon members.

Electronic Warfare and AI:

The primary non-energy and non-kinetic deterrence against these drones have been electronic jamming countermeasures that are used to sever the connection between the drone operator and the drone. This has led to drone confiscations and loss of battlefield information and intelligence on drones that store information offline instead of storing/recording them on the operator’s system as a redundancy measure.


With the emergence of AI being integrated into kamikaze and FPV drones, these drones do not need operator control. An improvement already being made on non-autonomous FPV systems was for the operator to target an immobile or mobile enemy and place the drone on a trajectory towards the target at maximum velocity. This tactic negates the electronic countermeasure’s effects as the severance of the connection cannot stop the momentum of the inbound kamikaze drone. Integrating AI into these smaller and faster systems is a new concept but can be seen being implemented in the Ukrainian and Russian battlefields. These drones provide the tactical advantage of identifying and discriminating targets without requiring an operator but are also beginning to prove to be immune to electronic countermeasures as they have the target and terrain information and parameters pre-loaded into them.


While the disadvantage of AI is the lack of human supervision across the entire ‘kill chain’, the real-world consequences and level of permissible and reliable autonomy are yet to be seen at scale. In the future, this would be a contentious matter, especially in a battlefield with a civilian population, in urban counter-terror and counter-insurgency operations and could cause deconfliction challenges in an active and fluid battlefield. Real-time decision-making relieves the operator while also leaving the door open for the aforementioned challenges when it comes to targeting mobile targets or operating in a highly dynamic battlefield. Active deconfliction of a changing battlefield would require a constant connection between frontline troops, the drone operator and the drone.

While the possibilities are many, it is yet to be seen how the current improvisations, augmentations to/for conventional battlefield roles with the added potential of machine autonomy, would affect the composition of smaller combat units and doctrine.


Where conventional CAS, ISR and precision strike systems and roles are expensive, require scarce expertise and are not expendable, these UAS systems are the exact opposite while also being a force multiplier. It is however yet to be seen whether they would have the same psychological effect and efficacy to either augment or replace major decisive battlefield interdiction roles.