News Archives – ITSS Verona

February 12, 2026 — No Comments

Maven and SETAF-AF: how AI is reshaping Modern Military Command

By Isabella Marchese - AI, Cybersecurity, Space Desk

In today’s rapidly evolving security landscape, artificial intelligence (AI) has emerged as a powerful force multiplier in defense. Among the most advanced examples of this trend is the Maven Smart System (MSS), a cutting-edge command and control platform that uses machine learning and data fusion to enhance decision-making and situational awareness ( Advocacy Alliance, 2025; U.S. Army, 2025).

One of the most forward-looking applications of Maven can be found in the U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF), a headquarters responsible for coordinating Army operations across Europe and Africa. In this context, SETAF-AF provides a real example of how AI is transitioning from experimental to operational doctrine, altering the way modern military plans, decide, and act (U.S. Army, 2025; Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance).

What Is the Maven Smart System?

Maven originated as a US Department of Defense program to automate the analysis of massive amounts of video and sensor data. It gradually evolved into the Maven Smart System, a fully integrated command and control (C2) platform. MSS integrates satellite images, logistical data, open-source intelligence, and operational inputs into a unified Common Operating Picture (COP), allowing for quick analysis and visualization of high-impact events (Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, 2025). Unlike traditional C2 systems, Maven is designed to continuously adapt through real-time data ingestion and user feedback, reducing decision-making cycles from hours to minutes—or even seconds. Built using an agile DevSecOps approach, the system is constantly tested and refined through live exercises such as Scarlet Dragon and Yama Sakura (U.S. Department of Defense, XVIII Airborne Corps’ Scarlet Dragon brings military and industry together to test artificial intelligence and cutting-edge technology, DVIDS, 2025.;U.S. Army, 2025).

SETAF-AF: AI in Action

In two strategically linked areas, SETAF-AF is essential to preserving U.S. Army preparedness and quick reaction capabilities. The incorporation of Maven into its everyday operations signifies a significant doctrinal shift rather than merely a technological advancement (Defense News, 2025).

SETAF-AF uses MSS to assist operations throughout the information environment, wargaming, and emergency planning during planning and field exercises. The command can evaluate different options, simulate crisis situations, and make quicker, better decisions by integrating AI-driven tools into these procedures.

One notable exercise in 2025 saw SETAF-AF planners using Maven to stress-test crisis response plans under complex and dynamic conditions. The system enabled teams to adapt strategies in near real time while also exploring scenarios in which AI capabilities were deliberately degraded or unavailable, reinforcing operational resilience in contested environments (Defense News, 2025).

Public Affairs and the Information Advantage

Beyond kinetic operations, SETAF-AF has expanded Maven’s application into the information domainThe tool is currently used by the public affairs directorate to keep an eye on the information landscape, get alerts almost instantly, and react quickly to new disinformation efforts (U.S. Army, 2025).

Weekly wargaming sessions allow communication teams to train with Maven under simulated stress, improving coordination with other functional areas such as G39 Information Operations (U.S. Army, 2025).

The integration of external platforms such as Dataminr First Alert and Sprinklr further enhances this capability by providing real-time news detection and social media sentiment analysis. By fusing these inputs into the Maven COP, SETAF-AF can identify emerging narratives earlier and act proactively within the information space rather than reacting once narratives have already gained traction (U.S. Army, 2025).

NATO Integration and Strategic Interoperability

Maven’s relevance extends well beyond U.S. forces. The Maven Smart System is being included into major international drills like STEADFAST DUEL 2025 by NATO's Joint Warfare Center (JWC) in Stavanger, Norway (NATO Joint Warfare Centre, 2025).

This project is a component of a larger endeavor to use AI-enabled capabilities to update NATO's command and control system.
NATO is enhancing cross-domain coordination, boosting interoperability, and speeding up decision-making by standardizing the use of MSS among partner forces. Maven serves as a catalyst for further digital transformation throughout the Alliance as it integrates more deeply into alliance structures (NATO JWC, 2025).

Critical Reflections and Future Outlook

As demonstrated by research centers such as ITSS Verona, incorporating AI into military decision-making creates important ethical, legal, and strategic concerns. While AI may significantly speed up analysis and planning, human judgment must still be respected (Department of Defense, “Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway”.
The SETAF-AF approach represents this compromise. Maven is used as a decision-support tool to improve staff performance, streamline data operations, and reduce operational friction, but decision-making authority remains with humans. This strategy emphasises the need of combining technological innovation with theoretical clarity and accountable leadership.

Conclusion

The integration of the Maven Smart System within SETAF-AF offers a compelling example of how artificial intelligence is reshaping modern military command. From operational planning and crisis response to the information environment, Maven is more than just a technology enabler; it is becoming an essential component of modern command systems.
As AI evolves, the SETAF-AF experience demonstrates a key lesson for modern militaries: innovation must be accompanied by doctrine, human judgment, and strategic responsibility.

U.S. Army, SETAF-AF Public Affairs Experiment with Emerging Technology to Shape the Information Environment, 2025. https://www.army.mil/article/289747

Defense News, Army Southern European Task Force, Africa Turns to AI for Wargaming, 2025. https://www.defensenews.com/land/2025/10/22/army-southern-european-task-force-africa-turns-to-ai-for-wargaming/

Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, Maven Smart System, 2025. https://www.missiledefenseadvocacy.org/tag/maven-smart-system/

NATO Joint Warfare Centre, Integrating Maven Smart System, 2025. https://www.jwc.nato.int/article/jwc-integrate-maven/

U.S. Department of Defense, Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway, 2023. https://www.ai.mil

U.S. Department of Defense – Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2). https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/JADC2/

U.S. Army – Multi-Domain Operations (MDO). https://www.army.mil/multi-domain-operations/

U.S. DoD – Responsible Artificial Intelligence. https://www.ai.mil/RAI.html

NATO Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). https://www.jwc.nato.int/

February 11, 2026 — No Comments

It’s not the plane, it’s the pilot. Or is it?

By Patrick Nicchiarelli - Asia & China desk

This question related to Top Gun: Maverick (Kosinski, 2022), can be put in parallel with the events of May 2025, when a Pakistan Air Force J‑10CE, shot down an Indian Rafale with a long‑range PL‑15 air‑to‑air long range missile. The episode came as a surprise to many analysts as the Rafale is considered an excellent 4.5 generation aircraft, and highlighted how little was still understood about the real operational performance of contemporary Chinese military aviation.

Beyond the “Best Aircraft” Debate

While opinions may differ on which aircraft truly deserves the title of “best,” the debate inevitably points to a broader and more consequential question. How many fighters China actually field, at what pace their rolling off production lines, and what they compare to the their Western counterparts?

Ultimately, these considerations lead to the question that matters most: what would a direct confrontation between the US and China look like, should tensions over Taiwan ever escalate into open conflict?

It is worth noting that this final question cannot be answered with certainty, given the number of critical variables that must be taken into account: the distance U.S. forces need to traverse to reach the battlefield; the availability and use of military bases in neighbouring regions; the volume of missiles and other munitions that could be sustained through resupply; the strength of China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy, which is widely regarded as highly effective (Pacific Forum, 2025); and the experience of the military personnel and material engaged (the use of J-10Cs by Pakistan mark the first time a recent Chinese aircraft is used in combat).

A Shrinking Fleet, but a More Capable One

Let us begin with the numbers. A study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) highlights that the number of aircraft in active service has declined over time. While this trend has been observed across several armed forces, due to a secure environments or economic constraints, Table 1 shows that older assets have been phased out, while third-generations aircraft, such as the J-7, are in the process of disappearing. This leaves the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) equipped predominantly with late-generation and advanced aircraft, such as the J-20 being the latest. If we take into account all the Chinese military branch, the number is in between of 2000 and 2300 (Edson and Saunders, 2025). (A comparative table on the generation of PLAAF aircraft in active service is available in Volume 125, Issue 1 (2025) of The Military Balance).

*Picture by Bangladesh Air Force F-7BGI inflight.png - CC BY-SA 4.0*

*Picture by N509FZ - Own work, *J20 Chengdu*, CC BY-SA 4.0*

If you are not familiar with military aviation, this may sound like foreign language. Before digging further, let’s clarify what aircraft generations mean with the following table. Basically, generations are categorised according to the technological development of fighter aircraft. It is important to note that there are different understandings of fighter generations, which may vary depending on the author or institution. There are at least six other classifications, including one used by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Table 2 shows the types of Jet fighter generations.

Period	Core Capability	Representative Aircraft	Hallion (1990)	Aerospaceweb (2004)	PLA (2007)	Air Force Magazine (2009)	APDC (2012)	Baker (2018)
1942–1950	High subsonic, conventional armament	Me 262, DH Vampire, P-80	1	1	—	1	1	1
1953–1955	Transonic, radar, early AAMs	F-86, MiG-15, Hawker Hunter	2	1	1	2	1	1
1953–1960	Early supersonic, radar, AAMs	F-100, MiG-19	3	2	2	2	2	2
1955–1970	Supersonic, Mach 2, AAM-focused	F-104, MiG-21, Mirage III	4	2		3	2	2
1960–1970	Multirole fighter-bombers	F-4, MiG-23/27, Mirage F1	5	3		3	3	3
1970–1980	Supersonic multirole	Tornado, Saab 37 Viggen	5	4	3	4	4	4
1974–1990	High manoeuvrability, efficiency	F-14, F-15, F-16, F/A-18, MiG-29, Su-27, Mirage 2000	6	4	3	4	4
1990–2000	Advanced avionics, limited stealth	F-15E, Su-30, Su-35, J-10, JF-17	—	4.5	3.5	4+	4.5
2000–present	Integrated avionics, stealth (4.5)	Rafale, Typhoon, Gripen, F/A-18E/F, J-16, KF-21		4.5	3.5	4++	4.5
2005–present	Full stealth, sensor fusion	F-22, F-35, J-20, Su-57, J-35		5	4	5	5	5

From Territorial Defence to Power Projection

Now let's turn our attention to production. Without delving into the full history of Chinese security and capability doctrine, it's important to understand that China has moved from static homeland and coastal air defence, where the PLA was the major actor, to "limited war actions under high-tech conditions" (USCC, 2007), and then toward a strategic force capable of deep strikes and independent missions with a greater involvement of the PLAAF and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).

This paradigm shift is linked to the Gulf War (1990–91), which demonstrated the dominance of high-tech Western air power and questioned a PLAAF numerically large but technologically lagging behind, highlighting both its technological and doctrinal gap. Added to this is the need to protect Chinese interests located at distance or overseas, such as Taiwan, the South/East China Sea, and the "string of pearls" (sea lines of communication). This has led the PLAAF's missions to expand beyond air defence and support to the army/navy, adding roles like long-range precision strike, air superiority over contested regions, strategic transport, and contribution to joint aerospace operations.

Naturally, replacing older aircraft with more technologically advanced models comes at a cost, increasing China's defence spending from around $77 billion in 2011 to $250 billion in 2025 (ECNS, 2025). China is not clearly stating how much money it allocates to its diverse branches of the military; it is generally considered being between 21% and 25% of the budget. Therefore, it can be assumed that at least $52.5 to $62.5 billion is spent on aviation. By way of comparison, the estimated air force expenditure of the United States (air force, navy, army) for the same year was between $273 and $308 billion, and that of Russia between $30 and $45 billion (SimpleFlying, 2025).

To add a further layer to the fog of war, production figures for Chinese military aircraft are also not disclosed. Nevertheless, current estimates suggest, for multi-role fighter aircraft, that the number of aircraft produced per year by Chinese companies exceed 240. This output is broadly broken down as follows: 40 for the J-10C Vigorous Dragon, and more than 100 for the J-16 Hidden Dragons and for the J-20 Mighty Dragon.

Annual Aircraft Output

By comparison, the US has announced approximately 36 F-16s, 36 F-15s, 150 F-35s (it seems that 43% of the F-35 production is for export) and an unknown number of F-18s (which are gradually phased out), for a total of more than 222 aircraft (SimpleFlying, 2025). Even accounting for this significant export share, the numbers speak for themselves: China produces more combat aircraft each year for its own forces than the US, a trend mirrored at sea where the PLAN has already surpassed the US Navy in terms of tonnage.

In addition to Chinese-built aircraft, China continues to operate Russian-made combat aircraft (among others), namely 32 Su-27s, 97 Su-30s and 24 Su-35s (IISS, The Military Balance 2007, 2012 and 2025). While not part of the latest generation, they are potent aircraft.

*Picture by Dmitriy Pichugin - PLAAF Su-30 fighter jet, commons file, CC BY-SA 4.0*

Despite higher US military spending, China appears to be leading the 2025 rankings as the country with the largest number of aircraft, namely 2,747, while the US peaks at 2,123, (it should kept in mind, however, that while indicative of industrial capacity, these figures reflect quantity only, leaving aside critical variables such as training, sustainment, and combat experience). Nevertheless, if we delve more in detail at the aircraft category (Table 3), it appears that the US has more tankers and transport aircraft than its Chinese counterpart. This highlights a greater strategic flexibility than China.

Two Strategies, Two Air Forces

This divergence is the consequence of two fundamentally different strategies. Until relatively recently, China’s strategy was mostly defensive, focused over territorial integrity and the protection of its immediate periphery, hence the anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) architecture designed to deter or complicate an intervention by a foreign country. This is the reason why it possesses almost twice as many fighter jets and a substantial fleet of AWACS and electronic aircraft, while not requiring long-range air-power projection capabilities (for now).

By contrast, the US has oriented its military strategy toward global power projection, working on its capabilities to operate and sustain prolonged deployments across multiple theatres simultaneously. (A comparative table of the aircraft number Russia, the U.S. and China is available on Defense Blog)

Yet, as we have seen, the numbers alone tell only part of the story. Beyond fleet size and production rates lies, the question of how these last generation aircrafts compare in terms of capability and strategic purpose. Although the latest generation aircraft in service with the PLAAF and PLAN is the J35A, which appeared at the military parade in Beijing on 3 September 2025, information about it is extremely scarce. Thus, we will focus on how the J-20 fits into China's defence strategy.

Although many details regarding the J-20 remain unknown, what is certain is that it possesses a small radar signature (stealth capabilities), the capacity to low super cruise (fly supersonic without using afterburner), and the ability to datalink with drones and other friendly platforms (exchange data in real time via a secure digital link). In addition, its passive sensor should allow the detection of aircraft by their thermal and visual/infrared signature, instead of emitting radar waves (which makes the aircraft detectable), allowing the J-20 to see without being seen, in theory (CSIS ChinaPower, 2025).

Consequently, the J-20 is equipped with long-range air-to-air missiles such as the PL-15 - the same as the one used by the Pakistani against the Rafale - and is believed to possess a 145 km range (DefenseFeeds, 2025). It is also equipped with the PL-21, which is believed to be capable of engagement beyond 200km. It thus gives the aircraft extraordinary air superiority and long-range interception capabilities. These characteristics allow the aircraft to integrate perfectly within a dense sensor network, ground-based air defences such as those deployed by Beijing in the south China sea.

Joint exercises with Russia and Pakistan have also confirmed an increase in the mastery of beyond visual range combat, based on stealth technology, sensors and long-range missiles (Leiter, 2023), perhaps detrimental to traditional dogfighting skill. This echoes the U.S. experience in the Vietnam War, when confidence in missiles led to the belief that dogfighting, and even cannons, had become obsolete, resulting in early F-4 Phantom variants being fielded without internal cannon. The disastrous result in terms of US aircrafts that were shot down, led the military to reinstate the cannon and set up the famous Top Gun program.

One might argue that the US operates broadly comparable systems that cancel each other in the end, placing a greater emphasis on the pilot skills. This is both true and misleading, because, like a football team, China enjoys the advantage of "playing at home". Thus, it benefits from the knowledge of its geography and meteorology, the distance from Taiwan (short response times), and inherently strategic position, as illustrated by the basing layout shown on the map below.

Furthermore, if the stealth factor is set aside due to modern detection capabilities constantly evolving the balance gets more subtle. These modernisation include multi-band radar, new passive electromagnetic detection systems, and "trans-horizon" radars that exploit atmospheric layers for very long-range early warning detection, such as the France’s Nostradamus system (Ministère des Armées, 2025) and China’s JY-27A (Odin, 2025). In addition to this are bistatic radar sets (RadarTutorial, 2025), where the transmitter and receiver are not in the same locations.

Taken together, these constant improvements suggest that the decisive factor could ultimately come down to a more traditional indicator: the number of aircraft available. As a reminder, an American F-117 was shot down by the Yugoslav forces in 1999, using radar operating in the VHF or UHF bands, underscoring that stealth aircrafts are not invisible when confronted with adaptive air-defence systems (theaviationgeekclub, 2025).

Conclusion

This inevitably highlights alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. The United States benefit from a network of partners from Japan and South Korea to Australia and the Philippines, with further support from Singapore and possibly India. In theory, this network of alliances reinforces Washington's ability to project power and conduct operations close to China's periphery (Carnegie endowment, 2025).

China, on the other hand, does not possess a comparable system of alliances. However, it compensates this weakness through its geographical and geopolitical position and its economic weight over neighboring states, and the number of military assets.

In the end, allied support involves constant trade-offs between economic risk and security obligations.

In the end, allied support cannot be taken for granted, as partners must balance security commitments against the risk of economic retaliation. This complexity is particularly salient today, amid growing uncertainty over the Trump administration to uphold its alliance commitments and security agreements. Yet this complexity remains preferable to operating without meaningful alliances, particularly for sustained operations that depend on access, resupply and extensive logistical networks.

February 9, 2026 — No Comments

How foreign loans can threaten sovereignty and economic stability

By Axelle Bougouma - Africa Desk

Introduction

Africa’s infrastructure needs are vast, however, in recent years, Chinese financing has played a major role in closing that gap. However, while Chinese loans often come with fewer conditionalities than those of the IMF or World Bank, they mask deeper structural trade-offs involving sovereignty, debt sustainability, and political autonomy. Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) project — its largest infrastructure undertaking to date since its independence — provides a concrete case through which these trade-offs can be assessed rather than assumed. Built to modernise transport between Mombasa and Nairobi and facilitate regional integration, the SGR has become emblematic of both the ambitions and vulnerabilities associated with foreign-financed mega-projects.

This essay argues that Kenya’s SGR symbolise how heavy reliance on a single external creditor under opaque contractual arrangements can constrain state autonomy even in the absence of explicit asset seizure. Kenya is not a passive victim;however, asymmetries in bargaining power, state capacity, and transparency translate financial dependence into political and economic constraint. I proceed in four parts: first, I examine the financing structure and implementation of the SGR; second, I analyse its implications for sovereignty; third, I situate Kenya’s experience within broader debates on China’s role in Africa; and finally, I conclude with implications and recommendations relevant to African development strategy.

Financing, structure, and implementation of the SGR

Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) is arguably its boldest infrastructure project in decades. The initial section, from the port city of Mombasa to Nairobi, was built between 2013 and 2019, with costs estimated at around US$5.3 billion .The largest financing source was China’s ExportImport Bank (EXIM), which provided the bulk of the capital. Over time, Chinese bilateral loans have grown to represent roughly 64 % of Kenya’s bilateral debt , making Kenya significantly indebted to China.

While the SGR has delivered operational improvements — shortening travel time between Mombasa and Nairobi, offering a modern rail alternative to road transport — its contracts and debt servicing are concerning. The SGR contract reportedly includes a clause that third parties cannot access its full terms without Chinese approval . It also requires that disputes be resolved under Chinese law , giving China legal leverage. Even though the loan is not explicitly backed by natural resource collateral, the stringent control over disclosure and legal jurisdiction tilt bargaining power heavily toward China. This asymmetry places Kenya in a position of vulnerability, forcing it to rely on Chinese goodwill when making decisions that directly affect its citizens.

The implementation of the contract also shows that Kenya has given up some degree of domestic control. In fact, Chinese firms provided much of the labor and technical expertise in constructing the SGR. The expectation is that Chinese personnel will remain engaged in operations and maintenance through around 2027. The transfer of technical skills to Kenyan workers has been criticized as inadequate, given how long it will take for Kenyans to take full control of the rail operations. This has created concerns among Kenyans about their ability to access stable and skilled jobs within the railway sector.

On the economic front, the SGR has struggled to generate adequate revenue. Operational losses - mainly because the railroad has been operating at a suboptimal level - has been substantial. For example, in its early years, passenger and freight revenues have fallen short of projections, requiring taxpayer support to cover deficits. Even more worryingly, extensions beyond the initial sections (e.g. toward Kisumu, Malaba, and beyond) remain underfunded , stalling plans to connect to Uganda and further integrate regional rail networks. As such, Kenya finds itself saddled with a debt-intensive flagship project that offers limited financial returns while remaining subject to long-term Chinese involvement and influence.

Analysis on sovereignty erosion

When a country becomes heavily indebted to a single external creditor, its room to make independent policy choices can shrink. In the case of the SGR, clauses related to legal jurisdiction and restrictions on contract disclosure limit Kenya’s ability to fully control the project. These provisions do not eliminate sovereignty in a legal sense but erode it by shifting decisions away from Kenyan institutions.

This has consequences for democratic accountability. Parliamentary oversight and public debate are weakened when major infrastructure agreements remain partially hidden from scrutiny. Over time, this creates a subtle but real loss of control, as policy decisions become increasingly shaped by external obligations rather than domestic priorities.

Dependence in the SGR is also reinforced through labor and management structures. Kenyan workers remain in subordinate roles , while Chinese personnel retain control over key technical and operational functions. Although this is often presented as temporary, the limited transfer of skills raises doubts about whether Kenya will truly be able to run the railway independently in the future. If the knowledge, tools, and authority needed to operate the SGR remain external, then Kenya’s ownership is more symbolic than substantive.

TTC, CC BY-SA 4.0 , via Wikimedia Commons

Geopolitics, African perspectives, and China’s broader agenda

The criticisms of Chinese infrastructure lending often center on the idea of debt -trap diplomacy — the notion that China intentionally extends loans that are unsustainable to extract strategic concessions. Supporters argue this is overstated and that many African borrowers have willingly taken up Chinese infrastructure financing because traditional Western donors impose stricter conditionalities.

Empirical studies have offered nuance: many Chinese loans are renegotiated, restructured, or cancelled when defaults loom, suggesting that China is more pragmatic than predatory . There is limited evidence that China systematically engineers traps, but the opacity, legal leverage, and lack of alternative lenders magnify risks for weak states.

In contrast, Western lenders like the IMF and World Bank often condition lending on governance reforms, fiscal discipline, and structural adjustments. While that may appear more intrusive, it can also embed accountability and transparency. Chinese lending is often politically easier for governments because it comes with fewer visible conditionalities, but that often translates into less scrutiny and weaker institutional checks.

However, China’s interest in Africa is not purely altruistic. Infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) enhance China’s trade routes, resource access, diplomatic influence, and global strategic reach. In fact, by financing ports, railways, energy plants, and digital infrastructure, China secures both economic returns and geopolitical footholds in regions where Western influence is contested.

Conclusion and Implications

Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway illustrates the dual character of contemporary infrastructure finance in Africa. Large-scale foreign lending, particularly from China, can accelerate the delivery of much-needed infrastructure projects and visibly transform landscapes. At the same time, the SGR demonstrates how reliance on a single external creditor, combined with opaque contractual arrangements, can generate new forms of vulnerabilities.

The central lesson is not that foreign borrowing is inherently detrimental, nor that Chinese financing constitutes a predatory strategy. Rather, Kenya’s experience shows how asymmetries in bargaining power and weak transparency mechanisms can translate financial dependence into constraints on policy autonomy. Legal jurisdiction clauses, restrictions on contract disclosure, and operational arrangements that concentrate technical authority in foreign hands do not formally extinguish sovereignty, but they weaken it. Decision-making authority shifts incrementally away from domestic institutions, while parliamentary oversight and public debate struggle to keep pace with the scale and complexity of externally financed projects.

These dynamics have broader implications beyond Kenya. As African countries take on more debt, they are faced with narrower fiscal and policy space . For African states, the challenge is therefore not simply to secure more financing, but to shape the terms under which financing is obtained. Diversifying funding sources across bilateral, multilateral, private, and domestic channels can preserve bargaining power and reduce exposure to any single creditor. Equally important is transparency. Infrastructure contracts should be publicly accessible, subject to legislative scrutiny, and reviewed by independent oversight bodies, as without such mechanisms, infrastructure development risks outpacing democratic accountability.

Kenya’s case also highlights the importance of embedding local capacity building within infrastructure agreements. If skills transfer and managerial roles remain limited to foreigners, ownership of financed assets will be more symbolic than substantive. Long-term development gains depend not only on building infrastructure, but on the ability of domestic institutions and workers to operate, maintain, and adapt these systems independently.

Ultimately, Kenya’s SGR reflects a broader pattern in global political economy. Debt distress and sovereignty pressures arise less from a single grand strategy to subjugate other countries than from the interaction between external power asymmetries and domestic vulnerabilities.

Safeguarding sovereignty, therefore, is a cumulative and institutional project. It requires strategic borrowing, enforceable transparency norms, and sustained investment in local capacity. Only under these conditions can foreign-financed infrastructure function as a foundation for durable economic stability rather than a subtle constraint on political autonomy.

January 9, 2026 — No Comments

A Year into al-Sharaa’s rule and Sectarian Violence

By Camilla Biolcati - Human Security Desk

One year after the self-proclamation of President al-Sharaa, Syria is taking stock of the new government’s performance. Although the country has not fallen into chaos or civil war, as many feared after the collapse of Bashar al-Assad, it cannot be said that Syria—and above all Syrians—find themselves in a significantly better condition than under the previous dictatorship. If the new president does not ensure security for all Syrians, protecting every minority within the country, this may well mark the beginning of another sectarian-based dictatorship.

From Assad’s Fall to al-Sharaa’s Rise

On 8 December a year ago, after 53 years of Assad's rule, a rebel coalition led by HTS launched an eleven-day offensive that led to the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad. Leading the rebels was the current self-proclaimed president, Ahmed al-Sharaa of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham—known to most as the former militant al-Jawlani. Over the past year, both his name and his public image have been apparently reshaped. His greatest challenge now is to hold together a country torn apart by civil war and deep internal divisions. HTS itself has fluctuated between affiliation with the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, before shifting from a global jihad ambition to a more local one, driven by nationalist aims and an exclusive focus on Syria, integrating different Islamist movements along the way. From 2017 until last December’s advance on Damascus, HTS positioned itself as the guardian of the Sunni community in Syria against the Alawite regime of the former dictator and its allies. How could such a movement overthrow a dictatorship without letting a deeply fragmented country collapse into chaos under such a slogan? But at the gates of Damascus of Damascus, al-Jawlani chanted: "A Syria for all Syrians.” But has he succeeded?

Syria’s Composition

Syria is described as a mosaic of minorities, with a particularly heterogeneous ethnic-religious composition. A simplified and non-exhaustive breakdown of the country’s main communities shows that around 70% of the population adheres to the Sunni branch of Islam. Approximately 10% are Kurds, the majority of whom are also Sunni. The Alawites, who belong to the Shia branch of Islam, constitute an estimated 10–15% of the population, while Christians of various denominations account for roughly 10%. Among the smaller minority groups are the Druze, who represent about 3% of the population.

What Is at Risk

Rebuilding Syria: pluralism, human rights and the human security challengeDespite the challenges inherited from decades of dictatorship and civil war, al-Sharaa has shown the capacity to pull Syria out of international isolation, attracting investment and recognition. Yet foreign relations and diplomacy are not the only concern. For months, leading Middle East analysts have been watching the fate and security of the population. The foundations on which Syria can—and must—be rebuilt are pluralism, inclusivity, and tolerance, particularly through the protection of human rights. This represents the new leader’s core challenge. Several atrocities have been documented in recent months, with the country’s major minority communities suffering severe attacks and massacres. According to ACLED reporting, around 60% of victims in armed confrontations belong to the Druze and Alawite communities.

March 2025 – The Alawite Massacre

From the day after Assad’s fall, clashes described by the transitional government as “individual cases” of revenge killings against members of the Alawite minority have persisted. Resentment toward Alawites runs high among many Syrians who perceive them as responsible for decades of oppression. Members of this community have repeatedly reported feeling under threat, accusing the new government of being unable—or unwilling—to protect them. Since February 2025, Amnesty International has recorded numerous reports of disappearances, abductions, and kidnappings of Alawite women and girls, calling on authorities to intervene.

Between 6 and 9 March 2025, the deadliest confrontation since al-Sharaa’s rise to power broke out, drawing harsh criticism from the international community and rights organisations. The violence appears to have started with an ambush targeting Syrian security forces and military checkpoints in north-western Latakia province, where government troops had been deployed for a "security campaign” aimed at suppressing Assad-loyalist rebels. The government response triggered a cycle of violence which, according to independent Reuters investigations and ACLED data, saw clashes across at least fifty locations in the governorates of Latakia, Hama, Homs, and Tartus. The response was described as brutal and disproportionate: according to an investigative commission, around 200,000 fighters from various military factions were mobilised to the coastal front, resulting in violations, abuses, extrajudicial killings, and disappearances. According to The Syrian Network for Human Rights, the units considered responsible for most killings included two factions previously affiliated with the SNA and under U.S. sanctions for human rights abuses. The confrontation escalated into a sectarian conflict which, according to SNHR and SOHR investigations, caused around 2,000 deaths, mostly Alawite civilians. Subsequent independent investigations, including joint work by Human Rights Watch, Syrians for Truth and Justice,and Syrian Archive, documented, through interviews and verified video footage, the complicity of forces under the Ministry of Defence in the atrocities, humiliation, and reprisals carried out by fighters. Testimonies also pointed to the recruitment of civilian volunteers not associated with militias to join the campaign, further demonstrating the government’s inability, or unwillingness, to control the use of force. Throughout these events, al-Sharaa continued to call for national unity, promising the creation of an independent committee to investigate civil rights abuses and identify perpetrators. Initial findings, however, claimed that military commanders had not ordered violations, fueling anger among the Alawites. The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria later recognised the involvement of segments of interim government forces and urged authorities to identify and prosecute those responsible.

July 2025 – Sectarian Violence in Suwayda

Only a few months later, in July 2025, another major eruption of violence broke out in the southern province of Suwayda, involving the Druze minority and Bedouin armed groups reportedly supported by government forces. The escalation followed months of latent tensions and clashes, which, according to ACLED, amount to nearly 133 recorded incidents between January and July 2025. On 13 July, after a wave of retaliatory kidnappings between Druze and Bedouin tribes, violence intensified dramatically. In just two weeks, reports documented 95 incidents, more than 800 casualties, and hundreds of displacements. Government forces intervened, claiming to be restoring order, but the operation instead deepened insecurity within the Druze community, which accused the military of taking sides with Bedouin groups. In the aftermath of the first ceasefire, Al-Sharaa himself publicly praised Bedouin involvement in restoring calm in the southern province against outlaw armed groups, a statement that sparked strong feelings of injustice within the Druze community and renewed fears of being not only unprotected by the state, but also directly targeted. Video and photographic evidence also suggests the involvement and incitement of hatred by transitional government forces against the Druze community.

This intervention is part of a strategy aimed at centralising state power and challenging local militias and governorates in Syria that want to preserve their autonomy. In March, the president signed a temporary Constitutional Declaration that immediately drew criticism and concern from the country's minorities because it did not reflect ethnic and religious diversity or the autonomy of the country's numerous governorates. In light of this, it is clear that abuses, reprisals and violations of humanitarian law are distancing President Al-Sharaa from his goal of unifying Syria into a free and safe Syria for all and winning the trust of its citizens.

*Photo by mohamad alshaekh yosef - pexels.com*

The need for Justice, and Minority Protection: Syria’s Crossroads

These two major episodes of violence—along the coastal region and later in Suwayda—serve as stark warning signs of the concrete risks posed by the transitional government’s current security approach for civilians, particularly minority communities. Syria remains a deeply fragmented society, where the idea of centralised authority recalls patterns of oppression typical of the previous dictatorship. It is therefore unrealistic to assume that regime change, especially if it brings a specific niche to power, would not provoke fear and insecurity among those who could once again be marginalised and oppressed. Analysts observing Syria’s fragile transition have repeatedly highlighted this dynamic.

The core challenge for the government of transition is to demonstrate the political will and capacity to integrate all of Syria’s diverse social, ethnic, religious groups into the political and security architecture of the state.Without an inclusive governance and security framework, existing sectarian rifts are likely to deepen rather than heal. Observers have stressed that prioritising domestic credibility and reducing sectarian tensions are essential if the transitional authority is to build trust across the population. Minority inclusion has internal and external dimensions: internally, ending cycles of revenge violence and ensuring accountability are crucial to preventing further retaliation and mistrust; externally, it is important to recognise the risk of regional powers exercising influence at the expense of minority communities.

In conclusion, despite the establishment of commissions tasked with judging and prosecuting violations committed during the Assad era and the massacres of recent months, these bodies have so far proved ineffective and inconsistent, making it necessary to guarantee transparency and impartiality in future trials. An accountable transitional justice mechanism is essential to overcoming the trauma of centuries of abuse and to laying the foundations for reconciliation and, potentially, peace. Secondly, the development of a decentralised and pluralistic security system, as recommended by experts, would help mitigate the risk of further clashes such as those in March and July 2025 and could provide a more solid basis for national reconciliation. Finally, greater political integration, including all minorities within the governmental and constitutional structures of the country, must be accompanied by recognition of the need for decentralisation and a degree of autonomy for minority groups.

January 5, 2026 — No Comments

Extremist Convergence and Antisemitism: Security Challenges in the Italian Context

By Francesco Foti - Italy Desk

In Western democratic systems, it is customary to promote spaces for pluralistic debate on sociopolitical phenomena. However, given the security threats arising from political polarisation and radicalisation dynamics, it is important to make a rigorous distinction between political criticism and discriminatory rhetoric, and to apply continuous monitoring of extremism and extremist actors seeking to destabilise Italy’s democratic fabric, without compromising individual rights.

According to the Centro di Documentazione Ebraica Contemporanea (CDEC), in 2024 there were 877 antisemitic incidents recorded — nearly double the 454 incidents in 2023. The increase includes both online hate speech (insults, slurs, threats) and real-world episodes: vandalism, physical assaults, threats to Jewish individuals, and attacks against Jewish institutions. The escalation coincides with international events — in particular, the war in Gaza and the October 7, 2023 massacre by Hamas — which have fuelled a surge in “anti-Zionist” protests that often overlapped with classic antisemitic tropes and rhetoric.

The pro-Palestinian protests that have fuelled antisemitism are said by some analysts to originate from the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood on the current far-left political thought prevalent among many commentators, activists, and political groups. The UCOII has been linked to this influence. The organisation includes the USMI (Unione degli Studenti Musulmani in Italia), which plays a significant role in the funding of mosques in Italy. According to some investigative reports, this group works closely with extra-parliamentary far-left and anarchist circles. A 2025 academic study mapping the Italian Telegram ecosystem found evidence that far-left and far-right rhetoric sometimes mix in chats; it also identified widespread toxicity and hate speech targeting Jews among other groups.

Some intelligence and counter-extremism sources associate the UCOII with FIOE — the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe — which is often described as linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. However, some analysts warn that the legal and institutional framework in Italy does not sufficiently regulate Islamist and charity associations, potentially leaving room for greater ideological influence and individuals of concern.

It is therefore important to identify the presence of political Islam operating covertly within anti-Israel protests. These underlying strategies are consistent with the goals of Muslim Brotherhood ideologues, who have historically found fertile ground in universities, political centers, and youth movements.

The recent episodes of antisemitism indicate that the radicalisation of receptive individuals is well underway. All of this suggests that increased security measures and surveillance of sensitive sites — such as synagogues, Jewish centers, and even non-Jewish places that may hold symbolic value for extremists or sleeper cells — should be accompanied by a counter-narrative exposing the alleged role of the Muslim Brotherhood in anti-Israel protests.

The U.S. State Department decision to designate Antifa and other far-left organisations as terrorist groups has been described as a step forward by some observers. However, this would also require the formal designation of organisations and movements linked to the Muslim Brotherhood as extremist. The objective should be to formally declare Hamas-linked entities incompatible with the values of the State and a threat to collective security, especially in a period marked by Islamist attacks and extremism elsewhere in Europe.

In recent years, Italian public debate has seen a rise in hostile expressions toward Israel, often presented as legitimate political criticism. Anti-Zionism—understood as opposition to the State of Israel as a political-state project—and antisemitism, which aims to delegitimise or demonise the Jewish community as such, appear to be inseparably linked. In various contexts, this dividing line is increasingly blurred: slogans, symbols, and narratives adopted in certain public demonstrations show a tendency to overlap judgments about the Israeli government with stigmatising representations of Jewish identity, fostering a climate of hostility that cannot be ignored.

*Photo by Mohamed elamine M'siouri, pixels.com*

At the same time, part of the security analysis reveals an additional element: the possibility that organisations or individuals linked to international extremist groups may attempt to allegedly channel funds to Hamas or insert themselves into street mobilisations characterised by a strong anti-Israel orientation. These last ones would be opportunistic attempts to exploit emotionally polarised contexts in order to amplify messages or recruit sympathisers—a phenomenon already observed in other parts of Europe. Potential infiltration should be regarded as a risk scenario that requires monitoring and analysis based on verified sources.

The boundary between freedom of protest, political criticism, and incitement to hatred is particularly delicate in an international context marked by strong tensions. The adoption of radicalised slogans, the use of ambiguous symbols, or the presence of narratives that justify violence against civilians—regardless of their nationality or affiliation—contribute to normalising forms of extremism that could take root in public debate. In this framework, Italy is not exempt from the risks affecting many European societies: the growth of polarising discourse can foster the marginalisation of Jewish communities and fuel hostility, with potential repercussions for social cohesion.

December 26, 2025 — No Comments

China-US Pause in Busan: Divorce in the Age of Supply Chains

By Carlotta Rinaudo - China & Asia Desk

The trade war between the United States and China increasingly resembles a failed divorce: expensive, chaotic, and ultimately impossible to finalize. Both sides threaten separation only to discover they are too deeply entangled to walk away: in October 2025 in Busan, the two unwilling partners found themselves forced back under the same marital roof. To make sense of this strange and dysfunctional relationship, over time many analysts have turned to an unexpected field: couple psychology.

Some analysts describe the relationship as a pragmatic partnership that dates back to the 1970s, forged out of necessity rather than mutual trust or alignment. The United States was burdened by the huge costs of the Vietnam War and a period of stagflation. Prices were rising, workers’ salaries were not, and consumption, the very engine of the American economy - was under threat. China, on the other side of the Pacific, was poor, isolated, and hungry for growth. The stage was set for what Zeno Leoni calls a “marriage of convenience”: two countries using one another as a quick fix for weaknesses they could not resolve alone. As Han Feizi puts it, it was an unlikely relation built on a clear imbalance: on one side, a weak country would work its way out of poverty, save aggressively, and lend money to a rich partner with a reckless spending habit – who would then use that money to buy even more of the poor country’s products. Strange as it sounded, the arrangement worked.

Walmart aisles quickly filled with low-cost clothes, toys, electronics, and household goods, contributing to affordable consumerism during a period of stagnant wages for many. Products that once felt like luxuries became accessible to most American families. For China, the benefits were just as tangible. American demand kept factories running, while millions of rural workers migrated to the coast in search of jobs that offered them a way out of poverty. Dollars flowed from US consumers to Chinese factories and then flowed back to Washington as purchases of US debt, allowing Americans to borrow and consume even more. As Stephen Roach said, China gave Americans a way to “repeal the basic laws of economics”: they could “live beyond their means, and that enabled the Chinese to do the same.”

Like many toxic relationships, however, this marriage of convenience also amplified each partner’s worst imbalances. In the United States, easy access to cheap imports deepened debt and hollowed out industrial towns like Martinsville, Virginia, where textile factories closed, jobs disappeared, and communities were left behind as production shifted overseas. In China, the costs were even more visible: rivers were polluted, air quality was deteriorated, and laborers were overworked. Also, like in human relationships, over time China’s behavior changed in ways that left the other feeling insecure. No longer a poor country desperate for jobs and dollars, China gradually became an industrial and technological powerhouse. With that rise came confidence, nationalism, and a growing desire to assert itself on the global stage. Also, China was no longer confined to filling Walmart aisles with cheap goods: now it began competing in advanced sectors once dominated by the US – from AI and telecommunications to robotics. For Washington, this shift in balance triggered something like an identity crisis, which brings us to the mutual resentment, finger-pointing, anxiety and suspicion we are seeing today. In human terms, this is often the stage that leads to separation, and the United States first attempted to follow that script. Washington began to openly speak of decoupling - a necessary “surgical strike” to reduce dependence on China, de-risk critical supply chains, and bring manufacturing jobs back home. US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick went so far as to imagine an “army” of workers assembling iPhones in the United States. The attempted separation reached its peak on what was called “Liberation Day”, when President Donald Trump imposed tariffs of up to 145% on Chinese products – to which China promptly responded.

Yet this tit-for-that soon revealed how separation between two economic giants can be messy, expensive, and ultimately self-defeating. Tariffs were not deployed like precision weapons, but more like land mines, harming almost everyone in their way. American workers and consumers – those the measures were meant to protect – quickly found themselves caught in the middle. Chinese-manufactured toys that once sold for $21.99 now cost $35, forcing long-standing toy storesin Manhattan to close. Farmers across the Midwest saw sales collapse as China restricted purchases of US soybeans. Nvidia, the crown jewel of American AI, lost billions of dollars in revenue due to restrictions on chip sales - money that could have been reinvested in domestic research. Even more, those same restrictions accelerated China’s push toward technological self-sufficiency.

The deeper lesson, however, goes beyond tariffs. In today’s interconnected supply chains, economic measures often have ripple effects, meaning that actions taken against a partner can have unintended consequences for both sides. Donald Trump often speaks of goods as if they were either “Made in China” or “Made in America,” yet while that worldview made sense in the industrial economy of the twentieth century, it does not make sense in the reality we live in today. In the age of container shipping and digital coordination, almost nothing is fully “made” in one place only: products are, more often than not, assembled from components sourced across multiple countries. Huawei - often depicted as the embodiment of “Made in China” – actually relies heavily on US firms such as Qualcomm and Broadcom for some of its components, and for years its operating system was Google’s Android. This means that sanctions aimed at Huawei inevitably end up harming US companies too. Such is the power of the supply chain in the 21^st century.

Rare earths offer an even starker example of how US attempts to project strength can expose new vulnerabilities at home. China controls much of the global supply chain of these critical materials, essential for everything from electric vehicles to advanced weapon systems. When Beijing restricted exports in retaliation for US tariffs, the consequences were immediate. To mention one, Ford shut down a factory in Chicago after it was unable to secure the rare earths needed for electric motors. Research showed that it would take eight to twelve years to rebuilding domestic refining capacity of these materials – if Americans would be willing to shoulder the dirty business of rare earth refining itself. Looking at Baotoutoday, a dry town in China’s Inner Mongolia, it is clear that reshoring production would mean accepting environmental costs that Americans have long outsourced to China. In Baotou, decades of processing have poisoned groundwater and produced a “cancer epidemic” throughout what they are now known as “cancer villages.”

In October 2025, President Trump and President Xi Jinping met in Busan. The meeting felt less like a resolution and more like a tacit recognition of limits. Leading a slowing economy, Xi urged Trump to learn from the recent “twists and turns” of the trade war. On his side, Trump agreed to cut tariffs to 47% and called a “ceasefire” on further escalation. Beijing, in turn, suspended restrictions on rare earth exports for one year. It was, overall, a pause that restored a fragile status quo while leaving the underlying tensions intact. Yet the Busan meeting made one reality impossible to ignore. Over decades, the US and China built production systems projected to function together – one side designing, consuming, and spending; the other manufacturing, assembling, and absorbing the environmental cost. That same structure is now dictating the terms of the relationship for both partners. In a supply-chain world, even an unhappy and suffocating marriage can be cheaper to endure than to escape. And for two unwilling partners forced together by necessity rather than affection, learning how to live together may eventually prove easier than walking away.

December 25, 2025 — No Comments

The Rise of Southeast Asia as a Global Manufacturing Hub

By Dejvi Dedaj - South East Asia and Oceania Desk

Introduction

Southeast Asia, once regarded as a periphery to the global manufacturing systems, has quickly become a core centre of the world production. Geopolitical tensions, in particular the U.S.-China trade war, increased labour costs in China, and the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic have made multinational companies reconsider their supply chains, moving production to new ASEAN economies like Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia.

This change is not just a geographic change, but a structural change in the global economy. The integration of the region into international supply chains has been enhanced by competitive labour markets, improved infrastructure and extensive trade agreements such as Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which have increased resilience and efficiency. Meanwhile, the growing financial ecosystem of Southeast Asia, including advanced capital markets, green and infrastructure financing, facilitates industrial development and innovation. But the emergence of the region is not without problems. The complex environment companies and governments have to operate in to maintain long-term growth is indicated by infrastructure gaps, human capital constraints, and geopolitical uncertainties.

The Forces Behind the Shift

The shift of the global manufacturing to Southeast Asia is due to several convergent forces. The post-2018 global trade environment has become characterized by geopolitical diversification, which has changed the way multinational companies organize their supply chains. The escalation of tariffs and the growing political tension between the United States and China posed greater uncertainty to the companies that had a high concentration of production in one country. The trade barriers, regulatory uncertainty, and the threat of disruption of supply at any time made companies rethink the stability of their current networks. Companies have responded by diversifying production in more than one country to minimize exposure to geopolitical shocks and safeguard the continuity of their operations. Their strategic location in Asia, comparatively open trade policies and integration into regional trade agreements have made neighbouring economies like Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia attractive alternatives. This change is indicative of a larger trend in the global supply chain strategy, where risk reduction and operational flexibility are now as important as cost efficiency in investment and production decisions.

The COVID-19 pandemic further supported the urgency of this diversification strategy. The crisis demonstrated the fragility of over-centralised supply chains and the strategic need of flexible, geographically dispersed production networks. Businesses realised that dependence on one nation, even as productive as China, could bring the world to a standstill. As a result, the geopolitical tensions and the vulnerabilities caused by the pandemic increased the pace of investment in ASEAN economies, as companies tried to establish resilient, diversified, and regionally balanced supply chains.

Moreover, Increasing labour expenses in China have emerged as one of the major reasons that have led to the outsourcing of manufacturing to Southeast Asia. In the last ten years, the wages in the manufacturing centres in China have gone up significantly making the country less competitive in terms of cost in labour intensive industries. Conversely, other Southeast Asian nations such as Vietnam and Indonesia are still providing relatively lower labour costsand thus are viable alternatives to industries such as textiles, electronics assembly and consumer goods. As a result, multinational companies that wish to remain cost effective and at the same time remain near the established supply chains are increasingly shifting production to Southeast Asia where an emerging industrial base is supplemented by favourable labour conditions.

Figure 1: Evolution of China’s Average Wages

Lastly, bilateral free trade agreements and the RCEP have greatly strengthened the regional supply chain connectivity in the Asia-Pacific. RCEP, which encompasses approximately 30 percent of the world GDP, enables the smooth flow of intermediate goods and investment among member economies by harmonising trade rules and reducing tariffs. This structure allows the multinational companies to spread the production to multiple countries in Asia without losing preferential access to the market, which makes it more resilient to geopolitical or pandemic-related shocks. The bilateral agreements like the Japan-Thailand EPA and the Indonesia-Korea CEPA are also complementary and enhance market integration and investment opportunities. Collectively, these institutional arrangements support the transition of the region to interdependent and elastic supply chains.

Financial and Economic Implications

The economic consequences of the manufacturing transformation in Southeast Asia go way beyond the relocation of industries, they are an indication of the new financial geography. Although foreign direct investment (FDI) has declined globally, ASEAN has registered its third year of consecutive growth in the region, while its stock increased by 56% since 2014, reaching $3.9 trillion. The major forces were the increased investors’ interest in finance, renewable energy, electric vehicles (EVs), and the reorganization of the supply chain. Financial sector was the largest inflow, which rose to $92 billion, and R&D activities were increasing rapidly, primarily in Singapore. Even though manufacturing FDI fell a little, it was still significant, representing 66% of all greenfield investments, indicating that ASEAN is still a manufacturing and innovation centre in the world.

Figure 2: Global FDI Flows, 2021–2023 (Billions of US Dollars and Year-on-Year % Change)

Figure 3: ASEAN FDI Flows, 2021–2023 (Billions of US Dollars and Year-on-Year % Change)

Source: UNCTAD (2024)

These changes are not just operational but reflect more fundamental financial rebalances that have been the basis of the rise of Southeast Asia as a manufacturing centre in the world. The capital markets in the region are also getting more sophisticated, which allows domestic companies to have a wider range of financing options and become more integrated into the global supply chains. The swift increase in green and sustainability bond issuance, including Singapore which leads the ASEAN’s US$7.8 billion green bond market and Vietnam reaching $1.5 billion in 2021, is an example of the growing financial infrastructure that facilitates industrial growth. The fact that Singapore is a regional financial centre also supports the cross-border trade finance and green financing programs, and other countries such as Malaysia and Thailand are also enhancing domestic markets to fund corporate investment. These financial innovations offer the required liquidity, sustainability orientation and capital depth to maintain the industrial and supply chain transformation in the region.

Financing of infrastructure is also very important in maintaining the growth of manufacturing in the Southeast Asia. TheADB and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are development institutions that have increased investments in logistics and energy infrastructure, which has facilitated the industrial transformation of the region. In 2015-2023, ADB and AIIB together invested billions of dollars in transport, power, and connectivity projects in ASEAN. The modernization of the deep-water ports in Vietnam, trans-island logistics corridors in Indonesia and the Eastern Economic Corridor in Thailand are increasing production capacity and intra-regional trade. Such projects do not only improve physical connectivity, but also bring in private capital in the form of public-private partnerships, which forms a basis of long-term supply chain resilience.

The transformation further extends into digital financial systems. Local payment systems are being integrated through regional payment linkages, e.g. the cooperation between Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia to enable quicker, less expensive and more secure cross-border payments. These links lower the transaction costs and contribute to the increase of financial inclusion, particularly among micro, small, and medium enterprises. This financial digitalisation increases the efficiency of trade and is a strong complement to the physical integration which has been attained through diversification of the supply chain.

Difficulties and Structural Constraints

In spite of such achievements, the development of Southeast Asia as a global manufacturing hub is associated with a number of structural issues that may jeopardize its sustainability in the long run. Among the most urgent problems, infrastructure gaps are still present. Although developed economies like Singapore and Malaysia have advanced their global logistics, port, and digital networks, others, especially in the Mekong subregion, such as Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, are still grappling with poor transport, energy, and digital infrastructure. According to the estimates of the ADB, ASEAN needs more than $2.8 trillion of infrastructure investment between 2023 and 2030 to address the projected economic and population growth. Persistent gaps in connectivity increase transit times, raise shipping and energy costs, and fragment supply chains that rely on just-in-time production. In addition, the disparity in the quality of infrastructure between the coastal and the inland regions restricts the possibility of industrial diversification outside of the major urban centres, which results in development imbalances that inhibit inclusive growth.

The lack of human capital and skills also limits the long-term competitiveness of the region. With the global manufacturing shifting to more high-value, technology-intensive manufacturing, Southeast Asia is experiencing a shortage of skilled engineers, data specialists, and technicians. Whereas other economies such as Singapore and Malaysia have invested a lot in technical education and research and development, others are lagging behind, with the vocational training systems being out of sync with industry requirements. World Bank and ADB reports indicate that a large percentage of the ASEAN workforce will need to be reskilled by 2030 to meet Industry 4.0 technologies, especially in digital, technical, and high-value manufacturing jobs. In the absence of strategic investments in education, STEM programmes, and workforce mobility, most countries will continue to be reliant on low-cost, labour-intensive production, instead of moving towards innovation-based growth.

Lastly, the geopolitical uncertainty is looming large over the rise of Southeast Asia. The same dynamics that have driven its expansion, U.S.-China competition and the global drive towards supply chain diversification, are also the ones that put it at risk of volatility. The trade restrictions, technological decoupling, or regional tensions in the South China Sea could disrupt production networks and deter foreign investment. The strategic neutrality of ASEAN and the enhancement of its collective voice in the multilateral forums will be critical to the stability and investor confidence. The effects of global fragmentation can be reduced through initiatives that strengthen transparency, supply chain security, and financial resilience.

Conclusion

The rise of Southeast Asia as a manufacturing hub in the world is an indication of a strategic repositioning of production, finance, and innovation. The geopolitical tensions, increasing costs in China, and vulnerability to the pandemic have increased the pace of investment in the region, whereas trade agreements, infrastructure, and financial development contribute to the growth. However, there are still obstacles, such as skill shortages and infrastructure differences, and geopolitical risks. The long-term success will involve aligned policies, strong supply chains, and human and physical capital investments.

December 11, 2025 — No Comments

The U.S. pressure and the Venezuela–Colombia Connection

By Giovanni Giacalone - Central and South America Desk

On October 24, 2025, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the President of Colombia Gustavo Petro, his wife, his son, and Petro’s close associate, Armando Benedetti, over accusations of involvement in the global drug trade.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said in a statement. “Petro has allowed drug cartels to flourish and refused to stop this activity…President Trump is taking strong action to protect our nation and make clear that we will not tolerate the trafficking of drugs into our nation.”

Following the sanctions announcement, Petro named an attorney and stated that he will battle the measure taken by Washington. The Colombian President also praised his approach to countering narcotics: “Combating drug trafficking effectively for decades brings me this measure from the government of the society we helped so much to stop its use of cocaine…Quite a paradox, but not one step back and never on our knees.”

In September, the United States added Colombia to a list of countries failing to cooperate in the war on drugs, for the first time since the Pablo Escobar era.

Gustavo Petro, a former far-left guerrilla leader, claims that his counter-narcotics policy is utilizing a non-repressive approach that prioritises reaching agreements with coca leaf farmers in order to convince them to cultivate other types of crops while, at the same time, using law enforcement to hunt down drug dealers.

However, according to UN data from the Office on Drugs and Crime, the amount of land dedicated to coca cultivation has almost tripled in the past decade to a record 253,000 hectares (625,000 acres) in 2023. Colombia provides around 90% of the cocaine that is sold every year in the U.S.

The Cartel de los Soles

While the Colombian President is accused of failing to cooperate in the drug war, with Colombia being the primary cocaine provider, Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro and his close associates are accused by the U.S. of leading the drug distribution network through the Cartel de los Soles, transporting the merchandise to Mexico, the final distributor.

In July 2025, the US Treasury Department sanctioned Maduro (indicated as the leader of the Cartel), Venezuelan Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez, and Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello Rondon. Other senior regime figures had already been blacklisted in 2020. President Trump has also placed a bounty on Maduro’s head, offering $US50 million for information leading to his arrest.

A drug trafficking organisation formed by high-ranking members of the Venezuelan state and armed forces, the Cartel de los Soles emerged in 1993, when two National Guard generals were investigated for drug trafficking. As brigade commanders, they wore a sun as their insignia, hence the name "Cartel de los Soles." Initially, the group was called "Grupo Fenix," and consisted primarily of majors, colonels, and lower-ranking military personnel. Over time, however, senior officers began to enter the fray, taking control of the trafficking ring and eliminating the lower ranks. The Cartel de los Soles was designated by the Trump administration as a “Foreign Terrorist Organisation” in November 2025.

The weak Petro-Maduro political alliance

In August 2025, after the sanctions imposed by Washington on Maduro and his associates, Colombian President Gustavo Petro expressed his support for the Venezuelan leader, claiming that “Colombia and Venezuela are the same people, the same flag, the same history” and that “any military operation that is not approved by our sister countries is an aggression against Latin America and the Caribbean.” Petro also referred to Simon Bolivar’s call “freedom or death,” further revealing his attempt to bring Colombia closer to Venezuela.

Since being elected president of Colombia in August 2022, Gustavo Petro has gradually sought to distance the country from Western alliances and position himself alongside Maduro and the Bolivarian Alliance. This shift is unsurprising given his past as a member of the M-19, a far-left armed group founded in the 1970s and inspired by the Uruguayan Tupamaros and the Argentine Montoneros. At its height in the mid-1980s, the M-19 was the second largest armed group in Colombia, after the FARC, with the number of active members estimated at between 1,500 and 2,000. The M-19 demobilised in the late 1980s and transitioned to electoral politics.

Former Colombian Defense Minister Juan Carlos Pinzon recently urged the U.S Presidency not to cut off all counter-narcotics aid to Colombia and hike tariffs, because this would affect the Colombian population as well as the military and law enforcement still operating on the frontline against narco-terrorism.

Pinzon instead suggested implementing sanctions against specific individuals who work in support of drug trafficking. This was done a few days later with the sanctions against Petro.

Pinzon was correct in that the situations in Colombia and Venezuela are extremely different and cannot be addressed with the same approach.

Venezuela has been a Bolivarian stronghold for decades, first under Chávez and then under Maduro. U.S. authorities contend that Venezuela has taken on a larger role in regional drug trafficking and has strengthened its ties with Iran, developments that have contributing to instability in the region. Under Maduro, Hezbollah's presence has proliferated in the country, becoming the main launching pad for drug trafficking to the United States.

Colombia, for its part, has always been a staunch ally of Washington, both in the fight against drug trafficking and against terrorism. The Colombian armed forces are trained by the United States and have been working together since the war against the Medellín and Cali cartels in the 1990s.

In 2022, Gustavo Petro was elected president, but despite his efforts, he was unable to separate the country's institutions from Washington. It's no coincidence that during the recent attempted attack by far-left protesters on the US Embassy in Bogotá, Petro had no choice but to deploy riot police to repel the attack, drawing criticism from his own supporters.

Critics argue that Petro’s government could face increasing internal challenges, and sanctions will certainly help. As for Maduro, however, some debate whether increased U.S. engagement may be required in the future, assuming Trump doesn't change his mind at the last minute.

Rising Tensions in the Region

The United States has deployed a massive military force of approximately 10,000 U.S. soldiers, most of them at bases in Puerto Rico, but also a contingent of Marines on amphibious assault ships, as well as F-35 fighters, MQ-9 Reaper drones, eight warships, and a submarine.

US navy ships and aircrafts have been sighted just a few hundreds of miles off the coast of Venezuela, while the US has been conducting raids against more narco-speed boats leaving the coasts of Colombia and Venezuela.

Moreover, the US Navy announced the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford, America’s largest warship, had arrived in the US Southern Command area of operations after US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered the Ford to head to the Caribbean from Europe in late October.

On the other side, this past week, Venezuela has announced a large-scale mobilisation of troops, weapons, and equipment in response to what it calls a growing U.S. military presence in the Caribbean Sea. Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez said land, air, naval, and reserve forces will conduct exercises through Wednesday, describing the operation as a response to what he termed the “imperialist threat” posed by the United States. The maneuvers will also include participation from the Bolivarian militia, a civilian reserve force aligned with the Maduro regime.

Whether all this mobilisation by the US serves merely to pressure the leader to resign peacefully or is instead instrumental in a regime change operation is another matter.

A full-scale U.S. invasion akin to the 1989 operation in Panama is highly improbable given Venezuela’s circumstances. The country’s vast size and complex geography, characterised by mountainous regions and dense jungle, provide ideal conditions for prolonged guerrilla warfare. Moreover, Venezuela’s armed forces are significantly more organised and capable than Panama’s were at the time. In addition, the Trump administration has shown little inclination to initiate new military conflicts.

A more plausible scenario for U.S. involvement might involve indirect support for a domestic uprising against the current regime, potentially through covert operations led by the Central Intelligence Agency, which may or may not already be active within Venezuelan territory.

December 10, 2025 — No Comments

The growing issues of violence against women in the cyber domain

By Maria Makurat - Human Rights Desk

Introduction

This year the 16 days of activism end gender-based violence last from the 25^th of November to the 10^th of December 2025. Especially this year, the call to end specifically violence against women in the cyber domain is a strong focus. The cyber domain is proving to cause many challenges and hurdles for issues in the areas of women’s rights, human trafficking, child pornography, international conflicts and many more. Australia for instance has taken the big step of banning social media for youth under the age of 16. The UN and other associated organisations have raised the alarm that the online violence which includes for example deepfakes, sextortion, stalking and bullying against women to name a few are increasing. Furthermore, the World Health Organisation (WHO) has released its landmark report, stating “Nearly 1 in 3 women – estimated 840 million globally – have experienced partner or sexual violence during their lifetime, a figure that has barely changed since 2000.” It is essential to continue collecting the data in order to keep track of trends and where to exactly tackle the issues however as is also pointed out, the danger lies in cutting funds and support for such research when “(…) just as when humanitarian emergencies, technological shifts, and rising socio-economic inequality are further increasing risks for millions of women and girls.”

The data is essential when one also thinks about what methods and schools of thought can be applied from international relations in order to analyse these trends. Many factors play a role when tackling this issue such as international conflicts, socio-economic factors and political aspects. How are schools of thought such as realism, constructivism, feminism and liberalism placed? Is there a connection? This article aims to analyse this and suggest possible future questions that need to be asked.

Schools of thought surrounding gender and international relations

In International relations as well as international affairs once has the main theoretical pillars: realism, liberalism and constructivism. These have been shaping the debates, dialogue and analytical methods of scholars in international relations. Feminist scholars have emerged around 1980-1990s by key figures such as Judith Ann Tickner, Cynthia Enloe, Cynthia Cockburn and V. Spike Peterson. Since then, a lot of debate has happened and there seems to be room for more to come.

As early as 2009, scholars have been addressing the issue of cyber and women’s rights such as Gurumurthy and Menon publishing in Economic and Political Weekly already addressing “Violence against Women via Cyberspace".^[1] For this work and analysis they focus on the impact of the economy and IT sector on women’s safety by using a neo-liberalism view shifting the focus strongly towards the institutions and the factors of interdependence. Taking a neo-liberalism view into account when tackling violence against women in the cyber domain would mean that the violence should be reduced since we are all depending on said technology and would be problematic to sabotage it through using it as a medium of violence however, as one can see, the development of violence is still taking place despite the factor of having benefits. Perhaps by applying Keohane’s theory of monitoring, as we see with the banning of social media for youth and making deepfakes as a medium of violence illegal, one could consider analysing violence in the cyber domain from this point of view but that of course leaves room for debate.

Traditional Kenneth Waltz and other scholars are of course the foundation for the international relations and international affairs field and remain fundamental when conducting analysis. However, quite recently in the past years a shift brings about new debates on which theories and schools of thought are appropriate in the using gender in international relations which should then also be applied to addressing the issue if violence against women in the cyber domain. Prügl for instance critically asses the landscape of international relations theories pointing out that: “Waltz suggests that treating gender as a cause of war would be reductionist because it pertains to the individual level of analysis”^[2] On the one hand this makes sense when considering a connection between violence against women in the cyber domain and for instance current international conflicts since one wants to focus on the states however, considering the individual is also of importance since the violence is linked to the gender and is proven to continue to be so when looking at the mentioned reports by the UN. Prügl also points out that sociological theories in combination with constructivism provide a bridge to feminist theorizing. This would also speak for an interdisciplinary approach when tackling the issue of violence against women and especially when we consider the cyber domain since one has to combine several theories to tackle the combined matter of states, organisations, individuals, social structures and international conflicts which all play a role with violence in the cyber domain.

*Photo by SCARECROW artworks on Unsplash*

Sjoberg for instance points out that one cannot simply identify positivists and non-positivists when tackling gender in international relation scholarship.^[3] Furthermore, Sjoberg suggests the notion that gender and international relations is “at it’s best when its and IR research is at its best when it is multimethod, epistemologically pluralist, multisited, and carefully navigates the differences between feminist analyses and large-n statistical studies.”^[4] As the changing landscape of war and violence is moving at a rapid pace, scholars of international relations are almost ‘driven’ to adapt also in terms of analysing and interpreting the data. When thinking about future questions, it is beneficial to have multiple methods and keeping the different schools of thought in mind when tackling the fast-changing landscape of violence in the cyber domain however, one should also strive for a comprehensive data collection and analysis in order to make thorough conclusions. The definitions of for example violence, should be clear for all disciplines and scholars in order to be able to draw overlapping conclusions when taking different schools of thought into account.

Conclusion and what are possible future questions

The issue of violence against women physically and other forms of cyber related conflicts should not be treated as separate incidents. It may be too early to say but there seems to be a correlation between cyber related incidents and international world conflict when one sees for instance South Africa facing the “highest levels of gender-based violence” and in Arab states (such as Yemen, Lebanon, Jordan) about 60% of women face online violence.

An interdisciplinary approach by using quantitative as well as qualitative methods (which would speak for a mix of positivist and non-positivist school of thought) allows one to combine several ways in order to tackle issues such as cyber violence and extortion against women (see for instance “Image-Based Sexual Base” research by Nicola Henry et al.)

Therefore, applying international relations theories such as constructivism and feminist theories whilst of course taking the traditional way of thinking of Waltz and Clausewitz into consideration may be of use. The multi-method approach is beneficial and should be used however, with certain caution as well. “Inspired by “gender lenses”, feminist research knows security differently both in terms of where knowledge is to be found (particularly at global politics’ margins, and with/in people), what counts as knowledge (including emotion, experience, and pain), and where knowledge can be found (particularly in nontraditional formats and sources).”^[5] Also scholars in the area of international human law are advocating for a feminist approach and speak of “gendering cyberwarfare”.

As international conflicts are changing rapidly, speak hybrid warfare and drone incidents, states are forced to constantly adapt. The same goes for dealing with cyber related conflicts and cyber violence. When looking at women, peace and security, it is well documented that ‘rape’ and ‘violence’ against women is used as a weapon of war Perhaps one should be wary and be careful that the same will not develop in the cyber domain. One already sees an increase of women stepping back being afraid to be a target (especially those working in the public sector). Therefore, one can see great benefit in continuing the debate amongst scholars on how schools of thought can be applied, and which methodologies seem to be fitting.

By continuing to ask questions and finding new ways to analyse the growing issue of violence against women (in the cyber domain) one can then also find possible solutions on how to achieve the end of violence against women. As can be seen from previous debates, scholars on international relations seem to be a bit ‘divided’ on how to implement feminist theories into the present-day international relations field. When looking at the developing issues of cyber-sex trafficking, cyber violence, grooming in the cyber domain, deepfakes, cyber espionage to name a few problems, it seems to be the case that using several methodologies and combining different theoretical ways of thinking are for now ‘the way to go’.

^[1] GURUMURTHY, ANITA, and NIVEDITHA MENON. “Violence against Women via Cyberspace.” Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 44, no. 40, 2009, pp. 19–21. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25663650. Accessed 27 Nov. 2025.

^[2] Prügl, Elisabeth, “Gender as a cause of conflict,” International Affairs 99: 5 (2023) 1885–1902; doi: 10.1093/ia/iiad184

^[3] Reevaluating Gender and IR Scholarship

Author(s): Laura Sjoberg, Kelly Kadera and Cameron G. Thies

Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution , April 2018, Vol. 62, No. 4 (April 2018), pp. 848-870

^[4] Reevaluating Gender and IR Scholarship

Author(s): Laura Sjoberg, Kelly Kadera and Cameron G. Thies

Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution , April 2018, Vol. 62, No. 4 (April 2018), pp. 848-870

^[5] Laura Sjoberg (2024) Feminist Theories and Thinking Security Otherwise, Security Studies, 33:5, 860-884, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2024.2449334, page 874

November 27, 2025 — No Comments

Protecting intangible Cultural Heritage: legal gaps and risks of mass violence

By Joseph Moses - Culture, Society & Security Desk

Introduction

The term “dehumanization”, although popular in the political lexicon, is notorious for often generating debate on its usage, rather than addressing the incidents and crimes it is supposed to aggregate and label. As it lacks a legal and fixed definition under international law, it means that a consensus can be drawn about attention to the subject only when sufficient political momentum is built up, or, in retrospect, when these activities lead to crimes labelled under international criminal law, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and/or genocide.

While this article will address the relatively abstract, intangible and subjective natures of this term, it will focus more on the challenges that the implementation of international law faces regarding the destruction of intangible cultural heritage (ICH). This destruction leads to the dehumanization of certain demographic groups, placing them under the risk of ethnic cleansing and, potentially, crimes addressed under international criminal law. ICH broadly consists of customs, beliefs, traditions, languages and cultural expressions. In the investigation and proceedings related to an ongoing or past genocide, destructing of ICH (and advocating for the latter) can be covered by the clause of intent in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. Dehumanization precedes Genocide, and this often involves a long process of de-legitimization, condemnation and destruction of the targeted social group’s ICH as part of their dehumanization.

International frameworks and risk factors

The United Nations, in 2014, launched its Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes which is a tool outlining 14 risk factors to observe and analyze the risk of atrocity crimes and their preceding symptoms. While the Framework specifies that in the initial stages it is not always possible to identify the trajectory of trends into crimes, it divides risk factors into “specific risk factors” which outline precursors to specific crimes using their legal definitions. Under the subcategories of Genocide (Risk Factor 10) and War Crimes (Risk Factor 13), it outlines in detail the application of dehumanisation trends against groups of people.

Sub-factors 10.3, 10.5 and 10.7 specify targeted systemic discriminatory practices against the lives and freedoms of a protected group, even if not reaching the level of elimination. They address the usage of methods intended to dehumanize, humiliate, or coerce and fragment the group with an intention to change the group’s identity, and declaring euphoria at the control of protected groups.

In the context of an armed conflict, sub-factors 13.4, 13.5, and 13.6 specify the promotion of ethnicity or religion as a determinant of national allegiance, the dehumanization of particular groups by exhibiting disrespect for their traditions, values, objects and institutions, and the adoption of measures that curtail the rights of protected groups who are perceived to be aligned to a hostile group.

Legal gaps and challenges in protecting intangible Cultural Heritage

It must be noted that to provide cover for discriminatory policies of exerting control over a group, states and hostile actors may also indefinitely extend the status of armed occupation or armed conflict by declaring security measures. The tool acknowledges that the intention behind these actions can often be calculated with certainty only in retrospect and that even those indicators may not be explicit. It highlights that even if uncertain, the intent to annihilate could always exist. It must be noted that while genocide and ethnic cleansing are not spontaneous acts, case law has associated intent with State or organizational policy.

The destruction and de-legitimization of ICH can take place during either peace time, periods of curfew, or active conflicts. Due to this state of definitional limbo, policies emphasizing security reasons for freedom restrictions pose a significant threat against the identity of certain groups of people, especially when they affect practices like gatherings. Re-shaping educational policy after specific narratives under the guise of de-radicalization, beyond directly targeting tangible cultural heritage as the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, describes that there is a deep-seated interdependence between ICH and tangible cultural and natural heritage, and that ICH is something that is constantly recreated and transmitted from generation to generation. Thus, beyond dehumanization, actions against ICH aim at also de-legitimizing ICH practices by breaking its continuity, hoping to expel or replace and reform the groups of people whose identity is tied to these practices.

Safeguarding cultural identity

It has been pointed out that the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict is not sufficient in addressing protections for ICH. Dr. Chainoglou, associate professor at the University of Macedonia, writes that the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, together with the norms of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and other international legal regimes, provides legal protection for intangible cultural heritage in all phases in the event of an armed conflict. While there are legal protections during times of armed conflict, the momentum and migratory flows from conflict zones cause complications to the actual protective capability and resources at the disposal of international regimes. This places a higher degree of onus on refugee diasporas or severely affected groups to rebuild and revive ICH (although ICH can still be continued by transforming its identity with derivations from the respective conflict itself), rather than on the aggressor upholding these protections.

While the dehumanization also contributes to deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of a group under Article II of the Genocide Convention of 1948, as precursors are often social and political and can be intentional or unintentional in their nature and conception, determining intent to commit genocide can be the most ambiguous at this stage. This further complicates the interpretation and enforcement of international law if the aggressor (State) uses the turbulence caused by declared security and reform policies, i.e., under domestically legal and bureaucratic procedures that adversely affect a group’s ICH, especially when intended to do so. The 2003 UNESCO Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage provides a broad interpretation of “cultural heritage” but still places the onus of the protection of cultural heritage on the State against their intentional destruction. The 2003 Declaration also consolidates peacetime protections for [intangible] cultural heritage and the responsibilities of States across the entirety of international cultural heritage law applicable during peacetime. While Article VI of the Declaration covers State responsibility in the event of destruction of cultural heritage regardless of whether it is inscribed on a UNESCO or another international organization’s list, under international law, there is debate about the lack of explicitly lower thresholds of what constitutes heritage, especially when the affected and disenfranchised groups tend to have a more holistic approach to what is considered cultural heritage.

While it is no secret that the enforcement of international law is entirely subjective based on the enforcing State’s interest, the protections afforded to ICH face significant challenges during peacetime, especially if its targeting is constantly upheld through perceived innocuous policies citing higher priority agendas such as reform and security campaigns, regardless of intent – unless the intention is explicitly stated. While a trend can be drawn retrospectively, the high threshold for what constitutes ICH and what can and must be protected by States becomes an ambiguity which can be adjusted conveniently, especially when the affected groups have a lower threshold and a higher degree of holistic approach to what they consider their ICH and its destruction. This gradual and subtle wedging and fragmenting of customs and practices (while having multiple effects on the affected group’s identity) allows political precedent to be set to trigger further cascading motions of dehumanization and disassociation of identity from the group.

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