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July 22, 2024 — No Comments

Navigating Norway’s Arctic Frontier: Energy expansion vs. Environmental concerns

by Max Giordano - Arctic Team

Norway has awarded a record number of new petroleum exploration licences despite questions over the environmental risks and Oslo's commitments under the 2016 Paris Agreement. Of the 62 new permits, 29 are located in the North Sea, 25 in the Norwegian Sea and 8 in the environmentally sensitive Barents Sea region. Norway's Ministry of Energy issued grants on the Norwegian Continental Shelf to 24 energy companies, with Equinor ASA and Aker BP ASA holding the majority stake. This marks a 30% increase in total licences from the previous auction 2022. 

Understanding the broader consequences of expanded drilling activities in the Arctic is essential. Looking at the Barents Sea area will highlight how this affects the economy, the environment, and politics. This paper offers a nuanced understanding of the multifaceted factors surrounding Arctic drilling. 

Understanding Oslo's Arctic Policy:

Interpreting Norway's decision to award new exploration licences within the High North framework offers a deeper understanding of its connection and relevance to Norwegian Arctic policy. So perhaps it is in the fitness of things to recall the significance of this concept. High North, integral to Norwegian Arctic policy since the 80s, delineates the expansive Arctic territories Norway seeks to influence, spanning the southern boundary of Nordland County to the Barents and Pechora Seas. Politically, it reflects Norway's efforts to shape Arctic governance, engaging in collaborations through the Arctic Council, Barents Cooperation, and partnerships with the European Union under the Northern Dimension.

High North was fully implemented in 2003 when Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a department called nordområdene, followed by a strategy in 2006. It represents a concerted effort to position the region as a high-ranking priority, emphasising the significance of the Arctic to Norway. 

Norway's Arctic Energy Strategy: Balancing Resources, Demands, and Environmental Considerations.

Norwegian gas meets the annual household needs of 800 million people. It has become Europe's largest supplier, surpassing Russia in 2022 after the Ukraine invasion. This milestone is critical in discussing new exploration licences, underscoring Oslo's push to boost hydrocarbon access amid energy transitions. Securing low-carbon supplies could advance emission-free blue hydrogen from natural gas, with captured CO2. Discoveries are fundamental in meeting European needs and bolstering local economies. Consequently, there is a heightened focus on developing untapped Arctic resources.

The Government's Northern Area Strategy of 2006 highlights Action Point 3 of 22 points, aiming to "further develop [drilling] in the Barents Sea through an award[s] policy, [increasing exploration acreage and additional geological mapping]," establishing a framework for oil and gas developments in the Barents Sea. Moreover, a 2010 agreement between Norway and Russia on maritime borders unlocked new opportunities (Article 5, Annex II), effectively transforming the place into Norway's latest petroleum province.  

Estimated undiscovered resources in the Barents Sea are 2400 million standard cubic metres of oil equivalent (or 15 100 million barrels), with natural gas comprising 1120 billion standard cubic metres — an area of 1,300,000 square kilometres.

Compared to other exploration sites in the Arctic, the Barents Sea offers low production costs and quicker project start-up times, accelerating extraction and distribution processes to be market-ready. Minimal ice cover, calmer winds, shallow waters, and easy-to-reach resources, collectively reduce drilling costs to around NOK 200 million per well ($21,000,000).

Growing global demand for oil and gas, particularly in Asia — led by China and India — is expected to boost consumption. The IEA forecasts a 3.2 million barrels per day rise in oil demand from 2023 to 2030, driven by increased jet fuel usage and petrochemical feedstocks. Gas demand has also surged, underpinning the importance of secure, flexible energy sources. The IEA predicts a 2.3 per cent increase in natural gas demand in 2024.

Closing infrastructure gaps is crucial for supporting Barents Sea discoveries. Ports like Hammerfest, Honningsvåg, and Kirkenes are integral. However, more infrastructure is needed for better connectivity with distant fields. Logistical and geopolitical challenges pose risks to future developments, but population growth, industry, transportation, and the petrochemical sector necessitate hydrocarbon investments.

Photo by Bit Cloud on Unsplash

Critical Decisions in Arctic Development

Arctic projects require careful planning and smart decisions based on detailed assessments. The Barents Sea has unique geological challenges, like tectonic movements, Arctic weather patterns, and varied soil and rock layers. It encompasses five areas, including the Finnmark platform, the Bjarmeland platform, Nordkappbassenget, Tiddlybankbassenget, and Fedynsky Høgda.

Oil and gas exploration entails identifying suitable rock formations, pinpointing reservoirs to store hydrocarbons, and maintaining secure containment to prevent leaks. Factors like sea depth affect operations, with shallower reservoirs in Bjarmeland and Fedynsky Høgda being more favourable. 

Environmental groups oppose Arctic drilling due to risks to biodiversity, wildlife, and Indigenous communities. Arctic ecosystems are fragile, and accidents can have lasting effects. Indigenous peoples depend on Arctic resources for their traditions and health, making them vulnerable to disruptions caused by drilling. Despite Norway's introduction of regulations like the 2006 Barents Sea policy and the 1996 Petroleum Act, opinions vary on whether these sufficiently mitigate concerns. 

In November 2021, six activists, aged 20 to 27, and two environmental groups, Greenpeace Nordic and Young Friends of the Earth Norway, brought their concerns to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). They filed a case dubbed 'the People vs. Arctic Oil' to challenge Oslo's energy policies. They cite Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which protects the right to life and family, arguing that drilling could pollute ice sheets, accelerating melting. It is noteworthy that the ECHR requires applicants to be directly affected by alleged violations. Its decisions are legally binding on member states. Previously, three Norwegian courts dismissed the claims. In January 2022, the ECHR formally asked Oslo for counterarguments by April 2023. The case is pending a final verdict, with no significant developments reported since.

Oslo faced further headaches when the Sámi Parliament of Norway sued it for constructing a wind turbine farm on traditional Sámi lands. This action is part of Sámi efforts to defend their territorial rights and heritage, criticising renewable energy projects as green colonialism. Situated on the Fosen peninsula, the wind farm encroached on traditional Sámi reindeer herding territories. In 2021, Norway's Supreme Court ruled that the project violated Sámi rights under Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. An agreement was reached this year, 2024, allowing the wind farm to operate under conditions that protect Sámi culture. Provisions include allocating a percentage of generated energy to the Sámi community, designating new reindeer herding areas, and granting NOK 5 million ($473,000) to support Sámi traditions.

Conclusion

The Arctic's importance in both domestic and foreign policy cannot be understated. Drilling can strengthen local economies and secure energy for Europe, but it also disrupts a delicate ecosystem. On the one hand, the Norwegian government seeks to ensure energy supplies for itself and its now-reliant European partners at great financial profits. On the other hand, the distribution of new licences prompts environmental concerns. The environment versus energy security is an ongoing battle. The critical question remains: How will the Norwegian government balance these concerns without compromising their energy security?

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July 15, 2024 — No Comments

On the horns of a dilemma, again! China’s uncomfortable position in the Moscow-Pyongyang Cooperation

by Ho Ting (Bosco) Hung - Asia & China Team

While Russia continues its brutal invasion of Ukraine, its destabilising behaviour has spread further eastward to the Korean Peninsula. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea to seek continued military support, which is surprising since international travel has been rare for Putin since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War. During the trip, Putin signed a new comprehensive strategic partnership pact with Kim Jong-un. The new treaty has not only exacerbated the already high geopolitical instability in the world, but it has also worsened China’s diplomatic dilemma. Despite having some ups and downs in its relations with North Korea, China is ultimately a formal ally of North Korea. With the new treaty, China appears to be increasingly drawn to the whirlpool of conflicts and tensions created by Russia and North Korea. 

As one of the most unpredictable and diplomatically disengaged governments in the world, North Korea has significantly increased its missile tests and applied an assertive rhetoric in the recent decade. Earlier this year, Kim announced a major policy shift towards South Korea, ruling out any possibility of peaceful reunification. Its military actions is further demonstrated by its active assistance for Russia, which is isolated by the West and is desperate for military support during the Russia-Ukraine War.

The signing of a strategic partnership pact is likely to bolster the ambitions of both Russia and North Korea, exacerbating chaos and tensions in Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia, respectively. This move signals to international community that neither country intends to yield to US hegemony. Instead, they prefer to remain diplomatically isolated, relying on their autocratic ally for support.

Although the signing of the new treaty is a bilateral move, China is unlikely to remain uninvolved due to its close relations with Russia and North Korea and the US's strong concern regarding developments on the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea’s destabilising behaviour has long been the US’s top foreign policy concern, especially because of its status as a nuclear power. Therefore, although the actual details of the pact have not yet been released, the expansion of the Russia-North Korean tie is likely to draw the US’s attention. Meanwhile, since China has a mutual defence agreement in the Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance first signed in 1961 with North Korea, in any case of conflict escalation, China could be dragged by its ‘friends’ into the saga and fall vulnerable to Western criticisms or retaliation. The ever-expanding ties between Russia and North Korea could also encourage the US and its allies to expand their presence in the Indo-Pacific region or give them a legitimate reason to do so, which will be unfavourable to Chinese interests.

Image by Tibor Janosi Mozes from Pixabay

This puts increasing pressure on China not to act in accordance with its friends’ interests, even if this may disappoint its Russian and North Korean friends. Admittedly, Russia and North Korea are China’s key allies in counteracting US influence and facilitating China’s revision of the international order. However, Russia is currently engaged in a conflict with Ukraine and facing international sanctions, while North Korea is notorious for its human rights infringement and its reluctance to denuclearise. In an environment with high geopolitical tension and the possibility of American countermeasures, it is advisable to distance itself from both countries to avoid any repercussions that could harm its international reputation and further drag down its economic growth. China’s reluctance to publicly support Russia’s invasion despite having a ‘no-limit’ partnership with Russia is a stark example reflecting such a mentality.

Meanwhile, as China’s economy is slowing down and the US is trying to strengthen its ties with Japan and South Korea, China has an increasing need to improve its relations with the two democratic nations. This is especially important in avoiding the creation of an Asian NATO or further advancing their military capabilities. As North Korea continues to challenge its two Northeast Asian neighbors, China's frustrations will likely increase. Consequently, China has a strong incentive to avoid being perceived as forming a contentious alliance with Russia and North Korea.

Nonetheless, as Japan and South Korea have witnessed China’s growing assertiveness and are developing strategic ties with the US, they will certainly be cautious about any Chinese proposals for cooperation or alleviating tensions. The US is also likely to impose pressure on Japan and South Korea not to side with China. In this sense, siding with North Korea or Russia and fixing ties with the Northeast Asian countries appear unfeasible and risky. Caught in a dilemma, China will find it hard to navigate the complex geopolitical landscape. 

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July 8, 2024 — No Comments

Cold Horizons: The Arctic’s Strategic Role Then and Now

by Isolde Sylvia Hatgis-Kessell - Arctic Desk

The Arctic region played a crucial role in the strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, with its unique geographical and environmental conditions shaping both military and scientific efforts. This article explores the Soviet Union's Arctic strategy, focusing on its dual purposes of showcasing military might and technological superiority; subsequently, it explores the significant changes in the region since the Cold War, namely climate change and increased Chinese involvement, and anticipates how these factors will influence Moscow’s current ambitions in the Arctic.

Overview of the Role of the Soviet Arctic Strategy 

During the Cold War, the Arctic acted as another arena for strategic competition between the United States and Russia, the importance of which was underscored by the unprecedented close proximity between the adversarial states. For the Soviet Union, the Arctic was a critical region as it possessed the “longest Arctic circumpolar coastline” and the largest population of Arctic inhabitants from one state. Moreover, Russia under both the Tsarist and Soviet systems, had a longer history of involvement in the region. 

The Russian Arctic served two key purposes for the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War; firstly, it was home to a significant portion of their advanced military equipment including the nuclear Northern Fleet. Secondly, the High North gave the Soviets a stage to exhibit their technological advancements and military might, a key competition during the Cold War.

However, the Arctic region remained underexplored and underutilised across various sectors due to harsh weather conditions; thus, the utility of the High North was closely tied to the advancement of technology which enabled effective exploration and greater understanding of the area.

A vital component of the Soviet’s Arctic strategy was the use of the region as a theatre to demonstrate scientific and military strength, directly playing into Cold War dynamics. A key example can be seen in the development and testing of the Tsar Bomb, commissioned by Nikita Gorbaschev in a bid to demonstrate Soviet strength. The thermonuclear bomb remains the most powerful nuclear weapon ever detonated; the test took place on the island of Novaya Zemlya inside the Soviet’s Arctic Territory. The Arctic arena became a frequent stage for projects that strengthened the Soviet’s Mutually Assured Destruction strategic doctrine. 

Scientific superiority underpinned by military objectives, an important characteristic of the Cold War, extended to the Arctic as well. The Soviets developed the Severny Polyus drifting research station in the Arctic; while the projects themselves were aimed at scientific goals, the information that they collected was used to help inform the military action and procurement. 

Ultimately, the Arctic provided the perfect theatre for the Soviets to prove their strength in both science and force and therefore cement their position on the international stage and against the United States. 

Key Changes Since the Cold War 

The Soviet’s strategy in the Arctic during the Cold War can serve as a good starting point to understand how Putin and the Russian Federation might use the region now, particularly as relations continue to deteriorate with the West. Nonetheless, three key changes must be considered in any analysis of the region. 

First and foremost are the effects of climate change which has increased sea levels, changed patterns of wildlife, and importantly melted a significant amount of the region's ice. Paradoxically, these devastating environmental consequences open up a breadth of new economic opportunities. As a result, interest in the region from the rest of the littoral Arctic states and beyond has increased drastically; this leads directly to the second defining shift, increased Chinese involvement. 

As the ice continues to melt, opening new possibilities for oil and gas exploration and increasing the feasibility of the Northern Sea Route, China’s interest in the Arctic has developed as well. Generally, Beijing has looked to Moscow for partnerships in the region which has alienated many of the other Arctic states. 

Lastly, all the Arctic countries are now members of NATO except for Russia; as the war rages on in Ukraine and tensions with the West deepen, this reality threatens Arctic exceptionalism which thus far has been dictated by cooperation overriding competition. 

Source - Photo by Bo Eide on Flickr - credits

Understanding Russia’s Current and Future Strategy in the Arctic 

Most recently, the 2023 Russian Foreign Policy Concept gave the international community new insight into Russia’s ambitions in the Arctic. With regards to the High North, the document highlights the importance of possible economic development in the region for the greater Russian economy including oil and gas exploration and the development of the Northern Sea Route. A noticeable change from the 2016 concept was the decision not to address any existing multilateral format such as the Arctic Council, and instead emphasise that partnerships with other nations, most likely with the other Arctic states, would be on a bilateral basis. 

Understanding Russia’s strategy in the high north through the prism of Soviet action in the Arctic indicates that Putin, with the help of the Chinese Communist Party, may use the Arctic as an arena to exert strength in the energy sector, shipping routes, and the military, possibly setting up a parallel system to Soviet times in which these aims become intrinsically linked. 

As the war in Ukraine continues, in turn highlighting the weakness of the Russian military and leadership, the Arctic can again serve as an easy arena to demonstrate strength. Novaya Zemlya remains a key test base for nuclear weapons including the unconfirmed 9M730 Burevestnik, a nuclear cruise missile. The war in Ukraine has emphasised that much of Russia’s military equipment is old and reserves of modern weapons are ultimately too small. Consequently, Moscow may attempt to reaffirm their military prowess by developing weapons for a harsh environment that NATO Arctic states lack. 

Another defining trait of the Ukraine war has been the West’s sanction regime and subsequent consequences for global energy markets. The decision not to purchase any oil from Russia has had serious, though not insurmountable, repercussions, particularly for European countries. As the potential for new energy resources opens up the Arctic, it is possible that Russia looks to establish a strong position in this development to maintain its foothold in international energy. 

Conclusion

The Soviet’s Arctic strategy throughout the Cold War was a critical component of their broader geopolitical and military objectives; the High North provided a strategic platform for the Soviet Union to demonstrate both scientific advancements and military prowess. As Russia continues to build up its presence in the Arctic, parallels to Soviet-era strategies, especially in energy and military domains, are increasingly likely, underscoring the region's ongoing importance for the U.S. and the Nordic countries as well as global power dynamics

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June 18, 2024 — No Comments

Jordan’s Balancing Act in the Israel-Hamas War: 

Since the outbreak of the war on October 7, Jordan has been caught between increasing external and internal pressures.

By Alice Elizabeth Strophair - Middle East Team

Escalating conflict and policy decisions 

In the midst of the Israel-Hamas war, the Middle East witnessed an unprecedented escalation in the ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran, when, on the night of April 13, the Islamic Republic launched a combined missile and drone attack on Israel. Some of  the projectiles were even intercepted above the Al-Aqsa mosque by Israel’s iron dome.  The attack saw the conflict take a new turn, with Iran attacking Israel directly, rather than through its proxies, such as Hamas or Hezbollah. The events of April 13 have also further challenged neighbouring Arab countries in balancing their political and economic ties with Israel, while showing their support for the Palestinian cause. One of these countries is Jordan, which has been a key regional actor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and now, more than ever, is caught between increasing external and internal pressures, both on the diplomatic as well as on the civilian front. The Hashemite Kingdom is walking a tightrope between its peace treaty with Israel, which emphasises its dependency on Israel for natural resources and security versus preventing “a breakdown in the social [contract]” between the population and the regime. King Abdallah II’s decision to join the international coalition MEAD (Middle East Air Defence), to prevent the use of Jordan’s airspace in the Israeli-Iranian conflict is meant, more than anything else, to prevent further escalation in violence, which would jeopardise Jordan’s security.  

The ongoing war in Gaza, “Iron Swords” 

Thirty years after Jordan signed the “Wadi Araba Treaty” (1994), with the expectation that the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinian Authority would be implemented, today’s situation must be a bitter disappointment for Jordan. The Hashemite Kingdom has been in favour of a two-state solution but has gradually seen the possibility of this solution decimate, especially since the establishment of the Israeli far right-wing government in late 2022. Since 1967, the unresolved question of East Jerusalem and its progressive annexation (Jerusalem Basic Law, 1980) by Israel has been a contentious point between both countries. The ongoing “Iron Swords” offensive led by Israel within the Gaza Strip has further deteriorated Israeli-Jordanian relations. On one occasion, two weeks after the beginning of the war during a peace summit that was held in Cairo, King Abdullah II denounced what he termed, “global silence about Israel’s attacks, [...] and urged an even-handed approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”  Even more so, Jordan fears that the displacement of Gaza’s residents to Egypt could set a precedent for a future displacement of Palestinians from the West Bank to Jordan. This fear is based on their concerns over the political agenda of Israel’s cabinet member Itamar Ben Gvir, who promotes the Eretz Yisrael Hashlema (Greater Israel) dream, declaring that “the people of Israel will settle in Gaza”. As a result, since the beginning of the war in Gaza, the West Bank has become a second front with a sharp increase in settler violence and further constraints on the Palestinian economy. These factors could lead to the possibility  of a third intifada and an economic migration from the West Bank to Jordan. These developments pose both a demographic and security threat to Jordan. The Kingdom already has a high population of Palestinians as a result of the 1948 and 1967 wars. A third wave of immigration could turn Jordan into a de facto Palestinian State, which, combined with the increased popularity of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in the West Bank, creates an actual threat to Jordan’s ability to control its borders and ensure internal security. 

Post-war scenarios are being considered, with the Arab Peace Initiative dating of 2002 re-emerging on the international stage as a potential solution. The American elections in November will also be decisive, as they will determine whether the future administration will prioritise a negotiated peace or adopt a stance more aligned with the current Israeli government, potentially altering its support for Jordan.

Photo de Hisham Zayadneh sur Unsplash

Jordan’s civil and military cooperation with Israel 

Jordan’s shortage of natural resources, namely water and gas, and the growing economic relationship it has with Israel, means it cannot cut its ties with the Jewish state, despite public demand.  In 2016, a fifteen-year deal was signed for Israel to supply it with gas, becoming the most important supplier for Jordan. In 2021, Jordan, being the second most water-poor country in the world, signed a memorandum of understanding with Israel and the UAE on a water project called the “Green and Blue Prosperity Agreement”. Within this agreement, Israel provides Jordan with desalinated water, the project financing coming from the UAE. However, these economic relations with Israel, like diplomatic ones, are not popular with the Jordanian public and protests demanding cutting ties and breaking deals with Israel. 

Jordan’s decision to join the MEAD alliance which includes the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, can be seen as an ideological convergence to counter a common enemy, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and to ensure stability across the region. Historical rivalries between Sunni and Shiite motivate the Arab states, providing Israel with leverage on the question of Palestine within the Middle East Cold War. King Abdullah II defended the decision to join the alliance, by arguing that it would help protect Jordan’s population and the country’s sovereignty. 

Conclusion

Jordan has demonstrated resilience when faced with previous escalations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, partly thanks to its diplomatic ties with the United States. The Hashemite kingdom is perceived by the West as a moderate actor that can help bring stability to the region. Nevertheless, King Abdullah II must be aware that his policymaking and commentary on the ongoing crisis in the Gaza Strip – as well as on  Benjamin Netanyahu’s and his right-nationalist coalition – will have consequences on his government's relationship with the Jordanian public. These past eight months of war could influence the upcoming parliamentary elections in Jordan, scheduled for next September. 

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June 17, 2024 — No Comments

The Spread of Weapons Among Civilians in Ukraine: Context, Impact, and Future Outlook

By Alexandra Tsarvulanova, Alessandro Macculi, and Arslan Sheikh - Human Security Team

Introduction

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has had a significant impact on the distribution and possession of weapons among civilians. The population now possesses a significantly higher number of firearms, according to data from the Small Arms Survey. Much of this growth can be attributed to the conflict, which has made self-defence tactics necessary and increased societal militarisation. A thorough examination of the historical background as well as the present data is necessary to determine the scope and consequences of this trend. 

Historical Context

According to estimates, Ukraine is considered to be home to a total of 4 to 5 million firearms, of which 2 to 3 million belong to the illicit sphere. The Maidan Square uprising and the subsequent outbreak of civil war in Donbass in 2014 dramatically exacerbated the spread of small arms and light weapons.

Among the sources of weapons of the first armed factions formed in the aftermath of the uprisings, the most relevant ones stem from the storage of weapons traditionally kept in households and military stocks of obsolete weapons. This phenomenon has much to do with the armed conflicts that plagued present-day Ukraine in the last century, as well as the Ukrainian SSR's function as a Soviet military stockpile. Moreover, vast arsenals were secured in the country following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe after the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact. This resulted in a disproportionate surplus following the downsizing of the Ukrainian Army.

Thus, the most crucial dynamic of arms proliferation after 2014 seems to be the leakage of weapons from state and civilian stockpiles.

Institutional and Legal Framework

It is necessary to note that Ukraine's legal framework for civilian firearm possession is notably underdeveloped and fragmented. Despite a substantial number of firearms in civilian hands, comprehensive national legislation regulating these arms is absent. Instead, firearm ownership is primarily governed by bylaws, specifically Order No. 622 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from 1998, which outlines conditions for the acquisition, storage, and use of firearms. The Constitution of Ukraine requires that ownership regimes be subject to parliamentary legislation, which this regulatory gap contravenes. 

Efforts to formalise firearm regulations have seen multiple drafts submitted to the Ukrainian Parliament over the years; the way to consensus has been long. Notably, Draft Law No. 5708, proposed in June 2021, aimed to establish a legal framework for civilian firearm ownership, including the creation of a Unified State Register of Civilian Firearms. This draft law sought to address issues such as the classification of firearms, the rights and responsibilities of firearm owners, and statutory limitations on certain types of weapons.  

The Ministry of Internal Affairs plays a pivotal role in firearm regulation and, amid the ongoing conflict, has adapted procedures to facilitate the issuance of arms to civilians participating in defence efforts. This adaptation underscores the urgent need for a comprehensive and updated legal framework to manage the proliferation and use of firearms among civilians effectively. On March 9, 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law providing for a wartime exemption for civilians to confront occupiers, allowing the use of several types of firearms for self-defence and for the protection of their property.  

 Picture 2. Potential Future Flow of Weapons 
(Source: Global Initiative, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Mark-Galeotti-and-Anna-Arutunyan-Peace-and-proliferation-The-Russo-Ukrainian-war-and-the-illegal-arms-trade-GI-TOC-March-2023.pdf) 

Impact of the War on the Spread of Weapons Among Civilians

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has significantly impacted the spread of weapons among civilians, exacerbating an already complex issue. Prior to the war, Ukraine had a notable number of both legal and illegal firearms in civilian hands. Even before the outbreak of the war, Ukraine was at the top of the list of European countries with the highest number of non-registered firearms in civilian use. The war has intensified this situation, as the government has taken steps to arm civilians to bolster defence efforts against Russian aggression. 

One immediate consequence has been the increased availability of firearms to the general population. With the invasion in 2022, the Ukrainian government began distributing weapons to civilians willing to join the defence efforts, leading to a surge in armed civilians. This was a necessary measure to ensure national defence, but it also raised concerns about long-term implications for public safety and order. The distribution of weapons has also resulted in a rise in the black market for arms. The urgency and scale of arming civilians have made it difficult to maintain strict and official control over weapon distribution, leading to leaks into illicit channels. This proliferation poses risks not only for immediate security but also for future crime rates and internal stability. Moreover, the increased weaponisation of the civilian population has heightened the potential for human rights abuses. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has highlighted the risks associated with increased civilian access to firearms, including heightened violence and insecurity. These issues underscore the need for robust mechanisms to monitor and regulate civilian-held arms to prevent misuse and ensure they do not contribute to further instability. 

To sum up, while the arming of civilians has been a critical component of Ukraine's defence strategy, it presents significant challenges that need to be addressed through comprehensive legal frameworks and effective control measures to mitigate long-term risks.

Possible Impacts on Crime Rates

Illegal firearms are increasingly involved in crime in both Ukraine and nearby Russian regions. According to the Ukrainian General Prosecutor’s Office, firearm-related offences in Ukraine surged from 720 in 2021 to 7,003 in 2022. In Russia, violent crimes involving firearms rose by 30% in the first ten months of 2022, with the Kursk and Belgorod regions, bordering Ukraine, seeing increases of 675% and 213%, respectively. Moscow saw a 203% rise in the same period.

Most illegal weapon flows in Ukraine are within the country, although some are exported through Odesa. Eastern Ukraine sees weapons diverted from military arsenals or brought back by soldiers. Larger deals involve crates of AK-74s, while smaller, opportunistic smuggling occurs via the personal belongings of injured soldiers.

Future illicit weapons transfers will likely follow established smuggling routes used for other contraband. The demobilisation of forces will create new routes, especially involving mercenaries and volunteers from the Western Balkans. These fighters may return with their weapons and establish transnational trafficking networks. An EU security official noted discussions among Ukrainian fighters about potential post-war illicit business ventures, indicating a complex and expansive future for illegal weapons flows from Ukraine.

Proliferation of Self-Defense Groups

A key feature of the conflict in Ukraine is the proliferation of territorial self-defence groups following the progressive deterioration of the Ukrainian security apparatus. As early as December 2013, Self Defence Forces (SDF) began to form in the context of the Maidan Square protests, supported by political movements opposed to former President Yanukovich. The SDF soon acted as a link between far-right groups and the protesters, contributing to the escalation by distributing weapons among civilians. Meanwhile, a parallel proliferation of self-defence groups took place in Donbass. Indeed, the intertwining of extreme right-wing and self-defence groups that emerged from Euromaidan triggered the creation of territorial defence forces in Donetsk and Luhansk in order to counter the perceived nationalist threat. 

Although the territorial self-defence groups were soon integrated into an institutional framework through the creation of state-sponsored territorial defence battalions and their incorporation into state forces, these groups retained considerable autonomy in the following years. Initially formed in a context of deep political crisis and coexisting with state security apparatuses, the battalions thus managed to gradually establish a monopoly on the use of force over territories.

The legitimisation of self-defence groups relies on their ability to step in where state security forces have faltered. As these groups gained influence and autonomy, they filled the void left by the breakdown of the state security apparatus. This process often involves seizing state arms stockpiles, which leads to the proliferation of weapons among civilians and group members. Therefore, there is a clear link between territorial control and the consolidation of authority, as well as between the latter and the ability to acquire arms.

Conclusions

In conclusion, the need for self-defence and societal militarisation have significantly increased civilian weapon possession during the conflict in Ukraine. This surge, alongside weak legal frameworks and the proliferation of self-defence groups, poses long-term risks for public safety, crime rates, and internal stability. Comprehensive regulation and effective control measures are urgently needed to mitigate these challenges.

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June 4, 2024 — No Comments

US Military Aid to Ukraine: A Pivotal Move Amid Ongoing Conflict and Global Implications

By Maida Pollinari - Russia Team

The war between Russia and Ukraine, now in its third year, continues to be intensely volatile and dynamic. Recent developments, particularly the approval of a significant US military aid package, mark a critical juncture in international support for Ukraine. This article delves into the US decision, its ripple effects across Europe, and the broader implications for all parties involved.

US Military Aid Package to Ukraine

On April 24, 2024, US President Joe Biden approved a substantial $61 billion aid package for Ukraine. This decision concluded prolonged and intense negotiations within the US Congress, characterised by a bipartisan struggle. Notably, Republican Mike Johnson, initially a staunch opponent, reversed his stance after a confidential briefing, citing the existential threat posed by an "axis of evil" comprising Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Iran. Johnson emphasised that supporting Ukraine was crucial to US national security and a testament to American leadership in defending democracy.

Strategic and Political Motivations

Analysts suggest that this aid package is not only a pragmatic political move but also a strategic necessity. The aid aims to stabilise Ukraine's frontlines, mitigating fears of a Russian breakthrough or Ukrainian collapse. This stabilisation is crucial as it sets the stage for potential Ukrainian offensives in the coming months. Furthermore, the timing of this aid is significant given the approaching US presidential elections. Prolonging the conflict could adversely affect former President Donald Trump's approval ratings, possibly benefiting Biden among undecided voters.

European Response

The US decision has resonated strongly across Europe, prompting several nations to announce their own aid packages. On April 23, 2024, during a visit to Warsaw, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak unveiled the UK's largest military aid package to date for Ukraine, worth £500 million. Sunak underscored the importance of defending Ukraine not just for regional security but for the entire European continent, warning that a victorious Putin would not halt at Poland's border.

Similarly, Sweden has committed 13 billion kronor ($1.23 billion) in military aid, marking the largest Scandinavian contribution. The Czech Republic has pledged to deliver at least 1.5 million artillery shells by year's end, part of a covert supply strategy involving unnamed countries, likely including some BRICS nations like India and South Africa.

Broader Implications and Russian Reaction

The widespread European support highlights a unified front against Russian offensive and a collective effort towards Ukraine's post-war reconstruction. However, the approval of the US aid package has not been well-received by Russia. Kremlin spokesman Dmitri Peskov condemned the decision, suggesting it would enrich the US at Ukraine's expense and result in further Ukrainian casualties. Former Russian President Dmitri Medvedev expressed hostility, wishing for internal US turmoil, while President Putin acknowledged the increased costs of Russia's military operations and committed to record war spending of 6% of GDP in 2024.

Economic and Military Considerations

Despite current economic stability, bolstered by domestic fiscal policies and import substitution, Russia's financial sustainability remains uncertain. Continued Western support is vital for Ukraine, especially given the critical timing of arms deliveries and their deployment on the battlefield. This window of delay provides the Russian military with opportunities to target Ukrainian infrastructure, particularly its energy sector. Moscow's propaganda leverages these delays to project Western disunity and ongoing internal US discord, which Russia finds reassuring.

Source: Image by Beverly Lussier from Pixabay

Future Outlook

The conflict's trajectory remains uncertain, with the upcoming US presidential elections poised to influence future dynamics and support for Ukraine. The sustained cohesion and determination of Western allies are essential for Ukraine's long-term resilience against Russian aggression. The new aid package from the US represents a pivotal moment, demonstrating substantial international support for Ukraine with profound implications for the global power balance and the conflict's future.

Conclusion

In summary, the approval of the $61 billion US military aid package signifies a crucial step in international backing for Ukraine. The response from European nations further consolidates a collective stance against Russian offensive, highlighting a significant geopolitical shift. Meanwhile, Russian reactions underscore the persistent challenges and the importance of continued, coordinated support for Ukraine. The coming months and years will be decisive in shaping the conflict's outcome and the broader geopolitical landscape.

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June 3, 2024 — No Comments

The viability of small Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) fulfilling conventional battlefield roles

by Joseph Moses - Military Strategy & Intelligence Team

Drone warfare has been one of the salient capabilities of the First World’s futuristic military arsenal through the conflicts of the 2000s and 2010s. The war that broke out in Ukraine in 2022, and the battlefields in Myanmar, Sudan and Gaza have since been the arena for another emerging technology that in tactical situations, proven to be decisive. These are the small drones ranging from the FPV variants, commercial hobby drones like the DJI drones. 

This essay focuses on smaller systems and aerial systems because these grant a force cheap options and also grant significant stealth, mobility, equipment safety, and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) collection capabilities and provide economically cheap tactically offensive capabilities than ground-based or water based systems. Another reason to focus on small drones is their assignment to smaller troop formations which grants these systems a very versatile and efficient [semi]autonomous usage. Furthermore, the integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI), also potentially negates the necessity of connecting the drones to nodal points like bigger drones or nearby aircraft which gives them relative immunity from detection and electronic countermeasures. This essay also focuses on electronic countermeasures (jamming) and not on energy weapons and kinetic countermeasures because this uniquely counters the threat posed by drones while rendering them temporarily inert as opposed to kinetic and energy countermeasures which destroy these systems.

Turkish and Iranian drones had been at the forefront of remotely controlled vehicles for precision strikes, kamikaze strikes and monitoring purposes in the initial months of the Ukraine war, providing cheaper options for drone warfare. However, over the course of the war, smaller drones have not only emerged but have caused major disruptions in the battlefield, dispatching enemy tanks, and armored vehicles, coordinating artillery strikes, and targeting small and mobile targets like combatants and individual vehicles. Initially, they were improvised to carry and drop grenades and mortars over enemy combatants and for surveillance. In recent months, these drones have begun to trickle into the battlefield on an industrial scale, with manufactured “pylons” to attach munitions onto these small drones. Modified FPV drones are used as guided kamikaze weapons. These drones also have increased ranges to increase their surveilling and strike capabilities.

These smaller drones can by no means in the short term, replace the bigger fixed-winged drones that are conventional in militaries nor will they have the costly sensor arrays and range of conventional kamikaze drones and other loitering munitions, but they do provide stealth, loitering and precision strike capability and above all, are expendable. In addition, given their precise nature, these drones also contribute to reducing collateral damage to both life and material which is inevitable with protracted infantry engagements, artillery and air strikes. 

In many ways, they fulfil the roles of snipers, forward observers, provide a good vantage point for observing and calculating firing solutions for artillery and conducting battle damage assessments, and one could argue, that the precision strikes by kamikaze drones and loitering drones are a form of Close Air Support (CAS). Another recent development as of the time of writing, is the emergence of AI being implemented in drone strikes in Ukraine to autonomously identify and strike targets. If developed, this would be a form of highly manoeuvrable and precise fire-and-forget missiles and would provide the drone launcher and operator significant situational awareness by relieving the targeting proces. It is yet to be seen at scale if autonomy is reliable across the ‘kill chain’ of target detection, discrimination, acquisition, and engagement.

While the improvised nature of the first iterations of loitering bomber drones carrying grenades and mortar shells was considered an asymmetrical and unconventional tactic, the new emerging technologies being integrated into these systems with the potential for these smaller and cheaper systems to replace conventional battlefield roles with the same quality of data collection, precision etc., could transform these systems into significant conventional and force multipliers. 

Replacing conventional battlefield roles:

The Drone Swarm: The recent attack on Israel by Iranian kamikaze drones and the number of attacks on oil refineries in Russia by Ukrainian drones are isolated examples of the drone swarm. While these drones can be intercepted, there are yet to be incidents involving swarms of smaller drones used against frontline troops where interceptions are much more difficult and where these drones will have the effect of cluster munitions or rocket strikes. The chief difference would be that these munitions would be far more accurate, and manoeuvrable and can potentially loiter, change course, make quick decisions, change targets etc.

These drones are difficult to intercept because of how small silent and cheap they are. If expensive air defence systems are used to soak these swarms up, this leaves these expensive air defence systems vulnerable to counterstrikes and with a reduced magazine in their positions. If it is included in doctrine, to ignore smaller drones, this would prove to be catastrophic to frontline troops, isolated patrols, and vehicles. The American Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), as of 2016 has already been experimenting with integrating autonomous systems into swarm drone tactics through their OFFensive Swarm-Enabled Tactics program (OFFSET). The US Department of Defense unveiled its “Replicator” program in 2023 and has planned on fielding thousands of autonomous systems across multiple domains by 2025 to counter Chinese military build-up in the Indo-Pacific. It has been confirmed that one of the systems that is a part of this program is the Switchblade loitering munition in association with the Low Altitude Stalking and Strike Ordnance (LASSO) program. The first iteration of the Replicator program aims to tackle the problem of slowing or defeating an invading force with swarms of lethal surface drones and overhead loitering munitions. This would shift the most dangerous battlefield roles of frontline repellence and area denial from manned vehicles and posts to unmanned and semi-autonomous or autonomous swarms, creating a highly fluid, dynamic and unpredictable ‘minefield’ for an advancing enemy force.

With the battlefield potential of swarm strikes, and with the novel usage of AI in Ukraine to discriminate targets and avoid electronic warfare measures, it is only a matter of time before swarm tactics will be implemented in drone swarms of smaller UASs to react, improve and harass frontline troops and significantly attack an enemy’s tactical defensive posturing while not costing the user significantly economically and commercially. This drone could be FPV (disposable) to loitering bombing drones, to drones with attached machine guns, rockets and other anti-drone counter-measures. While these systems can be assigned at squad levels, these can also be assigned at higher levels and be used in fire missions, and joint operations across wider active theaters. 

Source: Image by Pexels from Pixabay

CAS and sniper/precision-strike roles: The mobility and silent nature of drones affords fighting forces in urban settings and open terrain likewise, map out, reconnoiter, stalk and even kill hiding and isolated combatants. Their manoeuvrability can be used to attack fixed encampments as we see in the conflict in Gaza between Hamas and the Israeli IDF. Similarly, we have seen videos of Israeli forces using small copter drones to enter houses and search for Hamas combatants room by room, after which they can either engage through squads or call in an artillery or air strike against the entrenched enemy. While these strikes can be expensive, we can soon expect to see these strikes being taken up by the same reconnoitring drone. This economically relieves artillery batteries, tanks or aircraft while it also frees up the squad can focus on other operations/activities.  

A similar argument can be made for these systems being used in a CAS role. Given the precision, and payloads these drones can now carry and/or drop onto enemy positions and also strike and harass mobile enemies they can fulfill a very versatile CAS role while being assigned to smaller units like squads and platoons. In a swarm scenario or in a dynamic battlefield that is not shaped by shaping operations, while deconfliction could be a challenge for controlled and autonomous systems operated by smaller troop formations, this is already being performed in Ukraine against individual targets and to harass and survey larger formations. While these small drones may not be able to conduct large scale Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) operations, these smaller systems can be used as decoys, perform smaller precision strikes against less guarded enemy air defences, and psychologically de-motivate an infantry fighting force when used strategically. 

The primary advantage of conventional CAS systems is their precision, damage dealt and psychological effect of their munitions/guns with the disadvantage of being vulnerable to enemy ground fire from small handheld systems to surface-to-air missiles. With small drone systems, the advantage primarily is a relative degree of visual and audible stealth, the expendable nature of these systems and the shock-and-awe they provide to an enemy not expecting a highly mobile and smart targeting system. These systems can also drastically reduce the time required for a CAS aircraft to get to the battlefield as these will be at the hands of the squad or platoon members.

Electronic Warfare and AI:

The primary non-energy and non-kinetic deterrence against these drones have been electronic jamming countermeasures that are used to sever the connection between the drone operator and the drone. This has led to drone confiscations and loss of battlefield information and intelligence on drones that store information offline instead of storing/recording them on the operator’s system as a redundancy measure.


With the emergence of AI being integrated into kamikaze and FPV drones, these drones do not need operator control. An improvement already being made on non-autonomous FPV systems was for the operator to target an immobile or mobile enemy and place the drone on a trajectory towards the target at maximum velocity. This tactic negates the electronic countermeasure’s effects as the severance of the connection cannot stop the momentum of the inbound kamikaze drone. Integrating AI into these smaller and faster systems is a new concept but can be seen being implemented in the Ukrainian and Russian battlefields. These drones provide the tactical advantage of identifying and discriminating targets without requiring an operator but are also beginning to prove to be immune to electronic countermeasures as they have the target and terrain information and parameters pre-loaded into them.


While the disadvantage of AI is the lack of human supervision across the entire ‘kill chain’, the real-world consequences and level of permissible and reliable autonomy are yet to be seen at scale. In the future, this would be a contentious matter, especially in a battlefield with a civilian population, in urban counter-terror and counter-insurgency operations and could cause deconfliction challenges in an active and fluid battlefield. Real-time decision-making relieves the operator while also leaving the door open for the aforementioned challenges when it comes to targeting mobile targets or operating in a highly dynamic battlefield. Active deconfliction of a changing battlefield would require a constant connection between frontline troops, the drone operator and the drone.

While the possibilities are many, it is yet to be seen how the current improvisations, augmentations to/for conventional battlefield roles with the added potential of machine autonomy, would affect the composition of smaller combat units and doctrine.


Where conventional CAS, ISR and precision strike systems and roles are expensive, require scarce expertise and are not expendable, these UAS systems are the exact opposite while also being a force multiplier. It is however yet to be seen whether they would have the same psychological effect and efficacy to either augment or replace major decisive battlefield interdiction roles.

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May 28, 2024 — No Comments

Beyond Influence: The call for strategic defence in light of China’s interference in Canada

Author: Sandra Watson Parcels – China & Asia Team

The Interim Report

Canada is currently facing a critical moment in its history as it grapples with the urgent need to protect its democratic processes and national security from foreign interference. The release of the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions on May 3rd has prompted focus on this issue. Over the past five years, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has reported on the increasing international activity of the People's Republic of China (PRC), including efforts directed at democratic institutions, government bodies, and communities in various sectors. The interim report clarifies: "Foreign interference is not done by just one country. However, China currently stands out as the most persistent and sophisticated foreign interference threat to Canada."

Chapter four of the interim report examines China's use of foreign interference tactics, highlighting intelligence data suggesting extensive use of these methods to advance its interests. The chapter details a range of interference activities targeting various entities in Canada, including government officials, political organisations, political candidates, and diaspora communities. CSIS identifies China as a significant challenge to Canada's electoral integrity.

The report focuses on the activities of the United Front Work Department (UFWD), a key entity of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with a substantial budget. The UFWD plays a central role in China's foreign interference efforts,focusing on influencing the Chinese diaspora, shaping public opinion, and persuading politicians to support China's policies. It specifically targets individuals with status or influence, such as community leaders, academics, elected officials, and media members. The report describes the UFWD as employing a long-term strategy that utilises both overt and covert methods to cultivate and strengthen relationships over time.

The scope and scale of China's activities in the Canadian elections of 2019 and 2021 are reported to be more extensive than those of any other state, impacting not only federal but also local officials and indigenous communities. The report indicates the UFWD's activities blur the lines between foreign influence and foreign interference. It details clandestine,deceptive, and threatening activity around the world, often by leveraging influence and exerting control over some diaspora communities. Other PRC state institutions involved in foreign interference activities include the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Public Security, both of which reportedly operate covertly internationally and remotely from the PRC.

Canada's Reaction

This backdrop underscores Canada's urgency in strengthening its defences against foreign interference across all fronts. Canada recognises the evolving nature of these threats and the imperative to safeguard its sovereignty and interests. While the inquiry into foreign interference represents a significant step forward in Canada's response, whether the issue has been considered with enough timeliness and decisiveness still needs to be addressed. Conservative foreign affairs critic and MP Michael Chong stated that the report is a “damning set of conclusions and findings” and that it “contradicts much of what the government has told us over that period of time.”  New Democratic Party MP Jenny Kwan said there was a “systemic failure of communications by the government to those who are targeted or impacted by foreign interference.” 

The interim report provides a sobering glimpse into the extent of foreign meddling in Canadian affairs, with particular emphasis on activities surrounding recent federal elections. In response to these revelations, the Canadian government is addressing the issue through new legislation, such as Bill C-70, introduced on May 6th, which aims to update existing laws and improve Canada’s capacity to detect, disrupt, and defend against foreign interference. Additionally, the Canadian government's allocation of funds for establishing a National Counter-Foreign Interference Office underscores the seriousness with which Canada regards this issue.

China's Response

China has strongly rejected the allegations of foreign interference. On May 8th, the state-run Global Times published two articles on the subject. 

The first article criticised Canada's efforts to address foreign interference, describing it as "The so-called China's foreign interference is nothing but a lie to serve political purposes and a drama directed and performed by Canada itself." The preliminary report raises doubts about its validity, reflecting a broader trend in some Western states to attribute electoral outcomes to external influences. The article also accused Canada of interfering in China's domestic affairs. The paper also raised concerns about Canada's actions, suggesting they might hinder positive relations. It stated, "Canada's approach risks harming its relationship with China by aligning itself with US criticisms. We urge Canada to act objectively and avoid being misled by unsubstantiated reports."

The second article focused on Canada's introduction of draft legislation to counter foreign interference. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian was quoted saying, "China has never and will never have any interest in interfering in Canada's internal affairs," dismissing claims of foreign interference as politically motivated lies. A Chinese academic commented, "The introduction of the new law based on groundless accusations of Chinese interference in Canada's elections is once again the country's attempt to fuel unfriendliness and hostility toward China domestically and internationally." The article also mentioned that Canada's new draft legislation is driven by domestic political motives, with the opposition party pushing for tougher policies towards China to challenge Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau's leadership.

China's Grand Strategy

Despite China’s reaction, China's growing global influence and its strategic aspirations are a subject of extensive international discussion. It manifests through a multifaceted approach to enhance its global influence and secure strategic advantages. Politically, concerns exist regarding its role in other countries' elections, particularly through the United Front Work Department (UFWD). Allegations of such interference have surfaced in Canada, the US and Australia. Militarily, China's activities in the East and South China Seas create tensions with neighbouring states. These activities are challenging established international maritime norms, and contravening international laws and norms. Economically, the Belt and Road Initiative extends its reach across continents, fostering dependencies through infrastructure while facing criticisms of potentially resembling neo-colonialism practices. This economic outreach often seems to often complement its military ambitions, as infrastructure projects can double as strategic military footholds. Domestically, China's human rights record, particularly in Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang, is under international scrutiny. Issues surrounding limitations on freedoms are a source of international concern. In cyberspace, its strategic operations involve sophisticated espionage and potential disruptions of global infrastructure, raising international alarms over cyber warfare. China's cultural diplomacy and media expansion aim to shape global perceptions and address Western influence. These efforts can be seen as attempts to manage international reactions to its policies. Collectively, these strategies reinforce China's position on the global stage and intricately interlink to influence its relationships with major world powers, crafting a complex web of influence and control.

Source: Image created by the author.

China's Strategy in Canada

China's approach in Canada shares similarities with its broader strategies internationally. Both utilise a multifaceted approach to cultivate influence and achieve strategic goals. In line with its global political ambitions, China's engagement through the UFWD with Chinese diaspora communities raises questions about potential influence on domestic politics and public opinion. This comprehensive strategy presents significant challenges to Canadian sovereignty, security, and economic interests.

In the economic and technological spheres, China's tactics include cyber espionage and strategic investments in critical sectors, raising Canada's national security concerns. Notable incidents like the Microsoft Exchange server attacks have targeted essential Canadian infrastructure, undermining data security and intellectual property. Moreover, strategic investments in sectors such as natural resources and ports might be seen as signs of China's efforts to extend its geopolitical influence within Canada, mirroring its global economic outreach.

The involvement of Chinese companies like Huawei in Canada's 5G network raised concerns about data security vulnerabilities, prompting Canada to implement restrictive measures to protect its telecommunications infrastructure. Concurrently, Chinese investments in Canadian real estate and potential political influence attempts require careful monitoring.

In the areas of soft power and cultural influence, the presence of Confucius Institutes within Canadian universities raises questions about the promotion of a selective view of Chinese culture, potentially impacting academic freedoms and shaping public perception. These institutes, alongside other UFWD activities within diaspora communities, shape Canada’s political landscape to align with China’s interests. Surveillance efforts, such as monitoring the Chinese diaspora through organisations like the Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs), complement China's control operations within Canada.

In response, Canada has taken steps to address these concerns, including updates to legislation, enhanced cybersecurity measures, and the establishment of a National Counter-Foreign Interference Office.

Canada…Moving Forward

As Canada navigates this complex landscape, vigilance in defending its democratic institutions and national interests is paramount. Public Safety Canada has affirmed, "The Government of Canada takes the threat posed by foreign interference seriously and has various tools and mechanisms in place to protect individuals and Canada's interests." CSIS’s recent annual report states, "the PRC’s negative perceptions of select Canadian domestic and foreign policy initiatives may also drive more foreign interference….in 2024.” The evolving nature of these challenges demands comprehensive and multifaceted tactics, which include legislative measures, diplomatic engagement, and international cooperation. By addressing these challenges proactively, Canada will not only be upholding the integrity of its democratic processes but also asserting its sovereignty against external pressures. Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mélanie Joly stated, “As with past crises, multilateralism and diplomacy offer our best hope for maintaining peace and stability.”  While Canada must take decisive actions to counter interference and protect its sovereignty, it should also engage in diplomatic efforts with other states, including China, to address the issue of interference. This balanced approach combines responses to interference with diplomatic engagement where possible. Strengthening alliances with Five Eyes and other global partners, specifically in the Indo-Pacific, is crucial for effectively confronting and mitigating these risks. As these strategies continue to evolve, transparency, accountability, and community engagement are pivotal to ensure that Canadians are protected and that the democratic framework remains resilient against the covert and disruptive tactics of foreign actors. By strengthening its defences and adopting a proactive stance, Canada safeguards its sovereignty and contributes to the broader global effort to preserve democratic values and institutions, consequently enhancing stability in the world order.

Check out another China & Asia Team article on China’s Belt and Road in the Maldives by Carlotta Rinaudo.

Not Just a Vacation Paradise: Unveiling China’s Belt and Road in the Maldives
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May 22, 2024 — No Comments

The year of Generative AI elections: reviewing risks and mitigations

Author: Piero Soave and Wesley Issey Romain - AI, Cyber Security & Space Team

The year 2024 is sure to be remembered when it comes to elections: first, never before have so many people around the world been called to cast their vote; second, these elections will be the first to take place in a world of widespread Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI). The combined impact of these two elements is likely to have a lasting impact on democracy. This article looks at how GenAI can influence the outcome of elections, reviews examples of risks from recent elections, and investigates possible mitigations.

The year of high-stakes elections

In over 70 elections throughout 2024, some 800mn voters will take to the ballots in India, 400mn in Europe, 200mn in the United States of America, and many more across Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa1. In many cases, these elections will be polarized and will feature candidates from populist backgrounds. Previous electoral rounds have scarcely been an example of moderation, featuring instead accusations of foreign interference, and a deadly assault on the US Congress. Whoever wins the most votes will make decisions on topics as consequential as the US-EU relationships, the future of NATO, trade wars, the geopolitical equilibrium in the Middle East, Hindu-Muslim relationships, and more. With so much at stake, the risk of election interference warrants a closer look.

Enter GenAI

The launch of OpenAI’s ChatGPT at the end of 2022 brought GenAI to the mainstream. GenAI indicates an AI system that has the ability to create content in the form of text, audio or video. Having been popularized by ChatGPT, there are now thousands of applications readily available at minimal to no cost. These systems have been trained on billions of elements of text, sound or video, and are able to respond to a user query and create synthetic content in those formats. 

The existing legal and regulatory frameworks are poorly suited to mitigate the risks deriving from GenAI. Since the launch of ChatGPT, there have already been lawsuits related to intellectual property2, sanctions to corner-cutting lawyers3, egregious reinterpretations of historical facts4, as well as general concern about the bias inherent in these systems5. One specific problem related to GenAI is that of deepfakes, i.e. audio or video files that show people saying or doing things they never in fact said or did. This content is so realistic that it is all but impossible to determine whether what is in front of us is reality, or an artificial creation. The consequences are far-ranging, from the potential increase in financial and other fraud6, to the infringement of privacy and individual rights7. But it is in the domain of politics that deepfakes are particularly troubling. They can be used for a variety of bad purposes, from misleading voters about where, when and how they can vote, to spreading fake content from well recognizable public figures, to generating inflammatory messages that lead to violence8. 

GenAI and misinformation in elections

Misinformation is not a new phenomenon, and it certainly is older than artificial intelligence. However, technology can exacerbate and multiply its effects. By some accounts, “25% of tweets spread during the 2016 US presidential elections were fake or misleading”9. GenAI has the potential to turbocharge the creation of fake content, as this no longer requires sophisticated tools and expertise - anyone with an internet connection could do it. 

Examples of deepfake interference in the political process abound10, despite the relative young age of the technology. In what is perhaps the most consequential event to date, Gabon’s President Ali Bongo appeared in a 2019 video in good health, despite having recently suffered a stroke. The media started questioning the veracity of the video - which is still being debated - ultimately triggering an attempted coup11. Crucially, Schiff et al suggest that “the mere existence of deepfakes may allow for plausible claims of misinformation and lead to significant social and political harms, even when the authenticity of the content is disputed or disproved”12.

During Argentina’s 2023 presidential elections, both camps made extensive use of AI generated content. Ads featured clearly fake propaganda images of candidates as movie heroes, dystopian villains or zombies. In an actual deepfake video - labeled as AI generated - “Mr Milei explains how a market for human organs would work, something he has said philosophically fits in with his libertarian views”13. Also in 2023, synthetic content featured in mayoral elections14 in Toronto and Chicago, the Republican primaries in the US, Slovakia’s parliamentary elections - all the way to New Zealand15.

In the run-up to general elections in India, the Congress party shared a deepfake video of a Bharat Rashtra Samiti leader calling to vote for Congress. The video was shared on social media and messaging apps as voters went to the ballot, and was viewed over 500,000 times before the opposing campaign could contain the damage. AI is being widely used in India to create holograms of candidates, and translate speeches across multiple local languages - as well as for less ethical and transparent objectives16.

In an attempt to simulate bad actors’ attempt to generate misinformation, researchers tested four popular AI image generators and found that the tools “generated images constituting election disinformation in 41%” of cases. This is despite policies in place for these tools which should prevent the creation of misleading materials about elections. The same researchers looked for evidence of bad use and found that individuals “are already using the tool to generate content containing political figures, illustrating how AI image tools are already being used to produce content that could potentially be used to spread election disinformation”17.

Source: Markus Spiske. - https://www.pexels.com/photo/technology-computer-desktop-programming-113850/

Controls and mitigations

Regulation around AI is moving fast in response to even faster technological advancements. Perhaps the most thorough attempt at creating a regulatory framework is the EU AI Act18, approved in March 2024. In the US, a mix of federal and state initiatives seek to address several concerns related to AI, from bias to GenAI, and data privacy. These include the 2023 Presidential Executive Order and related OMB guidance; the NIST Risk Management Framework; and state legislation, from the early New York City Law 144 to the more recent California guidance and proposed bills. Other countries, from Singapore to Australia and China, have approved similar rules. 

Looking at elections integrity specifically, the EU adopted in March a new regulation “on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, aimed at countering information manipulation and foreign interference in elections”. This focuses mostly on making political advertising clearly recognizable, but most of the provisions won’t enter into force before the autumn of 202519. Also in March, the European Commission leveraged the Digital Services Act - which required very large online platforms to mitigate the risks related to electoral processes - to issue guidelines aimed at protecting the June European Parliament elections. The guidelines include labeling of GenAI content. Although these are just best practices, the Commission can start formal proceedings under the Digital Services Act if it suspects a lack of compliance20. In the US, two separate bipartisan bills have been introduced in the Senate: the AI Transparency in Elections Act21 and the Protect Elections from Deceptive AI Act22.

These frameworks have yet to stand the test of time, and the proliferation of open-source models and APIs makes it an uphill struggle for regulators. Regulation around deepfakes specifically is scarce and complex, as it needs to address two separate issues: the creation of the synthetic material, and its distribution. What regulation does exist, tends to focus on sexual content23, although in some cases political content is also covered24. Existing norms around privacy, defamation or cybercrime can offer some support, but are ultimately inadequate to prevent harm25. Some tech solutions are available, such as watermarks, detection algorithms to verify authenticity, or including provenance tags into content26. Whether these techniques are able to prevent or counter the creation and spread of deepfakes at scale remains an open question - and some of them may have unintended drawbacks27. The experience of social media platforms in tackling the spread of harmful content and misinformation is mixed at best28. Platforms’ efforts to mitigate harm (from content moderation to the provision of trustworthy information), and solutions proposed by other parties (such as the removal of the reshare option) are steps in the right direction - but seem unlikely to move the needle.

It is possible that tech developments in the near future will make it easier to detect and disrupt the flow of disinformation, fake news and deepfakes that threaten to sway elections - such as the recently released OpenAI detector29. But the best tool available right now might be literacy interventions, which can make readers more alert to fake news3031. For example, news media literacy aims to provide the tools to assess information more critically and to identify false information. Hameleers found that this type of intervention is effective at reducing the perceived accuracy of false information, although importantly it does not reduce agreement with it (when the reader’s beliefs align with its message)32. 

Conclusions

2024 will be a critical year for liberal democracies and election processes worldwide, from the Americas and Europe to Africa and Asia. Election outcomes will play a crucial role in shaping the orientation of the most pressing issues in world affairs.

The advent of AI tools such as Generative AI threatens electoral processes in democratic countries as it increases the risks of disinformation, potentially swaying voting outcomes. GenAI effectively gives anyone the ability to create synthetic content and deploy it in the form of robocalls, phishing emails, realistic deepfake photography or video, and more. Once this content is online, previous experience teaches that it is very difficult to moderate or eliminate, especially on social media platforms.

While continuing to support tech-based initiatives to detect or tag synthetic content, Governments and education institutions should invest in information literacy programs to equip people with the tools to critically evaluate information and make informed electoral decisions. 

  1. Keating, Dave. “2024: the year democracy is voted out?” Gulf Stream Blues (blog). Substack. Dec 29, 2023.<https://davekeating.substack.com/p/2024-the-year-democracy-is-voted?r=wx462&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&triedRedirect=true> ↩︎
  2. Grynbaum, Michael M., and Ryan Mac. “The Times Sues OpenAI and Microsoft Over A.I. Use of Copyrighted Work.” New York Times. Dec 23, 2023. <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/27/business/media/new-york-times-open-ai-microsoft-lawsuit.html>  ↩︎
  3. Merken, Sara. “New York lawyers sanctioned for using fake ChatGPT cases in legal brief.” Reuters. June 26, 2023. <https://www.reuters.com/legal/new-york-lawyers-sanctioned-using-fake-chatgpt-cases-legal-brief-2023-06-22> ↩︎
  4. Grant, Nico. “Google Chatbot’s A.I. Image Put People of Color in Nazi-Era Uniforms.” New York Times. Feb 22, 2024. <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/22/technology/google-gemini-german-uniforms.html> ↩︎
  5. Nicoletti, Leonardo., and Dina Bass. “Humans are Bias. Generative AI is even Worse.” Bloomberg. June 9, 2023. <https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2023-generative-ai-bias/> ↩︎
  6. Sheng, Ellen. “Generative AI financial scammers are getting very good at duping work email.” CNBC. Feb 14, 2024. <https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/14/gen-ai-financial-scams-are-getting-very-good-at-duping-work-email.html ↩︎
  7. Weatherbed, Jess. “Trolls have flooded X with graphic Taylor Swift AI fakes.” The Verge. Jan 25, 2024. <https://www.theverge.com/2024/1/25/24050334/x-twitter-taylor-swift-ai-fake-images-trending> ↩︎
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May 20, 2024 — No Comments

Eco-Mafias and the Ongoing Struggle for Environmental Security in Latin America

Author: Rabiah Ryklief - Central & South America Team

Latin America's rich biodiversity and vast natural resources have unfortunately attracted a destructive force: Eco-Mafias. These highly organised transnational criminal groups engage in the illegal extraction and exploitation of natural resources for illicit profit. Their activities cause widespread ecological degradation, posing a significant threat to the region's environmental security and, consequently, global climate security.

The Rise of Eco-Mafias

Latin America’s environmental security is deeply intertwined with the exploitation of its natural resources. From the colonial plunder of precious hardwoods like mahogany to the 20th century's surge in deforestation for government-backed infrastructure and cattle ranching, exploitation has driven significant habitat loss and disrupted vital ecological processes. This ongoing struggle has entered a particularly dangerous phase with the rise of Eco-Mafias.

Fueled by the confluence of the war on drugs, insatiable global demand for resources, and environmental crime's lucrative ranking as the third most profitable illegal activity, these transnational organised criminal groups pose a grave threat. While some countries have implemented environmental legislation and protected areas, the allure of the Amazon's vast resources has proven difficult to resist.

The remote nature of the Amazon rainforest, coupled with limited enforcement and vulnerabilities to corruption within government agencies, creates fertile grounds for these illicit networks to flourish. Unlike traditionally trafficked commodities - such as drugs, arms, or humans - timber and minerals can be laundered with relative ease, entering the legal commercial market to provide a cloak of legitimacy. Further obfuscation is achieved by placing funds in jurisdictions far removed from the original crime, hindering prosecution and facilitating tax evasion. This minimises risk while maximising profits, making environmental crimes more attractive.

In this context, the establishment of Eco-Mafias in Latin America signifies an escalation in the struggle against environmental insecurity. Their focus on high-value resources like timber, gold, and minerals presents a significant threat to ecosystems in hotspots like Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Central America.

The Devastating Impact

Eco-mafia activity in Latin America inflicts a devastating and multifaceted assault on the region's environment. The environmental crimes associated with these activities include legal transgressions, operating within protected areas and indigenous territories, unauthorised dredging, and altering natural river flows. These actions cause direct physical destruction of ecosystems and diminish the availability of vital natural resources.

Illegal logging caters to a booming international market for valuable hardwoods. Estimates suggest that up to 80% of logging activities in Brazil and 60% in Peru are illegal. This rampant exploitation translates to land grabs, deforestation, and the decimation of vital habitats - key drivers of biodiversity loss. While Latin America is home to 40% of the world's biodiversity, populations have declined rapidly by 89% since 1970.

Illegal mining operations leave a trail of toxic waste and polluted waterways in their wake. Illegal gold mining is a major concern, accounting for 86% in Venezuela, 80% in Colombia, and 70% in Ecuador. Small-scale, illegal gold mining is the second-largest source of global mercury pollution, releasing tons of mercury into Amazonian rivers and lakes each year. This contamination reaches levels up to 34 times above safe limits, posing a severe threat to aquatic ecosystems and ultimately reaching human populations through the food chain.

Deforestation and forest degradation driven by Eco-Mafia activities surged by 25% in the first half of 2020, significantly contributing to climate change emissions. The continuing loss of vital carbon sinks like the Amazon rainforest weakens the globe’s ability to mitigate climate change impacts, exacerbating extreme weather events.

Source: Vinícius Mendonça/Ibama - Wikimedia

The Environmental Security Landscape

Latin America faces a complex challenge in securing its environment. Peace, development, and security – the cornerstones of any nation – are under threat from the illicit activities of Eco-Mafias. Transnational organised crime thrives on diversification, and Eco-Mafias have capitalised on this trend, exploiting weaknesses in governance, particularly during local conflicts.

Latin America's political volatility and history of conflict create fertile ground for Eco-Mafia activities. Weak governance and instability provide a haven for these criminal groups to exploit natural resources with impunity. This highlights the critical role that combatting environmental crimes plays in preventing and resolving conflicts. Conflict zones, often riddled with corruption and influenced by powerful political and military figures, offer the most lucrative opportunities for Eco-Mafias.

The environmental crimes committed by Eco-Mafias carry a heavy price tag for peace, sustainable development, and security. When these groups operate in fragile regions marked by violence and instability, it presents a critical development challenge. The destruction of ecosystems and depletion of natural resources directly undermines efforts to alleviate poverty - a key socio-political issue across much of Latin America. The cycle becomes self-perpetuating; continued or renewed conflict fuels environmental crimes, further undermining development prospects.

Illegal mining also attracts a constellation of other criminal activities. Slave labour, forced prostitution, and human trafficking become entangled with environmental crimes creating opportunities for violent clashes with local communities who resist. The overall result is a devastating erosion of peace and human security in rural areas with limited governance.

The illicit revenue generated from the exploitation of natural resources is staggering, accounting for nearly 40% of conflict and terrorism financing globally. Even more alarming is the fact that environmental crimes contribute 64% of illicit and organised crime finances. In essence, Eco-Mafias not only promote environmental insecurity, but also pave the way for the emergence of other security threats, such as non-state armed groups and terrorist organisations that exploit environmental crimes for their own nefarious ends.

Conclusion

Latin America's fight for environmental security hinges on dismantling the complex web of Eco-Mafias. Their presence exacerbates existing vulnerabilities, jeopardising the region's pursuit of durable peace, sustainable development, and long-term security. A multi-pronged approach is essential, tackling not just the environmental damage they inflict, but also the underlying social, political, and economic drivers that fuel their activities.

International cooperation, strengthened environmental law enforcement, and investment in sustainable development initiatives offer a path forward. By breaking this destructive cycle, Latin America can achieve environmental security and safeguard its irreplaceable ecosystems for generations to come.

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