In this episode, Tobias Belgrano speaks about the changing political landscape in Argentina, and what this means for the future of Peronism in the country. Mr. Belgrano is a political analyst specialising in Latin American and global affairs.
Specifically, Tobias Belgrano explores how policies taken by Javier Milei are affecting the Argentine political sphere. He looks at the history of Peronism, both from its inception in the 1940s, and more recently under the Kirchners. He explains the role of Guillermo Moreno as a new actor on the Peronist scene.
Interviewers: Sarah Toubman- Central & South America Desk
In February 2025, US military airstrikes targeting the Islamic State (IS) in Somalia, hit the semi-autonomous region of Puntland in the northern part of Somalia, a branch often overlooked in comparison to other more prominent IS affiliates. Established in 2015, IS-Somaliaโs objective is to extend ISโs self-proclaimed caliphate in Africa, advancing and abiding by ISโs strict interpretation of Sharฤซ'ah law. According to interviews conducted by the International Crisis Group, the organization consists of approximately 500 militants and operates mainly in the Golis mountains and the Bari region in semi-autonomous Puntland. Yet, other sources estimate a significantly higher number, ranging between 700 and 1,500 militants, demonstrating the challenge of accurately estimating the size of a covert and elusive faction.
IS-Somalia has assumed a central role in the dynamics of the Islamic State as a logistical and financial hub for the network in the African continent and beyond. Furthermore, it has proven capable of resisting the offensives of its opponents: the Somali National Army (SNA), the Puntland Security Force, and its jihadist rival Al-Shabaab.
This article seeks to ascertain the trajectory of IS-Somaliaโs rise in influence while assessing the potential threat they pose to the Somali Federal Government. A significant portion of existing literature on the topic indicates that IS-Somaliaโs menace to the country originates more from its prospective development rather than its present capacity. This article will explore the group's history, the role of its leader, and its tactics.
Historical Background
In October 2015, a group of defectors in the Puntland region of Somalia led by Abdul Qadir Mumin left Al-Shabaab, an Al-Qaeda-affiliated group, and pledged allegiance to IS โ creating IS-Somalia. Despite previous efforts by IS Central to incorporate Al-Shabaab into its network, it appears that the impetus for IS-Somaliaโs formation was predominantly influenced by Mumin's aspirations of power and the impediments he faced in ascending within Al-Shabaab as an outsider to the dominant Warsengeli clan.
The groupโs first significant attack was carried out in October 2016, when IS-Somalia fighters captured the city of Qandala. In their first foray into governance, IS-Somalia sought to impose its version of Sharฤซ'ah law through administration and taxation. However, on 7th December, a counteroffensive by the Puntland Security Force pushed IS militants to withdraw from the city to the mountains.
Later in 2017, IS-Somalia was elevated to the status of wilaya (or โofficial provinceโ) by IS Central. By 2018, it was officially designated by the US Department of State as a foreign terrorist organisation. Militant operations continued, with IS-Somalia clashing with Al-Shabaab fighters for the first time. Despite the difference in extent of power between the two groups, IS-Somalia has progressively succeeded in increasing its influence by infiltrating the neighborhoods of Bosasso and Mogadishu to conduct illicit activities, domains previously exclusive to Al-Shabaab. Likewise, since its inception, IS-Somalia has increased the number of militants while attracting foreign fighters. Yet, their leadership continues to stay in the hands of Puntland clan members.
Between 2023 and 2024, IS-Somalia carried out a small number of operations, succeeding in seizing control of several villages from Al Shabaab. Nevertheless, IS-Somalia retains broad ambitions and remains difficult to eradicate due to the geography of the territory where it operates, its connections with local clans, and the difficulties of its opponents in defeating it militarily due to divisions or more important priorities.
Leadership
Abdul Qadir Mumin, the founder and current leader of IS-Somalia, has quickly become a central figure in jihadist circles. In a development that underscores his rising influence, Mumin may now serve as the Islamic Stateโs global leader, a remarkable shift for what has long been viewed as a relatively marginal offshoot of the wider Jihadist network, though some observers remain skeptical. Born in Puntland around 1950, Muminโs journey from a regional ideologue to a leader of international significance mirrors both his personal ambitions and broader strategic realignments within the Islamic State's structure. Mumin later moved to the United Kingdom and Sweden in the early 2000s, where he became known for delivering sermons infused with hardline Islamist views โ growing his notoriety as a radical preacher within diasporic communities. By 2010, he had solidified his reputation as a staunchly conservative and influential imam.
Upon his return to Somalia, Mumin initially aligned with al-Shabaab and gained prominence within its Puntland branch. However, his upward mobility within the organisation was likely constrained by Somaliaโs rigid clan-based political and militant hierarchies, which limited leadership roles to individuals from dominant clans. Facing these barriers, Mumin opted to break away by pledging allegiance to the Islamic State, bringing a small but loyal group of followers with him and formally establishing IS-Somalia in October 2015. Under his guidance, the Somali branch has reportedly gained heightened significance within the Islamic Stateโs international network.
Tactics and Activities
Conventionally, IS-Somalia has conducted attacks on an asymmetric basis, typically involving close-range assassinations and the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Its operational footprint also includes extorting local businesses and staging small-scale raids to acquire funding and resources in surrounding areas. In recent years, IS-Somalia has refined its strategies and tactics, increasingly asserting itself in Puntland and the broader Horn of Africa. One of the clearest examples of this shift came in early 2025 with the Shabelle offensive. During this campaign, IS-Somalia orchestrated coordinated and sophisticated attacks on military outposts, notably deploying vehicle-borne and motorbike-based explosives in an assault on the Dharjale base and military positions in the Cal Miskaad mountains. These strikes marked a move toward more sophisticated and synchronised operations in an effort to directly challenge Somalian state authority, while also holding a dual function: testing the resilience of Puntlandโs security forces, and concurrently allowing IS-Somalia time and space to reinforce its hold over areas between the Cal Miskaad and Al-Madow Mountain ranges, entrenching itself within this difficult and highly strategic terrain by building a network of fortified positions and supply corridors.
This territorial strategy has been supported by classic insurgency methods. IS-Somalia frequently uses IEDs to harass military movements and disrupt logistics. A clear instance occurred on 20 January, when a roadside explosion claimed the lives of thirteen soldiers. These asymmetric attacks serve to drain government resources and sap the morale of frontline units. IS-Somalia also engages in deliberate terror operations aimed at eliciting overwhelming responses. Suicide bombings, targeted killings against state figures, and drone attacks are employed to provoke military retaliation, which in turn helps the groupโs recruitment and propaganda drives. During the Shabelle campaign, IS militants deployed drones packed with explosives: an emerging tactic in Somalia that signals the group's evolving technical capabilities.
An example of an IED built using live ammunition shells, used in Iraq. (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:IED_Baghdad_from_munitions.jpg)
Conclusion
Altogether, these actions reveal IS-Somalia's broader ambition: to transform from a local insurgent faction into a credible rival to al-Shabaab in the Puntland region, capable of destabilising and pressuring the federal government into unsustainable military engagements. IS-Somalia may be positioning itself for a greater international role driven by decentralised warfare and strategic media outreach. At the same time, its broader role in generating revenue and distributing it across other branches of the ISIS network must be closely monitored in an effort to effectively counter the financing of international jihadist terrorism. Even if IS-Somalia may face difficulties in expanding their territorial control, this economic function is likely to ensure that IS-Somalia and Mumin continue to play a pivotal role within the decision-making processes of central ISIS and the wider jihadist network.
By Giovanni Giacalone - Central and Latin America Desk
On April 5, 2025, the Italian biologist Alessandro Coatti disappeared from the center of the Colombian city of Santa Marta, where he had arrived the previous day. He was last seen on the evening of April 5, after leaving the hotel in a taxi.
A hostel worker said that Coatti had "repeatedly asked for information on the routes to reach Minca," a location in the Sierra Nevada massif, "and if there was the possibility of studying the species in the area."
Santa Marta Metropolitan Police Commander Jaime Rรญos Puerto immediately pointed out that Coatti had no criminal record and, as far as authorities knew, had not received any threats. "He was a tourist, a scientist; he had no suspicious connections."
The 38-year-old molecular biologist, a Pisa Normale graduate specialised at the Max Planck Institute, had been an employee of the Royal Society of Biology in London until the end of 2024, before resigning to undertake a trip aimed at tourism, volunteering and naturalistic studies in the northern area of โโColombia. The researcher was interested in visiting the Tayrona Natural Park.
First Developments
According to Colombian sources, on Sunday, April 6, the first remains of Coatti (head and hands) were found in a suitcase abandoned in the vegetation near the Sierra Nevada stadium. The following day, other remains were found in a trolley under La Platina bridge and a third discovery with different body parts was found in a bag near the Villa Betel neighborhood, not far from the aforementioned stadium.
A gruesome narco-style murder, which does not fit well with the profile of the victim, who had no criminal record, had not received any threats, and was involved in naturalistic research. The initial hypothesis of a possible responsibility on behalf of the local paramilitary groups such as the Gulf Cartel and the Autodefensas Conquistadores de la Sierra was soon left aside and the investigations quickly led to a gang of criminals dedicated to robberies who allegedly lured him on Grindr, a dating app widely used by the LGBT community. Coatti was most likely contacted through a fake profile, and left his hotel believing he was heading to meet a person, but instead found himself facing his attackers who drugged him, robbed and killed him, scattering the dismembered body parts in various areas of the city to complicate the investigation.
The mystery remains as to why Coatti was killed, given that in most cases, the victims are simply abandoned in some remote place. In this case, the situation may have escalated in some way; Coatti may have reacted to the attempted theft or may have seen something he shouldnโt have. According to reports, the 38-year-old was first killed with a series of blows and, only later, cut into pieces.
The Colombian authorities have so far identified four individuals (three males and one female) who are currently at large, while a building in the San Josรฉ del Pando neighborhood has been seized and traces of the researcher's DNA, and objects belonging to him have been found there.
A major breakthrough in the case came after reconstructing Coatti's movements in the Santa Marta area. It was, in fact, strange for him to leave the central part of the city, where his hotel was located, and head towards the San Josรฉ del Pando neighborhood. The scientistโs body parts were retrieved in locations around that specific barrio.
The Italian ambassador in Bogotรก, Giancarlo Maria Curcio, had already reported the presence in the country of the so-called "scopolamine gangs": criminal groups that use this powerful drug to stun their victims, empty their bank accounts or rob them without leaving a trace in their memory.
Scopolamine's Shadow
Scopolamine, also known as Burandanga and Devilโs Breath (because it โsteals the victimโs soulโ), is a tropical alkaloid produced by species of plants such as Hyoscyamus Albus and Datura Stramonium. The substance is most commonly used to prevent motion sickness and alleviate post-surgery nausea and vomiting; however, it can also be used for criminal purposes. For instance, it has become common practice among some gangs operating in Latin American countries such as Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela. Scopolamine induces a disoriented state and leaves victims incapacitated and vulnerable to robbery, sexual assault, and other crimes.
A 2024 investigation by Guillermo Galdos for Channel 4 revealed that between 2020 and 2024, over 80 foreigners have died, only in the city of Medellin, under such circumstances; however, according to local sources, the number could be much higher. The victims are nearly all men, and often were last seen leaving their hotels to meet women on dates after hooking up on apps such as Tinder. Some of the victims end up dying after being drugged, since it can lead to respiratory issues and be fatal.
In 2012, the U.S. Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) issued a travel advisory warning travelers to Latin America about the risk of being assaulted and robbed by gangs utilising scopolamine:
โOne common and particularly dangerous method that criminals use to rob a victim is through the use of drugs. Scopolamine is most often administered in liquid or powder form in foods and beverages. The majority of these incidents occur in nightclubs and bars, and usually, men, perceived to be wealthy, are targeted by young, attractive womenโฆโ
In 2012, a Vice documentary exposed the use of scopolamine made by Colombian gangs to rob foreign tourists. Among other things, this substance leaves victims unable to recall many details of what happened to them, making it impossible for the police to identify suspects.
In the case of Alessandro Coatti, the reasons for his murder and mutilation remain unclear. For all we now know, it is only possible to speculate while waiting for the fugitives to be arrested.
ByValentina Gruarin, Sofia Lopes, Alessandro Spada - UK & EU Affairs Desk
Introduction
โIf Europe wants to avoid war, Europe must get ready for war,โ European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen declared in a speech at the Royal Danish Military Academy on 18 March 2025. This statement encapsulates the urgency driving the White Paper for European Defence โ Readiness 2030, also known as the ReArm Europe Plan, presented by the European Commission earlier that month. Designed to respond to shifting geopolitical dynamics โ including war on Europeโs eastern flank, the declining reliability of the Atlantic Alliance, and closer ties between the U.S. and Russia โ the Plan proposes to equip EU member states with the legal and financial tools to significantly scale up defence spending. The Planโs priorities include: increased national defence spending enabled by more flexible Stability and Growth Pact rules; a โฌ150 billion EU loan scheme for member states; expanded use of the EU budget for further defence investments; and mobilising private capital through the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the Savings and Investment Union. Altogether, the plan could unlock nearly โฌ800 billion in defence spending.
This blog article begins by analysing the implications of the ReArm Plan for the EUโs foreign policy and global positioning โ asking whether it strengthens EU Strategic Autonomy or merely reinforces national militarisation. We then examine the political and economic consequences of the plan, including its legal architecture, its fiscal mechanisms, and its potential to fragment or unify EU defence efforts. Finally, we reflect on whether this initiative brings the Union closer to the vision of a coherent global actor โ or drifts further from the integrationist ideals envisioned by Jean Monnet.
ReArm Europe: EU Strategic Autonomy or Fragmented Militarisation?
The ReArm Europe Plan, introduced by the European Commission under the pretext of urgent defense coordination, marks a controversial pivot point in the EUโs evolving security architecture. Situated between the agenda-setting and policy formulation phases of the EU decision-making cycle, the Plan is emblematic of a broader institutional tension: the divergence between supranational ambition and intergovernmental control.
The Commissionโs reliance on Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to bypass the European Parliament (EP), ostensibly to accelerate the legislative process, reveals a deeper democratic deficit in the Union's handling of foreign policy. Article 122, traditionally reserved for exceptional economic crises or emergencies affecting member states, is here leveraged to justify a โฌ150 billion defense fund โ a measure which, in substance, does not seem to meet the urgency threshold. The European Parliamentโs Legal Affairs Committee (JURI) unanimously rejected this procedural circumvention, underlining that such a far-reaching plan demands a legitimate and deliberative foundation, not a legal shortcut.
The EP institutional marginalisation reflects an unresolved tension in the EUโs foreign and defense policies: the persistent dominance of member states in security affairs, even as Brussels attempts to cultivate a semblance of strategic unity. Although the Plan rhetorically aligns with the discourse on EU Strategic Autonomy, it fundamentally reinforces national military capacities, not EU-level defense integration. It is not a blueprint for an EU army, but a financial mechanism to enable national armies to rearm โ and to do so under their own command and discretion. In a geopolitical crisis, the presumption that these individually empowered forces would act as one unified military bloc remains largely aspirational.
From a foresight perspective, the implications are stark. As EU member states enhance their military arsenals with limited coordination, the risk of policy divergence โ or even fragmentation โ intensifies. Instead of reinforcing the EUโs cohesive external action, the ReArm Plan may exacerbate the already fractured landscape of European foreign policy. It equips states to act, but not necessarily to act together. The Differentiated Integration (DI) model, long proposed as a solution to political and capability asymmetries in EU foreign policy, appears to have been sidelined rather than operationalised. In its place, a de facto re-nationalisation of defense prerogatives is emerging, subtly undermining the Unionโs strategic cohesion.
Moreover, the broader framing of the Plan raises profound questions about the direction of EU foreign policy in a multipolar world. As Europe finds itself navigating between cooperative multilateralism and the increasingly confrontational logics of great power rivalry โ notably between the US, China, and Russia โ the strategic choices made today will define its role in future global alignments. The ReArm Plan, while presented as a necessary measure to bolster the continent's security, may paradoxically increase its vulnerability: by deepening internal divides and by entrenching the logic of militarised competition. If the Unionโs foreign policy continues to be shaped by fragmented defense planning and opaque legislative processes, its credibility as a coherent strategic actor will remain elusive.
ReArm Europeโs Political Fallout: Divergence, NATO Tensions, and Regional Rifts
Russiaโs full-scale invasion of Ukraine had already propelled EU member-states to rethink their weak investment in defence, and the USโs increasing unreliability towards Europe further encouraged this plan. In this sense, the EU understands that defence and strategic autonomy are central to its action. The joint remarks of High Representative/Vice-President Kallas and Commissioner Kubilius on the 19th of March are very indicative of this new perspective: โ450 million EU citizens should not have to depend on 340 million Americans to defend ourselves against 140 million Russians who can't defeat 38 million Ukrainiansโ.
Nevertheless, ReArm Europeโs plan of action may produce unexpected issues. Countries might employ the freer financial schemes to enhance their own national defence spending without coordinating with other member-states, resulting in โfragmentation and duplication of efforts, rather than strengthening Europeโs collective military capabilitiesโ (Santopinto 2025). This is likely, as defence remains a sole prerogative of member-states.
Moreover, this new defence plan might antagonize NATO, despite repeated reassuring statements made by the Commission that โRebuilding European defence requires action across several dimensions, in close coordination with NATOโ. ReArm Europe might be seen as a European wish to become more autonomous in defence matters, as well as a competition and an unnecessary duplication of efforts regarding NATO. Furthermore, โmany member-states are sceptical about the Commission becoming more deeply involved in defenceโ (Scazzieri 2025), as it is a relatively new actor in defence matters. This is particularly the case for eastern EU member-states, which rely heavily on NATO and have a strong relationship with the USA.
Finally, ReArm Europe may lead to unintended frictions between member states. As previously mentioned, defence is a sole competence of member-states, and perspectives on this subject vary across the continent. Poland, the Baltic States, Greece and Finland are strongly pushing for bigger GDP defence spending and are big enthusiasts of the EUโs firmer role in defence, while countries like Spain, Ireland, or Austria โ traditionally neutral states in defence matters โ have emphasised that, first, the EU needs to achieve the 2% spending before thinking of increasing this percentage. These different outlooks on defence spending have yet to be surpassed. This shows the fragmentation of perspectives within the EU, and how the urgency of ramping up budgets dedicated to defence is perceived differently. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sรกnchez argued that โthe threats faced by southern Europe are 'somewhat different' than in the Eastโ, illustrating this ongoing struggle.
Creative Commons license (CC) credited: "ยฉ European Union 2014 - European Parliament" (Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs Creative Commons license).
ReArm Europeโs Economic Impact: A Double-Edged Sword
ReArm Europe aims to unlock โฌ800 billion in defense investments through five main measures:
Raising โฌ150 billion via the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) loan instrument.
Activating the Stability and Growth Pact's national escape clause to unlock โฌ650 billion over four years.
Increasing flexibility in defense investment with EU instruments.
Reinforcing the EIBโs role in defense financing.
Leveraging the Savings and Investments Union to mobilize private capital.
Given the significant amount of military spending, the Rearm Europe plan will have positive and negative economic consequences, according to some economists. It could mean powering economic growth, promoting regional development, boosting technological innovation, and supporting European competitiveness as a positive impact. For example, the plan could lead to +0.2% per year in growth in the Euro area. It would increase the creation of new production lines and factories, generating good jobs in the EU and decreasing the import of defence equipment from the USA. Last but not least, an important financial investment in the defence sector could support great technological innovations. Indeed, in the past, the military industry has been the origin of diverse innovations, of which the civil world obtained relevant benefits, such as the internet, GPS positioning, satellite imaging, the three-point seat belt, and the development of Silicon Valley.
The economic negative effects could derive from an excessive rise of budget deficit for some countries like France, Belgium, and Italy, exacerbating long-term debt issues. Other countries โthat already have positive output gaps may run into inflationary pressures more quickly given the extra spendingโ. There are concerns about loan requests that rely on grants from the European Defence Fund (EDF), because repayment obligations could discourage some countries. On one hand, governments with limited financial resources may take advantage of loans; on the other hand, Daniel Fiott of the Centre for Security,ย Diplomacy, and Strategy (CSDS), โhighlights the risk that wealthier Member States might not require such financing, potentially undermining the scheme's impactโ. Moreover, competitiveness in the EU defence sector could be affected negatively and much lowered. The underlying reason would be due to possible risks of persisting duplication and fragmentation originating from the absence of any guarantee of cross-border investments in the EU, in favour of more national defence spending. A deeper risk in the ReArm Europe Plan lies in its financing logic. By opening the door to substantial loans from institutions like the IMF, World Bank, or the EIB, the Plan normalizes debt for military spending. However, such loans often come with conditionalities, pushing countries toward fiscal consolidation, public spending cuts, and tax increases. As a result, accessing the European Defence Fund (EDF) may not simply strengthen defense capabilities but could also tie countries to austerity measures that harm sectors like health, education, and social services. This raises concerns about prioritizing defense over social cohesion and the political trade-offs member states are making for "strategic autonomy." Ironically, by securing military sovereignty through debt and fiscal constraint, the EU risks undermining the resilience it aims to build.
Conclusion
The ReArm Europe Plan represents the EU's ambition to become a credible geopolitical actor, yet it highlights contradictions in its institutional structure and member-state relations. Rather than uniting the Union behind a cohesive defense identity, the plan risks reinforcing national silos, with each state rearming on its own terms. Its reliance on Article 122 to bypass the European Parliament underscores the democratic fragility of the EU in foreign and security matters.
Economically, while the Plan mobilizes significant resources for defense, it may come at the cost of fiscal sustainability and social investment, particularly for weaker economies burdened with conditional loans. The intention to enhance resilience may inadvertently deepen vulnerabilities through debt dependence and fragmentation.
Ultimately, the question remains: Will strategic autonomy become a militarized funding mechanism reflecting disunity, or can it evolve into a genuine opportunity for the EU to project a coherent, independent voice on the global stage? If successful, this vision would allow Europe to move beyond the reactive logic of great power rivalry and embrace a model of principled global engagement.
However, both the ReArm Europe Plan and the 2022 European Political Community (EPC) reflect the EUโs intergovernmental nature โ coordinating but not integrating foreign and defense policies. This is in stark contrast to Jean Monnetโs vision of shared sovereignty, capable of shaping global affairs with legitimacy and purpose. Until the EU transitions from fragmented militarization to unified strategic action, its autonomy will remain more rhetorical than real. Two key events in June โ the NATO Summit and the European Council meeting โ will force EU member-states to clarify their defense strategies.
The idea of a full-on brawl in parliamentary chambers might be alien to a Western observer of Asian politics. Still, to a Taiwanese person, itโs nothing more than a national pastime. The islandโs legislature, the Legislative Yuan, has seen its fair share of physical altercations since the 1980s, and itโs so normalised to the point that these brawls are almost like a running joke to Taiwanese citizens. Brawls in the legislature are often jokingly compared to American TV wrestling shows, the point being that theyโre both performative acts. This tradition continued into 2024 as the new Lai administration of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) started its term. Taiwanese parliamentarians brawled on four[1] different occasions over policy differences and disagreements. In May, a controversial parliamentary reform bill from the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) that aimed to empower the legislature caused massive brawls in the chamber.[2] In December, three KMT bills once again sparked physical clashes.[3]
DPPโs uphill battle in the legislature
The continued clashes in the legislature indicate the monumental challenges the ruling party DPP is facing. In last yearโs presidential election, William Lai Ching-te of the DPP was elected president with a 40% share of the total votes to continue the DPPโs governance of the island since 2016. However, the DPP lost its commanding legislative majority in the same election. The KMT became the largest party in the Legislative Yuan but did not enjoy a complete majority. Instead, the TPP, Taiwan Peopleโs Party, a relative newcomer, was able to obtain enough seats in the legislature to ensure that either KMT or DPP would need their support to push through legislation, becoming a crucial third party in the Legislative Yuan.[4]
The TPP has since formed a coalition with the KMT to pass controversial bills that some would consider to be an attempt to undermine the ruling DPP government. The aforementioned parliamentary reform bill expanded the powers of the KMT-TPP-controlled legislature. Supporters of the bill cited the need for checks and balances against the DPP-controlled executive, while DPP supporters claimed this was an attempt to weaken the presidency.[5] Going into 2025, the DPP continued to fight an uphill battle in the Legislative Yuan. Last month, the legislature slashed the government budget by an unprecedented 7% - cutting NT$207.5 billion from government expenses.[6] The cuts meant that half of the funds allocated to Taiwanโs indigenous defense submarine initiative was frozen by the legislature, which cannot be used until the programme prototype, the Narwhal, completes its sea acceptance tests.[7]
Trump, China, and A Divided Island
The oppositionโs efforts to reduce the budget coincide with external pressures on Taiwan to increase military expenditure. U.S. President Donald Trump has publicly called for Taiwan to raise its defence spending to 10% of GDP. [8] Taiwanโs defence minister has expressed concern that budget reductions could send an unfavourable signal to the new U.S. administration.[9]Ongoing tensions in the Taiwan Strait have led some to worry that political deadlock could slow decision-making and weaken international confidence in Taiwanโs defence readiness.
The three main parties have exchanged accusations regarding the causes of recent legislative deadlock. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has criticised the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan Peopleโs Party (TPP) for obstructing governance, while the KMT has accused President Lai of consolidating power. The TPP, for its part, characterised the arrest of its leader, Ko Wen-je, on corruption charges as an instance of politically motivated prosecution by the DPP and the current administration.[10]
While perspectives differ, Taiwanโs internal divisions stem from more than performative politics. The islandโs geopolitical significance has often drawn international attention away from its domestic challenges. These include an aging population, declining upward mobility, and energy security concerns..[11] In the most recent election, some voters expressed dissatisfaction with the established partiesโ responses to these issues, contributing to increased support for the Taiwan People's Party (TPP), which gained a notable presence in the legislature. Taiwanโs political gridlock may be better understood as a reflection of unresolved domestic grievances.
Amid ongoing tensions with China and uncertainty surrounding potential shifts in U.S. policy, the current administration under President Lai faces the complex task of navigating institutional constraints while maintaining unity and addressing public concerns.
In April 2025, the Eastern Congo unrest seemed to have shifted timidly toward the end of major conflicts. First, on 23 April 2025, the Democratic Republic of Congo (โDRCโ) and, alleged by DRC and some international observers, the Rwanda-backed militia M23 released a joint statement in which they pleaded to cease hostilities that have soared since January 2025. Subsequently, on 25 April 2025, the DRC and Rwanda signed an economic cooperation and peace agreement. The accord was brokered by the United States, which, in return, was promised access to the mineral resources of the country.
At the beginning of April, before the most recent developments, ITSS interviewed Professor Koen Vlassenroot to better understand the possible drivers of the unrest in the region. In this article, a timeline of the events will be drawn from the Rwandan genocide to the recent escalation of 2025. Furthermore, the origin of M23 will be analysed, including what the movement has been in the last 15 years and what motivations have fueled the group. Finally, these insights will be used to infer what the future of the Eastern DRC might look like after the signing of the agreements.
From the Rwandan genocide to the rise of M23
Between April and July 1994, at least 800,000 ethnic Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed by the Hutu majority in Rwanda. The Rwandan genocide has heavily characterised the history of Rwanda and its neighbouring countries for the past 31 years. In July 1994, a coalition of exiled Tutsi called the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which had attempted to gain control of Rwanda since 1990, managed to take over the country and put an end to the genocide. The DRC was remarkably affected in the wake of the Rwandan genocide and civil war, as between 1993 and 1996, almost 2 million Hutus emigrated to the neighbouring regions of North and South Kivu in the Eastern Congo.
In 1996, a coalition of countries led by Rwanda, which included Uganda, Burundi, and Angola, launched an invasion into the Eastern DRC, then called Zaire and led by Dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. The First Congo War stemmed from two major elements: on one side, the Congolese opposition, led by Laurent Kabila, attempted to overthrow the Mobutu regime, and on the other hand, the surrounding countries wanted to deal with the security concerns generated by the Mobutu-backed militias active in the region. Unfortunately, it is to be noted that most of the victims were civilians and refugees inhabiting North and South Kivu territories.
In the years after he came to power, Laurent Kabila faced a complex conundrum. He needed to gain ground in local Congolese civil society, but to do that, he had to take a distance from the country that helped his accession to power, Rwanda. The Second Congo War was triggered by the decision from Kabila to expel the Rwandan and allied troops from the Eastern Congo. This resulted in support from Rwanda and Uganda to the rebel group Rassemblement Congolais pour la Dรฉmocratie (โRCDโ), composed of various ethnicities part of the macro group of the Banyarwanda. The war was concluded by a lengthy peace process that started in 2001 and ended in 2006 with the election of Joseph Kabila as president of the DRC. Joseph was the son of Laurent Kabila, who died in 2001.
The peace process and the UN peacekeeping mission MONUC (later MONUSCO) were not enough to bring lasting peace in the Eastern DRC. ย The process was rejected by the still active Tutsi groups in North and South Kivu, the most prominent example being Congrรจs national pour la dรฉfense du peuple (โCNDP)โ. According to CNDP and other military groups, backed by Rwanda, the 2006 election did not guarantee sufficient representation for the Tutsi groups in North and South Kivu. After fights escalated, the civilian death toll increased even further between 2006 and 2009. A new peace process started in 2009, attempting a brassage which was intended to be a progressive integration of the armed groups into the DRC army. The agreement was signed by CNDP and the other groups on 23 March 2009.
The results of this renovated peace process did not fully satisfy part of the CNDP members; therefore, in 2012, the failure to implement the March 23 agreement resulted in mutiny by a group that called itself the March 23 movement, or in short, M23.
M23 drivers and motivation for its accomplishments
The rise of M23 in 2012 was short-lived but somewhat rapid. By November 2012, the movement managed to conquer the city of Goma, North Kivu's major city. International pressure managed to push M23, and especially its allegedly main sponsor, Rwanda, to bring the movement within the Rwandan and Ugandan borders.
The unrest in the DRC, and Eastern Congo especially, did not cease after 2012, but the country experienced in 2018 the first peaceful transition of democratic power as Etienne Tshisekedi took over the presidency. However, M23 apparently claimed that Tshisekedi was not committed to existing peace agreements and decided to return to action in November 2021. In the early 2020s, M23 gained momentum rapidly again, with - according to UN reports and regional observers - the support of Rwanda, even with troops on the ground. M23 managed to defeat the DRC troops several times, both because of external support and due to the Congolese army persistent corruption and structural weakness.
However, the distrust toward Tshisekedi cannot be pinned as the sole or main reason for the return of M23. While their objectives cannot be surely identified, the movement has a plethora of motivations that may have fueled the return to arms. Firstly, M23 had a more grounded approach since 2021, and while still targeting civilians, it aimed at controlling territories in North and South Kivu. In 2012, it was only a question of fighting against the power that the reckon was not respecting the accords. In the 2020s, the motivations had morphed, and since its return, M23 has established outposts, electing majors and administrators, and governed cities and territories. Furthermore, one important element is that M23 is part of the Alliance Fleuve Congo (โAFCโ). AFC is a more politically involved movement with large overlaps with M23 in its leadership, and contrary to M23 itself, it has national ambitions. It is under the AFC umbrella that the April 2025 accords have been signed.
According to some sources, the Rwandan support has also changed; it has increased its direct involvement and reportedly has aided in the propaganda and recruitment. Rwandan president Kagame has often justified the involvement of Rwanda in the region and the M23 presence as a way of protecting Tutsi in North and South Kivu. While this claim is often refuted, there is also a general discredit and hate speech towards speakers of Kinyarwanda, Rwandaโs national language, in Eastern Congo, aggravated by decades of conflict.
The control of the mineral wealth of Congo is often cited by international publications as one of the key factors. The Eastern region is rich in gold and coltan, which is key for the sustainable transition. It is worth noting, however, that M23 has, for the most part, only gained from smuggling rather than the mining itself, and only in April 2024 gained direct access to a Coltan mine in Kabaya. During the period between November 2021 and April 2024, M23 conducted a campaign funded by alternative means. Rwanda has, in recent years, widely increased its export of minerals. However, although coltan exports are increasing, gold remains the country's main mineral export. According to multiple independent reports, there are credible concerns that this gold originates from the eastern part of the DRC. Additionally, one factor that needs to be taken into consideration is whether the presence of active conflict benefits or not the gold smuggling and extraction business. Academic studies indicate the opposite: the gold smuggling system does not necessarily benefit from active conflict.
Finally, Congo has the largest reserves of cobalt in the world, also extremely important for tech and clean energy purposes. This stockpile is located in the South of the country, which is, on the contrary, relatively more stable (although the Tigres movement has had some traction over the years). Therefore, it is important to understand that minerals do have an important role in the instability; however, they are not the main drivers of the conflict, but one of the many complex elements that fuel the fights in North and South Kivu.
What now?
The April 2025 agreement is not the first ceasefire attempt signed between M23 and the DRC. In July 2024, they signed a pact, mediated by Angola, that was quickly broken with mutual accusations of not respecting the accord. The aftermath of this fallout resulted in the most successful M23 campaign to date, in terms of territorial gains. What we can observe is however that this time the agreement came a few days after the agreement with Rwanda, and this may limit the option to come back to fighting for M23.
Thus, is this series of agreements going to solve the situation? The main issue, also underlined by Professor Koen Van Klassenroot in the interview with ITSS, is the fragmentation of the movements. The Alliance Fleuve Congo and M23 are only one part of the wider puzzle, Eastern Congo is plagued with smaller and as deadly armed groups. Other active armed factions involved in the increasingly complex fighting in eastern DRC include the DRC army-aligned Nyatura in North Kivu, the Islamic State-backed Allied Democratic Forces, which has recently increased attacks in Uganda, and CODECO and Zaire, who are in dispute in Ituri province.
International interest, such as US corporations have also pushed to access the mineral wealth of the DRC, and they could benefit from a situation more under control, and therefore, spend political capital on the US foreign policy in central Africa. The role of international players is going to be key to understanding how civilian massacres could be mitigated in a region that has been characterised by conflict for a long time. ย
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), executed in 1960 between India and Pakistan, is widely regarded as one of the most robust water-sharing accords globally. The World Bank facilitated the allocation of six rivers in the Indus River Basin (IRB): the three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab) were assigned to Pakistan, while the three eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej) were designated for India. Notwithstanding wars and conflicts, the IWT has persisted โ until the present. While it was a water-sharing agreement, experts believe it was more of a divorce settlement. This article aims to present the vulnerabilities of IWT in todayโs geopolitical and climate landscape and attempts to present a conceptual reframing of IWT based on academic literature on the subject. More importantly, it highlights the need to put a basin-wide, bottom-up approach into focus rather than a top-down approach.
The IRB rises in the southwestern Tibet Autonomous Region of China and flows northwest. It continues north-westward through the contested Indian and Pakistani areas of Jammu & Kashmir and then turns south into Pakistan. The basin has six main tributaries โ one of them Sutlej, like the Indus itself rises in Chinaโs Tibetan Plateau while another tributary Kabul rises in Afghanistan, and the remaining Ravi, Beas, Jhelum, and Chenab rises in India.
India's recent decision to put IWT into abeyance, citing ongoing difficulties in bilateral relations due to cross-border terrorism in the Indian Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir, has undermined its streak of being able to stand political ruptures. The IWT is intended to be an enduring accord. It lacks an expiration or unilateral withdrawal provision. However, under international law, specifically Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), suspension or termination is potentially permissible due to a "fundamental change of circumstances." India contends that ongoing cross-border terrorism represents a significant alteration. The interpretation of the IWT is governed by customary international law, as it predates the Vienna Convention. Practically, unilateral withdrawal or suspension would be exceedingly complex, inviting international censure and making sustainable governance of IRB more challenging in a politically volatile regionโespecially for the populations residing along the rivers whose livelihoods are intricately connected to these river systems.
Vulnerabilities of the Indus River Basin
The Indus Water Treaty has substantially enhanced regional stability; nonetheless, it currently exhibits serious challenges in light of contemporary zero-sum affairs, especially for the populations residing throughout the expansive IRB in the Himalayan region.
Human-induced climate change presents a significant challenge in achieving water security while simultaneously increasing the difficulty and costs associated with its protection. Water security is not solely defined by the availability of water resources; it also depends on the quality of these resources. Variability and extreme events present significant challenges to water security, particularly in low-income countries that face limitations in institutional capacity for managing water resources. The situation regarding IRB is no different.
The glaciers of the Himalayas, Karakoram, and Hindu KushโAsia's "water towers"โare rapidly melting as a consequence of climate change. For the inhabitants of hilly areas such as Ladakh, Baltistan, the Kashmir Valley, and the Chenab belt of Jammu, glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs) pose a risk to settlements and arable land. Alterations in snowmelt timing are undermining conventional irrigation and agricultural practices. The IWT was engineered for rather stable hydrological conditions. It fails to include abrupt or severe variations in river flows, rendering mountain populations particularly susceptible.
The IRB exhibits a complex hydrological system and is characterised by significant hydro-political tensions among its riparian states. The water security of the region is increasingly jeopardised by various factors, including being an international transboundary river and overarching global issues such as pollution, rapid population growth and urbanisation, diminishing surface water availability, declining groundwater quality and quantity, and the intensifying effects of climate change.
At the time of the signing of IWT, the geopolitical landscape was bipolar and less complex. Apparently, in todayโs multipolar landscape, IRB spans four sovereign nations. The establishment of infrastructure capable of influencing river flows would affect the overall health of the river system. The inhabitants of Jammu and Kashmir, encompassing all regions, may exhibit heightened sensitivity to any disturbances spanning political boundaries, as even little alterations in flow patterns can impact agriculture, water accessibility, and local ecosystems. Nevertheless, the IWT persists as a bilateral accord, incapable of accommodating the escalating multilateral dynamics of the basin.
Since 1960, the populations of the IRB areas have also experienced substantial growth. Economic shifts have introduced additional pressures. The reliance on river systems for hydropower, potable water, tourism, and agriculture has increased. Treaties with inflexible allocations and methods lack the adaptability to address these changing local demands.
Conceptual Reframing of IWT
Recommending changes to IWT is not under the scope of this article. Rather it is an attempt to present some guiding principles based on available academic literature on how to rethink or strengthen IWT. Reimagining the governance of the IRB needs to go beyond its traditional characterisation as a geopolitical and techno-legal issue. Jamie Linton emphasises that water is not just a physical resource; it is a socio-natural construct influenced by relationships, institutions, landscapes, and daily practices. This reconceptualisation of water does not regard rivers as apolitical conduits separate from the communities, cultures, and ecosystems they traverse. This framework has been meticulously enhanced by the hydro-heritage lens which highlights the symbolic, spiritual, and affective aspects of water. This framework intricately links water to memory, heritage, and legitimacy. According to it, springs, canals, and rivers serve not only as means for irrigation and power generation but also as repositories of heritage, traditional knowledge, and sustainable practices, often acting as silent witnesses to political transformation. Recognizing these aspects of water creates opportunities for governance that is inclusive, oriented towards justice, and rooted in historical context.
Postcolonial hydropolitics frequently exhibits fragmentation and zero-sum dynamics; however, prior initiatives for managing the IRB, exemplified by extensive canal planning during the British era, temporarily functioned at the basin-wide level. Despite their origins in colonial mandates, these interventions demonstrate that hydrological interdependence was historically recognised at an administrative level, albeit without equitable implementation. This moment, analysed critically, makes visible the potential benefits of basin-level coordination when viewed through a participatory governance lens.
Efforts to reimagine the IWT should not focus exclusively on legal amendments or institutional changes. They should adopt a broader and more innovative approach that integrates hydro social realities, recognises local and Indigenous water cultures, and promotes dialogue across ecological zones. Water diplomacy in the Indus Basin has the potential to transition from division and securitisation to collaborative stewardship, emphasising heritage, culture, and equity alongside flow volumes and engineering considerations.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the IWT has historically functioned as a robust framework for water-sharing between India and Pakistan; however, its contemporary limitations are clearly apparent due to evolving geopolitical dynamics, increasing climate vulnerabilities, and shifting socio-economic demands within the IRB. Reevaluating the treaty necessitates more than mere institutional adjustments; it demands a fundamental shift that recognises water as both a hydro-social and cultural resource, as highlighted by Linton and the hydro-heritage literature. Reframing the IWT through inclusive, basin-wide, and historically grounded perspectives presents a viable approach to sustainable water governance that makes IRB resilient to current challenges and addresses the realities of all riverine communities.
By Maria Makurat - Human Rights and Cyber Security Team
Introducing the issue
On February 9th, 2025, French President Emmanuel Macron posted on X a montage of AI deepfake created with videos of himself in various scenarios, including a TV series to promote the โArtificial Intelligence Action Summit โ. Deepfakes are more than ever a ubiquitous technology, very easy for anyone to access and use. Governments are investing more in AI and it seems almost a race by major players such as the EU, China, and the USA. In this context, a main topic remains an issue warranting priority in the discussion: AI and Womenโs Rights. Whether it be in the sector of cyber security, modern warfare, or even the arts domain, AI provides as many opportunities as challenges that should be equally analysed to highlight the current benefits and potential damage, what remains to be done, and where we are headed on the matter.
The AI Paris Summit has brought together many specialists and governments to tackle the multiple aspects of AI and โdeepfakesโ. This term is defined in the recent โInternational AI Safety Reportโ:โA type of AI-generated fake content, consisting of audio or visual content, that misrepresents real people as doing or saying something that they did not actually do or say.โ AI is affecting our cyber domain by spreading disinformation about women. Violence against women in the cyber domain such as โrevenge pornโ is not a new phenomenon.
What about the fast-evolving AI technology? What about the โdark netโ that has been largely discussed on TikTok, with some individuals warning women not to google themselves in the dark web? What are some of the benefits of AI in all of this? Just recently, in the USA the Bill โTAKE IT DOWNโ Act is being pushed to protect women against deepfake-generated content, showing the growing relevance of the issue.
This article aims to explore new aspects of the current debate by looking at the recent AI Paris Summit, what research groups and personal investigations have found up to now, and comparing the pros and cons of AI regarding womenโs rights in the cyber domain. Lastly, recommendations and suggestions will be made for further research, and what questions need to be tackled will be discussed.
One issue that comes to mind when thinking of women and violence in the cyber domain is non-consensual intimate image distribution (NCIID) related to revenge porn, an issue that goes back as early as 2007. However, now it is the ever-evolving technological landscape that complicates this crime. Celebrities have already been victims of this deepfake technology, resulting in wide scandals and many fans reacting in outrage towards the creators of such images and videos. Recent developments show that not only celebrities or public figures are falling victim, but also private individuals. The victims include women from all socio-economic occupations and backgrounds, regardless of whether they are celebrities or not.
Furthermore, in Germany, the debate has been surrounding not only deepfakes affecting women about revenge porn but also child pornography being created by deepfakes. Initiatives such as HateAid are calling for stronger action, like establishing specific laws in Germany and the EU to tackle the creation and dissemination of AI-generated videos that are violent and cause severe harm. In Germany for example, while no law bans the creation or distribution of deepfakes thus far, policymakers currently working on developing laws to regulate this strongly, as can be read in the law draft of September 2024. The EU has issued laws against AI programs, broadly, in an attempt to protect fundamental human rights from AI-produced harm.
What about dating apps that use AI to match potential partners? Will there be complications in using this technology in relation to deepfakes? โDating apps are constantly collecting personal data to improve their matchmaking and interactions. This ongoing data collection raises significant concerns about data privacy and security. Many users may not fully understand (especially young users) the extent of the data being collected or how it is being used, which puts them at risk of data misuse or hacking.โ Adding this to our early analysis of the number of deepfakes and the misuse of personal information, the safety of women can take a new turn, not for the good.
Does AI have a positive influence thus far? What is the sentiment?
After having seen that many issues prevail when discussing deepfakes and revenge porn in relation to womenโs rights, it becomes relevant to ask, are there any benefits of AI in the cyber domain in combating deepfakes? Another emerging question asks, what can be done? What other laws do we need? What is the current debate on this matter?
What remains evident is that offenders have relatively easy access and means to create, share, and spread deepfakes on social media platforms. Expert Bernard Marr asserts that these companies are heading in the right direction and know how to use AI to combat revenge porn. Concerning long-term solutions, Meta has shared initiatives such as starting a special team to combat sextortion, similarly, StopNCII has developed specific hashtag codes to further stop the spread of compromising photos and videos.
Meta has also been developing some policies and strategies to tackle sextortion on social media platforms, for instance establishing a team that uses an automated system to detect and remove perpetratorsโ accounts, and reporting them to authorities. This team is working with the NCMEC (National Center for Missing and Exploited Children).
This already shows a step in the direction of getting law enforcement involved. However, research suggests that it remains challenging to find the individuals behind the deepfakes. Even after deepfakes are taken down, victims need reassurance that some sort of official statement will be made, to clarify that these were fake, also supporting the victimโs innocence. A sense of safety in the future and their present environment to mend the damage to their public image and help them overcome โ or at least manage โ the imminent long-lasting trauma resulting from this
Metaโs and other platformsโ initiatives help to find โifโ videos are deepfakes, but the big question remains: finding those in the first place. What if women are not aware that there are deepfakes of them circulating in the dark net or porn sites? Should women or individuals in general regularly check their names on the internet to find out if falsified images and videos of themselves intervening with AI are being spread or should this add to womenโs already straining mental health? Do we continue relying on the โlucky factorโ to find such videos or wait till one is confronted by these deepfakes, brought to us by friends, family, or worst, by co-workers? Policymakers should consider implementing this issue more strongly into university studies to train special forces to tackle the spread of deepfakes.
Certainly what needs further advancement is research about these technologies and enforcement laws, or at least suggestions to make sure that corporate companies sign up with tech organisations mandated to preserve a safe workspace. Another possible future development is that organisations should fulfill certain standards of cooperation with said technological institutions, and inform their employees on a regular basis about how to act and report in certain situations. The factor of technological know-how, as well as resources, play a big role, however, as well as big companies should have the means and support to engage in tackling deepfakes and disinformation campaigns since such โattacksโ could have long-lasting effects both on the victims and the organisations too. This idea leads us to think if we will have some sort of โautomated deepfake cyber warโ where deepfakes of women are put out there and AI algorithms are used to automatically track these videos down and delete them. It could become an endless back-and-forth of uploading deepfakes and taking them down.
Additionally, companies in general should consider that this is a new and very present threat that can happen to anyone at any time. Victims should be able to contact law enforcement as well as confidential contacts in order to sort out such matters before it could lead to bigger legal conflicts; once the damage is done it is often irreparable. This is also the initiative and message of lawyers and activists - such as Noelle Martin - that are strongly pushing for action against deepfakes. After asking others their opinion (anonymous interviews held via e-mail) on the matter, it becomes apparent that there is still much to be done and uncertainty about what should be done: โIt needs more debate and discussion โฆ Itโs easy to dismiss something if you donโt see a personal value in it. Iโm not too sure what else could be done other to know that thereโs something and being weary and attentive.โ(anonymous interview held by the author via e-mail on 20/2/25) ย Several interviewees have the opinion that deepfakes should be regulated or banned since those cross the line when they involve someoneโs identity without consent. A positive aspect is that many of the interviewees have already heard the term deepfake and agree that it needs to be discussed.
Further, it can be taken away from the Summit that the EU is planning to establish the โAI Gigafactoriesโ to โdevelop the most advanced very large models needed to make Europe an AI continent.โ Contrasting these gigafactories and their goals to the International Safety Report, it becomes apparent that a whole lot of work is still needed. With that many corporative initiatives in place to tackle the abuse of AI, a potential risk is losing the overview of what nations are doing in terms of policy. Clear and concise strategies need to be put into place to unify institutions, research groups, and governments when it comes to regulating AI and tackling the issue of deepfakes against women.
An argument can be made about the fact that while countries developing strategies and setting up numerous think tanks, research organisations, and summits, AI and technology are developing that fast demand for those strategies to be in vigor at such quick rate as well. A good model is Australia, which government has already taken the big step of criminalising the spread of non-consensual images in 2019, an initiative also pushed by activists such as Martin.
The above resonates with the words of one of our interviewees about deepfakes in relation to womenโs rights: โ(โฆ) there need to be stricter laws around how you can make use of deepfakes and what could be considered unlawful use of it.โ(Anonymous interview held via e-mail 25/2/25).
Conclusion and further thoughts
The purpose of this article was to show the current debate surrounding deepfakes and womenโs rights; clearly a vigorous one held by organisations, research groups, private investigators, as well as activists. Policymakers and governments are missed in this debate. Also, several articles and discussions are held too, a great sign in terms of tackling the issue.
The introduction of AI has brought many benefits to companies in terms of automation and faster workflows. The EU has made it clear at the recent Paris AI Summit their determination to invest more into the development of AI for the benefit of everyone, particularly in sectors such as research, environment, and healthcare. Many challenges, however, are yet to be addressed to manage and mitigate AIโs negative impact. It also remains to be seen what the recent Paris AI Summit will bring and how the increased investment will shape the landscape of AI.
If discussing AI programs battling generated AI deepfakes, is the matter a โcyber deepfake warโ? A certain cyber war, extensively discussed by scholars Thomas Rid and Joseph S Nye, has been taking place when considering the use of deepfakes against individuals when aiming to harm and cause havoc. Perhaps in the future, we will have an automatic back-and-forth of deepfakes being created and identified, to later be deleted from cyberspace, in an endless loop.
If the use of deepfake against women continues, schools should educate children and young adults on these topics. Of course, there is the risk of making people aware of these technologies in the first place. However, not addressing the issue would perhaps cause greater harm. One interviewee has the opinion to put โa societal shame on people who use deepfakes against womenโ (anonymous interview held via e-mail 24/2/25) to ensure that these actions are not repeated.
Another major step that started in the US with a bill under discussion called โTAKE IT DOWN,โ to ban deepfakes and protect women against revenge porn. It remains to be seen how this bill will develop and if such ban can be put in vigor. How will authorities track the deepfakes and how strongly will perpetrators be punished? These are all questions that remain open for discussion thus far.
Conversely, it should also be asked the other way around what about the impact that deepfakes have โ if any โ on men? Few studies address whether men also experience deepfake attacks. Thus far, not enough data is available to draw conclusions. However, it is suggested that men do not feel as much affected as women do. The latter must be taken with a grain of salt as some reports have shown that men also experience such attacks. This is an interesting matter for further research.
If these technologies are so easy to access and to spread false videos of women, then it should be equally easy to access an AI program to find them and have them removed. Perhaps, women (and any other people affected by this) could sign up for a platform where they can easily track whether degrading deepfakes are being spread about them, and consequently report them to authorities.
An argument can also be made about this all been said and done before while such technology keeps evolving.
Governments are trying to produce laws to tackle deepfakes, such as the USAโs and Germanyโs. The debate therefore needs to be kept as well to find new niches, uphold certain questions and inquiries going, and see what the next major AI Summit will bring. What will the planned AI Gigafactories bring to the table? Will a ban in the USA for example have an impact on the rest of the world? Is it possible to ban deepfakes as opposed to womenโs rights worldwide, as a unified strategy? Perhaps the main question and decision most countries will face is the following: Will we ban deepfakes as a whole or will we continue developing AI programmes to try and regulate the deepfake landscape? For now, it seems that rowing back on AI would be a very difficult process since so many governments and countries are invested however, developing AI to protect women could become a powerful tool and should be considered. We need to adapt our strategy and find the โchink in the chainโ with the โenemyโ in this case the harassers. For this, drawing on Sun Tzu could help which was also used by Chin-Ning Chu to apply the Art of War for Women: โYet Sun is saying that victory is not in your control but rather the gift of your enemy โ in other words, victory is assured when your enemy makes a mistake. Of course, itโs up to you to pinpoint your enemyโs weakness and exploit it.โ Time will tell how well we will adapt and find the loopholes.
byย Marco Dordoni (Arctic Desk)ย & Pedro Mendes (US Team)
Introduction
Trumpโs second term as President of the United States, has already outlined his key objectives. High on his priorities is the acquisition of Greenland, an autonomous territory under Danish administration. This is not the first time Trump has expressed interest in purchasing Greenland. During his first term, he floated the idea, sparking mixed reactions internationally. Trump described the island as a strategic asset and an economic opportunity due to its abundant mineral resources and its strategic location in the Arctic. However, the Danish government firmly rejected the notion, stating that Greenland was "not for sale." Despite the earlier rejection, the renewed interest in Greenland could stem from the Arcticโs growing significance, both for its untapped natural resources and emerging maritime routes, particularly in the context of climate change and shifting global geopolitics.
This article seeks to examine the strategic interests of the United States in the Arcticโparticularly in Greenlandโand to trace the evolution of the U.S. Arctic policy over time. It aims to contextualise the resurgence of Trumpโs focus on Greenland by analysing both historical developments and contemporary geopolitical dynamics shaping American foreign policy in the region.
The (Un)Frozen Path: U.S. Policy for the Arctic
It is important to analyse the US interest in the Arctic, from a traditional security perspective. As explained in the next section, the proximity of the border with Russia, through the Bering Strait, indicates the need for a greater armed presence, to counter Russiaโs growing military activity, as well as the need for strategic dominance in the face of Russiaโs ballistic missile range, concurrently with the presence of Russian nuclear submarines in the Kola Peninsula.ย
These facts brought to light the strategic potential of the area, Likewise, non-traditional security perspectives point to factors like climate change , which remain beyond the scope of the current article, but may bring a greater flow of traffic to the region, due to the melting of the surrounding ice, which calls for an increased focus on strategic opportunities, like new shipping routes, fibre cables, fishing lanes and raw minerals.
Current US Administrationโs view on the Arctic echoes the former statements about the expansionist danger of Russia and China. Exacerbated by Chinaโs 2018 policy paper, proclaiming itself a โnear Arctic Stateโ, China demonstrated interest in the area with initiatives and projects as the โPolar Silk Roadโ. Despite the dispute over its capabilities and status as an โArctic Stateโ, Beijing materialized USโs geopolitical fears in the Arctic with this document, positioning itself in the region aiming to challenge the remaining players.
Policy wise, tracing its origin in 2009, the USโs several documents, like the Arctic Region Policy Directive recognized the Arcticโs strategic importance to American interests, from a security and energy lens. It further led to a greater focus in future documents, as the comprehensive view offered by the 2022 US National Strategy for the Arctic Region and the 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, which defined the Arctic as critical and prioritized four key vectors: security, climate change, sustainable development, and international governance.
After years as a footnote in US political priorities, the new American perspective of the Arctic region reacts to the current background. The several stances, policies, documents and increased activity attests to the importance of the region on the geopolitical chessboard.
Why Greenland Matters the U.S. National Security?
In recent years, Greenland has re-emerged as a strategic hub for global security and geopolitical stability. U.S. President Donald Trump notably emphasized this perspective, stating in a recent interview, โWe really need Greenland for our national security.โ This strategic importance encompasses in particular defense and military dimensions but also energy and economic security.
From a defense and military standpoint, Russiaโs 2022 invasion of Ukraine significantly reshaped Western strategic priorities, refocusing attention on the Arctic. . Moscowโs military build-up in the regionโexemplified by bases such as Nagurskoye, located just 600 miles from Greenlandโhas heightened concerns in Washington. Greenlandโs geographic location has historically been a cornerstone of transatlantic security, serving as a key site for the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line radar systemโbased at Pituffik Space base formerly Thule Air Baseโand playing a crucial role in anti-submarine warfare due to its strategic position near the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap.These installations, critical during the Cold War, contributed to NATO's strategic advantage and are once again viewed as essential in countering current threatsโnamely Russia and, increasingly in Trumpโs view, China. The growing Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic, extending beyond economic collaboration, further underscores the region's strategic volatility.
Trump has argued that Denmark is ill-equipped to manage these emerging threats, citing its geographic distance from Greenland and limited military capabilities. Furthermore, Greenland's central position in the Arctic makes it increasingly relevant in light of new maritime trade routes expected to open annually due to the melting polar ice cap. Of particular interest to the United States are the Northwest Passage and the Transpolar Route, both of which could place Greenland at the heart of a strategic chokepoint in Arctic navigation.
Greenland has also become a critical focal point in the U.S.โChina economic rivalry due to its abundance of strategic resources essential for the global energy transition and for advancing technological capabilities in the defense sector. The island contains 25 of the 34 minerals classified by the EU as Critical Raw Materials, including uranium, cobalt, lithium, and rare earth elements. Estimates suggest that Greenland holds approximately 1.5 million tons of rare earth elementsโnearly equivalent to the entire U.S. reserve of 1.8 million tonsโthus significantly elevating its value in American strategic planning.
In the context of rising tensions with China, securing access to Greenlandโs critical mineral reserves could provide the United States with a significant strategic advantage, especially in the event of a trade conflict over rare earth elements. Nevertheless, substantial challenges hinder the exploitation of these resources. Although Greenlandโs autonomous government controls its mineral rights and has expressed openness to foreign the territory suffers from severe infrastructure deficienciesโincluding a lack of roads and portsโwhich severely constrain mining operations. The typical timeline to open a new mine can extend up to 16 years, deterring many potential investors.
The U.S. interest in Greenland, exemplified by Trumpโs proposal to acquire the islandโwhether through economic means or other strategiesโreflects a broader shift in international relations. Although firmly rejected by Denmark and the Greenlandic government with the slogan โGreenland is not for sale, and never will be,โ the episode highlights how economic and strategic interests of major powers are increasingly challenging long-established principles of international law, such as territorial sovereignty and the inviolability of national borders. Washingtonโs focus on Greenland extends beyond the Trump presidency and is part of a larger Arctic strategy, driven by military considerations and the regionโs vast reserves of minerals and hydrocarbons.
The general elections held on March 11, followed by negotiations that led to the formation of a new Greenlandic government, reaffirmed existing U.S. concerns and pressures. In response to mounting American efforts to acquire or exert military influence over Greenland, the majority party, Demokraatitโa moderate social-liberal partyโopted to form a broad national unity coalition, securing 75% of the parliamentary seats. One of the coalitionโs first actions was the release of a joint statement strongly condemning and opposing the repeated U.S. pressure directed at Greenland.
The U.S. strategy appears to be clear: emphasize the importance of international security and highlight Greenlandโs strategic significance in this context, positioning the American security umbrella as the only power capable of providing adequate protectionโnot only for Greenland and U.S. citizens, but also for European allies. This narrative underlines Denmarkโs alleged unpreparedness and inability to ensure such security.
In this regard, the U.S. is likely to support Greenlandโs path toward independence, with the aim of later offering military and economic protection. This approach leverages NATOโs limited engagement on the issueโan area still significantly influenced by the strategic direction set by the White House. โand the European Unionโs current phase of redefining and reassessing its external action.
By Idriss El Alaoui Talibi, Mahssan Afzali, & Michele Mignogna - Defence and Procurement Desk
Introduction
While early forms of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) have existed for decades, the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) has pushed these technologies beyond simple automation, making them more independent, adaptive, and more lethal than ever before. A groundbreaking innovation or a dangerous gamble?
While Ukraine has leveraged AI-driven drone swarms for reconnaissance and precision strikes, Israel has, in turn, deployed systems such as โLavenderโ or โGospelโ in bombing campaigns in Palestine. These battlefield realities embody this shift toward machine-driven decision-making in warfare, hinting at a future where AWS plays decisive roles in combat scenarios, raising several ethical, legal, but also strategic concerns.
The Third Revolution in Warfare
This shift, often called the โthird revolution in warfare,โ is being driven by rapid advancements in AI. As the global race for AI dominance intensifiesโespecially between the U.S. and Chinaโits impact is reaching far beyond the social and economic realms, reshaping military power and defense strategies.
With innovation largely led by the private sector, governments are no longer the primary drivers of technological change. Instead, they must adaptโeither by cooperating with or controlling tech firms. The U.S. and China represent two competing models: one focused on aligning public and private innovation, the other on centralising power under a single-party state. How these models perform will shape future global power dynamics and success on the battlefield.
As said, at the heart of this revolution is the private sector, which is rapidly transforming the defence landscape, and its players. Traditionally, military technology was dominated by established defence contractors such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, or BAE systems. However, lately, a new wave of tech-driven defence firms is challenging this status quo. Indeed, according to groundbreaking reports from the U.S., Palantir, Anduril, OpenAI, and SpaceX have formed a consortium to bid for defense contracts, leveraging their cutting-edge technologies to introduce AI-enhanced military capabilities to the defense industry. Recent data shows that between 2019 and 2022, U.S. military and intelligence agencies awarded major tech companies contracts worth at least $53 billion. Altogether, these firms aim at offering more agile and cost-effective solutions, potentially, reshaping, not only, modern warfare, but also the industry of defence.
The Involvement of Tech Companies
โTech companies are driving innovation at a pace that traditional defence contractors struggle to match. For example, Skydio, a San Francisco-based startup, has developed autonomous drones utilising artificial intelligence to execute missions without GPS. On the other hand, collaborations between OpenAI and Anduril Industries aim to integrate advanced AI technologies into military systems to enhance capabilities such as countering drone threats. This contribution, by nature, has resulted in vigorous competition in the pursuit of profit maximization and market dominance in defense technologies. Tech firms are increasingly engaging in defense contracts to expand their market presence. For instance, companies like Palantir and Anduril along with SpaceX and OpenAI are in pursuit of Pentagon contractswhile Skydio has secured significant contracts with the U.S. Department of Defense and its allies.
AI generated Picture
But regardless of their significant effect on military capabilities, these innovations can lead to reduced government control and therefore a cause for concern for national security. According to the World Economic Forum, non-state actors can convert civilian devices, like commercial drones, into lethal AW using open-source AI and lightweight processing. Once such software is adapted for military purposes, its global dissemination becomes challenging to control.
Additionally, the deployment of AWS has its own ethical complications. A central concern is the delegation of life-and-death decisions to machines without meaningful human control, especially when adhering to principles of distinction and proportionality under International Humanitarian Law. There is growing concern over the ability of these systems to effectively differentiate between combatants and non-combatants and to assess the proportionality of an attack. More complicated would be situations in which AI has picked up biases from underlying data sets and may wrongly determine who a legitimate target is based on factors including gender, age, race, and ability.
Conclusion
The integration of AI and AWS is ushering in a new era of warfareโone increasingly shaped not by governments alone, but by private tech companies whose innovation cycles far outpace traditional defence procurement models. This shift presents both unprecedented opportunities and complex challenges. On the one hand, firms like Palantir, Anduril, SpaceX, OpenAI, and Skydio are redefining what is technologically possible on the battlefield. On the other hand, their growing role in national security raises urgent questionsabout control, accountability, and ethical use.
As the arms race in AI intensifiesโparticularly between the U.S. and Chinaโit is not only state power but industrial ecosystems that will determine strategic advantage. The success of future military operations may depend less on the quantity of traditional assets and more on the ability to harness real-time data, autonomous systems, and AI-enhanced decision-making. This transforms procurement priorities, requiring defence institutions to adapt procurement frameworks, ensure effective oversight, and navigate a landscape where innovation is driven by market incentives rather than strategic necessity.
If left unchecked, the proliferation of AWS could destabilize existing deterrence models and accelerate a global arms race where lethal capabilities are deployed with reduced human oversight. Conversely, responsible integrationโbacked by clear policy, ethical safeguards, and intergovernmental coordinationโcould enhance operational effectiveness while maintaining international legal and moral standards.
Ultimately, the battlefield of tomorrow is being built todayโnot only in labs and war rooms, but in boardrooms, investment rounds, and strategic alliances between governments and the private sector. The question is no longer if tech companies will reshape global security, but how states will respond to remain in control of it.
