By Giovanni Giacalone - Central & South America Team

In recent years, Peru has experienced a dramatic increase in extortion targeting small and medium-sized business owners, transport operators, market vendors, construction contractors, and informal entrepreneurs. What had long existed as localized criminal racketeering has evolved into a broader system of organized extortion linked to transnational criminal groups, weakened institutions, prison-based networks, and the rapid expansion of urban insecurity. The phenomenon has become one of the central public security concerns in Peru, particularly in Lima and northern coastal cities.

The perpetrators seek to extract regular payments, commonly known as cupos, from businesses in exchange for “protection,” meaning immunity from violence carried out by the extortionists themselves. Extortion has spread across transportation companies, mototaxi associations, neighborhood stores, restaurants, construction sites, nightclubs, and even schools. Media reports and police investigations indicate that refusal to pay often results in shootings, grenade attacks, arson, or targeted killings.

A major factor in this transformation has been the expansion of the Venezuelan-origin criminal network known as the Tren de Aragua into Peru. According to investigations by the Peruvian National Police (PNP) and reporting by La República, factions associated with the group, including “Los Gallegos,” “Dinastía Alayón,” and “Los Injertos de Aragua,” have established extortion operations in Lima, Callao, Trujillo, and other urban areas. Primary sources from the Peruvian state also confirmed the scale of the problem. While the expansion of Tren de Aragua has contributed to the growth and sophistication of extortion networks in Peru, the problem itself is not new. Extortion long predates the group's arrival and is closely linked to broader issues such as urban insecurity, economic informality, and limited state presence in some communities.

One of the sectors most affected has been urban transportation. Bus companies and informal transport associations in Lima and Callao have reported systematic threats demanding daily or weekly payments. According to La República, members of “Los Injertos de Aragua” extorted public transportation firms through digital payment systems such as Yape, allowing criminals to collect payments anonymously while reducing physical exposure. The use of fintech applications illustrates how extortion practices have modernized technologically alongside Peru’s expanding informal digital economy.

Data published by Gestión, citing the Peruvian Attorney General’s Office’s Crime Observatory, documented at least 125 attacks related to extortion in Lima and Callao’s transportation sector between August 2024 and December 2025. The report noted that most victims were drivers, followed by passengers and fare collectors. This demonstrates that extortion has evolved beyond isolated threats into sustained systems of coercion affecting entire economic sectors.

Peruvian media coverage also highlights the psychological dimension of extortion. Victims frequently receive WhatsApp messages containing videos of firearms, photographs of family members, or recordings of previous murders. In one reported case involving a transportation entrepreneur in San Martín de Porres, criminals demanded 10,000 soles per month and threatened to “blow up” the victim’s house if payments stopped. The combination of digital intimidation and spectacular violence creates a climate of fear that discourages denunciation and weakens public trust in authorities.

Another important feature of the phenomenon is its relationship with Peru’s informal economy. A large proportion of Peruvian small businesses operate with limited legal protection, precarious access to banking, and minimal police presence. Extortion networks exploit these vulnerabilities. Informal transport operators, street vendors, and neighborhood businesses often lack insurance, legal representation, or the resources necessary to resist criminal pressure. In many districts, extortion effectively becomes an unofficial tax imposed by armed actors.

The testimonies of some of the extortion victims, who asked to remain anonymous, provide a rather clear modus operandi on the part of these criminal groups:

A 34-year-old dance teacher from central Lima told us that her business had been thriving until she began receiving disturbing WhatsApp messages demanding large sums of money in exchange for being allowed to continue operating safely. The messages included threats against her and her family, along with photos of places she frequently visited. One day, a funeral wreath was delivered to her apartment. That was the moment she decided to close her business and move abroad.

Another former business owner had to close his restaurant in Trujillo as it had become impossible for him to even reach the end of the month as the gang planning to extort him wanted all of his monthly income. Eventually, he moved to another area of ​​the country and then abroad.

In some cases, the individuals involved in the extortion rings are as young as twelve, as explained by the Peruvian police and reported by Infobae in May 2026:

“Criminal organizations have begun recruiting even younger children for serious crimes in Callao. General Espinoza detailed that there have been “several cases” of 12-year-old children armed and participating as hitmen or extortionists.”

Scholars and journalists have noted that Peru’s extortion crisis differs from earlier forms of criminal taxation seen during the internal conflict of the 1980s and 1990s. Contemporary extortion networks are decentralized, entrepreneurial, and highly adaptive. Rather than operating through ideological insurgency, they function through flexible criminal markets. Investigative reporting in El Comercio revealed how some organizations linked to the Tren de Aragua combined extortion with shell companies and international money transfers, indicating increasing financial sophistication.

For instance, on April 19, 2026, the National Police of Peru (PNP) managed to dismantle the criminal gang “Bunker Gota Colombo,” dedicated to extortion, inside its center of operations located in the southern Lima district of Villa El Salvador.

The detainees, eight foreign nationals and one Peruvian citizen, are being investigated for the alleged crimes of illegal manufacture and possession of firearms, as well as aggravated extortion linked to predatory lending practices. During the searches, authorities seized four sticks of dynamite allegedly used to intimidate victims. Officers also confiscated 33 cell phones, seven notebooks containing detailed records of loans and collections, 13 motorcycles, and one car.

The operation began following a complaint filed by a woman living in Villa El Salvador, who reported receiving constant threats demanding that she make payments through a digital wallet.

The consequences for Peru’s economy and civil society are substantial. Extortion increases operating costs for small businesses, discourages entrepreneurship, reduces investment in vulnerable neighborhoods, and reinforces informality. For many entrepreneurs, paying cupos becomes normalized as a cost of survival. In some cases, business owners close operations entirely or migrate internally to avoid threats. The burden falls disproportionately on lower-income Peruvians whose livelihoods depend on small-scale commerce.

Ultimately, the recent extortion phenomenon in Peru reveals a broader crisis of governance and the institutional capability to provide efficient urban security. The expansion of criminal organizations, the weakness of institutional enforcement, the growth of informal labor markets, and the technological adaptation of extortion practices have combined to create an environment in which violence becomes economically rational for criminal actors. As long as state legitimacy remains fragile and economic precarity widespread, extortion is likely to remain one of the defining challenges facing Peruvian society and for law enforcement.