By Angelo Saad Hintermayer - Africa Desk

Introduction

The European Union (EU) has taken a firm stance on the Russia-Ukraine war, unequivocally condemning Russia’s actions since the conflict’s onset, citing violations of international law and human rights. This position portrays the EU as a defender of moral and legal principles. However, is the EU’s commitment to international law consistently applied across all contexts? One particularly compelling case that raises questions about this consistency is the situation in Western Sahara. The EU has entered into agreements with Morocco concerning resources on Western Saharan territory, prompting scrutiny of its adherence to international legal standards. This blog article examines the EU’s involvement in the Western Sahara-Morocco conflict, focusing on the exploitation of natural resources. It begins by introducing the people of Western Sahara, followed by a brief overview of the conflict’s historical development and key actors today. It then outlines the current status of Western Sahara, highlighting the roles of Morocco and the EU, with a particular emphasis on the EU’s engagement in extractivism. Extractivism refers to the process of extracting natural resources, such as minerals, oil, or agricultural products, from the earth, often prioritising economic gain over environmental sustainability and social justice, and frequently involving the exploitation of marginalised communities’ lands without their consent. This article does not delve into human rights violations or the refugee crisis associated with the conflict, as these topics are highly sensitive. Instead, it aims to present the issue from multiple perspectives to foster informed debate beyond academic circles.

People of Western-Sahara

The nomads of Western Sahara are called by the term Sahrawi, which is Arabic for “Saharan”. Sahrawi is sometimes also used as a synonym for “Western Saharan”, but this term goes along with some issues, which are not only related to a semantic problem. The problem implies a territorial limitation in Western Sahara today, even though the term Sahrawi refers in most definitions to an ethnic category rather than to a political-geographic term. There are Sahrawi natives outside of the now known Western Sahara, namely in the South of Morocco, West of Algeria and North of Mauritania. That given, the most convenient definition for the Sahrawi people should rather be understood as “[…] Hassaniyyah-speaking people who claim membership among at least one of the social groupings found in and around the area now known as Western Sahara”.

From colonialisation to a missing referendum and occupation

The Western Sahara conflict began at the 1885 Berlin Conference, where European powers divided Africa. Spain gained control of the region from Cap Blanc to Cap Bojador and, in 1900 and 1904, acquired Spanish-South Morocco near Tarfaya from France. In 1958, Western Sahara became a Spanish colony. After Morocco (1956), Mauritania (1960), and Algeria (1962) achieved independence, they supported Western Sahara’s decolonisation and a 1973 UN referendum. The Polisario Front emerged in 1973 as a key player. Spain planned independence, but Morocco’s King Hassan II launched the “Green March” on November 6, 1975, sending 350,000 civilians and soldiers into the territory. Amid Franco’s impending death, Spain signed the Madrid Accords, ending its rule by 1976 and dividing the region: Morocco took the north, Mauritania the south. No referendum occurred, ignoring Sahrawi aspirations. On February 2, 1976, the Polisario declared the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and fought Morocco and Mauritania. By 1979, the SADR expelled Mauritania, but Morocco seized the south. At its peak, the SADR controlled 90% of Western Sahara and attacked inside Morocco. Morocco responded with fortified walls guarded by mines and soldiers. In the conflict, Morocco gained the upper hand, and the SADR faced heavy losses. In 1991, UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuéllar negotiated a ceasefire, leading to Resolution 690 and the MINURSO peacekeeping mission. Proposals like Baker Plan I and II followed, but the referendum stalled over voter eligibility: Morocco argued Green March settlers should vote, while the Polisario limited it to 1974 residents. The UN recognised the impasse, turning the referendum into a “winner-takes-all” standoff, halting progress.

Extraactivism

Morocco’s 1975 occupation of Western Sahara has driven extensive resource extraction, often violating international law by excluding Sahrawi consent and benefits, as stipulated in a 2002 UN legal opinion. Motivated by the nationalist vision of a “Greater Morocco,” encompassing parts of Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Western Sahara, and the region’s rich resources—phosphates, fish, oil, gas, and metals like gold and platinum—Morocco has pursued a considerable exploitation. Since the 1970s, Morocco’s state-owned OCP has exported 1.23 million tons of phosphate rock from the Bou Craa mine in 2022, generating $655.5 million for importers like India and New Zealand, with plans for a new port despite Western Sahara Resource Watch’s “P for Plunder” reports urging cessation. Industrial fishing, enabled by the EU-Morocco Fisheries Agreement until a 2023 EU Court ruling requiered Sahrawi consent, primarily exports sardines and mackerel, generating significant revenue for Morocco. Oil and gas exploration, which began in the 1950s and intensified after Morocco´s occupation, involved companies like Total, Kerr-McGee, and Kosmos Energy. Total later withdrew, and while Kosmos and Cairn Energy drilled offshore in 2014, they found no viable deposits. Morocco continues to issue exploration licenses to coompanies like NewMed, backed by Delek Group, Deutsche Bank, and BlackRock. Sand exports to the Canary Islands, along with mineral exploration for uranium and gold, and agriculture expansion near Dakhla— covering to 963 hectares by 2016 on land owned by Morocco’s king and companies like Azura— are depleting local water reserves, fueled by EU trade deals. The EU, receiving 64% of Morocco’s exports, benefits from fishing, phosphate mining, and renewable energy projects such as Siemens’ wind farm supporting phosphate extraction. Morocco fears an independent Sahrawi state could destabilise the Sahel and point to the Polisario’s lack of governance experience, proposing autonomy in 2007 while Morocco controlling foreign and defense policies. The Polisario, however, insists on a referendum for full independence. Meanwhile, German and Irish groups advocate for excluding non-consensual firms from trade, though Morocco warns this could increase migration.

In October 2024, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that the 2019 EU-Morocco trade and fisheries agreements were invalid because they included Western Sahara without the explicit consent of its people, violating their right to self-determination. The ECJ emphasised that Western Sahara is a distinct, non-self-governing territory, and agreements affecting it must involve consultation with the Sahrawi people through their recognised representative, the Polisario Front. This decision reaffirmed earlier rulings from 2015, 2016, 2018, and 2021, and mandated that products like melons and tomatoes from Western Sahara be labeled as such, not as Moroccan, to avoid misleading consumers. The ruling, a significant victory for the Polisario Front, it has impacted Morocco’s exports, which constitute 64% of its trade with the EU, and affects EU companies involved in fishing, phosphate extraction, and renewable energy projects in the region. The EU has 12 months to adjust the agricultural agreement to comply with international law, balancing its strategic partnership with Morocco, which criticised the ruling as biased and politically motivated. The European Commission is analysing the judgment to ensure compliance while maintaining relations with Morocco, a key partner in regional stability. The ECJ’s decision underscores the legal necessity of Sahrawi consent, aligning with UN principles on the sovereignty of non-self-governing territories over their resources, and may influence future EU trade policies in disputed regions.

Conclusion

The Western Sahara conflict highlights a troubling contradiction between the European Union's actions and its core values and norms. By engaging in trade agreements with Morocco that exploit Western Sahara’s resources—such as phosphates, fish, and agricultural products—without the consent of the Sahrawi people, the EU has apparently contributed to the perpetuation of injustice in the region. The EU’s economic involvement, exemplified by the invalidated 2019 trade and fisheries agreements, has enabled Morocco’s occupation and resource extraction, which violate international law and the Sahrawi’s right to sovereignty over their resources, as affirmed by the 2024 ECJ ruling. This ruling underscores that the EU’s trade practices contravene its commitment to international law and the principles of the UN Charter, which emphasise the self-determination of non-self-governing territories. Furthermore, the EU’s prioritisation of strategic relations with Morocco over ethical considerations undermines its stated values of justice, equality, and solidarity, as outlined in the Treaty on European Union. The EU’s complicity, driven by economic interests and benefiting from 64% of Morocco’s exports, not only marginalises the Sahrawi but also weakens the EU’s credibility as a global advocate for human rights and democratic principles. To align with its normative framework, the EU should prioritise Sahrawi consent in future agreements, enforce accurate labeling of Western Saharan products, and support a referendum for self-determination, thereby addressing its role in perpetuating this longstanding injustice. The revised EU-Morocco agreement is expected to be presented by October 2025, in line with the ECJ's request.