By Francesco Foti

In Western democratic systems, it is customary to promote spaces for pluralistic debate on sociopolitical phenomena. However, given the security threats arising from political polarisation and radicalisation dynamics, it is important to make a rigorous distinction between political criticism and discriminatory rhetoric, and to apply continuous monitoring of extremism and extremist actors seeking to destabilise Italy’s democratic fabric, without compromising individual rights. 

According to the Centro di Documentazione Ebraica Contemporanea (CDEC), in 2024 there were 877 antisemitic incidents recorded — nearly double the 454 incidents in 2023. The increase includes both online hate speech (insults, slurs, threats) and real-world episodes: vandalism, physical assaults, threats to Jewish individuals, and attacks against Jewish institutions. The escalation coincides with international events — in particular, the war in Gaza and the October 7, 2023 massacre by Hamas — which have fuelled a surge in “anti-Zionist” protests that often overlapped with classic antisemitic tropes and rhetoric.

The pro-Palestinian protests that have fuelled antisemitism are said by some analysts to originate from the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood on the current far-left political thought prevalent among many commentators, activists, and political groups. The UCOII has been linked to this influence. The organisation includes the USMI (Unione degli Studenti Musulmani in Italia), which plays a significant role in the funding of mosques in Italy. According to some investigative reports, this group works closely with extra-parliamentary far-left and anarchist circles. A 2025 academic study mapping the Italian Telegram ecosystem found evidence that far-left and far-right rhetoric sometimes mix in chats; it also identified widespread toxicity and hate speech targeting Jews among other groups.

Some intelligence and counter-extremism sources associate the UCOII with FIOE — the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe — which is often described as linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. However, some analysts warn that the legal and institutional framework in Italy does not sufficiently regulate Islamist and charity associations, potentially leaving room for greater ideological influence and individuals of concern.

It is therefore important to identify the presence of political Islam operating covertly within anti-Israel protests. These underlying strategies are consistent with the goals of Muslim Brotherhood ideologues, who have historically found fertile ground in universities, political centers, and youth movements.

The recent episodes of antisemitism indicate that the radicalisation of receptive individuals is well underway. All of this suggests that increased security measures and surveillance of sensitive sites — such as synagogues, Jewish centers, and even non-Jewish places that may hold symbolic value for extremists or sleeper cells — should be accompanied by a counter-narrative exposing the alleged role of the Muslim Brotherhood in anti-Israel protests.

The U.S. State Department decision to designate Antifa and other far-left organisations as terrorist groups has been described as a step forward by some observers. However, this would also require the formal designation of organisations and movements linked to the Muslim Brotherhood as extremist. The objective should be to formally declare Hamas-linked entities incompatible with the values of the State and a threat to collective security, especially in a period marked by Islamist attacks and extremism elsewhere in Europe.

In recent years, Italian public debate has seen a rise in hostile expressions toward Israel, often presented as legitimate political criticism. Anti-Zionism—understood as opposition to the State of Israel as a political-state project—and antisemitism, which aims to delegitimise or demonise the Jewish community as such, appear to be inseparably linked. In various contexts, this dividing line is increasingly blurred: slogans, symbols, and narratives adopted in certain public demonstrations show a tendency to overlap judgments about the Israeli government with stigmatising representations of Jewish identity, fostering a climate of hostility that cannot be ignored.

At the same time, part of the security analysis reveals an additional element: the possibility that organisations or individuals linked to international extremist groups may attempt to allegedly channel funds to Hamas or insert themselves into street mobilisations characterised by a strong anti-Israel orientation. These last ones would be opportunistic attempts to exploit emotionally polarised contexts in order to amplify messages or recruit sympathisers—a phenomenon already observed in other parts of Europe. Potential infiltration should be regarded as a risk scenario that requires monitoring and analysis based on verified sources.

The boundary between freedom of protest, political criticism, and incitement to hatred is particularly delicate in an international context marked by strong tensions. The adoption of radicalised slogans, the use of ambiguous symbols, or the presence of narratives that justify violence against civilians—regardless of their nationality or affiliation—contribute to normalising forms of extremism that could take root in public debate. In this framework, Italy is not exempt from the risks affecting many European societies: the growth of polarising discourse can foster the marginalisation of Jewish communities and fuel hostility, with potential repercussions for social cohesion.