By Ilas Touazi - Africa desk

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the privatisation of security has emerged in response to transnational security threats. At the same time, with the events of September 11, the global security landscape was completely transformed, with the private security sector playing a crucial role in the fight against terrorism, thus initiating a significant shift in the transition from the mere privatisation of security services to the privatisation of counter-terrorism efforts. Given that Africa has become “the epicentre of global terrorism”, the African governments have turned to private military and security companies (PMSCs) as key players in the privatisation process of counter-terrorism and security sector governance, highlighting existing security gaps.

Globalization of Private Security: from the privatisation of security to counter-terrorism privatisation

In the post-Cold War era, the craze for the “privatisation of security” has spread globally in response to “transnational security threats”. This process was associated with efficiency and effectiveness in an international context characterised by numerous failures of centralised “Westphalian states” overwhelmed by “security dilemmas” of a changing nature, especially with the emergence of intra-state conflicts. Meanwhile, a major development in the state system of international relations (IR) has taken place with the reconfiguration of the roles of the state, which has ceded its position as the only legitimate provider and guarantor of security to private and non-state military security agents. Indeed, the increasing prominence of “private security entities” as crucial actors in global politics clearly mirrors the transformations in international “security governance” characteristic of the postmodern era; consequently, “private military firms” and “mercenaries” have evolved into novel types of normative agents that engage in interaction, collaboration, and rivalry, thereby establishing a three-way dynamic of institutionalised security engineering. Nevertheless, this trend results in the breakdown of conventional state governance structures, occurring within a context where the connections between public, private, global, and local domains are being redefined. Simultaneously, the African continent has also been the scene of the interaction between privatisation and the globalisation of security in the midst of the rise of private security providers, going beyond the traditional vision of state authority, which is moving more towards a new complex model of governance involving public and private security actors which blurs the line between internal and external, regional and international security.

The post-September 11 global security environment has offered the private security market a key role in the fight against terrorism; thus, a new turn has begun in changing the path from the privatisation of security to the privatisation of counter-terrorism. However, the formation of public-private partnerships (P3) has intensified with the engagement of private sector security professionals in favour of a broader intersectoral strategy to combat terrorism as part of a standardised approach to “terrorism securitisation” that includes the contribution of private security actors to prevention efforts. On the one hand, the privatisation of counter-terrorism has been undertaken to meet the intense needs of anti-terrorist cooperation operations abroad, with gaps to be filled in terms of toolboxes, whether in terms of resources, forces, or capabilities. On the other hand, private companies after September 11, 2001, had become de facto subcontractors of “counter-terrorism security operations” traditionally carried out exclusively by state agencies to avoid any control and direct legal responsibility. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has led to an increased reliance on private security companies while emphasising a “strategic capabilities-based approach” but also the adoption of a “preventive counter-terrorism strategy” against an unknown adversary that requires a refocusing of the mission of the armed forces, where the private sector is actively involved in an operational dynamic of “risk management” and clearly distinguishes it from previous “threat-based approaches”. Importantly, private security entities have become a crucial tool in the efforts of governments to maintain national security; thus, the privatisation of counter-terrorism takes several forms, namely open, closed, statutory and non-contractual co-option. Undoubtedly, this is manifested through their central roles to play in counter-terrorism surveillance (CTS), in particular in the fight against terrorist financing and in the use of technology to secure infrastructure against cyberterrorism. The private security sector plays an important role both in the prevention and response to critical incidents, including terrorist attacks; moreover, private security personnel provide information, command, control and communications in the management of terrorist risk. This sector has become an effective element of counter-terrorism capabilities and occupies the top level of strategic prevention plans.

The private security and military companies PSMCs in Africa: actors of international security

In Africa, the privatisation of security reflects the major shifts that the concept of security has undergone, moving from the exclusive domain of the State to private actors in a context characterised by hybridity and fragmentation, involving an array of private military and security companies (PMSCs), which have emerged as an alternative path to African security governance, primarily dominated by the erosion of State capacities, with a deficit in the regulation of the security sector. The PMSCs have become regular actors in the African security landscape. Organised as legal corporate entities, they provide a wide range of military and security services, including transport, maintenance, military and police training, demining, intelligence, risk analysis, armed and unarmed protection services, anti-piracy measures, border protection, drones and cyber operations. Indeed, African governments regularly call on transnational corporations (TNCs) to ensure security in areas with limited state status. The PMSCs and non-state actors, notably South Africa's Executive Outcomes (EO), have grown since the end of the Cold War as a result of the state's bankruptcy and the deficit in monopoly and use of power. The intensification of conflicts across the continent has been the driving force behind the privatisation of security, especially since the dynamics of these conflicts remain varied and complicated, and the involvement of the private security sector was a reality even during the post-independence period, due to arbitrary colonial borders and the nature of the post-colonial African state and patrimonialism. In fact, the private security industry also possesses the competence and capacity to conduct conflicts and wars. From this perspective, the increase in conflicts has created a need for private contractors to support and fill operational gaps in United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian aid missions; thus, PMSCs provide the UN with a multitude of services, including logistics, military training, and security sector reform, becoming key international security actors, and Africa is not immune to this.

The use of PMSCs in Africa has evolved from mercenary to undergo a significant transformation in the 1990s, becoming privatised and business-orientated. Whereas historically these non-state actors have been involved in activities related to civil wars and the exploitation of natural resources. With this in mind, Sierra Leone and Angola have been supported by military companies to fight against rebellions and regain control of diamond-rich regions. In addition, Congo recruited the Belgian company Union Minière between the period from 1960 to 1965. PMSCs often resorted to operations related to coups d'état and the fight against communism, white supremacy and the preservation of quasi-colonial structures in the 1960s and 1970s. The factors that have led to the rapid growth of the private security sector in Africa are generally linked to human insecurities resulting from the failure or weakness of states in the context of globalisation, which facilitates access to the private security sector, particularly with the commodification of the public sphere and the professionalisation of the armed forces and police in search of profit maximisation accentuated by the liberalisation of the arms trade.

The privatisation of counter-terrorism in Africa: understanding the complex and shifting dynamics

The fight against terrorism has become a priority on the agenda of private security companies in Africa. PMSCs actively support African governments primarily in the areas of combating the spread of transnational security threats, particularly in war governance, counter-insurgency (COIN), and counter-terrorism (CT). In this regard, the South African PMC Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment, and Protection (STTEP International Ltd) has intervened against Islamic terrorist groups and Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Sahel region. As a result, in the face of poor governance policies and ineffective management of the terrorist threat and security risks, this has led to the formation of non-state security actors as an intermediate security factor. Security groups like the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and the Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) were established to combat terrorist groups but as complementary entities to the security architectures of the police and the armed forces to help strengthen security functions. Western PMSCs are heavily involved in the privatisation efforts of counter-terrorism, namely the British Aegis Defence Services and Olive Group, the French companies Secopex and Agemira, the German companies Asgaard and Xeless and the American companies Triple Canopy and Advan Fort Co. Already in 2017, according to a Pentagon report, there were 21 private American security firms in the Sahel. All these entities are engaged in providing multifaceted operations to combat the emergence of extremist jihadist organisations. Thus, African countries receive operational training and logistical support in the field of anti-terrorism cooperation. In the current geopolitical circumstances, the fight against terrorism is the argument put forward by African governments that hire PMCs to counter the spread of jihadist groups. That is why new private military companies are operating in Africa, including Israeli private companies, and the UAE-based Black Shield Security.

The Sahel region in Africa has become a “coup belt”, especially since 2020, when military juntas came to power in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea and Niger. Meanwhile, the rapid expansion of militant jihadist groups, led by local subsidiaries of the Islamic State group, namely the Islamic State Province in the Sahel (ISSP) and Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), a branch of al-Qaida, has created a chaotic situation, as a result of which civilian and military governments have been unable to combat the security threats posed by jihadist groups, calling on private military and security companies (PMSCs) as key actors in the privatisation process of the fight against terrorism. In truth, the security vacuum and the inability of successive administrations to restore security order in the face of the emergence of an armed rebellion in the remote regions of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, led by groups linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS), are often instrumentalised by new military governments by promising to deal with Islamist fighters with an excessive reliance on security justification related to growing concerns about transnational insecurity. For example, the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP) in Mali used security gaps in the face of the territorial gains of radical jihadists to defend the military takeover in 2021, while in Burkina Faso, the putsch took place in September 2022 due to an inability to fight an Islamic insurgency. Indeed, the private military and security sector in Africa has recently been redefined, making way for new companies from emerging countries in a context of great power struggle, notably through the Chinese Frontier Services Group (FSG), while the Wagner paramilitary group has adopted a militaristic approach to combating terrorism in Africa. However, most countries in sub-Saharan Africa – Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania – have sought military and security support in the fight against the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. This also partly explains the proliferation of the Turkish International Defence Consulting Company (SADAT), which operates in the Sahel region destabilised by endemic terrorism and fragile security policies.

African approach in the field of the privatization of counter-terrorism: PSMCs within security sector governance and reform (SSG/R)

Despite the fact that the African private sector plays a key role in counter-terrorism missions, including intelligence gathering, border management, humanitarian assistance and reintegration. The use of PMSCs exposes African states to numerous ethical and moral concerns, particularly in terms of national security and sovereignty, as the reliance on private contractors increases the risk of vulnerability and security gaps due to shortcomings in the field of drone technology innovation and territorial surveillance missions. Even more seriously, this is accompanied by the transformation of the notion of the “citizen-soldier” looking out for the “common good” into a “private mercenary” seeking “individual financial gains” as the primary motivation, which raises the question of the divergence and non-conformity of the interests of PMCs with those of the States in wars and in counter-terrorism theatres of operations. Furthermore, despite attempts to regulate PMSC activities, regional and international efforts are still largely ineffective. In doing so, the use of PMSCs raises a number of ethical issues both in jus ad bellum and jus in bello, as they largely operate outside the effective jurisdiction of national and international law, unlike states and regular soldiers who are subject to a number of laws that restrict the conduct of war under international law. This is why the “Montreux Document” constitutes the intergovernmental framework that establishes international legal obligations and good practices for states in terms of PMSC operations during armed conflicts intended to promote respect for international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law. 

South Africa was one of the first countries to adopt legislation regarding PMSCs with the 1998 Foreign Military Assistance Regulation Act and the 2001 Private Security Industry Regulation Act, amended in 2013. While at the regional level, there are numerous efforts by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and its successor, the African Union (AU), to eliminate mercenary activities and regulate the PMSC industry that continues to thrive on the continent. Particularly within the framework of the African Convention on the Elimination of Mercenaries’ in Africa in 1977, notably Article 2(c) and Article 4(b); the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, from 1999; and the AU Non-Aggression and Defence Pact, from 2005; as well as the communiqué regarding the withdrawal of foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya to the Sahel and the rest of Africa, adopted by the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) in 2021. The AU plays a key role across the continent in promoting good governance of the security sector. The Political Framework on Security Sector Reform in 2014, related to the regulation of the private security sector, including non-state security bodies, was adopted. The AU deplores the use of PMSCs by AU Member States, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and their international partners, who must comply with international, regional, and national frameworks. The AU also emphasises the need for AU Member States to develop a holistic approach to Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the field of PMSCs to ensure that legal, political, and policy frameworks reflect good governance of PMSCs, making them more effective and accountable, both at the organisational and operational levels, in line with international and regional SSG/R standards.

Conclusion

It is evident that the complex and evolving international context of the post-Cold War era, as well as the events of September 11, 2001, marked an irreversible shift in the global expansion of private security and the fight against terrorism in Africa, characterised by the involvement of private military and security companies (PSMCs) in counter-terrorism operations, increasingly playing a major role in intelligence, counter-terrorism surveillance (CTS), counter-insurgency (COIN), and risk management related to the terrorist threat. Despite this, the involvement of PSMCs in the fight against terrorism poses major constraints regarding security dependence and the loss of national sovereignty since these firms are tied to the foreign policy agenda of their countries of origin and are often an instrument of competition between major powers in Africa. Thus, to address such ethical and moral concerns, aiming to promote respect for international humanitarian law (IHL), the African Union has established an intergovernmental framework that sets international legal obligations and best practices for PSMCs with a holistic approach to security sector reform (SSR).