Conflict Archives – ITSS Verona

May 14, 2025 — No Comments

Drivers of Chronic Unrest in Eastern Congo

By Andrea Sau - Africa Desk

In April 2025, the Eastern Congo unrest seemed to have shifted timidly toward the end of major conflicts. First, on 23 April 2025, the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”) and, alleged by DRC and some international observers, the Rwanda-backed militia M23 released a joint statement in which they pleaded to cease hostilities that have soared since January 2025. Subsequently, on 25 April 2025, the DRC and Rwanda signed an economic cooperation and peace agreement. The accord was brokered by the United States, which, in return, was promised access to the mineral resources of the country.

At the beginning of April, before the most recent developments, ITSS interviewed Professor Koen Vlassenroot to better understand the possible drivers of the unrest in the region. In this article, a timeline of the events will be drawn from the Rwandan genocide to the recent escalation of 2025. Furthermore, the origin of M23 will be analysed, including what the movement has been in the last 15 years and what motivations have fueled the group. Finally, these insights will be used to infer what the future of the Eastern DRC might look like after the signing of the agreements.

From the Rwandan genocide to the rise of M23

Between April and July 1994, at least 800,000 ethnic Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed by the Hutu majority in Rwanda. The Rwandan genocide has heavily characterised the history of Rwanda and its neighbouring countries for the past 31 years. In July 1994, a coalition of exiled Tutsi called the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which had attempted to gain control of Rwanda since 1990, managed to take over the country and put an end to the genocide. The DRC was remarkably affected in the wake of the Rwandan genocide and civil war, as between 1993 and 1996, almost 2 million Hutus emigrated to the neighbouring regions of North and South Kivu in the Eastern Congo.

In 1996, a coalition of countries led by Rwanda, which included Uganda, Burundi, and Angola, launched an invasion into the Eastern DRC, then called Zaire and led by Dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. The First Congo War stemmed from two major elements: on one side, the Congolese opposition, led by Laurent Kabila, attempted to overthrow the Mobutu regime, and on the other hand, the surrounding countries wanted to deal with the security concerns generated by the Mobutu-backed militias active in the region. Unfortunately, it is to be noted that most of the victims were civilians and refugees inhabiting North and South Kivu territories.

In the years after he came to power, Laurent Kabila faced a complex conundrum. He needed to gain ground in local Congolese civil society, but to do that, he had to take a distance from the country that helped his accession to power, Rwanda. The Second Congo War was triggered by the decision from Kabila to expel the Rwandan and allied troops from the Eastern Congo. This resulted in support from Rwanda and Uganda to the rebel group Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (“RCD”), composed of various ethnicities part of the macro group of the Banyarwanda. The war was concluded by a lengthy peace process that started in 2001 and ended in 2006 with the election of Joseph Kabila as president of the DRC. Joseph was the son of Laurent Kabila, who died in 2001.

The peace process and the UN peacekeeping mission MONUC (later MONUSCO) were not enough to bring lasting peace in the Eastern DRC. The process was rejected by the still active Tutsi groups in North and South Kivu, the most prominent example being Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (“CNDP)”. According to CNDP and other military groups, backed by Rwanda, the 2006 election did not guarantee sufficient representation for the Tutsi groups in North and South Kivu. After fights escalated, the civilian death toll increased even further between 2006 and 2009. A new peace process started in 2009, attempting a brassage which was intended to be a progressive integration of the armed groups into the DRC army. The agreement was signed by CNDP and the other groups on 23 March 2009.

The results of this renovated peace process did not fully satisfy part of the CNDP members; therefore, in 2012, the failure to implement the March 23 agreement resulted in mutiny by a group that called itself the March 23 movement, or in short, M23.

M23 drivers and motivation for its accomplishments

The rise of M23 in 2012 was short-lived but somewhat rapid. By November 2012, the movement managed to conquer the city of Goma, North Kivu's major city. International pressure managed to push M23, and especially its allegedly main sponsor, Rwanda, to bring the movement within the Rwandan and Ugandan borders.

The unrest in the DRC, and Eastern Congo especially, did not cease after 2012, but the country experienced in 2018 the first peaceful transition of democratic power as Etienne Tshisekedi took over the presidency. However, M23 apparently claimed that Tshisekedi was not committed to existing peace agreements and decided to return to action in November 2021. In the early 2020s, M23 gained momentum rapidly again, with - according to UN reports and regional observers - the support of Rwanda, even with troops on the ground. M23 managed to defeat the DRC troops several times, both because of external support and due to the Congolese army persistent corruption and structural weakness.

However, the distrust toward Tshisekedi cannot be pinned as the sole or main reason for the return of M23. While their objectives cannot be surely identified, the movement has a plethora of motivations that may have fueled the return to arms. Firstly, M23 had a more grounded approach since 2021, and while still targeting civilians, it aimed at controlling territories in North and South Kivu. In 2012, it was only a question of fighting against the power that the reckon was not respecting the accords. In the 2020s, the motivations had morphed, and since its return, M23 has established outposts, electing majors and administrators, and governed cities and territories. Furthermore, one important element is that M23 is part of the Alliance Fleuve Congo (“AFC”). AFC is a more politically involved movement with large overlaps with M23 in its leadership, and contrary to M23 itself, it has national ambitions. It is under the AFC umbrella that the April 2025 accords have been signed.

According to some sources, the Rwandan support has also changed; it has increased its direct involvement and reportedly has aided in the propaganda and recruitment. Rwandan president Kagame has often justified the involvement of Rwanda in the region and the M23 presence as a way of protecting Tutsi in North and South Kivu. While this claim is often refuted, there is also a general discredit and hate speech towards speakers of Kinyarwanda, Rwanda’s national language, in Eastern Congo, aggravated by decades of conflict.

The control of the mineral wealth of Congo is often cited by international publications as one of the key factors. The Eastern region is rich in gold and coltan, which is key for the sustainable transition. It is worth noting, however, that M23 has, for the most part, only gained from smuggling rather than the mining itself, and only in April 2024 gained direct access to a Coltan mine in Kabaya. During the period between November 2021 and April 2024, M23 conducted a campaign funded by alternative means. Rwanda has, in recent years, widely increased its export of minerals. However, although coltan exports are increasing, gold remains the country's main mineral export. According to multiple independent reports, there are credible concerns that this gold originates from the eastern part of the DRC. Additionally, one factor that needs to be taken into consideration is whether the presence of active conflict benefits or not the gold smuggling and extraction business. Academic studies indicate the opposite: the gold smuggling system does not necessarily benefit from active conflict.

Finally, Congo has the largest reserves of cobalt in the world, also extremely important for tech and clean energy purposes. This stockpile is located in the South of the country, which is, on the contrary, relatively more stable (although the Tigres movement has had some traction over the years). Therefore, it is important to understand that minerals do have an important role in the instability; however, they are not the main drivers of the conflict, but one of the many complex elements that fuel the fights in North and South Kivu.

What now?

The April 2025 agreement is not the first ceasefire attempt signed between M23 and the DRC. In July 2024, they signed a pact, mediated by Angola, that was quickly broken with mutual accusations of not respecting the accord. The aftermath of this fallout resulted in the most successful M23 campaign to date, in terms of territorial gains. What we can observe is however that this time the agreement came a few days after the agreement with Rwanda, and this may limit the option to come back to fighting for M23.

Thus, is this series of agreements going to solve the situation? The main issue, also underlined by Professor Koen Van Klassenroot in the interview with ITSS, is the fragmentation of the movements. The Alliance Fleuve Congo and M23 are only one part of the wider puzzle, Eastern Congo is plagued with smaller and as deadly armed groups. Other active armed factions involved in the increasingly complex fighting in eastern DRC include the DRC army-aligned Nyatura in North Kivu, the Islamic State-backed Allied Democratic Forces, which has recently increased attacks in Uganda, and CODECO and Zaire, who are in dispute in Ituri province.

International interest, such as US corporations have also pushed to access the mineral wealth of the DRC, and they could benefit from a situation more under control, and therefore, spend political capital on the US foreign policy in central Africa. The role of international players is going to be key to understanding how civilian massacres could be mitigated in a region that has been characterised by conflict for a long time.

April 18, 2025 — No Comments

Professor Koen Vlassenroot on the Eastern Congo conflict

Professor Koen Vlassenroot talks about the origin and current state of the Eastern Congo conflict. Koen Vlassenoot is a professor of Political science at the University of Ghent where he directs the Centre On Armed groups.

In this session, he discusses the ethnic and historical origins of the Eastern Congo conflict and describes the role, or lack thereof, of natural resources in the current clashes between the DRC and M23.

Interviewers: Andrea Sau, Leonardo Pesci, and Massimiliano Dosmo - Africa Desk

January 31, 2025 — No Comments

Loredana Teodorescu on Women’s Rights in International Conflict

In this session, Dr. Teodorescu delves into the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, exploring approaches to advancing women’s rights in international conflict and the critical role of women’s integration in achieving sustainable solutions. She highlights the importance of holding countries accountable through international frameworks like the WPS agenda and shares insights on how empowering women is essential for building long-term peace and security.

Dr. Teodorescu is a distinguished expert in European policies, migration, and gender issues. She serves as the Head of European and International Affairs at Istituto Luigi Sturzo in Rome and is the President of the Italian chapter of Women in International Security. She also leads the Mediterranean Women Mediators Network, focusing on women's roles in peace and security.

Interviewers: Hanorah Hardy and Sofia Sutera - Human Rights Team

October 28, 2024 — No Comments

Dr. Jozef Hrabina on Russia’s Strategic Game: Shifts, Doctrine, and the Ukraine War

Dr. Jozef Hrabina talks about Russia's strategic culture and the effect of the war with Ukraine on regional hierarchy in post-Soviet space. Dr. Hrabina is geopolitical risk advisor, scholar, and founder of GeopoLytics.

In this session, Dr. Hrabina explains the background of Russia's strategic culture helping to understand how it was formed during different historical periods. Together we discussed the effect of the Ukrainian war on post-Soviet Eurasia regional hierarchy and European security architecture. We also could not miss the actual topic of the shifting dynamics in frozen conflicts where Russia used to act as a mediator, as well as we explored key interplay between strategic biases with the West in context of nuclear rhetoric and recent remarks to Russia's nuclear doctrine.

Interviewers: Alexandra Tsarvulanova, Denise Gianotti, Will Kingston-Cox

June 7, 2024 — No Comments

Thomas Mayr-Harting on Transnistrian conflict

In this session, Mr. Thomas Mayr-Harting talks about the current dynamics of the Transnistrian frozen conflict. Mr. Mayr-Harting shares his expertise on the current status of the negotiations, the impact of Russia’s involvement, the grey zone trends, and the future prospects in the light of Moldova's political landscape.

Mr. Mayr-Harting is the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the Transnistrian Settlement Process.

Interviewers: Patrick René Haasler, Alexandra Tsarvulanova - Russia Team

April 22, 2024 — No Comments

Prof. Ilan Kelman on Climate Change & Conflict: Case Studies of Syria & Sudan

Professor Ilan Kelman is a Professor of Disasters and Health at University College London, England and Professor II at the University of Agder, Kristiansand, Norway.

This interview is divided into two parts. In the first episode, Davide Gobbicchi and Réka Szabó interview Professor Ilan Kelman about the impact of climate change on small island countries, with a specific focus on the Maldives. The interview touches upon the case of Bangladesh as well, since the country is extremely vulnerable to rising sea levels. Professor Kelman sheds light on the complexity and unpredictability of climate change. He also emphasizes the agency of the impacted countries in managing the consequences of climate change related to human security such as forced migration or conflict.

Interviewer: Réka Szabó and Davide Gobbicchi - Human Security Team

The second episode dives into the complex relationship between climate change and conflict. Professor Ilan Kelman analyzes evidence and deconstructs historical narratives surrounding climate change as a direct cause of conflict. Following a broad overview, the discussion delves into case studies of Syria and Sudan, exploring the UN's role in addressing these intricate dynamics.

Interviewer: Kelly Mikelatou and Davide Gobbicchi - Human Security Team

June 23, 2022 — No Comments

Jozef Hrabina on Global Economy in terms of Russian-Ukrainian War

Jozef Habrina is a Chief Analyst at the Council of Slovak Exporters - an expert in geopolitics and geoeconomics. He discusses war impact on the global economy and prospects for economic diversification. Jozef Habrina discusses with ITSS Verona members from Eastern Europe department сhanges in EU-Russian relations and the management of resource flows from a war perspective.

Interviewers: Igor Shchebetun and Greta Bordin.

April 25, 2022 — No Comments

The missing nexus of human security: Gaps in queer protections in conflicts

Authors: Esther Brito, Réka Szabó

Cover Image. Source: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/gay-rights-in-northern-ireland-a-war-by-other-means/

Efforts to improve human security in situations of violence have increasingly recognized the differential experiences and vulnerabilities of specific communities – like women or the elderly. In this line, advances have also been made in exploring the intersectionality of these contexts – that is, the fact that those belonging to multiple marginalized groups endure compounded risks. We are now at a point where we explore identity in conflict with more nuance than ever before. Yet, one collective still often remains excluded from our analysis – the LGBTQI+ or Queer community.

Despite efforts at inclusion and nuance in international security, like the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda, we still implicitly marginalize or exclude the queer community from policy or alleviation measures, offering little differential protection or recognition. As such, in the words of Academic Jamie Hagen, “those vulnerable to insecurity and violence because of their sexual orientation or gender identity remain largely neglected by the international peace and security community”.

Queer human security and protection in conflict: where we fall short

From Chechen leaders, to Zimbabwe’s President or Turkey’s Erdogan, world leaders often don’t only decline to offer protections to LGBTQI+ people – they actively deny their existence. Be it within their borders or entirely, the majority of world leaders still deny basic recognition and rights to the queer community, paving the way for discrimination, abuses, and killings.

As a result, LGBTQI+ experiences are often implicitly or explicitly excluded from policy, research, and services addressing identity-based violence and mass atrocity. A recent paper by Protection Approaches has explored the multiple ways queer experiences of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide remain under-explored and unaddressed.

As we have stated, this is often due to pervasive political, legal, and social discrimination. However, another prominent effect is that, due to the community’s exclusion from research and debate, there is a stark lack of data pertaining to the lives of queer populations. Even when attempts at inclusion are made, we have little experience in how to ethically and effectively gather data on the community. Firstly, as violence is often viewed through a dichotomous lens with regard to gender, there is little space or recognition for communities that do not conform to this binary. Secondly, even if research focuses on LGBTQI+ minorities, challenges remain when attempting to ethically explore identity outside primarily western categorizations of gender and sexuality – which need to be adapted to different cultural realities – as well as in deciding which collectives to include and how to do so without putting them in danger. Lastly, researchers face the potential lack of availability of basic data on abuses – as many people do not report violence due to the fear of stigmatization or reprisals. As a result of these converging dynamics, queer populations suffer a double attack: victimization and erasure.

Being Queer in war: lived experiences of LGBTQI+ populations in modern conflict

The reality is that LGBTQI+ persons suffer disproportionate violence during armed conflict. The continued abuse and discrimination the community is subject to in peacetime only aggravates within this context, with the worsening of social chaos and the erosion of the rule of law. Indeed, the violence extends beyond self-identification, as even those being only suspected of belonging to the community face reprisals. While progress has indeed been made in terms of the recognition of LGBTQ+ populations under human rights law and existing abuses are increasingly being documented by media, human rights bodies, and civil society, queer populations remain among the least protected of all communities in armed conflict.

“I was on my way home [from work] when five or six men (…) stopped me. They kicked and punched and slapped me all over my head and body. They (…) threw me in a garbage bin. I lay down (…) and they pulled out a razor blade and a screwdriver and poked and cut me all over (…). They sliced me up and poured around five liters of gasoline all over my body and face and set me alight…. The neighbors rescued me”.

Khadija, 31-year-old Iraqi transgender woman (August 5, 2021).

Beyond this, queer populations often contend with a severe lack of accountability and a sense of impunity, with states and armed groups tending to be involved in their abuses. Unlike other collectives, queer individuals not only have little or no recourse in law, they often can’t even find social or NGO support.

With discriminatory targeting driven by gender and sexuality worsening in much of the world, some scholars have come to consider these persecutions as amounting to crimes against humanity– as they are systematic, planned, and exercised against primarily civilian populations.

Source: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/29/sexual-violence-against-men-trans-women-syria-conflict

Notable examples of systematic abuses to LGBTQI+ populations continue to arise. Queer Afghans have been targets of increasingly severe attacks since 2021, in the wake of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. While same-sex relations were criminalized even before the Taliban took control, the situation has notably worsened. According to a report by Human Rights Watch and OutRight Action International, LGBT Afghans have been threatened, sexually assaulted, attacked, and often been forced to flee as refugees. In some cases, family members themselves that support the Taliban have become threats to their safety. Nevertheless, obtaining testimonies remains complicated and there is no accurate estimate of the scale of attacks currently targeting LGBT people in the country.

While Afghanistan may be one of the cases that has received the most coverage, similar abuses have been reported in Iraq, Syria, Colombia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, among others. In Syria, the Assad regime has continued to progressively exacerbate its persecution and abuse of LGBTQI+ persons, or those considered to be so. This has been exemplified by reports of sexual violence – including rape, forced stripping, and cavity examinations – threats, severe assault, extortion, kidnapping, and killings by both the state and rebel militias. Even localized conflicts may severely affect the attitude of entire states toward the queer community – in Ukraine, Russian-influenced anti-homosexuality policies and attitudes proliferated since 2014, with the advent of conflict in the Donbas, and negatively affected the lives of LGBTQI+ persons in Kyiv. In this line, we need to consider not only wars, but other severe conflicts as sources of victimization. For example, LGBTQI+ persons – especially trans women – have been recognized as more vulnerable to violence both by armed militias and organized crime across Central America. As such, queer populations stand at the intersection of exacerbated vulnerability and reduced social or institutional support, especially in situations of conflict or protracted human security crises.

Conclusions

While LGBTQI+ people are not the only collective facing increased risks to their human security, the lack of attention paid to their protection, as well as their exclusion from most policy and research efforts on international security, have led their needs and vulnerabilities to be marginalized in humanitarian responses and social assistance during violent conflict.

There is an urgency to recognize the dire situation of queer populations in modern conflict and develop a policy architecture that is able to ensure their protection at an international level. As it stands, the recognition of LGBTQI+ experiences is often absent from even from the most seismic of security crises, and unless that changes we will continue to fail in efforts to holistically protect human rights.

May 20, 2021 — 1 Comment

How Poverty Breeds Insecurity

By: Ludovica Aicha Brambilla.

The Global Humanitarian Overview 2021 has projected a historic level of food insecurity, with famine looming in several countries, due in large part to conflict and systemic violence. This forecast took into account the rising trend of the last two years; in 2019, in fact, seventy-seven million people in over 22 countries have experienced starvation due to armed violence. The new 2021 Global Report on Food Crises has confirmed that conflict has been the main driver of food crises also in 2020. Throughout the past year, up to 100 million people in 23 countries have experienced starvation because of violence and insecurity. The evidence that conflict causes food insecurity is well established. For instance, the FAO reports of the past decade have highlighted a recurring figure: The proportion of undernourished people is almost three times as high in countries in conflict than in other developing countries. This is also the result of the rapidly increasing civil displacements which can result in conflicts between social groups, causing food insecurity and a significant loss of income, resulting in acute famine and poverty.

However, these factors can sometimes interplay the other way round. Often poverty fosters conflict dynamics and insecurity; resource scarcity is a key factor of mass migrations and displacements which can result in conflicts between social groups. Economic inequalities are often seedbed for instability and represent a crucial contributing factor of violence together with socio-cultural and political factors. But poverty exacerbates all human vulnerabilities exposing people to a series of different types of risks. The condition of insecurity driven by privation concerns every dimension of life and it binds with multiple factors which reinforce each other and only eventually result in violence.

For instance, poverty is a key element when addressing food insecurity issues. Food security is a condition in which everybody has regular access to nutritious food, thanks to one’s own livelihood or a safety net provided by the state or any other organisation. Ensuring food security means guaranteeing the production of a sufficient amount of food in total and, especially, that everybody can access such vital resources. The Nobel Laureate in Economics Amartya Sen stated that the root cause of the continuation of world hunger is the continuation of poverty, despite the increasing total prosperity. In fact, even in periods of tight food markets, there is enough food available, but a large number of people are just too poor to afford it.

Many families, especially in developing countries, are particularly vulnerable to high food prices and they lack proper training on how to produce more food more sustainably. Agricultural development plays a key role in generating the incomes needed to ensure food security. In fact, two-thirds of the poor live in rural areas where agriculture is the dominant sector, but poor farmers are extremely vulnerable to the decline in agricultural output and aren’t able to benefit from basic infrastructures and access to markets. Income growth is necessary but the composition of growth matters too, as more equal growth is likely to lead to long-lasting food security. As a matter of fact, other compliments such as safe drinking water, awareness regarding adequate nutrition and access to health services are vital. In light of this approach, to tackle the causes of hunger, the policy objective should be the implementation of social norms dedicated to improving the conditions of the poor rather than concentrate on the overall agricultural production.

Food insecurity is, indeed, the result of many factors chained together. Some of them include privation and low wages coupled with poor education and inadequate health assistance. Malnutrition can be both a cause and a result of health problems. This depends on the quantity and quality of the food a person eats; the diet which a person can access must be sufficiently balanced otherwise a vicious circle begins. In this context, the crucial matter of health care deprivation and discrimination against women deserves a special mention. In fact, the vicious circle starts with maternal malnutrition and pours out, becoming a mass phenomenon further feeding famine and insecurity. The level of education is an important piece of the puzzle. Education significantly influences the information available and the possibility to obtain a well-paid job by which one can access sustainable and healthy food. But the possibility of having access to education and completing it depends precisely on the state of indigence. Malnutrition affects school performance and the diseases, often related to poor nutrition, reduce one’s opportunities in the labor market. In this way, the vicious cycle keeps feeding itself, pressing people in the tight grip of the poverty trap.

Ultimately, hunger driven by poverty can be both a cause and a consequence of conflict. The threats to food security can trigger unrest and provides a tangible reason for the instigation of violence. The 2015 FAO report Peace and Food Security estimated that post-conflict countries with high food insecurity are 40% more likely to relapse into conflict within a 10-year timespan. The report also highlighted how the increase in food prices in 2008 together with cuts in food subsidies, reduced real incomes triggering food riots in many countries.

Thereby, investing in food security may strengthen the effort to prevent conflict and achieve stability. To build long-lasting peace, it is essential to understand the mutual link among poverty, food security and conflict.

May 13, 2021 — No Comments

Russia and Ukraine prepare for War

By Igor Shchebetun

The situation in Eastern Ukraine is heating up. Videos published on social networks show military columns moving towards Donbass. Kiev has put its troops on high alert. Washington is considering sending the navy to the Black Sea, while Moscow is pulling heavy weapons and landing troops to the border.

Ukraine is a buffer state located in the center of Europe that serves as a road to an attack to the East or West. Today, the European Union and NATO, mainly represented by Poland, see Ukraine as a place where Russian influence on the European continent can be stopped. Russia sees Ukraine as an indispensable buffer zone against the West. To be fair, both Moscow and Kiev have internal motives for escalating tensions. President Zelensky's rating is rapidly goes down. In 2021, only slightly more than 20% of Ukrainians are willing to vote for him. Putin faces the same problem, his level of support in February 2021 is only 32%. The bottom line is that both sides have reasons to use the tensions in Donbass to influence the opinion of their voters. But let's still imagine that the conflict is not limited to Donbass, but fully involves Ukraine and Russia, what would it look like? Despite Kiev's efforts to reform the army in recent years, the balance of power between Ukraine and Russia has changed little. Russia has the ability to defeat its adversary and can implement its strategy in a variety of ways. Let's consider which ones? It can conduct small operations along the entire border with Ukraine, which will disperse Ukrainian forces. On the other hand, a small offensive will not bring additional influence in terms of politics or security. Another option for Russia and the Donbass it supports is to expand controlled territory into the rest of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, making the separatists more self-sufficient. However, increasing the buffer territory is too little. Especially considering that such an action would also evoke an even stronger pro-Western sentiment in Ukrainian society and guarantee Moscow additional sanctions, something it cannot afford.

A third option for Russia could be to advance along the Southern coast of Ukraine and the Dnieper River and connect Donbass with Crimea creating such an overland corridor would strengthen Russia's control over Crimea and Donbass and allow it to control 75% of the fresh water supplied to Crimea. In such a situation, the supply lines of the overland corridor will be greatly stretched. And that's not to mention their vulnerability for about 400 km this will not be a problem for Russia unless other regional forces are measured in the conflict otherwise the supply will probably be cut off and the whole campaign proves unsuccessful. However, if no outside force intervenes, then technically Russia could advance further it could seize all of Ukraine and link up with its forces in the region of Transnistria (а separatist region of Moldova) in which case Ukraine would be undermined it would lose access to the Black Sea, reducing the importance of its alliance with Turkey. The apathy of the port city of Odessa would cause significant damage to the Ukrainian economy. From Russia's point of view, having a regional territory along the Black Sea would ensure that most of its interests in the region would be achieved. Geographically, if Russia intended to attack Ukraine, the Dnieper River would be the ideal anchoring point. Capturing all of eastern Ukraine and controlling all crossing points across the Dnieper would allow Russia to focus only on specific points. This would have provided it with a much more reliable line of defense than the buffer zone of Donbass. However, the seizure of such vast territory would instantly provoke fierce resistance that would be difficult to pacify. Such cities as Kharkov, Kiev and Dnepr would become particularly problematic and hotspots. In addition, the seizure of Ukrainian territory would be guaranteed to lead to covert or overt interference by other countries, as well as the maximum application of sanctions by the U.S. as in the case of Iran.

Not much has changed between Ukraine and Russia, at least militarily and politically. Ukraine still does not have the ability to defeat Russia The US is now satisfied with the current situation, Germany does not want to interfere in the situation, and France remains a de facto ally of Russia. Turkey is increasing its support for Ukraine, but they do not have enough resources to affect the status quo. Meanwhile, Russia continues to insist on constitutional autonomy, not wanting direct annexation, so despite all the hype, the resumption of a large-scale conflict is unlikely. However, given the amount of weapons along the borders, it cannot be completely ruled out. In all likelihood, Donbass will remain in limbo, because in political issues diplomats often welcome something new and only when it is actually no different from the old.