The growing population and economies of South Asia are crucially dependent on its rivers and lands. Major rivers like Brahmaputra, Ganges, and Indus are the main sources of agriculture, energy, and livelihood. The region inhabits about a quarter of the world's population but only around four percent of its renewable waters. Global Environmental Change (GEC) is exacerbating glacial melt and shifting monsoon patterns causing extreme frequent floods and droughts. In terms of energy, South Asia is facing chronic deficiency - infrastructure strain and fuel import dependence have led many areas without reliable power. Experts argue that without new and efficient sources of energy which is causing “energy and power shortages”, could lead to crises. Altogether, these strains on water, food, and energy, accentuates urgent need for coordinated policies.
The Water-Energy-Food Nexus in South Asia
Water produces energy and is crucial for agriculture which provides food. Water management is “undoubtedly complex and interlinked with other significant challenges, including energy and food security, [and] agricultural production”. Agriculture uses most of South Asia’s freshwater and its farmers are heavily dependent on groundwater for irrigation. The tubewells/pumps used for the irrigation are run by diesel or electricity, which means energy shortfalls or high costs would adversely impact food production. Reciprocally, thermal power plants need high volumes of water for cooling, so water scarcity can also put strain on energy output. On the other hand, hydropower depends on rivers that also irrigate agricultural lands. In sum, activities in one sector often popple across other sectors. Integrated and coordinated approaches are therefore important for planning.
The stress due to GEC intensifies these interlinked water-food-energy nexus. Glacial melt and extreme droughts may lead to pumping of more groundwater, increasing demands for energy and depleting aquifers. Moreover, extreme droughts or floods can sever power generation. In the absence of cross-sectoral planning, South Asian countries are risking the opportunity to solve one problem, only to worsen another. In view of this, analysts argue that any policies for South Asian “development” must take into account these interdependencies.
Transboundary Water Management
Majority of South Asia’s waters come from the high Himalayas - highlighting the transnational character of these waters. These basins flow across multiple countries, yet formal cooperation is very limited and narrow in scope. No region-wide institution is in place to manage these shared basins with the exception of a few bilateral treaties that cover dozens of cross-boundary rivers. For example, India and Bangladesh, which share fifty-four rivers, have a Joint Rivers Commission and a 1996 Ganges water-sharing treaty. India and Pakistan have the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 - but currently in abeyance. India also has a 1996 Mahakali Treaty with Nepal as well as multiple powersharing agreements with Bhutan. Despite these limited agreements, there is no comprehensive cooperative framework among all riparians, majority of whose headwaters originate in China.
This assortment of water sharing is not sufficient in times of growing demands. Urbanizations and agricultural expansion are exploiting rivers and groundwater unsustainably, putting the region under water stress unless there is any improvement in management. Yet national policies are centred around short-term un-sustainable developmental goals without any consideration of its cross-sectoral and cross-boundary impacts. In these crucial times, countries prioritizing zero-sum games and competition over collaboration highlight how much they are worried about human and environmental security instead of national - ironically achieving neither.
Building of trust among South Asian countries is a constant challenge because of factors not limited to historical rivalries and concerns - which has led to minimal transparency and sharing of crucial environmental data. Increased data sharing and transparency are critical for riparian countries to negotiate equal and sustainable usage of waters. If the riparian countries of South Asia seek shared water security, cooperation over conflict offers a good chance for equitable and sustainable management.
Regional Energy Integration
South Asian countries are exploring cross-border trade of power to fill energy gaps. A World Bank researcher argues that in case of a unified South Asian regional “market”, untapped hydro resources could nearly double its generation capacity, and adding a moderate carbon tax could raise hydropower output by roughly 2.7 times over two decades. Another analysis highlights that electricity sharing would let South Asian countries exploit complementarities - for example, distribution of surplus peak to deficit area.
Some regional approaches are in process of materializing. Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal are discussing grid connections and energy corridors. For example, plans for an Easter Waterways Grid proposes linking river ports and transmission lines between India and Bangladesh, also connecting Bhutan and Nepal to facilitate trade. This initiative is projected to benefit some six-hundred million people across the sub-region. India has already positioned itself as a power-trade hub - it exports power to Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Nepal, while importing from Bhutan and Nepal. These examples are early steps toward a limited integrated system. If expanded to all South Asian countries, such trading would allow surplus power to flow in deficit regions, smoothing out fluctuations and lowering costs. Achieving sustainable energy security in South Asia is only possible through regional collaboration.
Agriculture, Food Security, Energy
Agriculture is the biggest provider of employment and food security in South Asia. It needs both water and energy, not only for irrigation but also for fertilisation, mechanisation, and post-harvest cold storage. Irrigation uses majority of freshwater in some areas. This means that any shortage in water or power can directly impact the crop production and harvests. Ignoring these linkages could backfire and undermine both food and energy security of the region.
As of 2021, nearly eight percent of the people in region lack access to reliable grid-based electricity, an forty-seven percent remain inaccessible to clean cooking fuels and technologies. In addition to this, the existing inefficiencies of the system has given rise to a three-fold challenge - “energy security, energy equity, and environmental sustainability”.
GEC-led variability adds complex challenges to the food production. The changing monsoon patterns and decreasing glacial melt in late summer can leave fields parched at important times. Simultaneously, increase in the occurrence of frequent floods are damaging crops and land. A cooperative regional approach could help reducing these risks. For example, sharing efficient practices in irrigation or rural electrification would yield benefits. Coordinated flood forecasting and storage-release policies could improve water use across borders to protect food and power systems.
Conclusion
The potential benefits of collaboration is enormous. For example, the increase in hydropower generation through regional markets could replace the need for expensive fuel-import, reducing carbon emissions and energy costs. An efficient, coordinated, and equitable water management could protect agriculture and industry from instability. The increase in transboundary power trade could also secure energy. Shared infrastructure could improve disaster resilience. Though this article may seem pointing towards a more ideal scenarios, but acknowledging the geopolitical barriers, water-food-energy nexus itself leaves no choice but to accept the fact that share challenges need shared solutions.
By Francesco Foti & Giacomo Prosperini - Italy Desk
Introduction
Italy’s strategic engagement in the Mediterranean is characterised by the intricate relationship between energy security, migration management, counter-terrorism and regional stability. This is particularly evident in Libya and Syria, where Italian interests intersect with broader European and global dynamics.
In Libya, Italy is confronted with the ongoing challenges of political fragmentation, competing local authorities, and the increasing influence of external powers. These factors constrain Rome’s capacity to fulfil its traditional role. Energy ties, migration control and managing local armed groups remain crucial levers, yet their effectiveness is increasingly undermined by militia activities, institutional deadlock and disruptive behaviour. The Greenstream pipeline and strategic oil and gas fields, for example, highlight the interdependence between Italian energy security and Libyan stability. However, reliance on fragile authoritarian systems carries great risks. Migration flows and criminal networks further exacerbate the challenges to Italian security, exposing the country to ethical dilemmas and limiting the effectiveness of regulatory strategies. In order to navigate this arena of geostrategic interests, it seems essential to strike a balance between short-term priorities, such as ensuring an adequate energy supply and controlling immigration, and long-term objectives, such as promoting institutional reforms to foster stability and coordinating effectively with European partners.
Conversely, the long civil war and ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria have exacerbated Europe’s security and migration challenges. Italy must strike a delicate balance, engaging with the new regime, countering extremist networks and managing refugee flows, all the while coordinating with European partners whose policies are often fragmented and reactive. Iranian and Turkish activities in the region further complicate Italy’s strategic calculations by influencing local governance and regional security dynamics. In response, Italy has pushed for Syria to be included in the EU’s external action agenda, proposing a broader strategy to address the complex challenges arising from the civil war, particularly the pressure on migration routes. However, this effort faces significant obstacles: the lack of a coherent policy from Western partners, coupled with the unresolved nature of the Syrian government, means that Rome must adopt a carefully calibrated approach that tackles the root causes of instability, migration flows and potential terrorist threats in order to mitigate them.
Taken together, these cases illustrate the limitations of a purely reactive or ad hoc approach. Italy should combine pragmatic diplomacy with long-term strategic planning, leveraging its historical ties primarily with Libya, expanding the external action in Syria, an economic presence, and enhancing regional credibility compared to France and the UK in Libya and Syria. The following analysis examines the Italian approach to Libya and Syria, highlighting the key dilemmas, vulnerabilities and opportunities that currently define its Mediterranean policy.
Post-Gaddafi Libya: Fragmentation and Political Deadlock
Among the multiple crises shaping the Mediterranean region, Libya remains a test case for Italy's ability to convert its geographical proximity into tangible influence. Rome’s interests - namely energy partnerships through ENI’s long-standing operations; containment of irregular migration; and broader regional stability - have been persistently undermined by Libya's political fragmentation since Gaddafi's regime collapsed in 2011. However, rather than redefining its strategy, Italy has tended to oscillate between ad hoc crisis management and a reliance on international processes that have produced limited results.
The post-2011 landscape in Libya remains marked by deep political and territorial tensions. Since Gaddafi's downfall, the country has been divided into two rival authorities: the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNA) in Tripoli, backed by Turkey and Qatar, and General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) in the east, supported by by Russia, Egypt, and the UAE. The existence of these two factions turned the conflict into a proxy arena for regional and global powers. This foreign interference has further weakened Italy’s previously privileged position, highlighting its diplomatic inferiority compared to more assertive external actors. Moreover, the proliferation of several armed groups with tribal and regional roots has created a security environment in which no single actor can guarantee stability.
Despite international initiatives, such as the Palermo Conference (2018) promoted by Italy and the Berlin Process (2020) Libya remains in deadlock. Tensions between historical Libyan provinces, rivalries between revolutionary and pro-Gaddafi factions, and competition over control of resources have undoubtedly fuelled instability. The repeated postponement of elections, most notably in December 2021, exposed the legal ambiguities of Libya’s institutional framework, as well as the reluctance of key stakeholders to embark on a genuine political transition. The absence of a coherent EU external action in the Mediterranean, coupled with minimal US involvement, has restricted Italy’s freedom of action in Libya. This has contributed to the country adopting temporary policies instead of pursuing a strategic and forward-looking approach.
This persistent stalemate raises uncomfortable questions for Italy: should Rome continue to invest in fragile diplomatic efforts that have yielded little progress, or should it recalibrate its approach by prioritising narrower interests, such as energy and migration management? Either option involves significant trade-offs between short-term stability and long-term credibility.
Italy and Libya Energy Nexus
Italy's involvement in Libya has long been influenced by its reliance on energy ties, with ENI playing a key role in diplomatic engagement and economic influence, particularly in the energy sector through ENI. The Italian multinational oil and gas company’s operations in the Wafa and El Feel oil and gas fields, directly connected to Sicily through the Greenstream pipeline underline how closely linked Italy’s energy security is to Libyan stability. Yet this reliance, which once gave Rome leverage, is increasingly revealing its fragility. ENI’s strategic assets are at the mercy of Libya’s internal rivalries and armed groups' bargaining, which turns energy security into a structural vulnerability rather than a source of strength.
The war in Ukraine has further enlarged this paradox. As Europe seeks to diversify away from Russian energy dependence, Libya is seen as a key alternative for Italy and the EU. However, production remains subject to political instability and militia activity, as demonstrated by the blockade of the Ras Lanuf oil terminal in 2023. These events demonstrate that Italian energy policy relies on the temporary support of local groups, which ultimately renders it incapable of influencing the Libyan economy. This vulnerability is worsened by the absence of an EU external action strategy in the Mediterranean, bringing Italy to largely manage these challenges on its own and to take on responsibilities that could better be shared at the EU level.
Italy therefore faces a strategic dilemma. While an approach that prioritises energy guarantees immediate supplies, it risks binding Rome to a model of dependence on fragile authorities and undermining its ability to act as a regional stabiliser. Alternatively, Italy could leverage its presence in the energy sector for diplomatic gain, but only if reforms are implemented to stabilise and transparently manage the country's political and economic affairs. The choice is both technical and geopolitical: Italy can either remain a passive observer of the instability in Libya, or it can take an active role in ensuring security in the Mediterranean through energy diplomacy.
Migration, Security, and Human Rights
Libya remains one of the main departure points for migration to Europe, particularly along the Central Mediterranean route to Italy. Due to its proximity to Italy, the Libyan coast is a key “hotspot” where thousands of migrants and refugees, primarily from Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, attempt dangerous sea crossings to reach Italian shores. For Italy, this influx of migrants is not only a humanitarian concern, but also an increasing security issue.
In response, the country has pursued a containment strategy, supporting the Libyan Coast Guard in intercepting and returning migrants before they reach European waters. However, these practices have sparked widespread criticism from various NGOs and the UN, who argue that Italian support effectively enables the return of migrants to Libyan detention centres, where conditions are described as inhumane and characterised by torture, extortion, continuous violence and abuse. The absence of effective border control, coupled with the fragmentation of the Libyan security apparatus, encourages the mobility of jihadist groups and foreign fighters, especially in southern Libya and across the Sahel. For Italy, the intersection of human trafficking, organised crime, and potential terrorist infiltration poses a multidimensional threat to national and regional security. By relying on Libyan authorities, Italy risks associating its migration policy with serious human rights violations. This tension is augmented by the lack of a unified European approach in terms of migratory policy. The limitations of the Dublin Regulation and the ambiguities of the EU’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum highlight the absence of a true European solidarity system, leaving frontline states such as Italy with a disproportionate amount of responsibility. This tension highlights a deeper dilemma, as short-term containment could come at the expense of international credibility and moral authority.
The suspension of operations for ten international NGOs and the UNHCR by the Libyan Internal Security Agency (LISA) in April 2025 further complicates the landscape. This suspension is a clear sign of Libya's increasingly securitarian and repressive shift, where international cooperation on migration is becoming increasingly subordinate to political and military interests. Italy and the EU now face a critical dilemma: should they continue to support authoritarian and violent actors in order to contain migration flows, or should they rethink their foreign policy in light of international law and human rights principles? Every path involves trade-offs. Disengagement could lead to uncontrolled migration flows, while continued support could reinforce inhumane authoritarian practices and destabilise the region.
The 2019 Memorandum of Understanding between Turkey and the GNA Turkey expanded Turkey's territorial waters in the Mediterranean, raising tensions with Greece and Cyprus. This Turkish expansion has created a new geopolitical dynamic in the Eastern Mediterranean, making it more difficult for Italy to assert its influence in Libya. By relying on its traditional influence and bilateral relations, Rome risks being marginalized in decision-making processes affecting both Libya and the wider region. Indeed, Turkey's increased presence in Tripoli means direct competition for control of energy resources, migration routes, and political alliances within Libya.
Should Italy adopt a proactive approach to limit Turkish influence and risk exacerbating regional tensions, or should it pursue multilateral coordination within the EU and NATO to preserve access and long-term stability? Either way, there are risks. A confrontational approach could provoke retaliation and further instability, while inaction could further erode Italy's strategic influence.
Italy and the Syrian Crisis: A Geopolitical, Security and Migratory Perspective
Following the collapse of the Assad regime, the West has been dealing with the consequences of a new Syria. Southeastern European countries have borne the brunt of the instability caused by the 14-year civil war. Southern EU countries' capacity to process migrants at their first point of entry into Europe has been significantly impacted by it. The disproportionate burden could also be posing a security risk, including instances of radicalisation and terrorismdocumented in Italy that reverberate at the single EU country’s level. A fragmented Syria complicates the security crisis. An extremist or ineffectual government that harbours or exports radical violent individualsshould not be ruled out, given the past of HTS and the explosions of violence involving former loyalists,Alawites,Druze, andChristians.
EU Policy Failures on Syrian Migration
At the EU level, inconsistent application and failure to reform or uniform the Dublin Regulation have contributed to the instability in the Mediterranean and impacted Italy’s capabilities, thus signalling a lack of European approach. The refusal to reform the Dublin treaty and the lack of a broad approach to the security crisis by relying only on Libya, Egypt, and Turkey as a way to stem the flow underscore the European limited role in addressing the Syrian issue. The 2016 migration between Turkey and the EU exemplifies the European strategy of exchanging political concessions and funding for assistance in curbing migration flows.
Italy’s Legal and Diplomatic Response to the Syrian Crisis
Italy has temporarily suspended aspects of the asylum registration process under emergency measures, currently contested in court. To help manage migration, the Albania Agreement (2023) served as an option currently under discussion at the European level. The Italian government has passed a restrictiveLaw n. 187/2024 on immigration, and the annual immigration quota decree. The agreement and the laws implemented have been impugned by the courts which has limited their enforceability. The same impasse is observable across other EU countries.
An Italian geopolitical approach?
Due to European limitations and approach, the Italian position is limited to diplomatic, investment and humanitarian initiatives. Italy thinks that dealing with the Syrian government, whether in the form of Assad or HTS, is the starting point to address the question of immigration from instability. Lifting sanctions was presented as leading to cooperation in terms of infrastructure and business opportunities, which could boost the recovery and bring about stability to address the root causes. Italy should be watching theinterregnum phase as this might precipitate another immigration crisis.Italian pragmatism should take into consideration the Turkish role, activism andexceptionalism of which Greece and Cyprus have long been vocal. Italy should clearly demand Turkey halt any unilateral actions in Northern Syria that have not been agreed upon with NATO and EU allies. Turkish military operations targeting the Kurds risk destabilising by triggering artificial resettlement, increased displacement and growth of refugee camps amid deterioration of humanitarian conditions. Furthermore, as shown by the 2020 Turko-Greek crisis, Turkish use of immigration as a hybrid threat exposes European inaction and the limits of the Italo-Turkish partnership in the face of unchecked Turkish militarism. Turkish actions frequently blur the distinction between support for moderates and extremists, thus undermining both the security of Syrian-controlled areas and prospects for the eventual, gradual return of refugees to Europe.
Italy should also reassess its approach to Iranian influence in Syria and the broader Levantine region. A critical component of this reassessment involves evaluating Iran’s use of sectarian dynamics to extend its regional influence, a strategy that has historically contributed to instability and, in turn, increased migration pressures toward Europe. While Iran will still remain an actor to reckon with in Syria, particularly through its support of the Shias and Alewites, the evolving political landscape in Damascus warrants close scrutiny. Italy should remain vigilant to any Iranian efforts to recalibrate its role and maintain leverage in the region, as this may have implications for both regional stability and require Italy’s bilateral relations with Tehran to be re-evaluated.
Israel'srecent actions show awareness of the need to ensure Syria does not spiral into all-out sectarianism. However, Italy’s relationship with Israel has come under strain in light of recent developments in Gaza. Unlike countries such as the United Kingdom, France, or Spain, Italy has avoided openly criticizing Israel’s actions. However, it has also refrained from vocally supporting Israeli airstrikes in Syria, which Israel claims are aimed at protecting the Druze minority from government aggression. This ambiguous stance reflects an inconsistent policy line that fails to address the broader challenge of sectarianism in the region.
In light of the Lebanese government's recent call for the disarmament of Hezbollah—a paramilitary Shia organization—Italy should formally support this initiative as a necessary measure to curb the regional spread of sectarianism from Lebanon into Syria. Such a stance is particularly warranted given Hezbollah’s alignment with the Iran-backed "axis of resistance”. So far, the Syrian government declined to take decisive steps.
A Western response
The West lacks a broad commitment to the Syrian issue, other than previously supporting rebels, much like with Libya’s Gaddafi and the French-led regime change without clear post-intervention commitment. A cautious approach requires that the EU and US pressure should not be lifted, avoiding aquick diplomatic clout, until the course of Ahmed al-Sharaa becomes clear without ambiguity and sectarianism. A long-term plan comprising stabilisation, limiting the influence of geopolitical rivals and continuous pressure could tackle the root causes for massive immigration to Europe. Activism within the EU framework requires the US to be involved, and the easing pressure not be too speedy, given the uncertain direction of HTS. The Western powers should refrain from arming HTS and pressure others, such as Ukraine, not to overreach.
A new approach?
The Albanian model should be internalised and made into EU law, thus securing funding and being administered by the EU itself, and a quota system approved at the European level. The Italian government should stress the security dimension of the deal to frame it as a public safety tool and a faster, more humane processing. Italy should invite other countries in a joint governance of the centres to share the burden but also show the profits of the model. The EU should have an updated approach to cooperate with the Syrian authorities on repatriations, limit Turkish, Iranian and Qatari influence and pressure them not to engage in sectarianism. Italy should also take centre stage and bring the issue of the future West-Syria relations to the fore to help form a broad Western initiative that should, however, be security-based and geopolitical before focusing on immigration, trade and investment. This requires a new perspective on the actors in the Syrian playground based on the Libyan case that saw the rushed support for rebels that replaced the dictator turning out to breed chaos and new security challenges met inconsistently by the western powers.
Conclusions
Analyses of the situations in Libya and Syria highlight several key lessons for Italy’s Mediterranean strategy. Firstly, both crises demonstrate the limitations of reactive or ad hoc approaches. Short-term interventions in areas such as energy, migration and security often fail to address the root causes of political fragmentation and the influence of external actors. Secondly, while Italy’s traditional levers, such as energy diplomacy, migration management and engagement with local authorities, are necessary, they are insufficient in contexts marked by instability and unpredictable actors. Thirdly, these cases demonstrate that external influences, such as those from Turkey and Russia in Libya and Turkey and Iran in Syria, can significantly restrict Italy’s ability to act alone, making it essential for Italy to coordinate with other EU and NATO partners. Finally, the dilemmas faced in both countries illustrate the persistent tension between immediate interests, such as energy security and migration governance, and long-term objectives, including institutional reform, human rights protection and regional stability.
In light of these lessons, Italy must reassess its strategy in Libya, taking into account the growing influence of Turkey, the ongoing engagement of Iran, and the persistent institutional fragmentation, while also addressing migration management. The continuing stalemate between Tripoli and the eastern authorities, the repeated blockading of oil terminals and the fragility of local governance structures demonstrate that the ad hoc diplomatic and reactive intervention-focused approaches adopted after Gaddafi's fall are no longer sufficient. Yet the limited engagement of the EU in defining a coherent Mediterranean policy compounds these challenges, leaving Rome to act in a largely unilateral way. Italy must therefore combine traditional diplomatic tools with innovative approaches, promoting stability in energy production and reforming local institutions. Together with the need to ensure stability and defend human rights, this will require a comprehensive European approach aimed at preventing Libya from becoming a permanent centre of insecurity along the EU’s southern border.
At the same time, there has been a welcome in Italy for the prospect of closer engagement with the new Syrian authorities. However, these proposals must be carefully evaluated. Rome must consider whether the Al Jolani government can realistically unify diverse communities, combat terrorism and curb extremism. Effective engagement will depend on a holistic Western approach combining incentives and pressure to ensure the new authorities commit to inclusive governance, reject sectarian policies and contribute to long-term stability. A coherent strategy integrating political, security and humanitarian dimensions is essential for mitigating migration flows to Europe and for consolidating Italy’s credibility as a stabilising force in the Mediterranean and the wider Middle East.
Quill Robinson talks about the intersection of climate and security. He delves into the topics of energy security, the role of China and the U.S., and shares his thoughts on COP28 (about to take place in the week of the interview's recording).
Dr. Cyril Widdershoven talks about the energy strategy pursued by the Gulf States in the context of the current war in Ukraine. Dr. Cyril Widdershoven is a long-experienced expert in oil and gas and geopolitics and the founder of Verocy.
In this session, Dr. Widdershoven considers the reasons for the Gulf States to act the way they are, avoiding an active engagement in energy price reduction. After an overview of the Gulf States' green energy policies, Dr. Widdershoven analyzes the consequences of the EU's sanctions on Russia on relations between Europe and energy powers in the Gulf.
This is ITSS Verona Member Series Video Podcast by the Political Economy and Energy Security Team.
ITSS Verona - The International Team for the Study of Security Verona is a not-for-profit, apolitical, international cultural association dedicated to the study of international security, ranging from terrorism to climate change, from artificial intelligence to pandemics, from great power competition to energy security.
For the first ITSS Verona - Hume Institute joint event, members Carlotta Rinaudo and Elena Bascone - along with the Political Economy, Development, and Energy Security Team - discuss energy security and its importance for Europe with Ms Vicky Pryce, one of Britain's top economists, and with Prof Mohammed Abdel-Haq.
By: Elena Bascone, Michele Mignogna, Miguel Jiménez and Sofia Dal Santo.
Holiday seasons often trigger unexpected crises, as the last two years proved: after the 2020 pandemic, a new global threat is on the rise - a global energy crisis. This new emergency is so severe that even Kazakhstan, the biggest central Asian country and one of the major producers of fossil fuels, was unable to escape it. At the beginning of January, the price per liter for liquified petroleum gas (LPG) more than doubled, increasing from 50 to 120 Tenges (about $0.27), and violent protests exploded in the country. LPG is mainly used for vehicles, but even for cooking and warming up during the severe Kazakh winter, making it a primary necessity. Energetic scarcity then fostered the explosion of violent protests all over Kazakhstan. Resulting in the death of 225 people, these demonstrations are unprecedented. The outbreak took place in Zhanaozen, in the southwest of the country, known as the capital of oil and gas, and spread all over the country in a few days. Peaceful demonstrations soon escalated into violent aggressions such as dangerous attacks on government buildings and clashes against police officers. However, rising energy prices are only the tip of the iceberg.
The Roots of the Protests
The country can attract millions of dollars of foreign investment due to its apparent political stability. Nevertheless, this political stability has been characterized by an authoritarian government led for three decades by Nazarbayev, eventually substituted by the current Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, by most regarded as his hand-picked successor. The relationship between them is confirmed by the fact that the latter appointed the former president as Head of the Security Council, and declared him Yelbasy, i.e., “the Father of the Nation.” This lack of democracy, combined with the over-rising income inequality due to a drop of GNI and further worsened by the pandemic, explains the protests’ origins. As of now, a quarter of the central Asian republic’s population is considered chronically poor.
This is ironic since, as a significant oil and gas producer, Kazakhstan produces much more LPG than its less than 19 million inhabitants can consume. However, existing domestic energy companies prefer to export it rather than sell it to the domestic market. Accordingly, the country’s authorities have tried to increase the supply of LPG through purchases from Russian companies, which sell it at prices 3-8 times higher than the domestic ones. Moreover, these gas supply contracts with the Russian companies are undisclosed and untransparent, thus encouraging corruption and the enrichment of the Kazakh and Russian elites.
The Government Response
All in all, given the growing anti-Nazarbayev sentiment, it is understandable why the song “Old man, go away!” soon spread among the protestors. Even the bold concessions given by Mr. Tokayev, such as the removal of his predecessor from his place as Head of the Security Council and the acceptance of the government’s resignation, substituting it with an ad-interim administration, has not proved to be sufficient to calm down the protestors. Moreover, the absence of pluralism and the intolerance of opposition in the political life of Kazakhstan prevents protestors from finding representation on an institutional level. This lack of opposition allows Mr. Tokayev to blame, although without evidence, “foreign-trained terrorist gangs” for the protests to justify a punitive response; notwithstanding, while the use of force may crush protests, it can only amplify the underlying anger.
Punitive responses immediately occurred: from the shutdown of the internet to the president’s public declaration addressing the special forces to “fire without warning”, as reported by BBC news. This declaration triggered the critics of the international community, from the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to the chairman in office of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Polish lawyer Zbigniew Rau. Overwhelmed by demonstrators, President Tokayev, following the soviet style of dealing with civil unrest, made a formal request for assistance to the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance headquartered in Moscow.
The peacekeeping mission was speedily approved. Alongside Russia, even Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan sent contingents to Kazakhstan for a total of almost 3000 soldiers. The mission has been defined by Andrei Kortunov, head of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), a Kremlin-linked think tank, as “less an armed intervention than a police operation.” As it is common knowledge, it is always risky to welcome home foreign troops, especially considering the assertive policy perpetrated by Russia on the European side. Nevertheless, the paratroopers made their way back as soon as the order was re-established. Still, it is essential to highlight the significance of this intervention for the future of international relations in Asia, considering the growing influence of China and its resulting possible conflict of interest with Russia.
Conclusion
The intervention of the CSTO led to a stabilization of the protests, at least for the moment. Moreover, according to The Guardian, Mr. Tokayev said that the ad interim government would re-introduce a price cap of 50 tenges per liter on LPG in Mangistau province, considering that it is a socially necessary consumer good. In addition, it is essential to bear in mind that it is likely that this crisis will have consequences in the context of future relations between Russia and Kazakhstan. The intervention of Russia might undermine the hard-won independence of the central Asian republic. However, we will have to wait to see the long-term effects of these events on the power dynamics of Central Asia. One thing remains certain: this region is crucial now more than ever. Indeed, as Alexander Cooley indicated, this region, which used to be disputed between Russia and the UK, is now at the center of a new “great game” - a power contest that sees the US, Russia, and China involved.
By: Filippo Grassi, Sarah Toubman, Maria Chiara Aquilino
This past September, Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi introduced measures to reduce gas and electricity bills this winter by three billion euros, as power prices soar across Europe.
The new energy crisis affecting Italy and the European Union is largely connected to the current situation in Ukraine. Military tensions in Eastern Europe have deteriorated relations between Russia, Europe’s largest gas exporter, and the EU. In the face of rising tensions with NATO, Russia cut off several gas pipelines into Europe, with flows into Germany and Poland restricted. This has further encouraged the EU’s transition to renewables and strengthened its energy partnership with the United States.
Recently, the European Union has adopted a two-pronged approach which includes decarbonisation processes and the diversification of energy market partners. This is aimed to reduce the Union’s dependency on Russian gas and to shift towards a low-carbon future by phasing out fossil fuels.
Italian Prime Minister Draghi has himself argued that there is the urgent need for Europe to diversify energy supplies and strengthen the bargaining power of purchasing countries to help curb power and gas price rises. Nevertheless, despite its declarations and intentions, Italy is struggling to keep up with other major EU economies and their actions to fully decarbonise the EU electricity system by 2035, aligning with1.5°C, and to diversify its energy partners.
While many nations aim to use renewables for 75% or more of their electrical consumption by 2030, Italy has set a target of only 55%. The country is also behind in its 2030 wind and solar target, and Ember’s Global Electricity Review 2020revealed that Italy’s retired coal generation is instead being replaced by fossil gas. Consequently, Italy could potentially reach one of the highest shares of fossil gas in its generation mix by 2030, accounting for 38% of its electricity production.
However, the need for a greater supply of backup energy generation, also known as a capacity mechanism, in Italy, has led to this further investment in natural gas. Combined Cycle Gas Turbine power plants are offered up to €70 per kW each year, as a result incentivizing often uneconomical gas companies and discouraging clean energy production. The recent crisis in energy supplies and costs has only reconfirmed that the European Union cannot solely rely on imported fossil fuels--in the past year, electricity prices in Italy have nearly tripled.
Recently, ENI, Italy’s National Hydrocarbons Agency and largest oil and gas company, has committed to a Climate Strategy with the aim of reducing the impact of its oil production projects and enhancing a low-carbon economic transition. In particular, Italian strategy is oriented towards the exploitation of natural resources, especially liquefied natural gas, present in the Arctic. Indeed, according to the estimates of the United States Geological Survey the region is expected to hold 15% of the world's remaining oil deposits, 30% of its natural gas deposits and around 20% of its liquefied natural gas. Consequently, a number of Italian producers, including ENI, Saipem, and Nuovo Pignone, are contributing to the development of the Arctic-LNG 2 and Yamal LNG projects to extract gas in northern Siberia. Although these are technically private business ventures, with Russian corporation Novatek owning 60% of the shares of Arctic-LNG 2, they remain deeply linked to Russian state interests, rendering the effort to reduce energy dependence futile. Indeed, Gazprom, the Russian state energy organization, owns 10% of Novatek. Additionally, the Italian National Agency for Electricity (ENEL) is currently helping build the Kolskaya wind plant in Russia’s Murmansk region, which would be the largest wind power plant in the Arctic Circle. Thus, while Italy is clearly making an effort to divest from some forms of fossil fuels, it remains reliant on natural gas and even renewables from Russia. To ensure energy security resilience against events like the Russia-Ukraine crisis in the future, Italy would have to further diversify its energy sources, and the countries from which they are obtained.
Nevertheless, Enel, Italy’s largest power utility (and the world’s second largest), recently announced a 2040 fossil gas phase-out, ten years ahead of schedule. This is a clear signal that it recognises the future lies in greater electrification powered by renewables. Overall, Italy’s energy policy is pro-renewables. In 2017, Italy passed an updated National Energy Strategy, subsequently ratified in 2020, through which it is committed to attaining Europe’s environmental and decarbonisation targets by 2030 in sustainable ways, in line with the targets set by COP21. Thus, in recent years, the country has successfully integrated renewable generation into its electricity system, especially improving discrepancies in the infrastructure between north and south. Still, more work clearly would be needed to successfully transition Italy away from fossil fuels and diversify energy sources.
Image Source: https://www.iea.org/countries/italy
Italian
La politica energetica italiana e il suo ruolo nell'Artico
Lo scorso settembre, il primo ministro italiano Mario Draghi ha introdotto misure per ridurre le bollette di gas ed elettricità di tre miliardi di euro, mentre i prezzi dell'energia salgono in tutta Europa.
La nuova crisi energetica che colpisce l'Italia e l'Unione europea è in gran parte legata alla situazione attuale in Ucraina. Le tensioni militari nell'Europa orientale hanno deteriorato le relazioni tra la Russia, il più grande esportatore europeo di gas, e l'UE. Di fronte alle crescenti tensioni con la NATO, la Russia ha bloccato diversi gasdotti verso l'Europa, limitando i flussi verso la Germania e la Polonia. Ciò ha ulteriormente incoraggiato la transizione dell'UE verso le energie rinnovabili e rafforzato il partenariato energetico con gli Stati Uniti.
Recentemente, l'Unione europea ha adottato un duplice approccio che comprende i processi di de-carbonizzazione e la diversificazione dei partner del mercato energetico. L'obiettivo è ridurre la dipendenza dell'Unione dal gas russo e orientarsi verso un futuro a basse emissioni di carbonio, eliminando gradualmente i combustibili fossili.
Lo stesso Primo Ministro italiano Draghi ha sostenuto che l'Europa ha urgente bisogno di diversificare gli approvvigionamenti energetici e rafforzare il potere contrattuale dei paesi acquirenti per contribuire a frenare l'aumento del potere e dei prezzi del gas. Nonostante questo, nonostante le dichiarazioni e le intenzioni, l'Italia sta lottando per tenere il passo con le altre principali economie dell'UE e le loro azioni per de-carbonizzare completamente il sistema elettrico dell'UE entro il 2035, allineandosi all'1,5 C, e per diversificare i suoi partner energetici.
Mentre molte nazioni puntano ad utilizzare le rinnovabili per il 75% o più del loro consumo elettrico entro il 2030, l'Italia ha fissato un obiettivo di appena il 55%. Il paese è anche in ritardo nel suo obiettivo 2030 eolico e solare, e Ember Global Electricity Review 2020 ha rivelato che la produzione di carbone in pensione in Italia è invece stata sostituita da gas fossile. Di conseguenza, l'Italia potrebbe raggiungere una delle quote più alte di gas fossile nel suo mix di generazione entro il 2030, rappresentando il 38% della sua produzione di energia elettrica.
Tuttavia, la necessità di una maggiore fornitura di energia di riserva, nota anche come meccanismo di capacità, in Italia, ha portato a questo ulteriore investimento nel gas naturale. Le centrali a turbina a gas a ciclo combinato sono offerte fino a 70 euro per kW ogni anno, il che incentiva le aziende a gas spesso antieconomiche e scoraggia la produzione di energia pulita. La recente crisi degli approvvigionamenti energetici e dei costi ha solo riconfermato che l'Unione europea non può contare unicamente sulle importazioni di combustibili fossili: nell'ultimo anno i prezzi dell'elettricità in Italia sono quasi triplicati.
Recentemente, ENI, l'Agenzia Nazionale degli Idrocarburi e la più grande società petrolifera e del gas, si è impegnata in una Strategia per il Clima con l'obiettivo di ridurre l'impatto dei suoi progetti di produzione petrolifera e di favorire una transizione economica a basse emissioni di carbonio. In particolare, la strategia italiana è orientata allo sfruttamento delle risorse naturali, in particolare del gas naturale liquefatto, presente nell'Artico. Infatti, secondo le stime dello United States Geological Survey, la regione dovrebbe detenere il 15% dei giacimenti petroliferi rimanenti del mondo, il 30% dei suoi giacimenti di gas naturale e circa il 20% del suo gas naturale liquefatto. Di conseguenza, alcuni produttori italiani, tra cui ENI, Saipem e Nuovo Pignone, stanno contribuendo allo sviluppo dei progetti Arctic-LNG 2 e Yamal LNG per l'estrazione di gas nella Siberia settentrionale. Sebbene si tratti di imprese tecnicamente private, con la società russa Novatek che detiene il 60% delle azioni di Arctic-LNG 2, rimangono profondamente legati agli interessi dello Stato russo, rendendo inutile lo sforzo di ridurre la dipendenza energetica. Infatti, Gazprom, l'organizzazione statale russa per l'energia, possiede il 10% di Novatek. Inoltre, l'Agenzia Nazionale Italiana per l'Elettricità (ENEL) sta attualmente aiutando a costruire la centrale eolica di Kolskaya nella regione russa di Murmansk, che sarebbe la più grande centrale eolica del Circolo Polare Artico.
Così, mentre l'Italia sta chiaramente facendo uno sforzo per disinvestirsi da alcune forme di combustibili fossili, rimane dipendente dal gas naturale e persino dalle energie rinnovabili provenienti dalla Russia. Per garantire la resilienza alla sicurezza energetica di eventi come la crisi Russia-Ucraina in futuro, l'Italia dovrebbe diversificare ulteriormente le proprie fonti energetiche e i paesi da cui sono ottenute.
Tuttavia, Enel, la più grande utility elettrica d'Italia (e la seconda al mondo), ha recentemente annunciato un'eliminazione graduale del gas fossile nel 2040, dieci anni prima del previsto. Questo è un chiaro segnale che riconosce che il futuro risiede in una maggiore elettrificazione alimentata da fonti rinnovabili. Nel complesso, la politica energetica italiana è a favore delle energie rinnovabili. Nel 2017 l'Italia ha approvato una Strategia Energetica Nazionale aggiornata, successivamente ratificata nel 2020, attraverso la quale si impegna a raggiungere gli obiettivi ambientali e di de-carbonizzazione dell'Europa entro il 2030 in modo sostenibile, in linea con gli obiettivi fissati dalla COP21. Così, negli ultimi anni, il paese ha integrato con successo la produzione di energia rinnovabile nel suo sistema elettrico, in particolare migliorando le discrepanze nelle infrastrutture tra nord e sud. Tuttavia, sarebbe necessario un maggiore impegno per riuscire a portare l'Italia lontano dai combustibili fossili e a diversificare le fonti energetiche.
Dr Tomas Maltby, KCL, explores definitions and concepts of "Energy Security" and how these affect strategies and approaches within the EU context. Particular emphasis is also allocated on how energy security relates to climate change and pandemics/Covid-19.
