Germany Archives – ITSS Verona

February 17, 2026 — No Comments

Germany’s cyber-strategy through an international relations lens

By Maria Makurat - Human Rights & Cyber Security Teams

Germany’s critical infrastructures

Germany is facing more cyber-attacks ever since the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and is also forced to deal with potential hybrid warfare scenarios due to drone sightings in 2025 (see drone article and interview by the president of the BKI ). Just in 2025, Germany’s train system faced cyber-attacks as well as the Berlin airport, causing major disruptions and delays. The Global Cyber Security Outlook report 2026 by the World Economic Forum (WEF) highlights the increasing use and issue of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in relation to cyber-attacks, as well as how countries such as Germany and Denmark are shifting their cloud solutions away from foreign dependency towards regional managed cloud solutions.This shows the continuously changing world order and how countries and states are redefining their priorities and security agenda in recent years of globalisation and complex interdependence.

Will states continue to retreat back to their own methods, or will we see new cooperations and treaties being made? The theory of complex interdependence is strong in international relations theory and is a major driver for states to ensure that the risk of conflict remains low; however, no longer purely financial and trade major factors, since security has become increasingly important in the light of emerging conflicts, which makes the application of said theory difficult. Consequently, it is essential to continuously analyse and reassess the cyber strategies of states such as Germany and examine how the evolving international landscape both shapes and is shaped by these strategies.

Analysing Germany’s cyber strategy through the international relations lens

Germany has gradually expanded its cyber strategy through institutional development, including the strengthening of the BSI and increased cooperation between civilian and military cyber units, calling it “Integrated Security for Germany”. These efforts demonstrate a recognition that cyber security is no longer a niche issue but a central component of national security policy.

Many scholars, such as Nye, Thomas Rid, Valeriano and Jagoda, have and are (re)discussing the security of the cyber-domain and how one can apply theories. Can we apply realism and liberalism? Is Clausewitz appropriate in the realm of cybersecurity? An interesting note is the comparison of cyber-attacks and the human body by Allan Friedman and P.W. Singer, saying they bypass our skin like a viral infection.[1] Making a connection between the human body and international affairs theory can also be led back to sociological theories, such as “functionalism” by Herbert Spencer and analysts comparing cyber-attacks directly to the human body and viruses. This can also be an interesting point of view to look at Germany’s cyber-strategy. As the Integrated Security Report states, Germany’s cyber strategy adopts a whole-of-society approach, encompassing civilians as well as the public and private sectors. Much like the human body, all parts must function together; if one fails, effective defence against external threats becomes impossible. However, with AI increasingly becoming part of our lives, how can we ensure this?

Valeriano and Maness discuss Kello’s view: “New theories and new ways of thinking are required, and Kello (2013: 8) asserts that the social science field is ill-equipped to offer anything of value now.”[2] They further assess that one must also consider what is ‘easier’ in the cyber domain: offence or defence? Nye points out that at the moment (note the analysis was 2010), the offense has an advantage in the cyber domain due to the unpredictable nature of cyber-attacks.[3]Now, in 2026, after having seen many more cyber-attacks and their consequences, it still remains difficult to make a sound statement on this but, one can say that when looking at Germany, the defence needs to be focused on more since cyber-attacks on Germany caused a cost of roughly 300 bln Euros. Furthermore, it is stated that the lines between cyber espionage and cyber-attacks from states such as China and Russia are blurring, making defence increasingly difficult when also speaking of ‘information warfare’.

Valeriano and Maness suggest a ‘Just War’ approach: “a system of justice for the use of cyber technologies where states are incentivised to maintain continued restraint.”[4] This has also been suggested by Weber by urging Germany and other states to deepen norms in order to ensure that critical infrastructure is not being attacked. Seeing recent developments, this may be complicated since hybrid warfare and changing interdependence between states is having an influence on how states are perceiving world order. The changing order causes much unrest, which could prove problematic to ensure that states practice a constrained cyber practice. One can also bring in some theoretical viewpoints from sociology, such as how states and societies can act ‘morally. Sociologists such as Sigmund already raised the question in 2001 about, how much automation, disappearance of institutionally prescribed traditions and values leads to the disappearance of social order.[5] Meaning with now more questions arising whether young people under the age of 16 should even have access to social media due to the dangers of mental health as well as cyber bullying and AI taking over more tasks, states such as Germany see themselves questioning how such a morally and ethically right cyber strategy with other states can take place when other states such as Russia have a “different understanding of warfare” (Oscar Jonsson).

The developments in the past years show that a multidimensional strategy, where one has to consider different methodologies and schools of thought when analysing these incidents to then make suggestions for further research, seems to still be the best way forward. Realism, liberalism and constructivism all have their place in international relations when analysing cyber domains.

Whilst the blackout in Germany was not a direct cyber-attack but a result of physically damaging the cable wires, the consequences were still severe. When developing a ‘cyber’ strategy in the light of the Ukraine Russia war and other conflicts, Germany must not only invest in cyber security, but also physically protect the critical infrastructures more strongly.

Other scholars say that the solution to a secure cyber domain is not more privacy but more openness[6]. Jagoda, for instance, argues that a lack of knowledge plays a big role for cyber security and threats. Schneider makes a point which is also discussed by Jagoda, namely that “only bad security relies on secrecy; good security works even if all the details of it are public”.[7] In other words, security through obscurity, but this still seems contested. Germany is now also considering banning social media apps for individuals under the age of 16 to ensure safety and protection. Closing off access seems to be for now, the strategy forward to try and minimise danger.

Further thoughts?

This article does not claim to find the ultimate solution for a cyber-strategy. When considering many theories, methodologies and having not only an international relations lens but also an interdisciplinary lens, it becomes clear that many questions remain as to how one analyses a cyber-strategy and how can states such as Germany can move forward?

It is a difficult task for Germany and other states, since it seems that, especially for a cyber-strategy, the macro level (states and international relations in this case) is just as important as the micro level (civilians and private sector). A cyber-strategy pushes states to increasingly focus on the private sector since those remain vulnerable if not continuously ‘updated’ and educated about the cyber domain.

Recent discussions at the WEF reveal that states are increasingly reassessing their strategies and international partnerships, which will have significant implications for security and the cyber domain. Germany must continue to invest in both cyber and physical defences whilst also involving private actors and citizens in resilience-building efforts. Only through a comprehensive and adaptive approach can Germany effectively respond to the evolving challenges of cyber and hybrid warfare. Future developments, such as Germany’s plan to develop a kind of ‘cyber dome against cyber-attacks’will show whether it is possible to prevent such attacks or also the issue of ‘information warfare’, which could not be thoroughly discussed in this article. Perhaps states must consider that cyber-attacks cannot be prevented 100% and that a certain cyber-war will, for now, always be part of our society.

[1] P. W. Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 34–39. (from Discussion: ‘Resilience and is cyber resilience more attainable than cybersecurity?’)

[2] Valeriano, Brandon, and Ryan C. Maness, 'International Relations Theory and Cyber Security: Threats, Conflicts, and Ethics in an Emergent Domain', in Chris Brown, and Robyn Eckersley (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Political Theory, Oxford Handbooks (2018; online edn, Oxford Academic, 5 Apr. 2018), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198746928.013.19, accessed 23 Jan. 2026: pg 264

[3] Valeriano, Brandon, and Ryan C. Maness, 'International Relations Theory and Cyber Security: Threats, Conflicts, and Ethics in an Emergent Domain', in Chris Brown, and Robyn Eckersley (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Political Theory, Oxford Handbooks (2018; online edn, Oxford Academic, 5 Apr. 2018), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198746928.013.19, accessed 23 Jan. 2026: pg 266

[4] Valeriano, Brandon, and Ryan C. Maness, 'International Relations Theory and Cyber Security: Threats, Conflicts, and Ethics in an Emergent Domain', in Chris Brown, and Robyn Eckersley (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Political Theory, Oxford Handbooks (2018; online edn, Oxford Academic, 5 Apr. 2018), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198746928.013.19, accessed 23 Jan. 2026: pg 268.

[5] Sigmund, Steffen (2001): Zwischen Altruismus und symbolischer Anerkennung. Überlegungen zum stifterischen Handeln in mondernen Gesellschaften. In: Jansen, A. et al (Hg): Eigeninteresse und Gemeinwohlbindung. Frankfurt/M.S. S 213.

[6] “Speculative Security.” pg 21-36, Patrick Jagoda, “Speculative Security.” In Cyber Space and National Security: Threats, Opportunities, and Power in a Virtual World edited by Derek S. Reveron (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 21–36.

[7] “Speculative Security.” pg 21-36, Patrick Jagoda, “Speculative Security.” In Cyber Space and National Security: Threats, Opportunities, and Power in a Virtual World edited by Derek S. Reveron (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012) pg 31.

April 4, 2023 — No Comments

Germany and other European countries supply Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine

Authors: Alessandro Spada, Francesca Belotti and Januaria Gizzi - UK & European Affairs Team

Exactly one year after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, both countries are at an impasse. On the one hand, Moscow has not obtained as many territories as it had wanted; on the other hand, the Ukrainian resistance has yet to make any progress in defeating Putin. This might be due to the lack of weapons at Kyiv's disposal. Indeed, until a few days ago, only lighter weaponry was given to Zelensky's troops to keep their line of defence intact. Unfortunately, a war cannot be won by playing only defence, so Kyiv has started asking its Western allies for additional support. In particular, Germany and the USA were asked to supply its high-tech Leopard 2 tanks, although, with initial insecurity, such a wish was finally granted.

The reasons behind the reluctance

The main reasons Germany was reluctant to send Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine are the following. The first one is certainly linked to the vast historical significance of World Wars One and Two. German modern-day leaders feel the weight of history, meaning that they feel a deep responsibility for the death of millions of Russians during the two world wars. Indeed, as the aggressor in two world wars, many Germans opt for a cautious line of being Ukraine's leading supplier of battle tanks. Moreover, this decision would be a further break for Berlin with its post-World War Two non-belligerent policy.

The second reason is related to German society. A significant segment of the population, particularly situated in the former communist German Democratic Republic, feels traditionally close to Russia and has an aversion to the values and functioning of Western society. Shortly before Christmas, 40% of Germans who took part in a poll said they recognized the Kremlin's justification to invade Ukraine, blaming the West for the eastward expansion of the Nato military alliance. In addition, according to a Jan. 19 poll, only 46% of Germans were in favour compared to 43% who opposed the supply of Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine.

The third reason is Scholz's governing coalition and even the SPD. The German Chancellor Scholz couldn't ignore the strong pacifist wings inside both major parties to its governing coalition, the Social Democrats and the Greens. Especially, many Social Democrats voters live in former East Germany, which has been more sympathetic to Moscow".

Another reason for such reluctance would be that the German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, wouldn't have authorized any Leopard 2 tank supply to Ukraine unless the US government agreed to send M1 Abrams tanks.

Lastly, granting Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine could mean overstepping Germany's position as a mere weapons supplier and cause a military escalation.

The two sides' reactions

Ultimately, the decision of Germany to send Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine generated some reactions at the international level. How did Russia react to this decision? Can we consider this decision proof that the Western powers are escalating into war more than before?

From a realist perspective, we could say that Russia perceived this decision as a proper threat, which will most likely reflect in Russia counter-attacking or entering a defensive approach towards Germany and the West in particular. Hence, in a statement, the Russian Embassy said that the current conflict would escalate to a new level.

Western powers play an essential role in understanding the reactions. First of all, NATO utterly supported Germany's decision, making clear that it would help Ukraine win against Russia. From this, Russia's threat perception has significantly increased, allowing Russia to undermine the Western powers consequently. Interestingly, the position of Britain in this given context reflected on Rishi Sunak, the current Prime Minister, to underpin Steffen Hebestreit's decision-making. Thus, the British Prime Minister clearly expressed his position on Twitter by saying, "The right decision by NATO Allies and friends to send main battle tanks to Ukraine. Alongside Challenger 2s, they will strengthen Ukraine's defensive firepower," and "Together, we are accelerating our efforts to ensure Ukraine wins this war and secures a lasting peace.".

In a nutshell, the decision to send Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine was made to help it defend itself better, but it was not made lightly. The fears of becoming too involved in a war "that is not ours to fight", the weight of history, and the pacifistic forces within Germany's main parties were all weighed carefully before lending the peculiar tanks to Ukraine. Unfortunately, this is not the end of the conflict or the requests. Indeed, the day after the announcement made by the Chancellery, a new request for fighter jets was filed by Kyiv in order to switch strategy to an attack-based one. Western ally has yet to respond positively to a possible supply of fighter jets, but all remains to be seen. Will the West stand by, or will it contribute even more than it already has?

June 3, 2021 — 1 Comment

European Security Challenges I: The footprint of power rebalancing

By Sonia Martínez and Giovanni Rasio.

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Currently, there exists no popular support to equip the Union with substantial military capabilities to defend itself against common threats. There is no consensus among leaders regarding European Strategic Autonomy, the key aspect of European defence planning. And if this decision is made, European leaders need to craft a common strategy. This query would entail questions such as what the risks are, who would join, or what are the next steps.

Unless the United States abruptly decided to abandon its commitment embodied in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European defence configuration is unlikely to vary. Since the beginning of the Cold War, the United States has always acted as the security guarantor of Europe. In particular, the long-standing American support for the Old Continent's defence and security has pivoted around NATO. As a full-fledged multilateral security alliance, NATO has provided an effective shield against the threats arising in Europe’s Eastern neighbourhood. The Organisation also represented the main framework through which Member States’ forces have engaged in military operations under American guidance.

Approaches to Security

Nonetheless, as positions concerning defence diverge, propelling European self-defence would put the unity of the block under pressure. Europe should not stand solely on its feet, as transatlantic support has and will prove crucial. However, it must undoubtedly increase its defence autonomy to a great extent. According to Chancellor Merkel, the ‘task of the future’ for Europe is to take destiny into its own hands.

After a rather unipolar age, the EU should use the global power rebalancing scenario to its benefit. New challenges are compelling the US to shift its focus and resources from Europe and the Middle East towards the Indo-Pacific. This rebalancing dynamic, which partially began with the so-called Pivot to Asia during the Obama Administration, culminated with the Indo-Pacific Strategy introduced by President Trump. The attention required by the US posture in the Pacific, combined with Trump’s proneness to threatening European allies to withdrawal the American troops, have somehow pushed Washington and Europe far from each other.

The Union beyond question needs a more autonomous security approach. This is certainly the viewpoint of President Macron, who advocates for ‘European autonomy’ in defence matters, based on the principle of interoperability. This approach evokes a Union capable of delivering both soft and hard power. The German approach is comparatively different. It is based on cooperation, support, and it emphasises the importance of strong transatlantic relations. A coordinated European approach is needed to secure the continent in an unprecedented environment marked by COVID-19 and a complex setting on the East wing.

Impact of European Security Approaches on Strategy

Given the ever-changing uncertain global outlook, observing strategic moves conducted by other global actors is paramount. After Brexit, the UK pivoting from Europe to a global strategy adds complexity to the EU’s defence strategy. In January 2021, the European Union officially lost an important partner for its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Other than holding one of the most powerful militaries in the world, the United Kingdom, together with France, has historically proved essential in nuclear deterrence and expeditionary capabilities for the European Union.

After leaving the EU, the UK aims to revive a more global dimension of its foreign policy. This would allow London to regain a leading role on the international stage. The Integrated Review 2021 offers a first glimpse of the new ‘Global Britain’, conveying that the UK will be the first European country to tilt to the Indo-Pacific region, thus inevitably shifting its focus away from a continental perspective.

Further crucial points need to be addressed in common security matters of the EU. The EU's internal and external security issues are becoming increasingly intertwined. An updated version of the 2016 EU Global Strategy and the implementation of tailored policies are required to counter potential security threats.

Moving forward

Initiatives such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PeSCo) and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) are turning points for a coordinated approach to security. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) comprises both assets and capabilities of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), dealing among others with crisis management. And yet, this task remains a vital milestone to secure Europe.

This is even more essential concerning the EU's southern and eastern neighbours. In this regard, Karrenbauer highlights the need to pay attention to the four cardinal points. The CFSP, in fact, is a model based on multilateralism that aims to demonstrate that this sort of international order functions. However, European multilateralism will not prove successful without coordination and agility. The unanimity factor implies that if member states do not arrive at a consensus other states might make a move to solely benefit themselves.

Conclusion

Member States should work together concerning security matters in the direction of strategic autonomy. The region should take on its hard power responsibility in an uncertain multipolar environment. There is an inevitable overlap between internal and external security threats. Exchanging information is crucial to achieve an effective defence strategy.

As Kramp-Karrenbauer, German Minister of Defence, wrote, Brexit exhibits the results of a European policy that feeds on sentiment instead of devising ideas for a common European future. Brexit has possibly fissured relations between the UK and the EU, as press biases indicate.

Europe needs to cooperate to bring forward a common defence framework that rises above politics. The way ahead should be a combination of more strategic autonomy and stronger transatlantic relations; while the former will be critical, the latter has proved crucial. The US rebalance of power, the pandemic and Brexit are increasing the temperature of the stove. European leaders should know that a watched pot never boils.