March 26, 2025No Comments

The Security Landscape of South Asia: A Country-Wise Analysis

by Arslan Sheikh, Ido Raz, Quanita Khan, & Sabur Shah - South Asia Desk

Introduction

The countries of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are all located in South Asia. The sub-region holds immense geopolitical significance at a global scale, characterised by its diverse political structures, economic interdependencies, and security complexities. The region’s security architecture is shaped by traditional geopolitical concerns, including military conflicts, border disputes, and threats of nuclear deterrence, as well as non traditional threats such as climate change, cyber vulnerabilities, terrorism, and transnational crime.

In this study, we will examine and discuss the security situation in each South Asian country within the context of existing international security frameworks and treaties from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). 

Afghanistan

Afghanistan’s security landscape remains precarious following the return of the Taliban to power in August 2021, leading to international concerns over governance and regional stability. Following accusations of human rights violations of women and minorities, the new regime faces recognition issues from the international community. Due to its strategic location, Kabul’s internal security challenges are problematic for South and Central Asian countries. For instance, the expansion of the Khorasan branch of the Islamic State (ISIS-K) in Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover led to serious concerns in many capitals over cross-border terrorism leakage, either through physical attacks or through radical propaganda. In addition, the harboring of other militant groups, such as the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Al-Qaeda, increases regional tensions and international distrust of Kabul.

Afghanistan, under Taliban rule, faces a severe humanitarian crisis characterized by the systematic exclusion of 2.5 million girls from education beyond sixth grade and 1.1 million women from universities. The maternal mortality rate is alarmingly high at 622 deaths per 100,000 births, while tensions along the Durand Line with Pakistan create ongoing instability. Approximately 8 million Afghans have fled the country, with thousands perishing during migration attempts. The country continues to be a focal point for international security cooperation, mainly through the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and multilateral counterterrorism frameworks.

Afghanistan faces severe food insecurity and an economic crisis exacerbated by international sanctions and humanitarian constraints. Additionally, environmental degradation and internal displacement contribute to the region’s broader security challenges.

Bangladesh

Due to a recent change in leadership, Bangladesh is still politically vulnerable and has effectively mitigated internal security risks through counterterrorism measures in coordination with regional security frameworks. However, challenges persist in managing sporadic border tensions with Myanmar and India, requiring continued diplomatic engagement and cross-border management strategies.

From a nontraditional security perspective, Bangladesh is one of the most climate-vulnerable countries with rising sea levels threatening coastal communities and agricultural production. Additionally, the Rohingya refugee crisis continues to strain national resources, necessitating sustained international support from organizations such as UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Bhutan

Bhutan maintains a stable security environment but remains engaged in boundary negotiations with China, which has significant implications for its economic relations with India. The country upholds a policy of strategic neutrality and actively participates in regional security initiatives under SAARC.

Bhutan faces non-traditional security concerns in its fiscal deficits,  climate disasters, and food production scarcity. Due to minimal refinancing and exchange rate risks from the loans it took from India,  Bhutan is facing a hydroelectric debt. The country experiences a high seismic activity as it is located in the Himalayan mountains — between the Indian and Eurasian tectonic plates. As an area prone to earthquakes and floods, agricultural loss makes food production relatively hard. Bhutan has growing concerns over climate change, particularly the impact of glacial melt on hydropower generation. Bhutan’s proactive environmental policies align with global frameworks such as the Paris Agreement, yet external climate pressures remain a persistent challenge.

India

India’s security posture is shaped by its border tensions with Pakistan and China, particularly in Jammu & Kashmir, Aksai Chin, and Arunachal Pradesh, with ongoing disputes over territorial claims.

As the largest military power in South Asia, India prioritizes defense modernization, strategic deterrence, and maritime security, particularly through multilateral frameworks such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad).

Beyond conventional threats, India faces significant non-traditional security challenges, including escalating cybersecurity risks. Additionally, climate change-induced glacier melt continues to threaten regional water security and disrupt food supply chains, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities.

Maldives

The Maldives is a key player in Indian Ocean security, balancing relations between India and China while addressing maritime security challenges such as illegal fishing and transnational crime. Its participation in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) underscores its commitment to regional stability.

Climate change represents an existential threat, with rising sea levels endangering national infrastructure and livelihoods. The Maldives seeks financial and technological support from initiatives like the Global Climate Fund (GCF) to enhance climate resilience

Source: Photo by Lara Jameson.

Nepal

Nepal’s security considerations are influenced by its geographical positioning between India and China. Border disputes with India and China and economic dependencies shape its strategic outlook, necessitating a balanced foreign policy approach.

Nepal is highly vulnerable to earthquakes and glacial retreats, both of which threaten national infrastructure and water security. The rapid loss of Himalayan glaciers poses severe risks to downstream populations reliant on water reserves, emphasizing the need for sustainable disaster management policies.

Pakistan

Pakistan’s security landscape remains dominated by tensions with India over Kashmir, coupled with national security threats posed by terrorism. The exchanges of cross-border airstrikes with Iran and Afghanistan have further caused regional political instability and a degradation of diplomatic dialogue. Afghanistan, under the Taliban regime, has targeted areas in Pakistan’s Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Moreover, it is accused of allowing and supporting cross-border attacks from Afghanistan inside Pakistani soil by the TTP and various militant groups. In response to the Afghan-based attacks, Pakistan conducted several airstrikes aimed against the TTP military posts in North Waziristan, which have increased tensions between the two neighbors. Other militant groups, such as the Balochistan Liberation Army (accused of being supported by India—India has officially denied such allegations, and no verifiable evidence has been presented to confirm these claims)—leverage Islamabad’s security problems in an attempt to damage valuable economic projects to further increase security instability in the country. Islamabad is engaged in counterterrorism efforts under the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to combat illicit financial networks and cooperate with South and Central Asian countries' counterterrorism institutes. 

Water scarcity and economic instability further exacerbate Pakistan’s security challenges. As a low-income country, Pakistan is highly dependent on agricultural production. With growing climate vulnerabilities, the country remains dependent on external assistance and multilateral economic interventions. Pakistan remains the 5th most vulnerable country on the Global Climate Risk Index. 

Sri Lanka

Despite the end of its decades-long civil war, ethnic and religious tensions continue to pose security risks. The 2019 Easter bombings highlighted the ongoing threat of Islamist extremism in the country. Political instability, coupled with post-war reconciliation challenges, remains a concern.

Sri Lanka is currently grappling with a severe financial crisis, which has led to widespread economic instability. Additionally, the country faces the impacts of climate change, with coastal erosion and shifting monsoons threatening agriculture and food security.

Conclusion

South Asia's security landscape is complex, balancing traditional threats such as geopolitical conflicts and non-traditional risks like climate change and cyber threats. Addressing these requires regional cooperation, policy innovation, and sustainable security frameworks. The new ITSS South Asia team will attempt to address the following challenges while suggesting proper solutions the international community could employ to mitigate them. 

January 19, 2025No Comments

 The Kashmir Conflict: The Tip of a Dangerous Glacier – Part II

by Davide Gobbicchi - Human Security Team

Having illustrated the region’s history and political structure, this second part of the article will look at the solutions to the Kashmir conflict proposed throughout the last decades, and the underlying motivations behind their failure to be adopted.

Solutions to the Kashmir Conflict

The debate around Kashmir has offered three major solutions to the current stalemate:

  1. Political Independence

A strand of the academic debate around Kashmir has argued that granting the region independence would lift the burden off the shoulders of India and Kashmir (thus the international community) while simultaneously allowing the Kashmiri people to best safeguard their own unique identity. This approach presents two problems:

  • Fractured Kashmiri Identity: as mentioned in the first paragraph of this paper, the seven decades of war characterizing Kashmir have greatly consumed the Kashmiriyat and the regional identity resulting from it, polarizing communities and fueling division. Within this context, it is hard - if not impossible - to imagine the Kashmiri people being able to agree on independence and on what country to build afterwards.  
  • Indo-Pakistani opposition: given Kashmir’s importance to both New Delhi and Islamabad (more of this in the next paragraph), it is even harder to believe that either of the two countries would ever grant its part of the region independence.

      2.   Formal Partition 

Several authors such as Wolpert argue that a formal partition of Kashmir based on the Line of Control between India and Pakistan would be the “most realistic solution”; however, this policy would face two problems:

  • Conflicting views regarding partition: while some of India and Kashmir’s major political actors have accepted the current Line of Control as the new Indo-Pakistani border, Pakistan has several times categorically opposed it without providing feasible alternatives, thereby leaving no margin of political dialogue. 
  • Prerequisites for peace are treated as consequences of future peace: the transformation of the LoC into a soft border, and Kashmir’s demilitarization have for decades been seen as the two fundamental initial steps to be taken towards a conflict resolution in Kashmir. However, despite pressures from the international community, both India and Pakistan refuse to take significant measures in that direction, each waiting for the other to make the first move. Within this strategy adopted by both sides in the conflict, it seems unlikely that a common agreement on Kashmir’s formal partition will be achieved any time soon. 

       3.   Autonomy

The debate on Kashmir’s autonomy has rotated around two kinds of autonomy:

  1. Separate autonomy: this approach advocates for the establishment of five different autonomous provinces (Kashmir; Jammu; Ladakh; Azad Kashmir; Gilgit-Baltistan) with the following characteristics:
  • free access to one another and to/from India and Pakistan;
  • individual democratic constitution(s) and legislature for all local issues;
  • defense and financial treaties between India and Pakistan for regional defense and foreign affairs;
  • a high-level governing body (comprising India; Pakistan and the 5 Autonomous Provinces) for cross-regional issues and demilitarization;
  1. Joint autonomy: another frequently discussed option, it envisages the creation of a no-borders Kashmir Economic Union with India and Pakistan jointly managing defense and foreign affairs, and the current Line of Control separating the two parts of Kashmir  being a mere formality.

Despite this third solution being the most popular and feasible (for it would be the one to best balance Kashmiri desire for autonomy and Indo-Pakistani interests), it nonetheless presents - similarly to the other two solutions previously discussed - two major issues:

  • Prerequisites for peace treated as consequences of future peace: (same as in the “formal partition” solution.)
  • Indian repression of Kashmiris’ attempts to engage in “political building processes”: the 2019 abrogation (discussed in the previous paragraph) of articles 370 and 35a of the Indian Constitution led to a centralization of power in the hands of New Delhi; this move hindered local forms of political engagement that would have helped India and Pakistan develop solutions to the conflict accepted by the very people living the conflict. The consequent de-legitimacion and de-responsabilisation of Kashmiri civil society drew locals away from official political processes and pushed them towards underground organizations that provided fertile ground to the Islamization and radicalization of society.    

As shown in this paragraph, all three major solutions to the Kashmir conflict offered by the international academic debate present problems that make them unfeasible in the short run. These issues are largely the product of Indian and Pakistani unwillingness to compromise, much to the disadvantage of the region’s population. It is by now clear that the limbo in which Kashmir finds itself is nothing but a reflection of the critical nature of Indo-Pakistani relations worsened by their respective national interests. The paper will now turn to this.

Map 1: Erstwhile Princely State of Jammu & Kashmir. Currently, Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir are administered by Pakistan, UT of Jammu & Kashmir and UT of Ladakh by India, and Aksai Chin by China.
Source and link: Wikimedia Commons.

 Indo-Pakistani motivations behind the Kashmir conflict 

The inability - or unwillingness - to take significant steps towards the resolution of Kashmir’s current state of affairs by both New Delhi and Islamabad conceals deep-rooted interests and discourses on both sides of the conflict: Kashmir’s resource-rich nature and important role as a water supplier make it vital for both countries’ economy. From a geopolitical point of view, the region serves as a bridge connecting South Asia to Central Asia and China, constituting a major economic corridor for both India and Pakistan. Apart from these obvious reasons, Kashmir plays a bigger role in both countries’s identity; let us analyze each of the two nations’ point of view:

  • India’s discourses and interests in Kashmir: there are three major motivations behind New Delhi’s desire to control Kashmir:
  1. Muslim Kashmir as a confirmation of India’s pluralist and secular federalism: Kashmir gradually became the symbol of India’s secular side of the political debate, which saw the region’s internal and external diversity as the alternative to hindu-nationalism. 
  2. Avoid the Balkanisation of the country: granting Kashmir independence would in turn foment nationalisms all over the diverse Indian nation, posing a serious threat to the country’s stability and unity.
  3. Avoid the radicalisation of the subcontinent: as many analysts claim, an independent (even more Pakistani) Kashmir would likely become a safe haven for islamic fundamentalism, which would then easily spill into India fomenting religious radicalism (islamic in action, hindu in reaction).
  • Pakistan’s discourses and interests in Kashmir: similarly to India, we find three main reasons for the country’s claims on Kashmir:
  1. Muslim Kashmir as the last piece in the national unification process: Pakistan gradually came to perceive itself as the homeland in which all muslims of South Asia could unite under one common Islamic Republic; given this self-bestowed identity and role, Kashmir - being the only muslim region of the subcontinent not under Pakistani control - represents the ultimate confirmation of the country’s identity.
  2. Religious sentiment as a means to ensure national unity: given the complex internal problems currently faced by the country, promoting the narration of a jihad in Kashmir against foreign oppressors could unite the people of Pakistan and distract them from bigger looming problems.
  3. The Pakistan Army’s major role in the country: the historical importance of the army in Pakistan has given it a great amount of political power; any (quasi) conflict increases the army’s power and legitimacy within society, whereas any stability has the opposite effect. Given the army’s weight in the decisions of Islamabad, it is no wonder that the government has so far promoted a policy of destabilization across Kashmir. 

 Conclusion

As this paper has shown, Kashmir is a complex region with a unique history and identity. Despite the erosion of Kashmiriyat tolerance and the rise of religious fundamentalism caused by seven decades of war, this identity still exists and should not be ignored by Indo-Pakistani processes of national homogenisation; it should rather be given voice to by official political channels, so as to avoid the proliferation of alternative violent forms of civic engagement - namely terrorism. Granting the region autonomy (as mentioned in the third solution of the third section of this paper) could be a mean to avoid this; however, given Kashmir’s complex political division and the clashing interests and discourses of India and Pakistan, a joint or separate autonomy for the region seems highly unlikely in the short run. While India perceives protests in Kashmir as the product of a Pakistani-backed radical minority, Pakistan sees the turmoils as a natural expression of the popular religious and nationalistic sentiment; consequently, each country believes the other to be the main reason behind the continuation of the conflict, and itself as the only solution to it. Given its position, a prolonged destabilization and radicalisation of Kashmir could bear consequences on the larger Asian region; given the nuclear-power status of both India and Pakistan, a worsening of their relations could have repercussions on the larger international community. It is therefore of utmost importance to avoid the crystallization of the conflict. Three important steps could have positive effects in this direction: 

  • Promote local forms of civic and political engagement (as opposed to India’s abrogation of article 370 and the consequent disruptive effect that it had on Kashmiri society). 
  • Take concrete actions tackling regional fundamentalism and terrorism (as opposed to Pakistan’s current ambiguity and past sponsorship of major radical islamist groups).
  • Promote Indo-Pakistani confidence-building measures to reduce fear and mutual mistrust,  thereby creating a channel for communication and ultimately cooperation (as opposed to the historically poor Indo-Pakistani relations characterized by 4 major wars and several clashes).

While the international community has since the failed UN mediation of 1947 always regarded Kashmir as a private issue between the two countries, it is by now clear that India and Pakistan alone are unable - or unwilling - to come to realistic solutions. The international community should then change its approach to Kashmir and act as a mediator between New Delhi and Islamabad in order to ensure the fulfillment of the three policies just mentioned, able to constitute a solid basis from which to later achieve a more ambitious regional autonomy; major actors directly affected by the region’s instability - such as China or Russia - could start working in this direction, consequently dragging the US and the EU (both afraid of leaving the region in the hands of Moscow and Beijing) into the region with the UN supervising cooperation among great powers. The need to change our approach to the Kashmir conflict is drastic and urgent, for it affects not only the region’s stability and security, but that of the international community as a whole.   

November 23, 2024No Comments

The Kashmir Conflict: The Tip of a Dangerous Glacier- Part I

by Davide Gobbicchi - Human Security Team

The return to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan has shed light on Central Asia’s geopolitics and security issues, with many analysts fearing that Afghanistan would initiate a domino effect of destabilisation and Islamic radicalisation across a particularly unstable region of the world. Kashmir has best symbolised the complexity of South Asia, given its decades of instability, ethnoreligious tensions and major great powers' interests. Assessing this region helps us understand one of the most strategic and complex areas in the world.

This article attempts to uncover the motivations behind the long-standing conflict that turned Kashmir into the world’s most militarised region, to consequently try providing policy recommendations that could bring Kashmir stability and development, much to the benefit of its people, the larger geographical area, and the international community as a whole.

This article will be divided into two parts: the first will focus on the region’s historical and sociocultural context as well as its political structure, investigating the factors behind Kashmiris’ unique identity and the developments leading Kashmir to its current state of affairs; the second part will then analyse the solutions to the conflict proposed by the recent international academic literature and try to uncover the motivations behind Indo-Pakistani inability to implement such solutions, finishing by presenting policy recommendations for the actors involved in the conflict.

Understanding Kashmir: history and cultural identity 

Kashmir’s geographical position at the crossroads of empires and its predominantly mountainous nature created throughout the centuries two conditions common to such regions across the world: a highly heterogeneous population within an isolated territory. The centuries-old melting pot resulting from the region’s location destroyed classic patterns of identity (religion and language) and generated a society with incongruous religious-linguistic divisions, thus preventing the radicalisation of social groups along ethno-religious lines and instead nurturing a culture of peaceful coexistence among different religions and ethnicities that became known as “Kashmiriyat”. Simultaneously, Kashmir’s territorial morphology provided a natural barrier- mountains-against excessive foreign influence, thereby preserving a strong regional identity based not on a unique language, culture, or religion, but rather on the unique coexistence and intermingling of many.

Map 1: Erstwhile Princely State of Jammu & Kashmir. Currently, Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir are administered by Pakistan, UT of Jammu & Kashmir and UT of Ladakh by India, and Aksai Chin by China.
Source and link: Wikimedia Commons.

The establishment of the "Princely State of Kashmir and Jammu" in 1846 marked the beginning of a distinct political entity in the region. The Maharaja of this new kingdom retained control over most internal matters while recognising the suzerainty of the British Empire. During its century of quasi-independent rule (1846–1952), the region saw the cultivation of ideals such as tolerance, secularism, and pluralism, which had long been part of its historical identity. Challenges emerged following the partition of 1947, as ethno-religious tensions in the newly created states of India and Pakistan began to affect Kashmir. The initial neutrality and aspirations for independence within the Princely State of Kashmir and Jammu encountered opposition from both India and Pakistan, each of which viewed Kashmir as integral to their national identities.

In 1947, armed tribal forces from Pakistan entered Kashmir, citing reports of violence against Muslims in the region, and sought to integrate Kashmir with the newly established Islamic Republic of Pakistan. in response to the foreign invasion, the Maharaja of Kashmir and Jammu - being himself a Hindu - requested India to intervene and stop Pakistani incursions into Kashmir, consequently allowing for Jammu and Kashmir to become part of the country. India’s intervention marked the beginning of the First Indo-Pakistani War (1947-1948) and - upon India’s request - the intervention of the UN to settle the dispute. UN Resolutions 47 and 48 called for a ceasefire and proposed a plebiscite to allow the people of Jammu and Kashmir to determine their political future. While a ceasefire was achieved and a ceasefire line established, disagreements between India and Pakistan prevented the implementation of the plebiscite, leaving the region divided and its population in a state of uncertainty.

In the following decades, the political and territorial landscape of Kashmir underwent further changes. The Sino-Indian War of 1962 resulted in China gaining control of the eastern region of Aksai Chin. The Third Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 led to the 1972 establishment of the Line of Control (LoC), a de facto border based largely on the previous ceasefire line, separating Pakistani-administered and Indian-administered territories. Despite a fourth Indo-Pakistani war in 1999 and subsequent smaller clashes, the region remains a point of contention between the two nations.

Kashmir remains to this day under the fragile division established by the 1972 Line of Control. However, decades of Indo-Pakistani influence and conflict have changed Kashmiri identity, slowly eroding the principles of tolerance and pluralism (Kashmiriyat) on which it had been resting for the previous centuries: Islamic fundamentalism - backed by Islamabad and fueled by New Delhi’s Hindu nationalism - gradually moved away from its historical irrelevance to gain growing importance in political and societal discourses, becoming the pillar of several political and civil society movements within the region. The increasing radicalisation among segments of the Muslim Kashmiri population contributed to the eruption of violence and terrorism, leading to the displacement of several religious minorities, including the Hindu Kashmiri Pandits, who relocated to predominantly Hindu areas of the region; these migrations impoverished the society’s ethnocultural diversity and consequently led to the alignment of identity with religion, thereby allowing the flourishing of geographical and sectarian divisions within Kashmir. These newly arising divisions greatly worsened living conditions, further fomenting extremism and interreligious hatred.

The political division of Kashmir 

As of today, India controls about 55% of Kashmir, Pakistan 30%, and China roughly 15% of it. Kashmir is now divided into four areas, with two under Indian control and two under Pakistani control, excluding the mostly uninhabited Chinese-controlled part of the region.:

  • Jammu & Kashmir (now “U.T. of Jammu and Kashmir”, and “U.T. of Ladakh”): This subregion under Indian control was given the status of “State” and granted a special degree of autonomy over its internal affairs by the Indian Constitution (article 370; article 35a). In 2019 the Indian Government - after decades of debate - approved the “Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act”, which abrogated the two articles and split the state into two “Union Territories” that enjoy far less autonomy than States: “the Union Territory of Ladakh”, and the “Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir”. Such a highly contested Act (justified by the Indian Government as a way to stimulate “financial activities, transparency in administration and growth in J&K’s economy.”) de facto marked the end to what was known as “Kashmiri Exceptionalism”, and was (and still is) met by widespread protests throughout the region (now divided into two different administrative territories), since many saw New Delhi’s centralism as an attempt to colonise the region and alter its unique identity.  
  •  Gilgit-Baltistan: this territory controlled by Pakistan is administered by the “Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order 2009”, which officially grants the region self-rule but de facto puts it under the control of “an Islamabad-based council with its Chairman being the Prime Minister of Pakistan”. The order further facilitated Islamabad’s policy of ethnic substitution in the region - given Gilgit-Baltistan’s Shia majority in direct opposition to Pakistan’s Sunni tradition - thereby fueling tensions across the territory and demands for separatism. 
  • Azad Kashmir: this second region under Pakistani rule officially enjoys a wide degree of autonomy under its Interim Constitution of 1974, though it de facto is - like the other Pakistan-controlled region - completely subject to the will of Islamabad. Major natural disasters and the resulting mass emigration rapidly changed the territory’s demographics, drawing it closer to the rest of Pakistan. 

Having explained Kashmir’s sociocultural and political context, the second part of the article will focus on the solutions to its critical state of affairs.

April 20, 2024No Comments

ITSS Verona 2023/2024 Webinar Series – India: the world’s largest democracy goes to the polls

For our third webinar of the 2023/2024 season we uncovered the complexities of the world’s largest democracy's upcoming elections, India, in April 2024, with a focus on Prime Minister Narendra Modi's domestic and foreign policies, the Kashmiri issue, as well as the narratives shaping the political landscape.

Agenda:

00:00 -06:11 Opening remarks and Presentation by Carlotta Rinaudo (Lead of the ITSS Webinar Series)

06:15 What is the state of India’s democracy, and why is Prime Minister Narendra Modi likely to win the elections again?

25:00 What is the general sentiment in Kashmir and how will the results affect the Kashmiri people?

40:16 Is the Indian economy really growing?

1:00:16 How will India’s foreign policy evolve post-election?

1:03:40 Q&A session

1:48:00 Closing Remarks by Carlotta Rinaudo

Speakers:

Join Dr. Anastasia Piliavsky (King’s College London)

Dr. Mauro Bonavita (King’s College London)

Dr. Anuradha Bhasin (the Kashmir Times)

Dr. Pawan Agrawal (Ocean Media Private Limited)

Don't miss out - click to watch now!

May 17, 20212 Comments

India’s impact on US Indo-Pacific Grand Strategy

By István Hagyó 

In the recent decades India has become a major power in the Indo-Pacific region which has increased its importance for the United States. China, the second largest economy, aims to establish hegemony in competition with the United States. This provides an opportunity both for the United States and India to find a common path and deepen their partnership to balance China. However, India’s intentions are still unclear and even more sophisticated, due to the changing dynamics of the Indo-Pacific. Will a traditionally neutral India be willing to support the United States in its effort to counter China?  

Obama’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy proved that Asia became the top priority of US Foreign Policy during his Administration. However, under Trump, the focus was reduced by merging East Asia with South Asia, calling the whole region as Indo-Pacific. President Trump’s February 2020 visit to India and the subsequent signing of Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement in October 2020 allowing the two states to exchange geospatial intelligence are symbolic events in highlighting India’s rising status in the U.S. Foreign Policy strategy. Additionally, the two states are engaged in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue along with Japan and Australia. The Dialogue has become a significant regional cooperation platform led by the United States. 

In late March this year, the Biden Administration continued the effort to engage with India by sending the Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin to visit India. During his first Asian tripbesides visiting America’s two closest allies Japan and South Korea, he also visited India, a symbolic step towards highlighting India’sincreased importance for the United States. Biden is generally viewed as an India-friendly politician, particularly due to his contribution towards the United States-India Civil Nuclear Deal in 2008. Additionally, the fact that his administration comprises of a higher percentage of Indian Americans than any other administration, in particular the vice-presidential pick Kamala Harris, carries a great symbolic significance. Biden considers the bilateral relations with India as the “defining relationship” of the 21st century. This makes more sense as China is seeking to become a regional hegemon, particularly through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) mega-project giving Beijing greater influence and military and geopolitical advantage in the region. The BRI mega-project would allow Chinese investments in several participating, vulnerable countries surrounding India, such as Myanmar, Sri Lanka and India’s traditional adversary, Pakistan. China is developing the ports in these countries which will allow it to gain access to the Indian Ocean. This raises concerns in New Delhi of geopolitical encirclement, thereby giving the United States a great opportunity to engage with India. 

However, the purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system by India raises concern in the United States. New Delhi was a traditional partner of the Soviet Union during the Cold War and afterwards, with Russia. It is unlikely that India will give up these ties on America’s insistence. As India’s External Affairs Minister,Subrahmanyam Jaishankar argues, India has no intention of fully aligning either with Russia or the United States, rather will continue to be neutral as it has been for the last 70 years. Further, he points out: “This is a time for us to engage America, manage China, reassure Russia, bring Japan into play … and expand traditional constituencies of support. … A longstanding trilateral with Russia and China coexists now with one involving the U.S. and Japan”. However, the former Indian Ambassador to the U.S. Arun Singh has a different vision on India’s role, where he says, “In the framework for China, U.S. sees India as a very important partner. I think that would be ... the defining parameter for the relationship going ahead.” Narendra Modi the Indian Prime Minister described the basic pillars of the bilateral relations: “India stands for "freedom of navigation and overflight, unimpeded lawful commerce and adherence to international law." Certainly, India welcomes these efforts and see the potential in it, but will consider all options and act in accordance with its national interest. 

It is uncertain how long India can remain neutral in a dynamically changing regional landscape. Will the United States be willing to accept India’s military ties to Russia as it engages with India to balance China? It is hard to answer which military alliance is more important for India, but it is certain that the United States is making serious efforts to engage India to counter China. The U.S Secretary of Defence stated, “...it's clear that the importance of this partnership (US-India), and its impact [on] the international rules-based order will only grow in the years ahead." While the Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh described the future of the US-India relations: “keen to work together to realize the full potential of the India-US comprehensive global strategic partnership." With four consecutive US Administrations in favor and bipartisan support for the US-India relations, it can be assumed that the bilateral relations will remain stabIe for the time-being. In case that India decides to align fully with the United States, the balance in the Indo-Pacific region will be reshaped and will accordingly prompt shift in policies on both sides, between the US-led group of countries and the China-led one.