December 25, 2025No Comments

The Rise of Southeast Asia as a Global Manufacturing Hub

By Dejvi Dedaj - South East Asia and Oceania Desk

Introduction

Southeast Asia, once regarded as a periphery to the global manufacturing systems, has quickly become a core centre of the world production. Geopolitical tensions, in particular the U.S.-China trade war, increased labour costs in China, and the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic have made multinational companies reconsider their supply chains, moving production to new ASEAN economies like Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia.

This change is not just a geographic change, but a structural change in the global economy. The integration of the region into international supply chains has been enhanced by competitive labour markets, improved infrastructure and extensive trade agreements such as Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which have increased resilience and efficiency. Meanwhile, the growing financial ecosystem of Southeast Asia, including advanced capital markets, green and infrastructure financing, facilitates industrial development and innovation. But the emergence of the region is not without problems. The complex environment companies and governments have to operate in to maintain long-term growth is indicated by infrastructure gaps, human capital constraints, and geopolitical uncertainties.

The Forces Behind the Shift

The shift of the global manufacturing to Southeast Asia is due to several convergent forces. The post-2018 global trade environment has become characterized by geopolitical diversification, which has changed the way multinational companies organize their supply chains. The escalation of tariffs and the growing political tension between the United States and China posed greater uncertainty to the companies that had a high concentration of production in one country. The trade barriers, regulatory uncertainty, and the threat of disruption of supply at any time made companies rethink the stability of their current networks. Companies have responded by diversifying production in more than one country to minimize exposure to geopolitical shocks and safeguard the continuity of their operations. Their strategic location in Asia, comparatively open trade policies and integration into regional trade agreements have made neighbouring economies like Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia attractive alternatives. This change is indicative of a larger trend in the global supply chain strategy, where risk reduction and operational flexibility are now as important as cost efficiency in investment and production decisions.

The COVID-19 pandemic further supported the urgency of this diversification strategy. The crisis demonstrated the fragility of over-centralised supply chains and the strategic need of flexible, geographically dispersed production networks. Businesses realised that dependence on one nation, even as productive as China, could bring the world to a standstill. As a result, the geopolitical tensions and the vulnerabilities caused by the pandemic increased the pace of investment in ASEAN economies, as companies tried to establish resilient, diversified, and regionally balanced supply chains.

Moreover, Increasing labour expenses in China have emerged as one of the major reasons that have led to the outsourcing of manufacturing to Southeast Asia. In the last ten years, the wages in the manufacturing centres in China have gone up significantly making the country less competitive in terms of cost in labour intensive industries. Conversely, other Southeast Asian nations such as Vietnam and Indonesia are still providing relatively lower labour costsand thus are viable alternatives to industries such as textiles, electronics assembly and consumer goods. As a result, multinational companies that wish to remain cost effective and at the same time remain near the established supply chains are increasingly shifting production to Southeast Asia where an emerging industrial base is supplemented by favourable labour conditions.

Figure 1: Evolution of China’s Average Wages

Source: Trading Economics (2024)

Lastly, bilateral free trade agreements and the RCEP have greatly strengthened the regional supply chain connectivity in the Asia-Pacific. RCEP, which encompasses approximately 30 percent of the world GDP, enables the smooth flow of intermediate goods and investment among member economies by harmonising trade rules and reducing tariffs. This structure allows the multinational companies to spread the production to multiple countries in Asia without losing preferential access to the market, which makes it more resilient to geopolitical or pandemic-related shocks. The bilateral agreements like the Japan-Thailand EPA and the Indonesia-Korea CEPA are also complementary and enhance market integration and investment opportunities. Collectively, these institutional arrangements support the transition of the region to interdependent and elastic supply chains.

Financial and Economic Implications

The economic consequences of the manufacturing transformation in Southeast Asia go way beyond the relocation of industries, they are an indication of the new financial geography. Although foreign direct investment (FDI) has declined globally, ASEAN has registered its third year of consecutive growth in the region, while its stock increased by 56% since 2014, reaching $3.9 trillion. The major forces were the increased investors’ interest in finance, renewable energy, electric vehicles (EVs), and the reorganization of the supply chain. Financial sector was the largest inflow, which rose to $92 billion, and R&D activities were increasing rapidly, primarily in Singapore. Even though manufacturing FDI fell a little, it was still significant, representing 66% of all greenfield investments, indicating that ASEAN is still a manufacturing and innovation centre in the world.

Figure 2: Global FDI Flows, 2021–2023 (Billions of US Dollars and Year-on-Year % Change)

Figure 3: ASEAN FDI Flows, 2021–2023 (Billions of US Dollars and Year-on-Year % Change)

Source: UNCTAD (2024)

These changes are not just operational but reflect more fundamental financial rebalances that have been the basis of the rise of Southeast Asia as a manufacturing centre in the world. The capital markets in the region are also getting more sophisticated, which allows domestic companies to have a wider range of financing options and become more integrated into the global supply chains. The swift increase in green and sustainability bond issuance, including Singapore which leads the ASEAN’s US$7.8 billion green bond market and Vietnam reaching $1.5 billion in 2021, is an example of the growing financial infrastructure that facilitates industrial growth. The fact that Singapore is a regional financial centre also supports the cross-border trade finance and green financing programs, and other countries such as Malaysia and Thailand are also enhancing domestic markets to fund corporate investment. These financial innovations offer the required liquidity, sustainability orientation and capital depth to maintain the industrial and supply chain transformation in the region.

Financing of infrastructure is also very important in maintaining the growth of manufacturing in the Southeast Asia. TheADB and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are development institutions that have increased investments in logistics and energy infrastructure, which has facilitated the industrial transformation of the region. In 2015-2023, ADB and AIIB together invested billions of dollars in transport, power, and connectivity projects in ASEAN. The modernization of the deep-water ports in Vietnam, trans-island logistics corridors in Indonesia and the Eastern Economic Corridor in Thailand are increasing production capacity and intra-regional trade. Such projects do not only improve physical connectivity, but also bring in private capital in the form of public-private partnerships, which forms a basis of long-term supply chain resilience.

The transformation further extends into digital financial systems. Local payment systems are being integrated through regional payment linkages, e.g. the cooperation between Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia to enable quicker, less expensive and more secure cross-border payments. These links lower the transaction costs and contribute to the increase of financial inclusion, particularly among micro, small, and medium enterprises. This financial digitalisation increases the efficiency of trade and is a strong complement to the physical integration which has been attained through diversification of the supply chain. 

Photo by Aqsa Adha: pixels.com

Difficulties and Structural Constraints

In spite of such achievements, the development of Southeast Asia as a global manufacturing hub is associated with a number of structural issues that may jeopardize its sustainability in the long run. Among the most urgent problems, infrastructure gaps are still present. Although developed economies like Singapore and Malaysia have advanced their global logistics, port, and digital networks, others, especially in the Mekong subregion, such as Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, are still grappling with poor transport, energy, and digital infrastructure. According to the estimates of the ADB, ASEAN needs more than $2.8 trillion of infrastructure investment between 2023 and 2030 to address the projected economic and population growth. Persistent gaps in connectivity increase transit times, raise shipping and energy costs, and fragment supply chains that rely on just-in-time production. In addition, the disparity in the quality of infrastructure between the coastal and the inland regions restricts the possibility of industrial diversification outside of the major urban centres, which results in development imbalances that inhibit inclusive growth.

The lack of human capital and skills also limits the long-term competitiveness of the region. With the global manufacturing shifting to more high-value, technology-intensive manufacturing, Southeast Asia is experiencing a shortage of skilled engineers, data specialists, and technicians. Whereas other economies such as Singapore and Malaysia have invested a lot in technical education and research and development, others are lagging behind, with the vocational training systems being out of sync with industry requirements. World Bank and ADB reports indicate that a large percentage of the ASEAN workforce will need to be reskilled by 2030 to meet Industry 4.0 technologies, especially in digital, technical, and high-value manufacturing jobs. In the absence of strategic investments in education, STEM programmes, and workforce mobility, most countries will continue to be reliant on low-cost, labour-intensive production, instead of moving towards innovation-based growth.

Lastly, the geopolitical uncertainty is looming large over the rise of Southeast Asia. The same dynamics that have driven its expansion, U.S.-China competition and the global drive towards supply chain diversification, are also the ones that put it at risk of volatility. The trade restrictions, technological decoupling, or regional tensions in the South China Sea could disrupt production networks and deter foreign investment. The strategic neutrality of ASEAN and the enhancement of its collective voice in the multilateral forums will be critical to the stability and investor confidence. The effects of global fragmentation can be reduced through initiatives that strengthen transparency, supply chain security, and financial resilience.

Conclusion

The rise of Southeast Asia as a manufacturing hub in the world is an indication of a strategic repositioning of production, finance, and innovation. The geopolitical tensions, increasing costs in China, and vulnerability to the pandemic have increased the pace of investment in the region, whereas trade agreements, infrastructure, and financial development contribute to the growth. However, there are still obstacles, such as skill shortages and infrastructure differences, and geopolitical risks. The long-term success will involve aligned policies, strong supply chains, and human and physical capital investments.

June 28, 2021No Comments

Gamers Revolution

'Gamers Revolution' - The ITSS team "Culture, Society and Security" interviews Dr Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci from Monash University and Professor Christina Sautter from Louisiana State University

Interviewing Team: Julia M. Hodgins, Sofia Stederini, Leigh Dawson

May 3, 20212 Comments

China’s Footprint in the Middle East: Strategic Partnership with Iran

By Carlotta Rinaudo et al

Iran and China sign a 25-yearlong "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" on March 27, 2021.

Late March this year the foreign ministers of China and Iran signed the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” in Tehran. According to a leaked draft, this 25-yearlong agreement would allow China to invest in many Iranian sectors, from banking, telecommunications, healthcare, railways, to information technology. In return, Beijing would secure a discounted supply of Iranian oil and easy access to Iranian islands and ports. In particular, the port of Jask, which sits outside the Strait of Hormuz, would provide a strategic gain for the so-called ‘String of Pearls’, a network of Chinese naval bases that stretches from Mainland China to the Horn of Africa. Additionally, the agreement would also allow enhanced military and intelligence cooperation between the two countries.

Following the announcement of the agreement, alarm bells rang on many Western media outlets. In a hardly surprising move, analysts were quick to label the two countries as the “New Axis of Evil”. It also raised qualms among the Iranian population, which fears that the deal would be a “sellout of Iran’s resources”, with some Iranians calling the agreement as “the new treaty of Turkmenchay”. This is an expression that describes an unjust settlement, and that recalls the treaty that forced Qajar Iran to cede large parts of its territory to the Russian empire in the 19th century. 

This reaction, however, might be considered an exaggerate speculation. In fact, a more cautious viewsuggests that the deal could be more symbolic than we think. It may also resuscitate Iran from its diplomatic isolation – and give Tehran more bargaining power in renegotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal.

An analysis of the historical relations between the two countries can explain why prudence will be preferred over risk. China and Iran are two ancient cultures whose cooperation is rooted in time. In the 80s, Beijing and Tehran collaborated to shield themselves from the external pressure imposed by the US and the USSR, condemning external violation of sovereignty and interference from big powers. Over the past decades, the two have developed a Great Power – Middle Power Partnership, where Tehran has often been dependent on Beijing. However, it needs to be noted that China does not want to be involved in Iran’s disputes, and it is also well aware through experience that doing business with Tehran is no easy task. In 1987, Iran attacked a US tanker with a Chinese-made Silkworm anti-ship missile. To Beijing, using Chinese weapons against an American target was an irresponsible provocation. Furthermore, Iranian sanctions have also been a burden for China to bear. In January 2017, Iran tested a medium-range ballistic missile for the fifth time since the nuclear deal. In response, the United States imposed unilateral sanctions on 25 individuals and companies, among which there were two Chinese firms and three Chinese citizens. A risk-averse China would not want these past events to be repeated, which is why Beijing is carefully moving forward in its relationship with Iran. Thus, analysts should not reach quick conclusions and apply the “New Axis of Evil” label, because today’s Sino-Iranian relations are aiming for prudence and caution.

China is using these Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships as a regular instrument of foreign policy, which means that Iran is not its only partner in the region. Beijing has signed similar agreements, for example with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both rivals of Iran and allies of the US. This is why it is also careful that its relations with Iran do not not jeopardize the balance of power in the Middle East – and, more importantly, the influence it has gained in the region. 

Like in the 80s, Iran and China continue to collaborate today to ultimately balance American regional dominance. The US under the Trump Administration decided to withdraw from the JCPOA and introduce the policy of “maximum pressure on Iran”. However, this only forced Tehran to look towards East. Trump’s decision created a vacuum – a vacuum that China was eager to fill, to emerge as the new major player in the Middle East today.