In this episode, Dr. Michael Barak talks about recent developments and policy changes in Iran, their impact on Israel, and the role of proxy actors following October 7th. Specifically, Dr Barak discusses the multifaceted dynamics involving Iran and its regional influence. He covers Iran’s relationships with various proxies, including Hezbollah and the Houthi’s, as well as its strategic partnerships with Russia. Additionally, Dr Barak examines Iran`s ongoing tensions with Israel and the corresponding Israeli responses.
by Ilaria Lorusso (Iran Team) in collaboration with the Human Rights Team
Introduction
Iranian elections following former president Raisi’s death in May 2024 were called rather abruptly for this July and resulted in the appointment of Massoud Pezeshkian. Considered a moderate candidate, he campaigned for his election maintaining progressive stances both in internal and external politics, promising more liberties and equal rights – especially with regards to women’s issues, animating the Women, Life, Freedom movement – on one hand, and advocating for a renewed nuclear deal and relations with Western countries, particularly the US, aimed at relieving the sanctions that have weakened the Islamic Republic to this day. His political positions fuel refurbished hope for social justice in Iran. However, the fact that he does not seem to want to openly disrupt the system in place after 1979 revolution, and the persistence of a conservative parliament and the absolute authority of Supreme Leader Khamenei dilute the expectations of most human rights advocates vis-à-vis the efforts possible to mitigate the oppression of traditionally marginalised groups. The LGBTQ+ community is notoriously part of the latter. Even if the new president has not exposed himself explicitly on this topic yet, this piece aims at retracing the treatment of LGBTQ+ rights in Iran, making evident above all the risks queer citizens undergo in the country in the current status quo.
Sharia and LGBTIQ+ rights
As an Islamic Republic after the 1979 revolution, Iran abides by the Shari'a system, following a strict interpretation of Islamic religious texts as a base for law norms1. As such, already when it comes to heterosexual relationships, the 2013 Iranian Penal Code2 condemns any form of sexual activity outside of a lawful marriage. Any extra-marital sexual relations, identified as zina, are illegal and subject to criminal sanctions.
Zooming in, homosexuality – particularly among men – is forbidden (haram) and considered a moral, physical, and psychological disorder, comparable to the heterosexual zina. Article 234-239 of the Penal Code shows that the death penalty is imposed on citizens accused of homosexual acts, particularly for those performing a “passive” role in the relationship. This, combined with the relative indulgence with which homosexuality between women is treated, reveals particularly the will to preserve a certain type of masculinity that Iranian men are supposed to perform3. Lashing, prison and fines are the alternative and almost always applied punishments associated with acts that fall into the interpretation of “sexual deviancy” – lesbian relationships and cross-dressing being among these. Besides legislation, then, the LGBTQ+ community is subject to state violence and police prosecution, with reported mass arrests and torture under custody, and queer activists imprisoned for threatening national security and production of “immoral content”.
LGBTQ+ community and the Iranian society
More importantly, because homotransphobia is widespread in Iranian society – up to 90% according to Equaldex’s 2022 findings4, discrimination then extends in every aspect of one’s personal and professional life, with limited access to housing, education, employment, judicial system and healthcare. Interestingly, The Islamic Republic of Iran offers limited subsidised support for gender confirmation surgery, hormone replacement therapy, and psychosocial counselling for trans people. This is due to the fact that the latter views are seen through the lens of gender identity disorders. This medicalisation has provided some legal recognition for trans individuals but has also reinforced the stigma that they suffer from psychological and sexual disorders and need treatment to become "normal"5. In a way, gender reaffirmation therapy is also perceived as a way to “correct” deviances related to non-heterosexual sexual orientations. Accordingly, trans individuals in Iran, whether recognised by the state, seeking recognition, or living without it, frequently face discrimination and abuse due to their gender identity, including hostile public attitudes, extreme violence, and the risk of arrest, detention, and prosecution.
Photo by Sima Ghaffarzadeh: https://www.pexels.com/photo/crowd-of-people-protesting-on-street-holding-flags-and-posters-14136859/
Queer activism, Mahsa Amini’s protests and the way forward
The 2022 national unrest related to the death of Mahsa Amini re-fueled not only women’s rights activists but also those belonging to the queer community. in custody for allegedly wearing her hijab improperly sparked nationwide protests in Iran, met with deadly force by the government. During the protests, young LGBTQ citizens openly defied the regime by removing their hijabs and displaying same-sex affection publicly6. Activists have also used pro-LGBTQ slogans and symbols, increasing visibility but also facing backlash, as the later overturned death sentence to queer activist Sareh Sedighi-Hamadani in that period exemplifies7. Clearly, this shows that queer liberation is to this day a pressing issue in Iranian civil society, and links back to the general discontent that especially younger generation has towards the post-revolution religious élite. Whether the new presidency will be able to appropriately take up the demands of these movements, remains an open question.
Rehman, J., & Polymenopoulou, E. (2013). Is green part of the rainbow: sharia, homosexuality, and LGBT rights in the Muslim world. Fordham International Law Journal, 37(1), 1-52. ↩︎
Karimi, A., & Bayatrizi, Z. (2019). Dangerous positions: Male homosexuality in the new penal code of Iran. Punishment & Society, 21(4), 417-434. https://doi.org/10.1177/1462474518787465↩︎
by Shahin Modarres, Ilaria Lorusso, Margherita Ceserani, and Will Kingston-Cox - Iran Team
Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi died in a helicopter crash in northwest Iran on May 19, as announced by the government on May 20, with Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and seven other passengers. The crash occurred as he was returning from the inauguration of a dam on the border with Azerbaijan, in adverse weather conditions while the aircraft was flying over a rugged, forested region. The death of Raisi, 63, ushers in a period of political uncertainty in Iran, already shaken by the war between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
Raisi, elected in 2021, was considered an ultraconservative and a favorite to succeed the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. According to political analysts, Raisi lacked personal charisma and popular support. During his presidency, Raisi intensified the crackdown on dissent, particularly after the protests following the death of Mahsa Amini, and revived Iran's military nuclear program, after US withdrawal from the historic 2015 agreement. Raisi also strengthened ties with Russia and China and reestablished diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. As such, his death prompted sympathetic reactions from various Arab leaders, such as those of Iraq and Qatar, and Iranian-backed militias, such as Hamas and the Houthis, as part of the "axis of resistance" against U.S. and Israeli influence. At the same time, in some parts of Iran his death was celebrated by the population.
Following the incident, Vice President Mohammad Mokhber was appointed interim president, with presidential elections scheduled for June 28. Though Ebrahim Raisi was one of the most well-known figures in the Iranian regime, his death is not expected to cause major upheaval in the Iranian system. Despite this, elections for a new president will be held at a time of great instability for Iran, both internally and externally. This article therefore aims to present the profiles of the candidates for the presidential election, and the possible effects of Iran's new political leadership on current international relations.
Following the passing of President Raisi, the urgent task of arranging snap elections has become the foremost concern in Iran's domestic affairs, prompting the election date to be rescheduled to June 28, 2024, as mandated by the constitution. With only 50 days allowed for elections following a president's demise, the need to fill the vacancy promptly is evident. However, the process is not devoid of controversies.
The Guardian Council, recognized for its conservative stance, has greenlit only six out of 80 candidates, setting the stage for a pivotal political moment. The 12 members of the Guardian Council — six clerics named by the supreme leader, and six jurists named by the Majlis — have consummate veto power and their decisions on disqualification cannot be appealed. The pool of approved candidates include the mayor of Tehran, Alireza Zakani; member of parliament, Masoud Pezeshkian; former interior and justice minister, Mostafa Pourmohammadi; and head of Iran’s Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs, Amir-Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi. However, the clear frontrunners for victory are Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the parliamentary speaker with ties to the influential Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and Saeed Jalili, a hardliner and former chief nuclear negotiator. Ghalibaf, despite his technocratic approach and connections to the IRGC, faces scrutiny from ultra-conservatives due to his moderate positions and past electoral failures. Meanwhile, Jalili, strongly backed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the IRGC, represents a continuation of Raisi's policies, particularly in opposition to any dialogue with the US.
The Iranian elections carry significance for the country's future direction, especially amid escalating domestic unrest and regional challenges. Low voter turnout in previous elections, coupled with concerns about the regime's legitimacy, represent the broader issues at stake. The regime must find a delicate balance between control and legitimacy, particularly as many Iranians have been disheartened by years of political upheaval and repression. Despite this, ultimate authority rests with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who can still wield influence over policy, making the choice of Raisi's successor critical.
The current Iranian tense relations with the West, exemplified by Tehran's support for proxy militias targeting Israel in response to the Gaza conflict, emphasise the need for a leader who can manage Iran's foreign policy challenges effectively. Khamenei's speeches frequently indicate satisfaction rather than concern about sanctions and other issues, suggesting a preference for Jalili’s continuity over compromise. Yet, there remains a possibility that Khamenei could astonish observers by supporting a candidate open to dialogue with the West, though such a move would deviate from his usual stance advocating "resistance”. The impending election thus holds significant implications for Iran's domestic landscape and also for its international relations. The chosen successor will likely be expected to continue Raisi's legacy, maintaining Iran's current trajectory and policies. However, the regime faces a critical dilemma in ensuring voter participation and maintaining its legitimacy, given widespread disillusionment among the population. While Iran's electoral process includes democratic elements, key policies and candidate selections are significantly influenced by the clerical leadership, leading to discussions about the extent of democratic choice in the system. The selection of Raisi's successor will shape Iran's path, further impacting its interactions on the world stage. With tensions simmering both at home and abroad, the election outcome will reverberate far beyond Iran's borders, influencing regional dynamics and international relations.
The upcoming Iranian elections will also have significant geopolitical implications. These implications can be seen through two lenses: the international and the regional. Globally, the outcome of the election could see Iran seek to strengthen bilateral relations with China and Russia, in order to compensate for increased Western pressure. Such a solidification of relations could be both geopolitically and economically detrimental, as energy markets and international alliances react. Iran natural resource reserves are pivotal to global energy markets, and an election result that favours continued conservatism could lead to further fluctuations, disruptions, and conflict in and over the energy sector.
Furthermore, if the conservative faction, as is predicted, remains in power, we can expect to see again, yet another solidification - this time, over nuclear negotiations. It would be likely to see tensions with the West escalate over increased uranium enrichment, rendering attempts to revive the JCPOA redundant and futile continuation of hardline sanctions policies.
Regionally, a continuation of conservative dominance could see an increase in support for Iranian proxies in Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. Iranian support for Hezbollah in Lebanon would be expected to continue or intensify if conservative hardliners are re-elected. With Hezbollah increasingly active on the northern Israeli border, this could further entrench Hezbollah’s position within Lebanese politics and bolster its military capacity.
For Yemen, Iranian support for the Houthis is likely to continue, if conservatives are re-elected. It is plausible that a hardline government in Tehran would provide increased aid, both military and financially, to the Houthis, prolonging the Yemen conflict. This scenario would likely intensify tensions between Saudi Arabia, which would threaten regional security all over the Middle East.
For the conflict between Israel and Gaza, if the current projections materialise, hardliner governance could see increased support for Hamas. It would not be wrong to assume that hardliners would incite more aggression towards Israel through the proxy network, perpetuating military pressure on Israel without the need for direct Iranian military involvement. Iran does not want an all out war with Israel. To do so would threaten the very existence of Iran’s military, economy, and society. The election is likely to see an intensification of Israel-Iran relations through the proxy network, to both pressurise Israel but defend Iran’s interests, whilst avoiding direct military conflict.
The sudden death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash has plunged Iran into a period of political uncertainty. Snap elections, scheduled for June 28, 2024, highlight the conservative dominance within the Guardian Council, which approved only six out of 80 candidates. Key contenders include Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Saeed Jalili, with Jalili likely to continue Raisi's hardline policies, particularly in opposing dialogue with the West and strengthening ties with Russia and China.
Domestically, the election underscores the regime's struggle for legitimacy amid widespread voter disillusionment. The conservative grip on the political process raises questions about the authenticity of Iran's electoral system. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's influence remains pivotal, ensuring that key policies and candidate selections align with his vision.
Regionally, a conservative victory would likely intensify Iran's support for proxy militias in Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq, escalating tensions, particularly with Israel. Increased aid to groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis could exacerbate conflicts, affecting regional security.
Globally, Iran's potential strengthening of alliances with China and Russia in response to Western pressures could reshape economic and geopolitical landscapes, particularly in energy markets. The international community remains watchful of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, with the election’s outcome crucial in determining the future of the JCPOA and broader diplomatic engagements.
In conclusion, the election following Raisi’s death is a critical juncture for Iran, influencing its domestic stability and regional dynamics. The regime's ability to manage internal discontent and external pressures will shape Iran's path in the coming years, with significant implications for global geopolitics.
In this session, prof. Rivetti talks about Iran in the aftermath of Mahsa Amini's death, dwelling into the movement Women Life Freedom, Iran's geopolitical position after the protests, and future prospect for the country (de)stabilisation.
Interviewers: Ilaria Lorusso, Shahin Modarres, Margherita Ceserani. - Iran Team
Authors: Will Kingston-Cox, Ilaria Lorusso, Margherita Ceserani, Shahin Modarres - Iran Team
The Russo-Iranian strategic military cooperation in the Red Sea unfolds against the backdrop of a multifaceted and changing geopolitical scenario. The evolving situation in the area prompts a reevaluation of the Russo-Iranian partnership, drawing parallels with their collaboration in Ukraine. While historical dynamics may inform the alliance, the Red Sea theater introduces a maritime dimension, reflecting an adaptive strategy. The interstate treaty between Tehran and Moscow further solidifies their alliance, positioning Iran strategically alongside Russia and China, as geopolitical alignments shift post-Russia's invasion of Ukraine1.
As Iran rejects US’s accusation of its support to the Houthis’ attacks, in turn linked to the conflict unfolding in the Gaza Strip, the complexities in the Red Sea underscore the delicate nature of their partnership and the need for a nuanced analysis considering historical context and evolving geopolitical dynamics. In this context, this article will attempt at providing such a summary of the Russo-Iranian partnership so far, and what prospect for the latter the new scenario in the Red Sea holds2.
On 17 January 2024, Maria Zakharova, the Kremlin’s spokeswoman, announced that Russia and Iran will sign a new comprehensive interstate cooperation agreement imminently3. This treaty, a furtherance of the Russo-Iranian strategic partnership already evident in Ukraine and before, will serve to consolidate this strategic partnership and entrench it both politically and legally. The signing, as told by Zakharova, has been expedited by the changing international context, a reference perhaps to the global discord resultant from conflicts in Ukraine and, pertinently, the Red Sea region. Such a contention is affirmed by prior comments from the Kremlin in November 2023, in which it was announced that significant work in deepening and developing “military-technical cooperation” was under way4.
It is important to emphasise the importance of such an agreement’s final draft being catalysed by events in the Red Sea, pertinently those relating to the Yemeni Houthis and the Red Sea shipping route. British and American strikes, described as “defensive” by NATO, on Yemeni Houthis on 11th January were condemned by Moscow, with Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov denouncing them as “illegitimate” and that the Western coalition were seeking to manipulate the international legal order. Tehran’s stance, too, was resolute. Nasser Kanaani, the spokesperson for the Iranian foreign ministry, derided the coalition strikes as “arbitrary” and “[in clear breach of Yemeni’s] sovereignty and territorial integrity…against international law.”
The level to which Iran involves itself, be it politically, diplomatically, or militarily, will undoubtedly concern the actions of policymakers in Moscow. The degree to which the Russo-Iranian politically-military strategic partnership will be seen in the Red Sea will depend on the extent to which the current Houthi conflict embroils Tehran.
Since the 1979 revolution, the Houthis have been intricately tied to the Islamic Republic of Iran, functioning as one of its proxy groups. This relationship unfolds against the backdrop of international sanctions, shaping Iran's defense strategy. Unable to engage in research development or scientific collaboration in defense due to sanctions, Iran has devised a defense doctrine grounded in two key pillars: proxy groups and a ballistic program.
The first pillar, involving proxy groups, has seen Iran establish and support various entities across Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Israel, and neighboring countries. The primary objective seems to be destabilizing regional and international security, and strategically deploying conflicts as leverage during negotiations.
The turning point emerged after the October 7th attack, prompting the Islamic Republic to perceive a threat to what it terms the "axis of resistance." In response to diminishing Hamas influence within the Gaza Strip and an effort to alleviate pressure on the group, Iran allegedly directed the Houthis in Yemen to escalate security destabilisation in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait region.
Source: An armed Yemeni sits on a boat in front of the Galaxy Leader cargo ship - EPA/via BBC News- Keystone archivio
Backed and provided by Iran, the Houthis pose a multifaceted threat against maritime security and Israel in the region. The first dimension involves the use of missiles sourced from Iran, followed by the deployment of drones also supplied by the Islamic Republic. Lastly, the Houthis reportedly possess and have been strategically placing sea mines since 2021 in the Red Sea, adding another layer of complexity to the threat.
Considering that a substantial 12% of international trade traverses the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the ongoing situation becomes increasingly untenable5. The intersection of geopolitical interests, proxy dynamics, and strategic maneuvers underscores the urgent need for international attention and diplomatic resolution to avert potential catastrophe in this crucial maritime passage.
While the Houthis, threaten commercial shipping in the Red Sea, oil has so far continued flowing. According to one Houthis political leader, Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, maritime routes around Yemen are safe for Chinese and Russian vessels, as long as they are not associated with Israel. Moscow, while publicly indicating support for Washington's efforts to maintain order in the Red Sea, has only a small amount of its trade passing through the Suez Canal. Moreover, Russian officials suggest that the Red Sea crisis could potentially redirect shipping to the Northern Sea Route or the North-South Transport Corridor via Iran to the Indian Ocean.
All in all, the renewed Russo-Iranian strategic partnership, in the Middle East space on this occasion, represents an adaptive response to the changing geopolitical landscape. The intricacies of the Red Sea, added to the Iranian grip on the Houthis, brings another dimension to the relationship between the two states. In this article, we have demonstrated how the partnership's strategic implications and the evolving nature of conflicts in the region underscore the need for a multilevel approach while addressing today’s complexities and potential risks in the Red Sea.
Authors: Ilaria Larusso, Margherita Ceserani, William Kingston-Cox, Shahin Modarres - Iran Team
Introduction On 16 September 2022, the Iranian’s morality police - the Guidance Patrol - arrested 22-year-old Iranian woman Masha Amini for allegedly not wearing the hijab in accordance with the proscribed governmental legislation. Whilst in custody, the Iranian authorities claimed she had suffered a heart attack, leading to her death. However, many witnesses reported that Amini had been severely beaten and that her death was the direct consequence of Iranian police actions. Her death has sparked widespread protests and civil unrest - commonly known as the Masha Amini protests - whose advocates seek to topple the Iranian regime, bring about the reintroduction of the protection of civil and political rights for women, enforce the revocation of mandatory hijab and other religious morality laws, as well as the dissolution of the Guidance Patrol. However, Amini’s death has served as a catalyst, rather than a creationary force, for Iranian resistance against the system.
As such, this article explores the history of the women’s movement in Iran since 1979, the year the mandatory hijab laws were introduced, as well as the history of Iranian civil disobedience against the government, to assess and analyze what, if anything, has changed since the death of Masha Amini.
Women’s movement in Iran since 1979 Clearly, the rise to power of Khomeini’s theocratic rule in Iran brought significant transformations in the country as a whole. Nevertheless, the aftermath of the 1979 Revolution for Iranian women particularly underwent considerable changes, spread across every aspect of their lives as citizens and human beings. The advancements women conquered during the White Revolution, a modernization period guided by the last Shah just before the monarchy was dismissed, suffered important steps back due to the strict interpretation of Sharia law - i.e., legislation determined by Islamic religious texts. The latter immediately manifested itself, for instance, with the elimination of the 1967 Family Protection Law right after Khomeini rose to power, eliminating rights for women and mothers and re-establishing strict patriarchal standards.
On the other hand, the restriction of rights was promptly matched with manifestations of women voicing their discontent towards these setbacks - the first one ever after the revolution was symbolically held right in 1979, on International Women’s Day in relation to the mandatory enforcement of the veil. What has always been peculiar about women’s movements in Iran is the bi-partisan character of the arguments used in support of gender equality. These theoretical grounds are not traceable back to a single source: as a result, Islamic theses intertwine with socialist and liberal arguments in an essential way. Accordingly, an indigenous trait of Iranian feminism resides precisely in its capacity to bring together diverse forces which, despite internal disagreements, all aim at achieving female autonomy and true empowerment. It is symbolic that, as they protested the Shah for prohibiting the veil in the second half of the 1930s, after the revolution the movement was taking the streets for the exact opposite reason.
Throughout the initial years of the Islamic Republic’s existence, Iranian women managed to regain some of the spaces that were taken away from them with the establishment of the new regime - first and foremost, judicial courts and public institutions. Female active involvement in the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988 was also praised by the main members of the clergy. However, with Ayatollah Khamenei (since 1989), an even more rigorous religious rule further enhanced gender inequalities to the detriment of women. This political phase for activists also saw the increasing involvement of female-based press, as exemplified by the well-known Zanan magazine founded in 1992. Feminist media helped voice the constellation of perspectives and opinions that ultimately all advocated for the liberation of women and their reproductive, social and political rights. The situation fluctuated between reformist and conservative governments from 1997 to 2008. Conservative leader Ahmadinejad chose a particularly hard line towards gender equality, closing Zanan and arresting activists involved in the One Million Signature campaign. Tensions between the government and social movements reached their peak in 2009, after the controversial vote that saw Ahmadinejad's re-election. The Green Movement, the name given to the pro-democracy force that took the streets in those days, saw many Iranian women as protagonists and proactive agents of change. The non-violent protests - features strongly advocated and adopted by Iranian feminists - were suppressed by the authority, leading to the death of civilians such as Neda Agha-Soltan and the arrest and torture of several thousands of people.
Rouhani’s rule, starting in 2013, can be seen as a phase in between for the women’s movement: some legal victories were achieved, but broader changes remained unseen. Concerning the number of activists sentenced to decades of years in prison and controversial trials, together with episodes like the suicide of Sahar Khodayari after her arrest for having attended a football match explain very vividly what is the context in which Iranian women live and organize their civil resistance. As a consequence, it did not come as a surprise that further uprisings occurred when, in September 2022, the news that Mahsa Amini had died, after being detained by the Iranian morality police, reached the broader public.
Source: photo by Shahin Modarres
Iranian women in the aftermath of Mahsa Amini’s death The protests in the aftermath of Mahsa Amini’s death have once more expressed the power of Iranian women to make their voices heard within Iran as well as obtaining global resonance thanks to the power of social media (i.e. via X). Since September 16th of last year, the burnt veil has become a prominent symbol, disseminating rapidly a willingness for political change across the country. Women activists of all kinds have stood up for equal rights, such as the right to be equal under the law, one’s freedom in the public sphere - including the right to choose one’s clothing - and the right to participate equally in political life. Indeed, the Woman, Life, Freedom Movement is not addressed to a specific audience, but instead, it welcomes any religious, or secular, people of any gender, and sends to the government the clear message that part of the Iranian population is at odds with its current tightness.
Although the veiling order was not strictly applied formally, during the last year systematic attacks on the female gender have occurred starting from November 2022. One of the most notorious cases is the poisoning in schools, which according to the UN hit more than 1200 young girls. The state reaction to these events was slow and inadequate compared to the quick deployment of personnel during the protests, also considering that the words pronounced by the Iranian Interior Minister reduced the attempts to undermine the activists cause to simple stress due to exams.
The restriction to freedom of speech shortly followed, once again targeting those who were advocating feminist activism, such as journalists and lawyers. Examples would be plentiful, however, it is worth remembering the irregular trial of Niloofar Hamedi and Elaheh Mohammadi in May and again in July 2023. After 8 months of custody, both the women were judged for exposing Amini’s death and inciting protests against national security. Law has been used as a tool to intimidate Iranians, retain them from joining the Movement and gain feminist consciousness. Indeed, it has been reported that several other journalists have perished in an effort to raise the voices of the activists instance.
More recently, the Iranian government has presented a pro-Islamic dress code bill, then adopted by the Parliament on August 13th, now it is waiting for the approval of the Guardian Council. The implementation of such a law could envisage gender segregation in public spaces, fines and between 5 and 10 years of prison for women not correctly wearing the compulsory headscarf, as well as for businesses who may host such women, and the reduction of the owner’s income up to 3 months.
All in all, the woman's body affair is becoming an ever more political matter if we consider that in March 2024 elections will be held in Iran and that the burnt hijab is denoting the urge for democratization. Nevertheless, it is hardly realistic to expect the Movement to turn into a political party or for existing parties to take over the feminist demand for reform.
In the wake of Mahsa Amini's tragic death in September 2022, a significant transformation has swept across Iran. This article explored the history of Iranian women's activism since the 1979 Revolution, revealing a narrative of resilience and commitment to gender equality.
Throughout the years, Iranian women have consistently voiced their grievances, enduring hardships and championing civil disobedience as a means to assert their rights. Amini's death served as a catalyst, sparking renewed protests demanding equal rights, freedom of expression, and the repeal of repressive laws.
However, these efforts have faced staunch opposition from the Iranian government, which has responded with tough measures, including systematic attacks on women and limitations on freedom of speech. A proposed pro-Islamic dress code bill adds to these concerns.
The Woman, Life, Freedom Movement embodies hope for a more equal system, although it may not become a formal political entity. Mahsa Amini's tragedy has not only mobilized Iranian women but has also ignited a global conversation about their rights and the need for change in Iran.
In conclusion, Amini's death has galvanized Iranian women, highlighting their resilience and commitment to justice. Their contest continues, serving as a reminder that the pursuit of equality and freedom knows no boundaries
With the beginning of its ground invasion into the Gaza Strip, Israel is at a crossroads it hoped it wouldn’t be in. It can be argued that any route Israel would take in this historic intersection would lead to regional escalation, even if only in the long-run. It is safe to assume, then, that even if there is no immediate backlash to the Israeli ground invasion, another front, sooner or later, will follow.
The most popular Israeli approach in responding to the October 7 Hamas attack is that the IDF’s infantry and armored brigades would invade the Gaza Strip, backed by heavy artillery, actionable intelligence, and preceded by intense aerial bombardment (as is happening). Israel, it has been argued, must respond forcefully, or else it would project to its enemies that it would refrain from war at all costs.
The ground invasion itself is meant to root out Hamas from the Gaza Strip and to disable its military capabilities. The other objective is the release of the 239 Israeli and foreign hostages, most of whom are civilians. Ideally – from Israel's point of view – the IDF would achieve its goals in the Gaza Strip without having to fight on another front simultaneously, as its capabilities in fighting multiple fronts at the same time are limited, and such a scenario will necessitate Israel to change its objectives. However, this is the least likely scenario. Total victory against Hamas is not guaranteed – and even unlikely within the limits of military power – and the ground operation can last for months. What is more likely is that Israel would embark on a limited ground incursion (due to American pressure and the possibility of another front elsewhere), achieve some tactical victories against Hamas, and will force a ceasefire on better conditions – which would lead to the release of some hostages (most likely women, children, and the elderly). However, the restrained war efforts in Gaza will surely be followed by war and terror on other fronts, and possibly simultaneously.
One ongoing front is in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, where Hamas, armed militias, and lone-wolf terrorists take arms against Israeli civilians and security personnel. At the time of the Hamas attack on October 7, most of the IDF was stationed in the West Bank, demonstrating its symbolic and strategic importance to Israel. The latter would have to react forcefully to any significant development there. It is in Hamas’ interest to start a new intifada in the West Bank, and possibly in Israeli cities, in order to destabilize and weaken Israel.
The other ongoing front, where Israel might face a full-scale war, is from the north. Hezbollah, with its arsenal of 150,000 projectiles (of close, medium, and long range) and army of approximately 100,000 soldiers, most of whom are well-trained and with some battle experience, pose a strategic threat – even bigger than the one Hamas poses.
Thus far, Hezbollah – which is backed by Iran and serves as its most strategic proxy in the region – has been reacting to Israel’s limited ground invasion, albeit with restraint. While Hezbollah needs to show it is committed to the Palestinian cause, it aims to avoid an all-out war with Israel.
According to Israeli calculation, an all-out war is not fully in Hezbollah’s interests, nor is it in Iran’s. According to this theory, both Iran and Hezbollah would rather open an all-out war with Israel only once Iran guarantees applicable nuclear military capabilities, which, in the long run, seems inevitable. This means that from Israel’s point of view – and contrary to the best-case scenario described above – it would be better for Israel to engage with Hezbollah and Iran before the latter becomes a nuclear power.
Israel, then, might choose to attack Hezbollah and either drag it into the war – and by so eliminating the surprise element of Hezbollah’s reaction – or, if Hezbollah chooses not to retaliate, to reestablish its deterrence up north. While it may seem like an act of self harm, the Israeli public would view a Hezbollah surprise attack as another failure of the government, IDF, Shin Bet and Mossad. In a way, then, these institutions hope to project to the public that Israel is on the front foot, and that if a war with Hezbollah and Iran is inevitable in the long run, then better now than later. It is important to note that while Israel calculates that the two Shia powers would rather avoid an all-out war prior to Iran’s nuclearization, Israel’s working assumption that Hamas was deterred and would have opted to avoid an armed conflict fell apart with the October 7 attack. Therefore, there are no guarantees that any theory that existed before the attack is still relevant.
Would Iran and Hezbollah wait peacefully for an Israeli strike, or for it to finish its fighting in Gaza? Unlikely. From their point of view, Iran and Hezbollah are happy to let Israel keep guessing whether they would join the war or not. From Israel’s standpoint, it cannot afford to be surprised again. While it is less likely that there would be a ground invasion from the north following the one from the Gaza Strip on October 7, an extensive missile attack on central Israel would be just as bad.
But initiating war with Hezbollah – and Iran – would force the US into the conflict, as it would be extremely challenging – on the verge of impossible – for Israel to conduct an all-out war with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran simultaneously. At the same time, if US forces end up fighting alongside Israel, then it is likely that other Iranian allies would occupy the US forces elsewhere in the region (such as in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria). While a recent poll shows that the vast majority of Americans are against US military involvement in the Middle East, the US would feel it has to protect its allies and interests in the region.
It seems, then, that the region is ahead of a long period – whether months or years – of an armed conflict.
Author: Danilo dalle Fave - Article Intelligence and Military Strategy Team
The Iranian strategic doctrine and the role of drone warfare
Iranian strategic doctrine has been influenced by the peculiar nature of its political regime and its history. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 infused in the Iranian strategic doctrine of Shah’s era, inspired by the contemporary Western military doctrines, some elements that influence the current role of drones in Iranian warfare: “holy defence”, export of the revolution, and especially the concept of self-reliance are the ideological foundation of the current Iranian strategic doctrine.
The Iraq-Iran war of the ‘80s has defined the current duality of Iranian armed forces: due to the distrust toward the Iranian army (Artesh), seen as an instrument of Shah’s supporters, the khomeinists developed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a parallel army and the main instrument of their foreign policy. The purges against the high command of Artesh and the lack of strategic doctrines among the pasdarans compelled them to create an ad hoc military doctrine, deeply influenced by their origin as an ideological militia with a revolutionary structure.
The result is a strategic doctrine centred around three pillars: proxy warfare, which means the use of guerrilla groups of Shia communities around the Islamic world used as an instrument for the projection of Iranian influence abroad; asymmetric warfare, a direct consequence of the military and technological superiority of their enemies; the focus on Ballistic missiles, which is caused by the weak Iranian air forces and the foreign dependency for aeronautical components and have compelled to focus on specific arms systems that can provide deterrence and be produced domestically.
Despite being formally a defensive strategic doctrine, the current supreme leader Ali Khamenei has provided also the official state doctrine for external interventions in 2010, the so-called two-wing doctrine: the Foreign Ministry and the Quds Force, the overseas operations arms of the IRGC, have the task to protect Iran and enhance Iranian role in the region. This means that the military instrument is embedded in Iranian foreign policy.
IRGC interventions of the last ten years have shown how foreign operations are usually conducted when certain conditions are met: the presence of a Shia community that can provide the proxy actor (e.g. in Lebanon Hezbollah or the Houtis in Yemen), the weakness of the state actors, like in Iraq or Lebanon, that can allow the strengthening of pro-Iranian forces and provide a logistics pipeline, capable of transfer personnel, weapons and allowing training by IRGC forces.
In this framework, drone warfare is exclusively conducted by the IRGC aerospace force, which also controls Iran’s strategic-missile force. Drones are used to compensate for the weakness of Iranian air forces in the reconnaissance and surveillance domain and the industrial constraints to the mass production of warplanes.
IRGC drones are perfectly suited to match the IRGC view of warfare: in the air domain, drones can be used along with ballistic and cruise missiles to attack enemy positions to strike and rapidly retreat, for reconnaissance and to overwhelm enemy positions. Swarms of loitering munitions can overburden enemy air defence allowing missiles to strike their objectives. The recent use in the Ukraine of Iranian-made drones by Russia is a clear example of how these kinds of saturation tactics can be very effective. In the sea, the traditional naval swarming tactics, developed during the Iran-Iraq war, can be augmented with unmanned vehicles and balance the military superiority of the US and their allies.
The first family of Iranian drones are the Iranian Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA) Ababil: originally developed by the IRGC-owned Qods Aviation Industries, the Ababil-1 was a suicide drone used during the Iran-Iraq war usually launched by pneumatic truck launchers. Now they developed a specific Unmanned loitering munition drone, the DIO Arash.
This experience allowed the production in the 90s of the Ababil-2 and its different variants: the Ababil-B, a target drone for air-defence exercises, the Ababil-S, the first Iranian surveillance drone, the Ababil-T, a twin-tail variant that can be used for surveillance and as strike munition payloads and has been adopted by Hezbollah and the Houtis. The latter has deployed the Qasef-1 and Qasef-2K, Abadil-2 variants with 30 kg warheads, used as loitering munition against the Saudi-led coalition forces since 2016.
The Ababil-3, suspected to be a copy of the South African Denel Dynamics Seeker, is an Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance (ISR) drone and has been used extensively by Iranian forces during the Syrian civil war. The last member of this family, the Ababil-5, debuted in April 2022 and appears to be a Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle, similar to the American Predator.
The other family of Iranian drones is represented by the Mohajer, the first ISR drone produced in the 80s and widely exported to Iranian proxies. Many Iranian drones are the result of a reverse-engineered version of Western drones, like the IAIO Fotros, IAIO Yasir, HESA Hamaseh, and IRIAF Kaman-22: the most important of them are the Saegheh, an entire family of drones that are the result of the acquisition of US Lockheed RQ-170 Sentinel, downed in 2011, which shows how Iranian industries are capable to copy stealth drones and in general to adapt western technology for internal purposes.
The most important drone family is the Shahed: the HESA Shahed-129, a dual-role drone is deployed for patrols and direct attacks for the Iranian Army and Navy, while the HESA Shahed-136 is a loitering munition designed for swarm attacks against ground targets. The last addition is the HESA Shahed-149, a reusable attack drone capable of launching missiles and bombs and being equipped for electronic warfare.
As previously said, Iran relies on drones in order to overcome the lack of a proper aerospace industry: the cost-effectiveness of drones in production and maintenance avoids the costly traditional aircraft procurement. At the same time, it is also a matter of internal political dynamics. Drone producers are mostly linked with the IRGC which managed to concentrate power in recent years, especially with the current president Ebrahim Raisi. The main consequence of this, apart from a greater role of IRGC in Iranian politics, is the “capture” of funds by the IRGC, leaving the Iranian Air Forces with shrinking resources to develop their vehicles and devices. That is why Iran relies, as during Shah’s era, on imports: the recent discussion for the procurement of the Russian Su-35, a 4th generation multi-role jet fighter, is a clear sign of the overreliance on imports for traditional aircraft.
Conclusion
Summing up, drone warfare is an important element of the Iranian way to wage war: it reflects Iranian leadership’s preference for asymmetric approaches and the adaptation to Western sanctions that prevented the development of traditional aerospace vehicles. Despite domestic strifes and tensions with the US, Iran can exploit its expertise in drones to obtain technology and know-how in the aerospace field that needs to scale up its military prowess: deeper cooperation with Russia, favoured by the isolation of both countries in the international arena, could augment Iranian aerospace forces, with consequences on the military balance in the Middle East.
Authors: Margherita Ceserani, Will Kingston-Cox, Ilaria Lorusso, Shahin Modarres
Russia’s war in Ukraine has reached its 398th day and the pro-Russian mercenary Wagner Group is still engaging in the battlefield of Bakhmut, in the Donetsk province, after eight months of combat. They have been assaulting the city since August 2022 and, even though they succeeded on the East frontline, there is still room for a defeat by hands of the Ukrainian resistance backed by three Mi-8 helicopter gunships.
That the war was also being conducted from the air is not news as several sources confirmed the deployment of Iranian drones serving the Russian army, although information was repeatedly denied by Tehran. Moreover, Iran has just confirmed a deal through which it will be in receipt of three SU-35 fighter planes from Russia. This signals two trends: firstly, the Iranian intention to reconstitute its military arsenal and to strengthen its aircraft forces; ultimately, its willingness to develop a weapon market and become a relevant seller, given that the embargo on ballistic missile commerce is expiring in October 2023.
The ties with Moscow have been growing increasingly close. Indeed since the rapprochement in 1989, the interests of the two Eastern powers have often converged, for example, on critiques of Western sanctions and the JCPOA. Today, the presence of Iranian personnel in Ukraine has the double aim of bringing support, training and know-how to Russian soldiers employing Iranian kamikaze drones, observing their functioning, and finding vulnerabilities to be improved. How do the military doctrines of these two countries meet? What should we expect from their bilateral relationship?
Russia’s military doctrine can be defined by its active pursuit of modernization and expansion in Russian military capabilities, such as investing in new weapons systems and conducting full-scale military exercises. The current doctrine–adopted in 2014–enshrines the importance of securing Russia’s borders and Moscow’s interests overseas, as well as the maintenance of the Kremlin’s strategic nuclear deterrence, vis-à-vis the identification of NATO and the United States' expansion of its missile capacity as a significant threat to Russia’s national security. It also contains the concept of ‘strategic deterrence’, which seeks to deter adversaries from attacking Russia under the notion that Moscow is willing to employ ‘preemptive strikes’ wherever it deems necessary
Similarly, the military doctrine of Iran is centred around the principles of defence and deterrence. Iranian military authorities emphasize the importance of perpetuating a strong, unwavering defensive position to deter potential threats and defend Iran’s territorial sovereignty against external belligerence. The doctrine’s latest update, in 2018, identifies the importance of enhancing and refining Iran’s military capabilities–both conventional and asymmetric–to advance the end goal of protecting Iranian territorial integrity.
The convergence of Russian and Iranian military doctrines through security cooperation is not a new phenomenon. For example, both Tehran and Moscow supported Bashar al-Assad in Syria to assert their geopolitical interests and strategic partnership in the region. However, in the context of the Russo-Iranian strategic partnership vis-à-vis the Ukrainian invasion, we can identify a greater synthesis of the military doctrines of Tehran and Moscow and their respective political and economic objectives. The war in Ukraine provides another dimension to the Russo-Iranian strategic cooperation.
Source: KREMLIN/ALEXANDR DEMYANCHUK via Associated Press
Both Russia and Iran find themselves increasingly isolated from the international community. Thus, strategic military cooperation provides unparalleled economic and political relief for the two ‘quasi-pariahs’. Russia, now a state proficient in the avoidance of sanctions, has been keenly training their Iranian counterparts the same techniques so as to continue fruitful trade between the two nations. Through the provision of loitering munitions–“kamikaze” drones–to Russia on the Ukrainian battlefields, Iran is hopeful it can alleviate the pressures of its current economic position–a position exponentially compounded by sanctions imposed by the West, as well as a metaphoric flex of muscles to its regional adversaries.
For Moscow, importing Iranian drones provides a cheap and effective method of carrying out its strategic goals in Ukraine. Costing roughly $20,000 per unit, Iranian “kamikaze” drones, such as the Shahed-136, strategically emboldens Putin’s war machine at little significant cost to Moscow. The capability of devastation loaded to these drones, however, should not be underexaggerated. Not only does ‘strategically cooperating’ with Iran alleviate the pressures of drone production on a beleaguered Russian economy, but it also perpetuates the likelihood of Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.
The so-called strategic cooperation between the Islamic Republic and Russia is in reality, mostly a one-way pact in favour of the Kremlin. Russia has backed its allies, such as Syria and Belarus to suppress the protests ruthlessly. In this case regarding Iran, Russian intervention can be divided into three categories:
Sending forces, which is not possible considering the serious lack of forces on the Ukrainian front. It is also crucial to mention that officials such as Sergei Surovikin who is one of the very few suitable forces to have such a role is now the new commander of the Russian forces in Ukraine.
Intelligence and Security cooperation, which precedent shows cannot exceed a certain level as it is a double-edged blade. Such cooperation in precedent was provided for Ba’ath movement in the Arab world but never exceeded a certain limit
Disinformation and #propaganda support, for which Russia holds the first place in the world but has already offered its best to the Islamic Republic.
Hence, it should not be a point that can discourage the Iranian people. Also, the international community is closely following the Tehran-Kremlin affairs. They will respond to such cooperation under many causes, making them take more serious positions regarding Iran's atrocious human rights violations.
The Islamic Republic’s interest in Russia is mostly based on three main elements. The first element is cooperation regarding the development of satellite technologies because the Islamic republic wants to save its three satellite positions and benefit from Russian satellites, not only for communication means but also for espionage. The second element to consider is Islamic republics’ dependency on the Russian campaign and models of disinformation, which they try to apply within the country. Finally, the third reason is their #intelligence cooperation and their need for structural support from Russia. Beyond these three elements, we should consider something called “the mad king phase, " a state where it’s a totalitarian system, before its demise, tends to commit grave strategic mistake after strategic mistake.
The response by the international community can only manoeuvre a little on the particular matter of drones because of legal technicalities that make this matter quite hard to analyze. However, it is crucial to consider that the political will to oppose the affluence of the Islamic republic will become much stronger, more systematic, and more collective.
Ukraine’s best strategy to counter the drones made by the Islamic Republic can come from a country that has been studying them for quite a few years. Israel has developed both #IronDome and IronBeam at the Rafael Company by precisely studying and developing mathematical models of the technologies that were used in most of the missiles and drones that came from Gaza and Lebanon, but originated from the Islamic republic. Even though the Israelis have expressed that they will not intervene in this war, it does not keep Israel from giving Ukraine practical, useful intelligence that can help them with countermeasures for these drones.
The convergence of Iranian and Russian interests has constituted a long-lasting partnership characterized by anti-Western sentiments focusing on limiting NATO expansion, protecting and affirming the countries’ respective sovereignty, and enhancing military and technological capabilities. This partnership has materialized, across the years, through a constellation of hard and soft power measures, spacing from exchanges of weapons and military know-how on one hand to the common ideologically-based spread of disinformation and counter-narratives against common enemies on the other. As for now, the war in Ukraine provides new momentum to this allyship as the conflicts continue to evolve.
Whether the international community is effective vis-à-vis Iran and Russia also depends on the cohesiveness of their collective action. We have already witnessed a round of sanctions from the EU and the UK on Iranian drones in October 2022, precisely in response to their use on the Ukrainian conflict. As for the US, punitive measures targeting drones’ producers for Teheran have been issued as of three days ago. While Western power keeps a strict opposing stand against the Iranian-Russian allyship, China may emerge from this as a new mediating power between the two parts. The latter has already facilitated the recent agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia to restore their diplomatic relations. It will discuss a possible resolution of the war in Ukraine with Spanish PM Sanchez in a soon-to-come meeting.
In the meantime, Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei continues to deny the Islamic Republic’s involvement in Ukraine. Accordingly, and in line with the anti-Western rhetoric previously mentioned, the official position reiterated by the Ayatollah is that the conflict in general was devised as a US-based diversion to justify NATO’s enlargements. As the UK gets ready to send armour-piercing rounds containing depleted uranium to Ukrainian forces, between the Kremlin, already protesting for the use of “nuclear weapons”, and the care recommendations of the UN on radioactive exposure, the conflict confirms to be yet another chessboard where the international power games unfold, with Iran and Russia playing on the same side.
2022 brought about several game-changing developments in the Middle East and beyond. These events - from domestic political instability, through the weakening of American influence in the region, to the protests in Iran - will all leave a mark in 2023, a year that is shaping to be decisive for the Middle East’s future.
Of the many things to monitor in the region during 2023, four issues stand out the most, largely due to their international significance. These are the American involvement in the Middle East; climate change and the region’s efforts - or lack of - to counter it; the domestic upheaval in Iran and its global impact; and the economic situation across the region, with a growing number of countries in economic disarray (Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt and Yemen).
Going into 2023, the United State’s role in the Middle East is undefined. Had it been clear and obvious, American officials wouldn’t have to reiterate that their country will remain pivotal as it once was. The facts on the ground suggest less American physical involvement. There are less American troops in the region; American diplomacy has been weakened; and one is much more exposed to alternative soft power than before. In that sense we are expected to see declining American presence across the region. Diplomatically, the US is losing grip as well. While it largely has Israel on its side in its competition with China and Russia, other allies - most notably Saudi Arabia - are becoming less and less dependent on the US, fueling a multipolar world where the US is now one of many, rather than the one. The US can stay assured that it will continue to have leverage over several individuals and countries in the coming year, but all in all - and much due to the multipolar inertia across the region - this leverage is not infinite, and further distancing from American policies are likely to follow. This dynamic played out in the relations between President Biden and the Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin-Salman, where the latter refused to give-in to American pressure on oil prices, proving that the American leverage on him and his country is limited. In other words, American superiority will not only continue to be challenged from afar, but also from within the region itself.
Iran
2023 might very well be the year of the Persian Spring. The revolutionary protests that began in September have the potential to spin the regime out of control and to create a new reality in the country, and the region. What started as a social protest against the state’s brutality and the killing of Masha Amini has developed into a full regime-change movement, with the slogan “death to Khamenei” gaining momentum and legitimacy on social media. It is of course possible that the harsh and lethal crackdown by the state will break the back of the revolution, but these past few months and the ones to follow will certainly change Iran and affect the region as a whole, whichever way the wind blows.
Furthermore, in light of the internal turmoil and the fact that the Iranian nuclear deal is all but alive, it is likely that Iran will push to both enrich as much uranium as possible and to create destabilizing chaos across the region in the coming months. All in all, what happens in Iran during 2023 will determine the near future of the Middle East.
Climate
After a rather unsuccessful COP27 failed to produce actionable policy solutions or real commitments from the international community, a decisive year lies ahead for the Middle East, where people will continue suffering from the consequences of the climate crisis. Most prominently, water scarcity will lead to an increasingly dire situation, fueling food insecurity, economic downturn, civil unrest, and violent extremism. That said, several innovative start-ups and promising technologies are on the rise, with the GCC countries upping the funding to accelerate developments in the field. Hope now lies upon the Abu Dhabi COP28, set to take place in November and, ironically, hosted by UAE’s National Oil Company CEO, with civil society organizations and academia urging for serious action.
Economy
A cleavage in economic performance is increasingly visible among Middle Eastern countries, with the oil-based GCC monarchies witnessing continuous growth - whereas others are facing economic decline, leading to or exacerbating existing socio-political turbulences. The economic outlook for 2023 indicates that inflation is likely to surpass 30% in numerous countries, with Syria at 63% and Lebanon at a staggering 167% . Further regional actors, such as Iran, Turkey, Egypt, and Yemen, face economic hardship while also having to tackle political challenges, civil unrest, and violent conflicts. Overall, domestic and international factors - such as the war in Ukraine - are likely to deepen a looming recession and the energy crisis. While it is likely that wealthy GCC countries will continue to support struggling regional allies, countries such as Yemen, Libya and Lebanon will continue to be used as arenas for proxy wars, further deepening their economic troubles.
