Iran Archives – ITSS Verona

August 12, 2026 — No Comments

Security, Economy, Alliances: Drivers of US Policy Toward Iran

By Anurag Mishra (US Team) and Martina Ferraresi (Iran Team)

Introduction

Divergent foreign policy philosophies have produced recurring patterns in US policy toward Iran since 2001. Rather than tracing a single ideological arc, three analytical drivers - security imperatives, economic instruments, and alliance commitments - better explain the continuities and ruptures across administrations, revealing why engagement and confrontation have repeatedly alternated without resolving the underlying strategic dilemma.

Security: The Nuclear File and the Proxy Threat

In 2002, President Bush labelled Iran part of the “Axis of Evil” over its nuclear program. A 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate found Iran had likely halted covert weaponisation by 2003, followed by 2006 UN sanctions. Diplomacy under President Obama produced the JCPOA in 2015, restricting Iran’s program in exchange for sanctions relief. President Trump withdrew the US from the agreements in 2018, despite the IAEA’s verified Iranian compliance; by July 2019, Iran breached its limits on its stockpile of low-enriched uranium, going beyond the JCPOA’s cap. President Biden‘s Vienna talks in 2021 stalled by 2022, with sanctions remaining in place. Iran began enriching to 60%, reaching roughly 3,800 kg by August 2022, with experts warning that it contained sufficient fissile material for at least one nuclear device, although weaponisation would require additional technical steps.

Furthermore, Iran’s strategic doctrine relies deeply on proxy warfare through the “Axis of Resistance”, a decentralised network including Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Shiʿa militias. Rather than deploying its own forces directly, Iranchannels weapons, training, and funding through the IRGC’s Quds Force, often via Hezbollah, to partners whose local agendas align with Tehran’s goal of pressuring Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the US. This asymmetric architecture lets each actor pursue its own interests while serving Iranian power at low cost. The 2020 killing of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani struck this network’s operational core but did not dismantle it: after Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack, the entire axis mobilised in coordination, closing what little remained of any diplomatic window and locking the region into a new cycle of escalation.

Economy: Sanctions as Strategy

Sanctions have functioned as the US’s primary lever of coercive diplomacy against Iran’s nuclear program. In July 2010, Congress passed CISADA, marking the shift from targeted export controls to systemic financial warfare. The meaning of CISADA was to sanction foreign banks and companies for doing business with Iran’s energy sector or sanctioned Iranian entities, effectively forcing them to choose between access to Iran and access to the US financial system. The EU further escalated pressure in 2012 with an oil embargo, banning imports of Iranian petroleum products, sanctioning Iran’s energy, financial, and transport sectors, and freezing the Central Bank of Iran’s assets. Subsequently, Iranian banks were expelled from SWIFT, cutting Iran off from international banking and severely constraining its ability to sell oil or access hard currency. After withdrawing from the JCPOA in 2018, Trump launched his first “Maximum Pressure“ campaign, reimposing sanctions on Iran’s energy, shipping, and financial sectors and designating the IRGC a Foreign Terrorist Organisation. In February 2025, Trump reinstated the campaign, aiming to drive Iran’s oil exports to zero, with the stated goal of making Iran’s economy collapse by shutting down its oil sector.

Alliances: Israel, the Gulf, and Europe

Israel

Israel has shifted from a proxy war to a direct engagement with Iran. In April and October of 2024, the two nations faced direct state-to-state strikes that broke the decades-old tradition of “shadow war”, and Israel launched an open-air war on Iran’s nuclear and military infrastructure in June 2025, dubbed the Twelve-Day War, that included a one-off US strike on Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan, before a ceasefire took effect on June 24, 2025. Israel’s air power has been widely assessed to have weakened, but not destroyed, Iran’s nuclear program, which is why American bunker-buster bombs were reportedly needed to strike the deeply buried Fordow facility. This delicate balance was once again upset in February 2026, when on February 28 joint US-Israeli missile attack launched against Iran’s military struck senior Iranian military officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and initiated five weeks of regional conflict that ended with a ceasefire agreement on April 7-8, 2026, which was followed by a formal memorandum ending the conflict signed by Presidents Trump and Pezeshkian on June 17, 2026. Washington’s relationship with Israel appears to have moved from arms sales and diplomatic backing toward something closer to direct co-belligerency, which many read as a strong signal that for Washington and Israel, a nuclear-armed Iran is treated as a red line rather than mere rhetoric.

Arab / Gulf Partners

The Gulf countries have been hedging rather than aligning themselves. Riyadh’s 2023 Chinese-brokered deal with Tehran signalled a willingness to reduce risks as opposed to confronting Tehran, but Israel’s air strike on Hamas leaders in Doha over a US ally that hosted a US air base complicated existing doubts about the US’s security guarantees in the Gulf region. The Saudi-Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement of September 17, 2025 was signed by the two nations, both of which agreed to consider an attack on one as an attack on the other, and was widely interpreted not only as a hedge against an uncertain Washington, but also against an unchecked Israel as well. Some have suggested the deal could extend a nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, although analysts caution against reading it as a formal war guarantee. Analysts have also pointed out that the agreement may lead to a new UAE-India defence cooperation, adding another layer to the Gulf security architecture, but not necessarily replacing it. The net result is a Gulf that is apparently diversifying its security guarantors, while staying formally in the US orbit.

*Photo: Creative Commons* - *Ali Khamenei e Mojtaba Khamenei*

European Allies

Through the JCPOA, Europe has primarily exercised its influence through diplomacy, sanctions, and multilateral institutions rather than military means. Following years of patience, France, Germany and the UK applied the “snapback” mechanism of the JCPOA on 28 August 2025, over Iran’s repeated failure to comply with its nuclear obligations, including the production of highly enriched uranium without any apparent civilian purpose. The E3 said the enriched-uranium stockpile in Iran was about 48 times the limit imposed by the JCPOA and that there are ten “significant quantities” of highly enriched uranium in Iran. Sanctions that had been lifted under the 2015 deal were therefore restored, and by the end of September 2025, the EU also reimposed its own nuclear sanctions, such as asset freezes and travel bans. At the time, Russia and China argued the E3 lacked a legal mandate to trigger a snapback, as the Security Council’s authority over the file had expired - and did so until the Council split over the issue along the same lines it has before. So, now, Europe’s role in Washington’s alliance is more about legal and multilateral legitimacy than military readiness: the E3 provided a UN Security Council seal of approval on Iran’s isolation that the unilateral US sanctions could not.

Conclusion

Security considerations remain the unalterable policy of the United States government, and, regardless of the differences in administration temperament over the course of four different administrations, no administration appears to have accepted a nuclear-armed Iran as a tolerable outcome. By 2025-26, this red line was enforced not only through sanctions but also through direct military strikes against Iranian nuclear infrastructure and leadership - a shift that many analysts see as marking a new phase in US policy. However, its long-term durability remains to be seen.

Alliance commitments have been fulfilled on paper, but not in practice. Israel’s evolution from an “active” to a “co-belligerent” has drawn the US-Israel relationship closer, while also placing strain on US relations with the Gulf states.Among these, Saudi Arabia appears to be leading efforts to diversify its security architecture, notably through its agreement with Pakistan, with a possible parallel arrangement with the UAE reportedly under discussion. Meanwhile, European allies have shown that legal and multilateral instruments can still carry weight even without direct US military backing, having reinstated UN sanctions in a context where unilateral US measures could not achieve the same effect.

The economic sanctions are the most flexible instrument in the policy toolkit, however - reversible, calibrated and renewable - and there is room to manoeuvre towards negotiations even after the outbreak of military conflict, provided that Tehran’s nuclear ambitions are kept in check.

What has been most important in the evolution of US Iran policy since 2001 is this asymmetry: rigid security boundaries, malleable economic measures and more and more varied rather than monolithic alliance pledges.

August 12, 2026 — No Comments

Europe as an Actor: Challenges and the Way Forward

Authors: Camilla Cormegna (Operations Associate), Isabelle Despicht (Executive Assistant), Sarah Toubman (Central & South America Team), Shams Jouve (Crime, Extremism & Terrorism Team), Daria Keyvan Khosrow (Middle East Team), Sofia Sutera (Human Rights Team), Michele Groppi (President of ITSS Verona), and Sonia Martínez Girón (Executive Director).

On June 6th, 2026, ITSS Verona and King’s College London hosted a closed-door, Chatham House Rule panel discussion amongst EU, NATO and academia representatives, focusing on “Europe as an Actor Amid War: Challenges and the Way Forward”. The event explored the potential reshuffling of the international order, Europe’s role in supporting regional security, and possible pathways for sustainable conflict resolution.

The Union Mediating

A high EU officer opened the panel by stating that de-escalation and prosperity in the region seem to heavily rely on seeking the deal between Iran and the United States. They specified that negotiations might prove to be more conditions-based than time-bound, with pressing nuclear aspects yielding matters linked to Lebanon and Hormuz. Yet, it is understood that the United States will have to balance Israeli interests and would probably benefit from Israeli limited operations in Lebanon in order to facilitate a deal with Iran.

The EU’s support towards mediation between the U.S. and Iran during the Biden administration led to a nearly complete return of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), for a final deal was essentially ready to be implemented. However, Iran’s drone support for Russia following the invasion of Ukraine and, most importantly, the regional escalation involving Israel and Iran’s allies suspended such negotiations. Building on this example, the speaker pointed to continuous dialogue, including with opposing counterparts, as key to achieving a sustainable agreement - even though, to be fair, the EU’s late reaction to the crisis following Operation Epic Fury, reflecting the experience of the war in Ukraine, has been characterised by internal division based on risk and dependence on U.S. strategic direction.

Concerning the EU’s support in the resolution of the crisis, the speaker wished to recall previous historical failures, including Afghanistan and Libya, emphasising the need for a region-led process meant to rebuild and strengthen the regional security architecture. Furthermore, amid the current geopolitical context, the EU should secure strategic autonomy without completely separating from the U.S. To the speaker, the EU should be more supportive of its bilateral partners in the Gulf, develop multilateral partnerships with both the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and its member states, and equip the latter with knowledge and tools to tackle the conflict without direct European intervention.

Amongst Recalibration of Alliances

All in all, one of the most high-level impactful consequences of Operation Epic Fury has been the emergence of new regional dynamics which could be described as the “Cold War of the Gulf”. Iran’s retaliatory strikes on GCC states have disrupted Gulf diplomacy and regional ties: GCC countries that had attempted to normalise ties with Iran in the past few years are now reassessing them, pushing Iran towards a long-term regional isolation despite any tactical results against the U.S. Crucially, the war is provoking substantial change more outside of Iran than within it. New alignments and alliances are forming across the region: Bahrain and the UAE are broadly on the same side against Iran, while Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are coordinating on ceasefire efforts. What is significant about these new alignments is their depth, as regional actors are switching from political alliances to defence commitments, filling the vacuum left by the collapse of a relatively functioning multipolar balance.

Alongside diplomatic repositioning, GCC countries are also rethinking their security partnerships, as their trust in the U.S. as the sole guarantor of security has been called into question, potentially benefiting the EU. The caveat noted by the speaker is that security diversification should not be framed as replacing the U.S. but, rather, as building resilience in a context where reliance on a sole partner has proven risky.

Energy security is also a concern in the context of this conflict, forcing countries to reshape regional energy infrastructures. Iran’s retaliatory strikes disrupted Qatari LNG production whilst closing or somehow impeding the flow of goods through the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline, the Petroline, has allowed Saudi Arabia to circumvent the closure, but major issues remain. In any case, long-term implications are clear. First, new alternative pipelines or energy routes will be needed in the region. Second, the question of maritime security through Hormuz will need to be addressed.

The EU officer concluded that the most optimistic current future scenario is a “no peace, no war” situation, where the conflict freezes rather than resolves. Strong reputational and economic incentives such as EXPO 2030 in Saudi Arabia, as well as trade and export relationships, give actors reasons to avoid prolonged conflict, although these have not been sufficient to produce a lasting peace. Thus, the risk is not a further escalation but the stalling of the conflict, an indefinite Gulf Cold War.

The Role of NATO

In light of this, our NATO speaker took a step back to illustrate the evolving security panorama and the need for NATO to upgrade to address the new features defining contemporary conflicts. While the Alliance continues to be founded on its three core tasks—crisis management, defence and deterrence—the current geopolitical context is increasingly shaped by overlapping crises, which naturally translates into major pressure to strengthen military capabilities. As a consensus-based organisation, NATO has to face different coalitions among its Allies, reflecting diverging views on the nature of contemporary warfare and on the most appropriate responses to current security challenges.

In line with the current developments, NATO has allocated particular attention to its engagement in the Middle East. Unlike the EU’s decision to appoint a High Representative for the GCC, NATO only features limited institutional presence in the region, with structures in Kuwait (and previously in Iraq), with no broader, permanent infrastructure. This was presented as a constraint on NATO’s ability to develop cooperative security, especially considering the importance of sustained political dialogue and direct engagement with regional partners. At the same time, Ukraine remains NATO’s primary strategic priority, while current discussions also reflect the influence of different Allied positions on the organisation’s future direction.

Human Security?

The situation in the Middle East brings another central topic to the forefront: the predominance of military considerations in contemporary security debates vs the absence of the human dimension. Current conflicts are increasingly discussed in terms of warfighting and military preparedness, while less attention is devoted to the impact on civilians and society as a whole. The war in Ukraine was identified as a significant example of this transformation, where civilians are no longer affected only as collateral damage. This development raises questions about whether existing normative frameworks remain sufficient to address the realities of contemporary warfare.

In response to these challenges, NATO ought to increasingly concentrate upon a whole-of-society approach to security. Training armed forces alone may be no longer sufficient; societies must become more resilient through the involvement of public institutions, the private sector and civil society. Security should therefore be understood as a shared responsibility that extends beyond military structures and incorporates the protection of civilians, critical infrastructure and democratic institutions.

Middle Powers’ Momentum

Finally, the last academic panellist highlighted the growing role of the Gulf states in conflict in the Middle East, the unique position occupied by middle powers, and the need for a shifting conceptualisation of women in modern warfare in particular, underscoring that wars in the Middle East can no longer be understood simply as a proxy for great power politics. An interesting case study in this context would be Türkiye. According to the speaker, Türkiye would have embraced the role of mediator to stop the war in Iran from escalating in the first place. This reinforces the conviction that Türkiye is fully stepping into its position as a middle power, particularly as it allows it to act as a primary negotiator in geopolitical conflict.

Voices within Türkiye are also stressing the need to prepare for the security implications of an escalating war with Iran, both domestically and in relation to its international priorities, the speaker reported. Concerns about the strength of Türkiye's borders and migration flows linked to the conflict were said to be increasing. After all, a middle power like Türkiye cannot and does not operate in isolation, but has to make sense of other important regional and global actors’ ambitions.

Finally, the panellist also questioned the United States’ military aims in Iran, asking whether Washington is eventually aiming for full regime change or merely the installation of a government that is more receptive to collaboration with the U.S.

Discussion

During the Q&A, major emphasis was placed on the role women might play in conflict. Participants stressed that women’s roles in conflict were shifting, particularly when it comes to the future of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda following adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. After 25 years, principles remain valid but both language and implementation must evolve to reflect today’s security environment.

Instead of framing the debate around the traditional distinction between participation and protection, the WPS Agenda should be presented as an enabler of a gender-sensitive security umbrella. Significantly, this requires recognising women not only as those affected by conflict but also as active contributors to security and resilience, and leaving behind old notions of women as merely as victims of human rights abuses. More importantly, this angle highlights the importance of an understanding of the particular gendered context in peacebuilding efforts. For example, part of the problem of the WPS agenda is that women have not been registered as agents of conflict, but only as passive civilians in charge of care duties. In the case of the Rwandan War, women are known to have contributed to genocide, with former Rwandan Minister for Family Affairs and Women’s Development Pauline Nyiramasuhuko ordering the rape of Tutsi women. omen today are also combatants and active participants in war. It was noted that 75,000 women have joined the Ukrainian army as volunteers, and are occupying roles as drone operators, engineers, and driving gender-responsive recovery efforts.

When it comes to the Middle East, women's direct involvement in regional conflicts, including Iran, is less visible than in other contexts. Yet a significant number of female protestors against the regime have been killed or jailed, whereas Iranian Kurdish women have actively taken up arms against the regime. Looking ahead, it is not clear whether co-development of military equipment, such as drones, between Ukraine and the Gulf states will offer women more prominent roles within the warfighting establishment, but there will most likely be new developments in this sense too.

What is clear, however, is that wars in the Middle East are not just an extension of ideological and military conflicts among great powers, and contributors to modern warfare extend far beyond those typically considered. Middle powers such as Türkiye are becoming increasingly impactful, Gulf states are occupying a prominent role, and women are becoming agents and drivers of modern conflict.

In conclusion, the event has offered substantial opportunity for reflection and critical engagement. Whilst Europe remains central, most of the notions presented by the panel would require further discussion, debate, and, above all, implementation. Thanking all speakers and actors, ITSS Verona wishes this to be nothing but a great starting point to spark debate on the role of Europe in Iran and beyond.

November 13, 2024 — No Comments

Iran’s Hostility Towards Israel: Three Influential Reasons

by Margherita Ceserani, Shahin Modarres, Shir Mor, William Kingston-Cox - Iran Team

The Islamic Republic’s recent choice to directly confront Israel, avoiding its usual reliance on proxy groups, marks a significant shift in its Middle East strategy. Long dependent on groups like Hezbollah and Hamas for regional influence, the weakening of these proxies—amid Israeli retaliation and Iran’s internal crises—has led Tehran to reconsider its approach. This article explores the internal and external factors driving the Islamic Republic’s move toward a more direct confrontation.

Its proxies weakening

The Islamic Republic's decision to attack Israel directly, bypassing its traditional reliance on proxy groups - also called the "Axis of Resistance" - marks a significant shift in its strategic approach. This uncharacteristic behaviour is largely driven by the weakening of its proxies, particularly in the aftermath of the events following October 7th.

For decades, the Islamic Republic has built, supported, and relied on external groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis to exert influence, especially in the Middle East, and keep Israel engaged. However, recent Israeli military retaliation has severely weakened these proxies, diminished their operational capabilities, and reduced their effectiveness in countering Israeli threats and holding power positions in the Middle East and the whole world.

The Islamic Republic maintains a network of allied groups across the Middle East, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip, Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen. The IRGC Quds Force, responsible for operations beyond Iran's borders, coordinates with these groups in line with Iranian directives. This network supports Iran’s strategy to extend its influence throughout the region and beyond. For example, the Houthis have impacted maritime security in the Red Sea, prompting responses from U.S. and U.K. military coalitions in Yemen. Iran also provides funding and weaponry to groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, facilitating their actions against Israel despite Hamas' Sunni background. In Syria, Iran has established a direct influence on the Assad regime and deploys allied militias to strengthen its presence, using the country as a base for potential actions against Israel. By supporting these groups, Iran seeks to counter its adversaries, extend its ideological influence, and maintain leverage in key areas, which affects both regional and global security.

The targeted killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah by Israel, coupled with the assassination of Hamas figure Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, signifies a pivotal moment in the collapse of the "Axis of Resistance." These significant blows not only weaken Iran's most powerful regional proxies but also destabilise Tehran's long-standing influence in the Middle East. Established in the 1980s, Hezbollah evolved under Iranian support into a formidable political and military force; Nasrallah's death highlights how Israel's recent military operations have fractured Iran's strategic foothold, jeopardising its long-term plans. Similarly, Haniyeh's assassination, attributed to Israel despite no official claim of responsibility, directly challenges Iran's authority, especially given that he was in Tehran to coordinate efforts with Iranian leaders. The operation's occurrence within Iran sends a powerful message about Tehran's vulnerability and reflects a broader Israeli strategy to undermine Iran’s network of proxies which consistently threaten Israel’s security and complicates Iran’s ability to project power.

The Islamic Republic's long-term strategic plans have been significantly disrupted, prompting a notable shift toward a direct approach to its conflict with Israel. Historically reliant on proxy forces to advance its agenda, the recent weakening of these groups has forced Iran to reevaluate its strategy. The decision to directly confront Israel reflects not only an immediate tactical shift but also an acknowledgement that its traditional methods may no longer achieve its regional objectives. This transformation is underscored by the diminishing effectiveness of the "Axis of Resistance" and signifies a recalibration of tactics amid a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape. These developments carry profound implications for both Iran's future strategies and broader regional stability and global security.

Domestic dissatisfaction

Tehran’s decision to escalate tensions with Israel can be understood by its multifaceted internal crises, which challenge the regime economically, politically, and socially. The economic decline of the Iranian economy has been worsened for years by international sanctions, global fluctuations and instability in oil prices, and rising inflation, fueling widespread discontent among an already-beleaguered Iranian population. Tehran has been unable to quell the resultant dissatisfaction, particularly following the protests after the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022. Amini’s death fuelled a popular challenge of cleric authority and demands for greater civil liberties.

The society of the Islamic Republic is becoming increasingly secularised, eroding the clerical influence of the regime. Its reliance upon the continued legitimacy of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which is increasingly contested as Iranian society, particularly its younger elements, becomes increasingly disillusioned with religious politicisation, and, in turn, becoming increasingly secularised. Many young Iranians are showing disdain for traditional practices, a consequence of exposure to Western media. This particular challenge for the regime is existential - its entire raison d’etre rests upon religious foundations.

Coupled with the endemic internal challenges and the pressures from its proxies, Tehran’s decision to strike Israel reveals itself as a tool of diversion; an attempt to rally patriotic fervour and unity in return for relative political stability. By framing a new national, external enemy, the Iranian regime can distract and obfuscate from its internal dissent, all whilst performatively asserting itself as a regional power. This approach undertaken by the Iranian government does, of course, risk exacerbating economic downfall as an overreliance on oil revenues could be manipulated to Tehran’s detriment. Whilst the Iranian leadership will no doubt conceive these external manoeuvres to be a part of a ‘survival strategy’, it cannot be overstated how further economic strife will precipitate deepening and widening domestic disillusionment and, ultimately, unrest, prompting new calls for regime change.

*Source: photo-generated with the support of artificial intelligence.*

Nuclear Advancements

Tehran’s approach to foreign policy in the Middle East is influenced by a combination of geopolitical, ideological, and military considerations, with its nuclear program playing a significant role. Since the United States' withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018, the Islamic Republic has advanced its nuclear developments, positioning these capabilities as a potential deterrent against perceived external threats, particularly from Israel. A notable development occurred in 2023, when the IAEA reported finding uranium particles enriched to 83.7% in a declared facility — a level approaching weapons-grade material.

These advancements have significantly strengthened the Islamic Republic’s strategic position, as the prospect of developing nuclear weapons reduces the likelihood of direct military intervention by its adversaries. With this deterrent in place, though not the sole factor, the Shiite regime feels emboldened to act more assertively, pushing the limits of its regional influence and responding more aggressively to external provocations. For instance, the Israeli strike on the Islamic Republic’s consulate in Damascus in April 2024 has been met with an increased likelihood of retaliation. Tehran’s nuclear capability serves as a protective shield, allowing it to project power and influence more aggressively, while its ideological goals and regional ambitions drive its assertiveness in confronting rivals like Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Despite arguments by some experts that nuclear weapons would undermine its security and diplomatic relations, Iranian officials view nuclear capabilities as a strategic asset that could grant superiority over regional adversaries. Engaging in a nuclear arms race could be economically unsustainable and diplomatically harmful for Tehran, however, nuclear capability is tied not only to military deterrence but also to a pursuit of prestige, both domestically and internationally. This aligns with its broader goal of establishing regional hegemony, while also reflecting its revolutionary ideology rooted in values like independence, anti-imperialism, and resistance to foreign domination since 1979.

Conclusion

The Islamic Republic’s shift to direct action against Israel reflects a new phase in its foreign policy. Weakened proxies and rising domestic discontent are challenging Tehran’s traditional strategies. As nuclear developments bolster its assertiveness, this new approach risks further regional instability and could have global security implications, underscoring a significant turning point in Middle Eastern dynamics.

Board of Governors (2023). NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General. Available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/gov2023-58.pdf.
Mirza, M.N., Abbas, H. and Qaisrani, Irfan Hasnain (2022). The Iranian Nuclear Programme: Dynamics of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), American Unisolationism and European Apprehensions. Journal of European Studies, 38(1), pp.14-32. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4002492.
Maleki, A. (2010). Iran’s nuclear file: recommendations for the future. Daedalus, 139(1), pp.105–116. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40544048 [Accessed 2024].

August 31, 2024 — No Comments

Dr. Michael Barak on Iran Recent Developments

In this episode, Dr. Michael Barak talks about recent developments and policy changes in Iran, their impact on Israel, and the role of proxy actors following October 7th. Specifically, Dr Barak discusses the multifaceted dynamics involving Iran and its regional influence. He covers Iran’s relationships with various proxies, including Hezbollah and the Houthi’s, as well as its strategic partnerships with Russia. Additionally, Dr Barak examines Iran`s ongoing tensions with Israel and the corresponding Israeli responses.

Dr. Michael Barak is a Senior researcher at the International Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT) where he serves as the head of the global jihad & Palestinian terrorism research desks. Additionally, Dr. Barak is a lecturer at the lauder school of government diplomacy and strategy at Reichman university.

Interviewers: Shahin Modarres & Shir Mor - Iran Team

August 10, 2024 — No Comments

Iran, the new “progressive” presidency and LGBTQ+ rights

by Ilaria Lorusso (Iran Team) in collaboration with the Human Rights Team

Introduction

Iranian elections following former president Raisi’s death in May 2024 were called rather abruptly for this July and resulted in the appointment of Massoud Pezeshkian. Considered a moderate candidate, he campaigned for his election maintaining progressive stances both in internal and external politics, promising more liberties and equal rights – especially with regards to women’s issues, animating the Women, Life, Freedom movement – on one hand, and advocating for a renewed nuclear deal and relations with Western countries, particularly the US, aimed at relieving the sanctions that have weakened the Islamic Republic to this day. His political positions fuel refurbished hope for social justice in Iran. However, the fact that he does not seem to want to openly disrupt the system in place after 1979 revolution, and the persistence of a conservative parliament and the absolute authority of Supreme Leader Khamenei dilute the expectations of most human rights advocates vis-à-vis the efforts possible to mitigate the oppression of traditionally marginalised groups. The LGBTQ+ community is notoriously part of the latter. Even if the new president has not exposed himself explicitly on this topic yet, this piece aims at retracing the treatment of LGBTQ+ rights in Iran, making evident above all the risks queer citizens undergo in the country in the current status quo.

Sharia and LGBTIQ+ rights

As an Islamic Republic after the 1979 revolution, Iran abides by the Shari'a system, following a strict interpretation of Islamic religious texts as a base for law norms¹. As such, already when it comes to heterosexual relationships, the 2013 Iranian Penal Code² condemns any form of sexual activity outside of a lawful marriage. Any extra-marital sexual relations, identified as zina, are illegal and subject to criminal sanctions.

Zooming in, homosexuality – particularly among men – is forbidden (haram) and considered a moral, physical, and psychological disorder, comparable to the heterosexual zina. Article 234-239 of the Penal Code shows that the death penalty is imposed on citizens accused of homosexual acts, particularly for those performing a “passive” role in the relationship. This, combined with the relative indulgence with which homosexuality between women is treated, reveals particularly the will to preserve a certain type of masculinity that Iranian men are supposed to perform³. Lashing, prison and fines are the alternative and almost always applied punishments associated with acts that fall into the interpretation of “sexual deviancy” – lesbian relationships and cross-dressing being among these. Besides legislation, then, the LGBTQ+ community is subject to state violence and police prosecution, with reported mass arrests and torture under custody, and queer activists imprisoned for threatening national security and production of “immoral content”.

LGBTQ+ community and the Iranian society

More importantly, because homotransphobia is widespread in Iranian society – up to 90% according to Equaldex’s 2022 findings⁴, discrimination then extends in every aspect of one’s personal and professional life, with limited access to housing, education, employment, judicial system and healthcare. Interestingly, The Islamic Republic of Iran offers limited subsidised support for gender confirmation surgery, hormone replacement therapy, and psychosocial counselling for trans people. This is due to the fact that the latter views are seen through the lens of gender identity disorders. This medicalisation has provided some legal recognition for trans individuals but has also reinforced the stigma that they suffer from psychological and sexual disorders and need treatment to become "normal"⁵. In a way, gender reaffirmation therapy is also perceived as a way to “correct” deviances related to non-heterosexual sexual orientations. Accordingly, trans individuals in Iran, whether recognised by the state, seeking recognition, or living without it, frequently face discrimination and abuse due to their gender identity, including hostile public attitudes, extreme violence, and the risk of arrest, detention, and prosecution.

*Photo by Sima Ghaffarzadeh: https://www.pexels.com/photo/crowd-of-people-protesting-on-street-holding-flags-and-posters-14136859/*

Queer activism, Mahsa Amini’s protests and the way forward

The 2022 national unrest related to the death of Mahsa Amini re-fueled not only women’s rights activists but also those belonging to the queer community. in custody for allegedly wearing her hijab improperly sparked nationwide protests in Iran, met with deadly force by the government. During the protests, young LGBTQ citizens openly defied the regime by removing their hijabs and displaying same-sex affection publicly⁶. Activists have also used pro-LGBTQ slogans and symbols, increasing visibility but also facing backlash, as the later overturned death sentence to queer activist Sareh Sedighi-Hamadani in that period exemplifies⁷. Clearly, this shows that queer liberation is to this day a pressing issue in Iranian civil society, and links back to the general discontent that especially younger generation has towards the post-revolution religious élite. Whether the new presidency will be able to appropriately take up the demands of these movements, remains an open question.

Rehman, J., & Polymenopoulou, E. (2013). Is green part of the rainbow: sharia, homosexuality, and LGBT rights in the Muslim world. Fordham International Law Journal, 37(1), 1-52. ↩︎
Center for Human Rights in Iran (2021, August). Fact Sheet: LGBTQ rights in Iran. https://iranhumanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/LGBTQ-Iran-Fact-Sheet.pdf ↩︎
Karimi, A., & Bayatrizi, Z. (2019). Dangerous positions: Male homosexuality in the new penal code of Iran. Punishment & Society, 21(4), 417-434. https://doi.org/10.1177/1462474518787465 ↩︎
https://www.equaldex.com/region/iran ↩︎
OutRight Action International (2016). Human Rights Report: Being Transgender in Iran. https://outrightinternational.org/our-work/human-rights-research/human-rights-report-being-transgender-iran ↩︎
Iran protests: LGBTQ community rises up (2023). BBC Website, April 19^th. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-64864132 ↩︎
Good news: Sareh Sedighi-Hamadani’s death sentence overturned (2023). Amnesty International Australia Website, May 16^th.
https://www.amnesty.org.au/good-news-sareh-sedighi-hamadanis-death-sentence-overturned/ ↩︎

August 9, 2024 — No Comments

Iran in Transition: The Implications of the Raisi’s Death and the presidential election

by Shahin Modarres, Ilaria Lorusso, Margherita Ceserani, and Will Kingston-Cox - Iran Team

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi died in a helicopter crash in northwest Iran on May 19, as announced by the government on May 20, with Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and seven other passengers. The crash occurred as he was returning from the inauguration of a dam on the border with Azerbaijan, in adverse weather conditions while the aircraft was flying over a rugged, forested region. The death of Raisi, 63, ushers in a period of political uncertainty in Iran, already shaken by the war between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Raisi, elected in 2021, was considered an ultraconservative and a favorite to succeed the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. According to political analysts, Raisi lacked personal charisma and popular support. During his presidency, Raisi intensified the crackdown on dissent, particularly after the protests following the death of Mahsa Amini, and revived Iran's military nuclear program, after US withdrawal from the historic 2015 agreement. Raisi also strengthened ties with Russia and China and reestablished diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. As such, his death prompted sympathetic reactions from various Arab leaders, such as those of Iraq and Qatar, and Iranian-backed militias, such as Hamas and the Houthis, as part of the "axis of resistance" against U.S. and Israeli influence. At the same time, in some parts of Iran his death was celebrated by the population.

Following the incident, Vice President Mohammad Mokhber was appointed interim president, with presidential elections scheduled for June 28. Though Ebrahim Raisi was one of the most well-known figures in the Iranian regime, his death is not expected to cause major upheaval in the Iranian system. Despite this, elections for a new president will be held at a time of great instability for Iran, both internally and externally. This article therefore aims to present the profiles of the candidates for the presidential election, and the possible effects of Iran's new political leadership on current international relations.

Following the passing of President Raisi, the urgent task of arranging snap elections has become the foremost concern in Iran's domestic affairs, prompting the election date to be rescheduled to June 28, 2024, as mandated by the constitution. With only 50 days allowed for elections following a president's demise, the need to fill the vacancy promptly is evident. However, the process is not devoid of controversies.

The Guardian Council, recognized for its conservative stance, has greenlit only six out of 80 candidates, setting the stage for a pivotal political moment. The 12 members of the Guardian Council — six clerics named by the supreme leader, and six jurists named by the Majlis — have consummate veto power and their decisions on disqualification cannot be appealed. The pool of approved candidates include the mayor of Tehran, Alireza Zakani; member of parliament, Masoud Pezeshkian; former interior and justice minister, Mostafa Pourmohammadi; and head of Iran’s Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs, Amir-Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi. However, the clear frontrunners for victory are Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the parliamentary speaker with ties to the influential Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and Saeed Jalili, a hardliner and former chief nuclear negotiator. Ghalibaf, despite his technocratic approach and connections to the IRGC, faces scrutiny from ultra-conservatives due to his moderate positions and past electoral failures. Meanwhile, Jalili, strongly backed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the IRGC, represents a continuation of Raisi's policies, particularly in opposition to any dialogue with the US.

The Iranian elections carry significance for the country's future direction, especially amid escalating domestic unrest and regional challenges. Low voter turnout in previous elections, coupled with concerns about the regime's legitimacy, represent the broader issues at stake. The regime must find a delicate balance between control and legitimacy, particularly as many Iranians have been disheartened by years of political upheaval and repression. Despite this, ultimate authority rests with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who can still wield influence over policy, making the choice of Raisi's successor critical.

The current Iranian tense relations with the West, exemplified by Tehran's support for proxy militias targeting Israel in response to the Gaza conflict, emphasise the need for a leader who can manage Iran's foreign policy challenges effectively. Khamenei's speeches frequently indicate satisfaction rather than concern about sanctions and other issues, suggesting a preference for Jalili’s continuity over compromise. Yet, there remains a possibility that Khamenei could astonish observers by supporting a candidate open to dialogue with the West, though such a move would deviate from his usual stance advocating "resistance”. The impending election thus holds significant implications for Iran's domestic landscape and also for its international relations. The chosen successor will likely be expected to continue Raisi's legacy, maintaining Iran's current trajectory and policies. However, the regime faces a critical dilemma in ensuring voter participation and maintaining its legitimacy, given widespread disillusionment among the population. While Iran's electoral process includes democratic elements, key policies and candidate selections are significantly influenced by the clerical leadership, leading to discussions about the extent of democratic choice in the system. The selection of Raisi's successor will shape Iran's path, further impacting its interactions on the world stage. With tensions simmering both at home and abroad, the election outcome will reverberate far beyond Iran's borders, influencing regional dynamics and international relations.

The upcoming Iranian elections will also have significant geopolitical implications. These implications can be seen through two lenses: the international and the regional. Globally, the outcome of the election could see Iran seek to strengthen bilateral relations with China and Russia, in order to compensate for increased Western pressure. Such a solidification of relations could be both geopolitically and economically detrimental, as energy markets and international alliances react. Iran natural resource reserves are pivotal to global energy markets, and an election result that favours continued conservatism could lead to further fluctuations, disruptions, and conflict in and over the energy sector.

Furthermore, if the conservative faction, as is predicted, remains in power, we can expect to see again, yet another solidification - this time, over nuclear negotiations. It would be likely to see tensions with the West escalate over increased uranium enrichment, rendering attempts to revive the JCPOA redundant and futile continuation of hardline sanctions policies.

*Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hamas_leader_Ismail_Haniyeh_meeting_Iranian_Supreme_Leader_Ali_Khamenei.jpg*

Regionally, a continuation of conservative dominance could see an increase in support for Iranian proxies in Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. Iranian support for Hezbollah in Lebanon would be expected to continue or intensify if conservative hardliners are re-elected. With Hezbollah increasingly active on the northern Israeli border, this could further entrench Hezbollah’s position within Lebanese politics and bolster its military capacity.

For Yemen, Iranian support for the Houthis is likely to continue, if conservatives are re-elected. It is plausible that a hardline government in Tehran would provide increased aid, both military and financially, to the Houthis, prolonging the Yemen conflict. This scenario would likely intensify tensions between Saudi Arabia, which would threaten regional security all over the Middle East.

For the conflict between Israel and Gaza, if the current projections materialise, hardliner governance could see increased support for Hamas. It would not be wrong to assume that hardliners would incite more aggression towards Israel through the proxy network, perpetuating military pressure on Israel without the need for direct Iranian military involvement. Iran does not want an all out war with Israel. To do so would threaten the very existence of Iran’s military, economy, and society. The election is likely to see an intensification of Israel-Iran relations through the proxy network, to both pressurise Israel but defend Iran’s interests, whilst avoiding direct military conflict.

The sudden death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash has plunged Iran into a period of political uncertainty. Snap elections, scheduled for June 28, 2024, highlight the conservative dominance within the Guardian Council, which approved only six out of 80 candidates. Key contenders include Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Saeed Jalili, with Jalili likely to continue Raisi's hardline policies, particularly in opposing dialogue with the West and strengthening ties with Russia and China.

Domestically, the election underscores the regime's struggle for legitimacy amid widespread voter disillusionment. The conservative grip on the political process raises questions about the authenticity of Iran's electoral system. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's influence remains pivotal, ensuring that key policies and candidate selections align with his vision.

Regionally, a conservative victory would likely intensify Iran's support for proxy militias in Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq, escalating tensions, particularly with Israel. Increased aid to groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis could exacerbate conflicts, affecting regional security.

Globally, Iran's potential strengthening of alliances with China and Russia in response to Western pressures could reshape economic and geopolitical landscapes, particularly in energy markets. The international community remains watchful of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, with the election’s outcome crucial in determining the future of the JCPOA and broader diplomatic engagements.

In conclusion, the election following Raisi’s death is a critical juncture for Iran, influencing its domestic stability and regional dynamics. The regime's ability to manage internal discontent and external pressures will shape Iran's path in the coming years, with significant implications for global geopolitics.

March 9, 2024 — No Comments

Prof. Paola Rivetti on Iran and Mahsa Amini

Prof. Paola Rivetti is an Associate professor in Politics and International Relations at Dublin City University. Her expertise lies in Iranian politics, gender and sexuality, social and political mobilisation and the Middle East Region.

In this session, prof. Rivetti talks about Iran in the aftermath of Mahsa Amini's death, dwelling into the movement Women Life Freedom, Iran's geopolitical position after the protests, and future prospect for the country (de)stabilisation.

Interviewers: Ilaria Lorusso, Shahin Modarres, Margherita Ceserani. - Iran Team

March 6, 2024 — No Comments

The Houthis and Iran: A Complex Nexus Threatening Regional Stability

Authors: Will Kingston-Cox, Ilaria Lorusso, Margherita Ceserani, Shahin Modarres - Iran Team

The Russo-Iranian strategic military cooperation in the Red Sea unfolds against the backdrop of a multifaceted and changing geopolitical scenario. The evolving situation in the area prompts a reevaluation of the Russo-Iranian partnership, drawing parallels with their collaboration in Ukraine. While historical dynamics may inform the alliance, the Red Sea theater introduces a maritime dimension, reflecting an adaptive strategy. The interstate treaty between Tehran and Moscow further solidifies their alliance, positioning Iran strategically alongside Russia and China, as geopolitical alignments shift post-Russia's invasion of Ukraine¹.

As Iran rejects US’s accusation of its support to the Houthis’ attacks, in turn linked to the conflict unfolding in the Gaza Strip, the complexities in the Red Sea underscore the delicate nature of their partnership and the need for a nuanced analysis considering historical context and evolving geopolitical dynamics. In this context, this article will attempt at providing such a summary of the Russo-Iranian partnership so far, and what prospect for the latter the new scenario in the Red Sea holds².

On 17 January 2024, Maria Zakharova, the Kremlin’s spokeswoman, announced that Russia and Iran will sign a new comprehensive interstate cooperation agreement imminently³. This treaty, a furtherance of the Russo-Iranian strategic partnership already evident in Ukraine and before, will serve to consolidate this strategic partnership and entrench it both politically and legally. The signing, as told by Zakharova, has been expedited by the changing international context, a reference perhaps to the global discord resultant from conflicts in Ukraine and, pertinently, the Red Sea region. Such a contention is affirmed by prior comments from the Kremlin in November 2023, in which it was announced that significant work in deepening and developing “military-technical cooperation” was under way⁴.

It is important to emphasise the importance of such an agreement’s final draft being catalysed by events in the Red Sea, pertinently those relating to the Yemeni Houthis and the Red Sea shipping route. British and American strikes, described as “defensive” by NATO, on Yemeni Houthis on 11th January were condemned by Moscow, with Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov denouncing them as “illegitimate” and that the Western coalition were seeking to manipulate the international legal order. Tehran’s stance, too, was resolute. Nasser Kanaani, the spokesperson for the Iranian foreign ministry, derided the coalition strikes as “arbitrary” and “[in clear breach of Yemeni’s] sovereignty and territorial integrity…against international law.”

The level to which Iran involves itself, be it politically, diplomatically, or militarily, will undoubtedly concern the actions of policymakers in Moscow. The degree to which the Russo-Iranian politically-military strategic partnership will be seen in the Red Sea will depend on the extent to which the current Houthi conflict embroils Tehran.

Since the 1979 revolution, the Houthis have been intricately tied to the Islamic Republic of Iran, functioning as one of its proxy groups. This relationship unfolds against the backdrop of international sanctions, shaping Iran's defense strategy. Unable to engage in research development or scientific collaboration in defense due to sanctions, Iran has devised a defense doctrine grounded in two key pillars: proxy groups and a ballistic program.

The first pillar, involving proxy groups, has seen Iran establish and support various entities across Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Israel, and neighboring countries. The primary objective seems to be destabilizing regional and international security, and strategically deploying conflicts as leverage during negotiations.

The turning point emerged after the October 7th attack, prompting the Islamic Republic to perceive a threat to what it terms the "axis of resistance." In response to diminishing Hamas influence within the Gaza Strip and an effort to alleviate pressure on the group, Iran allegedly directed the Houthis in Yemen to escalate security destabilisation in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait region.

*Source: An armed Yemeni sits on a boat in front of the Galaxy Leader cargo ship* - *EPA/via BBC News* *- Keystone archivio*

Backed and provided by Iran, the Houthis pose a multifaceted threat against maritime security and Israel in the region. The first dimension involves the use of missiles sourced from Iran, followed by the deployment of drones also supplied by the Islamic Republic. Lastly, the Houthis reportedly possess and have been strategically placing sea mines since 2021 in the Red Sea, adding another layer of complexity to the threat.

Considering that a substantial 12% of international trade traverses the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the ongoing situation becomes increasingly untenable⁵. The intersection of geopolitical interests, proxy dynamics, and strategic maneuvers underscores the urgent need for international attention and diplomatic resolution to avert potential catastrophe in this crucial maritime passage.

While the Houthis, threaten commercial shipping in the Red Sea, oil has so far continued flowing. According to one Houthis political leader, Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, maritime routes around Yemen are safe for Chinese and Russian vessels, as long as they are not associated with Israel. Moscow, while publicly indicating support for Washington's efforts to maintain order in the Red Sea, has only a small amount of its trade passing through the Suez Canal. Moreover, Russian officials suggest that the Red Sea crisis could potentially redirect shipping to the Northern Sea Route or the North-South Transport Corridor via Iran to the Indian Ocean.

All in all, the renewed Russo-Iranian strategic partnership, in the Middle East space on this occasion, represents an adaptive response to the changing geopolitical landscape. The intricacies of the Red Sea, added to the Iranian grip on the Houthis, brings another dimension to the relationship between the two states. In this article, we have demonstrated how the partnership's strategic implications and the evolving nature of conflicts in the region underscore the need for a multilevel approach while addressing today’s complexities and potential risks in the Red Sea.

https://www.itssverona.it/what-is-the-future-of-russo-iranian-military-relations ↩︎
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/07/us/politics/iran-us-israel-conflict.html;
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/23/us-accuses-iran-of-being-deeply-involved-in-houthi-attacks-in-red-sea
https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/walking-a-tightrope-what-is-irans-current-strategy-161592 ↩︎
https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-irans-raisi-sign-new-interstate-treaty-soon-russia-2024-01-17/ ↩︎
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/22/ukraine-claims-downing-barrage-from-russia-rare-iranian-made-drone ↩︎
https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20240119-red-sea-crisis-how-global-shipping-is-being-rerouted-out-of-danger ↩︎

November 8, 2023 — No Comments

Iranian women, civil disobedience and what has changed after the death of Mahsa Amini

Authors: Ilaria Larusso, Margherita Ceserani, William Kingston-Cox, Shahin Modarres - Iran Team

Introduction
On 16 September 2022, the Iranian’s morality police - the Guidance Patrol - arrested 22-year-old Iranian woman Masha Amini for allegedly not wearing the hijab in accordance with the proscribed governmental legislation. Whilst in custody, the Iranian authorities claimed she had suffered a heart attack, leading to her death. However, many witnesses reported that Amini had been severely beaten and that her death was the direct consequence of Iranian police actions.
Her death has sparked widespread protests and civil unrest - commonly known as the Masha Amini protests - whose advocates seek to topple the Iranian regime, bring about the reintroduction of the protection of civil and political rights for women, enforce the revocation of mandatory hijab and other religious morality laws, as well as the dissolution of the Guidance Patrol. However, Amini’s death has served as a catalyst, rather than a creationary force, for Iranian resistance against the system.

As such, this article explores the history of the women’s movement in Iran since 1979, the year the mandatory hijab laws were introduced, as well as the history of Iranian civil disobedience against the government, to assess and analyze what, if anything, has changed since the death of Masha Amini.

Women’s movement in Iran since 1979
Clearly, the rise to power of Khomeini’s theocratic rule in Iran brought significant transformations in the country as a whole. Nevertheless, the aftermath of the 1979 Revolution for Iranian women particularly underwent considerable changes, spread across every aspect of their lives as citizens and human beings. The advancements women conquered during the White Revolution, a modernization period guided by the last Shah just before the monarchy was dismissed, suffered important steps back due to the strict interpretation of Sharia law - i.e., legislation determined by Islamic religious texts. The latter immediately manifested itself, for instance, with the elimination of the 1967 Family Protection Law right after Khomeini rose to power, eliminating rights for women and mothers and re-establishing strict patriarchal standards.

On the other hand, the restriction of rights was promptly matched with manifestations of women voicing their discontent towards these setbacks - the first one ever after the revolution was symbolically held right in 1979, on International Women’s Day in relation to the mandatory enforcement of the veil. What has always been peculiar about women’s movements in Iran is the bi-partisan character of the arguments used in support of gender equality. These theoretical grounds are not traceable back to a single source: as a result, Islamic theses intertwine with socialist and liberal arguments in an essential way. Accordingly, an indigenous trait of Iranian feminism resides precisely in its capacity to bring together diverse forces which, despite internal disagreements, all aim at achieving female autonomy and true empowerment. It is symbolic that, as they protested the Shah for prohibiting the veil in the second half of the 1930s, after the revolution the movement was taking the streets for the exact opposite reason.

Throughout the initial years of the Islamic Republic’s existence, Iranian women managed to regain some of the spaces that were taken away from them with the establishment of the new regime - first and foremost, judicial courts and public institutions. Female active involvement in the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988 was also praised by the main members of the clergy. However, with Ayatollah Khamenei (since 1989), an even more rigorous religious rule further enhanced gender inequalities to the detriment of women. This political phase for activists also saw the increasing involvement of female-based press, as exemplified by the well-known Zanan magazine founded in 1992. Feminist media helped voice the constellation of perspectives and opinions that ultimately all advocated for the liberation of women and their reproductive, social and political rights. The situation fluctuated between reformist and conservative governments from 1997 to 2008. Conservative leader Ahmadinejad chose a particularly hard line towards gender equality, closing Zanan and arresting activists involved in the One Million Signature campaign. Tensions between the government and social movements reached their peak in 2009, after the controversial vote that saw Ahmadinejad's re-election. The Green Movement, the name given to the pro-democracy force that took the streets in those days, saw many Iranian women as protagonists and proactive agents of change. The non-violent protests - features strongly advocated and adopted by Iranian feminists - were suppressed by the authority, leading to the death of civilians such as Neda Agha-Soltan and the arrest and torture of several thousands of people.

Rouhani’s rule, starting in 2013, can be seen as a phase in between for the women’s movement: some legal victories were achieved, but broader changes remained unseen. Concerning the number of activists sentenced to decades of years in prison and controversial trials, together with episodes like the suicide of Sahar Khodayari after her arrest for having attended a football match explain very vividly what is the context in which Iranian women live and organize their civil resistance. As a consequence, it did not come as a surprise that further uprisings occurred when, in September 2022, the news that Mahsa Amini had died, after being detained by the Iranian morality police, reached the broader public.

Iranian women in the aftermath of Mahsa Amini’s death
The protests in the aftermath of Mahsa Amini’s death have once more expressed the power of Iranian women to make their voices heard within Iran as well as obtaining global resonance thanks to the power of social media (i.e. via X). Since September 16th of last year, the burnt veil has become a prominent symbol, disseminating rapidly a willingness for political change across the country. Women activists of all kinds have stood up for equal rights, such as the right to be equal under the law, one’s freedom in the public sphere - including the right to choose one’s clothing - and the right to participate equally in political life. Indeed, the Woman, Life, Freedom Movement is not addressed to a specific audience, but instead, it welcomes any religious, or secular, people of any gender, and sends to the government the clear message that part of the Iranian population is at odds with its current tightness.

Although the veiling order was not strictly applied formally, during the last year systematic attacks on the female gender have occurred starting from November 2022. One of the most notorious cases is the poisoning in schools, which according to the UN hit more than 1200 young girls. The state reaction to these events was slow and inadequate compared to the quick deployment of personnel during the protests, also considering that the words pronounced by the Iranian Interior Minister reduced the attempts to undermine the activists cause to simple stress due to exams.

The restriction to freedom of speech shortly followed, once again targeting those who were advocating feminist activism, such as journalists and lawyers. Examples would be plentiful, however, it is worth remembering the irregular trial of Niloofar Hamedi and Elaheh Mohammadi in May and again in July 2023. After 8 months of custody, both the women were judged for exposing Amini’s death and inciting protests against national security. Law has been used as a tool to intimidate Iranians, retain them from joining the Movement and gain feminist consciousness. Indeed, it has been reported that several other journalists have perished in an effort to raise the voices of the activists instance.

More recently, the Iranian government has presented a pro-Islamic dress code bill, then adopted by the Parliament on August 13th, now it is waiting for the approval of the Guardian Council. The implementation of such a law could envisage gender segregation in public spaces, fines and between 5 and 10 years of prison for women not correctly wearing the compulsory headscarf, as well as for businesses who may host such women, and the reduction of the owner’s income up to 3 months.

All in all, the woman's body affair is becoming an ever more political matter if we consider that in March 2024 elections will be held in Iran and that the burnt hijab is denoting the urge for democratization. Nevertheless, it is hardly realistic to expect the Movement to turn into a political party or for existing parties to take over the feminist demand for reform.

In the wake of Mahsa Amini's tragic death in September 2022, a significant transformation has swept across Iran. This article explored the history of Iranian women's activism since the 1979 Revolution, revealing a narrative of resilience and commitment to gender equality.

Throughout the years, Iranian women have consistently voiced their grievances, enduring hardships and championing civil disobedience as a means to assert their rights. Amini's death served as a catalyst, sparking renewed protests demanding equal rights, freedom of expression, and the repeal of repressive laws.

However, these efforts have faced staunch opposition from the Iranian government, which has responded with tough measures, including systematic attacks on women and limitations on freedom of speech. A proposed pro-Islamic dress code bill adds to these concerns.

The Woman, Life, Freedom Movement embodies hope for a more equal system, although it may not become a formal political entity. Mahsa Amini's tragedy has not only mobilized Iranian women but has also ignited a global conversation about their rights and the need for change in Iran.

In conclusion, Amini's death has galvanized Iranian women, highlighting their resilience and commitment to justice. Their contest continues, serving as a reminder that the pursuit of equality and freedom knows no boundaries

November 6, 2023 — No Comments

Israel’s Possible War Scenarios: From a Temporarily Restrained Conflict to a Prolonged All-out War

Author: Omri Brinner - Middle East Team

With the beginning of its ground invasion into the Gaza Strip, Israel is at a crossroads it hoped it wouldn’t be in. It can be argued that any route Israel would take in this historic intersection would lead to regional escalation, even if only in the long-run. It is safe to assume, then, that even if there is no immediate backlash to the Israeli ground invasion, another front, sooner or later, will follow.

The most popular Israeli approach in responding to the October 7 Hamas attack is that the IDF’s infantry and armored brigades would invade the Gaza Strip, backed by heavy artillery, actionable intelligence, and preceded by intense aerial bombardment (as is happening). Israel, it has been argued, must respond forcefully, or else it would project to its enemies that it would refrain from war at all costs.

The ground invasion itself is meant to root out Hamas from the Gaza Strip and to disable its military capabilities. The other objective is the release of the 239 Israeli and foreign hostages, most of whom are civilians. Ideally – from Israel's point of view – the IDF would achieve its goals in the Gaza Strip without having to fight on another front simultaneously, as its capabilities in fighting multiple fronts at the same time are limited, and such a scenario will necessitate Israel to change its objectives. However, this is the least likely scenario. Total victory against Hamas is not guaranteed – and even unlikely within the limits of military power – and the ground operation can last for months. What is more likely is that Israel would embark on a limited ground incursion (due to American pressure and the possibility of another front elsewhere), achieve some tactical victories against Hamas, and will force a ceasefire on better conditions – which would lead to the release of some hostages (most likely women, children, and the elderly). However, the restrained war efforts in Gaza will surely be followed by war and terror on other fronts, and possibly simultaneously.

One ongoing front is in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, where Hamas, armed militias, and lone-wolf terrorists take arms against Israeli civilians and security personnel. At the time of the Hamas attack on October 7, most of the IDF was stationed in the West Bank, demonstrating its symbolic and strategic importance to Israel. The latter would have to react forcefully to any significant development there. It is in Hamas’ interest to start a new intifada in the West Bank, and possibly in Israeli cities, in order to destabilize and weaken Israel.

The other ongoing front, where Israel might face a full-scale war, is from the north. Hezbollah, with its arsenal of 150,000 projectiles (of close, medium, and long range) and army of approximately 100,000 soldiers, most of whom are well-trained and with some battle experience, pose a strategic threat – even bigger than the one Hamas poses.

Thus far, Hezbollah – which is backed by Iran and serves as its most strategic proxy in the region – has been reacting to Israel’s limited ground invasion, albeit with restraint. While Hezbollah needs to show it is committed to the Palestinian cause, it aims to avoid an all-out war with Israel.

*Source: https://twitter.com/IDFSpokesperson/status/1721014635623522767/photo/4*

According to Israeli calculation, an all-out war is not fully in Hezbollah’s interests, nor is it in Iran’s. According to this theory, both Iran and Hezbollah would rather open an all-out war with Israel only once Iran guarantees applicable nuclear military capabilities, which, in the long run, seems inevitable. This means that from Israel’s point of view – and contrary to the best-case scenario described above – it would be better for Israel to engage with Hezbollah and Iran before the latter becomes a nuclear power.

Israel, then, might choose to attack Hezbollah and either drag it into the war – and by so eliminating the surprise element of Hezbollah’s reaction – or, if Hezbollah chooses not to retaliate, to reestablish its deterrence up north. While it may seem like an act of self harm, the Israeli public would view a Hezbollah surprise attack as another failure of the government, IDF, Shin Bet and Mossad. In a way, then, these institutions hope to project to the public that Israel is on the front foot, and that if a war with Hezbollah and Iran is inevitable in the long run, then better now than later. It is important to note that while Israel calculates that the two Shia powers would rather avoid an all-out war prior to Iran’s nuclearization, Israel’s working assumption that Hamas was deterred and would have opted to avoid an armed conflict fell apart with the October 7 attack. Therefore, there are no guarantees that any theory that existed before the attack is still relevant.

Would Iran and Hezbollah wait peacefully for an Israeli strike, or for it to finish its fighting in Gaza? Unlikely. From their point of view, Iran and Hezbollah are happy to let Israel keep guessing whether they would join the war or not. From Israel’s standpoint, it cannot afford to be surprised again. While it is less likely that there would be a ground invasion from the north following the one from the Gaza Strip on October 7, an extensive missile attack on central Israel would be just as bad.

But initiating war with Hezbollah – and Iran – would force the US into the conflict, as it would be extremely challenging – on the verge of impossible – for Israel to conduct an all-out war with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran simultaneously. At the same time, if US forces end up fighting alongside Israel, then it is likely that other Iranian allies would occupy the US forces elsewhere in the region (such as in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria). While a recent poll shows that the vast majority of Americans are against US military involvement in the Middle East, the US would feel it has to protect its allies and interests in the region.

It seems, then, that the region is ahead of a long period – whether months or years – of an armed conflict.

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