Israel Archives – ITSS Verona

March 9, 2026 — No Comments

Of War and Peace in southern Syria

By Marco Malaguzzi - Middle East Team

Introduction

The tumultuous events in northeastern Syria have shifted the media’s attention away from the As-Suwayda Governorate in the country’s south. Nonetheless, the strategic relevance of this area should not be underestimated. As-Suwayda is the only region of Syria where the new administration led by President al-Shara has not yet managed to assert its control. It is adjacent to the Golan Heights and Mount Hermon, key military positions for Israel to defend its northern border. Moreover, the different sectarian and ethnic groups that comprise As-Suwayda’s population have varying political loyalties. Bedouin clans are aligned with the new Syrian government, while the Druzes share sectarian links with their co-religionaries in Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan. This article presents the events that have taken place in the area since the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and outlines how various actors are vying for power both locally and internationally.

Background

When rebel troops entered Damascus on the 8th of December 2024, long-time president Bashar al-Assad fled the country. His escape brought the regime that had ruled Syria since 1970 to an inglorious end. Syrians looked at the future with hope, and celebrations took place in many cities. However, the divisions caused by a decade of civil war, intertwined with external interventions, did not disappear with the departure of al-Assad. Syria was fragmented into various fiefdoms controlled by armed groups. Moreover, years of conflict had deepened the sectarian and ethnic divisions that have always characterised the country. Finding a political arrangement that reunified the country once more seemed a far-fetched plan. Al-Shara, leader of the militia that had spearheaded the military operations against the al-Assad’s regime, managed to assert control over Damascus. A former jihadist who had fought against the American occupation of Iraq, al-Shara had risen to the position of leader of an Islamist armed group that controlled the province of Idlib in northern Syria. In January 2025, al-Shara assumed the presidency. In his first address to the country, he highlighted the need to rebuild state institutions and maintain peace, but this spirit did not come to fruition. In March, clashes broke out in Latakia, in the west of Syria, between the new government and supporters of the previous regime. The brutal repression that followed, which indiscriminately targeted the local Alawite community, made it clear that the reunification of Syria will be neither smooth nor bloodless.

The events in As-Suwayda

In an attempt to prevent similar events from taking place in As-Suwayda, where unidentified individuals were setting up armed ambushes and conducting assassinations, the new Syrian government scrambled to negotiate a deal with local notables. On March 12, a memorandum of understanding was signed by Mustafa Bakour, the governor, and various local stakeholders. According to its text, troops loyal to al-Shara would take over the area, salaries to public employees would come from Damascus, and regular consultations between the central government and local dignitaries would be held. Nonetheless, , Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, one of the spiritual leaders of the Druze population of As-Suwayda, opposed this deal. He denounced the extremist nature of the new government and rejected any compromise with Damascus. On the following day, armed individuals raised the Druze flag on government buildings all over the governorate. They were affiliated with the Suwayda Military Council (SMC), a predominantly Druze militia that formed after the collapse of al-Assad’s regime to prevent a security void. These incidents did not lead to a major escalation. However, they were the beginning of an uneasy, and ultimately short-lived, truce. In April, a blasphemous audio which insulted Prophet Muhammad went viral. It was attributed to Marwan Kiwan, a Druze cleric. He rejected all allegations, but the recording was enough to ignite a vicious cycle of violence. According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, 113 individuals lost their lives during these clashes. External powers also played a role. On the 29th of April, the Druze minority in Israel took to the streets to protest against the sectarian violence against their co-religionaries in Syria. On the following day, the Israeli air force conducted a drone strike in As-Suwayda targeting the Syrian security forces, which were converging on the area. Various parties tried to de-escalate the situation. Walid Jumblatt, the political leader of the Druze minority in Lebanon, contacted his co-religionaries in As-Suwayda and the new Syrian administration in an attempt to find an agreement. SANA, a press agency linked to the government of Damascus, announced a ceasefire had been negotiated between the governor and local notables. Nonetheless, the violence continued unabated. On the 2nd of May, Israel dropped a bomb in the proximity of the presidential palace in Syria’s capital, warning that it would not allow the government to deploy forces south of Damascus and harm the Druze population of As-Suwayda . Türkiye, the main ally of al-Shara’s new administration, also got involved. When Israeli planes entered the Syrian airspace on the following night, Turkish fighter jets attempted to jam their communications. After this incident, the situation calmed down because neither Israel nor Türkiye were interested in a military escalation, but one figure, once again, stood out for his opposition to any deal with Damascus: the aforementioned Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri. Distancing himself from the Druze clerics who had negotiated the deal with Damascus, he declared:

“We no longer trust a group that calls itself a government, because the government doesn’t kill its own people through extremist gangs that are loyal to it, and after the massacre claims they are loose forces”

Despite his uncompromising statements, the situation in As-Suwayda calmed down for a few months. However, on the 11th of July 2025, Bedouin gunmen kidnapped a Druze vegetable seller. Druze militias reacted by taking hostage several members of As-Suwayda’s Bedouin clans. Violence spread quickly, and Bedouin fighters, supported by other Bedouin clans from the Daraa Governorate, began attacking Druze villages with heavy weapons. In some instances, they fought against the Syrian security forces that attempted to de-escalate the situation. In other instances, videos show troops loyal to Damascus joining the onslaught against the Druzes. The arrival of foreign fighters loyal to Syria’s Defence Ministry only exacerbated the fears of the Druze population of As-Suwayda because these units are known for having carried out massacres against religious minorities in Latakia. On the 14th of July, Israel intervened once more, this time by carrying out strikes that destroyed a Syrian Army convoy. On the following day, dozens of Israeli Druze civilians illegally crossed the border with Syria to support their co-religionaries. Moreover, the Israeli air force bombed the Syrian Defence Ministry in Damascus multiple times. Türkiye issued statements in support of Syria’s sovereignty and unity. Nonetheless, this time it did not deploy fighter jets to defend al-Shara’s security forces. On the 16th of July, the Syrian army announced its pullout from As-Suwayda. Thousands of Bedouin civilians also began evacuating the region, fearing that the victorious Druze militias would carry out ethnic violence. Since the withdrawal of Syrian troops, As-Suwayda is administered by the Supreme Legal Committee (SLC), a government body – unsurprisingly – created under the auspices of Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri. On the 23rd of August 2025, the SLC announced the creation of a National Guard, a new force made up of 40 militias, including the Suwayda Military Council. A joint plan announced by Jordan, the United States and the Syrian government to de-escalate the situation has yielded some results. Bedouin families have begun returning to their homes. Moreover, the Syrian security forces and the Druze militias that control the region of As-Suwayda have conducted a prisoner exchange on the 26th of February 2026. However, the reintegration of As-Suwayda into a unified Syrian state seems a far-fetched dream.

As-Suwayda and the regional context

When the government of Bashar al-Assad was overthrown, two regional players began jousting for power in Syria. As shown by the events outlined above, they were Israel and Türkiye. The former occupied the territories surrounding Mount Hermon and played a very active role in As-Suwayda. The latter positioned itself as the closest ally of the new administration in Damascus. Since the fall of the regime, Türkiye has pledged to provide Syria with gas and electricity. Moreover, the Turkish defence ministry has stipulated a deal with its counterpart in Damascus, committing to provide the new Syrian armed forces with modern weapon systems and training. Lacking the economic muscle of the Gulf monarchies, Türkiye is capitalising on the strength of its defence industry and its energy sector. The recent developments in Syria have given the Turkish government an opportunity to expand its role as a regional security provider and transform Anatolia into a major energy hub. Israel’s ambitions in Syria are of a different nature. The actions undertaken by the government of Benjamin Netanyahu show that its primary concern is to enhance Israel’s security by creating a new buffer zone at its northern border. Moreover, Israel wants to ensure that Syria stays weak by supporting groups such as the National Guard in As-Suwayda and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in the northeast of the country. It mistrusts al-Shara because of his jihadist past and close relationship with Türkiye. Repeated American efforts to negotiate a deal between the new government in Damascus and Israel have not led to an Israeli withdrawal from the Syrian territories it occupies, nor to a Syrian recognition of the Jewish state. Nonetheless, Israel’s shipments of military supplies to the Druzes in As-Suwayda have become smaller and less frequent. The lack of an Israeli reaction to the Syrian military offensive against the Kurds in northeast Syria, which stands in stark contrast to Israel’s air campaign when the government of Damascus deployed troops in As-Suwayda, may show the division of Syria into spheres of influence. The Turkish inaction following Israel’s bombing of the Syrian defence ministry in July also points to a tacit agreement between Ankara and the Jewish state. The south of Syria seems to lie within Israel’s domain. The rest of the country, instead, is controlled by the government of Damascus and its Turkish sponsors. Of course, other regional powers also play a role. The Gulf countries have pledged significant investments to rebuild Syria’s battered economy. Russia maintains military bases in Latakia, and the United States remains interested in conducting counter-terrorism operations to contain ISIS. Nonetheless, Israel and Türkiye are the most powerful stakeholders in the country at the time of writing. Following the American withdrawal and the downsizing of the Russian military presence caused by the war in Ukraine, Israel and Türkiye are the only countries that maintain a substantial military presence in Syria. How their rivalry plays out will shape the future not only of As-Suwayda but of the whole country.

*Photo by Dimitrisvetsikas1969 – pixabay.com*

The local power struggle in As-Suwayda

Regional dynamics are reflected in local power struggles in As-Suwayda, where the frontline remains blurred, and alliances shift quickly. In 2012, Hikmat al-Hijri became one of three Sheikhs of Reason – the spiritual leaders of the Druze community in Syria – inheriting the position from his brother, who had died in a suspicious car accident many blamed on al-Assad’s regime. For a while, al-Hijri aligned himself with the regime in Damascus, probably having been intimidated by the death of his brother. However, in 2020, as popular discontent with the worsening economic situation grew, al-Hijri distanced himself from Bashar al-Assad. In the meantime, he had sidelined the other two Sheikhs of Reasons and had moved to Qanawat, a small village in the Druze heartland on the mountains of southern Syria, where it was easier to ensure his personal safety. Thanks to his manoeuvring, when the al-Assad regime fell in 2024, al-Hijri could present himself as the leader of the Druze community. However, there were other leaders who also claimed to speak on behalf of the Druze population. One of them was Laith al-Balous, the son of an influential Druze cleric assassinated by the regime in 2015. After his father’s death, al-Balous and his brother founded a militia that clashed with al-Assad’s forces on multiple occasions. Consequently, he has better revolutionary credentials than al-Hijri. When the regime was overthrown, al-Balous immediately aligned himself with the new government of al-Shara in Damascus. As mentioned before, when tensions in As-Suwayda escalated, al-Hijri opposed any compromise. Al-Balous instead was one of the notables who negotiated the aforementioned memorandum of understanding in March. There were two cowboys in town. In May, al-Balous survived a mysterious assassination attempt. Despite his luck, the violence in April and in July made his policies unpopular. Various Druze notables and armed groups distanced themselves from al-Balous, and he was forced to flee from As-Suwayda, where one of his advisors was murdered, and the grave of his father was razed to the ground. Al-Hijri has won the match and is now the undisputed leader of both the National Guard and the Supreme Legal Committee. From his exile, al-Balous has condemned the Israeli intervention in As-Suwayda and plauded Türkiye’s role in preserving Syria’s unity. However, Damascus’s man seems to have lost all his influence on the ground. Al-Hijri’s victory was facilitated by his close relationship with Sheikh Mowafaq Tarif, the Druze spiritual leader in Israel. Tarif exercised his considerable influence to convince Israeli Druzes to take to the street in support of al-Hijri. He also lobbied with the Israeli government to convince them to repeatedly intervene in As-Suwayda. Al-Balous instead could not count on direct support from the Druze communities in the surrounding countries, although his efforts to mediate with the government in Damascus paralleled those of the aforementioned Walid Jumblatt, political leader of the Druze minority in Lebanon. Jumblatt has an adversarial relationship with both Mowafaq Tarif. Moreover, he has criticised al-Hijri for his close relationship with Israel. The undeclared alliance between Jumblatt and al-Balous can even count on a historical precedent. In 2015, Jumblatt condemned Druze clerics who supported the regime against al-Balous’s father. Nonetheless, Lebanese Druzes could not provide al-Balous with military support even if they wanted to. Once a mighty warlord, Jumblatt disbanded his militia after the end of the Lebanese Civil War.

Final considerations

The situation in As-Suwayda has stabilised in recent months. However, the new government in Damascus seems committed to unifying Syria under its control, as shown by its successful offensive against the Kurds in the northeast of the country. Tension in southern Syria may escalate quickly. There was very little warning before the military operations against the Syrian Democratic Forces. There will be very little warning before a government offensive against As-Suwayda. As shown above, the consequences of an escalation in this region will go way beyond its borders. Israel and Türkiye will be drawn in. They may have a tacit agreement on the partition of Syria. However, in the Middle East, no deal lasts forever, and new developments such as the war between Iran, the United States, and Israel can open windows of opportunity. Türkiye and the government of al-Shara have already surprised the world in the past, with the sudden offensive that overthrew Assad in 2024, and will be eager to exploit any opportunity. If al-Hijri, the uncontested winner of the local power struggle, continues to be uncompromising with the government in Damascus, diplomacy may have little space left for manoeuvre. However, his inflexibility should not be taken for granted. Al-Hijri already changed sides in the past, when he stopped supporting the Assad government. If offered the right deal, he may do so again, and the fortunes of As-Suwayda and its inhabitants will change with him. Undoubtedly, Israel will have a say in any decision al-Hijri takes. However, the importance of local dynamics should not be underestimated. The Druze minority in Syria and beyond is not a cohesive unit. Various leaders claim to represent the Druze community, which spans four countries. How their rivalry plays out will shape the future of As-Suwayda at least as much as the competition between Türkiye and Israel. The events outlined in this article show that religious bonds do not deter Druze powerholders from exercising violence against each other. The government of al-Shara could attempt to find new interlocutors in the two Sheikhs of Reasons who had been sidelined by al-Hijri. In any case, for the reunification of Syria to take place, its sectarian groups must find a way to coexist. Only if the new government in Damascus succeeds in negotiating a deal with the different minorities that make up the population can Syria truly turn the page on the Civil War.

December 2, 2025 — No Comments

Dr. Julie Norman, “Gaza: The Dream and the Nightmare”

In this episode, Dr. Julie Norman speaks about her recent co-authored book (with Maia Carter Hallward), Gaza: The Dream and the Nightmare, where they explore the Gaza Strip's history, current situation, and future, through local Gazans’ voices, experiences, and hopes. Dr. Julie Norman is an Associate Professor of Politics & International Relations at University College London, and a Senior Associate Fellow on the Middle East at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).

In the interview, Dr. Norman addresses the modern history of the Gaza Strip, the story of its population, the Strip’s vibrant life even during times of crises, which include entrepreneurship, solidarity, and militancy. Dr. Norman talks about the Hamas-Fatah rivalry and the 2006 elections – the first and last democratic elections to take place in the Gaza Strip – the role Hamas plays in the Gazans’ daily life, and how local Gazans view life under Hamas. And, of course, she discusses the October 7, 2023 attack and the Israel-Hamas war that has followed.

Interviewer: Omri Brinner - Middle East Desk

December 10, 2024 — No Comments

Dr. Ofer Idels on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Dr. Ofer Idels discusses the role history has played throughout the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the dangers and opportunities in molding narratives, and his new book, Zionism: Emotions, Language, and Experience.

Ofer Idels is a Minerva Postdoctoral Fellow in the History Department at Munich University. His book, Zionism: Emotions, Language, and Experience, was recently published by Cambridge University Press (free download here: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009442947)

Interviewer: Omri Brinner - Middle East Team

November 13, 2024 — No Comments

Iran’s Hostility Towards Israel: Three Influential Reasons

by Margherita Ceserani, Shahin Modarres, Shir Mor, William Kingston-Cox - Iran Team

The Islamic Republic’s recent choice to directly confront Israel, avoiding its usual reliance on proxy groups, marks a significant shift in its Middle East strategy. Long dependent on groups like Hezbollah and Hamas for regional influence, the weakening of these proxies—amid Israeli retaliation and Iran’s internal crises—has led Tehran to reconsider its approach. This article explores the internal and external factors driving the Islamic Republic’s move toward a more direct confrontation.

Its proxies weakening

The Islamic Republic's decision to attack Israel directly, bypassing its traditional reliance on proxy groups - also called the "Axis of Resistance" - marks a significant shift in its strategic approach. This uncharacteristic behaviour is largely driven by the weakening of its proxies, particularly in the aftermath of the events following October 7th.

For decades, the Islamic Republic has built, supported, and relied on external groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis to exert influence, especially in the Middle East, and keep Israel engaged. However, recent Israeli military retaliation has severely weakened these proxies, diminished their operational capabilities, and reduced their effectiveness in countering Israeli threats and holding power positions in the Middle East and the whole world.

The Islamic Republic maintains a network of allied groups across the Middle East, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip, Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen. The IRGC Quds Force, responsible for operations beyond Iran's borders, coordinates with these groups in line with Iranian directives. This network supports Iran’s strategy to extend its influence throughout the region and beyond. For example, the Houthis have impacted maritime security in the Red Sea, prompting responses from U.S. and U.K. military coalitions in Yemen. Iran also provides funding and weaponry to groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, facilitating their actions against Israel despite Hamas' Sunni background. In Syria, Iran has established a direct influence on the Assad regime and deploys allied militias to strengthen its presence, using the country as a base for potential actions against Israel. By supporting these groups, Iran seeks to counter its adversaries, extend its ideological influence, and maintain leverage in key areas, which affects both regional and global security.

The targeted killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah by Israel, coupled with the assassination of Hamas figure Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, signifies a pivotal moment in the collapse of the "Axis of Resistance." These significant blows not only weaken Iran's most powerful regional proxies but also destabilise Tehran's long-standing influence in the Middle East. Established in the 1980s, Hezbollah evolved under Iranian support into a formidable political and military force; Nasrallah's death highlights how Israel's recent military operations have fractured Iran's strategic foothold, jeopardising its long-term plans. Similarly, Haniyeh's assassination, attributed to Israel despite no official claim of responsibility, directly challenges Iran's authority, especially given that he was in Tehran to coordinate efforts with Iranian leaders. The operation's occurrence within Iran sends a powerful message about Tehran's vulnerability and reflects a broader Israeli strategy to undermine Iran’s network of proxies which consistently threaten Israel’s security and complicates Iran’s ability to project power.

The Islamic Republic's long-term strategic plans have been significantly disrupted, prompting a notable shift toward a direct approach to its conflict with Israel. Historically reliant on proxy forces to advance its agenda, the recent weakening of these groups has forced Iran to reevaluate its strategy. The decision to directly confront Israel reflects not only an immediate tactical shift but also an acknowledgement that its traditional methods may no longer achieve its regional objectives. This transformation is underscored by the diminishing effectiveness of the "Axis of Resistance" and signifies a recalibration of tactics amid a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape. These developments carry profound implications for both Iran's future strategies and broader regional stability and global security.

Domestic dissatisfaction

Tehran’s decision to escalate tensions with Israel can be understood by its multifaceted internal crises, which challenge the regime economically, politically, and socially. The economic decline of the Iranian economy has been worsened for years by international sanctions, global fluctuations and instability in oil prices, and rising inflation, fueling widespread discontent among an already-beleaguered Iranian population. Tehran has been unable to quell the resultant dissatisfaction, particularly following the protests after the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022. Amini’s death fuelled a popular challenge of cleric authority and demands for greater civil liberties.

The society of the Islamic Republic is becoming increasingly secularised, eroding the clerical influence of the regime. Its reliance upon the continued legitimacy of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which is increasingly contested as Iranian society, particularly its younger elements, becomes increasingly disillusioned with religious politicisation, and, in turn, becoming increasingly secularised. Many young Iranians are showing disdain for traditional practices, a consequence of exposure to Western media. This particular challenge for the regime is existential - its entire raison d’etre rests upon religious foundations.

Coupled with the endemic internal challenges and the pressures from its proxies, Tehran’s decision to strike Israel reveals itself as a tool of diversion; an attempt to rally patriotic fervour and unity in return for relative political stability. By framing a new national, external enemy, the Iranian regime can distract and obfuscate from its internal dissent, all whilst performatively asserting itself as a regional power. This approach undertaken by the Iranian government does, of course, risk exacerbating economic downfall as an overreliance on oil revenues could be manipulated to Tehran’s detriment. Whilst the Iranian leadership will no doubt conceive these external manoeuvres to be a part of a ‘survival strategy’, it cannot be overstated how further economic strife will precipitate deepening and widening domestic disillusionment and, ultimately, unrest, prompting new calls for regime change.

*Source: photo-generated with the support of artificial intelligence.*

Nuclear Advancements

Tehran’s approach to foreign policy in the Middle East is influenced by a combination of geopolitical, ideological, and military considerations, with its nuclear program playing a significant role. Since the United States' withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018, the Islamic Republic has advanced its nuclear developments, positioning these capabilities as a potential deterrent against perceived external threats, particularly from Israel. A notable development occurred in 2023, when the IAEA reported finding uranium particles enriched to 83.7% in a declared facility — a level approaching weapons-grade material.

These advancements have significantly strengthened the Islamic Republic’s strategic position, as the prospect of developing nuclear weapons reduces the likelihood of direct military intervention by its adversaries. With this deterrent in place, though not the sole factor, the Shiite regime feels emboldened to act more assertively, pushing the limits of its regional influence and responding more aggressively to external provocations. For instance, the Israeli strike on the Islamic Republic’s consulate in Damascus in April 2024 has been met with an increased likelihood of retaliation. Tehran’s nuclear capability serves as a protective shield, allowing it to project power and influence more aggressively, while its ideological goals and regional ambitions drive its assertiveness in confronting rivals like Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Despite arguments by some experts that nuclear weapons would undermine its security and diplomatic relations, Iranian officials view nuclear capabilities as a strategic asset that could grant superiority over regional adversaries. Engaging in a nuclear arms race could be economically unsustainable and diplomatically harmful for Tehran, however, nuclear capability is tied not only to military deterrence but also to a pursuit of prestige, both domestically and internationally. This aligns with its broader goal of establishing regional hegemony, while also reflecting its revolutionary ideology rooted in values like independence, anti-imperialism, and resistance to foreign domination since 1979.

Conclusion

The Islamic Republic’s shift to direct action against Israel reflects a new phase in its foreign policy. Weakened proxies and rising domestic discontent are challenging Tehran’s traditional strategies. As nuclear developments bolster its assertiveness, this new approach risks further regional instability and could have global security implications, underscoring a significant turning point in Middle Eastern dynamics.

Board of Governors (2023). NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General. Available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/gov2023-58.pdf.
Mirza, M.N., Abbas, H. and Qaisrani, Irfan Hasnain (2022). The Iranian Nuclear Programme: Dynamics of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), American Unisolationism and European Apprehensions. Journal of European Studies, 38(1), pp.14-32. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4002492.
Maleki, A. (2010). Iran’s nuclear file: recommendations for the future. Daedalus, 139(1), pp.105–116. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40544048 [Accessed 2024].

August 31, 2024 — No Comments

Dr. Michael Barak on Iran Recent Developments

In this episode, Dr. Michael Barak talks about recent developments and policy changes in Iran, their impact on Israel, and the role of proxy actors following October 7th. Specifically, Dr Barak discusses the multifaceted dynamics involving Iran and its regional influence. He covers Iran’s relationships with various proxies, including Hezbollah and the Houthi’s, as well as its strategic partnerships with Russia. Additionally, Dr Barak examines Iran`s ongoing tensions with Israel and the corresponding Israeli responses.

Dr. Michael Barak is a Senior researcher at the International Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT) where he serves as the head of the global jihad & Palestinian terrorism research desks. Additionally, Dr. Barak is a lecturer at the lauder school of government diplomacy and strategy at Reichman university.

Interviewers: Shahin Modarres & Shir Mor - Iran Team

August 27, 2024 — No Comments

The Italian Military export and its possible implications in the light of the Israel-Hamas conflict

By Alberto Trame, Aline Blanchard, Christian Gaole, Giacomo Bortolazzi - Italy Team

The Military Industry in Italy as a Leading Global Actor

It is widely acknowledged that Italy has a leading role in the European production and export of weapons, a trend that will probably continue to grow in the next years: at the end of March, the annual report to the Parliament on operations authorised and carried out for the control of exports, imports and transit of armament materials estimated that export licenses for a total value of 6.31 billion euros have been issued during the year 2023, causing an increase in Italian military exports from the sum of 5,289 million euros in 2022 to 6,311 million in 2023. The document also included a list of the States with the highest share in the total export of Italian weapons: the list includes countries such as France, the United States, Ukraine (whose ongoing conflict against Russia has resulted in a steep rise in military contributions), several Middle Eastern countries such as Türkiye, Azerbaijan and Kuwait, and Israel as the main beneficiaries.

Has Anything Changed After Al-Aqsa Flood?

The report also highlighted Israel's situation following the attacks conducted by Hamas on 7 October 2023. Although the volume of Italian military exports to Israel increased to a total value of 31.5 million euros, placing the country seventh among the largest importers, the annual report noted the consideration given to the issuing of new authorisations in light of the ongoing conflict. This cautious approach regarding military exports was also confirmed by the Italian Defence Minister, who responded to a Parliamentary interrogation on the issue by stating that no new authorisations have been granted since the attacks of 7 October 2023. The media observed that this statement seemed to differ from those made by other representatives of the Italian Government, including the Italian Prime Minister and, notably, the Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who stated on 20 February 2024 that the dispatch of any kind of weapons to Israel had been suspended since the beginning of the conflict. The distinction between a “total” and a “partial” suspension has been at the center of an intense political debate and several journalistic inquiries conducted in recent months.

The Italian Military Export to Israel Analyzed in Light of Law 185/1990

The ongoing discussion related to the Italian military exportations to Israel, which has not been uniformly addressed by the national political establishment, assumes further importance when considering the potential implications under the Italian legal system, which regulates the import, export, trade, and transit of arms and ammunition through Law 185/1990. Article 1, paragraph 6, of this law prohibits the export and transit of military material towards countries engaged in armed conflict in violation of the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,” as per Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (subject to any exception made through the Council of Ministers’ decision after the approval of the Parliament). The law also prohibits export to countries with policies that conflict with the rejection of “war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other peoples and as a means for the settlement of international disputes,” as per Article 11 of the Constitution, or whose governments have breached international conventions on human rights. Allegations of such violations have been raised in the context of the Israel-Hamas conflict, with concerns expressed about the actions of both belligerent parties.

In this regard, the recent public call by the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court for the arrest warrant of Hamas’ Leader and Commander-In-Chief and of the Israeli Prime and Defence Ministers was issued in response to a series of alleged violations of the Rome Statute, such as “starvation of civilians as a method of warfare,” “intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population,” and “persecution.” The further call by the Prosecutor for adherence to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) gains relevance in light of the most recent report by the International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem and Israel, which suggested that both Hamas and Israel may have committed several “violations of IHL and IHRL” during the conflict. These legal implications remain an open issue, meaning that if the allegations are found to be true, there could be significant legal consequences regarding Italy’s contribution to this conflict, all in light of the requirement to prohibit the export of arms to countries in violation of international human rights conventions as per Law 185/1990.

Concluding Remarks: The Importance of Being Earnest

In light of multifaceted debates and of the serious consequences that serious accusations such as those of violating international conventions might imply, the importance of transparent and complete information cannot be questioned. Even though occupying such a self-evident pivotal role, the concern expressed by many is that it may still be jeopardised: the new Parliamentary Bill modifying Law 185/90 could in fact result in the reduction of the kind and quantity of data to be included in the annual report to the Parliament if approved. Given this possibility, it is important to remember the importance of free information.

June 18, 2024 — No Comments

Jordan’s Balancing Act in the Israel-Hamas War:

Since the outbreak of the war on October 7, Jordan has been caught between increasing external and internal pressures.

By Alice Elizabeth Strophair - Middle East Team

Escalating conflict and policy decisions

In the midst of the Israel-Hamas war, the Middle East witnessed an unprecedented escalation in the ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran, when, on the night of April 13, the Islamic Republic launched a combined missile and drone attack on Israel. Some of the projectiles were even intercepted above the Al-Aqsa mosque by Israel’s iron dome. The attack saw the conflict take a new turn, with Iran attacking Israel directly, rather than through its proxies, such as Hamas or Hezbollah. The events of April 13 have also further challenged neighbouring Arab countries in balancing their political and economic ties with Israel, while showing their support for the Palestinian cause. One of these countries is Jordan, which has been a key regional actor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and now, more than ever, is caught between increasing external and internal pressures, both on the diplomatic as well as on the civilian front. The Hashemite Kingdom is walking a tightrope between its peace treaty with Israel, which emphasises its dependency on Israel for natural resources and security versus preventing “a breakdown in the social [contract]” between the population and the regime. King Abdallah II’s decision to join the international coalition MEAD (Middle East Air Defence), to prevent the use of Jordan’s airspace in the Israeli-Iranian conflict is meant, more than anything else, to prevent further escalation in violence, which would jeopardise Jordan’s security.

The ongoing war in Gaza, “Iron Swords”

Thirty years after Jordan signed the “Wadi Araba Treaty” (1994), with the expectation that the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinian Authority would be implemented, today’s situation must be a bitter disappointment for Jordan. The Hashemite Kingdom has been in favour of a two-state solution but has gradually seen the possibility of this solution decimate, especially since the establishment of the Israeli far right-wing government in late 2022. Since 1967, the unresolved question of East Jerusalem and its progressive annexation (Jerusalem Basic Law, 1980) by Israel has been a contentious point between both countries. The ongoing “Iron Swords” offensive led by Israel within the Gaza Strip has further deteriorated Israeli-Jordanian relations. On one occasion, two weeks after the beginning of the war during a peace summit that was held in Cairo, King Abdullah II denounced what he termed, “global silence about Israel’s attacks, [...] and urged an even-handed approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” Even more so, Jordan fears that the displacement of Gaza’s residents to Egypt could set a precedent for a future displacement of Palestinians from the West Bank to Jordan. This fear is based on their concerns over the political agenda of Israel’s cabinet member Itamar Ben Gvir, who promotes the Eretz Yisrael Hashlema (Greater Israel) dream, declaring that “the people of Israel will settle in Gaza”. As a result, since the beginning of the war in Gaza, the West Bank has become a second front with a sharp increase in settler violence and further constraints on the Palestinian economy. These factors could lead to the possibility of a third intifada and an economic migration from the West Bank to Jordan. These developments pose both a demographic and security threat to Jordan. The Kingdom already has a high population of Palestinians as a result of the 1948 and 1967 wars. A third wave of immigration could turn Jordan into a de facto Palestinian State, which, combined with the increased popularity of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in the West Bank, creates an actual threat to Jordan’s ability to control its borders and ensure internal security.

Post-war scenarios are being considered, with the Arab Peace Initiative dating of 2002 re-emerging on the international stage as a potential solution. The American elections in November will also be decisive, as they will determine whether the future administration will prioritise a negotiated peace or adopt a stance more aligned with the current Israeli government, potentially altering its support for Jordan.

Jordan’s civil and military cooperation with Israel

Jordan’s shortage of natural resources, namely water and gas, and the growing economic relationship it has with Israel, means it cannot cut its ties with the Jewish state, despite public demand. In 2016, a fifteen-year deal was signed for Israel to supply it with gas, becoming the most important supplier for Jordan. In 2021, Jordan, being the second most water-poor country in the world, signed a memorandum of understanding with Israel and the UAE on a water project called the “Green and Blue Prosperity Agreement”. Within this agreement, Israel provides Jordan with desalinated water, the project financing coming from the UAE. However, these economic relations with Israel, like diplomatic ones, are not popular with the Jordanian public and protests demanding cutting ties and breaking deals with Israel.

Jordan’s decision to join the MEAD alliance which includes the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, can be seen as an ideological convergence to counter a common enemy, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and to ensure stability across the region. Historical rivalries between Sunni and Shiite motivate the Arab states, providing Israel with leverage on the question of Palestine within the Middle East Cold War. King Abdullah II defended the decision to join the alliance, by arguing that it would help protect Jordan’s population and the country’s sovereignty.

Conclusion

Jordan has demonstrated resilience when faced with previous escalations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, partly thanks to its diplomatic ties with the United States. The Hashemite kingdom is perceived by the West as a moderate actor that can help bring stability to the region. Nevertheless, King Abdullah II must be aware that his policymaking and commentary on the ongoing crisis in the Gaza Strip – as well as on Benjamin Netanyahu’s and his right-nationalist coalition – will have consequences on his government's relationship with the Jordanian public. These past eight months of war could influence the upcoming parliamentary elections in Jordan, scheduled for next September.

November 6, 2023 — No Comments

Israel’s Possible War Scenarios: From a Temporarily Restrained Conflict to a Prolonged All-out War

Author: Omri Brinner - Middle East Team

With the beginning of its ground invasion into the Gaza Strip, Israel is at a crossroads it hoped it wouldn’t be in. It can be argued that any route Israel would take in this historic intersection would lead to regional escalation, even if only in the long-run. It is safe to assume, then, that even if there is no immediate backlash to the Israeli ground invasion, another front, sooner or later, will follow.

The most popular Israeli approach in responding to the October 7 Hamas attack is that the IDF’s infantry and armored brigades would invade the Gaza Strip, backed by heavy artillery, actionable intelligence, and preceded by intense aerial bombardment (as is happening). Israel, it has been argued, must respond forcefully, or else it would project to its enemies that it would refrain from war at all costs.

The ground invasion itself is meant to root out Hamas from the Gaza Strip and to disable its military capabilities. The other objective is the release of the 239 Israeli and foreign hostages, most of whom are civilians. Ideally – from Israel's point of view – the IDF would achieve its goals in the Gaza Strip without having to fight on another front simultaneously, as its capabilities in fighting multiple fronts at the same time are limited, and such a scenario will necessitate Israel to change its objectives. However, this is the least likely scenario. Total victory against Hamas is not guaranteed – and even unlikely within the limits of military power – and the ground operation can last for months. What is more likely is that Israel would embark on a limited ground incursion (due to American pressure and the possibility of another front elsewhere), achieve some tactical victories against Hamas, and will force a ceasefire on better conditions – which would lead to the release of some hostages (most likely women, children, and the elderly). However, the restrained war efforts in Gaza will surely be followed by war and terror on other fronts, and possibly simultaneously.

One ongoing front is in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, where Hamas, armed militias, and lone-wolf terrorists take arms against Israeli civilians and security personnel. At the time of the Hamas attack on October 7, most of the IDF was stationed in the West Bank, demonstrating its symbolic and strategic importance to Israel. The latter would have to react forcefully to any significant development there. It is in Hamas’ interest to start a new intifada in the West Bank, and possibly in Israeli cities, in order to destabilize and weaken Israel.

The other ongoing front, where Israel might face a full-scale war, is from the north. Hezbollah, with its arsenal of 150,000 projectiles (of close, medium, and long range) and army of approximately 100,000 soldiers, most of whom are well-trained and with some battle experience, pose a strategic threat – even bigger than the one Hamas poses.

Thus far, Hezbollah – which is backed by Iran and serves as its most strategic proxy in the region – has been reacting to Israel’s limited ground invasion, albeit with restraint. While Hezbollah needs to show it is committed to the Palestinian cause, it aims to avoid an all-out war with Israel.

*Source: https://twitter.com/IDFSpokesperson/status/1721014635623522767/photo/4*

According to Israeli calculation, an all-out war is not fully in Hezbollah’s interests, nor is it in Iran’s. According to this theory, both Iran and Hezbollah would rather open an all-out war with Israel only once Iran guarantees applicable nuclear military capabilities, which, in the long run, seems inevitable. This means that from Israel’s point of view – and contrary to the best-case scenario described above – it would be better for Israel to engage with Hezbollah and Iran before the latter becomes a nuclear power.

Israel, then, might choose to attack Hezbollah and either drag it into the war – and by so eliminating the surprise element of Hezbollah’s reaction – or, if Hezbollah chooses not to retaliate, to reestablish its deterrence up north. While it may seem like an act of self harm, the Israeli public would view a Hezbollah surprise attack as another failure of the government, IDF, Shin Bet and Mossad. In a way, then, these institutions hope to project to the public that Israel is on the front foot, and that if a war with Hezbollah and Iran is inevitable in the long run, then better now than later. It is important to note that while Israel calculates that the two Shia powers would rather avoid an all-out war prior to Iran’s nuclearization, Israel’s working assumption that Hamas was deterred and would have opted to avoid an armed conflict fell apart with the October 7 attack. Therefore, there are no guarantees that any theory that existed before the attack is still relevant.

Would Iran and Hezbollah wait peacefully for an Israeli strike, or for it to finish its fighting in Gaza? Unlikely. From their point of view, Iran and Hezbollah are happy to let Israel keep guessing whether they would join the war or not. From Israel’s standpoint, it cannot afford to be surprised again. While it is less likely that there would be a ground invasion from the north following the one from the Gaza Strip on October 7, an extensive missile attack on central Israel would be just as bad.

But initiating war with Hezbollah – and Iran – would force the US into the conflict, as it would be extremely challenging – on the verge of impossible – for Israel to conduct an all-out war with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran simultaneously. At the same time, if US forces end up fighting alongside Israel, then it is likely that other Iranian allies would occupy the US forces elsewhere in the region (such as in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria). While a recent poll shows that the vast majority of Americans are against US military involvement in the Middle East, the US would feel it has to protect its allies and interests in the region.

It seems, then, that the region is ahead of a long period – whether months or years – of an armed conflict.

July 18, 2022 — No Comments

Prof. Germano Dottori on Iran’s shifting role amidst developments in the Middle East

In this interview conducted by the "Iran Desk" at ITSS Verona Prof. Germano Dottori addresses and analyzes Iran's role within the new developments in the Middle East. The interview focuses on the possible outcomes of Biden's travel to the Middle East and the developing potentials of new Middle Eastern alliances.

Professor Germano Dottori was the Chair of Strategic Studies at Luiss-Guido Carli University in Rome until November 2020. He was an Adviser to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee between 2001 and 2006. He has worked with the Rivista Italiana di Difesa (Italian Defence magazine) since 1997. He has published books and research in Italy and Great Britain on security and defence.

Interviewer: Shahin Modarres

June 18, 2022 — No Comments

Will METO be the new NATO?

Author: Shahin Modarres.

As the light at the end of the tunnel of revitalizing the JCPOA grows weaker the tension between Iran and the international community rises fiercely. Tension can be analyzed on two levels, regional level, and international level. On a regional level whilst Iran's regional competitors express their concerns regarding Iran's nuclear program, Israel has been applying a drastically different approach, a completely physical approach that dances on the edge of initiating a direct regional conflict. For the past month a notable number of high-ranking officers and scientists within the IRGC and Ministry of defense have been targeted and assassinated in the streets of Iran, almost all targets played an important role in the country's nuclear and missile program. Even though the Israeli officials never officially accepted the responsibility but Israel remains to be the main guess behind the calls. At the same time reports have been registered regarding threats against Israeli citizens in Turkey and Thailand. Earlier Israel's minister of foreign affairs asked all citizens to evacuate Istanbul immediately because of a series of imminent threats against their lives.

On another proxy level, the shelling of Iranian infrastructures in Syria by the Israeli Air Force has been intensified. Drones trying to reach Israeli territories through Iraq's airspace have been shot and there have been reports of drone attacks on safe sites of Israel's intelligence operations according to Iranian authorities. Constant cyber war has been going on as well, every now and then, Iranian or Israeli hackers have been claiming victory by accessing infrastructures or personal data from the rival. A full encounter between the countries is now more threatening than ever. That is the main reason why both actors are reinforcing their teams in anticipation.

*Image Source*: https://www.bakerinstitute.org/center-for-the-middle-east/

One of Iran's main bargaining leverages has been its regional influence. A military influent formed of mostly Shiite militant groups in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen running alongside vast support of Sunni groups such as Hamas for years gave Iran an upper hand to proceed with its regional proxy wars but what has changed? Iran's influence in the region has been limited mainly because of two reasons, a technological shift in the defense paradigm and a realistically Machiavellian perception of diplomacy. The aerial defense system known as the "Iron Dome" by Israel has definitely been a game-changer redefining traditional defensive methods through advanced approaches to countering missile attacks. On the diplomatic level, the "Abraham Accords" were none other than a realist perception of "my enemy's enemy can be my friend!" The growing angle of difference between Iran and Arab countries of the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia itself lead the tension between Israel and Arab countries to decrease gradually. Now a new form of an alliance is being formed between them. An alliance that some interpret as a Middle Eastern form of NATO; is METO.

A few days ago Israel's minister of defense called for a new alliance between Israel and its Arab partners against Iran led by the United States. It appears that the defensive circle against Iran is getting tighter but at the same time Iran has decided to deactivate the surveillance set by the IAEA within its nuclear facilities. President Biden's trip to the Middle East will happen soon during which he will visit Israel and Saudi Arabia. Against all odds, the Biden administration appears to be considering its foreign policy legacy none other than peacebuilding between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Hence, his trips will play a crucial role that may affect and form Middle East's near future on different levels.

A Middle Eastern Treaty Organization(METO) on a dynamic scale may only live with the blessing of the United States. But on a regional level, actors are consciously trying to build an independent alliance as well. Almost each and every member of the new alliance at some point during the past two decades has been unhappy regarding US policies in the region hence traces of a collective will to have independent strong regional alliances are quite clear amongst actors. There is already talk regarding Israel sharing parts of its "Iron Dome" technology with Arab partners. Whilst wealthy Arab partners can generously invest in the Israeli technological and scientific R&D, all allies may benefit from the results.

On the other end, Iran has shown a Russo-Oriental turn towards developing military and security cooperation with China and Russia. Also, there has been a fast development of the county's Aerospatiale program, particularly in regards to ballistic missiles program, drones, and satellites. Even though the Iranian economy is facing its most fragile state expenses regarding the doctrines of "Defense and Influence" have indeed increased.

To anticipate the outcome of this equation we all need to think in a Machiavellian context, to simply interpret the equation based on each country's national interest. Will the US join the coalition to form METO? Will Russia and China support their supposed ally if Iran's nuclear program once again ends up in the United Nations Security Council? And eventually, the final unfortunate question is, will we face another devastating war in the Middle East?

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