By Alberto Trame, Aline Blanchard, Christian Gaole, Giacomo Bortolazzi - Italy Team
The Military Industry in Italy as a Leading Global Actor
It is widely acknowledged that Italy has a leading role in the European production and export of weapons, a trend that will probably continue to grow in the next years: at the end of March, the annual report to the Parliament on operations authorised and carried out for the control of exports, imports and transit of armament materials estimated that export licenses for a total value of 6.31 billion euros have been issued during the year 2023, causing an increase in Italian military exports from the sum of 5,289 million euros in 2022 to 6,311 million in 2023. The document also included a list of the States with the highest share in the total export of Italian weapons: the list includes countries such as France, the United States, Ukraine (whose ongoing conflict against Russia has resulted in a steep rise in military contributions), several Middle Eastern countries such as Türkiye, Azerbaijan and Kuwait, and Israel as the main beneficiaries.
Has Anything Changed After Al-Aqsa Flood?
The report also highlighted Israel's situation following the attacks conducted by Hamas on 7 October 2023. Although the volume of Italian military exports to Israel increased to a total value of 31.5 million euros, placing the country seventh among the largest importers, the annual report noted the consideration given to the issuing of new authorisations in light of the ongoing conflict. This cautious approach regarding military exports was also confirmed by the Italian Defence Minister, who responded to a Parliamentary interrogation on the issue by stating that no new authorisations have been granted since the attacks of 7 October 2023. The media observed that this statement seemed to differ from those made by other representatives of the Italian Government, including the Italian Prime Minister and, notably, the Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who stated on 20 February 2024 that the dispatch of any kind of weapons to Israel had been suspended since the beginning of the conflict. The distinction between a “total” and a “partial” suspension has been at the center of an intense political debate and several journalistic inquiries conducted in recent months.
The Italian Military Export to Israel Analyzed in Light of Law 185/1990
The ongoing discussion related to the Italian military exportations to Israel, which has not been uniformly addressed by the national political establishment, assumes further importance when considering the potential implications under the Italian legal system, which regulates the import, export, trade, and transit of arms and ammunition through Law 185/1990. Article 1, paragraph 6, of this law prohibits the export and transit of military material towards countries engaged in armed conflict in violation of the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,” as per Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (subject to any exception made through the Council of Ministers’ decision after the approval of the Parliament). The law also prohibits export to countries with policies that conflict with the rejection of “war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other peoples and as a means for the settlement of international disputes,” as per Article 11 of the Constitution, or whose governments have breached international conventions on human rights. Allegations of such violations have been raised in the context of the Israel-Hamas conflict, with concerns expressed about the actions of both belligerent parties.
In this regard, the recent public call by the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court for the arrest warrant of Hamas’ Leader and Commander-In-Chief and of the Israeli Prime and Defence Ministers was issued in response to a series of alleged violations of the Rome Statute, such as “starvation of civilians as a method of warfare,” “intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population,” and “persecution.” The further call by the Prosecutor for adherence to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) gains relevance in light of the most recent report by the International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem and Israel, which suggested that both Hamas and Israel may have committed several “violations of IHL and IHRL” during the conflict. These legal implications remain an open issue, meaning that if the allegations are found to be true, there could be significant legal consequences regarding Italy’s contribution to this conflict, all in light of the requirement to prohibit the export of arms to countries in violation of international human rights conventions as per Law 185/1990.
Concluding Remarks: The Importance of Being Earnest
In light of multifaceted debates and of the serious consequences that serious accusations such as those of violating international conventions might imply, the importance of transparent and complete information cannot be questioned. Even though occupying such a self-evident pivotal role, the concern expressed by many is that it may still be jeopardised: the new Parliamentary Bill modifying Law 185/90 could in fact result in the reduction of the kind and quantity of data to be included in the annual report to the Parliament if approved. Given this possibility, it is important to remember the importance of free information.
Author: Isabel Dekker and Federico Alistair D'Alessio.
Between the 22nd and 26th of October 2022, 234 migrants (including over 40 minors) were rescued by the Ocean Viking, a rescue boat managed by SOS Méditerranée, a humanitarian organization that rescues people in distress at sea. Before being allowed to dock in Toulon (France) on the 11th of November, the boat was stranded at sea for almost three weeks leading to a rapid decline in the passengers’ health. The vessel landed in France after Italy refused to allow the ship to dock on their shores, intensifying their bitter dispute over migration. Since 2015, the EU has forwarded numerous initiatives to improve the coordination and handling of the arrival of migrants. Nevertheless, EU’s migration policies are often executed in an ad hoc fashion resulting in diplomatic tensions across the European continent.
FRANCE’S POINT OF VIEW
The French government condemned Italy’s refusal to welcome the vessel carrying over 200 migrants: the French Minister of the Interior Gérald Darmanin referred to Italy’s actions as ’incomprehensible’ and ’unacceptable’, in addition to emphasizing on ‘strong consequences’ for the relations between the two countries.
France has also adjourned its collaboration in the relocation mechanism which was proposed last June. This plan concerned a dozen European Union member states, including France, The Netherlands and Germany, which voluntarily decided to welcome 8,000 migrants arriving in countries of first entry to Europe, such as Italy. The Interior Ministry announced that the planned relocation of 3,500 people to France in support of Italy between the summer of 2022 and 2023 is suspended, while also inviting other EU member states to do so. Moreover, France has also strengthened its border controls with Italy.
‘’It’s the Italian government that’s losing out’’ – Mr. Darmanin (Minister of Interior)
Nevertheless, France has had its own political rows over accepting the ship, as far-right opposition leader Marine Le Pen called Macron ‘dramatically’ soft on migration and justified and praised the decisions taken by the Italian government.
ITALY’S STANCE
By denying the Ocean Viking to dock in Catania, the Italian government has reiterated a message often emphasized by the countries most affected by migration: the responsibility of receiving and integrating migrants must be shared equally by all EU member states. Italian PM Giorgia Meloni strongly criticizes the Dublin III Regulation, according to which each asylum application must be examined only by the first country where the migrants disembark in. This represents a significant disadvantage for Mediterranean countries as they are always considered the nearest place of safety when dealing with boats coming from Africa.
Criticism also concerns the lack of a clear and effective European framework regarding the relocation of migrants. The most recent plan was arranged last summer, but it did not lead to the expected outcome. A voluntary redistribution of 8000 migrants was agreed, but just 117 of them have been resettled so far, of which only 38 to France. As a result of this perceived failure, a joint statement issued in November by Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Malta laments the little support shown by other member states to share the burden of asylum applications, as well as the absence of a common strategy to adequately support frontline countries.
Meloni criticizes what she referred to as an ‘incomprehensible and unjustified’ reaction of the French government, which decided to freeze the abovementioned plan and suggested the rest of the EU to act accordingly. France also chose to strengthen its control over borders with Italy, even though similar measures in the past have brought to light to questionable tactics used by French authorities to pushback migrants.
Moreover, the Italian government underlines that the country has dealt with more than 100 thousand arrivals by sea in 2022, which represents a sharp increase in comparison to previous years. Considering this evidence and given that the Italian government allowed three ships out of four to disembark, the Ministry of Interior deemed reasonable for France to accommodate the last migrant rescue boat.
The Vice President of the European Commission, Margaritis Schinas, criticized Italy for its ambiguous approach: the government requested more European solidarity, but at the same time did not allow the docking of the Ocean Viking ship, which was carrying people in deteriorating sanitary conditions. Schinas claims that migrants must be first allowed to disembark in the closest location before any resettlement operations can be carried out. In fact, a 2002 annex to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea states that people rescued at sea must be promptly taken to the nearest place of safety.
On the 25th of November, EU officials met at an extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting and reiterated the immediate necessity of a common resolution that would increase the support to all countries and organizations most involved in searching and rescuing migrants, in such a way as to avoid further deaths in the Mediterranean. In addition, home affairs ministers stressed the need to focus on human smuggling and the roots of migration in order to prevent departures. The meeting also highlighted the urgency to reinforce the existing migration pact, which allows frontline countries to either relocate a share of the migrants in other states or request funds from those EU members that reject any sort of responsibility.
CONCLUSION
A French-Italian dispute has the potential to become a full-blown European issue: this bilateral crisis reflects the state of the EU on the management of migration flows, which has not been successfully addressed since the refugee crisis of 2015-16. The union has not been able to unanimously reform its rules of asylum which currently put the burden of applications solely on the arrival country. Moreover, the state deemed competent to examine the application often ends up being also the place in which refugees remain once protection has been obtained. It could be thus discussed that this mechanism undermines the concept of shared responsibility among EU members. Arguably, it also does not take into account the aspirations of displaced people, nor their concrete prospects of finding a job in other European countries.
As a result, aside from a revision of the Dublin accords, there is the necessity to make the resettlement scheme compulsory because of its inefficiency when dealing with governments who have a harder stance against migration and thus refuse to comply with voluntary accords. A comprehensive agreement that would deal with the migrant flux on an ongoing basis is also needed, rather than relying on ad-hoc resolutions: for instance, the EU may benefit from a pact in which each member state is assigned a specific set of responsibilities and a quota of migrants according to its economic and demographic availability.
Furthermore, the European Union requires alternative solutions for migrants that are not eligible for international protection (e.g. economic migrants), who currently represent the majority of people reaching Europe through the central Mediterranean route – as stated by Ylva Johansson, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs. Focus should also be put on the Balkan situation, as it is the second most used route by migrants in order to reach Europe.
In conclusion, these are some of the challenges that the EU must face as whole, although the reality shows several obstacles when trying to reach collective decisions that would benefit all the parties involved.
Venice recently announced that from January 2023 it will charge a fee of between €3 to €10 to tourists who visit the city for a day only, a long-awaited measure by locals who feel the negative effects of overtourism on a day-to-day basis. Overtourism poses both a nuisance and a hazard to those living in the city. Tourists leave garbage by the canals, posing an environmental and health risk. Large tour groups also swarm the city’s small streets, making it difficult for everyday people, especially the elderly, to easily reach their destinations. Oversized cruise ships also previously damaged the Venetian Lagoon’s natural ecosystem and the city’s historic built environment, such as medieval walls and docks, until a change in regulation last year banning these boats from the port.
However, addressing these issues in this manner means the city of Venice essentially draws legislative lines between who is a “good” or a “bad” tourist, and who is or isn’t a “real” Venetian, and therefore exempt. For example, even if an EU citizen grew up in Venice, but was born elsewhere and no longer had family in the city, they may still have to pay the new fee if they visit for a day only. On the surface, this may seem like an inappropriate application of the regulation, but on the other hand, it would likely take the local Venetian government a huge amount of resources and funding to accurately sift through this level of nuance. For the moment, the tax on daytrippers to Venice, the vast majority of whom arrive via large cruise ships, seems to be a suitable measure to discourage overtourism in the city. However, were the range of tourists subject to tax to be expanded this would certainly raise a number of legal, moral, and security-related issues.
Venice is not the only city in Italy or Europe struggling with problems related to overtourism and housing security, however it is one of the few struggling with both these issues and a rapidly depleting population. Florence has also called for restrictions related to Airbnb, while Barcelona plans to introduce a pollution tax for cruise passengers, and Amsterdam taxes cruise guests. But while Barcelona has a population of 1.6 million, Amsterdam has 907,976 inhabitants, and Florence has 383,083 residents, Venice has less than 55,000. Nevertheless, Venice is not alone in these concerns, with Dubrovnik, Croatia, recently raising its tax on overnight tourist stays in light of its issues with overtourism, housing security, and population depletion. Therefore, there must be a systemic approach to addressing overtourism and housing security while maintaining the freedom of mobility in Europe.
La città di Venezia ha recentemente annunciato che i turisti giornalieri dovranno pagare una tassa di entrata tra i €3 to €10. Il provvedimento era a tempo atteso dai cittadini, i quali subivano gli effetti negativi dell’overtourism, ovvero il sovraffollamento turistico giornaliero. L’overtourism porta fastidio ma anche opportunità ai cittadini di Venezia. I turisti lasciano immondizia a ridosso dei canali, generando rischi sanitari e ambientali. I grandi gruppi turistici affollano i piccoli vicoli della città, rendendo difficili gli spostamenti per gli abitanti, particolarmente per gli anziani. Enormi navi da crociera hanno precedentemente danneggiato l’ecosistema della Laguna e l’ambiente storico della città, come i muri e porti storici, fino all’anno scorso in seguito al provvedimento che vietò l’arrivo di queste navi nei porti.
Venezia ha anche problemi con Airbnb, come molti luoghi turistici. Molte proprietà appartengono a proprietari provenienti da famiglie benestanti che vivono fuori dalla città ed affittano le loro case a coloro che passano per la città per un breve periodo, fallendo nella possibilità di contribuire alla vita economica e culturale della città. Inoltre, questo crea un problema di sicurezza abitativa, in quanto coloro che vivono o cercano di trasferirsi a Venezia hanno una scelta limitata e prezzi esorbitanti. “Se non risolviamo questi problemi, Venezia sarà come Disneyland - come un parco di turisti senza abitanti,” un attivista Veneziano, Matteo Sechi, commenta nel 2010. Infatti, nel 2016, Venezia registra meno di 55.000 abitanti, mentre in alta stagione in numero di turisti giornalieri supera i 60.000.
La nuova tassa sui turisti giornalieri ha l’obiettivo di stabilire “una soglia tra 40.000 e 50.000 visitatori al giorno”, dice Simone Venturini, assessore al turismo di Venezia. Coloro che passano una notte a Venezia non dovranno pagare la tassa, in quanto, dal 2011, è stata introdotta la tassa di soggiorno nel conto di hotel e Airbnb. C’è anche una lunga lista di esenzioni alla tassa per visita giornaliera. La lista include residenti di Venezia, residenti della regione Veneto, parenti fino al terzo grado di chiunque abiti a Venezia, coloro che lavorano e studiano a Venezia, chiunque vi sia nato o possieda una proprietà nella città, coloro che visitano Venezia con bus ufficiali o per competizioni sportive.
Una problematica che non è stata ancora propriamente analizzata riguarda come le restrizioni funzioneranno rispetto le leggi di mobilità dell’Unione Europea. Secondo la legge dell’UE, la libertà di movimento, residenza e lavoro dei cittadini europei nell’Unione deve essere garantita. Infatti, questa garantisce che in quanto turisti, “i cittadini dell’UE possano entrare e rimanere in un territorio di un altro Stato Membro fino a tre mesi senza essere soggetto a condizioni o formalità se non il requisito di possedere un valido documento di identità o passaporto.” Tecnicamente, la tassa per i turisti a Venezia potrebbe evadere la categorizzazione come "condizione o formalità” per entrare in un territorio di uno Stato Membro dell’Unione Europea, in quanto non impedisce ai visitatori di entrare, ma richiede il pagamento di una tassa all’arrivo. Inoltre, questo provvedimento agisce concretamente contro l’overtourism a cui Venezia è soggetta.
Ad ogni modo, affrontare questo problema con questa norma significa per la città di Venezia tracciare una linea legislativa tra il turista “buono” e quello “cattivo”, stabilendo chi è un vero Veneziano e chi no, per determinare chi di conseguenza è esente dalla tassa. Per esempio, anche se un cittadino europeo fosse cresciuto a Venezia, ma fosse nato altrove o se non avesse più famiglia nella città, allora dovrebbe comunque pagare la tassa turistica se volesse visitare la città per un solo giorno. Questo può apparire inappropriato, ma d’altro canto porterebbe al comune di Venezia grandi risorse e fondi per fronteggiare questa problematica. Al momento, la tassa per i visitatori giornalieri a Venezia, che per la maggior parte arrivano con grandi navi da crociera, sembra essere una misura adatta a scoraggiare il sovraffollamento turistico nella città. Comunque, se il numero di turisti che possono giornalmente entrare nella città pagando la tassa dovesse aumentare, certamente si incorrerebbe a diverse problematiche legali, morali e di sicurezza.
Venezia non è la sola città italiana ed europea ad affrontare le difficoltà poste dall’overtourism e dalla sicurezza abitativa, ma è una delle poche che affronta entrambe contemporaneamente ad una riduzione della sua popolazione. Firenze ha anche richiesto l'implementazione di restrizioni per Airbnb, mentre Barcellona pianifica di introdurre una tassa sull’inquinamento per passeggeri di crociera, così come Amsterdam. Ma mentre Barcellona ha una popolazione di 1.6 milioni di abitanti, Amsterdam ha 907,876 abitanti e Firenze ne conta 383,083, Venezia ne ha meno di 55,000. Nonostante ciò, Venezia non è l’unica con questi problemi, in quanto anche Dubrovnik, Croazia, ha recentemente aumentato la sua tassa sul pernottamento dei turisti a causa dell’overtourism, problemi di sicurezza abitativa e diminuzione della popolazione. Per questo, ci dovrebbe essere un approccio sistematico per risolvere i problemi legati al sovraffollamento turistico e alla sicurezza abitativa, cercando di preservare allo stesso tempo la libertà di movimento in Europa.
In the past few years, the Italian government has rapidly increased both the pace and number of steps taken to protect its national cybersecurity interests. Italy began creating legislation and organizations for the defense of its cybersecurity infrastructure in 1993, but many observers have criticized developments in Italian cybersecurity as inadequate and slow-moving compared to its peers in Europe and beyond. However, in June 2021, the Italian government declared its intention to create a new national agency for cybersecurity, and just weeks ago, released a national cybersecurity policy for 2022-2026.
The Italian government’s increased attention to cybersecurity has come just in time, as several prominent cyberattacks against Italy by Russian hackers occurred this May. Considering Italy and the European Union’s support for Ukraine in its war against Russia, it is not surprising that Russian-backed agents have unleashed attacks on Italy in the cybersphere, a space the Kremlin has long operated in. For example, during the 2008 Ruso-Georgian war, Russian-backed hackers reportedly carried out cyberattacks against Georgian internet infrastructure.
While Russian-backed cyber organizations are clearly enthusiastically targeting Italy, the robust responses of Italian cyber-defense organizations are now successful on a level which would have been unlikely prior to the development of its new cybersecurity agency and the rollout of its 2022-2026 cybersecurity policy. Although historically Italy has often been behind the curve in its cybersecurity policies, Mario Draghi’s push to launch the National Cybersecurity Agency was in fact extremely forward-looking and timely. Furthermore, since the agency’s announcement, Italian cybersecurity forces have developed the skills required to successfully counter Russian-backed agents, proving its creation was not merely a publicity-boosting measure for the Draghi government.
One recent headline has declared that “Italy [is] embroiled in cyber war with pro-Russian hackers.” Definitions of what constitutes cyberwarfare still vary, and the Russian government formally denies involvement with the groups of hackers conducting these attacks. However, such a headline again serves to remind those concerned with international security that Russia has historically and continues to use the cyber sphere to wage war, and therefore a robust international security policy necessarily includes cyber-defense. Therefore, in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine--the largest war seen in Europe since 1945--defensive cybersecurity capabilities are evermore important for Italy and any nation openly opposing Russian actions.
Italy’s 2013 National Strategic Framework for Cyberspace Security and 2017 Cybersecurity Action Plan had both highlighted the need for improved public-private cooperation to ensure national cybersecurity moving forward. In fact, the 2017 plan had urged that “private entities operating in strategic sectors must be considered as key assets and included into a holistic approach to national cybersecurity that provides for the implementation of minimum security requirements for country-critical systems.” Again, such a point was forward-looking, highlighting the fact that in May 2022, Russian-backed agents did not only launch cyberattacks on Italian government organizations, but also the Eurovision Song Contest, a multinational initiative being operated out of Italy.
Notably, under the country’s new cybersecurity policy, the Italian Computer Security Incident Response Team was successfully able to both prevent an attack against Eurovision and resolve cyber incidents related to government websites. However, moving forwards, this area merits even further attention. The Italian state could be severely impacted by cyberattacks against a whole range of websites, companies, and infrastructure, including public, private, and multinational organizations. Therefore, ensuring Italian cybersecurity going forward would require not just improved public-private cooperation, but also coordination between Italy and all interconnected sectors of the EU.
Negli ultimi anni, il governo italiano ha accelerato rapidamente il passo e ha compiuto progressi nella protezione dei suoi interessi nazionali nell’ambito della sicurezza cibernetica. L’Italia iniziò a legiferare e fondare organizzazioni per la difesa delle infrastrutture legate alla sicurezza cibernetica nel 1993. Da allora, molti osservatori hanno criticato gli sviluppi, ritenendoli inadeguati e lenti rispetto agli altri paesi in Europa e nel mondo. Giugno 2021 segna una tappa importante per il governo italiano, che dichiara di voler creare una nuova agenzia nazionale per la sicurezza cibernetica, e poche settimane fa, è stata pubblicata la policy per la sicurezza cibernetica nazionale 2022-2026.
L’aumento di attenzione per questo campo arriva perfettamente in tempo, quasi in concomitanza con diversi attacchi cibernetici compiuti da hacker russi contro l’Italia lo scorso Maggio. Tenendo presente il supporto dichiarato da Italia e Unione Europea per la guerra portata avanti dall’Ucraina contro la Russia, non è una sorpresa che agenti sostenuti dalla Russia stessa abbiano effettuato attacchi contro l’Italia nella sfera cyber, uno spazio in cui il Cremlino opera da tempo. Per esempio, durante la guerra tra Russia e Georgia nel 2008, la Russia ha dato supporto ad hacker per colpire le infrastrutture internet dell’avversario.
Mentre le cyber organizzazioni russe sono chiaramente entusiaste di avere l’Italia come bersaglio, le risposte robuste date dalle organizzazioni di cyber-difesa italiane hanno avuto un successo che non sarebbe stato possibile raggiungere precedentemente allo sviluppo della nuova Agenzia per la Cybersicurezza Nazionale e alla nuova policy 2022-2026. Sebbene storicamente l’Italia si è sempre trovata in ritardo rispetto ai progressi e alle policy promosse dagli altri paesi, il Presidente Mario Draghi ha insistito per fondare l’Agenzia per la Cybersicurezza Nazionale e questo ha permesso di essere estremamente lungimiranti nel garantire una risposta agli attacchi. Inoltre, dalla creazione dell’Agenzia, l’Italia ha sviluppato delle abilità notevoli e necessarie nella lotta contro gli agenti russi.
Di recente, è stato dichiarato che “l’Italia è coinvolta in una cyber guerra con gli hacker russi.” Le definizioni di questa cyber-guerra sono ancora varie, e il governo russo ha formalmente negato il coinvolgimento dei gruppi hacker e gli attacchi condotti. Nonostante questo, la situazione al momento conferma che la sfera cyber è sempre utilizzata dalla Russia come arma contro i nemici di guerra, e perciò c’è bisogno di politiche per la sicurezza internazionale più robuste e che includano necessariamente la cyber difesa. Nella guerra tra Russia e Ucraina, la più grande guerra mai vista dopo il 1945, le capacità difensive nel campo della cybersicurezza sono ancora più significative per l’Italia e per qualunque altra nazione che voglia apertamente condannare le azioni Russe.
La National Strategic Framework for Cyberspace Security del 2013 e il Cybersecurity Action Plan del 2017 hanno entrambi sottolineato il bisogno di migliorare la cooperazione tra pubblico e privato per assicurare una rapida evoluzione nell’ambito della cyber sicurezza nazionale. Infatti, il piano del 2017 ha evidenziato che “le entità private che operano per la cyber sicurezza nazionale lavorano per l’implementazione dei minimi standard di sicurezza richiesti per le infrastrutture critiche del paese.” Ancora una volta, questo punto di vista è lungimirante e sottolinea il fatto che a Maggio 2022, gli agenti russi non hanno solo colpito il governo italiano ma anche l’Eurovision Song Contest, un’iniziativa multinazionale che era organizzata dall’Italia.
Il Computer Security Incident Response Team dell’Italia ha avuto successo nel prevenire l’attacco contro l’Eurovision e nel risolvere incidenti legati a siti internet del governo.
Infine, questo argomento meriterebbe ancora più attenzione. Lo stato italiano potrebbe essere severamente colpito da cyber attacchi contro siti internet, compagnie e infrastrutture, includendo il settore pubblico, privato e organizzazioni multinazionali. Per questo, garantire la cyber sicurezza del paese e svilupparla ulteriormente richiederebbe non solo un miglioramento della cooperazione tra pubblico e privato, ma anche la coordinazione tra Italia e tutti i settori interconnessi dell’Unione Europea.
In this podcast, Dr. Sonia Silvestri from the University of Bologna speaks about threats to Italy's coastal ecosystems and environmental security. She explains how environmental challenges across Italy impact the state, its communities, and individuals. She also notes the specific difficulties Venice faces balancing the preservation of its built and natural environments.
Interviewers: Sarah Toubman & Filippo Grassi
This is ITSS Verona Member Series Video Podcast by the Political Economy and Energy Security Team. ITSS Verona - The International Team for the Study of Security Verona is a not-for-profit, apolitical, international cultural association dedicated to the study of international security, ranging from terrorism to climate change, from artificial intelligence to pandemics, from great power competition to energy security.
Italian state security has become evermore intertwined with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region in recent days, as the invasion of Ukraine by Russia has highlighted the need for Europe to secure a renewable, multi-origin energy supply, as well as the importance of European food supplies in North Africa. The impact of war on Ukrainian and Russian harvests has not only caused wheat shortages in European markets, but also devastated grain imports across the MENA region, such as in Tunisia, Morocco and Libya. European sanctions on Russian oil and gas have also sent the cost of energy soaring, leading European leaders to seek other sources of fuel, including in the Middle East. War in Eastern Europe could see Western Europe and the EU seeking out a stronger partnership with the MENA region in both trade and diplomacy. However, Europe and the MENA region would have to overcome historic and contemporary tensions in order to achieve closer collaboration.
However, in order to establish mutual food and energy security, Italy and the MENA region would have to build stronger ties in both the trade and diplomatic spheres, working through historic and contemporary tensions. To this day, Italy’s relations with the MENA region are still damaged by the country’s legacy of colonization in Libya and the Horn of Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries, as well its support for France’s colonization of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco.
La sicurezza dello stato italiano è diventata negli ultimi giorni sempre più legata alla regione del Medio Oriente del Nord Africa. Infatti l’invasione dell’Ucraina da parte della Russia ha evidenziato, da un lato, la necessità per l’Europa di assicurarsi un approvvigionamento energetico rinnovabile e diversificato, dall’altro ha posto l’accento sull’importanza delle forniture alimentari europee in Nord Africa. L’impatto della guerra sui raccolti ucraini e russi non solo ha causato carenze di grano nei mercati europei, ma ha anche colpito duramente le sue importazioni in tutta la regione MENA, così come in Tunisia, Marocco e Libia.
Inoltre, le sanzioni di Bruxelles sul petrolio e sul gas russo hanno causato un’esponenziale crescita del costo dell’energia, portando i leader europei a cercare nuove fonti di carburante, in particolar modo anche in Medio Oriente.
A tal proposito, la guerra in Ucraina potrebbe spingere l’Europa occidentale e l’Unione Europea a formare una partnership più forte con la regione MENA sia a livello commerciale che diplomatico. Per raggiungere un livello di collaborazione più stretta, è necessario tuttavia che l’Europa e i paesi del MENA superino le tensioni storiche e contemporanee che pervadono nei loro rapporti internazionali.
Questa situazione rappresenta un’opportunità per numerosi paesi dell’UE di coprire il vuoto lasciato da Russia e Ucraina. La Francia, per esempio, è un grande produttore globale di grano con 30,1 milioni di tonnellate raccolte nel 2020, meno delle 85,9 milioni di tonnellate russe, ma più delle 24,9 milioni dell’Ucraina nello stesso anno. Anche la Germania, seppur in modo minore, contribuisce alla produzione europea di grano, avendo prodotto nel 2020 circa 22,2 milioni di tonnellate. Un altro paese che potrebbe giocare un ruolo importante nella regione si tratta dell’Italia. Nonostante questa abbia raccolto “solo” 6,7 milioni di tonnellate, il paese ha esportato oltre 24,8 milioni di dollari in grano nel 2020. Il sostegno dei paesi europei garantirebbero quindi ai paesi del Medio Oriente e del Nord Africa la possibilità di attingere dal mercato europeo e di soddisfare la propria domanda interna.
Tuttavia, al fine di stabilire una reciproca sicurezza alimentare ed energetica, l’Italia e i paesi del MENA dovrebbero perseguire nuove forme di collaborazione economica e diplomatica. Ad oggi le relazioni dell’Italia con la regione del MENA risentono ancora del passato imperialista di Roma, in particolare della colonizzazione della Libia e del Corno d’Africa nel XIX-XX secolo, e del sostegno alla colonizzazione francese di Algeria, Tunisia e Marocco.
Ad aggravare lo status diplomatico tra Italia e paesi del Medio Oriente e del Nord Africa si aggiungono anche eventi più contemporanei come la recente crisi migratoria. Questa, iniziata nel 2010 e intensificatasi nel 2015, ha visto milioni di rifugiati provenienti dall’Asia, dall’Africa e dal Medio Oriente fuggire in Europa in seguito alle guerre scatenatesi nei loro paesi. In alcuni momenti della crisi, la maggior parte dei migranti stava attraversando l’Italia dal Nord Africa, partendo specialmente dalla Libia. Questo ha creato una situazione di tensione e sfiducia tra i due paesi e a livello internazionale, dal momento che ai migranti stranieri veniva spesso negato l’ingresso in Italia e lasciati annegare in mare, oppure detenuti e maltrattati nei centri di detenzione in Libia. I politici italiani come l’ex Primo Ministro Matteo Salvini hanno spesso lanciato commenti infiammatori sugli immigrati provenienti dal Medio Oriente e dal Nord Africa, aumentando le tensioni e suscitando forti attriti tra le diverse comunità multietniche. Un esempio è la dichiarazione con cui Salvini difese un collega reo di aver sparato a un immigrato marocchino, oppure il processo che l’ex Primo Ministro ha dovuto affrontare per le accuse di rapimenti di 147 rifugiati, impossibilitati a scendere in Italia dalla barca della ONG Seawatch.
Mentre questi eventi hanno indebolito le relazioni diplomatiche tra l’Italia e i paesi del MENA, alcune ostilità di recente memoria sono in realtà servite a rafforzare i loro legami strategici. Nonostante non abbiano raggiunto i loro obiettivi strategici, le truppe di pace italiane a Beirut durante la guerra civile libanese negli anni ’80 sono state lodate per la loro “neutralità sostenuta, il comportamento rispettoso e il minimo uso della forza”.
For its third event of the 2021/22 Webinar Series, ITSS Verona members Ludovica Brambilla, Chiara Aquilino, Sarah Toubman, and Julia Hogdings discuss with world-leading cyber security expert Andrea Rigoni the question of cyber security in Italy, with particular reference to the creation of the new Cyber Security Agency and its current and future implications.
In this interview, the Ambassador Giulio di Sant’Agata, former Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, tackles a complex issue: the International Community's response to the Iranian threat.
In this double interview, Limes's Director, Dr Lucio Caracciolo, offers his views on ITSS Verona Member Alessio Moroni's book on Italian youth Neo-Fascist movements, 1949-1969, ending with his reflections upon the current far-right scene in Italy.
Interviewing Team: Alessio Moroni and Maria Chiara Aquilino.
