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March 17, 2026 — No Comments

SDG 5 at Risk: The Global Backlash Against Gender Equality

By Sofia Sutera - Human Rights Team

Gender equality has long been considered one of the central pillars of the international human rights system. Through Sustainable Development Goal 5, the United Nations committed the global community to achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls by 2030.

Yet today the challenge appears increasingly different from what many policymakers envisioned a decade ago. Rather than focusing primarily on how to accelerate progress, governments, researchers, and human rights advocates are increasingly confronted with another question: how to respond to what many observers describe as a growing global backlash against gender equality.

Across multiple regions, the rise of anti-gender mobilisations and the diffusion of narratives portraying gender equality as a threat to social order are reshaping public debates. These developments raise serious concerns about the future of SDG 5. If these dynamics continue, progress toward gender equality may slow significantly, potentially making it more difficult to achieve the SDG 5 targets by the 2030 deadline.

From a human rights perspective, this shift is particularly alarming. Gender equality is not simply a policy objective. It is a fundamental component of the international human rights framework, embedded in instruments such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and recognised as essential for the protection of dignity, equality, and democratic participation.

Gender Equality as a Contested Concept

A key factor contributing to the current backlash is the transformation of the concept of “gender” itself. Originally developed as an analytical category in social sciences to understand how power relations shape expectations and opportunities for women and men, the term has increasingly been reframed as a controversial ideological project.

In many political discourses, “gender” is portrayed as a concept that critics argue threatens the family, cultural traditions, or national identity. Rather than engaging with concrete questions of equality, anti-gender actors frequently frame gender-related policies as part of a broader ideological agenda imposed by international institutions, academic communities, or progressive elites.

This discursive strategy has proven remarkably effective. By framing gender equality as a broader cultural conflict, this narrative can shift public debate away from structural inequalities and toward concerns about social transformation. Discussions about wage gaps, political representation, reproductive rights, or gender-based violence are replaced by narratives centred on protecting children, defending traditions, or resisting external influence, as discussed in the work of Judith Butler.

Scholars have described this dynamic as the construction of gender as a “symbolic glue” capable of uniting diverse actors across religious, political, and nationalist movements. As highlighted in the volume Gender as Symbolic Glue, anti-gender narratives allow otherwise heterogeneous groups to mobilise around a shared sense of cultural threat.

Anti-gender Mobilisations in Europe

Europe has become one of the most visible arenas where these dynamics unfold. Over the past two decades, anti-gender campaigns have increasingly moved from religious discourse into broader political mobilisation.

These movements often present themselves as spontaneous civic initiatives defending families or parental rights. Research suggests that these movements often operate through networks linking religious organisations, civil society groups, and political actors. In several cases, mobilisations initially framed as grassroots initiatives have later been integrated into broader populist or nationalist political agendas.

Italy offers a particularly revealing example. Large-scale mobilisations such as the Family Day protests have demonstrated the ability of anti-gender actors to influence public debates and shape legislative processes. Campaigns opposing civil unions, gender equality education, or anti-discrimination laws have mobilised broad segments of society by framing gender equality policies as threats to cultural identity.

Research on these developments, including the work of Massimo Prearo, highlights how these mobilisations have contributed to a broader reconfiguration of political Catholicism and its interaction with right wing populist actors. In this context, gender equality becomes a central battleground in struggles over national identity, morality, and political authority.

Global Circulation of Anti-gender Narratives

Importantly, these dynamics are not confined to Europe. Anti-gender narratives circulate transnationally, adapting to local contexts while maintaining remarkably similar rhetorical structures.

Recent research on information environments and political narratives highlights how gender equality debates can be strategically framed within geopolitical and ideological struggles. As discussed in the ITSS Verona article Civil Resistance in the Digital Age: Gender Narratives and Information Integrity, different political contexts show how equality discourses are manipulated for political purposes.

In Turkey, for instance, state institutions have been observed invoking equality discourse while simultaneously reinforcing women’s traditional roles within society. In parts of Eastern Europe, particularly Russia and Poland, political narratives centred on “family values” promote motherhood as a national duty while marginalising LGBTQ+ activism. In these cases, women’s rights are often invoked selectively, gaining support only when they align with patriarchal and anti-Western narratives.

This selective use of gender equality illustrates how human rights language can be appropriated and reinterpreted in ways that may weaken its intended emancipatory goals.

The Significance of the United States

Recent developments in the United States further illustrate the global relevance of these dynamics. Political debates around gender and sexuality have become increasingly polarised, with some actors framing gender equality initiatives as ideological threats rather than democratic commitments.

The 2022 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Dobbs vs. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which overturned federal protections for abortion rights, represents a significant turning point. For decades, access to reproductive healthcare had been widely considered an essential element of women’s autonomy and equality.

The rollback of these protections demonstrates how quickly established rights can be challenged and reconfigured within changing political environments.

Given the global influence of political debates in the United States, these developments have repercussions far beyond national borders. Narratives emerging in the United States political arena often circulate internationally, reinforcing existing backlash movements and shaping policy discussions elsewhere.

Defending Gender Equality as a Human Rights Imperative

These developments point to a fundamental shift in the politics of gender equality. For many years, international institutions focused primarily on promoting women’s empowerment and expanding rights protections. Today, the challenge increasingly includes responding to organised political opposition to gender equality initiatives.

This shift has direct implications for the future of SDG 5. Achieving gender equality by 2030 requires not only policies designed to reduce discrimination and empower women, but also strategies capable of addressing the narratives and political forces that seek to delegitimise equality itself.

From a human rights perspective, defending gender equality means reaffirming that equality is not an ideological preference but a core democratic principle. Without gender equality, the broader system of human rights protection cannot function effectively.

With less than five years remaining before the 2030 deadline, the urgency of this challenge is clear. If the international community is serious about achieving SDG 5, it must recognise that many scholars argue that gender equality norms are currently experiencing one of the most significant global backlashes in decades.

The success of the Sustainable Development Agenda may therefore depend not only on promoting new policies, but also on defending the fundamental human rights principles on which gender equality is built.

March 9, 2026 — No Comments

Of War and Peace in southern Syria

By Marco Malaguzzi - Middle East Team

Introduction

The tumultuous events in northeastern Syria have shifted the media’s attention away from the As-Suwayda Governorate in the country’s south. Nonetheless, the strategic relevance of this area should not be underestimated. As-Suwayda is the only region of Syria where the new administration led by President al-Shara has not yet managed to assert its control. It is adjacent to the Golan Heights and Mount Hermon, key military positions for Israel to defend its northern border. Moreover, the different sectarian and ethnic groups that comprise As-Suwayda’s population have varying political loyalties. Bedouin clans are aligned with the new Syrian government, while the Druzes share sectarian links with their co-religionaries in Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan. This article presents the events that have taken place in the area since the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and outlines how various actors are vying for power both locally and internationally.

Background

When rebel troops entered Damascus on the 8th of December 2024, long-time president Bashar al-Assad fled the country. His escape brought the regime that had ruled Syria since 1970 to an inglorious end. Syrians looked at the future with hope, and celebrations took place in many cities. However, the divisions caused by a decade of civil war, intertwined with external interventions, did not disappear with the departure of al-Assad. Syria was fragmented into various fiefdoms controlled by armed groups. Moreover, years of conflict had deepened the sectarian and ethnic divisions that have always characterised the country. Finding a political arrangement that reunified the country once more seemed a far-fetched plan. Al-Shara, leader of the militia that had spearheaded the military operations against the al-Assad’s regime, managed to assert control over Damascus. A former jihadist who had fought against the American occupation of Iraq, al-Shara had risen to the position of leader of an Islamist armed group that controlled the province of Idlib in northern Syria. In January 2025, al-Shara assumed the presidency. In his first address to the country, he highlighted the need to rebuild state institutions and maintain peace, but this spirit did not come to fruition. In March, clashes broke out in Latakia, in the west of Syria, between the new government and supporters of the previous regime. The brutal repression that followed, which indiscriminately targeted the local Alawite community, made it clear that the reunification of Syria will be neither smooth nor bloodless.

The events in As-Suwayda

In an attempt to prevent similar events from taking place in As-Suwayda, where unidentified individuals were setting up armed ambushes and conducting assassinations, the new Syrian government scrambled to negotiate a deal with local notables. On March 12, a memorandum of understanding was signed by Mustafa Bakour, the governor, and various local stakeholders. According to its text, troops loyal to al-Shara would take over the area, salaries to public employees would come from Damascus, and regular consultations between the central government and local dignitaries would be held. Nonetheless, , Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, one of the spiritual leaders of the Druze population of As-Suwayda, opposed this deal. He denounced the extremist nature of the new government and rejected any compromise with Damascus. On the following day, armed individuals raised the Druze flag on government buildings all over the governorate. They were affiliated with the Suwayda Military Council (SMC), a predominantly Druze militia that formed after the collapse of al-Assad’s regime to prevent a security void. These incidents did not lead to a major escalation. However, they were the beginning of an uneasy, and ultimately short-lived, truce. In April, a blasphemous audio which insulted Prophet Muhammad went viral. It was attributed to Marwan Kiwan, a Druze cleric. He rejected all allegations, but the recording was enough to ignite a vicious cycle of violence. According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, 113 individuals lost their lives during these clashes. External powers also played a role. On the 29th of April, the Druze minority in Israel took to the streets to protest against the sectarian violence against their co-religionaries in Syria. On the following day, the Israeli air force conducted a drone strike in As-Suwayda targeting the Syrian security forces, which were converging on the area. Various parties tried to de-escalate the situation. Walid Jumblatt, the political leader of the Druze minority in Lebanon, contacted his co-religionaries in As-Suwayda and the new Syrian administration in an attempt to find an agreement. SANA, a press agency linked to the government of Damascus, announced a ceasefire had been negotiated between the governor and local notables. Nonetheless, the violence continued unabated. On the 2nd of May, Israel dropped a bomb in the proximity of the presidential palace in Syria’s capital, warning that it would not allow the government to deploy forces south of Damascus and harm the Druze population of As-Suwayda . Türkiye, the main ally of al-Shara’s new administration, also got involved. When Israeli planes entered the Syrian airspace on the following night, Turkish fighter jets attempted to jam their communications. After this incident, the situation calmed down because neither Israel nor Türkiye were interested in a military escalation, but one figure, once again, stood out for his opposition to any deal with Damascus: the aforementioned Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri. Distancing himself from the Druze clerics who had negotiated the deal with Damascus, he declared:

“We no longer trust a group that calls itself a government, because the government doesn’t kill its own people through extremist gangs that are loyal to it, and after the massacre claims they are loose forces”

Despite his uncompromising statements, the situation in As-Suwayda calmed down for a few months. However, on the 11th of July 2025, Bedouin gunmen kidnapped a Druze vegetable seller. Druze militias reacted by taking hostage several members of As-Suwayda’s Bedouin clans. Violence spread quickly, and Bedouin fighters, supported by other Bedouin clans from the Daraa Governorate, began attacking Druze villages with heavy weapons. In some instances, they fought against the Syrian security forces that attempted to de-escalate the situation. In other instances, videos show troops loyal to Damascus joining the onslaught against the Druzes. The arrival of foreign fighters loyal to Syria’s Defence Ministry only exacerbated the fears of the Druze population of As-Suwayda because these units are known for having carried out massacres against religious minorities in Latakia. On the 14th of July, Israel intervened once more, this time by carrying out strikes that destroyed a Syrian Army convoy. On the following day, dozens of Israeli Druze civilians illegally crossed the border with Syria to support their co-religionaries. Moreover, the Israeli air force bombed the Syrian Defence Ministry in Damascus multiple times. Türkiye issued statements in support of Syria’s sovereignty and unity. Nonetheless, this time it did not deploy fighter jets to defend al-Shara’s security forces. On the 16th of July, the Syrian army announced its pullout from As-Suwayda. Thousands of Bedouin civilians also began evacuating the region, fearing that the victorious Druze militias would carry out ethnic violence. Since the withdrawal of Syrian troops, As-Suwayda is administered by the Supreme Legal Committee (SLC), a government body – unsurprisingly – created under the auspices of Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri. On the 23rd of August 2025, the SLC announced the creation of a National Guard, a new force made up of 40 militias, including the Suwayda Military Council. A joint plan announced by Jordan, the United States and the Syrian government to de-escalate the situation has yielded some results. Bedouin families have begun returning to their homes. Moreover, the Syrian security forces and the Druze militias that control the region of As-Suwayda have conducted a prisoner exchange on the 26th of February 2026. However, the reintegration of As-Suwayda into a unified Syrian state seems a far-fetched dream.

As-Suwayda and the regional context

When the government of Bashar al-Assad was overthrown, two regional players began jousting for power in Syria. As shown by the events outlined above, they were Israel and Türkiye. The former occupied the territories surrounding Mount Hermon and played a very active role in As-Suwayda. The latter positioned itself as the closest ally of the new administration in Damascus. Since the fall of the regime, Türkiye has pledged to provide Syria with gas and electricity. Moreover, the Turkish defence ministry has stipulated a deal with its counterpart in Damascus, committing to provide the new Syrian armed forces with modern weapon systems and training. Lacking the economic muscle of the Gulf monarchies, Türkiye is capitalising on the strength of its defence industry and its energy sector. The recent developments in Syria have given the Turkish government an opportunity to expand its role as a regional security provider and transform Anatolia into a major energy hub. Israel’s ambitions in Syria are of a different nature. The actions undertaken by the government of Benjamin Netanyahu show that its primary concern is to enhance Israel’s security by creating a new buffer zone at its northern border. Moreover, Israel wants to ensure that Syria stays weak by supporting groups such as the National Guard in As-Suwayda and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in the northeast of the country. It mistrusts al-Shara because of his jihadist past and close relationship with Türkiye. Repeated American efforts to negotiate a deal between the new government in Damascus and Israel have not led to an Israeli withdrawal from the Syrian territories it occupies, nor to a Syrian recognition of the Jewish state. Nonetheless, Israel’s shipments of military supplies to the Druzes in As-Suwayda have become smaller and less frequent. The lack of an Israeli reaction to the Syrian military offensive against the Kurds in northeast Syria, which stands in stark contrast to Israel’s air campaign when the government of Damascus deployed troops in As-Suwayda, may show the division of Syria into spheres of influence. The Turkish inaction following Israel’s bombing of the Syrian defence ministry in July also points to a tacit agreement between Ankara and the Jewish state. The south of Syria seems to lie within Israel’s domain. The rest of the country, instead, is controlled by the government of Damascus and its Turkish sponsors. Of course, other regional powers also play a role. The Gulf countries have pledged significant investments to rebuild Syria’s battered economy. Russia maintains military bases in Latakia, and the United States remains interested in conducting counter-terrorism operations to contain ISIS. Nonetheless, Israel and Türkiye are the most powerful stakeholders in the country at the time of writing. Following the American withdrawal and the downsizing of the Russian military presence caused by the war in Ukraine, Israel and Türkiye are the only countries that maintain a substantial military presence in Syria. How their rivalry plays out will shape the future not only of As-Suwayda but of the whole country.

*Photo by Dimitrisvetsikas1969 – pixabay.com*

The local power struggle in As-Suwayda

Regional dynamics are reflected in local power struggles in As-Suwayda, where the frontline remains blurred, and alliances shift quickly. In 2012, Hikmat al-Hijri became one of three Sheikhs of Reason – the spiritual leaders of the Druze community in Syria – inheriting the position from his brother, who had died in a suspicious car accident many blamed on al-Assad’s regime. For a while, al-Hijri aligned himself with the regime in Damascus, probably having been intimidated by the death of his brother. However, in 2020, as popular discontent with the worsening economic situation grew, al-Hijri distanced himself from Bashar al-Assad. In the meantime, he had sidelined the other two Sheikhs of Reasons and had moved to Qanawat, a small village in the Druze heartland on the mountains of southern Syria, where it was easier to ensure his personal safety. Thanks to his manoeuvring, when the al-Assad regime fell in 2024, al-Hijri could present himself as the leader of the Druze community. However, there were other leaders who also claimed to speak on behalf of the Druze population. One of them was Laith al-Balous, the son of an influential Druze cleric assassinated by the regime in 2015. After his father’s death, al-Balous and his brother founded a militia that clashed with al-Assad’s forces on multiple occasions. Consequently, he has better revolutionary credentials than al-Hijri. When the regime was overthrown, al-Balous immediately aligned himself with the new government of al-Shara in Damascus. As mentioned before, when tensions in As-Suwayda escalated, al-Hijri opposed any compromise. Al-Balous instead was one of the notables who negotiated the aforementioned memorandum of understanding in March. There were two cowboys in town. In May, al-Balous survived a mysterious assassination attempt. Despite his luck, the violence in April and in July made his policies unpopular. Various Druze notables and armed groups distanced themselves from al-Balous, and he was forced to flee from As-Suwayda, where one of his advisors was murdered, and the grave of his father was razed to the ground. Al-Hijri has won the match and is now the undisputed leader of both the National Guard and the Supreme Legal Committee. From his exile, al-Balous has condemned the Israeli intervention in As-Suwayda and plauded Türkiye’s role in preserving Syria’s unity. However, Damascus’s man seems to have lost all his influence on the ground. Al-Hijri’s victory was facilitated by his close relationship with Sheikh Mowafaq Tarif, the Druze spiritual leader in Israel. Tarif exercised his considerable influence to convince Israeli Druzes to take to the street in support of al-Hijri. He also lobbied with the Israeli government to convince them to repeatedly intervene in As-Suwayda. Al-Balous instead could not count on direct support from the Druze communities in the surrounding countries, although his efforts to mediate with the government in Damascus paralleled those of the aforementioned Walid Jumblatt, political leader of the Druze minority in Lebanon. Jumblatt has an adversarial relationship with both Mowafaq Tarif. Moreover, he has criticised al-Hijri for his close relationship with Israel. The undeclared alliance between Jumblatt and al-Balous can even count on a historical precedent. In 2015, Jumblatt condemned Druze clerics who supported the regime against al-Balous’s father. Nonetheless, Lebanese Druzes could not provide al-Balous with military support even if they wanted to. Once a mighty warlord, Jumblatt disbanded his militia after the end of the Lebanese Civil War.

Final considerations

The situation in As-Suwayda has stabilised in recent months. However, the new government in Damascus seems committed to unifying Syria under its control, as shown by its successful offensive against the Kurds in the northeast of the country. Tension in southern Syria may escalate quickly. There was very little warning before the military operations against the Syrian Democratic Forces. There will be very little warning before a government offensive against As-Suwayda. As shown above, the consequences of an escalation in this region will go way beyond its borders. Israel and Türkiye will be drawn in. They may have a tacit agreement on the partition of Syria. However, in the Middle East, no deal lasts forever, and new developments such as the war between Iran, the United States, and Israel can open windows of opportunity. Türkiye and the government of al-Shara have already surprised the world in the past, with the sudden offensive that overthrew Assad in 2024, and will be eager to exploit any opportunity. If al-Hijri, the uncontested winner of the local power struggle, continues to be uncompromising with the government in Damascus, diplomacy may have little space left for manoeuvre. However, his inflexibility should not be taken for granted. Al-Hijri already changed sides in the past, when he stopped supporting the Assad government. If offered the right deal, he may do so again, and the fortunes of As-Suwayda and its inhabitants will change with him. Undoubtedly, Israel will have a say in any decision al-Hijri takes. However, the importance of local dynamics should not be underestimated. The Druze minority in Syria and beyond is not a cohesive unit. Various leaders claim to represent the Druze community, which spans four countries. How their rivalry plays out will shape the future of As-Suwayda at least as much as the competition between Türkiye and Israel. The events outlined in this article show that religious bonds do not deter Druze powerholders from exercising violence against each other. The government of al-Shara could attempt to find new interlocutors in the two Sheikhs of Reasons who had been sidelined by al-Hijri. In any case, for the reunification of Syria to take place, its sectarian groups must find a way to coexist. Only if the new government in Damascus succeeds in negotiating a deal with the different minorities that make up the population can Syria truly turn the page on the Civil War.

February 17, 2026 — No Comments

Germany’s cyber-strategy through an international relations lens

By Maria Makurat - Human Rights & Cyber Security Teams

Germany’s critical infrastructures

Germany is facing more cyber-attacks ever since the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and is also forced to deal with potential hybrid warfare scenarios due to drone sightings in 2025 (see drone article and interview by the president of the BKI ). Just in 2025, Germany’s train system faced cyber-attacks as well as the Berlin airport, causing major disruptions and delays. The Global Cyber Security Outlook report 2026 by the World Economic Forum (WEF) highlights the increasing use and issue of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in relation to cyber-attacks, as well as how countries such as Germany and Denmark are shifting their cloud solutions away from foreign dependency towards regional managed cloud solutions.This shows the continuously changing world order and how countries and states are redefining their priorities and security agenda in recent years of globalisation and complex interdependence.

Will states continue to retreat back to their own methods, or will we see new cooperations and treaties being made? The theory of complex interdependence is strong in international relations theory and is a major driver for states to ensure that the risk of conflict remains low; however, no longer purely financial and trade major factors, since security has become increasingly important in the light of emerging conflicts, which makes the application of said theory difficult. Consequently, it is essential to continuously analyse and reassess the cyber strategies of states such as Germany and examine how the evolving international landscape both shapes and is shaped by these strategies.

Analysing Germany’s cyber strategy through the international relations lens

Germany has gradually expanded its cyber strategy through institutional development, including the strengthening of the BSI and increased cooperation between civilian and military cyber units, calling it “Integrated Security for Germany”. These efforts demonstrate a recognition that cyber security is no longer a niche issue but a central component of national security policy.

Many scholars, such as Nye, Thomas Rid, Valeriano and Jagoda, have and are (re)discussing the security of the cyber-domain and how one can apply theories. Can we apply realism and liberalism? Is Clausewitz appropriate in the realm of cybersecurity? An interesting note is the comparison of cyber-attacks and the human body by Allan Friedman and P.W. Singer, saying they bypass our skin like a viral infection.[1] Making a connection between the human body and international affairs theory can also be led back to sociological theories, such as “functionalism” by Herbert Spencer and analysts comparing cyber-attacks directly to the human body and viruses. This can also be an interesting point of view to look at Germany’s cyber-strategy. As the Integrated Security Report states, Germany’s cyber strategy adopts a whole-of-society approach, encompassing civilians as well as the public and private sectors. Much like the human body, all parts must function together; if one fails, effective defence against external threats becomes impossible. However, with AI increasingly becoming part of our lives, how can we ensure this?

Valeriano and Maness discuss Kello’s view: “New theories and new ways of thinking are required, and Kello (2013: 8) asserts that the social science field is ill-equipped to offer anything of value now.”[2] They further assess that one must also consider what is ‘easier’ in the cyber domain: offence or defence? Nye points out that at the moment (note the analysis was 2010), the offense has an advantage in the cyber domain due to the unpredictable nature of cyber-attacks.[3]Now, in 2026, after having seen many more cyber-attacks and their consequences, it still remains difficult to make a sound statement on this but, one can say that when looking at Germany, the defence needs to be focused on more since cyber-attacks on Germany caused a cost of roughly 300 bln Euros. Furthermore, it is stated that the lines between cyber espionage and cyber-attacks from states such as China and Russia are blurring, making defence increasingly difficult when also speaking of ‘information warfare’.

Valeriano and Maness suggest a ‘Just War’ approach: “a system of justice for the use of cyber technologies where states are incentivised to maintain continued restraint.”[4] This has also been suggested by Weber by urging Germany and other states to deepen norms in order to ensure that critical infrastructure is not being attacked. Seeing recent developments, this may be complicated since hybrid warfare and changing interdependence between states is having an influence on how states are perceiving world order. The changing order causes much unrest, which could prove problematic to ensure that states practice a constrained cyber practice. One can also bring in some theoretical viewpoints from sociology, such as how states and societies can act ‘morally. Sociologists such as Sigmund already raised the question in 2001 about, how much automation, disappearance of institutionally prescribed traditions and values leads to the disappearance of social order.[5] Meaning with now more questions arising whether young people under the age of 16 should even have access to social media due to the dangers of mental health as well as cyber bullying and AI taking over more tasks, states such as Germany see themselves questioning how such a morally and ethically right cyber strategy with other states can take place when other states such as Russia have a “different understanding of warfare” (Oscar Jonsson).

The developments in the past years show that a multidimensional strategy, where one has to consider different methodologies and schools of thought when analysing these incidents to then make suggestions for further research, seems to still be the best way forward. Realism, liberalism and constructivism all have their place in international relations when analysing cyber domains.

Whilst the blackout in Germany was not a direct cyber-attack but a result of physically damaging the cable wires, the consequences were still severe. When developing a ‘cyber’ strategy in the light of the Ukraine Russia war and other conflicts, Germany must not only invest in cyber security, but also physically protect the critical infrastructures more strongly.

Other scholars say that the solution to a secure cyber domain is not more privacy but more openness[6]. Jagoda, for instance, argues that a lack of knowledge plays a big role for cyber security and threats. Schneider makes a point which is also discussed by Jagoda, namely that “only bad security relies on secrecy; good security works even if all the details of it are public”.[7] In other words, security through obscurity, but this still seems contested. Germany is now also considering banning social media apps for individuals under the age of 16 to ensure safety and protection. Closing off access seems to be for now, the strategy forward to try and minimise danger.

Further thoughts?

This article does not claim to find the ultimate solution for a cyber-strategy. When considering many theories, methodologies and having not only an international relations lens but also an interdisciplinary lens, it becomes clear that many questions remain as to how one analyses a cyber-strategy and how can states such as Germany can move forward?

It is a difficult task for Germany and other states, since it seems that, especially for a cyber-strategy, the macro level (states and international relations in this case) is just as important as the micro level (civilians and private sector). A cyber-strategy pushes states to increasingly focus on the private sector since those remain vulnerable if not continuously ‘updated’ and educated about the cyber domain.

Recent discussions at the WEF reveal that states are increasingly reassessing their strategies and international partnerships, which will have significant implications for security and the cyber domain. Germany must continue to invest in both cyber and physical defences whilst also involving private actors and citizens in resilience-building efforts. Only through a comprehensive and adaptive approach can Germany effectively respond to the evolving challenges of cyber and hybrid warfare. Future developments, such as Germany’s plan to develop a kind of ‘cyber dome against cyber-attacks’will show whether it is possible to prevent such attacks or also the issue of ‘information warfare’, which could not be thoroughly discussed in this article. Perhaps states must consider that cyber-attacks cannot be prevented 100% and that a certain cyber-war will, for now, always be part of our society.

[1] P. W. Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 34–39. (from Discussion: ‘Resilience and is cyber resilience more attainable than cybersecurity?’)

[2] Valeriano, Brandon, and Ryan C. Maness, 'International Relations Theory and Cyber Security: Threats, Conflicts, and Ethics in an Emergent Domain', in Chris Brown, and Robyn Eckersley (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Political Theory, Oxford Handbooks (2018; online edn, Oxford Academic, 5 Apr. 2018), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198746928.013.19, accessed 23 Jan. 2026: pg 264

[3] Valeriano, Brandon, and Ryan C. Maness, 'International Relations Theory and Cyber Security: Threats, Conflicts, and Ethics in an Emergent Domain', in Chris Brown, and Robyn Eckersley (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Political Theory, Oxford Handbooks (2018; online edn, Oxford Academic, 5 Apr. 2018), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198746928.013.19, accessed 23 Jan. 2026: pg 266

[4] Valeriano, Brandon, and Ryan C. Maness, 'International Relations Theory and Cyber Security: Threats, Conflicts, and Ethics in an Emergent Domain', in Chris Brown, and Robyn Eckersley (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Political Theory, Oxford Handbooks (2018; online edn, Oxford Academic, 5 Apr. 2018), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198746928.013.19, accessed 23 Jan. 2026: pg 268.

[5] Sigmund, Steffen (2001): Zwischen Altruismus und symbolischer Anerkennung. Überlegungen zum stifterischen Handeln in mondernen Gesellschaften. In: Jansen, A. et al (Hg): Eigeninteresse und Gemeinwohlbindung. Frankfurt/M.S. S 213.

[6] “Speculative Security.” pg 21-36, Patrick Jagoda, “Speculative Security.” In Cyber Space and National Security: Threats, Opportunities, and Power in a Virtual World edited by Derek S. Reveron (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 21–36.

[7] “Speculative Security.” pg 21-36, Patrick Jagoda, “Speculative Security.” In Cyber Space and National Security: Threats, Opportunities, and Power in a Virtual World edited by Derek S. Reveron (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012) pg 31.

February 16, 2026 — No Comments

Civil resistance in the digital age: gender, narratives, and information integrity

By Alessia Maira (Culture, Society & Security Team) & Giulia Panfilo (Russia Team)

Civil resistance in the 21st century

In 1994, Randle defined the 20th century as the time a new term entered the world vocabulary: People Power. In contrast to power by defence (the idea that power stems from violence and weaponry), power by people signifies the citizens' ability to fight dictatorships, repressive governments, and military regimes. When people come together to exercise power, this is rooted in voluntary collective cooperation and is called “civil resistance”. From the Latin words “civis” (citizen) and “resistere” (to stand up against something), civil resistance is a relatively recent phenomenon of non violent people-led collective action against the political or economic status quo: as a conflict, it mobilises people sharing collective political struggle with protests, demonstrations, even petitions or boycotts; yet, as an act of resistance, it distinguishes itself from warfare, guerrilla, or para-military action as it must reject violence. Civil resistance is also essentially non-institutional: while citizens may conduct actions through existing institutions, the very spirit of civil resistance depends on confronting them (the legal system, governments, or even major industries) often through disruptive tactics that challenge those same structures.

Still, the impact of civil resistance on dismantling oppressive systems remains debated. Does civil resistance truly stand a chance at creating lasting change? How much power do ordinary people hold in building peace compared to military forces or usual institutional peacebuilding actions? Researcher Abbs argues that its strength lies in its power to mobilise diverse groups across social backgrounds, genders, and generations, united around a shared purpose. He concludes that nonviolent movements have instead shaped negotiations and supported democratic transitions in numerous cases - in Europe, such movements include the fall of Communism in East Germany, the rise of the Solidarność movement in Poland, and the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia. On the characteristics and status of civil resistance, researcher Bartkowki lays down an incredible collection of “civil struggles” in his book, “Recovering Non-Violent History”, and argues that civil resistance is often kept in the shadow of history and is even deemed unpatriotic, ineffective, and even un-masculine: this very last point raises a question of gender. Is civil resistance seen as a weak version of political action? Why is this weakness, if any, frowned upon as “too feminine”?

The link to femininity is not new, as gender and civil resistance intersect on two levels: first, women’s significant yet underrecognised contributions to nonviolent movements; second, the way gendered perceptions of strength and legitimacy shape how such movements are publicly valued; and third, how gender affects the repression of civil resistance groups. Back to Randle, if the 20th century marked the age of civil resistance, the 21st has redefined it through the digital revolution, which offers new tools to challenge dominant institutions. Yet, the same online spaces that empower activism also enable mis/disinformation, smear campaigns, and digital harassment, often undermining both the legitimacy of civil resistance and the credibility of gender-based narratives.

Digital spaces as arenas of civil resistance

If civil resistance has historically relied on physical presence and collective action in shared offline spaces, its contemporary expressions increasingly take place in digital environments. Social media platforms, messaging applications, and online networks have allowed for the expansion of collective action, allowing for mobilisation, coordination, and visibility far beyond geographical constraints. In this sense, it can be argued that digital spaces do not replace traditional forms of resistance but extend them, allowing collective action to circulate virtually through images, testimonies, and narratives in real time.

However, these spaces of digital collective action and coordination are often deeply contested, criticised, and at the centre of ongoing debate. Digital platforms are now shaped by algorithms and commercial interests, which in turn influence whose voice gets promoted and whose voice gets marginalised. State and non-state actors are known for increasingly exploiting these algorithmic dynamics through coordinated information operations - one example being the widely documented interference in the 2016 US Elections, attributed to Russian-linked actors. Nowadays, as a consequence of how algorithms work for social media, visibility can be seen both as a resource and a liability. And while digital spaces may serve to amplify civil resistance and collective action, they also pose the risk of surveillance, repression, and counter-narratives, presenting new risks for the dynamics of contemporary civil resistance in digital spaces.

Gendered dimensions of digital resistance

Why a gendered perspective? Women’s mobilisation in collective actions has long been linked to a decline in violent campaigns. Between 1945 and 2014, nonviolent movements saw a growing presence of women on the frontlines. Studies show that women’s participation in collective action often encourages broader involvement, including among men. During the 2011 Egyptian revolution, activist Asmaa Mahfouz urged men to join the protests, framing her appeal as a call to “protect their women on the streets.” Yet this notion of protection served more as a strategic guise than a genuine vulnerability. In Pinochet’s Chile, women fought poverty through handmade arpilleras, embroidered tapestries that carried coded messages and were smuggled abroad to expose Chile’s internal repression. Similarly, in Argentina between the 1970s and 1980s, motherhood was used as a political shield: middle-aged women mothers to disappeared people (Los Desaparecidos) used their moral authority and presumed harmlessness to demand justice for their missing sons. They did not meet any military confrontation.

However, in this contemporary context, narratives are key in shaping how collective action is conducted, interpreted, legitimised or delegitimised by the wider public, institutions, and international audiences. Gender (and womanhood) could be played in a twisted way. With digital platforms expanding and authoritarian regimes tightening control, going online has become a means of survival rather than a choice, marking the 2010s as the decade of gendered transnational activism - the “hybrid world of activism.” In Germany, the AfD instrumentalises gender narratives to oppose immigration; In Turkey, state institutions twist equality discourses to reinforce women’s traditional roles, while in some Eastern European countries, especially Russia and Poland, debates on “family values” promote motherhood and exclude LGBTQ+ mobilisation. Across these cases, women’s equality is instrumentalised for political gain, their activism supported only within patriarchal, anti‑Western frames.

Information integrity under pressure

Access to accurate information is one of the cornerstones of democratic societies, enabling informed decisions and social cohesion. According to the United Nations, “Information integrity refers to an information ecosystem in which freedom of expression is fully enjoyed and information that is accurate, reliable, free from discrimination and hate is available to all in an open, inclusive, safe and secure information environment”. Information integrity, therefore, is not only a mere technical task of removing mis/disinformation, but a social condition in itself: the ability of societies to access, trust, and interpret information at any given time.

However, in modern times, mis/disinformation tactics are increasingly part of broader strategies of political contestation and civil resistance suppression. Rather than aiming to convince audiences of a single false narrative, these tactics often seek to cause confusion and overwhelm information environments through narrative flooding, selective amplification, and other false engagement tactics. In this context, attacks of this type are often aimed at specific groups online: seven in ten women report experiencing targeted abuse through online harassment, sexualised disinformation, credibility attacks, and other similar tactics. The architecture of digital platform algorithms often amplifies these dynamics, allowing misleading content to circulate rapidly, with consequences on collective sense-making and on the informational foundations upon which civil resistance lies.

Shaping something new, navigating old struggles

Civil resistance in the digital age is no longer confined to streets or institutions: it increasingly takes place in online spaces in the form of a struggle over meaning, visibility, and credibility. Digital spaces now amplify both the possibilities and the vulnerabilities of collective action, while narratives and algorithmic structure influence who is heard, seen, trusted, or silenced.

Civil resistance has the power to unite people across ages, classes, and genders. Gender - understood as the set of societal and political expectations embodied by women, men, and people of all genders - offers a particularly insightful lens through which to analyse civil resistance in the digital age. Whether mobilised as a strategic guise or as a moral shield under especially violent regimes, gendered performances of resistance have become increasingly visible as direct, on-the-ground confrontation is diminished or rendered impossible. This shift raises a crucial question: what are the advantages and risks of resisting online? Digital resistance is a double-edged sword. While it amplifies visibility and enables new forms of mobilisation, it also exposes activists to surveillance and gender-specific threats. Another risk is attracting dominant power narratives that seek to instrumentalise gender discourses for political gain. How, then, is this struggle narrated or delegitimised by dominant and oppositional actors across the world?

As digital information environments continue to evolve, understanding collective resistance as a struggle over meaning, visibility, and credibility is essential to grasp how power, participation and democracy are being reshaped in contemporary societies.

February 5, 2026 — No Comments

André Kahlmeyer & Kristian Svendsen on a European Perspective of the War in Sudan

In this session, Mr. Kahlmeyer and Mr. Svendsen examine the war in Sudan through a European policy lens. They assess the international and European responses to the conflict, the political constraints shaping diplomatic engagement, and the challenges of accessing reliable information from the field, in the context of the world’s largest humanitarian crisis, with over 30 million people in need of assistance and more than 12 million displaced.

They explain that international efforts, led mainly by the UN and financially supported by the EU, remain focused on humanitarian aid, while repeated diplomatic initiatives and ceasefire attempts have failed. The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces continues because neither side faces meaningful political or military costs for rejecting negotiations, and both benefit from sustained regional and international support.

Mr. Kahlmeyer and Mr. Svendsen warn that Europe is underestimating Sudan’s strategic relevance, particularly in relation to displacement and migration, Red Sea and maritime security, regional instability, and the spread of weapons and armed networks. They argue that meaningful leverage over a peace process lies primarily with regional actors, especially Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and highlight how Sudan’s war economy, built on gold, oil, and gum, sustains the fighting.

The interviewees also explain how conflict monitoring and research are conducted despite access constraints. This is done through the triangulation of conflict event data, satellite and remote-sensing analysis, displacement statistics, and trusted local civil society networks. Finally, Mr. Kahlmeyer and Mr. Svendsen argue that Europe’s dominant humanitarian framing obscures the political and economic drivers of the war and the role of Sudanese communities as local conflict-management actors. They call for a stronger European debate on political accountability, civilian governance, and long-term conflict prevention alongside humanitarian assistance.

André Kahlmeyer and Kristian Svendsen are senior experts at Conflict Management Consulting (CMC), an independent Brussels-based consultancy working with the EU, UN, bilateral donors, and NGOs on conflict analysis, monitoring, and evaluation in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

André Kahlmeyer is the founder and CEO of CMC and an expert in governance, evaluation, and humanitarian programming, with more than twenty years of experience across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, including extensive field experience in Sudan.

Kristian Svendsen is Lead on PeaceTech and Senior Researcher at CMC, specialising in tech-enabled monitoring and analysis of hard-to-reach crises, with a particular focus on the Horn of Africa and Sudan.

Interviewers: Camilla Cormegna, Leonardo Pesci, and Angelo Saad - Africa Team

January 26, 2026 — No Comments

Prof. Gunaratna on the State of Terrorism in Africa: The case of Mali

Professor Rohan Gunaratna is Professor of Security Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technology University, in Singapore. He has over 30 years of academic, policy, and operational experience in national and global security and has held senior research positions and fellowships at institutions such as the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.

In this session, Prof. Rohan Gunaratna explores the evolving threat of terrorism in Africa, drawing on insights from his newly co-edited volume The Palgrave Handbook of Terrorism in Africa.

He traces the roots of modern terrorism on the continent back to 1991, when Osama bin Laden relocated to Sudan, training fighters from across North and West Africa. From there, jihadist networks expanded into East Africa, West Africa, and the Sahel. Today, the threat is moving deeper into the continent and southwards, with growing implications for the Indian Ocean region.

Prof. Gunaratna identifies the Sahel—particularly Mali—as the current epicentre of global terrorism, driven largely by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). He explains how JNIM has drawn inspiration from groups such as the Taliban, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and Al-Shabaab, showing how the trajectories of other terrorist groups provide tactical and organisational lessons. By forging alliances with Tuareg and Fulani communities, JNIM has expanded its influence and now surrounds Bamako, while also competing with Islamic State–linked groups across the region.

Warning that JNIM’s ambitions extend beyond Mali, Prof. Gunaratna calls on African leaders and the international community to recognise the scale of the threat and strengthen regional cooperation to counter it.

Interviewer: Camilla Cormegna - Crime, Extremism and Terrorism Team

January 9, 2026 — No Comments

A Year into al-Sharaa’s rule and Sectarian Violence

By Camilla Biolcati - Human Security Team

One year after the self-proclamation of President al-Sharaa, Syria is taking stock of the new government’s performance. Although the country has not fallen into chaos or civil war, as many feared after the collapse of Bashar al-Assad, it cannot be said that Syria—and above all Syrians—find themselves in a significantly better condition than under the previous dictatorship. If the new president does not ensure security for all Syrians, protecting every minority within the country, this may well mark the beginning of another sectarian-based dictatorship.

From Assad’s Fall to al-Sharaa’s Rise

On 8 December a year ago, after 53 years of Assad's rule, a rebel coalition led by HTS launched an eleven-day offensive that led to the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad. Leading the rebels was the current self-proclaimed president, Ahmed al-Sharaa of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham—known to most as the former militant al-Jawlani. Over the past year, both his name and his public image have been apparently reshaped. His greatest challenge now is to hold together a country torn apart by civil war and deep internal divisions. HTS itself has fluctuated between affiliation with the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, before shifting from a global jihad ambition to a more local one, driven by nationalist aims and an exclusive focus on Syria, integrating different Islamist movements along the way. From 2017 until last December’s advance on Damascus, HTS positioned itself as the guardian of the Sunni community in Syria against the Alawite regime of the former dictator and its allies. How could such a movement overthrow a dictatorship without letting a deeply fragmented country collapse into chaos under such a slogan? But at the gates of Damascus of Damascus, al-Jawlani chanted: "A Syria for all Syrians.” But has he succeeded?

Syria’s Composition

Syria is described as a mosaic of minorities, with a particularly heterogeneous ethnic-religious composition. A simplified and non-exhaustive breakdown of the country’s main communities shows that around 70% of the population adheres to the Sunni branch of Islam. Approximately 10% are Kurds, the majority of whom are also Sunni. The Alawites, who belong to the Shia branch of Islam, constitute an estimated 10–15% of the population, while Christians of various denominations account for roughly 10%. Among the smaller minority groups are the Druze, who represent about 3% of the population.

What Is at Risk

Rebuilding Syria: pluralism, human rights and the human security challengeDespite the challenges inherited from decades of dictatorship and civil war, al-Sharaa has shown the capacity to pull Syria out of international isolation, attracting investment and recognition. Yet foreign relations and diplomacy are not the only concern. For months, leading Middle East analysts have been watching the fate and security of the population. The foundations on which Syria can—and must—be rebuilt are pluralism, inclusivity, and tolerance, particularly through the protection of human rights. This represents the new leader’s core challenge. Several atrocities have been documented in recent months, with the country’s major minority communities suffering severe attacks and massacres. According to ACLED reporting, around 60% of victims in armed confrontations belong to the Druze and Alawite communities.

March 2025 – The Alawite Massacre

From the day after Assad’s fall, clashes described by the transitional government as “individual cases” of revenge killings against members of the Alawite minority have persisted. Resentment toward Alawites runs high among many Syrians who perceive them as responsible for decades of oppression. Members of this community have repeatedly reported feeling under threat, accusing the new government of being unable—or unwilling—to protect them. Since February 2025, Amnesty International has recorded numerous reports of disappearances, abductions, and kidnappings of Alawite women and girls, calling on authorities to intervene.

Between 6 and 9 March 2025, the deadliest confrontation since al-Sharaa’s rise to power broke out, drawing harsh criticism from the international community and rights organisations. The violence appears to have started with an ambush targeting Syrian security forces and military checkpoints in north-western Latakia province, where government troops had been deployed for a "security campaign” aimed at suppressing Assad-loyalist rebels. The government response triggered a cycle of violence which, according to independent Reuters investigations and ACLED data, saw clashes across at least fifty locations in the governorates of Latakia, Hama, Homs, and Tartus. The response was described as brutal and disproportionate: according to an investigative commission, around 200,000 fighters from various military factions were mobilised to the coastal front, resulting in violations, abuses, extrajudicial killings, and disappearances. According to The Syrian Network for Human Rights, the units considered responsible for most killings included two factions previously affiliated with the SNA and under U.S. sanctions for human rights abuses. The confrontation escalated into a sectarian conflict which, according to SNHR and SOHR investigations, caused around 2,000 deaths, mostly Alawite civilians. Subsequent independent investigations, including joint work by Human Rights Watch, Syrians for Truth and Justice,and Syrian Archive, documented, through interviews and verified video footage, the complicity of forces under the Ministry of Defence in the atrocities, humiliation, and reprisals carried out by fighters. Testimonies also pointed to the recruitment of civilian volunteers not associated with militias to join the campaign, further demonstrating the government’s inability, or unwillingness, to control the use of force. Throughout these events, al-Sharaa continued to call for national unity, promising the creation of an independent committee to investigate civil rights abuses and identify perpetrators. Initial findings, however, claimed that military commanders had not ordered violations, fueling anger among the Alawites. The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria later recognised the involvement of segments of interim government forces and urged authorities to identify and prosecute those responsible.

July 2025 – Sectarian Violence in Suwayda

Only a few months later, in July 2025, another major eruption of violence broke out in the southern province of Suwayda, involving the Druze minority and Bedouin armed groups reportedly supported by government forces. The escalation followed months of latent tensions and clashes, which, according to ACLED, amount to nearly 133 recorded incidents between January and July 2025. On 13 July, after a wave of retaliatory kidnappings between Druze and Bedouin tribes, violence intensified dramatically. In just two weeks, reports documented 95 incidents, more than 800 casualties, and hundreds of displacements. Government forces intervened, claiming to be restoring order, but the operation instead deepened insecurity within the Druze community, which accused the military of taking sides with Bedouin groups. In the aftermath of the first ceasefire, Al-Sharaa himself publicly praised Bedouin involvement in restoring calm in the southern province against outlaw armed groups, a statement that sparked strong feelings of injustice within the Druze community and renewed fears of being not only unprotected by the state, but also directly targeted. Video and photographic evidence also suggests the involvement and incitement of hatred by transitional government forces against the Druze community.

This intervention is part of a strategy aimed at centralising state power and challenging local militias and governorates in Syria that want to preserve their autonomy. In March, the president signed a temporary Constitutional Declaration that immediately drew criticism and concern from the country's minorities because it did not reflect ethnic and religious diversity or the autonomy of the country's numerous governorates. In light of this, it is clear that abuses, reprisals and violations of humanitarian law are distancing President Al-Sharaa from his goal of unifying Syria into a free and safe Syria for all and winning the trust of its citizens.

*Photo by mohamad alshaekh yosef - pexels.com*

The need for Justice, and Minority Protection: Syria’s Crossroads

These two major episodes of violence—along the coastal region and later in Suwayda—serve as stark warning signs of the concrete risks posed by the transitional government’s current security approach for civilians, particularly minority communities. Syria remains a deeply fragmented society, where the idea of centralised authority recalls patterns of oppression typical of the previous dictatorship. It is therefore unrealistic to assume that regime change, especially if it brings a specific niche to power, would not provoke fear and insecurity among those who could once again be marginalised and oppressed. Analysts observing Syria’s fragile transition have repeatedly highlighted this dynamic.

The core challenge for the government of transition is to demonstrate the political will and capacity to integrate all of Syria’s diverse social, ethnic, religious groups into the political and security architecture of the state.Without an inclusive governance and security framework, existing sectarian rifts are likely to deepen rather than heal. Observers have stressed that prioritising domestic credibility and reducing sectarian tensions are essential if the transitional authority is to build trust across the population. Minority inclusion has internal and external dimensions: internally, ending cycles of revenge violence and ensuring accountability are crucial to preventing further retaliation and mistrust; externally, it is important to recognise the risk of regional powers exercising influence at the expense of minority communities.

In conclusion, despite the establishment of commissions tasked with judging and prosecuting violations committed during the Assad era and the massacres of recent months, these bodies have so far proved ineffective and inconsistent, making it necessary to guarantee transparency and impartiality in future trials. An accountable transitional justice mechanism is essential to overcoming the trauma of centuries of abuse and to laying the foundations for reconciliation and, potentially, peace. Secondly, the development of a decentralised and pluralistic security system, as recommended by experts, would help mitigate the risk of further clashes such as those in March and July 2025 and could provide a more solid basis for national reconciliation. Finally, greater political integration, including all minorities within the governmental and constitutional structures of the country, must be accompanied by recognition of the need for decentralisation and a degree of autonomy for minority groups.

December 26, 2025 — No Comments

China-US Pause in Busan: Divorce in the Age of Supply Chains

By Carlotta Rinaudo - China & Asia Team

The trade war between the United States and China increasingly resembles a failed divorce: expensive, chaotic, and ultimately impossible to finalize. Both sides threaten separation only to discover they are too deeply entangled to walk away: in October 2025 in Busan, the two unwilling partners found themselves forced back under the same marital roof. To make sense of this strange and dysfunctional relationship, over time many analysts have turned to an unexpected field: couple psychology.

Some analysts describe the relationship as a pragmatic partnership that dates back to the 1970s, forged out of necessity rather than mutual trust or alignment. The United States was burdened by the huge costs of the Vietnam War and a period of stagflation. Prices were rising, workers’ salaries were not, and consumption, the very engine of the American economy - was under threat. China, on the other side of the Pacific, was poor, isolated, and hungry for growth. The stage was set for what Zeno Leoni calls a “marriage of convenience”: two countries using one another as a quick fix for weaknesses they could not resolve alone. As Han Feizi puts it, it was an unlikely relation built on a clear imbalance: on one side, a weak country would work its way out of poverty, save aggressively, and lend money to a rich partner with a reckless spending habit – who would then use that money to buy even more of the poor country’s products. Strange as it sounded, the arrangement worked.

Walmart aisles quickly filled with low-cost clothes, toys, electronics, and household goods, contributing to affordable consumerism during a period of stagnant wages for many. Products that once felt like luxuries became accessible to most American families. For China, the benefits were just as tangible. American demand kept factories running, while millions of rural workers migrated to the coast in search of jobs that offered them a way out of poverty. Dollars flowed from US consumers to Chinese factories and then flowed back to Washington as purchases of US debt, allowing Americans to borrow and consume even more. As Stephen Roach said, China gave Americans a way to “repeal the basic laws of economics”: they could “live beyond their means, and that enabled the Chinese to do the same.”

Like many toxic relationships, however, this marriage of convenience also amplified each partner’s worst imbalances. In the United States, easy access to cheap imports deepened debt and hollowed out industrial towns like Martinsville, Virginia, where textile factories closed, jobs disappeared, and communities were left behind as production shifted overseas. In China, the costs were even more visible: rivers were polluted, air quality was deteriorated, and laborers were overworked. Also, like in human relationships, over time China’s behavior changed in ways that left the other feeling insecure. No longer a poor country desperate for jobs and dollars, China gradually became an industrial and technological powerhouse. With that rise came confidence, nationalism, and a growing desire to assert itself on the global stage. Also, China was no longer confined to filling Walmart aisles with cheap goods: now it began competing in advanced sectors once dominated by the US – from AI and telecommunications to robotics. For Washington, this shift in balance triggered something like an identity crisis, which brings us to the mutual resentment, finger-pointing, anxiety and suspicion we are seeing today. In human terms, this is often the stage that leads to separation, and the United States first attempted to follow that script. Washington began to openly speak of decoupling - a necessary “surgical strike” to reduce dependence on China, de-risk critical supply chains, and bring manufacturing jobs back home. US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick went so far as to imagine an “army” of workers assembling iPhones in the United States. The attempted separation reached its peak on what was called “Liberation Day”, when President Donald Trump imposed tariffs of up to 145% on Chinese products – to which China promptly responded.

Yet this tit-for-that soon revealed how separation between two economic giants can be messy, expensive, and ultimately self-defeating. Tariffs were not deployed like precision weapons, but more like land mines, harming almost everyone in their way. American workers and consumers – those the measures were meant to protect – quickly found themselves caught in the middle. Chinese-manufactured toys that once sold for $21.99 now cost $35, forcing long-standing toy storesin Manhattan to close. Farmers across the Midwest saw sales collapse as China restricted purchases of US soybeans. Nvidia, the crown jewel of American AI, lost billions of dollars in revenue due to restrictions on chip sales - money that could have been reinvested in domestic research. Even more, those same restrictions accelerated China’s push toward technological self-sufficiency.

The deeper lesson, however, goes beyond tariffs. In today’s interconnected supply chains, economic measures often have ripple effects, meaning that actions taken against a partner can have unintended consequences for both sides. Donald Trump often speaks of goods as if they were either “Made in China” or “Made in America,” yet while that worldview made sense in the industrial economy of the twentieth century, it does not make sense in the reality we live in today. In the age of container shipping and digital coordination, almost nothing is fully “made” in one place only: products are, more often than not, assembled from components sourced across multiple countries. Huawei - often depicted as the embodiment of “Made in China” – actually relies heavily on US firms such as Qualcomm and Broadcom for some of its components, and for years its operating system was Google’s Android. This means that sanctions aimed at Huawei inevitably end up harming US companies too. Such is the power of the supply chain in the 21^st century.

Rare earths offer an even starker example of how US attempts to project strength can expose new vulnerabilities at home. China controls much of the global supply chain of these critical materials, essential for everything from electric vehicles to advanced weapon systems. When Beijing restricted exports in retaliation for US tariffs, the consequences were immediate. To mention one, Ford shut down a factory in Chicago after it was unable to secure the rare earths needed for electric motors. Research showed that it would take eight to twelve years to rebuilding domestic refining capacity of these materials – if Americans would be willing to shoulder the dirty business of rare earth refining itself. Looking at Baotoutoday, a dry town in China’s Inner Mongolia, it is clear that reshoring production would mean accepting environmental costs that Americans have long outsourced to China. In Baotou, decades of processing have poisoned groundwater and produced a “cancer epidemic” throughout what they are now known as “cancer villages.”

In October 2025, President Trump and President Xi Jinping met in Busan. The meeting felt less like a resolution and more like a tacit recognition of limits. Leading a slowing economy, Xi urged Trump to learn from the recent “twists and turns” of the trade war. On his side, Trump agreed to cut tariffs to 47% and called a “ceasefire” on further escalation. Beijing, in turn, suspended restrictions on rare earth exports for one year. It was, overall, a pause that restored a fragile status quo while leaving the underlying tensions intact. Yet the Busan meeting made one reality impossible to ignore. Over decades, the US and China built production systems projected to function together – one side designing, consuming, and spending; the other manufacturing, assembling, and absorbing the environmental cost. That same structure is now dictating the terms of the relationship for both partners. In a supply-chain world, even an unhappy and suffocating marriage can be cheaper to endure than to escape. And for two unwilling partners forced together by necessity rather than affection, learning how to live together may eventually prove easier than walking away.

December 25, 2025 — No Comments

The Rise of Southeast Asia as a Global Manufacturing Hub

By Dejvi Dedaj - South East Asia and Oceania Team

Introduction

Southeast Asia, once regarded as a periphery to the global manufacturing systems, has quickly become a core centre of the world production. Geopolitical tensions, in particular the U.S.-China trade war, increased labour costs in China, and the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic have made multinational companies reconsider their supply chains, moving production to new ASEAN economies like Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia.

This change is not just a geographic change, but a structural change in the global economy. The integration of the region into international supply chains has been enhanced by competitive labour markets, improved infrastructure and extensive trade agreements such as Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which have increased resilience and efficiency. Meanwhile, the growing financial ecosystem of Southeast Asia, including advanced capital markets, green and infrastructure financing, facilitates industrial development and innovation. But the emergence of the region is not without problems. The complex environment companies and governments have to operate in to maintain long-term growth is indicated by infrastructure gaps, human capital constraints, and geopolitical uncertainties.

The Forces Behind the Shift

The shift of the global manufacturing to Southeast Asia is due to several convergent forces. The post-2018 global trade environment has become characterized by geopolitical diversification, which has changed the way multinational companies organize their supply chains. The escalation of tariffs and the growing political tension between the United States and China posed greater uncertainty to the companies that had a high concentration of production in one country. The trade barriers, regulatory uncertainty, and the threat of disruption of supply at any time made companies rethink the stability of their current networks. Companies have responded by diversifying production in more than one country to minimize exposure to geopolitical shocks and safeguard the continuity of their operations. Their strategic location in Asia, comparatively open trade policies and integration into regional trade agreements have made neighbouring economies like Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia attractive alternatives. This change is indicative of a larger trend in the global supply chain strategy, where risk reduction and operational flexibility are now as important as cost efficiency in investment and production decisions.

The COVID-19 pandemic further supported the urgency of this diversification strategy. The crisis demonstrated the fragility of over-centralised supply chains and the strategic need of flexible, geographically dispersed production networks. Businesses realised that dependence on one nation, even as productive as China, could bring the world to a standstill. As a result, the geopolitical tensions and the vulnerabilities caused by the pandemic increased the pace of investment in ASEAN economies, as companies tried to establish resilient, diversified, and regionally balanced supply chains.

Moreover, Increasing labour expenses in China have emerged as one of the major reasons that have led to the outsourcing of manufacturing to Southeast Asia. In the last ten years, the wages in the manufacturing centres in China have gone up significantly making the country less competitive in terms of cost in labour intensive industries. Conversely, other Southeast Asian nations such as Vietnam and Indonesia are still providing relatively lower labour costsand thus are viable alternatives to industries such as textiles, electronics assembly and consumer goods. As a result, multinational companies that wish to remain cost effective and at the same time remain near the established supply chains are increasingly shifting production to Southeast Asia where an emerging industrial base is supplemented by favourable labour conditions.

Figure 1: Evolution of China’s Average Wages

Lastly, bilateral free trade agreements and the RCEP have greatly strengthened the regional supply chain connectivity in the Asia-Pacific. RCEP, which encompasses approximately 30 percent of the world GDP, enables the smooth flow of intermediate goods and investment among member economies by harmonising trade rules and reducing tariffs. This structure allows the multinational companies to spread the production to multiple countries in Asia without losing preferential access to the market, which makes it more resilient to geopolitical or pandemic-related shocks. The bilateral agreements like the Japan-Thailand EPA and the Indonesia-Korea CEPA are also complementary and enhance market integration and investment opportunities. Collectively, these institutional arrangements support the transition of the region to interdependent and elastic supply chains.

Financial and Economic Implications

The economic consequences of the manufacturing transformation in Southeast Asia go way beyond the relocation of industries, they are an indication of the new financial geography. Although foreign direct investment (FDI) has declined globally, ASEAN has registered its third year of consecutive growth in the region, while its stock increased by 56% since 2014, reaching $3.9 trillion. The major forces were the increased investors’ interest in finance, renewable energy, electric vehicles (EVs), and the reorganization of the supply chain. Financial sector was the largest inflow, which rose to $92 billion, and R&D activities were increasing rapidly, primarily in Singapore. Even though manufacturing FDI fell a little, it was still significant, representing 66% of all greenfield investments, indicating that ASEAN is still a manufacturing and innovation centre in the world.

Figure 2: Global FDI Flows, 2021–2023 (Billions of US Dollars and Year-on-Year % Change)

Figure 3: ASEAN FDI Flows, 2021–2023 (Billions of US Dollars and Year-on-Year % Change)

Source: UNCTAD (2024)

These changes are not just operational but reflect more fundamental financial rebalances that have been the basis of the rise of Southeast Asia as a manufacturing centre in the world. The capital markets in the region are also getting more sophisticated, which allows domestic companies to have a wider range of financing options and become more integrated into the global supply chains. The swift increase in green and sustainability bond issuance, including Singapore which leads the ASEAN’s US$7.8 billion green bond market and Vietnam reaching $1.5 billion in 2021, is an example of the growing financial infrastructure that facilitates industrial growth. The fact that Singapore is a regional financial centre also supports the cross-border trade finance and green financing programs, and other countries such as Malaysia and Thailand are also enhancing domestic markets to fund corporate investment. These financial innovations offer the required liquidity, sustainability orientation and capital depth to maintain the industrial and supply chain transformation in the region.

Financing of infrastructure is also very important in maintaining the growth of manufacturing in the Southeast Asia. TheADB and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are development institutions that have increased investments in logistics and energy infrastructure, which has facilitated the industrial transformation of the region. In 2015-2023, ADB and AIIB together invested billions of dollars in transport, power, and connectivity projects in ASEAN. The modernization of the deep-water ports in Vietnam, trans-island logistics corridors in Indonesia and the Eastern Economic Corridor in Thailand are increasing production capacity and intra-regional trade. Such projects do not only improve physical connectivity, but also bring in private capital in the form of public-private partnerships, which forms a basis of long-term supply chain resilience.

The transformation further extends into digital financial systems. Local payment systems are being integrated through regional payment linkages, e.g. the cooperation between Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia to enable quicker, less expensive and more secure cross-border payments. These links lower the transaction costs and contribute to the increase of financial inclusion, particularly among micro, small, and medium enterprises. This financial digitalisation increases the efficiency of trade and is a strong complement to the physical integration which has been attained through diversification of the supply chain.

Difficulties and Structural Constraints

In spite of such achievements, the development of Southeast Asia as a global manufacturing hub is associated with a number of structural issues that may jeopardize its sustainability in the long run. Among the most urgent problems, infrastructure gaps are still present. Although developed economies like Singapore and Malaysia have advanced their global logistics, port, and digital networks, others, especially in the Mekong subregion, such as Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, are still grappling with poor transport, energy, and digital infrastructure. According to the estimates of the ADB, ASEAN needs more than $2.8 trillion of infrastructure investment between 2023 and 2030 to address the projected economic and population growth. Persistent gaps in connectivity increase transit times, raise shipping and energy costs, and fragment supply chains that rely on just-in-time production. In addition, the disparity in the quality of infrastructure between the coastal and the inland regions restricts the possibility of industrial diversification outside of the major urban centres, which results in development imbalances that inhibit inclusive growth.

The lack of human capital and skills also limits the long-term competitiveness of the region. With the global manufacturing shifting to more high-value, technology-intensive manufacturing, Southeast Asia is experiencing a shortage of skilled engineers, data specialists, and technicians. Whereas other economies such as Singapore and Malaysia have invested a lot in technical education and research and development, others are lagging behind, with the vocational training systems being out of sync with industry requirements. World Bank and ADB reports indicate that a large percentage of the ASEAN workforce will need to be reskilled by 2030 to meet Industry 4.0 technologies, especially in digital, technical, and high-value manufacturing jobs. In the absence of strategic investments in education, STEM programmes, and workforce mobility, most countries will continue to be reliant on low-cost, labour-intensive production, instead of moving towards innovation-based growth.

Lastly, the geopolitical uncertainty is looming large over the rise of Southeast Asia. The same dynamics that have driven its expansion, U.S.-China competition and the global drive towards supply chain diversification, are also the ones that put it at risk of volatility. The trade restrictions, technological decoupling, or regional tensions in the South China Sea could disrupt production networks and deter foreign investment. The strategic neutrality of ASEAN and the enhancement of its collective voice in the multilateral forums will be critical to the stability and investor confidence. The effects of global fragmentation can be reduced through initiatives that strengthen transparency, supply chain security, and financial resilience.

Conclusion

The rise of Southeast Asia as a manufacturing hub in the world is an indication of a strategic repositioning of production, finance, and innovation. The geopolitical tensions, increasing costs in China, and vulnerability to the pandemic have increased the pace of investment in the region, whereas trade agreements, infrastructure, and financial development contribute to the growth. However, there are still obstacles, such as skill shortages and infrastructure differences, and geopolitical risks. The long-term success will involve aligned policies, strong supply chains, and human and physical capital investments.

December 15, 2025 — No Comments

Thomas Nilsen on the Geopolitics of the High North

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