In this session, Mr. Kahlmeyer and Mr. Svendsen examine the war in Sudan through a European policy lens. They assess the international and European responses to the conflict, the political constraints shaping diplomatic engagement, and the challenges of accessing reliable information from the field, in the context of the world’s largest humanitarian crisis, with over 30 million people in need of assistance and more than 12 million displaced.
They explain that international efforts, led mainly by the UN and financially supported by the EU, remain focused on humanitarian aid, while repeated diplomatic initiatives and ceasefire attempts have failed. The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces continues because neither side faces meaningful political or military costs for rejecting negotiations, and both benefit from sustained regional and international support.
Mr. Kahlmeyer and Mr. Svendsen warn that Europe is underestimating Sudan’s strategic relevance, particularly in relation to displacement and migration, Red Sea and maritime security, regional instability, and the spread of weapons and armed networks. They argue that meaningful leverage over a peace process lies primarily with regional actors, especially Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and highlight how Sudan’s war economy, built on gold, oil, and gum, sustains the fighting.
The interviewees also explain how conflict monitoring and research are conducted despite access constraints. This is done through the triangulation of conflict event data, satellite and remote-sensing analysis, displacement statistics, and trusted local civil society networks. Finally, Mr. Kahlmeyer and Mr. Svendsen argue that Europe’s dominant humanitarian framing obscures the political and economic drivers of the war and the role of Sudanese communities as local conflict-management actors. They call for a stronger European debate on political accountability, civilian governance, and long-term conflict prevention alongside humanitarian assistance.
André Kahlmeyer and Kristian Svendsen are senior experts at Conflict Management Consulting (CMC), an independent Brussels-based consultancy working with the EU, UN, bilateral donors, and NGOs on conflict analysis, monitoring, and evaluation in fragile and conflict-affected settings.
André Kahlmeyer is the founder and CEO of CMC and an expert in governance, evaluation, and humanitarian programming, with more than twenty years of experience across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, including extensive field experience in Sudan.
Kristian Svendsen is Lead on PeaceTech and Senior Researcher at CMC, specialising in tech-enabled monitoring and analysis of hard-to-reach crises, with a particular focus on the Horn of Africa and Sudan.
Interviewers: Camilla Cormegna, Leonardo Pesci, and Angelo Saad - Africa Desk
Professor Rohan Gunaratna is Professor of Security Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technology University, in Singapore. He has over 30 years of academic, policy, and operational experience in national and global security and has held senior research positions and fellowships at institutions such as the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.
In this session, Prof. Rohan Gunaratna explores the evolving threat of terrorism in Africa, drawing on insights from his newly co-edited volume The Palgrave Handbook of Terrorism in Africa.
He traces the roots of modern terrorism on the continent back to 1991, when Osama bin Laden relocated to Sudan, training fighters from across North and West Africa. From there, jihadist networks expanded into East Africa, West Africa, and the Sahel. Today, the threat is moving deeper into the continent and southwards, with growing implications for the Indian Ocean region.
Prof. Gunaratna identifies the Sahel—particularly Mali—as the current epicentre of global terrorism, driven largely by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). He explains how JNIM has drawn inspiration from groups such as the Taliban, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and Al-Shabaab, showing how the trajectories of other terrorist groups provide tactical and organisational lessons. By forging alliances with Tuareg and Fulani communities, JNIM has expanded its influence and now surrounds Bamako, while also competing with Islamic State–linked groups across the region.
Warning that JNIM’s ambitions extend beyond Mali, Prof. Gunaratna calls on African leaders and the international community to recognise the scale of the threat and strengthen regional cooperation to counter it.
Interviewer: Camilla Cormegna - Crime, Extremism and Terrorism Desk
One year after the self-proclamation of President al-Sharaa, Syria is taking stock of the new government’s performance. Although the country has not fallen into chaos or civil war, as many feared after the collapse of Bashar al-Assad, it cannot be said that Syria—and above all Syrians—find themselves in a significantly better condition than under the previous dictatorship. If the new president does not ensure security for all Syrians, protecting every minority within the country, this may well mark the beginning of another sectarian-based dictatorship.
From Assad’s Fall to al-Sharaa’s Rise
On 8 December a year ago, after 53 years of Assad's rule, a rebel coalition led by HTS launched an eleven-day offensive that led to the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad. Leading the rebels was the current self-proclaimed president, Ahmed al-Sharaa of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham—known to most as the former militant al-Jawlani. Over the past year, both his name and his public image have been apparently reshaped. His greatest challenge now is to hold together a country torn apart by civil war and deep internal divisions. HTS itself has fluctuated between affiliation with the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, before shifting from a global jihad ambition to a more local one, driven by nationalist aims and an exclusive focus on Syria, integrating different Islamist movements along the way. From 2017 until last December’s advance on Damascus, HTS positioned itself as the guardian of the Sunni community in Syria against the Alawite regime of the former dictator and its allies. How could such a movement overthrow a dictatorship without letting a deeply fragmented country collapse into chaos under such a slogan? But at the gates of Damascus of Damascus, al-Jawlani chanted: "A Syria for all Syrians.” But has he succeeded?
Syria’s Composition
Syria is described as a mosaic of minorities, with a particularly heterogeneous ethnic-religious composition. A simplified and non-exhaustive breakdown of the country’s main communities shows that around 70% of the population adheres to the Sunni branch of Islam. Approximately 10% are Kurds, the majority of whom are also Sunni. The Alawites, who belong to the Shia branch of Islam, constitute an estimated 10–15% of the population, while Christians of various denominations account for roughly 10%. Among the smaller minority groups are the Druze, who represent about 3% of the population.
What Is at Risk
Rebuilding Syria: pluralism, human rights and the human security challengeDespite the challenges inherited from decades of dictatorship and civil war, al-Sharaa has shown the capacity to pull Syria out of international isolation, attracting investment and recognition. Yet foreign relations and diplomacy are not the only concern. For months, leading Middle East analysts have been watching the fate and security of the population. The foundations on which Syria can—and must—be rebuilt are pluralism, inclusivity, and tolerance, particularly through the protection of human rights. This represents the new leader’s core challenge. Several atrocities have been documented in recent months, with the country’s major minority communities suffering severe attacks and massacres. According to ACLED reporting, around 60% of victims in armed confrontations belong to the Druze and Alawite communities.
March 2025 – The Alawite Massacre
From the day after Assad’s fall, clashes described by the transitional government as “individual cases” of revenge killings against members of the Alawite minority have persisted. Resentment toward Alawites runs high among many Syrians who perceive them as responsible for decades of oppression. Members of this community have repeatedly reported feeling under threat, accusing the new government of being unable—or unwilling—to protect them. Since February 2025, Amnesty International has recorded numerous reports of disappearances, abductions, and kidnappings of Alawite women and girls, calling on authorities to intervene.
Between 6 and 9 March 2025, the deadliest confrontation since al-Sharaa’s rise to power broke out, drawing harsh criticism from the international community and rights organisations. The violence appears to have started with an ambush targeting Syrian security forces and military checkpoints in north-western Latakia province, where government troops had been deployed for a "security campaign” aimed at suppressing Assad-loyalist rebels. The government response triggered a cycle of violence which, according to independent Reuters investigations and ACLED data, saw clashes across at least fifty locations in the governorates of Latakia, Hama, Homs, and Tartus. The response was described as brutal and disproportionate: according to an investigative commission, around 200,000 fighters from various military factions were mobilised to the coastal front, resulting in violations, abuses, extrajudicial killings, and disappearances. According to The Syrian Network for Human Rights, the units considered responsible for most killings included two factions previously affiliated with the SNA and under U.S. sanctions for human rights abuses. The confrontation escalated into a sectarian conflict which, according to SNHR and SOHR investigations, caused around 2,000 deaths, mostly Alawite civilians. Subsequent independent investigations, including joint work by Human Rights Watch, Syrians for Truth and Justice,and Syrian Archive, documented, through interviews and verified video footage, the complicity of forces under the Ministry of Defence in the atrocities, humiliation, and reprisals carried out by fighters. Testimonies also pointed to the recruitment of civilian volunteers not associated with militias to join the campaign, further demonstrating the government’s inability, or unwillingness, to control the use of force. Throughout these events, al-Sharaa continued to call for national unity, promising the creation of an independent committee to investigate civil rights abuses and identify perpetrators. Initial findings, however, claimed that military commanders had not ordered violations, fueling anger among the Alawites. The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria later recognised the involvement of segments of interim government forces and urged authorities to identify and prosecute those responsible.
July 2025 – Sectarian Violence in Suwayda
Only a few months later, in July 2025, another major eruption of violence broke out in the southern province of Suwayda, involving the Druze minority and Bedouin armed groups reportedly supported by government forces. The escalation followed months of latent tensions and clashes, which, according to ACLED, amount to nearly 133 recorded incidents between January and July 2025. On 13 July, after a wave of retaliatory kidnappings between Druze and Bedouin tribes, violence intensified dramatically. In just two weeks, reports documented 95 incidents, more than 800 casualties, and hundreds of displacements. Government forces intervened, claiming to be restoring order, but the operation instead deepened insecurity within the Druze community, which accused the military of taking sides with Bedouin groups. In the aftermath of the first ceasefire, Al-Sharaa himself publicly praised Bedouin involvement in restoring calm in the southern province against outlaw armed groups, a statement that sparked strong feelings of injustice within the Druze community and renewed fears of being not only unprotected by the state, but also directly targeted. Video and photographic evidence also suggests the involvement and incitement of hatred by transitional government forces against the Druze community.
This intervention is part of a strategy aimed at centralising state power and challenging local militias and governorates in Syria that want to preserve their autonomy. In March, the president signed a temporary Constitutional Declaration that immediately drew criticism and concern from the country's minorities because it did not reflect ethnic and religious diversity or the autonomy of the country's numerous governorates. In light of this, it is clear that abuses, reprisals and violations of humanitarian law are distancing President Al-Sharaa from his goal of unifying Syria into a free and safe Syria for all and winning the trust of its citizens.
The need for Justice, and Minority Protection: Syria’s Crossroads
These two major episodes of violence—along the coastal region and later in Suwayda—serve as stark warning signs of the concrete risks posed by the transitional government’s current security approach for civilians, particularly minority communities. Syria remains a deeply fragmented society, where the idea of centralised authority recalls patterns of oppression typical of the previous dictatorship. It is therefore unrealistic to assume that regime change, especially if it brings a specific niche to power, would not provoke fear and insecurity among those who could once again be marginalised and oppressed. Analysts observing Syria’s fragile transition have repeatedly highlighted this dynamic.
The core challenge for the government of transition is to demonstrate the political will and capacity to integrate all of Syria’s diverse social, ethnic, religious groups into the political and security architecture of the state.Without an inclusive governance and security framework, existing sectarian rifts are likely to deepen rather than heal. Observers have stressed that prioritising domestic credibility and reducing sectarian tensions are essential if the transitional authority is to build trust across the population. Minority inclusion has internal and external dimensions: internally, ending cycles of revenge violence and ensuring accountability are crucial to preventing further retaliation and mistrust; externally, it is important to recognise the risk of regional powers exercising influence at the expense of minority communities.
In conclusion, despite the establishment of commissions tasked with judging and prosecuting violations committed during the Assad era and the massacres of recent months, these bodies have so far proved ineffective and inconsistent, making it necessary to guarantee transparency and impartiality in future trials. An accountable transitional justice mechanism is essential to overcoming the trauma of centuries of abuse and to laying the foundations for reconciliation and, potentially, peace. Secondly, the development of a decentralised and pluralistic security system, as recommended by experts, would help mitigate the risk of further clashes such as those in March and July 2025 and could provide a more solid basis for national reconciliation. Finally, greater political integration, including all minorities within the governmental and constitutional structures of the country, must be accompanied by recognition of the need for decentralisation and a degree of autonomy for minority groups.
The trade war between the United States and China increasingly resembles a failed divorce: expensive, chaotic, and ultimately impossible to finalize. Both sides threaten separation only to discover they are too deeply entangled to walk away: in October 2025 in Busan, the two unwilling partners found themselves forced back under the same marital roof. To make sense of this strange and dysfunctional relationship, over time many analysts have turned to an unexpected field: couple psychology.
Some analysts describe the relationship as a pragmatic partnership that dates back to the 1970s, forged out of necessity rather than mutual trust or alignment. The United States was burdened by the huge costs of the Vietnam War and a period of stagflation. Prices were rising, workers’ salaries were not, and consumption, the very engine of the American economy - was under threat. China, on the other side of the Pacific, was poor, isolated, and hungry for growth. The stage was set for what Zeno Leoni calls a “marriage of convenience”: two countries using one another as a quick fix for weaknesses they could not resolve alone. As Han Feizi puts it, it was an unlikely relation built on a clear imbalance: on one side, a weak country would work its way out of poverty, save aggressively, and lend money to a rich partner with a reckless spending habit – who would then use that money to buy even more of the poor country’s products. Strange as it sounded, the arrangement worked.
Walmart aisles quickly filled with low-cost clothes, toys, electronics, and household goods, contributing to affordable consumerism during a period of stagnant wages for many. Products that once felt like luxuries became accessible to most American families. For China, the benefits were just as tangible. American demand kept factories running, while millions of rural workers migrated to the coast in search of jobs that offered them a way out of poverty. Dollars flowed from US consumers to Chinese factories and then flowed back to Washington as purchases of US debt, allowing Americans to borrow and consume even more. As Stephen Roach said, China gave Americans a way to “repeal the basic laws of economics”: they could “live beyond their means, and that enabled the Chinese to do the same.”
Like many toxic relationships, however, this marriage of convenience also amplified each partner’s worst imbalances. In the United States, easy access to cheap imports deepened debt and hollowed out industrial towns like Martinsville, Virginia, where textile factories closed, jobs disappeared, and communities were left behind as production shifted overseas. In China, the costs were even more visible: rivers were polluted, air quality was deteriorated, and laborers were overworked. Also, like in human relationships, over time China’s behavior changed in ways that left the other feeling insecure. No longer a poor country desperate for jobs and dollars, China gradually became an industrial and technological powerhouse. With that rise came confidence, nationalism, and a growing desire to assert itself on the global stage. Also, China was no longer confined to filling Walmart aisles with cheap goods: now it began competing in advanced sectors once dominated by the US – from AI and telecommunications to robotics. For Washington, this shift in balance triggered something like an identity crisis, which brings us to the mutual resentment, finger-pointing, anxiety and suspicion we are seeing today. In human terms, this is often the stage that leads to separation, and the United States first attempted to follow that script. Washington began to openly speak of decoupling - a necessary “surgical strike” to reduce dependence on China, de-risk critical supply chains, and bring manufacturing jobs back home. US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick went so far as to imagine an “army” of workers assembling iPhones in the United States. The attempted separation reached its peak on what was called “Liberation Day”, when President Donald Trump imposed tariffs of up to 145% on Chinese products – to which China promptly responded.
Yet this tit-for-that soon revealed how separation between two economic giants can be messy, expensive, and ultimately self-defeating. Tariffs were not deployed like precision weapons, but more like land mines, harming almost everyone in their way. American workers and consumers – those the measures were meant to protect – quickly found themselves caught in the middle. Chinese-manufactured toys that once sold for $21.99 now cost $35, forcing long-standing toy storesin Manhattan to close. Farmers across the Midwest saw sales collapse as China restricted purchases of US soybeans. Nvidia, the crown jewel of American AI, lost billions of dollars in revenue due to restrictions on chip sales - money that could have been reinvested in domestic research. Even more, those same restrictions accelerated China’s push toward technological self-sufficiency.
The deeper lesson, however, goes beyond tariffs. In today’s interconnected supply chains, economic measures often have ripple effects, meaning that actions taken against a partner can have unintended consequences for both sides. Donald Trump often speaks of goods as if they were either “Made in China” or “Made in America,” yet while that worldview made sense in the industrial economy of the twentieth century, it does not make sense in the reality we live in today. In the age of container shipping and digital coordination, almost nothing is fully “made” in one place only: products are, more often than not, assembled from components sourced across multiple countries. Huawei - often depicted as the embodiment of “Made in China” – actually relies heavily on US firms such as Qualcomm and Broadcom for some of its components, and for years its operating system was Google’s Android. This means that sanctions aimed at Huawei inevitably end up harming US companies too. Such is the power of the supply chain in the 21st century.
Photo by mohamed_hassan (pixabay.com)
Rare earths offer an even starker example of how US attempts to project strength can expose new vulnerabilities at home. China controls much of the global supply chain of these critical materials, essential for everything from electric vehicles to advanced weapon systems. When Beijing restricted exports in retaliation for US tariffs, the consequences were immediate. To mention one, Ford shut down a factory in Chicago after it was unable to secure the rare earths needed for electric motors. Research showed that it would take eight to twelve years to rebuilding domestic refining capacity of these materials – if Americans would be willing to shoulder the dirty business of rare earth refining itself. Looking at Baotoutoday, a dry town in China’s Inner Mongolia, it is clear that reshoring production would mean accepting environmental costs that Americans have long outsourced to China. In Baotou, decades of processing have poisoned groundwater and produced a “cancer epidemic” throughout what they are now known as “cancer villages.”
In October 2025, President Trump and President Xi Jinping met in Busan. The meeting felt less like a resolution and more like a tacit recognition of limits. Leading a slowing economy, Xi urged Trump to learn from the recent “twists and turns” of the trade war. On his side, Trump agreed to cut tariffs to 47% and called a “ceasefire” on further escalation. Beijing, in turn, suspended restrictions on rare earth exports for one year. It was, overall, a pause that restored a fragile status quo while leaving the underlying tensions intact. Yet the Busan meeting made one reality impossible to ignore. Over decades, the US and China built production systems projected to function together – one side designing, consuming, and spending; the other manufacturing, assembling, and absorbing the environmental cost. That same structure is now dictating the terms of the relationship for both partners. In a supply-chain world, even an unhappy and suffocating marriage can be cheaper to endure than to escape. And for two unwilling partners forced together by necessity rather than affection, learning how to live together may eventually prove easier than walking away.
Southeast Asia, once regarded as a periphery to the global manufacturing systems, has quickly become a core centre of the world production. Geopolitical tensions, in particular the U.S.-China trade war, increased labour costs in China, and the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic have made multinational companies reconsider their supply chains, moving production to new ASEAN economies like Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
This change is not just a geographic change, but a structural change in the global economy. The integration of the region into international supply chains has been enhanced by competitive labour markets, improved infrastructure and extensive trade agreements such as Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which have increased resilience and efficiency. Meanwhile, the growing financial ecosystem of Southeast Asia, including advanced capital markets, green and infrastructure financing, facilitates industrial development and innovation. But the emergence of the region is not without problems. The complex environment companies and governments have to operate in to maintain long-term growth is indicated by infrastructure gaps, human capital constraints, and geopolitical uncertainties.
The Forces Behind the Shift
The shift of the global manufacturing to Southeast Asia is due to several convergent forces. The post-2018 global trade environment has become characterized by geopolitical diversification, which has changed the way multinational companies organize their supply chains. The escalation of tariffs and the growing political tension between the United States and China posed greater uncertainty to the companies that had a high concentration of production in one country. The trade barriers, regulatory uncertainty, and the threat of disruption of supply at any time made companies rethink the stability of their current networks. Companies have responded by diversifying production in more than one country to minimize exposure to geopolitical shocks and safeguard the continuity of their operations. Their strategic location in Asia, comparatively open trade policies and integration into regional trade agreements have made neighbouring economies like Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia attractive alternatives. This change is indicative of a larger trend in the global supply chain strategy, where risk reduction and operational flexibility are now as important as cost efficiency in investment and production decisions.
The COVID-19 pandemic further supported the urgency of this diversification strategy. The crisis demonstrated the fragility of over-centralised supply chains and the strategic need of flexible, geographically dispersed production networks. Businesses realised that dependence on one nation, even as productive as China, could bring the world to a standstill. As a result, the geopolitical tensions and the vulnerabilities caused by the pandemic increased the pace of investment in ASEAN economies, as companies tried to establish resilient, diversified, and regionally balanced supply chains.
Moreover, Increasing labour expenses in China have emerged as one of the major reasons that have led to the outsourcing of manufacturing to Southeast Asia. In the last ten years, the wages in the manufacturing centres in China have gone up significantly making the country less competitive in terms of cost in labour intensive industries. Conversely, other Southeast Asian nations such as Vietnam and Indonesia are still providing relatively lower labour costsand thus are viable alternatives to industries such as textiles, electronics assembly and consumer goods. As a result, multinational companies that wish to remain cost effective and at the same time remain near the established supply chains are increasingly shifting production to Southeast Asia where an emerging industrial base is supplemented by favourable labour conditions.
Lastly, bilateral free trade agreements and the RCEP have greatly strengthened the regional supply chain connectivity in the Asia-Pacific. RCEP, which encompasses approximately 30 percent of the world GDP, enables the smooth flow of intermediate goods and investment among member economies by harmonising trade rules and reducing tariffs. This structure allows the multinational companies to spread the production to multiple countries in Asia without losing preferential access to the market, which makes it more resilient to geopolitical or pandemic-related shocks. The bilateral agreements like the Japan-Thailand EPA and the Indonesia-Korea CEPA are also complementary and enhance market integration and investment opportunities. Collectively, these institutional arrangements support the transition of the region to interdependent and elastic supply chains.
Financial and Economic Implications
The economic consequences of the manufacturing transformation in Southeast Asia go way beyond the relocation of industries, they are an indication of the new financial geography. Although foreign direct investment (FDI) has declined globally, ASEAN has registered its third year of consecutive growth in the region, while its stock increased by 56% since 2014, reaching $3.9 trillion. The major forces were the increased investors’ interest in finance, renewable energy, electric vehicles (EVs), and the reorganization of the supply chain. Financial sector was the largest inflow, which rose to $92 billion, and R&D activities were increasing rapidly, primarily in Singapore. Even though manufacturing FDI fell a little, it was still significant, representing 66% of all greenfield investments, indicating that ASEAN is still a manufacturing and innovation centre in the world.
Figure 2: Global FDI Flows, 2021–2023 (Billions of US Dollars and Year-on-Year % Change)
Figure 3: ASEAN FDI Flows, 2021–2023 (Billions of US Dollars and Year-on-Year % Change)
These changes are not just operational but reflect more fundamental financial rebalances that have been the basis of the rise of Southeast Asia as a manufacturing centre in the world. The capital markets in the region are also getting more sophisticated, which allows domestic companies to have a wider range of financing options and become more integrated into the global supply chains. The swift increase in green and sustainability bond issuance, including Singapore which leads the ASEAN’s US$7.8 billion green bond market and Vietnam reaching $1.5 billion in 2021, is an example of the growing financial infrastructure that facilitates industrial growth. The fact that Singapore is a regional financial centre also supports the cross-border trade finance and green financing programs, and other countries such as Malaysia and Thailand are also enhancing domestic markets to fund corporate investment. These financial innovations offer the required liquidity, sustainability orientation and capital depth to maintain the industrial and supply chain transformation in the region.
Financing of infrastructure is also very important in maintaining the growth of manufacturing in the Southeast Asia. TheADB and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are development institutions that have increased investments in logistics and energy infrastructure, which has facilitated the industrial transformation of the region. In 2015-2023, ADB and AIIB together invested billions of dollars in transport, power, and connectivity projects in ASEAN. The modernization of the deep-water ports in Vietnam, trans-island logistics corridors in Indonesia and the Eastern Economic Corridor in Thailand are increasing production capacity and intra-regional trade. Such projects do not only improve physical connectivity, but also bring in private capital in the form of public-private partnerships, which forms a basis of long-term supply chain resilience.
The transformation further extends into digital financial systems. Local payment systems are being integrated through regional payment linkages, e.g. the cooperation between Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia to enable quicker, less expensive and more secure cross-border payments. These links lower the transaction costs and contribute to the increase of financial inclusion, particularly among micro, small, and medium enterprises. This financial digitalisation increases the efficiency of trade and is a strong complement to the physical integration which has been attained through diversification of the supply chain.
In spite of such achievements, the development of Southeast Asia as a global manufacturing hub is associated with a number of structural issues that may jeopardize its sustainability in the long run. Among the most urgent problems, infrastructure gaps are still present. Although developed economies like Singapore and Malaysia have advanced their global logistics, port, and digital networks, others, especially in the Mekong subregion, such as Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, are still grappling with poor transport, energy, and digital infrastructure. According to the estimates of the ADB, ASEAN needs more than $2.8 trillion of infrastructure investment between 2023 and 2030 to address the projected economic and population growth. Persistent gaps in connectivity increase transit times, raise shipping and energy costs, and fragment supply chains that rely on just-in-time production. In addition, the disparity in the quality of infrastructure between the coastal and the inland regions restricts the possibility of industrial diversification outside of the major urban centres, which results in development imbalances that inhibit inclusive growth.
The lack of human capital and skills also limits the long-term competitiveness of the region. With the global manufacturing shifting to more high-value, technology-intensive manufacturing, Southeast Asia is experiencing a shortage of skilled engineers, data specialists, and technicians. Whereas other economies such as Singapore and Malaysia have invested a lot in technical education and research and development, others are lagging behind, with the vocational training systems being out of sync with industry requirements. World Bank and ADB reports indicate that a large percentage of the ASEAN workforce will need to be reskilled by 2030 to meet Industry 4.0 technologies, especially in digital, technical, and high-value manufacturing jobs. In the absence of strategic investments in education, STEM programmes, and workforce mobility, most countries will continue to be reliant on low-cost, labour-intensive production, instead of moving towards innovation-based growth.
Lastly, the geopolitical uncertainty is looming large over the rise of Southeast Asia. The same dynamics that have driven its expansion, U.S.-China competition and the global drive towards supply chain diversification, are also the ones that put it at risk of volatility. The trade restrictions, technological decoupling, or regional tensions in the South China Sea could disrupt production networks and deter foreign investment. The strategic neutrality of ASEAN and the enhancement of its collective voice in the multilateral forums will be critical to the stability and investor confidence. The effects of global fragmentation can be reduced through initiatives that strengthen transparency, supply chain security, and financial resilience.
Conclusion
The rise of Southeast Asia as a manufacturing hub in the world is an indication of a strategic repositioning of production, finance, and innovation. The geopolitical tensions, increasing costs in China, and vulnerability to the pandemic have increased the pace of investment in the region, whereas trade agreements, infrastructure, and financial development contribute to the growth. However, there are still obstacles, such as skill shortages and infrastructure differences, and geopolitical risks. The long-term success will involve aligned policies, strong supply chains, and human and physical capital investments.
Thomas Nilsen talks about the current geopolitical dynamics in the High North, and counters the growing media narrative around the 'inevitable' conflict in the Arctic, clarifying realities on the ground. This video podcast also discusses whether Russia has a military advantage over NATO in the Arctic, and considers how any future peace in Ukraine could reshape Arctic geopolitics.
Thomas Nilsen is the Editor of the Barents Observer, a journalist-owned online newspaper covering the key trends and developments in the Euro-Arctic region and northern Russia, publishing in both English and Russian. Its news-desk is located in Kirkenes, a Norwegian Arctic town situated a few kilometres from the borders of Russia and Finland in Norway’s northernmost county – Finnmark.
Interviewers: Will Quilter and Marco Dordoni - Arctic Desk
By Giovanni Giacalone - Central and South America Desk
On October 24, 2025, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the President of Colombia Gustavo Petro, his wife, his son, and Petro’s close associate, Armando Benedetti, over accusations of involvement in the global drug trade.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said in a statement. “Petro has allowed drug cartels to flourish and refused to stop this activity…President Trump is taking strong action to protect our nation and make clear that we will not tolerate the trafficking of drugs into our nation.”
Following the sanctions announcement, Petro named an attorney and stated that he will battle the measure taken by Washington. The Colombian President also praised his approach to countering narcotics: “Combating drug trafficking effectively for decades brings me this measure from the government of the society we helped so much to stop its use of cocaine…Quite a paradox, but not one step back and never on our knees.”
In September, the United States added Colombia to a list of countries failing to cooperate in the war on drugs, for the first time since the Pablo Escobar era.
Gustavo Petro, a former far-left guerrilla leader, claims that his counter-narcotics policy is utilizing a non-repressive approach that prioritises reaching agreements with coca leaf farmers in order to convince them to cultivate other types of crops while, at the same time, using law enforcement to hunt down drug dealers.
However, according to UN data from the Office on Drugs and Crime, the amount of land dedicated to coca cultivation has almost tripled in the past decade to a record 253,000 hectares (625,000 acres) in 2023. Colombia provides around 90% of the cocaine that is sold every year in the U.S.
The Cartel de los Soles
While the Colombian President is accused of failing to cooperate in the drug war, with Colombia being the primary cocaine provider, Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro and his close associates are accused by the U.S. of leading the drug distribution network through the Cartel de los Soles, transporting the merchandise to Mexico, the final distributor.
In July 2025, the US Treasury Department sanctioned Maduro (indicated as the leader of the Cartel), Venezuelan Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez, and Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello Rondon. Other senior regime figures had already been blacklisted in 2020. President Trump has also placed a bounty on Maduro’s head, offering $US50 million for information leading to his arrest.
A drug trafficking organisation formed by high-ranking members of the Venezuelan state and armed forces, the Cartel de los Soles emerged in 1993, when two National Guard generals were investigated for drug trafficking. As brigade commanders, they wore a sun as their insignia, hence the name "Cartel de los Soles." Initially, the group was called "Grupo Fenix," and consisted primarily of majors, colonels, and lower-ranking military personnel. Over time, however, senior officers began to enter the fray, taking control of the trafficking ring and eliminating the lower ranks. The Cartel de los Soles was designated by the Trump administration as a “Foreign Terrorist Organisation” in November 2025.
The weak Petro-Maduro political alliance
In August 2025, after the sanctions imposed by Washington on Maduro and his associates, Colombian President Gustavo Petro expressed his support for the Venezuelan leader, claiming that “Colombia and Venezuela are the same people, the same flag, the same history” and that “any military operation that is not approved by our sister countries is an aggression against Latin America and the Caribbean.” Petro also referred to Simon Bolivar’s call “freedom or death,” further revealing his attempt to bring Colombia closer to Venezuela.
Since being elected president of Colombia in August 2022, Gustavo Petro has gradually sought to distance the country from Western alliances and position himself alongside Maduro and the Bolivarian Alliance. This shift is unsurprising given his past as a member of the M-19, a far-left armed group founded in the 1970s and inspired by the Uruguayan Tupamaros and the Argentine Montoneros. At its height in the mid-1980s, the M-19 was the second largest armed group in Colombia, after the FARC, with the number of active members estimated at between 1,500 and 2,000. The M-19 demobilised in the late 1980s and transitioned to electoral politics.
Former Colombian Defense Minister Juan Carlos Pinzon recently urged the U.S Presidency not to cut off all counter-narcotics aid to Colombia and hike tariffs, because this would affect the Colombian population as well as the military and law enforcement still operating on the frontline against narco-terrorism.
Pinzon instead suggested implementing sanctions against specific individuals who work in support of drug trafficking. This was done a few days later with the sanctions against Petro.
Pinzon was correct in that the situations in Colombia and Venezuela are extremely different and cannot be addressed with the same approach.
Venezuela has been a Bolivarian stronghold for decades, first under Chávez and then under Maduro. U.S. authorities contend that Venezuela has taken on a larger role in regional drug trafficking and has strengthened its ties with Iran, developments that have contributing to instability in the region. Under Maduro, Hezbollah's presence has proliferated in the country, becoming the main launching pad for drug trafficking to the United States.
Colombia, for its part, has always been a staunch ally of Washington, both in the fight against drug trafficking and against terrorism. The Colombian armed forces are trained by the United States and have been working together since the war against the Medellín and Cali cartels in the 1990s.
In 2022, Gustavo Petro was elected president, but despite his efforts, he was unable to separate the country's institutions from Washington. It's no coincidence that during the recent attempted attack by far-left protesters on the US Embassy in Bogotá, Petro had no choice but to deploy riot police to repel the attack, drawing criticism from his own supporters.
Critics argue that Petro’s government could face increasing internal challenges, and sanctions will certainly help. As for Maduro, however, some debate whether increased U.S. engagement may be required in the future, assuming Trump doesn't change his mind at the last minute.
The United States has deployed a massive military force of approximately 10,000 U.S. soldiers, most of them at bases in Puerto Rico, but also a contingent of Marines on amphibious assault ships, as well as F-35 fighters, MQ-9 Reaper drones, eight warships, and a submarine.
US navy ships and aircrafts have been sighted just a few hundreds of miles off the coast of Venezuela, while the US has been conducting raids against more narco-speed boats leaving the coasts of Colombia and Venezuela.
Moreover, the US Navy announced the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford, America’s largest warship, had arrived in the US Southern Command area of operations after US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered the Ford to head to the Caribbean from Europe in late October.
On the other side, this past week, Venezuela has announced a large-scale mobilisation of troops, weapons, and equipment in response to what it calls a growing U.S. military presence in the Caribbean Sea. Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez said land, air, naval, and reserve forces will conduct exercises through Wednesday, describing the operation as a response to what he termed the “imperialist threat” posed by the United States. The maneuvers will also include participation from the Bolivarian militia, a civilian reserve force aligned with the Maduro regime.
Whether all this mobilisation by the US serves merely to pressure the leader to resign peacefully or is instead instrumental in a regime change operation is another matter.
A full-scale U.S. invasion akin to the 1989 operation in Panama is highly improbable given Venezuela’s circumstances. The country’s vast size and complex geography, characterised by mountainous regions and dense jungle, provide ideal conditions for prolonged guerrilla warfare. Moreover, Venezuela’s armed forces are significantly more organised and capable than Panama’s were at the time. In addition, the Trump administration has shown little inclination to initiate new military conflicts.
A more plausible scenario for U.S. involvement might involve indirect support for a domestic uprising against the current regime, potentially through covert operations led by the Central Intelligence Agency, which may or may not already be active within Venezuelan territory.
The data is essential when one also thinks about what methods and schools of thought can be applied from international relations in order to analyse these trends. Many factors play a role when tackling this issue such as international conflicts, socio-economic factors and political aspects. How are schools of thought such as realism, constructivism, feminism and liberalism placed? Is there a connection? This article aims to analyse this and suggest possible future questions that need to be asked.
Schools of thought surrounding gender and international relations
In International relations as well as international affairs once has the main theoretical pillars: realism, liberalism and constructivism. These have been shaping the debates, dialogue and analytical methods of scholars in international relations. Feminist scholars have emerged around 1980-1990s by key figures such as Judith Ann Tickner, Cynthia Enloe, Cynthia Cockburn and V. Spike Peterson. Since then, a lot of debate has happened and there seems to be room for more to come.
As early as 2009, scholars have been addressing the issue of cyber and women’s rights such as Gurumurthy and Menon publishing in Economic and Political Weekly already addressing “Violence against Women via Cyberspace".[1] For this work and analysis they focus on the impact of the economy and IT sector on women’s safety by using a neo-liberalism view shifting the focus strongly towards the institutions and the factors of interdependence. Taking a neo-liberalism view into account when tackling violence against women in the cyber domain would mean that the violence should be reduced since we are all depending on said technology and would be problematic to sabotage it through using it as a medium of violence however, as one can see, the development of violence is still taking place despite the factor of having benefits. Perhaps by applying Keohane’s theory of monitoring, as we see with the banning of social media for youth and making deepfakes as a medium of violence illegal, one could consider analysing violence in the cyber domain from this point of view but that of course leaves room for debate.
Traditional Kenneth Waltz and other scholars are of course the foundation for the international relations and international affairs field and remain fundamental when conducting analysis. However, quite recently in the past years a shift brings about new debates on which theories and schools of thought are appropriate in the using gender in international relations which should then also be applied to addressing the issue if violence against women in the cyber domain. Prügl for instance critically asses the landscape of international relations theories pointing out that: “Waltz suggests that treating gender as a cause of war would be reductionist because it pertains to the individual level of analysis”[2] On the one hand this makes sense when considering a connection between violence against women in the cyber domain and for instance current international conflicts since one wants to focus on the states however, considering the individual is also of importance since the violence is linked to the gender and is proven to continue to be so when looking at the mentioned reports by the UN. Prügl also points out that sociological theories in combination with constructivism provide a bridge to feminist theorizing. This would also speak for an interdisciplinary approach when tackling the issue of violence against women and especially when we consider the cyber domain since one has to combine several theories to tackle the combined matter of states, organisations, individuals, social structures and international conflicts which all play a role with violence in the cyber domain.
Sjoberg for instance points out that one cannot simply identify positivists and non-positivists when tackling gender in international relation scholarship.[3] Furthermore, Sjoberg suggests the notion that gender and international relations is “at it’s best when its and IR research is at its best when it is multimethod, epistemologically pluralist, multisited, and carefully navigates the differences between feminist analyses and large-n statistical studies.”[4] As the changing landscape of war and violence is moving at a rapid pace, scholars of international relations are almost ‘driven’ to adapt also in terms of analysing and interpreting the data. When thinking about future questions, it is beneficial to have multiple methods and keeping the different schools of thought in mind when tackling the fast-changing landscape of violence in the cyber domain however, one should also strive for a comprehensive data collection and analysis in order to make thorough conclusions. The definitions of for example violence, should be clear for all disciplines and scholars in order to be able to draw overlapping conclusions when taking different schools of thought into account.
Conclusion and what are possible future questions
The issue of violence against women physically and other forms of cyber related conflicts should not be treated as separate incidents. It may be too early to say but there seems to be a correlation between cyber related incidents and international world conflict when one sees for instance South Africa facing the “highest levels of gender-based violence” and in Arab states (such as Yemen, Lebanon, Jordan) about 60% of women face online violence.
An interdisciplinary approach by using quantitative as well as qualitative methods (which would speak for a mix of positivist and non-positivist school of thought) allows one to combine several ways in order to tackle issues such as cyber violence and extortion against women (see for instance “Image-Based Sexual Base” research by Nicola Henry et al.)
Therefore, applying international relations theories such as constructivism and feminist theories whilst of course taking the traditional way of thinking of Waltz and Clausewitz into consideration may be of use. The multi-method approach is beneficial and should be used however, with certain caution as well. “Inspired by “gender lenses”, feminist research knows security differently both in terms of where knowledge is to be found (particularly at global politics’ margins, and with/in people), what counts as knowledge (including emotion, experience, and pain), and where knowledge can be found (particularly in nontraditional formats and sources).”[5] Also scholars in the area of international human law are advocating for a feminist approach and speak of “gendering cyberwarfare”.
As international conflicts are changing rapidly, speak hybrid warfare and drone incidents, states are forced to constantly adapt. The same goes for dealing with cyber related conflicts and cyber violence. When looking at women, peace and security, it is well documented that ‘rape’ and ‘violence’ against women is used as a weapon of war Perhaps one should be wary and be careful that the same will not develop in the cyber domain. One already sees an increase of women stepping back being afraid to be a target (especially those working in the public sector). Therefore, one can see great benefit in continuing the debate amongst scholars on how schools of thought can be applied, and which methodologies seem to be fitting.
By continuing to ask questions and finding new ways to analyse the growing issue of violence against women (in the cyber domain) one can then also find possible solutions on how to achieve the end of violence against women. As can be seen from previous debates, scholars on international relations seem to be a bit ‘divided’ on how to implement feminist theories into the present-day international relations field. When looking at the developing issues of cyber-sex trafficking, cyber violence, grooming in the cyber domain, deepfakes, cyber espionage to name a few problems, it seems to be the case that using several methodologies and combining different theoretical ways of thinking are for now ‘the way to go’.
[1] GURUMURTHY, ANITA, and NIVEDITHA MENON. “Violence against Women via Cyberspace.” Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 44, no. 40, 2009, pp. 19–21. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25663650. Accessed 27 Nov. 2025.
[2] Prügl, Elisabeth, “Gender as a cause of conflict,” International Affairs 99: 5 (2023) 1885–1902; doi: 10.1093/ia/iiad184
By Joseph Moses - Culture, Society & Security Desk
Introduction
The term “dehumanization”, although popular in the political lexicon, is notorious for often generating debate on its usage, rather than addressing the incidents and crimes it is supposed to aggregate and label. As it lacks a legal and fixed definition under international law, it means that a consensus can be drawn about attention to the subject only when sufficient political momentum is built up, or, in retrospect, when these activities lead to crimes labelled under international criminal law, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and/or genocide.
While this article will address the relatively abstract, intangible and subjective natures of this term, it will focus more on the challenges that the implementation of international law faces regarding the destruction of intangible cultural heritage (ICH). This destruction leads to the dehumanization of certain demographic groups, placing them under the risk of ethnic cleansing and, potentially, crimes addressed under international criminal law. ICH broadly consists of customs, beliefs, traditions, languages and cultural expressions. In the investigation and proceedings related to an ongoing or past genocide, destructing of ICH (and advocating for the latter) can be covered by the clause of intent in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. Dehumanization precedes Genocide, and this often involves a long process of de-legitimization, condemnation and destruction of the targeted social group’s ICH as part of their dehumanization.
International frameworks and risk factors
The United Nations, in 2014, launched its Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes which is a tool outlining 14 risk factors to observe and analyze the risk of atrocity crimes and their preceding symptoms. While the Framework specifies that in the initial stages it is not always possible to identify the trajectory of trends into crimes, it divides risk factors into “specific risk factors” which outline precursors to specific crimes using their legal definitions. Under the subcategories of Genocide (Risk Factor 10) and War Crimes (Risk Factor 13), it outlines in detail the application of dehumanisation trends against groups of people.
Sub-factors 10.3, 10.5 and 10.7 specify targeted systemic discriminatory practices against the lives and freedoms of a protected group, even if not reaching the level of elimination. They address the usage of methods intended to dehumanize, humiliate, or coerce and fragment the group with an intention to change the group’s identity, and declaring euphoria at the control of protected groups.
In the context of an armed conflict, sub-factors 13.4, 13.5, and 13.6 specify the promotion of ethnicity or religion as a determinant of national allegiance, the dehumanization of particular groups by exhibiting disrespect for their traditions, values, objects and institutions, and the adoption of measures that curtail the rights of protected groups who are perceived to be aligned to a hostile group.
Legal gaps and challenges in protecting intangible Cultural Heritage
It must be noted that to provide cover for discriminatory policies of exerting control over a group, states and hostile actors may also indefinitely extend the status of armed occupation or armed conflict by declaring security measures. The tool acknowledges that the intention behind these actions can often be calculated with certainty only in retrospect and that even those indicators may not be explicit. It highlights that even if uncertain, the intent to annihilate could always exist. It must be noted that while genocide and ethnic cleansing are not spontaneous acts, case law has associated intent with State or organizational policy.
The destruction and de-legitimization of ICH can take place during either peace time, periods of curfew, or active conflicts. Due to this state of definitional limbo, policies emphasizing security reasons for freedom restrictions pose a significant threat against the identity of certain groups of people, especially when they affect practices like gatherings. Re-shaping educational policy after specific narratives under the guise of de-radicalization, beyond directly targeting tangible cultural heritage as the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, describes that there is a deep-seated interdependence between ICH and tangible cultural and natural heritage, and that ICH is something that is constantly recreated and transmitted from generation to generation. Thus, beyond dehumanization, actions against ICH aim at also de-legitimizing ICH practices by breaking its continuity, hoping to expel or replace and reform the groups of people whose identity is tied to these practices.
Safeguarding cultural identity
It has been pointed out that the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict is not sufficient in addressing protections for ICH. Dr. Chainoglou, associate professor at the University of Macedonia, writes that the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, together with the norms of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and other international legal regimes, provides legal protection for intangible cultural heritage in all phases in the event of an armed conflict. While there are legal protections during times of armed conflict, the momentum and migratory flows from conflict zones cause complications to the actual protective capability and resources at the disposal of international regimes. This places a higher degree of onus on refugee diasporas or severely affected groups to rebuild and revive ICH (although ICH can still be continued by transforming its identity with derivations from the respective conflict itself), rather than on the aggressor upholding these protections.
While the dehumanization also contributes to deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of a group under Article II of the Genocide Convention of 1948, as precursors are often social and political and can be intentional or unintentional in their nature and conception, determining intent to commit genocide can be the most ambiguous at this stage. This further complicates the interpretation and enforcement of international law if the aggressor (State) uses the turbulence caused by declared security and reform policies, i.e., under domestically legal and bureaucratic procedures that adversely affect a group’s ICH, especially when intended to do so. The 2003 UNESCO Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage provides a broad interpretation of “cultural heritage” but still places the onus of the protection of cultural heritage on the State against their intentional destruction. The 2003 Declaration also consolidates peacetime protections for [intangible] cultural heritage and the responsibilities of States across the entirety of international cultural heritage law applicable during peacetime. While Article VI of the Declaration covers State responsibility in the event of destruction of cultural heritage regardless of whether it is inscribed on a UNESCO or another international organization’s list, under international law, there is debate about the lack of explicitly lower thresholds of what constitutes heritage, especially when the affected and disenfranchised groups tend to have a more holistic approach to what is considered cultural heritage.
While it is no secret that the enforcement of international law is entirely subjective based on the enforcing State’s interest, the protections afforded to ICH face significant challenges during peacetime, especially if its targeting is constantly upheld through perceived innocuous policies citing higher priority agendas such as reform and security campaigns, regardless of intent – unless the intention is explicitly stated. While a trend can be drawn retrospectively, the high threshold for what constitutes ICH and what can and must be protected by States becomes an ambiguity which can be adjusted conveniently, especially when the affected groups have a lower threshold and a higher degree of holistic approach to what they consider their ICH and its destruction. This gradual and subtle wedging and fragmenting of customs and practices (while having multiple effects on the affected group’s identity) allows political precedent to be set to trigger further cascading motions of dehumanization and disassociation of identity from the group.
The growing population and economies of South Asia are crucially dependent on its rivers and lands. Major rivers like Brahmaputra, Ganges, and Indus are the main sources of agriculture, energy, and livelihood. The region inhabits about a quarter of the world's population but only around four percent of its renewable waters. Global Environmental Change (GEC) is exacerbating glacial melt and shifting monsoon patterns causing extreme frequent floods and droughts. In terms of energy, South Asia is facing chronic deficiency - infrastructure strain and fuel import dependence have led many areas without reliable power. Experts argue that without new and efficient sources of energy which is causing “energy and power shortages”, could lead to crises. Altogether, these strains on water, food, and energy, accentuates urgent need for coordinated policies.
The Water-Energy-Food Nexus in South Asia
Water produces energy and is crucial for agriculture which provides food. Water management is “undoubtedly complex and interlinked with other significant challenges, including energy and food security, [and] agricultural production”. Agriculture uses most of South Asia’s freshwater and its farmers are heavily dependent on groundwater for irrigation. The tubewells/pumps used for the irrigation are run by diesel or electricity, which means energy shortfalls or high costs would adversely impact food production. Reciprocally, thermal power plants need high volumes of water for cooling, so water scarcity can also put strain on energy output. On the other hand, hydropower depends on rivers that also irrigate agricultural lands. In sum, activities in one sector often popple across other sectors. Integrated and coordinated approaches are therefore important for planning.
The stress due to GEC intensifies these interlinked water-food-energy nexus. Glacial melt and extreme droughts may lead to pumping of more groundwater, increasing demands for energy and depleting aquifers. Moreover, extreme droughts or floods can sever power generation. In the absence of cross-sectoral planning, South Asian countries are risking the opportunity to solve one problem, only to worsen another. In view of this, analysts argue that any policies for South Asian “development” must take into account these interdependencies.
Transboundary Water Management
Majority of South Asia’s waters come from the high Himalayas - highlighting the transnational character of these waters. These basins flow across multiple countries, yet formal cooperation is very limited and narrow in scope. No region-wide institution is in place to manage these shared basins with the exception of a few bilateral treaties that cover dozens of cross-boundary rivers. For example, India and Bangladesh, which share fifty-four rivers, have a Joint Rivers Commission and a 1996 Ganges water-sharing treaty. India and Pakistan have the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 - but currently in abeyance. India also has a 1996 Mahakali Treaty with Nepal as well as multiple powersharing agreements with Bhutan. Despite these limited agreements, there is no comprehensive cooperative framework among all riparians, majority of whose headwaters originate in China.
This assortment of water sharing is not sufficient in times of growing demands. Urbanizations and agricultural expansion are exploiting rivers and groundwater unsustainably, putting the region under water stress unless there is any improvement in management. Yet national policies are centred around short-term un-sustainable developmental goals without any consideration of its cross-sectoral and cross-boundary impacts. In these crucial times, countries prioritizing zero-sum games and competition over collaboration highlight how much they are worried about human and environmental security instead of national - ironically achieving neither.
Building of trust among South Asian countries is a constant challenge because of factors not limited to historical rivalries and concerns - which has led to minimal transparency and sharing of crucial environmental data. Increased data sharing and transparency are critical for riparian countries to negotiate equal and sustainable usage of waters. If the riparian countries of South Asia seek shared water security, cooperation over conflict offers a good chance for equitable and sustainable management.
Regional Energy Integration
South Asian countries are exploring cross-border trade of power to fill energy gaps. A World Bank researcher argues that in case of a unified South Asian regional “market”, untapped hydro resources could nearly double its generation capacity, and adding a moderate carbon tax could raise hydropower output by roughly 2.7 times over two decades. Another analysis highlights that electricity sharing would let South Asian countries exploit complementarities - for example, distribution of surplus peak to deficit area.
Some regional approaches are in process of materializing. Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal are discussing grid connections and energy corridors. For example, plans for an Easter Waterways Grid proposes linking river ports and transmission lines between India and Bangladesh, also connecting Bhutan and Nepal to facilitate trade. This initiative is projected to benefit some six-hundred million people across the sub-region. India has already positioned itself as a power-trade hub - it exports power to Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Nepal, while importing from Bhutan and Nepal. These examples are early steps toward a limited integrated system. If expanded to all South Asian countries, such trading would allow surplus power to flow in deficit regions, smoothing out fluctuations and lowering costs. Achieving sustainable energy security in South Asia is only possible through regional collaboration.
Agriculture, Food Security, Energy
Agriculture is the biggest provider of employment and food security in South Asia. It needs both water and energy, not only for irrigation but also for fertilisation, mechanisation, and post-harvest cold storage. Irrigation uses majority of freshwater in some areas. This means that any shortage in water or power can directly impact the crop production and harvests. Ignoring these linkages could backfire and undermine both food and energy security of the region.
As of 2021, nearly eight percent of the people in region lack access to reliable grid-based electricity, an forty-seven percent remain inaccessible to clean cooking fuels and technologies. In addition to this, the existing inefficiencies of the system has given rise to a three-fold challenge - “energy security, energy equity, and environmental sustainability”.
GEC-led variability adds complex challenges to the food production. The changing monsoon patterns and decreasing glacial melt in late summer can leave fields parched at important times. Simultaneously, increase in the occurrence of frequent floods are damaging crops and land. A cooperative regional approach could help reducing these risks. For example, sharing efficient practices in irrigation or rural electrification would yield benefits. Coordinated flood forecasting and storage-release policies could improve water use across borders to protect food and power systems.
Conclusion
The potential benefits of collaboration is enormous. For example, the increase in hydropower generation through regional markets could replace the need for expensive fuel-import, reducing carbon emissions and energy costs. An efficient, coordinated, and equitable water management could protect agriculture and industry from instability. The increase in transboundary power trade could also secure energy. Shared infrastructure could improve disaster resilience. Though this article may seem pointing towards a more ideal scenarios, but acknowledging the geopolitical barriers, water-food-energy nexus itself leaves no choice but to accept the fact that share challenges need shared solutions.
