Pakistan Archives – ITSS Verona

July 18, 2026 — No Comments

Theaterisation of India’s Armed Forces and its impact on South Asian Security

By Zorawar Singh - South Asia Team

During India’s 73rd Independence day speech in 2019, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the creation of the position of a ‘Chief of Defence Staff’ (CDS) who would be responsible for enhancing the integration of the Indian Armed Forces and “to bring about synergy in operation, logistics, transport, training, support services, communications, repairs and maintenance, etc of the three Services.” (Press Information Bureau, 2020). The years following the announcement were marred by inter-service rivalries and concerns over the division of assets, expressed particularly by the Indian Air Force (IAF) until April 2026 when the then CDS General Anil Chauhan stated that a proposal on theaterisation would soon be shared with the government following a “100 per cent agreement on the concept of theaterisation” even as minor differences on the implementation persisted. While a specific timeline for when these reforms will be implemented has not yet been specified, given India’s position as a major, if not premier, military power in the South Asia, these are likely to have a significant impact on South Asian security.

Impact on the Indian Armed Forces

At present, the three branches of the Indian Armed Forces operate largely independently of each other and are organised under ‘commands’. The Army has seven commands (six operations and one training command), the Air Force has seven (five operational and two functional), and the Navy has three. This has resulted in issues such as parallel command structures, resource duplication, and slower decision-making. Committees such as the Kargil Review Committee (1999) and the Shekatkar Committee (2016) have emphasised the need for India’s armed forces to develop a more joint method of functioning, and theaterisation seeks to model India’s military more along the lines of Western ones, where the assets of all branches work in tandem to enhance operational effectiveness.

From India's perspective, theaterisation promises several operational advantages. First, integrated commands could improve intelligence sharing, streamline logistics, and enable faster responses during military crises. Second, unified command structures may also reduce bureaucratic friction between services and improve the efficient allocation of defence resources. This is particularly relevant in the context of India's security challenges. The 2020 Galwan Valley clashes with China highlighted the need for rapid coordination between ground forces, air assets, surveillance systems, and logistical networks. Similarly, India's continuing rivalry with Pakistan requires the capability to respond effectively across multiple domains and fronts, as seen in the clashes in May 2025.

A more integrated military structure could therefore enhance India's deterrence capabilities by increasing the credibility of its conventional military power. Potential adversaries may perceive a theaterised Indian military as more capable of executing coordinated operations, thereby raising the costs associated with military escalation.

Impact on the India-Pakistan Military Balance

The impact of theaterisation of Indian Armed Forces on India-Pakistan relations is likely to be mixed. On one hand, enhanced military coordination could strengthen deterrence by reducing uncertainty regarding India's ability to mobilise and conduct operations. A more effective conventional force may discourage Pakistan from engaging in limited military provocations or supporting cross-border militant activities and Op. Sindoor showcased India’s willingness to respond to terror attacks in India with conventional force, including the targeting of assets and infrastructure belonging to the Pakistani armed forces.

On the other hand, Pakistan may interpret theaterisation as part of a broader effort by India to achieve conventional military superiority. Given the asymmetry in economic and military resources between the two states, Pakistanhas traditionally relied on nuclear deterrence to offset India's conventional advantages. Any reform that significantly enhances India's operational capabilities could reinforce Pakistani concerns regarding strategic vulnerability. This perception may further encourage Pakistan to modernise its military capabilities, leading to reforms within Pakistan as seen with the establishment of the Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC), invest in advanced missile systems, and continue expanding its tactical nuclear arsenal. Such developments could contribute to a regional security dilemma, whereby measures taken by one state to increase its security are perceived as threatening by another, resulting in reciprocal military build-ups.

Furthermore, the reality of the India-Pakistan rivalry has gradually been altered since the Uri attacks in 2016. The Modi-led government, during each major terror attack in its tenure, has shown a willingness to go up the escalation ladder from limited surgical strikes in 2016, limited airstrikes in 2019, to now an exchange of missiles and drones targeting military assets and infrastructure. The ruling Bhartiya Janata Party government’s voters now expect a ‘strong’ response (targeting the Pakistani army directly) whenever a terror attack occurs in Indian territory, meaning the window and scope for a negotiated resolution have become significantly smaller. To add to this, Pakistan’s continued and growing cooperation with China in countering India’s traditional military advantage will likely also be furthered by India’s military reforms, besides impacting the relationship between India and China, as discussed below.

The China Factor

The most important strategic driver behind India’s theaterisation of its armed forces is arguably China's growing military power. Since the 2020 border crisis, Indian defence planners have increasingly focused on the challenge posed by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). China's own military reforms offer an important point of comparison. Between 2015 and 2017, Beijing undertook extensive military restructuring, replacing its traditional military regions with integrated theatre commands designed to improve joint operations. Chinese reforms have significantly enhanced the PLA's ability to coordinate forces across different domains and operational theatres.

Indian policymakers view theaterisation partly as a response to this changing military balance. By integrating its own command structures, India seeks to improve readiness and operational effectiveness in the event of future border confrontations. Enhanced jointness may enable India to better coordinate surveillance, airpower, logistics, and ground operations across the Himalayan frontier.

However, this dynamic may also contribute to intensifying strategic competition between Asia's two rising powers. As both states continue to modernise their militaries and improve operational capabilities, the risk of military rivalry becoming increasingly institutionalised cannot be dismissed. While theaterisation itself is not inherently destabilising, it forms part of a broader pattern of military modernisation occurring on both sides of the border. Furthermore, an increase in tensions between China and India has the potential to spill over into a wider regional confrontation where both states may seek to increase their influence in other South Asian countries and see attempts by the other to do the same as a potentially hostile act by the third state.

In conclusion, India’s theaterisation reforms may be aimed solely at enhancing its own military readiness and the joint operational capability of its armed forces and may be without an offensive goal in mind. However, this may not be how other states, particularly Pakistan and China view it, and reciprocal reforms and measures to enhance their own capability have the potential to lead to an increased risk of conventional conflict in South Asia, a reality which was briefly seen in the India-Pakistan conflict in 2025.

March 26, 2025 — No Comments

The Security Landscape of South Asia: A Country-Wise Analysis

by Arslan Sheikh, Ido Raz, Quanita Khan, & Sabur Shah - South Asia Desk

Introduction

The countries of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are all located in South Asia. The sub-region holds immense geopolitical significance at a global scale, characterised by its diverse political structures, economic interdependencies, and security complexities. The region’s security architecture is shaped by traditional geopolitical concerns, including military conflicts, border disputes, and threats of nuclear deterrence, as well as non traditional threats such as climate change, cyber vulnerabilities, terrorism, and transnational crime.

In this study, we will examine and discuss the security situation in each South Asian country within the context of existing international security frameworks and treaties from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

Afghanistan

Afghanistan’s security landscape remains precarious following the return of the Taliban to power in August 2021, leading to international concerns over governance and regional stability. Following accusations of human rights violations of women and minorities, the new regime faces recognition issues from the international community. Due to its strategic location, Kabul’s internal security challenges are problematic for South and Central Asian countries. For instance, the expansion of the Khorasan branch of the Islamic State (ISIS-K) in Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover led to serious concerns in many capitals over cross-border terrorism leakage, either through physical attacks or through radical propaganda. In addition, the harboring of other militant groups, such as the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Al-Qaeda, increases regional tensions and international distrust of Kabul.

Afghanistan, under Taliban rule, faces a severe humanitarian crisis characterized by the systematic exclusion of 2.5 million girls from education beyond sixth grade and 1.1 million women from universities. The maternal mortality rate is alarmingly high at 622 deaths per 100,000 births, while tensions along the Durand Line with Pakistan create ongoing instability. Approximately 8 million Afghans have fled the country, with thousands perishing during migration attempts. The country continues to be a focal point for international security cooperation, mainly through the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and multilateral counterterrorism frameworks.

Afghanistan faces severe food insecurity and an economic crisis exacerbated by international sanctions and humanitarian constraints. Additionally, environmental degradation and internal displacement contribute to the region’s broader security challenges.

Bangladesh

Due to a recent change in leadership, Bangladesh is still politically vulnerable and has effectively mitigated internal security risks through counterterrorism measures in coordination with regional security frameworks. However, challenges persist in managing sporadic border tensions with Myanmar and India, requiring continued diplomatic engagement and cross-border management strategies.

From a nontraditional security perspective, Bangladesh is one of the most climate-vulnerable countries with rising sea levels threatening coastal communities and agricultural production. Additionally, the Rohingya refugee crisis continues to strain national resources, necessitating sustained international support from organizations such as UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Bhutan

Bhutan maintains a stable security environment but remains engaged in boundary negotiations with China, which has significant implications for its economic relations with India. The country upholds a policy of strategic neutrality and actively participates in regional security initiatives under SAARC.

Bhutan faces non-traditional security concerns in its fiscal deficits, climate disasters, and food production scarcity. Due to minimal refinancing and exchange rate risks from the loans it took from India, Bhutan is facing a hydroelectric debt. The country experiences a high seismic activity as it is located in the Himalayan mountains — between the Indian and Eurasian tectonic plates. As an area prone to earthquakes and floods, agricultural loss makes food production relatively hard. Bhutan has growing concerns over climate change, particularly the impact of glacial melt on hydropower generation. Bhutan’s proactive environmental policies align with global frameworks such as the Paris Agreement, yet external climate pressures remain a persistent challenge.

India

India’s security posture is shaped by its border tensions with Pakistan and China, particularly in Jammu & Kashmir, Aksai Chin, and Arunachal Pradesh, with ongoing disputes over territorial claims.

As the largest military power in South Asia, India prioritizes defense modernization, strategic deterrence, and maritime security, particularly through multilateral frameworks such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad).

Beyond conventional threats, India faces significant non-traditional security challenges, including escalating cybersecurity risks. Additionally, climate change-induced glacier melt continues to threaten regional water security and disrupt food supply chains, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities.

Maldives

The Maldives is a key player in Indian Ocean security, balancing relations between India and China while addressing maritime security challenges such as illegal fishing and transnational crime. Its participation in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) underscores its commitment to regional stability.

Climate change represents an existential threat, with rising sea levels endangering national infrastructure and livelihoods. The Maldives seeks financial and technological support from initiatives like the Global Climate Fund (GCF) to enhance climate resilience

Nepal

Nepal’s security considerations are influenced by its geographical positioning between India and China. Border disputes with India and China and economic dependencies shape its strategic outlook, necessitating a balanced foreign policy approach.

Nepal is highly vulnerable to earthquakes and glacial retreats, both of which threaten national infrastructure and water security. The rapid loss of Himalayan glaciers poses severe risks to downstream populations reliant on water reserves, emphasizing the need for sustainable disaster management policies.

Pakistan

Pakistan’s security landscape remains dominated by tensions with India over Kashmir, coupled with national security threats posed by terrorism. The exchanges of cross-border airstrikes with Iran and Afghanistan have further caused regional political instability and a degradation of diplomatic dialogue. Afghanistan, under the Taliban regime, has targeted areas in Pakistan’s Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Moreover, it is accused of allowing and supporting cross-border attacks from Afghanistan inside Pakistani soil by the TTP and various militant groups. In response to the Afghan-based attacks, Pakistan conducted several airstrikes aimed against the TTP military posts in North Waziristan, which have increased tensions between the two neighbors. Other militant groups, such as the Balochistan Liberation Army (accused of being supported by India—India has officially denied such allegations, and no verifiable evidence has been presented to confirm these claims)—leverage Islamabad’s security problems in an attempt to damage valuable economic projects to further increase security instability in the country. Islamabad is engaged in counterterrorism efforts under the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to combat illicit financial networks and cooperate with South and Central Asian countries' counterterrorism institutes.

Water scarcity and economic instability further exacerbate Pakistan’s security challenges. As a low-income country, Pakistan is highly dependent on agricultural production. With growing climate vulnerabilities, the country remains dependent on external assistance and multilateral economic interventions. Pakistan remains the 5th most vulnerable country on the Global Climate Risk Index.

Sri Lanka

Despite the end of its decades-long civil war, ethnic and religious tensions continue to pose security risks. The 2019 Easter bombings highlighted the ongoing threat of Islamist extremism in the country. Political instability, coupled with post-war reconciliation challenges, remains a concern.

Sri Lanka is currently grappling with a severe financial crisis, which has led to widespread economic instability. Additionally, the country faces the impacts of climate change, with coastal erosion and shifting monsoons threatening agriculture and food security.

Conclusion

South Asia's security landscape is complex, balancing traditional threats such as geopolitical conflicts and non-traditional risks like climate change and cyber threats. Addressing these requires regional cooperation, policy innovation, and sustainable security frameworks. The new ITSS South Asia team will attempt to address the following challenges while suggesting proper solutions the international community could employ to mitigate them.

January 19, 2025 — No Comments

The Kashmir Conflict: The Tip of a Dangerous Glacier – Part II

by Davide Gobbicchi - Human Security Team

Having illustrated the region’s history and political structure, this second part of the article will look at the solutions to the Kashmir conflict proposed throughout the last decades, and the underlying motivations behind their failure to be adopted.

Solutions to the Kashmir Conflict

The debate around Kashmir has offered three major solutions to the current stalemate:

Political Independence

A strand of the academic debate around Kashmir has argued that granting the region independence would lift the burden off the shoulders of India and Kashmir (thus the international community) while simultaneously allowing the Kashmiri people to best safeguard their own unique identity. This approach presents two problems:

Fractured Kashmiri Identity: as mentioned in the first paragraph of this paper, the seven decades of war characterizing Kashmir have greatly consumed the Kashmiriyat and the regional identity resulting from it, polarizing communities and fueling division. Within this context, it is hard - if not impossible - to imagine the Kashmiri people being able to agree on independence and on what country to build afterwards.
Indo-Pakistani opposition: given Kashmir’s importance to both New Delhi and Islamabad (more of this in the next paragraph), it is even harder to believe that either of the two countries would ever grant its part of the region independence.

2. Formal Partition

Several authors such as Wolpert argue that a formal partition of Kashmir based on the Line of Control between India and Pakistan would be the “most realistic solution”; however, this policy would face two problems:

Conflicting views regarding partition: while some of India and Kashmir’s major political actors have accepted the current Line of Control as the new Indo-Pakistani border, Pakistan has several times categorically opposed it without providing feasible alternatives, thereby leaving no margin of political dialogue.
Prerequisites for peace are treated as consequences of future peace: the transformation of the LoC into a soft border, and Kashmir’s demilitarization have for decades been seen as the two fundamental initial steps to be taken towards a conflict resolution in Kashmir. However, despite pressures from the international community, both India and Pakistan refuse to take significant measures in that direction, each waiting for the other to make the first move. Within this strategy adopted by both sides in the conflict, it seems unlikely that a common agreement on Kashmir’s formal partition will be achieved any time soon.

3. Autonomy

The debate on Kashmir’s autonomy has rotated around two kinds of autonomy:

Separate autonomy: this approach advocates for the establishment of five different autonomous provinces (Kashmir; Jammu; Ladakh; Azad Kashmir; Gilgit-Baltistan) with the following characteristics:

free access to one another and to/from India and Pakistan;
individual democratic constitution(s) and legislature for all local issues;
defense and financial treaties between India and Pakistan for regional defense and foreign affairs;
a high-level governing body (comprising India; Pakistan and the 5 Autonomous Provinces) for cross-regional issues and demilitarization;

Joint autonomy: another frequently discussed option, it envisages the creation of a no-borders Kashmir Economic Union with India and Pakistan jointly managing defense and foreign affairs, and the current Line of Control separating the two parts of Kashmir being a mere formality.

Despite this third solution being the most popular and feasible (for it would be the one to best balance Kashmiri desire for autonomy and Indo-Pakistani interests), it nonetheless presents - similarly to the other two solutions previously discussed - two major issues:

Prerequisites for peace treated as consequences of future peace: (same as in the “formal partition” solution.)
Indian repression of Kashmiris’ attempts to engage in “political building processes”: the 2019 abrogation (discussed in the previous paragraph) of articles 370 and 35a of the Indian Constitution led to a centralization of power in the hands of New Delhi; this move hindered local forms of political engagement that would have helped India and Pakistan develop solutions to the conflict accepted by the very people living the conflict. The consequent de-legitimacion and de-responsabilisation of Kashmiri civil society drew locals away from official political processes and pushed them towards underground organizations that provided fertile ground to the Islamization and radicalization of society.

As shown in this paragraph, all three major solutions to the Kashmir conflict offered by the international academic debate present problems that make them unfeasible in the short run. These issues are largely the product of Indian and Pakistani unwillingness to compromise, much to the disadvantage of the region’s population. It is by now clear that the limbo in which Kashmir finds itself is nothing but a reflection of the critical nature of Indo-Pakistani relations worsened by their respective national interests. The paper will now turn to this.

Map 1: Erstwhile Princely State of Jammu & Kashmir. Currently, Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir are administered by Pakistan, UT of Jammu & Kashmir and UT of Ladakh by India, and Aksai Chin by China.
Source and link: Wikimedia Commons.

Indo-Pakistani motivations behind the Kashmir conflict

The inability - or unwillingness - to take significant steps towards the resolution of Kashmir’s current state of affairs by both New Delhi and Islamabad conceals deep-rooted interests and discourses on both sides of the conflict: Kashmir’s resource-rich nature and important role as a water supplier make it vital for both countries’ economy. From a geopolitical point of view, the region serves as a bridge connecting South Asia to Central Asia and China, constituting a major economic corridor for both India and Pakistan. Apart from these obvious reasons, Kashmir plays a bigger role in both countries’s identity; let us analyze each of the two nations’ point of view:

India’s discourses and interests in Kashmir: there are three major motivations behind New Delhi’s desire to control Kashmir:

Muslim Kashmir as a confirmation of India’s pluralist and secular federalism: Kashmir gradually became the symbol of India’s secular side of the political debate, which saw the region’s internal and external diversity as the alternative to hindu-nationalism.
Avoid the Balkanisation of the country: granting Kashmir independence would in turn foment nationalisms all over the diverse Indian nation, posing a serious threat to the country’s stability and unity.
Avoid the radicalisation of the subcontinent: as many analysts claim, an independent (even more Pakistani) Kashmir would likely become a safe haven for islamic fundamentalism, which would then easily spill into India fomenting religious radicalism (islamic in action, hindu in reaction).

Pakistan’s discourses and interests in Kashmir: similarly to India, we find three main reasons for the country’s claims on Kashmir:

Muslim Kashmir as the last piece in the national unification process: Pakistan gradually came to perceive itself as the homeland in which all muslims of South Asia could unite under one common Islamic Republic; given this self-bestowed identity and role, Kashmir - being the only muslim region of the subcontinent not under Pakistani control - represents the ultimate confirmation of the country’s identity.
Religious sentiment as a means to ensure national unity: given the complex internal problems currently faced by the country, promoting the narration of a jihad in Kashmir against foreign oppressors could unite the people of Pakistan and distract them from bigger looming problems.
The Pakistan Army’s major role in the country: the historical importance of the army in Pakistan has given it a great amount of political power; any (quasi) conflict increases the army’s power and legitimacy within society, whereas any stability has the opposite effect. Given the army’s weight in the decisions of Islamabad, it is no wonder that the government has so far promoted a policy of destabilization across Kashmir.

Conclusion

As this paper has shown, Kashmir is a complex region with a unique history and identity. Despite the erosion of Kashmiriyat tolerance and the rise of religious fundamentalism caused by seven decades of war, this identity still exists and should not be ignored by Indo-Pakistani processes of national homogenisation; it should rather be given voice to by official political channels, so as to avoid the proliferation of alternative violent forms of civic engagement - namely terrorism. Granting the region autonomy (as mentioned in the third solution of the third section of this paper) could be a mean to avoid this; however, given Kashmir’s complex political division and the clashing interests and discourses of India and Pakistan, a joint or separate autonomy for the region seems highly unlikely in the short run. While India perceives protests in Kashmir as the product of a Pakistani-backed radical minority, Pakistan sees the turmoils as a natural expression of the popular religious and nationalistic sentiment; consequently, each country believes the other to be the main reason behind the continuation of the conflict, and itself as the only solution to it. Given its position, a prolonged destabilization and radicalisation of Kashmir could bear consequences on the larger Asian region; given the nuclear-power status of both India and Pakistan, a worsening of their relations could have repercussions on the larger international community. It is therefore of utmost importance to avoid the crystallization of the conflict. Three important steps could have positive effects in this direction:

Promote local forms of civic and political engagement (as opposed to India’s abrogation of article 370 and the consequent disruptive effect that it had on Kashmiri society).
Take concrete actions tackling regional fundamentalism and terrorism (as opposed to Pakistan’s current ambiguity and past sponsorship of major radical islamist groups).
Promote Indo-Pakistani confidence-building measures to reduce fear and mutual mistrust, thereby creating a channel for communication and ultimately cooperation (as opposed to the historically poor Indo-Pakistani relations characterized by 4 major wars and several clashes).

While the international community has since the failed UN mediation of 1947 always regarded Kashmir as a private issue between the two countries, it is by now clear that India and Pakistan alone are unable - or unwilling - to come to realistic solutions. The international community should then change its approach to Kashmir and act as a mediator between New Delhi and Islamabad in order to ensure the fulfillment of the three policies just mentioned, able to constitute a solid basis from which to later achieve a more ambitious regional autonomy; major actors directly affected by the region’s instability - such as China or Russia - could start working in this direction, consequently dragging the US and the EU (both afraid of leaving the region in the hands of Moscow and Beijing) into the region with the UN supervising cooperation among great powers. The need to change our approach to the Kashmir conflict is drastic and urgent, for it affects not only the region’s stability and security, but that of the international community as a whole.

November 23, 2024 — No Comments

The Kashmir Conflict: The Tip of a Dangerous Glacier- Part I

by Davide Gobbicchi - Human Security Team

The return to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan has shed light on Central Asia’s geopolitics and security issues, with many analysts fearing that Afghanistan would initiate a domino effect of destabilisation and Islamic radicalisation across a particularly unstable region of the world. Kashmir has best symbolised the complexity of South Asia, given its decades of instability, ethnoreligious tensions and major great powers' interests. Assessing this region helps us understand one of the most strategic and complex areas in the world.

This article attempts to uncover the motivations behind the long-standing conflict that turned Kashmir into the world’s most militarised region, to consequently try providing policy recommendations that could bring Kashmir stability and development, much to the benefit of its people, the larger geographical area, and the international community as a whole.

This article will be divided into two parts: the first will focus on the region’s historical and sociocultural context as well as its political structure, investigating the factors behind Kashmiris’ unique identity and the developments leading Kashmir to its current state of affairs; the second part will then analyse the solutions to the conflict proposed by the recent international academic literature and try to uncover the motivations behind Indo-Pakistani inability to implement such solutions, finishing by presenting policy recommendations for the actors involved in the conflict.

Understanding Kashmir: history and cultural identity

Kashmir’s geographical position at the crossroads of empires and its predominantly mountainous nature created throughout the centuries two conditions common to such regions across the world: a highly heterogeneous population within an isolated territory. The centuries-old melting pot resulting from the region’s location destroyed classic patterns of identity (religion and language) and generated a society with incongruous religious-linguistic divisions, thus preventing the radicalisation of social groups along ethno-religious lines and instead nurturing a culture of peaceful coexistence among different religions and ethnicities that became known as “Kashmiriyat”. Simultaneously, Kashmir’s territorial morphology provided a natural barrier- mountains-against excessive foreign influence, thereby preserving a strong regional identity based not on a unique language, culture, or religion, but rather on the unique coexistence and intermingling of many.

The establishment of the "Princely State of Kashmir and Jammu" in 1846 marked the beginning of a distinct political entity in the region. The Maharaja of this new kingdom retained control over most internal matters while recognising the suzerainty of the British Empire. During its century of quasi-independent rule (1846–1952), the region saw the cultivation of ideals such as tolerance, secularism, and pluralism, which had long been part of its historical identity. Challenges emerged following the partition of 1947, as ethno-religious tensions in the newly created states of India and Pakistan began to affect Kashmir. The initial neutrality and aspirations for independence within the Princely State of Kashmir and Jammu encountered opposition from both India and Pakistan, each of which viewed Kashmir as integral to their national identities.

In 1947, armed tribal forces from Pakistan entered Kashmir, citing reports of violence against Muslims in the region, and sought to integrate Kashmir with the newly established Islamic Republic of Pakistan. in response to the foreign invasion, the Maharaja of Kashmir and Jammu - being himself a Hindu - requested India to intervene and stop Pakistani incursions into Kashmir, consequently allowing for Jammu and Kashmir to become part of the country. India’s intervention marked the beginning of the First Indo-Pakistani War (1947-1948) and - upon India’s request - the intervention of the UN to settle the dispute. UN Resolutions 47 and 48 called for a ceasefire and proposed a plebiscite to allow the people of Jammu and Kashmir to determine their political future. While a ceasefire was achieved and a ceasefire line established, disagreements between India and Pakistan prevented the implementation of the plebiscite, leaving the region divided and its population in a state of uncertainty.

In the following decades, the political and territorial landscape of Kashmir underwent further changes. The Sino-Indian War of 1962 resulted in China gaining control of the eastern region of Aksai Chin. The Third Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 led to the 1972 establishment of the Line of Control (LoC), a de facto border based largely on the previous ceasefire line, separating Pakistani-administered and Indian-administered territories. Despite a fourth Indo-Pakistani war in 1999 and subsequent smaller clashes, the region remains a point of contention between the two nations.

Kashmir remains to this day under the fragile division established by the 1972 Line of Control. However, decades of Indo-Pakistani influence and conflict have changed Kashmiri identity, slowly eroding the principles of tolerance and pluralism (Kashmiriyat) on which it had been resting for the previous centuries: Islamic fundamentalism - backed by Islamabad and fueled by New Delhi’s Hindu nationalism - gradually moved away from its historical irrelevance to gain growing importance in political and societal discourses, becoming the pillar of several political and civil society movements within the region. The increasing radicalisation among segments of the Muslim Kashmiri population contributed to the eruption of violence and terrorism, leading to the displacement of several religious minorities, including the Hindu Kashmiri Pandits, who relocated to predominantly Hindu areas of the region; these migrations impoverished the society’s ethnocultural diversity and consequently led to the alignment of identity with religion, thereby allowing the flourishing of geographical and sectarian divisions within Kashmir. These newly arising divisions greatly worsened living conditions, further fomenting extremism and interreligious hatred.

The political division of Kashmir

As of today, India controls about 55% of Kashmir, Pakistan 30%, and China roughly 15% of it. Kashmir is now divided into four areas, with two under Indian control and two under Pakistani control, excluding the mostly uninhabited Chinese-controlled part of the region.:

Jammu & Kashmir (now “U.T. of Jammu and Kashmir”, and “U.T. of Ladakh”): This subregion under Indian control was given the status of “State” and granted a special degree of autonomy over its internal affairs by the Indian Constitution (article 370; article 35a). In 2019 the Indian Government - after decades of debate - approved the “Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act”, which abrogated the two articles and split the state into two “Union Territories” that enjoy far less autonomy than States: “the Union Territory of Ladakh”, and the “Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir”. Such a highly contested Act (justified by the Indian Government as a way to stimulate “financial activities, transparency in administration and growth in J&K’s economy.”) de facto marked the end to what was known as “Kashmiri Exceptionalism”, and was (and still is) met by widespread protests throughout the region (now divided into two different administrative territories), since many saw New Delhi’s centralism as an attempt to colonise the region and alter its unique identity.
Gilgit-Baltistan: this territory controlled by Pakistan is administered by the “Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order 2009”, which officially grants the region self-rule but de facto puts it under the control of “an Islamabad-based council with its Chairman being the Prime Minister of Pakistan”. The order further facilitated Islamabad’s policy of ethnic substitution in the region - given Gilgit-Baltistan’s Shia majority in direct opposition to Pakistan’s Sunni tradition - thereby fueling tensions across the territory and demands for separatism.
Azad Kashmir: this second region under Pakistani rule officially enjoys a wide degree of autonomy under its Interim Constitution of 1974, though it de facto is - like the other Pakistan-controlled region - completely subject to the will of Islamabad. Major natural disasters and the resulting mass emigration rapidly changed the territory’s demographics, drawing it closer to the rest of Pakistan.

Having explained Kashmir’s sociocultural and political context, the second part of the article will focus on the solutions to its critical state of affairs.

April 24, 2024 — No Comments

B.J. Sadiq on Pakistan’s Election Results, Pakistan Crises, and Imran Khan

In this interview, Mr. Sadiq discusses the history of Pakistani democracy delving into Imran Khan's legacy, the recent elections results, and the current political landscape in Pakistan.

B. J. Sadiq is a British is writer, journalist, and poet. He is the author of a bestselling biography of Pakistan's former Prime Minister, Imran Khan, "Let There Be Justice: The Political Journey of Imran Khan," and has also written a novella in verse, "Of Kings and Nobilities."

Interviewers: Angelo Calianno and John Devine - Middle East Team

February 14, 2022 — No Comments

Jeremy Garlick on China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

Dr Jeremy Alan Garlick is an Associate Professor of International Studies and International Relations. Currently, he is the Director of the J. Masaryk Centre of International Studies at Prague University of Economics and Business. His research focusses on the Belt and Road Initiative, China's relations with Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), China-Middle East relations, and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). He is the author of books, “Reconfiguring the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Geo-Economic Pipe DreamsVersus Geopolitical Realities” published November 2021 and “The Impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: From Asia to Europe” published December 2019. He has also authored various book chapter, peer reviewed articles, book reviews and conference papers. He is also member of the editorial board of the Journal of Current Chinese Affairs since 2018.

In this interview he talks about his recent book "Reconfiguring the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor" and explains how CPEC may not be such a game-changing endeavour for the region as originally hoped. He explains how almost all projects are centred within Pakistan instead of being cross-border in nature. He also highlights the security risks among other factors within Pakistan that have repeatedly hindered development of the CPEC Projects.

Interviewing Team: Sandra Watson Parcels and Carlotta Rinaudo.

September 20, 2021 — 2 Comments

Afghanistan Fallout: Time to Rethink Pak-US Relations?

By: Mariam Qureshi

Prime Minister Imran Khan during his speech at the National Assembly of Pakistan in June 2021.
Source: https://www.dawn.com/news/1632376

United States’ longest war in Afghanistan has finally come to a haphazard end. The Taliban remain undefeated and now control Afghanistan. How does the United States intend to utilise its alliance with Pakistan to preserve peace and security in the country without having boots on the ground?

United States’ (US) longest war came at an astronomical cost with 66,000 to 69,000 Afghan troops and 2,500 US troops killed, and over $2 trillion spent since the war began in 2001. In addition, 2.7 million Afghans were forced to migrate and another 4 million were internally displaced. Despite this, the US-backed Afghan military rapidly collapsed, and the Taliban spared no time in taking over and establishing an interim government. Taliban-controlled Afghanistan has increased the fear of terrorism and the return of Al-Qaeda to the region. The shrinking economy and curtailed women and human rights have further worsened the socio-economic situation in Afghanistan.

The Biden Administration was heavily criticised for the haphazard US evacuation before the September 1^st deadline, leaving behind its’ allies and US citizens in Afghanistan. Antony Blinken, President Biden’s Secretary of State, rushed to defend the chaotic US pull-out from Afghanistan in the first official testimony to the members of Congress since the exit. In his opening remarks, he stated there was no chance of extending the US stay in Afghanistan because if 20 years and billions of dollars did not suffice, another year or five would not have made much of a difference. At this point, many have turned to Pakistan, expecting it to play a vital role in preserving peace and stability in the region.

However, the Pakistan-US relationship is at a low. Blinken asserted the need for Washington to reassess its relationship with Pakistan. Whilst acknowledging Pakistan’s contribution to the US endeavour in Afghanistan, Blinken also stated that at times Pakistan acted against US interests. “This is one of the things we're going to be looking at in the days, and weeks ahead — the role that Pakistan has played over the last 20 years. But also, the role we would want to see it play in the coming years and what it will take for it to do that,” he said. Blinken also stated that Pakistan must ‘line up’ with the broader international community in denying the legitimacy of the Afghan Taliban, unless they ensure free travel, the protection of women and children’s rights, and guarantee no safe haven for terrorism again.

Pakistan assisted the US in its War on Terror in 2001, under the leadership of President General Pervez Musharraf. Pakistan signed the framework of cooperation in terms of Air Lines of Communication (ALOC) and Ground Lines of Communication (GLOC), which granted the US Military access to Pakistani ground and airspace. This allowed for operations to be conducted swiftly in Afghanistan and the agreement remains in place to date. General Musharraf, the then Pakistani President, also allowed US troops access to airbases and granted permission for military aircraft to deploy from Pakistani soil. Then, in 2019, Pakistan took the initiative to facilitate the Afghan-US peace dialogue to reinstall peace in the region. The increased engagement with the US during the early years of the 2001 War in Afghanistan created a domestic security challenge for Pakistan. The increased terrorist attacks on Pakistani soil compromised Pakistan’s international image and the burden of incoming Afghan refugees fleeing their war-torn country crippled Pakistan’s already weak economy and limited resources. The mismanaged Pak-Afghan border, Durand Line, became the gateway for drug smuggling, human trafficking, refugee migration, and cross-border terrorism after 9/11. Although Pakistan is the largest trading partner of landlocked Afghanistan, its economic ties have dwindled over the years due to political and security tensions in the region. Pakistan also suffered a loss of 70,000 lives with a further $150 billion loss to its economyas a result of this war. Therefore, a stable Afghanistan is also in Pakistan’s best interest.

However, the tension between the US and Pakistan is evident and is hampering the creation of a viable strategy for Afghanistan moving forward. Despite being a critical ally to the US in its war in Afghanistan, President Biden has not reached out to Prime Minister (PM) Imran Khan since assuming office in January 2021. Regardless of the repeated assurances from Washington in keeping close contact with Pakistan and working together in devising a strategy for Afghanistan, Pakistan’s National Security Advisor Moeed Yusuf conveyed Pakistan’s displeasure at the delay in the phone call from the White House.

In an interview in June, Journalist Jonathan Swan asked PM Imran Khan if he would allow CIA presence in Pakistan to conduct cross-border counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan against Al-Qaeda, ISIS and Taliban. PM Khan replied with a stern ‘absolutely not’. Later, Pakistan Foreign Office officially denied any reports claiming the presence of US bases in Pakistan. In a recent speech at the National Assembly of Pakistan, PM Khan clarified that Pakistan could be ‘partners with the United States in peace but never in conflict’. PM Khan lamented that past decisions to join the US in its war against terrorism which jeopardized the security of Pakistan and came at a heavy price for Pakistani civilians and soldiers. This suggests a policy divergence from the longstanding Pak-US cooperation.

PM Khan has reiterated his position in several interviews that he believes in a political solution to the Afghanistan problem. In a recent interview with CNN, he emphasized the need for an inclusive government and the assurance of women and human rights in Afghanistan. PM Khan clarified that he wants the international community to find a diplomatic solution to pressure the Taliban government into protecting women and human rights, exercising inclusive governance, and ensuring there's no safe haven for terrorism on Afghan soil, in exchange for international recognition and desperately needed aid. He elaborated that the conclusion of the two-decade-long war has proven that Afghanistan and its’ people cannot be controlled by outside forces and that a puppet government cannot survive in Afghanistan.

Pakistan, under PM Imran Khan, desires a stable and peaceful Afghanistan and is not interested in negotiating with the US on future military endeavours. Moving forward, this will have implications on the Pak-US relationship, which will, by extension, also reconfigure the security situation in the region. If the Pak-US alliance is in jeopardy and the US looks towards India for a potential alliance, Pakistan might increasingly look to China for support. All key states have a stake in Afghanistan, which seems dangerously close to collapse. Only time will reveal how the alliances are reconfigured in a post-war scenario in the region.

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