June 15, 2026No Comments

Extortion and the Crisis of Small Business Security in Peru

By Giovanni Giacalone - Central & South America Team

In recent years, Peru has experienced a dramatic increase in extortion targeting small and medium-sized business owners, transport operators, market vendors, construction contractors, and informal entrepreneurs. What had long existed as localized criminal racketeering has evolved into a broader system of organized extortion linked to transnational criminal groups, weakened institutions, prison-based networks, and the rapid expansion of urban insecurity. The phenomenon has become one of the central public security concerns in Peru, particularly in Lima and northern coastal cities.

The perpetrators seek to extract regular payments, commonly known as cupos, from businesses in exchange for โ€œprotection,โ€ meaning immunity from violence carried out by the extortionists themselves. Extortion has spread across transportation companies, mototaxi associations, neighborhood stores, restaurants, construction sites, nightclubs, and even schools. Media reports and police investigations indicate that refusal to pay often results in shootings, grenade attacks, arson, or targeted killings.

A major factor in this transformation has been the expansion of the Venezuelan-origin criminal network known as theย Tren de Araguaย into Peru. According to investigations by the Peruvian National Police (PNP) and reporting byย La Repรบblica, factions associated with the group, including โ€œLos Gallegos,โ€ โ€œDinastรญa Alayรณn,โ€ and โ€œLos Injertos de Aragua,โ€ have established extortion operations in Lima, Callao, Trujillo, and other urban areas. Primary sources from the Peruvian state also confirmed the scale of the problem. While the expansion of Tren de Aragua has contributed to the growth and sophistication of extortion networks in Peru, the problem itself is not new. Extortion long predates the group's arrival and is closely linked to broader issues such as urban insecurity, economic informality, and limited state presence in some communities.

One of the sectors most affected has been urban transportation. Bus companies and informal transport associations in Lima and Callao have reported systematic threats demanding daily or weekly payments. According to La Repรบblica, members of โ€œLos Injertos de Araguaโ€ extorted public transportation firms through digital payment systems such as Yape, allowing criminals to collect payments anonymously while reducing physical exposure. The use of fintech applications illustrates how extortion practices have modernized technologically alongside Peruโ€™s expanding informal digital economy.

Data published by Gestiรณn, citing the Peruvian Attorney Generalโ€™s Officeโ€™s Crime Observatory, documented at least 125 attacks related to extortion in Lima and Callaoโ€™s transportation sector between August 2024 and December 2025. The report noted that most victims were drivers, followed by passengers and fare collectors. This demonstrates that extortion has evolved beyond isolated threats into sustained systems of coercion affecting entire economic sectors.

Peruvian media coverage also highlights the psychological dimension of extortion. Victims frequently receive WhatsApp messages containing videos of firearms, photographs of family members, or recordings of previous murders. In one reported case involving a transportation entrepreneur in San Martรญn de Porres, criminals demanded 10,000 soles per month and threatened to โ€œblow upโ€ the victimโ€™s house if payments stopped. The combination of digital intimidation and spectacular violence creates a climate of fear that discourages denunciation and weakens public trust in authorities.

Another important feature of the phenomenon is its relationship with Peruโ€™s informal economy. A large proportion of Peruvian small businesses operate with limited legal protection, precarious access to banking, and minimal police presence. Extortion networks exploit these vulnerabilities. Informal transport operators, street vendors, and neighborhood businesses often lack insurance, legal representation, or the resources necessary to resist criminal pressure. In many districts, extortion effectively becomes an unofficial tax imposed by armed actors.

The testimonies of some of the extortion victims, who asked to remain anonymous, provide a rather clear modus operandi on the part of these criminal groups:

A 34-year-old dance teacher from central Lima told us that her business had been thriving until she began receiving disturbing WhatsApp messages demanding large sums of money in exchange for being allowed to continue operating safely. The messages included threats against her and her family, along with photos of places she frequently visited. One day, a funeral wreath was delivered to her apartment. That was the moment she decided to close her business and move abroad.

Another former business owner had to close his restaurant in Trujillo as it had become impossible for him to even reach the end of the month as the gang planning to extort him wanted all of his monthly income. Eventually, he moved to another area of โ€‹โ€‹the country and then abroad.

In some cases, the individuals involved in the extortion rings are as young as twelve, as explained by the Peruvian police and reported by Infobae in May 2026:

โ€œCriminal organizations have begun recruiting even younger children for serious crimes in Callao. General Espinoza detailed that there have been โ€œseveral casesโ€ of 12-year-old children armed and participating as hitmen or extortionists.โ€

Scholars and journalists have noted that Peruโ€™s extortion crisis differs from earlier forms of criminal taxation seen during the internal conflict of the 1980s and 1990s. Contemporary extortion networks are decentralized, entrepreneurial, and highly adaptive. Rather than operating through ideological insurgency, they function through flexible criminal markets. Investigative reporting in El Comercio revealed how some organizations linked to the Tren de Aragua combined extortion with shell companies and international money transfers, indicating increasing financial sophistication.

Photo by Tima Miroshnichenko, pexels.com.

For instance, on April 19, 2026, the National Police of Peru (PNP) managed to dismantle the criminal gang โ€œBunker Gota Colombo,โ€ dedicated to extortion, inside its center of operations located in the southern Lima district of Villa El Salvador.

The detainees, eight foreign nationals and one Peruvian citizen, are being investigated for the alleged crimes of illegal manufacture and possession of firearms, as well as aggravated extortion linked to predatory lending practices. During the searches, authorities seized four sticks of dynamite allegedly used to intimidate victims. Officers also confiscated 33 cell phones, seven notebooks containing detailed records of loans and collections, 13 motorcycles, and one car.

The operation began following a complaint filed by a woman living in Villa El Salvador, who reported receiving constant threats demanding that she make payments through a digital wallet.

The consequences for Peruโ€™s economy and civil society are substantial. Extortion increases operating costs for small businesses, discourages entrepreneurship, reduces investment in vulnerable neighborhoods, and reinforces informality. For many entrepreneurs, paying cupos becomes normalized as a cost of survival. In some cases, business owners close operations entirely or migrate internally to avoid threats. The burden falls disproportionately on lower-income Peruvians whose livelihoods depend on small-scale commerce.

Ultimately, the recent extortion phenomenon in Peru reveals a broader crisis of governance and the institutional capability to provide efficient urban security. The expansion of criminal organizations, the weakness of institutional enforcement, the growth of informal labor markets, and the technological adaptation of extortion practices have combined to create an environment in which violence becomes economically rational for criminal actors. As long as state legitimacy remains fragile and economic precarity widespread, extortion is likely to remain one of the defining challenges facing Peruvian society and for law enforcement.

February 14, 2022No Comments

History and Ethnography of Tusan People, Peru

In this session, Mariela Noles Cotito - Professor of Political Science, Discrimination and Public Policy at the Universidad del Pacifico, Peru and Editor of the Book Mas alla del Bicentenario: Tareas Pendientes Alexandra Arana Blas - PhD Candidate at the University of Pittsburgh Author of the Chapter โ€œSensibilidades y Subjetividadesโ€; and Julia Hodgins - Masterโ€™s Candidate at Kingโ€™s College London, co-author of the Chapter โ€œEl Peru a Travรฉs de Nuestros Ojos,โ€ and our valued colleague and member of the ITSS Verona Culture, Society and Security Team.

Interviewing Team: Sofia Staderini and Leigh Dawson.

September 28, 20211 Comment

The death of Abimael Guzman and Sendero Luminosoโ€™s current situation

By: Giovanni Giacalone

Sendero Luminosoโ€™s historical leader, Abimael Guzman, died on September 11th at the Maximum Safety Center of the Callao Naval Base. He was 86 and had been serving a life sentence for terrorism and treason since 1992.

Guzman, also known among his followers as โ€œcamarada Gonzaloโ€, had been arrested on September 12th 1992 during a raid conducted by the Grupo Especial de Inteligencia (GEIN) in a two-floor house located in Limaโ€™s residential area of Surquillo. Together with him, eight other high ranks of Sendero Luminoso were detained, including Laura Zambrano and Elena Iparraguirre โ€œcomrade Miriamโ€, Guzmรกn's female companion. Shortly after the raid, most of the remaining leadership fell too.

The 1992 โ€œOperacion Victoriaโ€ and the beginning of the end for SL

The 1992 operation against Sendero Luminosoโ€™s leaders, known as โ€œOperacion Victoriaโ€, put an end to twenty years of violence that according to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, caused over 69,000 victims. 

The capture of Guzman left a huge vacuum and ravaged the organization, which never recovered from the blow. This is due to the fact that Sendero Luminoso had founded its roots on the figure of โ€œcamarada Gonzaloโ€, due to its strong charisma and authority, as confirmed by a Sendero Luminoso political officer during a birthday celebration for Guzman at the San Juan de Lurigancho penitentiary in December 1990: โ€œThere is no No. 2. There is only Presidente Gonzalo and then the partyโ€ฆWithout Presidente Gonzalo, we would have nothingโ€. 

Gustavo Gorriti, the author of the book โ€œThe Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peruโ€, explained how in Peru there were no visible leaders that could have even gone close to Guzmanโ€™s strategic vision, capacity, and decisiveness. [1]

Guzman had sought to create a mythic figure of himself but this veneration, that went very close to a cult of personality, was also one of Sendero Luminosoโ€™s  weakest points, together with the constant violent attacks against other Communist groups, trade unionists, and the quick loss of support in the rural areas due to the groupโ€™s extreme violence against peasants that wished to remain neutral in a context of bloodshed caused by the Marxist guerrilla, the Peruvian army and the โ€œronderosโ€, autonomous defense groups formed by peasants that acted against Sendero Luminoso.

For instance, in March 1983 โ€œronderosโ€ in Lucanamarca (Ayacucho province), killed a Sendero Luminoso local commander; the following month the organization responded by murdering 69 people (including 18 children, the youngest of whom was 6 months old) in the provinces of Ayacucho and Huancasancos. This became known as the โ€œThe Lucanamarca massacreโ€. 

A brief history

Sendero Luminoso was formed between 1969 and 1970 as a small offshoot of the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) by the already cited Abimael Guzman, a philosophy professor at the University of Ayacucho who had become fascinated by Maoism after a trip to China. As a matter of fact, Sendero Luminosoโ€™s Ejercito Guerrillero Popular was an almost perfect copy of Maoโ€™s army, and its visual propaganda was clearly inspired by Maoist features.

One of Guzmanโ€™s main propaganda tactics was to recruit university students fertile to Maoist propaganda and send them to the โ€œselvaโ€ and the โ€œsierraโ€ to politically indoctrinate peasants.

Sendero Luminoso initially gained popular support in the rural areas of Peru, starting its activity with only 12 members (including Guzman), reaching 500 by 1980, and 3,000 at its peak of power in 1990.

However, the organizationโ€™s extreme and indiscriminate violence against civilians in both urban and rural areas quickly brought to a loss of support. [2]

The post-1992 developments

As a consequence of โ€œOperacion Victoriaโ€, Sendero Luminoso fragmentated into splinter groups such as the one based in the VRAEM that accused Guzman of being a traitor, and the one led by Florindo Eleuterio Flores Hala, alias โ€œcamerada Artemioโ€, based further north in the Huallaga Valley and loyal to Guzman. These factions further split into other subgroups and quickly interlaced with drug traffickers.

Between 2002 and 2010 Sendero Luminoso tried to resume violence through a series of terrorist attacks against the US Embassy in Lima, multinational companies, and Peruvian law enforcers, but the Peruvian government quickly managed to inflict heavy blows against the remaining splinter groups, arresting leading commanders including โ€œcamarada Artemioโ€, Jaime Arenas Caviedes, and killing Orlando Alejandro Borda Casafranca, alias "Alipioโ€, Marco Antonio Quispe Palomino and recently, in March 2021, his brother Jorge.

On March 23rd 2021 an attack perpetrated by the โ€œMilitarizado Partido Comunista del Peruโ€ (MPCP), considered to be an evolution of Sendero Luminoso and currently led by Victor Quispe Palomini โ€œcamarada Josรจโ€, murdered 18 people in San Miguel del Ene (Satipo province). According to fliers found on site, the assailantsโ€™ aim is to "clean VRAEM and Peru of "parasites, corrupts, homosexuals, lesbians, drug addicts, and thieves".  However, there are still many unclear elements regarding this attack.

While Abimael Guzman was still a historical figure kept in very high regard by the splinter factions still loyal to him and by Sendero Luminosoโ€™s political sympathizers, he had no more influence regarding the armed activity. His death is certainly sad news for his followers; some of them will eventually idolize him but, as already said, the end of Sendero Luminoso occurred between September and December of 1992.

Instead, it is rather important to point out the close link between what remains of Sendero Luminoso in the VRAEM region and the drug production and trafficking activity that this area is known for, currently making Sendero Luminoso more of a problem in relation to drug trafficking, rather than terrorism. A July 2021 White House report indicated Peru as the second largest cocaine producer in Latin America (coca cultivation and cocaine production reached a record level of 88,200 hectares), right behind Colombia. We should therefore not be surprised if Sendero Luminosoโ€™s splinter groups will prefer business to political militancy.


[1] G. Gorriti, โ€œThe Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peruโ€, (University of North Carolina Press; New edition, February 22, 1999).

[2] The group's methods were particularly brutal, including stoning victims to death, or placing them in boiling water. The Shining Path carried out massacres of peasant communities perceived as being against their struggle, as well as attacking the security forces and other representatives of the state.

Image Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abimael_Guzmรกn#/media/File:Abimael_Guzmรกn_Sendero_Luminoso.jpg