November 12, 2025No Comments

Energy security and regional interdependence: can South Asia collaborate?

By Arslan Sheikh - South Asia Desk

The growing population and economies of South Asia are crucially dependent on its rivers and lands. Major rivers like Brahmaputra, Ganges, and Indus are the main sources of agriculture, energy, and livelihood. The region inhabits about a quarter of the world's population but only around four percent of its renewable waters. Global Environmental Change (GEC) is exacerbating glacial melt and shifting monsoon patterns causing extreme frequent floods and droughts. In terms of energy, South Asia is facing chronic deficiency - infrastructure strain and fuel import dependence have led many areas without reliable power. Experts argue that without new and efficient sources of energy which is causing “energy and power shortages”, could lead to crises. Altogether, these strains on water, food, and energy, accentuates urgent need for coordinated policies.

The Water-Energy-Food Nexus in South Asia

Water produces energy and is crucial for agriculture which provides food. Water management is “undoubtedly complex and interlinked with other significant challenges, including energy and food security, [and] agricultural production”. Agriculture uses most of South Asia’s freshwater and its farmers are heavily dependent on groundwater for irrigation. The tubewells/pumps used for the irrigation are run by diesel or electricity, which means energy shortfalls or high costs would adversely impact food production. Reciprocally, thermal power plants need high volumes of water for cooling, so water scarcity can also put strain on energy output. On the other hand, hydropower depends on rivers that also irrigate agricultural lands. In sum, activities in one sector often popple across other sectors. Integrated and coordinated approaches are therefore important for planning.

The stress due to GEC intensifies these interlinked water-food-energy nexus. Glacial melt and extreme droughts may lead to pumping of more groundwater, increasing demands for energy and depleting aquifers. Moreover, extreme droughts or floods can sever power generation. In the absence of cross-sectoral planning, South Asian countries are risking the opportunity to solve one problem, only to worsen another. In view of this, analysts argue that any policies for South Asian “development” must take into account these interdependencies.

Transboundary Water Management

Majority of South Asia’s waters come from the high Himalayas - highlighting the transnational character of these waters. These basins flow across multiple countries, yet formal cooperation is very limited and narrow in scope. No region-wide institution is in place to manage these shared basins with the exception of a few bilateral treaties that cover dozens of cross-boundary rivers. For example, India and Bangladesh, which share fifty-four rivers, have a Joint Rivers Commission and a 1996 Ganges water-sharing treaty. India and Pakistan have the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 - but currently in abeyance. India also has a 1996 Mahakali Treaty with Nepal as well as multiple powersharing agreements with Bhutan. Despite these limited agreements, there is no comprehensive cooperative framework among all riparians, majority of whose headwaters originate in China.

This assortment of water sharing is not sufficient in times of growing demands. Urbanizations and agricultural expansion are exploiting rivers and groundwater unsustainably, putting the region under water stress unless there is any improvement in management. Yet national policies are centred around short-term un-sustainable developmental goals without any consideration of its cross-sectoral and cross-boundary impacts. In these crucial times, countries prioritizing zero-sum games and competition over collaboration highlight how much they are worried about human and environmental security instead of national - ironically achieving neither.

Building of trust among South Asian countries is a constant challenge because of factors not limited to historical rivalries and concerns - which has led to minimal transparency and sharing of crucial environmental data. Increased data sharing and transparency are critical for riparian countries to negotiate equal and sustainable usage of waters. If the riparian countries of South Asia seek shared water security, cooperation over conflict offers a good chance for equitable and sustainable management.

Regional Energy Integration

South Asian countries are exploring cross-border trade of power to fill energy gaps. A World Bank researcher argues that in case of a unified South Asian regional “market”, untapped hydro resources could nearly double its generation capacity, and adding a moderate carbon tax could raise hydropower output by roughly 2.7 times over two decades. Another analysis highlights that electricity sharing would let South Asian countries exploit complementarities - for example, distribution of surplus peak to deficit area.

Some regional approaches are in process of materializing. Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal are discussing grid connections and energy corridors. For example, plans for an Easter Waterways Grid proposes linking river ports and transmission lines between India and Bangladesh, also connecting Bhutan and Nepal to facilitate trade. This initiative is projected to benefit some six-hundred million people across the sub-region. India has already positioned itself as a power-trade hub - it exports power to Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Nepal, while importing from Bhutan and Nepal. These examples are early steps toward a limited integrated system. If expanded to all South Asian countries, such trading would allow surplus power to flow in deficit regions, smoothing out fluctuations and lowering costs. Achieving sustainable energy security in South Asia is only possible through regional collaboration.

Agriculture, Food Security, Energy

Agriculture is the biggest provider of employment and food security in South Asia. It needs both water and energy, not only for irrigation but also for fertilisation, mechanisation, and post-harvest cold storage. Irrigation uses majority of freshwater in some areas. This means that any shortage in water or power can directly impact the crop production and harvests. Ignoring these linkages could backfire and undermine both food and energy security of the region.

Photo by Tanha Tamanna Syed (Pexel).

As of 2021, nearly eight percent of the people in region lack access to reliable grid-based electricity, an forty-seven percent remain inaccessible to clean cooking fuels and technologies. In addition to this, the existing inefficiencies of the system has given rise to a three-fold challenge - “energy security, energy equity, and environmental sustainability”.

GEC-led variability adds complex challenges to the food production. The changing monsoon patterns and decreasing glacial melt in late summer can leave fields parched at important times. Simultaneously, increase in the occurrence of frequent floods are damaging crops and land. A cooperative regional approach could help reducing these risks. For example, sharing efficient practices in irrigation or rural electrification would yield benefits. Coordinated flood forecasting and storage-release policies could improve water use across borders to protect food and power systems.

Conclusion

The potential benefits of collaboration is enormous. For example, the increase in hydropower generation through regional markets could replace the need for expensive fuel-import, reducing carbon emissions and energy costs. An efficient, coordinated, and equitable water management could protect agriculture and industry from instability. The increase in transboundary power trade could also secure energy. Shared infrastructure could improve disaster resilience. Though this article may seem pointing towards a more ideal scenarios, but acknowledging the geopolitical barriers, water-food-energy nexus itself leaves no choice but to accept the fact that share challenges need shared solutions.

July 22, 2025No Comments

Riding the Wave: The Opportunity for AI Collaboration in South Asia

By Dhruv Banerjee - South Asia Desk

Regional Cooperation in South Asia: A Tale of Ups and Downs

South Asia’s struggle to achieve effective regional integration has been well documented. Previously, World Bank estimates have indicated that intra-regional trade accounts for a meager 5 percent of the total trade in South Asia. For context, the percentage for intra-regional trade in South-east Asia is about five times as much, a significant difference. In turn, a combined lack of regional integration and stability has led to a dearth of foreign direct investment flowing into the region. A multitude of reasons have held back regional integration. These include border instability between countries, diverging economic goals, and uncertainty about each other’s intentions

Initially, the path to overcoming these issues was institutionally conceived in the form of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), established in 1985. However, since 2014, there have been a total of zero summits, primarily because of increased tensions between India and Pakistan following the 2016 Pulwama terror attack. SAARC’s institutional deadlock was a deeply worrying event with regard to the prospect of regional cooperation in South Asia. SAARC’s failure led to a re-evaluation of neighbourhood policy for countries like India, with the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) now viewed as an alternative institutional approach. The idea was that connectivity along the Bay of Bengal would be a strategically effective measure to spur regional interconnectivity.  

Over the last nine years or so, India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, Thailand, Bhutan, and Myanmar have ramped up participation within the organisation. They have focused on several different areas of cooperation, held frequent meetings, and streamlined the organisational structure. There have been six BIMSTEC summits, the latest one taking place in Thailand in April 2025. A notable exception to collaboration under BIMSTEC, however, is the lack of measures around Artificial Intelligence. This is even more surprising given that technology is one of the key areas of collaboration in the organisation. Thus far, there are no concrete initiatives under BIMSTEC that seek to explicitly address Artificial Intelligence as a means of cooperation. There are no expert groups explicitly seeking to address AI, and no official frameworks, agreements, or MoUs specifically aimed towards AI. Not capitalising on the prospect of strengthening cooperation by focusing on AI would be a big opportunity foregone for BIMSTEC. 

Given the rapid diffusion of the technology, most member states do not yet have comprehensive regulatory frameworks in place. This is actually an opportunity, since they can now coordinate their respective domestic policies, which in turn would reduce the compliance costs for companies in a BIMSTEC state to work across borders. Reports on the Asia-Pacific demonstrate that intergovernmental collaboration on AI can have a two-fold effect of attracting foreign investment and improving public service delivery. Converging AI policies can also improve technical and technological transfer between countries. Certainly, global AI summits and the spread of AI Safety Institutes (AISI) seem to suggest a global consensus that AI collaboration is indeed fruitful. All of this is to suggest something intuitive: It is time for South Asia, and more specifically, BIMSTEC, to focus on collaboration in Artificial Intelligence.

How AI Collaboration Can Be Effective for BIMSTEC

Given the breadth and sheer scale of developments related to AI globally, it can be tempting to try to dabble in every possible policy angle related to AI. However, for a multilateral organisation such as BIMSTEC, with relatively limited funding, it would be prudent to focus on a few specific factors. There are four main considerations with regard to AI cooperation in BIMSTEC. 

Firstly, cooperation on AI could lead to regional economic growth and attract more investment from abroad. This is a sentiment echoed by the BIMSTEC Secretary General, who stated that “regional collaboration on AI standards” was essential in achieving “collective development goals”. Certainly, the conditions are conducive for such growth. After all, the BIMSTEC countries have a young population, and therefore a strong workforce, with a majority of people below the age of 30. Collaboration on upskilling this workforce to be adept at developing and using AI is thus a lucrative opportunity for members. A good way to do this would, of course, be to facilitate cross-border exchange programs and education opportunities specifically designed for AI and related fields, perhaps through a flagship BIMSTEC AI scholars program. Providing a platform to AI companies in BIMSTEC countries in the form of a workshop or a startup summit would further allow cross-order exchange of ideas and facilitate a young and vibrant regional AI innovation ecosystem. 

Secondly, collaborating on AI could help BIMSTEC members collectively address issues in critical sectors. For context, BIMSTEC has 7 priority “sectors” of cooperation, which have further sub-sectors. Coordination between members on the use of AI technologies in key sectors such as agriculture, connectivity, and disaster management (sub-sector under security) would be highly beneficial. The 2nd BIMSTEC ministerial meeting on Agriculture called for coordination in using “new agriculture technology, including artificial intelligence”, and such efforts across each of the sectors would make the Bay of Bengal region a hub for incorporating emerging technologies into critical sectors. This, in turn, would also prove attractive to investors. 

Thirdly, AI safety and cooperation are relatively non-political subjects, making cooperation easier. Naturally, issues related to security or even economic integration tend to be harder to build consensus around, due to the potentially politically divergent objectives of members in these areas. A number of security-related conventions and agreements in BIMSTEC have taken a long time to finalise, or have seen really slow progress. In contrast, AI is a relatively less contentious issue. Agreeing on the broad tenets of AI safety, or technology transfer of low-risk Artificial Intelligence, is unlikely to elicit much opposition. Since all the countries within BIMSTEC are developing nations, they also largely share the dilemma of balancing AI for economic growth with regulation to ensure AI safety. 

Photo by Amar Preciado: https://www.pexels.com/photo/detailed-vintage-globe-showing-south-asia-region-30792665/

Finally, AI-oriented collaboration is logistically plausible if the existing measures under the technology sub-sector can be leveraged effectively. Currently, technology is a sub-sector under the broader science, technology, and innovation sector, which is led by Sri Lanka.  Under this sub-sector, the Technology Transfer Facility (TTF) can be particularly useful in the context of AI collaboration. The mandate of the TTF (defined in an MoA signed in 2022) should be modified to include Artificial Intelligence. Following this, it can run “diagnostic studies” to assess the AI needs of each member state. Then, this information can be used by the TTF to provide targeted recommendations for AI-related technology transfer between member states. Additionally, the BIMSTEC Expert Group on Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) Cooperation, which has previously met in 2023 and 2024, could focus on broader objectives. The expert group should gear its third meeting towards addressing the potential of establishing a BIMSTEC framework on AI safety. This would help harmonise the currently divergent AI regulatory approaches undertaken by member states. In this vein, a prudent area to focus on would be to recommend that all the member states set up AI Safety Institutes to become part of the global AISI network, with India having decided to set up an AISI earlier this year. 

Keeping all of this in mind, it is fair to conclude that collaboration on AI can serve as an effective path to increased regional cooperation in South Asia. In particular, BIMSTEC should consider increasing its focus on AI, in terms of both discourse and funding. After all, coordinating approaches to AI would be beneficial for member states in terms of both economic and security considerations, while also providing a relatively non-political area of cooperation. The future can be a bright one for South Asia, provided it works together to embrace the technologies that define it. 

August 1, 2023No Comments

Professor Ashok Swain on Water Security in South Asia

Professor Ashok Swain talks about Water Security in South Asia, its vulnerabilities and what approach could policymakers take to ensure water security in South Asia. Professor Ashok Swain is a Professor and Head of Department of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University Sweden. He is the UNESCO Chair on International Water Cooperation, and the Director of Research School of International Water Cooperation at Uppsala University, Sweden.

In this session, Prof. Swain introduces the concept of water security. He highlights major vulnerabilities endangering water security of South Asia and also talks about various approaches which state and non-state actors could take to ensure water security of South Asia.

Interviewer: Arslan Sheikh - Human Security Team

October 8, 2021No Comments

The great contemporary human security crises of South Asia: Kashmir and Afghanistan

Authors: Esther Brito Ruiz, Arslan Sheikh and Ludovica Brambilla

Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/39/C-17_carrying_passengers_out_of_Afghanistan.jpg

The last two years have been the site of unexpected human security crises -  ranging from a global pandemic to the collapse of states. South Asia particularly has been subjected to important crises that have echoed across the region and had global consequences. Maybe the two most significant of these crises have been the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan and the enduring crises in Kashmir. Both these situations have seen human security determine the broader trajectory of national security, and can serve as examples of why to promote any kind of stability, the wellbeing of the people must come first. 

Afghanistan: the consequences of setting human security aside

​​The Afghanistan crisis clearly represents the consequence of failing to centralize and protect human security. In the wake of the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan, which was originally deployed under the justification of anti-terrorist efforts – seeking the capture of Bin Laden and the countering of Al Qaeda – little good has remained after the end to two decades of occupation and trillions of dollars of investment. With the Taliban back in power and a looming humanitarian catastrophe – in the words of UN Secretary-General António Guterres – this crisis is one of the most severe threats to human security today.

But the real impact we can expect on the lives of Afghans remains multifaceted. Firstly, we have seen the weeks since the US withdrawal marked by a resurgence of terrorism in the state - as evidenced by the Daesh-K August 26 attack on the Kabul airport. Secondly, as a result of the war and widespread violence, the country now has over four million Internally Displaced People (IDPs), contending not only with overcrowded camps and a lack of access to basic services - like clean water - but also with the increase of COVID-19 cases. Afghans are facing a possible famine, collapsing health services, and a paralyzed economy in the wake of the seizing of most of the country’s reserves. In fact, the country’s Central Bank has been expelled from the international banking system and refused access to both the states’ foreign reserves and any international credit and assets assistance – including that which it had been previously granted to combat the rise of COVID. As a result of this economic paralysis, prices of food and essential goods have experienced an exponential rise and most financial services and banks have been left unable to operate or provide money to residents. This compromises the survival of local populations – especially those already most vulnerable. As this situation worsens, over 40% of the Afghan population faces acute food insecurity. Beyond these circumstances, the behaviour itself from Taliban authorities  is a core threat to the rights and security of its citizens – especially for women and minorities. Massacres of ethnic and religious minorities – specifically of Hazara men in recent weeks – and retribution killings to collaborators of the US army set a worrying precedent to what opposition groups will experience in coming months, as the Taliban secure their rule and repress revolts. Indeed,  Deborah Lyons, the Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), has affirmed that “the lives of millions of Afghans will depend on how the Taliban choose to govern”. With little response from recent UN Human Rights Council sessions and assistance on the ground from United Nations agencies and aid organizations being scaled back due to security concerns, prospects are not positive.

Marines assigned to the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) await a flight at Al Udeied Air Base, Qatar August 17. Marines are assisting the Department of State with an orderly drawdown of designated personnel in Afghanistan. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by 1st Lt. Mark Andries). Source: US Military

The severe human crisis in Afghanistan we see today is a consequence of an erroneous and militaristic view of what national security and peace requires. Peace begins with the security not of broad governments or the promotion of abstract values, but with the security of the people – established and maintained through access to the basic tenants of a dignified life; including education, food, healthcare, and jobs. By choosing not to center human security, the US acted more as an empire than as an ally for the Afghan people - and in their retreat, little care has been given to the wellbeing of locals and the crises left behind for them to endure. We can wonder what the situation would be today if the focus of the international community’s involvement in this state was for its communities to thrive – rather than the imposition of strategic goals for external parties. In the words of Ibrahim Al Marashi, “America’s failure to address human security ended up harming its national security”. 

With the world facing one of the worst humanitarian crises of the last decades, Afghanistan’s people have been left to contend with the human crisis of a pandemic and a state collapse simultaneously. While proposals to extend the UN mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) have been put forth, the likelihood of this engagement in the long term is minimal. Afghanistan now faces a human security crisis in almost every of its expressions - combining a political and economic crisis, a compromised food and healthcare system, and personal and communal threats to life. The way this crisis develops over the next few months will profoundly impact not only Afghans and their future, but the trajectory of all of South Asia. 

Kashmir: the forgotten crisis of water security

Water Security is sometimes considered the most important component of human security - since the very basic survival of life is dependent on it. Additionally, water insecurity effectively compromises all other expressions of human security; thus putting the very continued existence of human communities at grave risk. Despite this, it has often become sidelined in conversations regarding international security and humanitarian crises. Specifically, the water-security nexus over transboundary river basins among riparian countries is a growing concern, which will need to be dealt with increased urgency in the wake of the escalating consequences of climate change.

Among such various transboundary river basins, the Indus River Basin (IRB) in South Asia represents a peculiar case. The IRB flows through the erstwhile princely State of Jammu and Kashmir, which is now divided through a Line-of-Control - a de facto border between India and Pakistan. While this area has a relatively successful water management framework - in the form of Indus Water Treaty - there is no institutional and legal framework which addresses the effects of climate change on water availability in the IRB. This is a delicate situation, as the IRB has become the second ‘most overstressed aquifer’ in the world because of the area’s growing population and the development pressures of both shoreline countries. 

The issue of water security in the region is a potential future source of state conflict and a prime human security issue. The territorial conflict over the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir has led India and Pakistan into three conventional wars in 1947, 1965 and 1999 respectively. Both these countries have built major dam infrastructures on the IRB for irrigation and hydroelectricity. In India, it is one of the two main river systems supporting the country’s water deficient areas of the north-west. In fact, according to NITI Aayog, a public policy think-tank of the Government of India, “India is suffering from the worst water crisis in its history, with around six-hundred million people facing high to extreme water stress and about two-hundred thousand people dying every year due to inadequate access to safe water’’. However, even this report mentions no data on water management and composition of the Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir - still a delicately trodden political issue. In turn, Pakistan is exclusively dependent on IRB for irrigation and hydropower. Thus, this basin represents a vital source for their national food, water, and energy security. This dependency is worsened by the severe water shortages and declining water per capita availability that Pakistan has been facing in recent years. As such, hydro-politics over the IRB have put the growing population of both countries at an extreme risk - both in terms of human security and with regards to broader state conflict. With the perennial tensions between India and Pakistan, and the frequent indication of IRB being used as a geopolitical weapon, the water security of South Asia’s most populated region remains an imminent threat.

Conclusion

Both the cases presented evidence a simple truth - security, at any level, lays its foundations on the wellbeing of the people. In the absence of this, there can be no sense of stability or continuity. Afghanistan and Kashmir serve to remind us that even with vested national security interests, state and military involvement, and capital investment, those endeavours  that forgo human security will eventually face violence, conflict,  and possible internal collapse.