Strategy Archives – ITSS Verona

November 24, 2025 — No Comments

The end of the New START and the beginning of something new? Game-changing technologies and old strategic tensions

By Camilla Braito and Patrick Haasler - Russia Desk

Introducing the New START

During the Cold War, nuclear arms control stood as one of the key pillars of international stability and as a guarantor of predictability in states’ behaviour. Today, that foundation is faltering. The idea of quantitatively or qualitatively reducing nuclear arsenals clashes with a growing global call to rearm, both in the nuclear field and beyond. Nowhere is this tension more visible than in the uncertain future of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).

Signed by the United States and the Russian Federation in 2010 and entered into force on February 5, 2011, the New START replaced the 1991 START I, renewing both parties’ commitment to verifiably reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals. The Treaty sets three main limits. First, it caps the number of nuclear warheads deployed on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. Second, it restricts the number of deployed delivery systems, including ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable bombers. Third, it limits the total number of deployed and non-deployed launchers and bombers. Within these constraints, each side retains the freedom to structure and modernise its strategic forces at its discretion. A central feature of the New START is its monitoring and verification regime. This relies on the use of National Technical Means (NTM), a shared database updated twice a year with data on the numbers, types, and locations of Treaty-limited systems, as well as two types of on-site inspections to confirm accuracy and proper implementation. This arrangement, however, has already been on life support since 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic interrupted on-site inspections and the two signatories never agreed on their resumption. In February 2023, the situation aggravated when Russia further suspended its participation in the Treaty, citing Washington’s hostile policy and support for Ukraine, just weeks after renewed compliance disputes.

Originally, the New START was set to last ten years, until 2021, with the option of a single five-year extension to 2026. Beyond that, no further renewals were envisioned. Within this framework, Moscow’s September 22, 2025, proposal to Washington to voluntarily continue adhering to the Treaty’s limits for one additional year after its expiration has particular significance. After warning in July that allowing the New START to lapse would be highly undesirable, on October 5, Donald Trump responded positively to the Russian proposal, although without making any formal commitment. A few days later, Vladimir Putin confirmed ongoing contacts with the U.S. through diplomatic channels, suggesting that four months should be sufficient to decide on an extension. However, he added that if the U.S. did not consider the continued adherence worthwhile, it would not be critical for Russia, whose nuclear deterrent capabilities continue to advance, most notably with the Poseidon system, a development that poses a game-changing challenge to traditional deterrence.

The delicate balance of incentives and apprehensions surrounding the Treaty’s future sets the stage for exploring the motivation behind Russia’s proposal for an extension.

Russia’s offer in context: strategic motives and technological leverage

Strategic deterrence between Russia and the U.S. has become increasingly tense following the erosion of Cold War–era nuclear arms control. Following the dissolution of the INF Treaty in 2019, both countries reintroduced intermediate-range systems to Europe, reigniting mutual suspicion. The U.S. development and potential deployment of Tomahawk and Typhon missile systems in Europe - and possibly in Ukraine - has revived Russia's long-standing fears of a preemptive "decapitation strike" that could target its leadership with little warning. Moscow interprets the short flight times and high precision of these American weapons as a direct threat to its command structures, reminiscent of Soviet-era concerns during the 1980s Euromissile crisis. Washington argues that these deployments are defensive and necessary to counter Russian violations and capabilities, such as the SSC-8 missile and hypersonic systems. Nevertheless, Russia’s leadership views the situation as growing encirclement and has warned of retaliatory measures if U.S. systems move closer to its borders. This dynamic has reintroduced instability into the European theatre, with both sides signalling and counter-signalling under the shadow of mutual deterrence. Thus, the renewed presence of American long-range missiles in Europe symbolises a broader breakdown in trust and the return of Cold War–style anxieties about nuclear first strikes.

Against this tense backdrop, Russia’s revised nuclear doctrine, announced in December 2024, broadened the conditions under which nuclear weapons could be employed, including in response to an attack by a non-nuclear state supported by a nuclear power. This is consistent with Moscow’s fear of a potential U.S. transfer to Ukraine of Tomahawk missiles that can be nuclear-armed and for that are considered a direct and destabilising threat, reinforcing concerns about strategic vulnerability and justifying the lowering of its nuclear threshold. The "dirty bomb" alluded to by Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, which, in the event of an attack on the Russian Federation, would render it impossible to differentiate between conventional and nuclear armaments, is regarded by Russia's preeminent security elites as a grave threat to Russian sovereignty. This threat is met with a range of proactive, preemptive (non-nuclear), and reactive (tactical nuclear) countermeasures.

Assuming that Russia is solely interested in a deal with the U.S. because of the perceived threat posed by the Tomahawks would once again oversimplify the issue. The following brief outline of the latest technical and military developments will substantiate the assumption that Russia is attempting to force the Americans to the negotiating table from a position of strength. Russia has recently increased its pace of development and production of the intermediate-range missile Oreshnik, with a reported first combat use in November 2024 in the Ukrainian Oblast Dnipropetrovsk, and mass production declared in mid-2025. The system is characterised as mobile, solid-fuel, capable of speeds beyond Mach 10, equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), and capable of carrying submunitions. Due to its range (potentially up to 3,000–5,500 km) and hypersonic speed, the Oreshnik missile challenges existing missile defence systems and revives the risk posed by ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) since the collapse of the INF Treaty. Meanwhile, Russia claims that the nuclear-powered cruise missile Burevestnik (9M730) has successfully undergone very long endurance tests (14,000 km over 15 hours) and is approaching deployment. Its lower-altitude flight profile and seemingly unlimited range are designed to evade missile defence systems, representing a significant shift in the design of strategic weapons. Even though substantial technical uncertainty remains, particularly regarding the nuclear reactor propulsion unit, post-flight guidance, and operational safety, it can be expected that the missile will undergo further technical improvement and is therefore seen by many experts as a potential game-changer that could put the United States under immense pressure.

Another strand of novel Russian strategic capability is represented by the Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle (nuclear-powered torpedo), which is designed to travel long distances underwater, carry a high-yield thermonuclear charge, and threaten coastal infrastructure and naval bases. Due to the extensive nature of U.S. coastal and marine infrastructure, some analysts describe Poseidon as a "strategy-changer" in the maritime nuclear domain. These systems are important because they have the potential to degrade existing U.S./NATO missile defence and deterrence architectures, and they signal Russian strategic resolve. By introducing weapons that evade or challenge existing defence layers, Russia aims to tip the scales of nuclear and conventional deterrence in its favour and signal a determined position of strength on a tactical and strategic level. The U.S., so far, is lacking equivalent public breakthroughs. Russia's recent tests of the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile and Poseidon underwater drone are portrayed as revolutionary, providing unlimited range and the ability to loiter indefinitely, thus ensuring strategic parity for the entire 21st century. These systems are said to blur traditional missile categories, making them nearly impossible to verify or limit under existing arms control frameworks. Overall, the absence of reciprocal control mechanisms and growing distrust could fuel an uncontrolled arms race and heighten global nuclear danger.

All these things considered, it can be argued that Russia is leveraging technological innovation not merely as a means of deterrence but as a political instrument to restore strategic balance and compel renewed engagement from Washington. The shift from perceived vulnerability to technological assertiveness forms the backdrop for Russia’s new weapons programs and its current approach to arms control negotiations.

What comes next for the New START?

Three possible scenarios on the New START could unfold after February 5, 2026. In the first, Moscow confirms the proposed commitment, and Washington agrees to reciprocate, allowing both parties to continue voluntarily observing the Treaty’s quantitative limits for one more year, notwithstanding other major divergences, mainly on the war in Ukraine. In the second, the Treaty expires without any time-bound effort to uphold its provisions, and in the absence of a successor arms control arrangement, the two largest nuclear arsenals may go unconstrained for the first time in more than three decades. In the third scenario, negotiations begin on a new agreement addressing strategic nuclear arsenals, either bilaterally or with China involved, at least in the early stages. Indeed, China’s growing capabilities provide strategic cover for Russia and reduce the leverage of traditional U.S.–Russia arms control, highlighting the need for a multilateral framework. This final scenario could develop independently or alongside one of the previous two, provided there is sufficient political will to initiate sustained talks. As both parties remain preoccupied with other urgent matters, it is unlikely that such an initiative will advance on its own; rather, it would likely progress in parallel with either an extension or the definitive termination of the existing Treaty.

This range of possible outcomes sheds light on how the trajectory of the New START reflects the state of U.S.–Russia relations, the impasse in Ukraine, and the broader decline in genuine commitment to non-proliferation goals.

Conclusion

As things stand, the New START remains the only existing nuclear arms control treaty between the United States and Russia. When it expires in 2026, there will be no formal, legally binding limits on strategic nuclear arsenals for the first time in decades. Since a further formal renewal is not permitted under its current terms, serious concerns about the future of global arms control and strategic stability arise.

Russia seeks to extend or replace the New START from a perceived position of strength, leveraging its recent breakthroughs in novel strategic weapons to force the United States back to the negotiating table, preferably on Moscow’s terms. These systems are designed to bypass or overwhelm U.S. missile defences, restore strategic parity after the INF Treaty’s collapse, and counter perceived encirclement by NATO, particularly the potential deployment of nuclear-capable Tomahawk missiles in Europe or Ukraine. By showcasing technically advanced, hard-to-intercept delivery vehicles and broadening its nuclear doctrine, Moscow aims to deter further Western escalation while signalling that any future arms-control agreement must account for these game-changing capabilities and address Russia’s core security concerns.

More than ever, the not-so-distant prospect of the New START reaching the end of its validity highlights the enduring importance of nuclear arms control for global security. Arms control embodies a paradoxical form of partnership, one in which rivals cooperate to co-manage deterrence and reduce the risks inherent in their competition. In essence, such agreements serve to uphold strategic stability, preserve crisis stability, and prevent the escalation of arms races, reminding us that even limited and imperfect cooperation is preferable to the absence of any attempt at regulation and that the willingness of states to negotiate in bona fide is a precondition for arms control efforts to work out.

It remains incumbent on the American and Russian leadership to balance technological advancement with diplomatic engagement, seeking paths to stabilise deterrence beyond mere temporary extensions. The coming months are crucial for shaping the future of nuclear arms control and reducing strategic risks in an increasingly complex geopolitical environment.

October 28, 2024 — No Comments

Dr. Jozef Hrabina on Russia’s Strategic Game: Shifts, Doctrine, and the Ukraine War

Dr. Jozef Hrabina talks about Russia's strategic culture and the effect of the war with Ukraine on regional hierarchy in post-Soviet space. Dr. Hrabina is geopolitical risk advisor, scholar, and founder of GeopoLytics.

In this session, Dr. Hrabina explains the background of Russia's strategic culture helping to understand how it was formed during different historical periods. Together we discussed the effect of the Ukrainian war on post-Soviet Eurasia regional hierarchy and European security architecture. We also could not miss the actual topic of the shifting dynamics in frozen conflicts where Russia used to act as a mediator, as well as we explored key interplay between strategic biases with the West in context of nuclear rhetoric and recent remarks to Russia's nuclear doctrine.

Interviewers: Alexandra Tsarvulanova, Denise Gianotti, Will Kingston-Cox

November 14, 2022 — No Comments

The future of European Defence: procurement issues and institutional challenges

Authors: Danilo delle Fave and Justine Le Man.

The current international crisis provoked by the invasion of Ukraine has led to a renewed thrust toward a major integration of European defence initiatives. On March, 21^st of 2022, the Strategic Compass for security and defence was adopted by EU Member States. It provides a plan of action for strengthening the EU’s security and defence policy by 2030. Structured around four pillars: act, invest, partner and secure.

Act: Europe needs to be able to “act rapidly and robustly whenever a crisis erupts, with partners if possible and alone when necessary”. To be able to do it, Europe needs to reinforce the interoperability and the cooperation of European civilian and military during CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) missions.

Invest: “We must resolutely invest more and better in defence capabilities and innovative technologies, both at the EU and national levels”. By agreeing to this condition Member States commit themselves to devoting a larger share of their budget to European defence but also to taking part in more collaborative European projects along the CARD (to devoting a larger share of their budget to European defence) recommendations to “develop a resilient, competitive and innovative European Defence Technological and Industrial Base throughout the Union".

the Union”.

Partner “partnerships are an essential instrument to support the EU’s ambition to be global strategic player”. The EU needs to reinforce and take into consideration all its partners:international organisations such as NATO, UN… but also, bilateral partners who share the same values as the United-States, Canada, Norway, UK and Japan.

Secure “enhance its ability to anticipate threats, guarantee secure access to strategic domains and protect its citizens”. To be able to anticipate threats, the EU needs to focus on common intelligence capacities by developing common tools and a common policy to face new threats like cyberattacks.

*Image Source*: https://www.pexels.com/photo/fighter-aircraft-flying-in-sky-during-air-show-5786112/

Over the last few years, the cooperation between European countries increased thanks to collaborative defence agreements.

In 2017, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was adopted by the Council of the European Union to enable 25 EU Member States to develop their defence and security cooperation for better interoperability and to increase military capabilities. With the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), which provides the correct information flow, the European Defence Fund (EDF) devoting a larger share of their budget to European defence and the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), the aim of EU institutions is to make EU members leading projects together from training on the field to the research projects.

In order to strengthen those instruments, the European intervention initiative was launched: the French President Macron declared in a speech at the Sorbonne University in 2017, that Europe needed a shared strategic culture. In order to do so, in the next decades Europe should have a common intervention force, a common defence budget and a common doctrine for action. Today there are 13 countries in this initiative (11 EU Member States, Norway, and the United Kingdom). Despite major advances and progress to build European defence based on a better interoperability on the ground and a stronger solidarity and cooperation between army and political leaders, especially since the beginning of the Ukrainian war, Europe faces strong debates about the sovereignty and the place of a European defence with or without NATO.

The focus on a European defence and the adoption of the strategic compass reinforces the principle of the strategic autonomy of Europe which made some countries reluctant on the subject. In fact, for some of them, that means pushing away NATO and focusing only on Europe. For Josep Borell, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security, “the more Europeans invest in their own defence capabilities, the more they will become as partners for the US” and the implementation of the Strategic Compass “could boost defence cooperation and strengthen Europe’s military clout, in complementarity with NATO”.

The difficulty of building a real entity in Europe is, in a big part, linked to the history of each country which makes Europe a multicultural whole. Some of the eastern countries for example see NATO as the only way to be protected and the invasion of Ukraine reinforces that perception, fearing further Russian expansion. The issue of sovereignty is another constraint factor for the construction of a strong Europe of defence. In fact, some countries are reluctant to cede sovereignty. For some countries this reluctance concerns the budgetary and fiscal fields. It is mostly the case for Nordic countries: the “New Hanseatic League” created in 2018: Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Ireland, which do not want to be burdened by too costly solidarity with the rest of Europe. The deteriorating security in Europe has led those countries to increase their share of budget defence. This is the case of The Netherlands, which has declared that the country will reach the benchmark of at least 2% of their gross domestic products on defence by 2024, which represents an increase of 40 percent in its spending.

For the last few years, large progress has been made to build a strong European defence but there are still lots of blockages due to too many political differences between European countries. According to General Robert Brieger, Chairman of the EU Military Committee “We (Europeans) should give up some national sovereignty in developing key capabilities”. Now that EU Member States are aware that, to face the actual and future threats, they need to do more, one important point led us to the technical issues and the need a real industrial and economic consortium. One of the major obstacles for a common European defence is represented by procurement. The competition between consortia and firms has prevented the standardization of armaments, from bullets to tanks, and the lack of harmonization in procurement policies by member states has led to a duplication of programs and weapon systems.

The main reason is based on economic considerations: military technology has a dual use nature now more than ever. The development of high-tech technologies provides a trickle-down effect on a national market: firms that work on the procurement of military technology acquire expertise and know-how capable of being used in civilian projects and technologies. An example is represented by the GPS: born as a military technology, it is now part of everyday life used by firms like Google, Tesla, and so on.

The stakes are indeed high, and so the competition for the conquest of market niches. Each member state tries to favour its industries and national champions and at the same time does not want to renounce technoscientific diplomacy. The technological offsets, both hardware and software, constitute an important instrument to influence other countries. High-tech armaments or projects could be used to conclude international agreements. For instance the participation in the US F-35 program has been used by Washington to pressure the Turkish stance toward Russia. With this in mind, one possible solution for European defence procurement could be the “juste retour system”, as already working in the European Space Agency. Of course this division of labour comes not without shortfalls: the procurement policy will be focused not on the best provider of the requested service but on the distribution system of juste retour. The risk is the development of armaments and projects less efficient and the political pressure by member states, with the consequences that a defective or ineffective technology could have both on the economic and defence field.

April 30, 2022 — No Comments

Dr Widdershoven on the Gulf States’ Energy Strategy in the Context of the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict

Dr. Cyril Widdershoven talks about the energy strategy pursued by the Gulf States in the context of the current war in Ukraine. Dr. Cyril Widdershoven is a long-experienced expert in oil and gas and geopolitics and the founder of Verocy.

In this session, Dr. Widdershoven considers the reasons for the Gulf States to act the way they are, avoiding an active engagement in energy price reduction. After an overview of the Gulf States' green energy policies, Dr. Widdershoven analyzes the consequences of the EU's sanctions on Russia on relations between Europe and energy powers in the Gulf.

Interviewers: Riccardo Bosticco & Michele Mignogna

This is ITSS Verona Member Series Video Podcast by the Political Economy and Energy Security Team.

ITSS Verona - The International Team for the Study of Security Verona is a not-for-profit, apolitical, international cultural association dedicated to the study of international security, ranging from terrorism to climate change, from artificial intelligence to pandemics, from great power competition to energy security.

March 31, 2022 — No Comments

ITSS Verona 2021/22 Webinar Series: “The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict: What’s Next?” with Tracey German (KCL)

For its forth event of the 2021/22 Webinar Series, entitled "The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict: What's Next?", ITSS Verona members Ludovica Brambilla, Davide Gobbicchi and Fabrizio Napoli (from the Russia and Post-Soviet Space Team) discuss with Dr Tracey German (KCL) - one of Europe's main experts on Russian affairs - the status of the conflict in Ukraine, narratives, strategies, winners and losers, and political, social, cultural, economic implications for all actors involved.

Do not miss on the other ITSS Verona webinars, which are available at the following link: https://www.itssverona.it/activities

September 23, 2021 — No Comments

Carl von Clausewitz: a milestone in the History of Strategic Thought

By: Danilo delle Fave, Javier Olaechea and Marco Verrocchio.

Carl von Clausewitz was born at Burg, in Prussia on the 1^stof June 1780. His family had Polish origins and belonged to the Prussian middle-class. Aged twelve, in 1792 he entered the Prussian army as standard-bearer. He received his baptism by fire during the siege of Mainz in 1793, but he showed to be more interested in war, theory, and strategy.

He started reading Frederick the Great’s “General Principles of War” and moved on to studying Machiavelli, Montecuccoli and other military strategy theorists. Clausewitz lived in a culturally successful period for European and German philosophy, so his thought was influenced by his contemporary philosophers such as Kant, Fichte, Schiller, and Hegel. During the war with France, he was present at the battle of Auerstaedt. After being held prisoner in Paris for a year, he was convinced of the need to reform the army and to apply new strategies.

Once back in Prussia, Clausewitz joined General Gerhard von Scharnhorst in the attempt to reform the Army. Together they introduced conscription and limited the privileges of the nobility in the army, to create a more meritocratic military. Clausewitz also proposed the idea of “People in Arms”, a reserve force to defend the country on the side-lines. In 1810, Clausewitz married Maria von Brhul, a woman of noble origins close to the Court. When in 1812, Prussia (under the pressure of Napoleon) sided with France against Russia, Clausewitz and other officers joined the Tsarist troops.

He believed that the most dangerous enemy was Napoleon rather than Russia and soon he became an officer of tsarist-Prussian troops, fighting also at Borodino. In 1813, He played a key role in convincing General Yorck to sign the armistice of Tauroggen. Until the end of Napoleon, Clausewitz fought in the greatest battles in Western Europe such as the Battle of the Nations and Ligny. The period between 1818 and his death (occurred in 1831) was one of the more prosperous times for his studies. Clausewitz’s masterpiece, Vom Kriege (On War), was published in 1832, one year after his death. It was published thanks to the will of his wife Maria von Brhul, who also contributed to writing the introduction of the book. One (if not the only one) case of a woman who wrote an introduction to a classic of war strategy.

Why is Carl Von Clausewitz so important for our time?

Carl von Clausewitz’s works have been studied extensively for 150 years by dedicated scholars and Clausewitz is acknowledged as one of the few great writers on war. Many aspects of his ideas and concepts have received much attention in recent years and continue to remain relevant and are often used in today’s doctrines and for civil-military educational processes. The most important theoretical aspects of war and strategy expounded by Clausewitz, some of which are enduring contributions to contemporary thought and still relevant to today’s strategists.

The first is "War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means" and the second is " War is not a mere act of policy, but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means". The third is “War is an act of force to compel out enemy to do our will”. In addition to these quotes, Clausewitz is important to our time for the meaning of war, but also for his purpose, and suggest to task to follow to reach our goals on the field, which are still used nowadays:

First Task: planning for a war requires identifying the enemy's center of gravity and if possible, trace them back to a single one; (examples: enemy's army, capital or allies)

Second Task: To ensure that the main forces to be used to attack that point are concentrated for a main offensive.

Insights and Lessons for our Times:

Delimitation of the final objectives: a war is not started, or rationally it should not be done, without the definition of its political and geo strategic aim, in the short term, and its ultimate goal, in the long run. In short, a total war that includes the civilian element and seeks unconditional surrender (World War II) is not the same as a limited war whose objective is to restore a previous situation (Las Malvinas).
Active defence: defence cannot be conceived without offensive reactions. Apparently, the defender has the advantage, but mere defence is incompatible with victory. If defence is ever necessary, it should be seen as a step prior to counterattack.
Operational flexibility: when two armies engage in combat, there are always elements who emerge unexpectedly, or that behave differently than planned (the so-called “friction”). The battlefield is dynamic, the military commander must know how to adapt to the circumstances. In addition, having a strategic reserve allows dealing with unforeseen situations.
Troop’s morale: The morale of the troop must be taken care of; it is a determining factor. A well-equipped army, immune to disinformation strategies through specific training, fights better and performs better under stress.
Limits of the action: every commander must know the limit of the army’s strength, in order to avoid losing what they have gained on the battlefield. This operational limit has to be clear at the time of planning.
Intelligence analysis: every decision maker must obtain intelligence reports in order to make decision at the strategic level in the right direction otherwise the decision making is likely to be taken over by method and routine, with potentially disastrous results

Since the end of the Cold War and the revamping of unconventional warfare, Clausewitz’s work has renewed significance for scholars and academics. However, even during the Cold War, it continued to be a milestone for several leaders and decision-makers. Roosevelt, Lenin, Mao Tse-tung and Hitler were among the important readers of Clausewitz. For instance, Lenin enlarged the concept of war as policy with other means to explain the conflict of the social classes.

Today, the lucid approach of Clausewitz to war can be a useful help in understanding how to deal with asymmetrical threats in different fields. The recent defeat in Afghanistan shows how it can be possible to win battles but lose the war. Clausewitz draws from his age concepts still used today: moral hazard, guerrilla, the importance of the human factor, etc. and therefore, On War remains even today, a benchmark for military and strategic thought.

June 3, 2021 — 1 Comment

European Security Challenges I: The footprint of power rebalancing

By Sonia Martínez and Giovanni Rasio.

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Currently, there exists no popular support to equip the Union with substantial military capabilities to defend itself against common threats. There is no consensus among leaders regarding European Strategic Autonomy, the key aspect of European defence planning. And if this decision is made, European leaders need to craft a common strategy. This query would entail questions such as what the risks are, who would join, or what are the next steps.

Unless the United States abruptly decided to abandon its commitment embodied in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European defence configuration is unlikely to vary. Since the beginning of the Cold War, the United States has always acted as the security guarantor of Europe. In particular, the long-standing American support for the Old Continent's defence and security has pivoted around NATO. As a full-fledged multilateral security alliance, NATO has provided an effective shield against the threats arising in Europe’s Eastern neighbourhood. The Organisation also represented the main framework through which Member States’ forces have engaged in military operations under American guidance.

Approaches to Security

Nonetheless, as positions concerning defence diverge, propelling European self-defence would put the unity of the block under pressure. Europe should not stand solely on its feet, as transatlantic support has and will prove crucial. However, it must undoubtedly increase its defence autonomy to a great extent. According to Chancellor Merkel, the ‘task of the future’ for Europe is to take destiny into its own hands.

After a rather unipolar age, the EU should use the global power rebalancing scenario to its benefit. New challenges are compelling the US to shift its focus and resources from Europe and the Middle East towards the Indo-Pacific. This rebalancing dynamic, which partially began with the so-called Pivot to Asia during the Obama Administration, culminated with the Indo-Pacific Strategy introduced by President Trump. The attention required by the US posture in the Pacific, combined with Trump’s proneness to threatening European allies to withdrawal the American troops, have somehow pushed Washington and Europe far from each other.

The Union beyond question needs a more autonomous security approach. This is certainly the viewpoint of President Macron, who advocates for ‘European autonomy’ in defence matters, based on the principle of interoperability. This approach evokes a Union capable of delivering both soft and hard power. The German approach is comparatively different. It is based on cooperation, support, and it emphasises the importance of strong transatlantic relations. A coordinated European approach is needed to secure the continent in an unprecedented environment marked by COVID-19 and a complex setting on the East wing.

Impact of European Security Approaches on Strategy

Given the ever-changing uncertain global outlook, observing strategic moves conducted by other global actors is paramount. After Brexit, the UK pivoting from Europe to a global strategy adds complexity to the EU’s defence strategy. In January 2021, the European Union officially lost an important partner for its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Other than holding one of the most powerful militaries in the world, the United Kingdom, together with France, has historically proved essential in nuclear deterrence and expeditionary capabilities for the European Union.

After leaving the EU, the UK aims to revive a more global dimension of its foreign policy. This would allow London to regain a leading role on the international stage. The Integrated Review 2021 offers a first glimpse of the new ‘Global Britain’, conveying that the UK will be the first European country to tilt to the Indo-Pacific region, thus inevitably shifting its focus away from a continental perspective.

Further crucial points need to be addressed in common security matters of the EU. The EU's internal and external security issues are becoming increasingly intertwined. An updated version of the 2016 EU Global Strategy and the implementation of tailored policies are required to counter potential security threats.

Moving forward

Initiatives such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PeSCo) and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) are turning points for a coordinated approach to security. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) comprises both assets and capabilities of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), dealing among others with crisis management. And yet, this task remains a vital milestone to secure Europe.

This is even more essential concerning the EU's southern and eastern neighbours. In this regard, Karrenbauer highlights the need to pay attention to the four cardinal points. The CFSP, in fact, is a model based on multilateralism that aims to demonstrate that this sort of international order functions. However, European multilateralism will not prove successful without coordination and agility. The unanimity factor implies that if member states do not arrive at a consensus other states might make a move to solely benefit themselves.

Conclusion

Member States should work together concerning security matters in the direction of strategic autonomy. The region should take on its hard power responsibility in an uncertain multipolar environment. There is an inevitable overlap between internal and external security threats. Exchanging information is crucial to achieve an effective defence strategy.

As Kramp-Karrenbauer, German Minister of Defence, wrote, Brexit exhibits the results of a European policy that feeds on sentiment instead of devising ideas for a common European future. Brexit has possibly fissured relations between the UK and the EU, as press biases indicate.

Europe needs to cooperate to bring forward a common defence framework that rises above politics. The way ahead should be a combination of more strategic autonomy and stronger transatlantic relations; while the former will be critical, the latter has proved crucial. The US rebalance of power, the pandemic and Brexit are increasing the temperature of the stove. European leaders should know that a watched pot never boils.

Here is an in-depth analysis of Russia’s motivation in the region.

May 5, 2021 — 2 Comments

The Book of Five Rings: The Japanese Art of Becoming Better Individuals

Marco Verrocchio and Javier Olaechea Lázaro.

The Book of Five Rings by Miyamoto Musashi, alongside Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, is one of main masterpieces in strategic studies. Not only can it be considered as a manual for leaders in the military and private sectors, but it can also serve as a way for self-development and success in daily life. Encompassing five books on spiritual symbols from Buddhist culture, the combination of Mushashi’s martial arts and his literary skills is a tremendous inspiration for us all.

Historical setting

The end of the Momoyama Period and the beginning of the Edo, when Musashi lived and wrote the Book of Five Rings, was an age of political, religious and social turmoil. An age that started with the Warring State period and culminated with the establishment of the Tokugawa shogunate in the 1603. The main actors of this era were the Daimyō , warlords who fought each other to control the country. Initially, the Daimyō were open to new trade routes, especially with the arrival of the Portuguese in 1543 and the arrival of Christianity through the missionaries. Soon, these improvements brought technical development such as the arquebuses and printing. Thanks to these, the Daimyō were able to increasingly focus on military campaigns meant to control Buddhists and Shintoist religious institutions, as well as merchants. This resulted into urbanisation of civic society, with Samurai, merchants, and bureaucrats settled around local warlords' fortified castles, and farmers gathered in small villages in the countryside.

Other than creating a strict hierarchy of social classes, the Samurai class benefited from great privileges serving under a Daimyō. Samurai became so relevant that many of them were able to gain political and military power, overthrowing members of upper classes. War amongst the Daimyō continued in the last decade of the XVI century, especially after failed attempts to invade Korea in 1592 and 1597. The Warring Period ended only with the preeminence of Tokugawa Ieyasu. After defeating opposing Daimyō at Sekigahara, he established the Shogunate in 1603. The Edo period began. This is known as an era marked by Japan's isolationist foreign policy, which lasted for 214 years. The missionaries were ousted and Christianity was prohibited. With the unification of Japan, firm social hierarchy was ultimately consolidated.

The role of the Samurai changed too. The latter increasingly transitioned from warriors to courtiers, bureaucrats, and administrators. Keen to preserve their glorious past from the Warring Period, Samurai-led martial arts schools flourished all over the country and many Samurai started to write novels and manuals to preserve and pass down their precious cultural heritage. The famous Bushido written by Yamaga Soko (1622-1685) and the Book of Five Rings of Miyamoto Musashi are examples of this period.

Author setting

Little is known of his early life. Miyamoto Musashi was born around 1584 in the Harima province, situated in the south-west part of Japan. His father, Hirata Munisai, was a Samurai but Musashi lived his early years with his uncle, a clergyman, studying Confucianism and Buddhism. Three years later, Musashi left his village, fighting several Samurai in order to be accepted under the patronage of a Daimyō. At the age of 25, Musashi established a school of martial arts in Edo, the capital of the Shogunate.

Musashi explored other arts, such as poetry, acting, calligraphy, and tea ceremony. He established the school of martial arts ``two skies in one” (Niten Ichi-ryu), teaching the use of two swords. In 1643, he exiled himself to a mountain with the aim to write the Book of Five Rings. He died aged 62 years old two years later.

Insights and Lessons for our Times

From its purely formal conception, the book describes a series of stages designed to guide us along the path of personal growth in any field where we seek to develop. Musashi divides the book into an introduction presenting himself and five chapters, or rings, from which we chose the three most relevant in relation to our time:

Earth Manuscript: the importance of military strategy, or the "Way of strategy", sets out the spirit and moral requirements for understanding this domain. As the great swordsman explains, for any challenge we may be faced with, very few (if any) require the mastering of only one single skill. To master any field, it is argued, it is important to understand and master all the constituent parts of that peculiar field.

Water Manuscript: methods to achieve victory through certain techniques to master body and arms correctly. Focus is allocated particularly on the importance of “looking in” and “looking out”, as one seeks to maximise strategy. Within this context, we learn about the damaging nature of tunnel vision and blind spot. This is given by narrow approaches that push us to consider a limited number of solutions vis-à-vis challenges instead of valuing alternative course of action.

Fire Manuscript: describes techniques that have to do with different situations such as the environment where the fight is taking place, how to handle the mood of the opponent or what attitudes are to be adopted according to the situation. The most valuable word here is “timing”. The timing to decide when to fight or, conversely, when not to fight. Musashi teaches us to think deeply about our preparedness to fight life-battles. He explains how there is no shame in admitting we are not ready to overcome challenges. There is instead shame in knowing we are not ready and still convince ourselves we can fight and win. Whilst self-confidence remains key, right timing is even more important.

In general, this piece is about the type of honour and impeccable conduct that coexist with bushido^{^[1]}. One could argue that its relevance to today's time is minimal. And yet, whilst focus is mostly military, the Book of the Five Rings can actually be applied to other, if not all, ethical and psychological dimensions that feature adversarial competition.

In truth, we claim it promotes effort and search for self-improvement through discipline, which greatly resonates to the kind of lessons we are to internalise in our daily lives.

^[1] It is a term translated as "the way of the warrior", in the Japanese tradition. It is a strict and particular code of ethics to which many samurai (or bushi) gave their lives, demanding loyalty and honour until death.