By Camilla Braito and Patrick Haasler - Russia Desk
Introducing the New START
During the Cold War, nuclear arms control stood as one of the key pillars of international stability and as a guarantor of predictability in states’ behaviour. Today, that foundation is faltering. The idea of quantitatively or qualitatively reducing nuclear arsenals clashes with a growing global call to rearm, both in the nuclear field and beyond. Nowhere is this tension more visible than in the uncertain future of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).
Signed by the United States and the Russian Federation in 2010 and entered into force on February 5, 2011, the New START replaced the 1991 START I, renewing both parties’ commitment to verifiably reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals. The Treaty sets three main limits. First, it caps the number of nuclear warheads deployed on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. Second, it restricts the number of deployed delivery systems, including ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable bombers. Third, it limits the total number of deployed and non-deployed launchers and bombers. Within these constraints, each side retains the freedom to structure and modernise its strategic forces at its discretion. A central feature of the New START is its monitoring and verification regime. This relies on the use of National Technical Means (NTM), a shared database updated twice a year with data on the numbers, types, and locations of Treaty-limited systems, as well as two types of on-site inspections to confirm accuracy and proper implementation. This arrangement, however, has already been on life support since 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic interrupted on-site inspections and the two signatories never agreed on their resumption. In February 2023, the situation aggravated when Russia further suspended its participation in the Treaty, citing Washington’s hostile policy and support for Ukraine, just weeks after renewed compliance disputes.
Originally, the New START was set to last ten years, until 2021, with the option of a single five-year extension to 2026. Beyond that, no further renewals were envisioned. Within this framework, Moscow’s September 22, 2025, proposal to Washington to voluntarily continue adhering to the Treaty’s limits for one additional year after its expiration has particular significance. After warning in July that allowing the New START to lapse would be highly undesirable, on October 5, Donald Trump responded positively to the Russian proposal, although without making any formal commitment. A few days later, Vladimir Putin confirmed ongoing contacts with the U.S. through diplomatic channels, suggesting that four months should be sufficient to decide on an extension. However, he added that if the U.S. did not consider the continued adherence worthwhile, it would not be critical for Russia, whose nuclear deterrent capabilities continue to advance, most notably with the Poseidon system, a development that poses a game-changing challenge to traditional deterrence.
The delicate balance of incentives and apprehensions surrounding the Treaty’s future sets the stage for exploring the motivation behind Russia’s proposal for an extension.
Russia’s offer in context: strategic motives and technological leverage
Strategic deterrence between Russia and the U.S. has become increasingly tense following the erosion of Cold War–era nuclear arms control. Following the dissolution of the INF Treaty in 2019, both countries reintroduced intermediate-range systems to Europe, reigniting mutual suspicion. The U.S. development and potential deployment of Tomahawk and Typhon missile systems in Europe - and possibly in Ukraine - has revived Russia's long-standing fears of a preemptive "decapitation strike" that could target its leadership with little warning. Moscow interprets the short flight times and high precision of these American weapons as a direct threat to its command structures, reminiscent of Soviet-era concerns during the 1980s Euromissile crisis. Washington argues that these deployments are defensive and necessary to counter Russian violations and capabilities, such as the SSC-8 missile and hypersonic systems. Nevertheless, Russia’s leadership views the situation as growing encirclement and has warned of retaliatory measures if U.S. systems move closer to its borders. This dynamic has reintroduced instability into the European theatre, with both sides signalling and counter-signalling under the shadow of mutual deterrence. Thus, the renewed presence of American long-range missiles in Europe symbolises a broader breakdown in trust and the return of Cold War–style anxieties about nuclear first strikes.
Against this tense backdrop, Russia’s revised nuclear doctrine, announced in December 2024, broadened the conditions under which nuclear weapons could be employed, including in response to an attack by a non-nuclear state supported by a nuclear power. This is consistent with Moscow’s fear of a potential U.S. transfer to Ukraine of Tomahawk missiles that can be nuclear-armed and for that are considered a direct and destabilising threat, reinforcing concerns about strategic vulnerability and justifying the lowering of its nuclear threshold. The "dirty bomb" alluded to by Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, which, in the event of an attack on the Russian Federation, would render it impossible to differentiate between conventional and nuclear armaments, is regarded by Russia's preeminent security elites as a grave threat to Russian sovereignty. This threat is met with a range of proactive, preemptive (non-nuclear), and reactive (tactical nuclear) countermeasures.
Assuming that Russia is solely interested in a deal with the U.S. because of the perceived threat posed by the Tomahawks would once again oversimplify the issue. The following brief outline of the latest technical and military developments will substantiate the assumption that Russia is attempting to force the Americans to the negotiating table from a position of strength. Russia has recently increased its pace of development and production of the intermediate-range missile Oreshnik, with a reported first combat use in November 2024 in the Ukrainian Oblast Dnipropetrovsk, and mass production declared in mid-2025. The system is characterised as mobile, solid-fuel, capable of speeds beyond Mach 10, equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), and capable of carrying submunitions. Due to its range (potentially up to 3,000–5,500 km) and hypersonic speed, the Oreshnik missile challenges existing missile defence systems and revives the risk posed by ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) since the collapse of the INF Treaty. Meanwhile, Russia claims that the nuclear-powered cruise missile Burevestnik (9M730) has successfully undergone very long endurance tests (14,000 km over 15 hours) and is approaching deployment. Its lower-altitude flight profile and seemingly unlimited range are designed to evade missile defence systems, representing a significant shift in the design of strategic weapons. Even though substantial technical uncertainty remains, particularly regarding the nuclear reactor propulsion unit, post-flight guidance, and operational safety, it can be expected that the missile will undergo further technical improvement and is therefore seen by many experts as a potential game-changer that could put the United States under immense pressure.
Another strand of novel Russian strategic capability is represented by the Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle (nuclear-powered torpedo), which is designed to travel long distances underwater, carry a high-yield thermonuclear charge, and threaten coastal infrastructure and naval bases. Due to the extensive nature of U.S. coastal and marine infrastructure, some analysts describe Poseidon as a "strategy-changer" in the maritime nuclear domain. These systems are important because they have the potential to degrade existing U.S./NATO missile defence and deterrence architectures, and they signal Russian strategic resolve. By introducing weapons that evade or challenge existing defence layers, Russia aims to tip the scales of nuclear and conventional deterrence in its favour and signal a determined position of strength on a tactical and strategic level. The U.S., so far, is lacking equivalent public breakthroughs. Russia's recent tests of the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile and Poseidon underwater drone are portrayed as revolutionary, providing unlimited range and the ability to loiter indefinitely, thus ensuring strategic parity for the entire 21st century. These systems are said to blur traditional missile categories, making them nearly impossible to verify or limit under existing arms control frameworks. Overall, the absence of reciprocal control mechanisms and growing distrust could fuel an uncontrolled arms race and heighten global nuclear danger.
All these things considered, it can be argued that Russia is leveraging technological innovation not merely as a means of deterrence but as a political instrument to restore strategic balance and compel renewed engagement from Washington. The shift from perceived vulnerability to technological assertiveness forms the backdrop for Russia’s new weapons programs and its current approach to arms control negotiations.
What comes next for the New START?
Three possible scenarios on the New START could unfold after February 5, 2026. In the first, Moscow confirms the proposed commitment, and Washington agrees to reciprocate, allowing both parties to continue voluntarily observing the Treaty’s quantitative limits for one more year, notwithstanding other major divergences, mainly on the war in Ukraine. In the second, the Treaty expires without any time-bound effort to uphold its provisions, and in the absence of a successor arms control arrangement, the two largest nuclear arsenals may go unconstrained for the first time in more than three decades. In the third scenario, negotiations begin on a new agreement addressing strategic nuclear arsenals, either bilaterally or with China involved, at least in the early stages. Indeed, China’s growing capabilities provide strategic cover for Russia and reduce the leverage of traditional U.S.–Russia arms control, highlighting the need for a multilateral framework. This final scenario could develop independently or alongside one of the previous two, provided there is sufficient political will to initiate sustained talks. As both parties remain preoccupied with other urgent matters, it is unlikely that such an initiative will advance on its own; rather, it would likely progress in parallel with either an extension or the definitive termination of the existing Treaty.
This range of possible outcomes sheds light on how the trajectory of the New START reflects the state of U.S.–Russia relations, the impasse in Ukraine, and the broader decline in genuine commitment to non-proliferation goals.
Image generated by AI
Conclusion
As things stand, the New START remains the only existing nuclear arms control treaty between the United States and Russia. When it expires in 2026, there will be no formal, legally binding limits on strategic nuclear arsenals for the first time in decades. Since a further formal renewal is not permitted under its current terms, serious concerns about the future of global arms control and strategic stability arise.
Russia seeks to extend or replace the New START from a perceived position of strength, leveraging its recent breakthroughs in novel strategic weapons to force the United States back to the negotiating table, preferably on Moscow’s terms. These systems are designed to bypass or overwhelm U.S. missile defences, restore strategic parity after the INF Treaty’s collapse, and counter perceived encirclement by NATO, particularly the potential deployment of nuclear-capable Tomahawk missiles in Europe or Ukraine. By showcasing technically advanced, hard-to-intercept delivery vehicles and broadening its nuclear doctrine, Moscow aims to deter further Western escalation while signalling that any future arms-control agreement must account for these game-changing capabilities and address Russia’s core security concerns.
More than ever, the not-so-distant prospect of the New START reaching the end of its validity highlights the enduring importance of nuclear arms control for global security. Arms control embodies a paradoxical form of partnership, one in which rivals cooperate to co-manage deterrence and reduce the risks inherent in their competition. In essence, such agreements serve to uphold strategic stability, preserve crisis stability, and prevent the escalation of arms races, reminding us that even limited and imperfect cooperation is preferable to the absence of any attempt at regulation and that the willingness of states to negotiate in bona fide is a precondition for arms control efforts to work out.
It remains incumbent on the American and Russian leadership to balance technological advancement with diplomatic engagement, seeking paths to stabilise deterrence beyond mere temporary extensions. The coming months are crucial for shaping the future of nuclear arms control and reducing strategic risks in an increasingly complex geopolitical environment.
by Wesley Issey Romain & Giulia Saccone - AI, Cyber Security & Space Team
Introduction
The emergence of the “smart city” as a concept in the 1980s and a reality in the mid-2000s coincided with the rapid development of technology and internet worldwide. Two decades later, in 2024, growing urbanisation, environmental concerns, social and governance issues, shifting lifestyles, and economic and residential attractiveness contribute to deeper reliance on digital tools and emergent technologies, such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices and artificial intelligence (AI). Consequently, protecting smart cities’ infrastructures, networks and IoT devices against data theft, sabotage, surveillance, ransomware, terrorism, and other cybercrimes – whether from state-sponsored hacker groups or non-state actors – is crucial for government, private businesses, and civil society stakeholders.
This paper argues that despite the constant and multifaceted cybersecurity threats smart cities encounter, holistic and long-term solutions exist to maintain and enhance the security of their infrastructures and prevent any potential massive disruption. Our article mainly uses qualitative and quantitative data from secondary sources. It will be organised into five parts in the subsequent order:
Firstly, it will provide a brief understanding of the concept of a “smart city” and a presentation of its interpretations, strengths, opportunities, and primary stakeholders. The second part (II) will discuss the leading cyber security challenges smart cities face and demonstrate how the advent of emerging technologies and new threat actors will continue to impact smart cities’ overall safety and integrity. Finally, the third, fourth, and last parts (III, IV, and V) will each present an existing and potential solution to strengthen the security of intelligent cities’ IT infrastructures against cyber threats and disruptions.
A brief presentation of the concept of the smart city
The concept of “smart city” started appearing in academia around the 1990s; however, the notion has been popularised through IBM’s Smart Cities Challenges. Although nowadays there is not a univocal definition of a smart city, for this article, we may define them as an urban area where ICT and IoT occupy a pivotal role in data collection, anonymisation and analysis for the improvement of citizens’ quality of life, addressing contemporary challenges on a multi-stakeholder partnership. It is hence characterised by the use of diverse IoT-based systems (from smart grids to garments with sensors), which change from city to city–which implies the diverse definition of smart cities. Therefore, connectivity is the indispensable trait that every IoT device should have to join the smart city’s network, and scalability is what ensures that every project can be initially implemented on a small scale and then expanded in the wide urban landscape. Furthermore, users’ participation is vital for concretising the effects of a smart city and spotting new challenges1.
The main sectors involved are the ones of mobility, where IoT devices, AI and 5G optimise citizens’ transportation both on private vehicles and public transportation; energy, where smart grids allocate energy efficiently based on demand; and health, where IoT timely communicates through 5G the physiological state of individuals to provide timely responses and targeted therapies. IoT implementation in housing is important not only for this latter aim but also for improving lifestyle, with a house capable of responding to our daily necessities in a timely manner. IoT paired with AI can be functional for improving surveillance and predicting crime. Recently, smart cities’ R&D has also focused on public administration and citizenship participation, boosting the efficiency of public administration and creating smart communities for boosting citizens' engagement in local politics2.
Smart cities aim to improve citizens’ quality of life by addressing urbanisation challenges through energy efficiency and responsive systems enabled by IoT devices. However, only 16% of cities can independently afford these projects due to high costs and diverse program requirements. To attract investors and drive innovation, cities use their smart city mission as a branding strategy, fostering advancements in underdeveloped but essential areas and consequentially creating long-term investments and competitiveness on the international stage. Partnerships with international bodies, research institutions, and other smart cities have proven effective for acquiring cutting-edge technology and best practices, mainly through city-to-city collaborations that bypass traditional bureaucratic channels.
The success of a project in a smart city resides in the coordination of the multiple stakeholders, which play simultaneous roles as planners, developers, implementation agents and follow-up responsible. The main actors involved are public stakeholders - namely national and local governments, administration and political institutions – that enable the coordination, monitoring and compliance of other players through policy formulation. Following, we have the private sector – composed of companies and start-ups primarily focused on the ICT field, investors, and in specific contexts, energy suppliers and property developers – that, in the case of cybersecurity, provide ICT infrastructures and investments in cutting-edge technology to boost the system readiness for cyberattacks. The Academic group has emerged as knowledge brokers, concurring with private counterparts in offering solutions in the implementation stage. Civil stakeholders – namely press, NGOs, and private citizens - play a dual role as recipients and contributors of projects, dispensing continuous feedback to the abovementioned categories thanks to advocacy and data sharing.
The digital challenges of smart cities with emerging technologies.
Due to its incorporation of mixed technologies, software, and hardware, a smart city would inevitably be exposed to multiple cyber attacks by various threat actors. Experts have suggested that smart cities necessitate novel and inventive approaches to safeguard devices and applications, taking into account factors such as resource limitations, the nature of distributed architecture and geographic dispersion while confronting issues such as unreliable communication, insufficient data, and privilege safeguarding. Regardless of whether the cyber attack is conducted on the perception layer (sensor, actuators, RFID or GPS), on the network layer (Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and LAN), or on the application layer (Smart Home, Health, and Grid), most common cybersecurity risks associated with smart cities can be summarised into four types.
First, the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is perhaps the most documented practice of cyber attacks against a service or a network. DDoS is a malicious attack restricting digital traffic by inundating a target with excessive internet traffic, utilising compromised computer systems and IoT devices as sources. A cybercriminal could, for example, launch a DDoS attack to gain a smart city’s charging station, traffic light, or public transportation network, which could become a component of a botnet employed to disable another system. In 2018, CISCO indicated that the number of DDoS attacks worldwide was 7.9 million and had forecasted a substantial rise to 15.4 million in 2023. Additionally, most recent statistics data showed that DDoS attacks increased by 46% in the first half of 2024 in comparison to 2023, with peak attack power jumping from 1.6 Tbps to 1.7 Tbps, in which online gaming, technology, financial services, and telecommunications were the most targeted industries with 49%, 15%, 12%, and 10% respectively.
Secondly, data exfiltration from devices such as traffic lights, CCTV cameras, parking meters, or public services servers is another significant challenge for smart cities as they gather extensive data from citizens. Public data theft violates the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of public data, as cybercriminals can use compromised information to perpetrate ransomware or other fraudulent transactions with third parties on the dark web. Privacy violations, financial loss, legal problems, and loss of trust from citizens are just a few of the damaging effects of data leaks from a city’s IoT devices. Such incidents have happened and are more frequent than one may think. For example, in July 2024, a large-scale data theft conducted by a cybercriminal group was reported in the United States in Columbus, Ohio. After the breach of private data stolen from over a hundred thousand ordinary people stored in public IT infrastructures and municipal agencies, a ransomware operation was launched, and sensitive information was divulged on the dark web. This type of incident will likely occur again as cities rely more and more on technology.
Thirdly, device hijacking is another threat associated with smart cities. Hacker groups often seek to control a device to influence the myriad of technological equipment constituting a smart city infrastructure and network. IT experts argue that IoT devices frequently possess default credentials that malicious actors can use, and weak data encryption, absence of periodic software updates, and interconnectedness render them easily compromised by hackers.
Fourth, Permanent Denial of Service (PDoS) is documented as a devastating cyber risk to any technologically advanced and dynamic city. IT experts have noted that, in contrast to sporadic DDoS, which results in ephemeral cyber disruptions, PDoS causes permanent hardware damage and substantial economic consequences, potentially endangering human life in healthcare and critical infrastructure sectors.
Urban areas are projected to accommodate 68% of the global population by 2050, propelled by urbanisation and demographic expansion. Consequently, such prevision, coupled with the advancement and availability of devices and digital tools, the participation of state-sponsored and non-state actors groups in malign cyber-attacks is undoubtedly a source of concern for developed and emerging countries, global cities and their inhabitants. At the same time, it should be observed thatcities worldwide do not share the same level of cyber threat. As Cesar Cerrudo mentioned, while most cities possess technology, the effectiveness of smart cities varies based on the extent of technological advancements implemented. Some cities have implemented more technology while others have less.
Smart cities are expected to face several digital challenges with the availability and advent of new technologies; nevertheless, solutions and measures exist to enhance security and prevent disruptions.
Source: Illustration generated by AI
Threat detection and investments in advanced technology
Existing measures are primarily concerned with ensuring data and privacy protection based on trust, integrity, and confidentiality to prevent leaks from sensors, cameras, other IoT devices, and critical infrastructures. To support them and address the main concerns raised by industry and academia on privacy and data protection, the cybersecurity sector has focused on the mitigation of breaches in IoT for privacy protection, improving device authentication, access control, and firmware updates to provide better data anonymisation, secure data sharing and analytics for safe decision-making. A smart city is a goldmine of personal data due to its pivotal role in enhancing the quality of life of citizens and the interconnectedness through IoT. This provides criminals with a myriad of access points on devices with limited.
Blockchain technology has demonstrated a high potential solution thanks to its capacity to transmit information securely and directly. Specifically, this technology can be applied to cybersecurity to protect personal data. In the case of e-governance, it enables individuals to manage their credentials independently, bypassing centralised controlling authorities. Seoul is a fitting example: in 2018, the city started applying blockchain in its public administration, and during the same year, it developed a metaverse secured by blockchain for document issuance and citizen participation.
AI application is another game-changing technology that can boost smart cities’ cybersecurity thanks to their high computational and predictive qualities, which, applied to the fog computing layer, could protect them from cyberattacks despite their resource constraints – i.e. limited storage and RAM3. In particular, the fog layer managing the data transfer between the IoT devices and the Cloud layer provides a higher amount of computing load than those two extremes, lower latency in the communications between the IDS and the IoT, and lower energy consumption. This enables the operators to isolate the attack, repel it, and avoid its spread throughout the network, allowing an interrupted flow of smart city services. In particular, ML can be applied to both SDIS and AIDS. On the other hand, it can ease the time-consuming characteristics of updating the signature database. Regarding the latter, it can enhance the precision of attack detection, lowering the rate of false positives.
Biometrics is already used to facilitate authentication thanks to the uniqueness of individual features, addressing the constant concern for privacy and security. They have already found wide applications in the smart economy field, like the fingerprint and face recognition used by Apple Pay, face recognition for video surveillance devices of Amazon Web Services, and voice recognition employed by Amazon Alexa for telemedicine in the UK.
Strengthening and facilitating public-private partnerships
It is already visible from these few examples how private and public sectors coexist in the development of smart cities’ security, acting in synergy for optimising the outcomes of their projects thanks to risk and resource sharing and the relative reduction of costs; access to the private’s technical and management skills and the innovation enhancement for effective, creative and real-time solutions. An example is the collaboration between Barcelona’s Municipal Institute of Informatics and CISCO to implement a communication protocol for CERT and CSIRT to detect, share, respond and recover from cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities in IoT devices.
Indeed, Barcelona is a perfect example of a smart city where public and private partnerships (PPP) can thrive thanks to companies with a sound knowledge of the local market, the involvement of all the stakeholders – citizenship included – to commit them towards the same type of projects and ease the tensions through transparency and responsibility, and trust-building practices, which are paramount in the initial phases. The cruciality of trust building is visible in the failure of the PPP of Sidewalk Labs and Waterfront Toronto, where the lack of involvement of the citizens led to tensions that resulted in boycott protests of the project.
However, it must be pointed out that this factor is crucial in democracies, where citizenship plays an active role in shaping smart cities. Nevertheless, transparency is a value that benefits all smart cities regardless of the ongoing regime since it communicates the reliability of the projects and the worth of investing in this transformation.
Strengthening and facilitating regional and international cooperation, information sharing and dialogue among experts
PPPs are not the only method to transform and strengthen the security of smart cities; international fora, capacity-building projects, and collaboration among cities play fundamental roles. At the international level, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the UN-HABITAT coordinate the global platform "United for Smart Sustainable Cities" (U4SSC) to encourage the transition from traditional to smart cities, which has also developed a set of key performance indicators (KPIs) for sustainable cities, a valuable instrument for agenda setting and performance evaluation adopted by more than 50 cities worldwide.
The ITU, thanks to the Smart Sustainable Cities program, supports the development of stable, secure, reliable and interoperable ICT devices for sustainable cities. The Smart Cities Council is a network of experts providing capacity building and investment programs, which, among all the objectives, aim to ensure cyber, privacy, and data protection. At the regional level, for instance, the EU provides the Smart Cities Marketplace: a platform for the various stakeholders involved in the field to improve citizens’ quality of life and increase the competitiveness of European cities and industry with respect to EU climate targets.
While at the level of bilateral agreements, Singapore has exploited its expertise to catalyse agreements from distant poles, such as China and the US, for mutual cyber capacity-building projects. Those multilevel initiatives have a common effect that addresses one of the biggest challenges of smart cities intra and interoperability: the normative and standard differences between cities, which makes PPP challenging and prevents effective data protection, the biggest concern in the research field.
Conclusion
In conclusion, despite the persistent, increasing, and diverse cybersecurity risks faced by smart cities, comprehensive and sustainable solutions are available to safeguard their infrastructures and avert significant disruptions. Firstly, it has been shown that the notion of a smart city originated in academic circles throughout the nineties. The concept emphasises mobility, energy, and health, with research and development concentrating on public administration and citizen participation. It was argued that successful projects necessitate the collaboration of several stakeholders, including planners, developers, implementation agents, and follow-up measures, to enhance the quality of life for citizens.
The second part of the article sought to demonstrate that smart cities incorporate various technologies, including software and hardware, making them vulnerable to multiple cyber-attacks from a wide range of threat actors. DDoS and PDoS attacks, data exfiltration, and device hijacking attacks are common cybersecurity dangers. The involvement of both state-sponsored and non-state actors in malicious cyber-attacks is a cause for concern for both developed and emerging nations, as well as capital cities around the globe and their populations.
Thirdly, it has been observed that investments in cutting-edge technologies to prevent cyber threats are deemed pertinent and practical. For instance, tools such as blockchain technology provide a safe and direct method for information transmission, positioning it as a viable option for cybersecurity. Besides, artificial intelligence applications can improve cybersecurity in smart cities through their computational and predictive abilities. Lastly, biometrics, characterised by its distinctive attributes, is employed for authentication, mitigating privacy and security issues.
The successful example of the city of Barcelona, introduced in the fourth part of the paper, confirmed that public-private collaborations improve security and optimise project results via risk and resource sharing, cost reduction, access to private technical and managerial expertise, and innovation. Additionally, it has been demonstrated that transparency is essential for smart cities.
Lastly, multilateral forums are part of the solution. International forums and initiatives to increase capacity building are essential to strengthening the safety of smart cities. Developing reliable, secure, and stable information and communication technology devices must be encouraged within forums such as the ITU’s Smart Sustainable Cities. Only through the listed solutions can government, public, and private stakeholders ensure that smart cities remain safe.
References
Houichi, Mehdi. “Cyber Security within Smart Cities: A Comprehensive Study and a Novel Intrusion Detection-Based Approach.” p.394. ↩︎
Hermann P. Rapp., and Moebert, Joechen. “Smart Cities: Investing in the urban future”. ↩︎
Abaimov, Stanislav. “Understanding and Classifying Permanent Denial-of-Service Attacks”. Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy. 2024; 4(2):324-339. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.3390/jcp4020016>
Admass, Wasyihun Sema., Yirga Yayeh Munaye., and Abebe Abeshu Diro. 2024. “Cyber Security: State of the Art, Challenges and Future Directions.” Cyber Security and Applications 2:100031. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.csa.2023.100031>.
Alibasic, Armin.,et al. “Cyber Security for Smart Cities: A Brief Review”. In Data Analytics for Renewable Energy Integration: 4th ECML PKDD Workshop, DARE 2016, Riva del Garda, Italy, September 23, 2016, Revised Selected Papers 4. 22-30, Springer International Publishing. 2017. Retrieved from: <https://e-tarjome.com/storage/btn_uploaded/2019-08-14/1565752729_9885-etarjome-English.pdf>
Hamid, Bushra. et al. “Cyber Security Issues and Challenges for Smart Cities: A survey”. 13th International Conference on Mathematics, Actuarial Science, Computer Science and Statistics (MACS), Karachi, Pakistan, 2019, pp. 1-7. Retrieved from: <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/9024768>
Houichi, Mehdi., Faouzi Jaidi., and Adel Bouhoula. 2024. “Cyber Security within Smart Cities: A Comprehensive Study and a Novel Intrusion Detection-Based Approach.” Computers, Materials & Continua 81 (1): 393–441. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.32604/cmc.2024.054007>
Jayasena, N.S., H. Mallawaarachchi, and K.G.A.S. Waidyasekara. “Stakeholder Analysis For Smart City Development Project: An Extensive Literature Review.” Edited by E. Mohd Ahnuar, R. Mohd Nordin, J. Yunus, and N.A. Abdul Rahman. MATEC Web of Conferences 266 (2019): 06012. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.1051/matecconf/201926606012>
Md Mamunur, Rashid.,et al. “Cyberattacks Detection in IoT-Based Smart City Applications Using Machine Learning Techniques.” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 17, no. 24 (December 14, 2020): 9347. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17249347>
Mijwil, Maad M.et al. “Cybersecurity Challenges in Smart Cities: An Overview and Future Prospects”. Mesopotamian Journal of Cybersecurity. Vol. 2022, pp. 1- 4. Retrieved from: <https://www.iasj.net/iasj/download/6b7ef8fef416253e>
Smart Cities Council “Smart Cities Council Works to Deliver Sector-Wide Upliftment through Specialized Products and Services.” 2025. Smart Cities Council. December 30, 2025. Retrieved from: <https://smartcitiescouncil.com/smartcitiescouncil/advisory/.>
US-ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership, “CET Smart City Project Pairing Initiative Sends Delegation of U.S. Experts to Singapore.” 2024.. May 30, 2024. Retrieved from: <https://www.usascp.org/us-expert-delegation/>
Uyarra, Elvira, Jon Mikel Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, Kieron Flanagan, and Edurne Magro. “Public Procurement, Innovation and Industrial Policy: Rationales, Roles, Capabilities and Implementation.” Research Policy 49, no. 1 (February 2020): 103844. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2019.103844>
Vempati, Smita., & N. Nalini. “Securing Smart Cities: A Cybersecurity Perspective on Integrating IoT, AI, and Machine Learning for Digital Twin Creation.” Journal of Electrical Systems, 20-5s, pp. 2817-2827, 2024. Retrieved from: <https://journal.esrgroups.org/jes/article/view/3052>
By Francesco Marchesini - UK & European Affairs Team - editing Valentina Gruarin
Rule Britannia: what remains of the Empire?
The United Kingdom once used to rule the largest Empire in human history. It was the first real superpower; ruling half of the World for a Century. Subsequently, after two World Wars and the Suez crisis of 1956, the UK lost its title of world superpower to the USA.
For decades, Great Britain has been playing the role of a medium-sized power. In fact, the military budget of HM Treasury -UK’s economic and finance Ministry- has been shrinking more and more over the years: from 8.65% of UK GDP in 1956 to 2.25% in 2018. After the Falkland War of 1982, the UK has not led a military campaign by its own initiative.
Despite this condition, the UK has some peculiarities: it is a nuclear power, with a leading role in the Commonwealth of Nations, NATO (being in command of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, which are NATO’s strike forces) and both the G7 and the G20 councils. The UK also takes part to the Five Powers Defence Arrangements -a military alliance with Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore- and the Five Eyes programme -joining the intelligence agencies of UK, USA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Lastly, the UK still holds strategic positions on seas via the control of Dominions, such as. Gibilter, Bermudas and Ascension, as well as through the presence of its military bases set in several key points of international routes.
The UK is thus maintaining a privileged position in matters of diplomacy and soft power, based on its trustworthiness and reliability. This can be witnessed by a British Council’s study of 2021 showing that the UK is the most attractive G20 Nation. According to the same study, the UK's soft power seems to be strongest in the southern hemisphere, particularly in South-East Asia and the Pacific. Moreover, the Consultancy Brand Finance’s Global Soft Power Index ranks the UK second, just behind the USA.
However, after Brexit, EU countries tend to perceive the UK as less willing to cooperate in terms of economy and security. The UK is not showing cohesiveness on how to implement its foreign policy and relations with the EU. Agreements for leaving the EU have been problematic, led by indecision and incoherence, and have been one of the main factors of the UK’s political instability over the last years.
Nevertheless, the UK and the European Countries are now developing new bilateral and multilateral forms of cooperation. It is still too early to assess their effectiveness. A productive collaboration with the European Union might benefit the UK’s military and economic systems, consequently strengthening both its foreign policy and bargaining power with other European nations.
Per mare, per terram: how strong is the UK?
Considering the UK’s military strength, the 2024 Global Firepower Index ranks the UK at 6th place and it is composed of a total of 230.000 personnel. In 2021 PM Boris Johnson launched the Integrated Review (IR), a programmatic plan for Britain’s security and strategic policies for the following decade. It included a vision of the UK’s future as a cosmopolitan, open and flourishing country, which could lead the “competitive World” through its soft power and technological advancement; while also increasing the investments in defence. Concerning technological advancement, the IR planned to enhance scientific research around matters related to AI development, cybersecurity, quantum technology, biomechanics and semiconductors -part of the so-called CyberPower Agenda- as well as energy security and environmental protection.
In the following years, both Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak changed this strategic plan, adapting it to the aggravation and multiplication of challenges and threats that the UK had to face. The most recent version, IR23, shows that the primary threat to the security of Britain is Russia, and that the UK has been in first line since before the mass invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, training Ukraine’s personnel and furnishing military equipment more and before other Western allies (over £12 billion). These data show that the UK is still a reliable and strong ally for the European countries. The second concern is China, a rising superpower, which is both intensifying its military operations in the South Chinese Sea and the Taiwan Strait and strengthening its armed forces, as well as employing soft power skills, for instance with the Belt and Road Initiative or the financial support to sub-saharan Countries. China can be seen, by some African and Asian countries, as a valid alternative to the so-called “Western world” and the UK fears losing control over Southeast Asia and the Pacific.
In 2024 the British PM Starmer declared the commitment of the Kingdom to reform its Armed Forces and increase the defense budget to 2.5% by the end of the decade, reaching £87 billion in 2030. Despite the former Chief of General Staff Gen. Sir Patrick Sanders declaring in January 2024 that the UK could not stand a conventional war, some work has been done. The UK is financing a new class of aircraft carriers (Queen Elizabeth Class), the new nuclear submarines programme (SSNR Class, included in the AUKUS cooperatio programme with the US and Australia), the new multirole fighter jet (Tempest Class, as a result of the Global Combat Air Programme with Italy and Japan) and the new main battle tank class (Challenger 3 Class).
All these avant-garde war machines will be developed by BAE Systems -a multinational firm with the participation of HM’s Government- as well as the partnership with other leading firms in defence, such as Leonardo, Mitsubishi, Thales and Rheinmetall. Despite its firepower, the UK is relying on Donald Trump's re-election as POTUS could be a game-changing event. He will probably focus its efforts on the internal front, de-prioritising the US’ foreign policy agenda. Indeed, during the electoral campaign, he repeatedly declared his intentions to disengage the US from their current grounds of action abroad, including Ukraine. Without the military and economical support of the USA, NATO’s existence itself could be compromised.
In this scenario, the UK and EU would necessarily have to strengthen their military and economical bonds, both inside and outside of NATO’s framework. Something is already. moving: UK’s Foreign Secretary David Lammy labelled the EU as the most urgent foreign policy priority, and PM Starmer declared that the negotiations for a pact over common security will start in Spring 2025. This could be a historic occasion to build an effective European defence strategy and to reunite the UK and the EU, perhaps even to reform the European Union itself into a more fair and functional confederation, able to play a crucial role in the geopolitical arena.
We should not forget that the UK is facing an unseen economic crisis that could make it impossible for the Government to keep pursuing their programmes, that's why the future negotiations will need to include forms of economic reintegration of UK and EU economies. The United Kingdom has ambitious goals for the future, which appear to be more and more unpredictable every day; only time will tell if their new route will be successful.
Diletta Huyskes, Head of Advocacy in Privacy Network, talks about the latest developments regarding Artificial Intelligence. In particular, this episode deals with the challenges that AI poses to the protection of Human Rights and how this issue is tackled in the upcoming AI Act.
Author: Zrinka Boric, Giorgia Zaghi, and Beatrice Gori
According to the estimates, the global population will reach 9.7 billion people by 2050. To meet such growing food demand, the food production in the world will need to increase by 70% in the upcoming decades. At the same time, the agricultural sector is currently facing several challenges, such as limited availability of arable land and fresh water, a slowdown in the growth of crop yields, consequences of climate change, and covid-19. The UN's second Sustainable Development Goal (SDG2) targets to end hunger, double agricultural productivity, and ensure sustainable food production systems by 2030. To successfully address the challenges and achieve food security digital technologies are expected to become a foundation in future food production. At the World Summit on Food Security 2009, the four pillars of food security were identified as availability, access, utilization, and stability.
Recently the Focus Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Internet of Things (IoT) for Digital Agriculture (FG-AI4A) was formed, in cooperation with Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), to explore the potential of technologies (AI, IoT) in the acquisition and handling of necessary data, optimization of agricultural production processes, and to ultimately identify best ways (and possible challenges) to use such technologies within the agricultural domain.Artificial intelligence (AI) technologies are forecast to add US$15 trillion to the global economy by 2030. According to the Government AI Readiness Index 2019, the governments of high income-countries have better odds to utilize these gains than low-income countries. Therefore, there is a risk that low-income countries could be left behind by the fourth industrial revolution.
Examples of the use of digital technologies in agriculture
TECHNOLOGY
USE IN AGRICULTURE
AI
The utilization of AI and Human Intelligence can increase the capabilities and knowledge of farmers and improve the sustainability of their productions. Meanwhile, farmers can better manage their resources and obtain superior production rates. Sustainable green farms with optimal yielding are a fundamental step towards the Sustainable Development Goal 12 which provides for a “responsible consumption and production."Farms produce massive amounts of data daily, which AI and machine learning models could utilize to increase agricultural productivity while minimizing harmful practices (i.e. extensive use of pesticides, monocropping).
Image Data (drones & satellites)
For instance, agricultural technology or AgriTech drones are powerful tools that can help monitor the most inaccessible and vulnerable areas and design and support adequate farming operations. By surveying and mapping the fields, drones provide information and predictions on the crops' growth and help prevent anomalies and disruption of the productions.Satellite image data paired with AI technology aims to help governments and organizations address agricultural challenges by providing granular insight and data analysis.
GPS technology is already steadily used to enhance agricultural processes and productivity and provides insight into the quantity of food produced proportionately to units of water.
Internet of Things
The IoT refers to devices with a sensor that enables them to transmit data through a network. IoT enables the collection and analysis of data and enables better tracking of performance, making informed decisions, and increasing efficiency and sustainability.
Yield monitoring and mapping
During the harvest, a dataset is collected (using different sensors and GPS technology) which can later be analyzed through specified software.This valuable dataset provides relevant information that helps to improve yield management, rational use of available resources, develop future nutrient strategies, and ultimately achieve more sustainable agriculture with lowered production costs.
Automation
Different forms of automation are used in agriculture to help farms operate more efficiently and increase productivity. Automation appears in many forms, from simple automatic watering systems used in many households, to specialized agricultural drones, robots (like harvest robots), and even driverless tractors.
AI in low-income countries
AI has the potential to have relevant impacts on low-income countries as it could bring about more opportunities to current problems in agriculture and numerous other fields. AI is a tool directed towards development enhancement, the so-called “AI4D” (AI for development). AI could bring about infrastructural and qualitative development, in terms of societal empowerment and change.
Moreover, one of the most relevant improvements in the agricultural sector would be rendering more efficient use of scarce resources.
Specified technologies and systems can target specific needs and/or problems in the exact timing and/or quantities. The specific cases of Israel and China exemplify the relevance of AI for development and resilience.
Both countries have massively invested in smart agriculture to increase yields, productivity and improve precision agriculture given the constraints of the growing scarcity of natural resources. China and Israel managed to improve their agricultural output to an extent where it is possible to consider them as “nations that feed the world”. Moreover, they both could export basic technologies to other countries to implement such “smart tools” to strengthen the latter’s agricultural export sector. For instance, this would be the case for Israel in countries like Indonesia and Thailand that have successfully utilized Israeli technology to improve their agricultural sector and export.
While the adoption of AI technology in agricultural practices of low-income countries seems like an easy way to solve relevant problems related to development, there are still many risks and barriers that ought to be considered. More specifically, compared to the costs of traditional systems, initial infrastructure costs for AI are extremely high – this would call for more participation from transnational organizations and technology companies to assist and supply basic infrastructure in low-income countries.
Conclusion
To conclude, the opportunities that AI holds in the agricultural sector seem to have the potential to accomplish part of the SDGs agenda for 2030. This is certainly an argument that can be applied to Western countries with the investment capacity to carry on a fourth agricultural revolution. Optimization of precision agriculture and the efficient use of scarce resources are essential steps to fight world hunger and climate change.
However, new technologies come with high entry-level costs and such investment could be too risky or too high for low-income countries and small-scale food producers.
While a new agricultural revolution will benefit countries and food producers who can afford to bring about sustainable development, it is necessary to acknowledge that a significant risk lies ahead: leaving out the have-nots in favor of the sole development of the haves.
Teuta Sahatqija talks about development of cybersecurity capacity in Kosovo since 1999, gender equality in the technology industry, cybersecurity, cybercriminal and cyberviolence occurrences, and the importance of technological development. Teuta Sahatqija is a Women in Tech Ambassador for Kosovo Chapter and an Advisor to the Mayor of Pristina for Digital Transformation and Smart City.
The team "Culture, Society, and Security" interviews Dr. Madeline Carr, Professor of Global Politics and Cyber Security in the Faculty of Engineering Science at the University College of London and Dr. Camino Kavanagh, visiting fellow at King’s College London, and member of UN advisory support team for negotiating processes related to cyber and international security.
Interviewing Team: Julia Hodgins and Sofia Staderini
Oleg Goldshmidt talks about Cybersecurity, deception technology, 5G, protection of key infrastructure, financial services and national security. Oleg Goldshmidt is a principal software architect at Fortinet. This is ITSS Verona Member Series Video Podcast by the Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence and Space Team.
