In this espisode, Dr. Simona Grano discusses the geopolitical implications of Chinese and Taiwanese influence in Southeast Asia and Oceania, and how this influence is being perceived and addressed by regional actors.
This podcast analyses how China is applying its strategic initiatives to influence infrastructure development and economic integration in Southeast Asia and Oceania examining Taiwan's counterbalancing efforts. It also investigates how regional nations navigate their relations with both China and Taiwan, the function of regional organisations, and the security ramifications of China's growing military might and a potential AUKUS alliance during the Trump era.
Dr. Grano is a distinguished expert in China and Taiwan issues. Dr. Grano serves as the Senior Fellow on Taiwan at the Asia Society Policy Institute's (ASPI) Center for China Analysis (CCA). She is also currently a Senior Lecturer and Director of the Taiwan Studies Project at the University of Zurich.
Interviewer: Kristina Kovalenko - Southeast Asia & Oceania Desk
by Marco Dordoni (Arctic Desk) & Pedro Mendes (US Team)
Introduction
Trump’s second term as President of the United States, has already outlined his key objectives. High on his priorities is the acquisition of Greenland, an autonomous territory under Danish administration. This is not the first time Trump has expressed interest in purchasing Greenland. During his first term, he floated the idea, sparking mixed reactions internationally. Trump described the island as a strategic asset and an economic opportunity due to its abundant mineral resources and its strategic location in the Arctic. However, the Danish government firmly rejected the notion, stating that Greenland was "not for sale." Despite the earlier rejection, the renewed interest in Greenland could stem from the Arctic’s growing significance, both for its untapped natural resources and emerging maritime routes, particularly in the context of climate change and shifting global geopolitics.
This article seeks to examine the strategic interests of the United States in the Arctic—particularly in Greenland—and to trace the evolution of the U.S. Arctic policy over time. It aims to contextualise the resurgence of Trump’s focus on Greenland by analysing both historical developments and contemporary geopolitical dynamics shaping American foreign policy in the region.
The (Un)Frozen Path: U.S. Policy for the Arctic
It is important to analyse the US interest in the Arctic, from a traditional security perspective. As explained in the next section, the proximity of the border with Russia, through the Bering Strait, indicates the need for a greater armed presence, to counter Russia’s growing military activity, as well as the need for strategic dominance in the face of Russia’s ballistic missile range, concurrently with the presence of Russian nuclear submarines in the Kola Peninsula.
These facts brought to light the strategic potential of the area, Likewise, non-traditional security perspectives point to factors like climate change , which remain beyond the scope of the current article, but may bring a greater flow of traffic to the region, due to the melting of the surrounding ice, which calls for an increased focus on strategic opportunities, like new shipping routes, fibre cables, fishing lanes and raw minerals.
Current US Administration’s view on the Arctic echoes the former statements about the expansionist danger of Russia and China. Exacerbated by China’s 2018 policy paper, proclaiming itself a “near Arctic State”, China demonstrated interest in the area with initiatives and projects as the “Polar Silk Road”. Despite the dispute over its capabilities and status as an “Arctic State”, Beijing materialized US’s geopolitical fears in the Arctic with this document, positioning itself in the region aiming to challenge the remaining players.
Policy wise, tracing its origin in 2009, the US’s several documents, like the Arctic Region Policy Directive recognized the Arctic’s strategic importance to American interests, from a security and energy lens. It further led to a greater focus in future documents, as the comprehensive view offered by the 2022 US National Strategy for the Arctic Region and the 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, which defined the Arctic as critical and prioritized four key vectors: security, climate change, sustainable development, and international governance.
After years as a footnote in US political priorities, the new American perspective of the Arctic region reacts to the current background. The several stances, policies, documents and increased activity attests to the importance of the region on the geopolitical chessboard.
Why Greenland Matters the U.S. National Security?
In recent years, Greenland has re-emerged as a strategic hub for global security and geopolitical stability. U.S. President Donald Trump notably emphasized this perspective, stating in a recent interview, “We really need Greenland for our national security.” This strategic importance encompasses in particular defense and military dimensions but also energy and economic security.
From a defense and military standpoint, Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine significantly reshaped Western strategic priorities, refocusing attention on the Arctic. . Moscow’s military build-up in the region—exemplified by bases such as Nagurskoye, located just 600 miles from Greenland—has heightened concerns in Washington. Greenland’s geographic location has historically been a cornerstone of transatlantic security, serving as a key site for the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line radar system—based at Pituffik Space base formerly Thule Air Base—and playing a crucial role in anti-submarine warfare due to its strategic position near the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap.These installations, critical during the Cold War, contributed to NATO's strategic advantage and are once again viewed as essential in countering current threats—namely Russia and, increasingly in Trump’s view, China. The growing Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic, extending beyond economic collaboration, further underscores the region's strategic volatility.
Trump has argued that Denmark is ill-equipped to manage these emerging threats, citing its geographic distance from Greenland and limited military capabilities. Furthermore, Greenland's central position in the Arctic makes it increasingly relevant in light of new maritime trade routes expected to open annually due to the melting polar ice cap. Of particular interest to the United States are the Northwest Passage and the Transpolar Route, both of which could place Greenland at the heart of a strategic chokepoint in Arctic navigation.
Greenland has also become a critical focal point in the U.S.–China economic rivalry due to its abundance of strategic resources essential for the global energy transition and for advancing technological capabilities in the defense sector. The island contains 25 of the 34 minerals classified by the EU as Critical Raw Materials, including uranium, cobalt, lithium, and rare earth elements. Estimates suggest that Greenland holds approximately 1.5 million tons of rare earth elements—nearly equivalent to the entire U.S. reserve of 1.8 million tons—thus significantly elevating its value in American strategic planning.
In the context of rising tensions with China, securing access to Greenland’s critical mineral reserves could provide the United States with a significant strategic advantage, especially in the event of a trade conflict over rare earth elements. Nevertheless, substantial challenges hinder the exploitation of these resources. Although Greenland’s autonomous government controls its mineral rights and has expressed openness to foreign the territory suffers from severe infrastructure deficiencies—including a lack of roads and ports—which severely constrain mining operations. The typical timeline to open a new mine can extend up to 16 years, deterring many potential investors.
The U.S. interest in Greenland, exemplified by Trump’s proposal to acquire the island—whether through economic means or other strategies—reflects a broader shift in international relations. Although firmly rejected by Denmark and the Greenlandic government with the slogan “Greenland is not for sale, and never will be,” the episode highlights how economic and strategic interests of major powers are increasingly challenging long-established principles of international law, such as territorial sovereignty and the inviolability of national borders. Washington’s focus on Greenland extends beyond the Trump presidency and is part of a larger Arctic strategy, driven by military considerations and the region’s vast reserves of minerals and hydrocarbons.
The general elections held on March 11, followed by negotiations that led to the formation of a new Greenlandic government, reaffirmed existing U.S. concerns and pressures. In response to mounting American efforts to acquire or exert military influence over Greenland, the majority party, Demokraatit—a moderate social-liberal party—opted to form a broad national unity coalition, securing 75% of the parliamentary seats. One of the coalition’s first actions was the release of a joint statement strongly condemning and opposing the repeated U.S. pressure directed at Greenland.
The U.S. strategy appears to be clear: emphasize the importance of international security and highlight Greenland’s strategic significance in this context, positioning the American security umbrella as the only power capable of providing adequate protection—not only for Greenland and U.S. citizens, but also for European allies. This narrative underlines Denmark’s alleged unpreparedness and inability to ensure such security.
In this regard, the U.S. is likely to support Greenland’s path toward independence, with the aim of later offering military and economic protection. This approach leverages NATO’s limited engagement on the issue—an area still significantly influenced by the strategic direction set by the White House. —and the European Union’s current phase of redefining and reassessing its external action.
By Clémence Van Damme & Pedro Mendes - The US Desk
Introduction
According to John Ruggie, multilateralism refers to coordinating relations between three or more states by certain principles. He argues that NATO was predicated on two multilateralist principles, the indivisibility of threats to the collective (response irrespective of the attacker) and “diffuse reciprocity” (members expecting a rough equivalence of benefits over time). The same NATO now doubts the American commitment to respond.
These shared principles appear to be changing with the Trump administration. The signing of an executive order on February 4th, to review all current multilateral organisations, and determine whether American support should be withdrawn, marks the “America First” rhetoric, which saw a withdrawal of the Paris Climate Agreement, the World Health Organization, concurrently with USAid’s large cut in funding. Ultimately, are we witnessing a shift in foreign policy or a schism in American multilateralism?
The Erosion of Multilateralism Under Trump
The signing of this executive order, originated from an alleged drift from the agency's original mission, contrary to the interests of the US and its allies. In light of the broader political context, this change in stance gives rise to an increased criticism of multilateral agreements.
Trump’s criticism of multilateralism concerns three aspects; international organisations infringing on American sovereignty (regardless of its voluntary involvement and consistent with the Constitution), the restriction of the US’s freedom of action (in contrast with the predictability and trade-offs of the collective effort), and the cost of this multilateral involvement, which is the subject of much debate.
Policy-wise, the once-held belief of Ukraine’s Victory being vital, is being shattered by sharp criticism of Ukrainian leadership, the demands for a swift end to hostilities, and a semblance of peace. The possibility of a narrative that grants Russia a chance to turn the context into a political victory, undermines the “Western” model and denotes its failures. However, the latest diplomatic developments with Ukrainian leadership might even prompt Russia to escalate the conflict and risk paving the way for revisionist adversaries to challenge American primacy with renewed vigour.
What this means to the LIO (liberal international order) is a constant challenge to some of its core characteristics, namely, free trade and open markets being contested by tariffs, a US-led “Western” perspective permeating institutions, and organisations, being opposed by an aggressive pursuit of “vital interests”, and the political exceptionalism of the US, “the city atop a hill”, contrasting with a more unilateralist, nationalist, realist pursuit of political goals, albeit, far from isolationist.
Case Study: US Withdrawal from the World Health Organisation
On January 20, 2025, the White House issued anexecutive order announcing the US withdrawal from the World Health Organisation (WHO). Donald Trump announced his intent to leave in July 2020 based on several concerns: the WHO’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, its failure to implement crucial reforms, and its lack of independence from political influence. He also cited what he called « unfairly onerous and out of proportion » financial demands.
As the largest financial contributor, providing34% of the WHO’s $6.8 billion budget for 2024-2025, the US’s departure threatens critical operations, including the WHO’s health emergencies program. US funding accounts for up to 40% of its operations, forming a critical « backbone » for emergency health responses in conflict zones. Additionally, specialised initiatives such as polio eradication and tuberculosis treatment faceuncertain future.
Moreover, Washington’s move will undermine US diplomatic influence. It will limit its ability to engage with nations, especially those withstrained political relations, through health initiatives, ultimately risking to harm long-term security, economic interests, and geopolitical stability. This power vacuum paves the way for nations to expand their influence in global health governance. By shaping international norms in its favour and leveraging health diplomacy, countries like China can strengthenbilateral partnerships.
In addition, Trump’s withdrawal has strained transatlantic relations, asEuropean nations, like Germany, view this decision as a retreat from multilateral cooperation, prompting European leaders to reconsider US leadership in global health. Furthermore, this decision sets a precedent for other right-wing governments, such as those inArgentina andItaly, which have also cited their intent to leave.
The implications of Trump’s exit exacerbate the broader decline of multilateral cooperation, reinforcing a pattern of disengagement from international agreements such as theParis Climate Accord and theUN human rights body. This has been viewed by several observers as indicative of the US’s shift toward unilateral policies, reducing its participation in global health efforts, and further isolating it on the international stage.
Washington has however pursued alternative bilateral agreements, such as its recent health cooperation initiative with India. This signals an effort to maintain strategic influence in global health while shifting away from multilateral frameworks.
Conclusion: What Comes Next?
The change in American foreign policy within the Trump administration poses a great challenge to the multilateral order established after WWII. The US withdrawal from multilateral organisations represents a profound shift towards focused bilateral relations and transactional diplomacy, where national interests are given precedence over the principles set for cooperation. Such drastic changes, however, have deep repercussions, ranging from the global impact on health security to diplomatic soft power, and international relations as a whole.
All these considerations beg the question of how likely a return to multilateralism in future administrations is, and why would that approach be justified, given the damage caused by withdrawing from treaties and organisations. Trust in US commitment to these frameworks has been eroded, and other challengers have taken America’s leading role in the international arena. Such policies may change, but the amount of time China and other countries have had to set normative behaviour and relationships to fill the gap left by America’s absence makes the need to reconsider how the objectives of multilateral policies have shifted.
This draws attention to one of the most important problems which is: Can effective global governance exist without consistent American leadership, or are we witnessing the emergence of a new multipolar system with competing spheres of influence?
With Donald Trump's victory, the US Big Tech, with the second Trump administration, could significantly influence and consolidate the strong interconnection between the federal government and American technology companies.
In recent years, the relationship between the military industrial complex and the US tech companies (Amazon, Microsoft and Google in the lead) has strengthened, especially on technology renewal issues coming from the Pentagon in the political-military sphere. This connects the relationship between Silicon Valley and the military-industrial complex in national security matters.
In the context of the future Trump administration, which will take office on 20 January 2025, the latter could grant Big Tech ample room to manoeuvres in exchange for support in national security matters.
The strong concern is the partnership that could emerge in a public-private collaboration. According to a recent 2024 paper by Costs of War/Brown University's WATSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, entitled ‘How Big Tech and Silicon Valley are Transforming the Military-Industrial Complex’, the link between the Department of Defence and the tech company sector is gradually influencing and directing the Pentagon's investments and the Defence Budget ($886 billion for the year 2024). In the current context, the role of Tech companies such as Amazon, Google, and Microsoft is increasing dramatically, competing with traditional US defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin.
Besides the classic Big Tech companies, other companies such as Palantir Technologies also carve out important spaces for themselves. Founded in 2003 by Peter Thiel and Alex Karp to develop software for analyzing large amounts of data, this company is one of the best known cases of start-ups backed by military and intelligence funds that have become key players in providing services and technologies to the Department of Defence (DoD) and other federal agencies.
During its early stages, Palantir received around $2 million in funding from In-Q-Tel, the CIA's venture capital fund, which enabled the start-up to grow rapidly and acquire contracts with various government agencies. This helped Palantir to be able to grow, giving it important resources to be able to strengthen its relationships with major government agencies.
For several insiders, Palantir's role, linked to its potential, would grant it the cards to transform itself into a figure similar to Raytheon or Lockheed Martin, historically dominant companies in the defense sector. Indeed, it is theorized that Palantir and other technology companies, such as Microsoft and Amazon, may soon get to acquire traditional defence contractors, blurring the distinction between the technology industry and the US defence sector.
Image Source: Generated with ChatGPT/DALL·E
The role of tech companies has started to strengthen since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine of growing tensions with China. Linked to these geopolitical tensions, several start-ups operating in the tech sector are receiving significant investments. Among these is Anduril, a company operating in the production of military systems and drones with a focus on AI integration, which recently completed a $1.5 billion funding round, bringing its valuation to $14 billion.
As a matter of fact, the role of Big Tech in the coming years could be consolidated also in view of the geopolitical competition with Beijing.
by Miguel Jiménez, Ingrid Heggstad, & Dan Ziebarth - Political Economy, Development, & Energy Security Team
Introduction
It was announced on Tuesday, November 5th that Donald Trump, the candidate for the right-wing Republican Party, had won the 2024 Presidential Election in the United States of America and would officially become the President-Elect. Kamala Harris, the left-wing Democratic Party candidate, conceded defeat in a speech on Wednesday, December 6th, urging voters to accept the election results. While Harris and her vice presidential running mate, Time Walz, received significant party support ahead of the election and were seen as a new phase for the Democratic Party, the party will be weakened following the election results. Even though during the campaign she lacked a compelling economic narrative and often avoided answering how to fund any proposal she brought to the table, in terms of global economic relations, a Harris presidency was expected to maintain continuity with the current Biden administration's approach largely.
The second Trump presidency is expected to have major ramifications for global politics, particularly global economic relations, particularly as Trump has been a vocal proponent of protectionist trade policies. The Republican Party, led by Trump, will also control both chambers of the legislature, while conservative justices make up 6 of the 9 seats on the Supreme Court of the United States. These conditions could give Trump a strong mandate for policy change. In particular, economic relations with China, the European Union, and Russia are expected to be affected by a second Trump presidency.
China
Trump has announced that, if re-elected, he will impose a 10–20 per cent across-the-board tariff on imports into the United States, with an additional 60 per cent tariff on all imports from China. Trump has also pledged to terminate the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) passed by the Biden administration, which would be expected to increase domestic production and reduce Chinese imports. This is in contrast to what would have been expected under a Kamala Harris administration, where the usage of tools to inhibit the arrival of Chinese goods would have come from domestic policies with the continuation of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the single largest climate investment in American history. Based on building domestic champions in the field of energy transition, which is currently dominated by China, being the world’s leader in clean energy production and the refinement of the majority of mineral inputs.
European Union
The second Trump presidency could challenge Europe through an “America First” trade policy, focused on reducing the U.S. trade deficit, with tariffs as high as 20 per cent on imports and even more on Chinese goods. These tariffs would increase costs for European exporters and consumers, impacting the EU’s economy. Ongoing disputes from the Biden era, such as steel and aluminium tariffs and green subsidies, may also escalate, while the expiration of paused EU retaliatory tariffs in 2025 and the Airbus-Boeing subsidy conflict in 2026 could further strain EU-U.S. trade relations, adding to Europe’s economic uncertainty. It is noteworthy that during his tenure as president, Donald Trump's imposition of tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from the European Union and China resulted in the implementation of retaliatory tariffs on U.S. agricultural products.
Russia
A renewed Trump presidency could also impact global economic relations with Russia. In his 2024 campaign, Trump promised to swiftly resolve the Ukraine conflict, asserting he could achieve peace within 24 hours through negotiation. However, if Russia resists a settlement, Trump has signalled he would impose tougher economic sanctions, potentially targeting Russia’s central bank and curtailing energy exports to key markets like India and China. This intensified economic pressure, coupled with increased US energy production to lower global prices, would squeeze Russia’s vital oil revenue.
Additionally, Trump’s scepticism toward ongoing US aid to Ukraine, which has amounted to $92.7 billion since 2022, raises concerns over a potential reduction in support, which could compromise Ukraine’s defence and shift the regional balance in Russia’s favour. Trump has also suggested that Europe should shoulder more responsibility for its security, which may lead to a reevaluation of US commitments to NATO. It is possible that a reduction in the US role in NATO could have the effect of weakening collective defenses, which might in turn expose Europe to greater tensions with Russia. This approach indicates a shift toward a more isolationist US foreign policy, with strategic economic measures as leverage to influence Russia's actions.
Additionally, Trump’s expected policies in oil and gas could intensify competition with Russia and reshape global energy markets. Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska has predicted that Trump’s support for US oil production might drive global prices down to around $50 per barrel by 2025, creating pressure on Russia’s oil-dependent economy. Trump’s approach would likely include promoting US LNG exports, reviving paused projects, and further challenging Russia’s position in Europe’s energy market.
His stance on projects like the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which he previously sanctioned to limit Russia’s influence, suggests he might continue efforts to curb Russia’s global LNG ambitions while supporting policies to maintain affordable oil prices for US consumers. By influencing OPEC+ to stabilise prices favourable to the US, Trump could further impact Russia’s revenue, potentially reducing its leverage in Europe and heightening competition in the global energy sector.
Conclusion
Taken together, based upon a previous presidency led by Donald Trump and his recent claims on the campaign trail, global economic relations could become increasingly tense between the United States and other nations and political unions.
In particular, trade relations between China and the United States are expected to worsen, with major increases in tariffs on Chinese goods entering into the United States possibly leading to retaliatory tariffs and an intensification of trade competition between the two countries. The European Union could also be affected by the competition between the United States and China, as well as the possibility of increased tariffs on goods from the EU going into the United States. The conflict in Ukraine also casts a shadow over Trump’s second term and whether the Trump administration continues to provide funding to Ukraine and keep sanctions on Russia in place will affect both the war in Ukraine, as well as economic relations between the United States and Russia.
These considerations will all have ripple effects across the entire world, meaning it is important for policymakers, scholars, and citizens alike to continue watching the effects of the second Trump presidency on global economic relations.
In this timely and thought-provoking discussion, Cristina Ramirez and Gesine Weber, PhD Candidates at King's College London, break down the 2024 US elections and their wide-reaching implications. From domestic shifts to global challenges, their insights are not to be missed.
In doing so, our special guests, moderated by our researcher and Webinar Series leader, Carlotta Rinaudo, will attempt to analyse the situation by answering the following questions:
Agenda:
00:00 -02:45 Opening remarks and Presentation by Carlotta Rinaudo (Lead of the ITSS Webinar Series)
02:48 What does Trump's return to power reveal about American society and identity? Have we misunderstood his appeal to American voters?
12:00 Is this the era of a new establishment? and if so, what might be its implications for policymaking?
15:18 Are democratic values eroding, and what could his transactional foreign policy mean for the world? Can we expect a rapid peace deal in the Russia-Ukraine war? How could a new Trump administration reshape relations with the EU, China, or impact the war in Gaza?
Prof. Inderjeet Parmar talks about the United States domestic and foreign policy in 2023. Parmar is a professor of international politics at the City, University of London, and co-editor of the book series "Routledge Studies in US Foreign Policy".
In this session, he discusses the future of the Republican Party and former President Trump heading towards the 2024 elections, before shifting the focus overseas. The main issues addressed are American interests in the Indo-Pacific, including discussions on India, QUAD, and Taiwan, the Ukraine war and its impact on the international order, and the special relationship between the US and the UK.
Interviewers: Giovanni Luca Catucci and Anurag Mishra - US Team
Embassies are much more than just a mere foreign praesidium; their openings, closings, evacuations have a strong potential effect on world politics. Image source: https://unsplash.com/photos/tI_DEyjWOkY
What role do embassies play in major events nowadays? When do countries consider opening, evacuating or temporarily closing embassies? These are some of the questions that arise when we consider global events such as the U.S. moving the capital of Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and also when analysing the recent crisis in Afghanistan.
In order to answer them, we met with Boy Frank, a former diplomat with 34 years of experience in the Dutch foreign service, during which he worked in the opening of three embassies and the evacuation of the same number.
Embassies in a nutshell
Generally, we think of embassies as mere foreign praesidiums in a country. However, they play a much more significant role, as they help us communicate, find refuge, and especially establish a medium between two countries.
But opening an embassy in a specific country or even city is much more than just opening a new access point. An embassy is used as a base for economic relationships, and is a necessary instrument to waive a country’s presence on the ground. Mr Frank explains that ‘’when determining where to open an embassy all factors are carefully weighted’’. Embassies will be opened in those countries that are the most relevant economically, politically or culturally.
Just as embassies can be opened, they can be closed, evacuated, and their personnel can be called back for consultation. This was recently the case with the French president Emmanuel Macron, who called back his Ambassadors to the United States (US) and Australia after the latter cancelled its purchase of French submarinesand announced a new contract with the US.
Such moves have a political weight, and rightly so. The act of recalling Ambassadors was a way for France to underline its discontent with Australia’s move. By the same token, Trump's decision to move the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem through which he took sides in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Also in times of pandemic, embassies come to play an important role. While most of those we know were functioning on high alert, tasked to inform the public about the situation surrounding Covid-19, many embassies situated in North Korea’s capital Pyongyang were temporarily closed due to restricted access to essential goods. European countries such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom temporarily closed their missions, as opposed to Russia: proof that although closing an embassy or calling back its personnel can be a political move, it can also be the result of a humanitarian emergency.
Trump’s controversial move: from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem
International custom dictates that a country has to place a diplomatic representation in a country's capital. However, as the status of Jerusalem is considered one of the greatest disputes in International Law as both Israelis and Palestinians claim sovereignty over the city. Nevertheless, on the 6 of December 2017, Trump announced that he would move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, thus changing de facto Israel’s capital city.
During the opening ceremony of Jerusalem’s embassy, Trump said: “Our greatest hope is for peace”. Still, as Mr Frank states, it appears evident that this was a unilateral move by which the U.S. took sides in favour of Israel. Pro Israeli politicians in the U.S had long been pressuring Washington to move the Embassy to Jerusalem. In 2017 Trump maintained the promise he made during his 2016 presidential campaign, where he used the argument of moving the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem as one of the main points in his race for the White House.
The major European powers did not take long to distance themselves from Trump’s decision. Indeed, the European Union (EU)’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) reiterated that the EU would continue to respect the international consensus on Jerusalem's status. The European Parliament has always favoured the two-states solution, in which Jerusalem would serve as the capital of both Israel and Palestine.
In spite thereof, European institutions did not seem to reflect the position of every European country: recently, Hungary and the Czech Republic have opened a diplomatic mission in Jerusalem, underlining the friendly relationship with Israel, destined to change the political dynamics of the region.
As Mr Frank suggests, this case demonstrates that the U.S. has the ability to affect and influence the development of international geopolitics, just as it recently happened with the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan. This resulted in the arrival of the Taliban and the evacuation of its capital, which Joe Biden called “the largest airlift in U.S. history”.
Evacuation of Kabul’s Embassies: what went wrong?
When in April, the U.S. announced that it would be withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan by 11 of September 2021, many feared the arrival of the Taliban, although no one was prepared for what was about to happen.
In mid-August, the capital of Kabul was taken over by the Taliban, creating immense chaos that led to the evacuation of both civilians and diplomats, who desperately tried to reach the airport in an attempt to flee the country.
More than a month after this international incident, we asked Mr Frank what went wrong in Kabul’s evacuation and what could have been done better from a European perspective. He explains that: ‘’people waited too long to evacuate. They let the crisis unfold, and it got too intense to plan for a proper evacuation.’’
Indeed, the time at which the Taliban arrived in Kabul was highly underestimated, which only contributed to the emergency of the situation. So this bears the question: are European embassies sufficiently prepared for these types of circumstances?
How could they not be prepared? In the interview, the former diplomat points out that, in theory, each embassy has an evacuation plan. Still, because there are always-changing scenarios, the circumstances remain unpredictable, and embassy evacuation plans are thus limited to the most likely scenarios.
One could ask, why a plan if they cannot apply it? Embassies do so to ensure the highest chances of safety, which is what they come down to in times of hardship. But while many of those located in Kabul and their staff warned their home countries about the situation and the arrival of the Taliban, EU countries were scrambling to send rescue.
Today the respective Foreign Affairs departments of each state have audit teams, which are in turn responsible for identifying gaps and proposing improvements for incidents such as the one in Kabul. We can only hope that the international community will learn from this political and humanitarian disaster.
Conclusion
As we have seen, it seems that most of the major events of our time, from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the Afghan Crisis, can be read in the key of embassies’ openings and movements. Today embassies are not just a medium between two states; they play a leading role in developing economic, political and cultural relations and are symbolic in acknowledging and recognizing a state.
If you are interested in learning more about opening and closing embassies, our interviewee, Mr Frank, provides Masterclasses on the topic. He has also recently published his first book, ‘’The adventures of Boy Frank’’ where he talks about his diplomatic experience in several countries, including Pakistan, Algeria, Eritrea, Angola and many others.
