January 29, 2024No Comments

Lebanon: a story of crisis upon crisis

Authors: Sonia Martínez Girón (ITSS Executive Director) and Anna Lorenzini (Middle East Team)

(Photo by Christelle Hayek on Unsplash)


Once known for its cultural richness and economic resilience, Lebanon is located in the Eastern Mediterranean Levant region with over five million inhabitants and no Head of State. The complex interplay of economic and political mismanagement, multiple corruption cases, lack of accountability, instability, unrest and poor freedom of expression do not bolster any sociopolitical or economic positive change to thwart the spiralling crises affecting the Lebanese people. Currently, around 80% of Lebanon’s population lives under the poverty threshold. 


Lebanon has been in a profound economic and political crisis since the banking system collapsed in 2019, damaging the currency, increasing poverty, and paralysing most of the country. Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s resignation in October 2019 triggered a series of unsuccessful attempts to form a new government. The ensuing political vacuum left Lebanon without a coherent leadership to address pressing economic challenges. External factors, including regional conflicts, have further complicated the political situation, hindering the formation of a government capable of steering the country out of crisis.

Lebanon's political landscape, characterised by a delicate sectarian balance, has been a source of strength and weakness. The confessional system, designed to distribute power among various religious communities, has often resulted in political gridlock, impeding effective governance. The parliament extended army commander Joseph Aoun's tenure last December to prevent a leadership vacuum. The army, which was rebuilt during the civil war, is viewed as essential to keep the country stable in the face of emergencies (e.g. an imminent border clash with Israel). Besides, the parliament prolonged the term of Lebanon's Internal Security Chief, a Sunni Muslim. Hence, the absence of a stable government capable of implementing crucial reforms has exacerbated the economic crisis. 

Uncertainty in its governance structure persists, with rising vacancies in key governance positions. While Lebanon's economic and institutional crisis weakens its international standing, numerous players remain involved in the Lebanese geopolitical scenario. The prolonged delay in electing a new president and increasing polarisation are not easing this knot. Despite reaching an agreement on maritime borders, tensions persist. In addition to the traditional tensions with Israel, the presence of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in the south of the country has become contentious.

Tensions arose from a UN Security Council resolution in August 2022, allowing UNIFIL to act independently of local authorities, consequently altering the relations between UNIFIL and the Lebanese army. The Group of Five (formed by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, France, Qatar, and the United States) was created to facilitate the resolution of Lebanon's political crisis. Unluckily, in July 2023, the shortfall of results from their second meeting worsened the state of affairs. 


Lebanon’s fifteen-year-long civil war (1975–90) severely damaged this country’s economy. Due to its heavy dependence on banking and financial services since the conclusion of the civil war in 1990, along with the neglect of the agricultural and industrial sectors, Lebanon heavily relied on imports to fulfil the needs of its citizens. The Lebanese Central Bank subsidised wheat and fuel to make these commodities affordable, leading to significant challenges in the face of mounting public debt, a lack of economic reforms, and an increasing current account deficit.

In the early 2010s, Lebanon's economic issues worsened, and in 2019, widespread protests erupted against economic inequality, corruption, and poor public services, reaching a breaking point. A series of intertwined crises, starting with an economic downturn, followed by the impact of COVID-19, and culminating in the Beirut Port explosion, have severely impacted Lebanon. Besides, after the 2020 Port explosions, the lack of accountability has bolstered poverty in the country. Among these, the economic crisis has had the most substantial negative effect, with the Lebanese currency, the lira, experiencing a drastic depreciation of over 90% against the US dollar on the parallel market.

This configuration has resulted in hyperinflation, soaring prices of essential goods, and a sharp decline in the purchasing power of citizens, contributing to widespread business struggles, surging unemployment, and increased poverty rates. Indeed, the Lebanese currency's value has plummeted by over 95%. With the Central Bank depleting foreign reserves, discontinuing subsidies on crucial imports, and simultaneously witnessing a surge in electricity, water, and gas prices, essential utilities have become a luxury for many. A Human Rights Watch survey from November 2021 to January 2022 revealed that the median household income was only US$122, with 70% of households struggling to meet basic expenses. While the crisis affects the entire population, vulnerable groups such as women, children, migrant workers, refugees, and individuals with disabilities bear a disproportionate burden. 

The population sector that appears to be most vulnerable to unemployment includes the migrants from Syria and Palestine, the inhabitants of North Lebanon, the youth and the women.  Unemployment numbers have more than doubled since 2019. The unemployment level reached 29.6% in 2022. The Italian government estimated that 27.5% of people would be unemployed in 2023. 

The younger generation in Lebanon faces a dilemma, resulting in many choosing to either leave the nation or feel closed in. High rates of youth unemployment and the burden of debts incurred for university education in a system controlled by the corporate sector further discourage young people from envisioning a future within Lebanon. The youth is also experiencing significant challenges in pursuing their education degrees, as the country's universities have raised tuition costs to an unprecedented rate, prompting many students to abandon their studies. Youth unemployment rocketed to 47.8% in 2022. Current data on out-migration could look better for the economy. In a recent survey, 77% of Lebanese youth between 18 and 24 years indicated their wish to leave the country to find better opportunities elsewhere. Even those youngsters with jobs who are paid in dollars report feeling insecure

Source: D.Khamissy / UNHCR, 2012 (https://www.flickr.com/photos/eu_echo/7942068204)

Food Insecurity

Around 2 million people face food insecurity in Lebanon. Alas, the situation is expected to get worse in the upcoming months. According to the IPC predictions, it is expected to reach 2.26 million people by April. Specifically, the refugees are the most affected. Vis-à-vis the nearly thirteen-year conflict in Syria, Lebanon has hosted over 1.5 million refugees, maintaining one of the largest refugee populations. This was the first time that the IPC Acute Food Insecurity analysis included Palestine refugees in Lebanon and Palestine refugees from Syria. Currently, many people are dependent on food assistance in Lebanon. While aid keeps flowing into Lebanon, people's needs still escalate due to local and global turbulences.

As we have seen, the food crisis in this country is linked to several other critical topics. It is necessary to talk about the water crisis. Regarding water use in the Middle East, agriculture uses 85 per cent of the total fresh water. The poor water governance and the inefficient irrigation systems augment this country's water shortages. As if this was not enough, water pollution affects the quality of drinking water, agricultural production, and food safety.

Needless to say, water shortages have affected agriculture. Water scarcity resulted in poorer agricultural yields, making it more difficult for farmers to sustain their livelihoods. A recent study discovered that significant rural areas are experiencing decreased production, particularly in coastal locations where citrus fruits and olives are cultivated and at higher elevations where deciduous fruit trees are. Areas depending on irrigation systems in the Beqaa Valley, the country's primary agricultural region, are being harmed by increased groundwater stress and loss of water resources. Farming communities in these areas have already seen severe consequences, such as unreliable household food supply.

The ongoing agricultural crisis is a source of concern. Lebanon's prolonged neglect of the agriculture sector resulted in direct import reliance, which Lebanon still suffers today. Mainly, almost 80% of the food consumed in Lebanon is imported. First, agricultural labour has traditionally been precarious in Lebanon. Second, the high dependence on the agricultural labour of refugees has exacerbated the devaluation of farm workers. Third, more than 20 per cent of heads of households engaged in farming are highly vulnerable. Women farmers, marked by increased poverty, account for 9 per cent of the total farmers.

Over and above that, Lebanon's food resources are squandered due to several drivers. On the one hand, the multiple crises that have affected Lebanon since 2019 have damaged the food security status of its inhabitants. The national and local crises have a direct impact on food security. Referring back to the port incident, grain silos that were stored in the port were turned into rubble during the port blast in 2020, consequently boosting food insecurity in the region.

On the other hand, other global turmoils are impacting food security in Lebanon. To name a paradigmatic example, the Russo-Ukrainian War has added further pressure to the already exhausted Lebanese economy with rising food costs. In fact, 96% of the wheat consumed in Lebanon is imported from Ukraine and Russia. This configuration leads to considerable direct and indirect food price increases. Besides, due to the devaluation of the lira, food prices are currently increasing further. Indeed, food prices have surged by 332% since June 2021. Additionally, the WFP food aid cuts will not help this crisis. Unfortunately, poor water management and corruption add to this list. 

So far, there have been several responses to the food crisis. The first is the provision of aid to vulnerable groups. Since 2012, the World Food Programme has assisted Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Actually, 90% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon now find themselves living in conditions of extreme poverty. Since the crisis began in October 2019, food costs have increased 19 times. The Wheat Supply Emergency Response Project was the second response to this food crisis. Lebanon received a USD150 million loan from the World Bank, effectively sustaining wheat subsidies despite a rise in the exchange rate from USD/LBP 15,000 to 30,000 in October 2023. In May 2023, more availability and access to USD, more job possibilities, and a continuous supply of subsidised wheat helped ease access to food and other vital resources.

Additionally, the World Food Programme's Country Strategic Plan for 2023-2025 is a strategic contingency mechanism against financial system shocks. Since the situation has escalated along the Blue Line in the South of Lebanon, 462 Hectares of agricultural land have been burnt, and 300k animals have been killed, aggravating the food insecurity in this area. Furthermore, OCHA’s Humanitarian Country Team has provided water, meals and food parcels, nutritional supplements, cash assistance and health services.


Lebanon is witnessing an unprecedented crisis, intertwining economic challenges, political instability, and social upheaval. This has led to a severe economic downturn marked by currency depreciation, hyperinflation, and growing unemployment. Vulnerable populations bear a disproportionate burden, while political instability undermines effective governance and exacerbates economic issues. Lebanon's weakened international standing and the recent violence pose additional threats to recovery. Despite initial hopes for 2024, the outlook could be better. Lebanon stands at a critical juncture, requiring collaborative efforts for a sustainable and prosperous future. The increasingly tumultuous political scene that started escalating last Autumn does not contribute to improving the country's economic and food security. Although there was a glimpse of hope last year prompted by the responses to the food crisis, food insecurity persists in Lebanon.

The country's food security status is weak and in danger of worsening over time. Continuous work is needed to combat food insecurity and protect vulnerable groups (e.g. refugees). Violence, political and economic uncertainty, inflation, and discontinuing food aid do not hamper this crisis. These factors indicate that food insecurity will likely worsen in the upcoming months.

October 29, 2021No Comments

Water Crisis in the Middle East: A case study of Urmia, Tigris and Euphrates

By: Angelo Calianno and John Devine

Image Source: World Resource Institute, https://wriorg.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/uploads/water_stress_world_map_large.jpg

Water is a vital component of all life on the planet. Its importance is rarely overstressed. This is no truer than in the Middle East. The region, characterised by a hot and arid climate, has several major lakes and river systems supporting local agriculture. Unfortunately access to the water supply has often been a point of contention.

It has been reported that the Middle East is warming at twice the global average. Coupled with the World Resources Institute (WRI) listing 12 out of 17 of the world's most water-stressed countries in the Middle East and North Africa region, water access will only become more critical in the coming years and decades. This article will look at two different case studies—first, the actions of Iran in reversing the environmental degradation of Lake Urmia. Second, how a combination of infrastructure projects by neighboring countries and environmental changes have altered the flow of the Tigris and Euphrates River system in Iraq.

Lake Urmia:

Once the largest lake in the Middle East and the 6th largest saltwater lake on the planet Lake Urmia was both an ecological sight of interest that supported several different species and a popular tourist destination with a local economy tailored to it. Lake Urmia covered an area of over 5,200 square kilometres. But, a combination of policy decisions and poor weather saw the lake diminish in size to a mere 10% of its maximum capacity in 2014.

The desire to utilise natural resources led to the construction of several dams, for irrigation and hydropower, on the three rivers, which were the source of 90% of the water to the lake. There were also an estimated 40,000 illegal water wells were also in the surrounding area.

The effect of the shrinking lake affected the local wildlife and tourist industry and the local agriculture. In addition, the receding water exposed massive amounts of salt, which produced dust that affected the agriculture of the surrounding areas. The effects of the reducing lake were severe enough to cause several protests.

Efforts to reverse this trend have seen the creation of the Urmia Lake Restoration Program (URLP). Local press have reports $1 billion dollars have been spent to restore the size of the lake and wildlife habitats. In addition, the URLP has tried to wean farmers off thirstier crops and fill in the lake's illegal water wells. Also, higher than expected rainfall has contributed to the increase of the lake to 2,700 square kilometres in 2021.

Tigris and Euphrates: 

As the water source for one of the three major ancient river civilisations, the Tigris and Euphrates have always held a special place in the collective consciousness of historians. A bountiful river system that for generations provided fertile land for in the surrounding area. However, this is no longer the case in Iraq. Reports state over 7 million people in Iraq are directly affected by low water levels in the Tigris and Euphrates . In addition, UNICEF has reported that 3 out of 5 children have no access to safely managed water services. 

Both the Tigris and the Euphrates originate in Turkey before descending into Syria and Northern Iraq. The Tigris also has supporting tributaries originating from Iran. The rivers provide 98% of Iraq's water. Therefore, the policies enacted by Turkey, Syria, or Iran directly affect the flow of water into Iraq downstream.

The construction of major infrastructure projects, including over 20 major dams and numerous hydraulic power plants, in Turkey since the 1970's have significantly reduced the flow of water to Iraq. In the 1990s saw Turkey intentionally filled up its reservoirs that proved significantly detrimental to Iraq and Syria's water supply. Iraq's water supply issues were further exacerbated due to the infrastructure projects of Iran and Syria. This in turn, affected the agriculture of Iraq and the health of its growing population.

The three major conflicts in the past three decades in Iraq have also seen the destruction of much of Iraqi water infrastructure, including many water treatment centers. This has proven consequential. Due to the infrastructure of other countries further upstream, the reduced flow of water reaching Iraq affects the cleanliness of the water systems - as the water is unable to dilute much of the sewage and dirt that gets into the Tigris and Euphrates. Without the ability to treat the water in the country, it creates sanitary problems. As a result, whatever water can now reach Iraq is not a clean as it had been previously

The domestic political factors have contributed to the worsening water crisis. Successive divided national governments focused on insurgency of militia groups in the country have been unable to formulate an effective strategy to counter the effects of the looming humanitarian crisis.

The October 2021 elections, the sixth since Saddam Hussein's regime's fall, have seemed to produce little evidence that an effective coalition will be able to address the water crisis. If there is any hope to address the problem directly, the next Iraqi government will need to have a tangible power-sharing coalition and agree with their regional neighbours on managing the Tigris and Euphrates.


There is an imperative need for precise and effective action to counter the changing climate in the Middle East. To this end, collaboration and consultation over infrastructure projects between the neighboring countries is required to prevent sever disruption to the shared water resources, particularly as severe droughts are expected to exacerbate humanitarian conditions in the region. It will require not only the consensus within individual states to implement constructive change but also wider regional cooperation.

October 1, 2021No Comments

Crimea faces a Water Disaster

By: Igor Shchebetun and Alessio Calzetti

Six years after Crimea's annexation to Russia, the Peninsula faces a new threat - a serious shortage of water. Ukraine has cut off Crimea's access to the Dnieper River, and in recent years Crimea's water supply has fallen to such an extent that major cities are now limiting consumption, as 2020 was considered the most waterless year in the history of Crimea. The impending drought is already hurting agriculture, cities and preventing the use of military infrastructure; Crimea can be expected to see more severe restrictions in future. The speculated water wars of the twenty-first century might start with Crimea.

The Crimean Peninsula has great strategic importance due to its link to the Black Sea, therefore, whichever state controls Crimea, can exert influence beyond its national borders. The Crimean Peninsula has been a foothold for the empires of the past such as the Scythians, Greeks, Slavs, Mongols, Tatars, Turks, and Cossacks, all have claimed the Peninsula at different points in history. Russia gained control of the Crimea in 1783, and it instantly became its gateway to the world economy. During the Soviet era, Crimea was given to Ukraine, and when the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine inherited the region. However, Ukrainian sovereignty proved to be a temporary phenomenon that lasted only from 1991 to 2014. In 2014, Putin signed a law that accepted Crimea as part of the Russian Federation despite the risk of an economic and diplomatic backlash because of the annexation. The move remains legally disputed and not recognized by the international community. 

In this zero-sum game, Russia is likely to do all it takes to preserve its national interests. The control of the Crimean Peninsula ensures the security of Russia's Black Sea coast and Caucasian territories. Moreover, Russia can use Crimea to protect its territorial integrity and security by means of restricting, denying access and maneuvering prevent the enemy from occupying or crossing land territory or airspace in and near Crimea.

Sevastopol, Crimea's largest city, has a significant Russian population and also home to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Without Sevastopol, Russia would not have been able to conduct foreign military operations in Syria and Libya. Moreover, the military infrastructure in and around Sevastopol provides Russia with exceptional opportunities to restrict and deny access and maneuver. 

Annexation has brought the added responsibility of providing for the two million inhabitants of Crimea with all possible services and benefits. However, since the Peninsula is not directly connected to the main territory of the country, the initial goal was to maintain the existing Ukrainian infrastructure: power lines, energy distribution system and so on, which could not materialize when Kiev cut off the Peninsula from its infrastructure. 

Russia laid new cables across the Sea of Azov and provided Crimea with new sources of energy and communications. In addition, a new bridge was erected over the Kerch Strait, making road and rail connections between the main territory of Russia and the Crimean Peninsula possible. Though Russia stepped in, it was unable to meet Crimea’s water needs. Crimean local water sources meet only 15% of consumption. The remaining 85% came through the North Crimean Canal, which runs through Ukraine.

The North-Crimean Canal takes water from the Dnieper. It pumps billions of cubic meters of water to Crimea every year. The Dnieper itself originates in the Smolensk region of Russia, so, legally speaking, the Dnieper is an international, transboundary river running through Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. However, after the annexation, Kiev suspended the flow of water from the Dnieper. 

Politicians from Moscow held several stages of negotiations trying to persuade their Kiev counterparts to resume the flow of water through the canal, claiming that Ukraine's actions were illegal and inhumane. At the same time, it is not very fair of Russia to reason about international law after annexing territory of another state. The Ukrainians, however, did not give in, and this political stalemate created a looming drought for Crimea. 

As of today, Crimea relies on only one thing to provide itself with fresh water: precipitation, an element it has no control over. Even rainfall in the Crimea has decreased significantly in recent years due to climate change. Since the beginning of last year, local water reservoirs have emptied by one-third, and 2020 was the driest year since rainfall records began about 150 years ago.

The result of this drought is significant: two-thirds of the Peninsula is severely water-stressed. In north and east of the Peninsula, people have started to relocate. According to Russian statements, the population of Crimea has almost doubled by 2020, and part of this increase is due to the migration of Russians. The greater presence of people helps consolidate Russian control over Crimea, but it has also doubled the need for water resources.

The migrants from Russia in addition to the new infrastructure has put a serious strain on water supplies. Water shortages have increased in proportion to population growth. Taking agriculture as an example, during the best period of the Soviet Union, about 400,000 hectares of Crimean land were cultivated. By 2013, after years of mismanagement of water, the amount of cultivated land had dropped to 140,000 hectares. In 2014, when Russia gained control of Crimea, that number dropped to a modest 17,000 hectares. Based on this data, Crimea's agricultural sector has shrunk by a factor of 8 since joining Russia, and by a factor of 23 from its highest point. The local farmers have been forced to stop growing crops like rice and soybeans, which consume a lot of water. The Russian leadership calls this ecological adaptation, but it is a sign of decline at best.

Though Crimean water shortage was inevitable, the Russian annexation exacerbated the problem. Moscow has developed a plan to counter Crimea’s water crisis which is set to be fully implemented by 2024. Russia plans to build new dams, new desalination plants and drill new wells to extract water from the ground. It also intends to build new water pipelines and connect the Crimea to the Don and Kuban. There is even a plan to use airplanes to artificially increase rainfall, but this is only a temporary solution. It is unknown what the ultimate cost of this is, but Russia has already earmarked at least $650 million for the plan. 

However, due to the illegal annexation, the execution of any project in Crimea can only be done by Russian companies, as international partners would not risk doing business in Crimea. This creates difficulty in executing the Moscow plan for Crimea as, for example, building a desalination plant requires support of international partners and Russia itself never invested in desalination technology due to lack of need. 

If the plan to provide water to the Crimea does not work, Moscow may switch to more radical measures. Depending on the criticality of the water situation, Russia could either destroy the Ukrainian platypuses on the Dnieper River, blocking the flow of water, or try to occupy more territory in southern Ukraine along the North Crimean Canal. Such a military operation would force Russia to entrench itself about 60 kilometers from Crimea near the banks of the Dnieper River. Neither of these actions will be easy. Russia will use troops only if any other options are completely exhausted. However, wars have also been started for lesser reasons. Geopolitics is the art of choosing the unpleasant to avoid the disastrous.