November 12, 2026 — No Comments

Espacio Lejano: What Chinaโ€™s Request in Argentina Reveals About Its Global Space Network

By Sandra Watson Parcels - China & Asia Team

Upgrading Espacio Lejano Deep Space Station: What China's Request in Argentina Reveals About Its Global Space Network

China has requested to upgrade one of its most important space facilities abroad, installing new equipment at its Espacio Lejano deep space station in Argentina that could sharpen the station's sensitivity, data processing and monitoring. The request is technical in form, but in substance it tests how Beijing maintains a growing network of ground stations on foreign soil, and on what terms its host states remain willing to accept it.

The request, first reported by Argentine media in August 2026, concerns the station near Bajada del Agrio, in Neuquรฉn province. It is one of only three Chinese deep space ground stations, and the only one outside China's borders. The Argentine government has referred the request to the Ministry of Defence for a military opinion.

That referral produced a detailed official assessment of the request. The Argentine Air Force examined the proposed equipment and found no evidence that China intends to add a new antenna. It did find a significant upgrade to the station's capabilities, one with potential use in tracking objects in orbit, the same capability militaries use to monitor other states' satellites. On that basis, the Air Force advised against automatic approval and set out conditions: an equipment inventory, inspections before and after installation, and notice of any future changes. The decision is now with Buenos Aires, but the more revealing choice is whether Beijing will accept these conditions.

Why the station matters to Beijing

For China, Espacio Lejano enables access geography would otherwise not allow. Its other two deep space stations, at Kashgar and Jiamusi, sit inside China. A dish on the opposite side of the globe allows the Beijing Aerospace Control Center, which directs China's lunar and deep space missions, to stay in contact with spacecraft when they are out of view from Chinese territory. Analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) have noted this permits more frequent communication with Chinese satellites. The station played a critical role in China's 2019 landing on the far side of the Moon. It remains part of the infrastructure behind China's lunar programme, including the Chang'e-7 mission to the Moon's south pole, postponed in August 2026 and now expected in 2027, and the planned International Lunar Research Station.

The operator matters as much as the location. The station is run by China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General, part of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) space tracking system. In April 2024, the PLA dissolved its Strategic Support Force and placed space operations under a new Aerospace Force. According to the Jamestown Foundation, the Xi'an Satellite Control Center, known as Base 26, now manages a worldwide network of ground stations and control centres under that force. The station's chain of command changed, but its public description did not: Beijing still presents it as a civilian facility for space technology cooperation with Argentina, open and transparent in its operations.

This is the core of the debate, often framed as a choice between two readings. Argentine visitors to the station have reported a small civilian staff, consistent with Beijing's account. Critics point to its place within a tracking network run by the military. These are not rival explanations. Espacio Lejano is a dual-use facility, serving scientific and strategic purposes at once, and that is what makes any upgrade contentious.

China's growing ground station network, and its limits

Espacio Lejano is one node in a fast-expanding network. The United States (US) Defense Intelligence Agency's 2026 space assessment describes overseas sites as an important source of supplementary satellite-tracking data. A CSIS study published in January 2026 documented Chinese-built or expanded ground stations and space facilities in Pakistan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Venezuela and Namibia, many within the last five years. A month later, a US House select committee report identified at least eleven China-linked space facilities across Argentina, Venezuela, Bolivia, Chile and Brazil. At Swakopmund, in Namibia, satellite imagery shows a new antenna at a station China first established in 2001. That station is also managed by Base 26.

China has also learned that access abroad can be withdrawn. In 2020, the Swedish Space Corporation announced it would not renew contracts supporting Chinese satellites at its ground stations, including in Sweden, Chile and Australia, citing changes in the geopolitical situation since the contracts were signed in the early 2000s. It did not specify what those changes were or when the contracts would expire, though it noted such contracts typically run for about ten years. A year earlier, Sweden's defence research agency had warned that the officially civilian cooperation could ultimately be controlled by China's military.

In January 2026, Chile went further, cancelling a planned Chinese-backed observatory at Cerro Ventarrones in the Atacama Desert. The project, agreed in 2023 between Chile's Universidad Catรณlica del Norte and the National Astronomical Observatories of China, was intended to study objects near Earth. Chile's foreign ministry cited legal grounds, ruling that international astronomy agreements must be made between states or through the University of Chile. The decision also followed US warnings that the facility could track satellites in orbit. Beijing countered that the project was scientifically comparable to US-funded telescopes in Chile, and attributed its cancellation to geopolitical pressure.

After losing access in Sweden and Chile, China appears to be investing in the stations it already holds. Swakopmund has received a new antenna, and Espacio Lejano is now the subject of an upgrade request. Building a new station abroad is slow, visible and politically costly. Upgrading an existing one, under agreements already in force, is quieter and preserves access that has proven hard to secure. From Beijing, the Espacio Lejano request looks like routine modernisation.

For Argentina, the issue is how little control the original agreements secured. The agreements behind Espacio Lejano run for 50 years and commit Argentina not to interfere with the station's operations. Argentine officials can visit, but only by prior arrangement, accompanied by Chinese staff and limited to what the operator chooses to show. The agreements give Argentina no right to inspect the station's equipment or operations on its own terms, which is why its 2024 visit was described as a scientific visit rather than an inspection. The civilian-use clause was added only in 2016, after construction had begun. Operational control belongs to China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General, now under the PLA Aerospace Force, which limits how far Argentina can exercise sovereignty over a facility on its own territory. Because the station is dual-use, any gain in capability serves both its scientific and strategic purposes. An upgrade request brings these gaps into view.

What Beijing's answer will signal

Argentina's Air Force has recommended three conditions: an equipment inventory, inspections before and after installation, and notice of any future changes. China's response to them will be read well beyond Buenos Aires. Beijing has kept the relationship steady across successive Argentine governments, including one that campaigned against China. In August 2026, Argentina renewed its currency swap with the People's Bank of China, worth about US$19 billion, for a further five years, despite US pressure to end it. On 6 August, in a separate dispute over a Neuquรฉn electricity cooperative's data-centre talks with Huawei, China's embassy accused the US of obstructing cooperation between the two states. Beijing responds from a position of strength.

Beijing has four main options based on its record. First, it could accept the Air Force's conditions, as it accepted the 2016 Additional Protocol limiting Espacio Lejano to civilian use, while the station's operations continued unchanged. The cost is precedent and access: other host states could demand the same, and inspections could reveal what the station may be doing. Second, it could negotiate, offering to formalise Argentina's existing visits on a regular schedule in place of the inspections the Air Force has recommended, keeping access on China's terms. Even so, regular visits would give Argentine experts repeated sight of the station's equipment and any changes to it, and Argentina and the US may still see the offer as evasion. Alternatively, it could argue that the conditions are discriminatory unless Argentina imposes the same requirements on the European Space Agency's deep space station at Malargรผe, in Mendoza province. Argentina visited both stations on consecutive days in April 2024, and Beijing made a similar argument over Ventarrones. The argument works better as pressure than an offer: the European Space Agency would likely accept the same conditions, leaving China with no grounds to refuse inspection.

Third, it could reject the conditions and frame them as US interference, as its embassy did in April 2024, when it called the US ambassador's criticism of the station 'inappropriate'. The cost is that this reinforces US concerns and risks Argentina refusing the upgrade. Fourth, it could withdraw or delay the request. China is working to reduce its reliance on overseas ground stations, and Chinese researchers have proposed linking its lunar relay satellites with its Tianlian relay network for that purpose. But the same researchers note that overseas stations such as Espacio Lejano greatly improve communication, so withdrawing would still mean giving up a capability China values. These options are not mutually exclusive. In the sale of CK Hutchison's Panama Canal port terminals, Beijing sought a stake for the state-owned shipping company COSCO while its foreign ministry publicly accused the US of seeking to control the canal. Its approach there was to negotiate quietly while contesting publicly.

None of these options is cost-free. Whichever Beijing chooses will show what it values most: operational freedom at Espacio Lejano, its standing with Argentina, or the precedent it sets for host states across its network. Espacio Lejano's uniqueness weighs on that choice. As China's only deep space station abroad, it is harder to replace than any other site in the network, which makes withdrawal costly and gives Argentina more leverage than most host states.

Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnologรญa e Innovaciรณn, CC BY 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Lessons for host states

Other governments hosting Chinese ground stations, from southern Africa to South America, face versions of the same question. So does the European Union (EU). Its March 2026 Ports Strategy calls on member states to screen foreign control of ports treated as strategic dual-use infrastructure, and Regulation 2026/1386, adopted in June, extended EU investment screening to strategic transport infrastructure. Both are designed for the moment of investment.

Israel's 2015 concession for Haifa's Bayport, operated by the state-owned Shanghai International Port Group, goes further: the port stays in Israeli ownership, the operator must follow Israeli security instructions in emergencies, and the state can revoke its licence. Critics argue even these safeguards are incomplete, but they were written in at signature and apply for the life of the concession. Espacio Lejano's agreements had neither form of protection. Argentina's Congress approved the treaty only after construction had begun, and the agreements gave Argentina no right of inspection. As a result, the hardest decisions come years after the contract was signed, when the operator of an asset already in place requests an upgrade. By then, a host state's say depends largely on the terms it secured at the start. Argentina's 2016 Additional Protocol shows that terms can be added later, but it limited how the station may be used, not how Argentina can verify that use.

Conclusion

The request to upgrade the Espacio Lejano deep space station provides a window into how China sustains and entrenches a global space network beyond its borders. This request, the new antenna at Swakopmund and the access China lost in Sweden and Chile together suggest that Beijing's priority is to keep, and improve, the access it already has. For host states, the risk is gradual: sovereignty erodes in practice, one upgrade at a time. Each change made under terms they cannot verify widens an already asymmetric relationship, in which China holds the operational control and the information, and the host holds the territory. How China responds to Argentina's conditions will show whether Beijing is prepared to trade some operational freedom for the consent of its hosts.

November 10, 2026 — No Comments

Prof. Dr. Engel on the African Unionโ€™s Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

This session examines the institutional structure of the African Union and its Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), including the Panel of the Wise, the Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention and Mediation (FemWise-Africa) and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS).

Furthermore, Prof. Engel explores prospects for closer cooperation between the African Union and the European Union, particularly in the areas of early warning, structural conflict prevention as well as dialogue on preventive diplomacy and peace mediation under the AU-EU Partnership.

Prof. Engel is professor of โ€˜Politics in Africaโ€™ at the Institute of African Studies at Leipzig University, Germany. Since 2006, he has been advising the African Union Commissionโ€™s Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security in the fields of conflict prevention, early warning, preventive diplomacy and knowledge management.

Interviewers: Angelo Christopher Saad Hintermayer, Martina Kronier and Abdoulie Badjie - Africa Team

November 3, 2026 — No Comments

Electoral Pressure, Strategic Persistance: The Future of US Policy Towards Iran

By Federico Sergio - USA Team

When foreign policy becomes domestic politics

On 3 November, Americans vote in midterm elections that rarely turn on foreign affairs. This year may be an exemption. Given the US and Israel attack on Iran on 28 February, and President Trumpโ€™s statement about the end of the war ending โ€œimmediately afterโ€ the elections a question araises: has the conflict become a political liability, and can an election change how Washington fights it? The answer is subtler than โ€œvoters punish warโ€. The midterms will probably not decide whether the US keeps confronting Tehran but they could, however, change the political and institutional constraints under which the administration acts, a relationship Chatham House analysts have highlighted.

The strategic costs of the conflict

US, and consequently worldwide, costs are mainly military, economic and diplomatic. From a military perspective, the Pentagon estimated in September that the war had cost $43.6 billion so far, and Defense Secretary Hegseth is seeking roughly $80 billion more to replenish depleted stockpiles. Trump has also announced 9,000 additional troops for the region.

Coming to economic costs, energy is the central channel. About a fifth of the worldโ€™s oil normally passes through Hormuz, but September flows ran at roughly half the normal volume, and Brent futures are around $107 a barrel in mid-October. Tehran may view uncertainty surrounding the Strait's status as an important source of leverage. From this perspective, Iran could consider its survival and the securing of guarantees against future attacks as significant strategic achievements.

Moreover, a survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 86 per cent of Americans believed the war with Iran had negatively affected the cost of living, while 68 per cent considered the conflict not worth the costs. Moreover, 72 per cent of Americans believe the war has damaged relations with allies.

The electoral dimension

Votersโ€™ views of the war and their economic grievances are related but distinct. Only 2 per cent name Iran as the most important issue, possibly because US casualties have been relatively low. Yet, the aforementioned percentages show a clear stance on how the war is perceived with regard to the cost of living. Gasoline averaged about $4.33 a gallon in mid-October, against $2.98 before the war. Payneโ€™s comment on this is neat: โ€œthe economy is foreign policyโ€.

Academic research points the same way. Studies of the Iraq War found that electoral damage tracked casualties and perceived success, while midterms outcomes have long followed presidential approval and economic conditions. With US casualties comparatively low, the economic channel is the more plausible route for Iran to matter at the ballot box. For Republicans, the pressure is real but not uniform. Democratsโ€™ generic-ballot lead is trending towards double digits, and Republicans have privately conceded that the House is all but lost. Yet, the GOPโ€™s mid-decade redistricting has left the median House district about 3.5 points redder than the county, and Speaker Mike Johnson insists Republicans can โ€œabsolutelyโ€ win even if the war continues.

There is also a limit on how much the White House can gain from de-escalation given majorities saying they would not view Trumpโ€™s party more favourably even if he ended the war before the vote. Voters, in other words, may already have priced in the damage.

What could a change in Congress mean?

A Democratic majority in either chamber would probably increase friction with the White House over Iran. The tools are oversight hearings, subpoenas, appropriations and legislations. The scholarship suggests Congressโ€™s influence over war often works less through binding law than through hearings, public criticism and the political costs they impose on a president. 

Some constraint already exists. Congress has already demonstrated its willingness to challenge the administration's approach to Iran. A war powers resolution passed both chambers, with the Senate approving it by 50 votes to 48. However, its legal implications and enforceability remain disputed, highlighting the limitations of congressional efforts to constrain presidential military action. Historically, such resolutions have been vetoed or ignored by presidents of both parties, including Trump in 2019 and 2020, producing a veto-proof majority unlikely.

Photo by Edmond Dantรจs - pexels.com

In this situation, money is the more potent lever, as for example, the slow or conditioned of the $80 billion supplemental and wider defence budget by a Democratic House. But Democrats are not united. Some senators fear a supplemental vote would act as a โ€œbackdoorโ€ authorisation, while the others, such as John Fetterman, support more spending. Because a supplemental needs 60 Senate votes, that split matters.

Sanctions and any eventual settlement add a further wrinkle. Constraint could come from both directions, with Republicans criticising a proposed $300 billion fund to rebuild Iran, warning that a poor deal could give congressional Republicans an opening to hit the president after a rout. So a Democratic victory could constrain the administration without automatically reversing its policy. Hearings can raise the political price of escalation, and funding fights can slow it meaning none of these force a withdrawal, cautioning that the factors that have blocked a deal remain in place after 3 November.

Conclusion

The sharper question is not whether the midterms end the war but how they change Washingtonโ€™s room for manoeuvre. A weakened president faces more scrutiny, tighter budgets and less credibility when he threatens force or promises a deal. Allies and adversaries will read the results closely, and Tehran, which faces no comparable electoral test until 2028, may conclude that patience is a strategy.

Voters are unlikely to deliver a verdict on Iran itself, but they will deliver one on what the war costs them at the pump and at the checkouts. Whether that verdict reshapes US policy depends on what a new Congress chooses to do with it, and on whether a president who has said he doesnโ€™t care about the midterms chooses to listen.


Sources

Al Jazeera (2026) โ€˜Trumpโ€™s Iran war now has a midterm election problemโ€™, 10 September. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/10/trumps-iran-war-now-has-a-midterm-election-problem

Payne, A. (2026) โ€˜Why the US midterms are a rare foreign policy electionโ€™, Chatham House, October. Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/10/why-us-midterms-are-rare-foreign-policy-election.

Hurlburt, H. (2026) โ€˜US voters are angry. But on tariffs and war, the midterms wonโ€™t bring quick changeโ€™, Chatham House, 22 October. Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/10/us-voters-are-angry-tariffs-and-war-midterms-wont-bring-quick-change

Associated Press (2026) โ€˜Senate for first time approves a war powers resolution in a rebuke to Trump over Iran conflictโ€™, 23 June. Available at: https://lasvegassun.com/news/2026/jun/23/senate-for-first-time-approves-a-war-powers-resolu/

Political.org (2026) โ€˜Gas prices explained: the Iran war, the Strait of Hormuz and what you pay at the pumpโ€™. Available at: https://political.org/explained/gas-prices-iran-oil/

The National (2026) โ€˜US midterms: Iran war and cost of living put Trumpโ€™s foreign policy under pressureโ€™, 20 October. Available at: https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/us/2026/10/20/us-midterms-iran-foreign-policy/

UNN (2026) โ€˜U.S. officials warn of rising oil and gasoline prices due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuzโ€™. Available at: https://unn.ua/en/news/us-officials-warn-of-rising-oil-and-gasoline-prices-due-to-the-closure-of-the-strait-of-hormuz.

Gelpi, C., Feaver, P.D. and Reifler, J. (2005/06) โ€˜Success matters: casualty sensitivity and the war in Iraqโ€™, International Security, 30(3), pp. 7โ€“46.

Karol, D. and Miguel, E. (2007) โ€˜The electoral cost of war: Iraq casualties and the 2004 U.S. presidential electionโ€™, The Journal of Politics, 69(3), pp. 633โ€“648.

Kriner, D.L. and Shen, F.X. (2007) โ€˜Iraq casualties and the 2006 Senate electionsโ€™, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 32(4), pp. 507โ€“530.

Tufte, E.R. (1975) โ€˜Determinants of the outcomes of midterm congressional electionsโ€™, American Political Science Review, 69(3), pp. 812โ€“826. Available at: https://www.cambridge.org/core/article/determinants-of-the-outcomes-of-midterm-congressional-elections/2D3701D5F63001FAAD7BF14394DCCAB8

Egypt Independent (2026) โ€˜Republicans are panicking about 2026โ€™. Available at: https://www.egyptindependent.com/?p=2834988

Associated Press (2026) โ€˜Trumpโ€™s Iran war leaves Republicans adrift ahead of midtermsโ€™, via WTOP, April. Available at: https://wtop.com/national/2026/04/trump-offers-murky-path-forward-for-republicans-as-iran-war-clouds-midterm-elections/

Al Jazeera (2026) โ€˜Iran war: Top US lawmaker says Republicans can โ€œabsolutelyโ€ win midtermsโ€™, 23 August. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/23/iran-war-top-us-lawmaker-says-republicans-can-absolutely-win-midterms

Howell, W.G. and Pevehouse, J.C. (2007) While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kriner, D.L. (2010) After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Scripps News (2026) โ€˜Senate passes war powers resolution to curb future US military action against Iranโ€™. Available at: https://mynews4.com/news/nation-world/senate-passes-iran-war-powers-resolution-challenging-trump-military-actions

NOTUS (2026) โ€˜Senate Democrats are split over supplemental funding for the war in Iranโ€™. Available at: https://www.notus.org/senate/senate-democrats-supplemental-funding-iran-war

Chatham House (2026) โ€˜Trump has an incentive to strike a deal with Iran, as midterms approach. But at what cost?โ€™, 10 April. Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/04/trump-has-incentive-strike-deal-iran-midterms-approach-what-cost

October 26, 2026 — No Comments

Ebola in a region of war: highlighting vulnerabilities in DRC

By Katy Adams & Lisa Kaltner โ€“ Africa Team

Introduction to Ebola

Since May 2026, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been battling itsย largest Ebola outbreak on record. As of 21 October, theย European Centre for Disease Prevention and Controlย reportedย 9,704ย confirmedย casesย andย 4,687ย deathsย inย theย DRC.

Given the local environment, however, containing the virus is a daunting task. The affected regions are densely populated yet geographically isolated, suffering from severely underdeveloped health infrastructure. Compounding these physical obstacles is chronic regional conflict and insecurity, which severely obstructs contact tracing and containment efforts. Speaking on the hostile conditions, World Health Organization Africa Director Dr. Mohamed Janabi told the BBC: "We are chasing the virus, the virus is ahead of us."

At the root of this vulnerability is anย ongoing conflict that has plagued eastern DRC since 1996, persisting despite multiple attempted peace agreements. Inย recentย years,ย fightingย betweenย theย Congoleseย militaryย andย armedย groupsย hasย increasinglyย involvedย regionalย actors,ย withย competitionย overย valuableย mineralย resourcesย contributingย toย anย alreadyย complexย securityย environment. The resulting cycle of violence and displacement creates a fragile security climate that directly undermines the public health response.

What is Ebola and what has happened in the DRC? 

Ebola is a viral infection native to the DRC, where it was first identified in 1976 near the Ebola River, the waterway from which it takes its name. The disease can be caused by six distinct virus species, typically jumping to humans from animal hosts like fruit bats or non-human primates. The strain behind the countryโ€™s current surge is the Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD), and it marks the 17th Ebola outbreak in the DRC.

Transmissionย occurs through direct contact with infected bodily fluids, including blood, urine, feces, sweat, tears, and semen. Following an incubation period ranging from 2 to 21 days, early symptoms often present subtly as fever, fatigue, headaches, vomiting, and diarrhea, making initial diagnosis difficult due to overlap with other regional illnesses. As the disease progresses, patients may develop severe complications, including organ failure and, in some cases, internal or external bleeding. The virus can also persist in certain parts of the body after recovery, potentially leading to long-term complications.

Deadly even after a patient succumbs, the virus makes traditional burial practices a severe vector for infection. In the DRC, mourning customs often involve close physical contact and ceremonial washing of the deceased, exposing relatives to high viral loads.

While Ebola case fatality rates average around 50% overall, this outbreak of BVD in the DRC appears noticeably larger and more fatal than past BVD events. Earlier BVD outbreaks in Uganda (2007) and the DRC (2012) recorded lower fatality rates than the current 48%. After starting in Ituri Province, the outbreak quickly logged over 250 confirmed and suspected cases alongside 80 suspected deaths by May 16, leading the WHO to declare a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on May 17. Within its first two months, the number of infected and deceased matched the full totals of the 2018โ€“2020 epidemic, which was previously the second-largest outbreak on record. Experts also suspect a high number of unreported cases. The severity is further heightened because no cure or vaccine exists for BVD; vaccines are currently available for only one virus type (Ebola virus), and despite ongoing clinical trials for BVD treatments, a solution will take more time.

How can we contain an Ebola outbreak?

To execute a comprehensive containment strategy, Africa CDC and the WHO rely on a preparedness and response framework divided into 14 distinct pillars. Central to this approach is risk communication and community engagement, which aims to build trust in government and international responders, reduce fear and misinformation, and encourage early medical help at the community level.

To break transmission chains, the surveillance and epidemiology pillar focuses on early case detection, rapid field investigations, and contact tracing. This is closely linked to laboratory diagnostics, which are crucial for confirming suspected cases quickly and identifying new outbreaks early.

When confirmed patients enter health facilities, case management and clinical care take priority. Providing high-quality medical care within strict isolation units is essential to reduce illness, lower mortality rates, and prevent further spread.

Furthermore, dedicated pillars focus on infection prevention and control (IPC); water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH); and safe, dignified burials to target primary infection pathways. The response framework also explicitly incorporates measures for protection from sexual exploitation, abuse, and harassment (PSEAH) to safeguard vulnerable populations during emergency relief.

In short, containing an Ebola outbreak requires effective healthcare provision, the capacity to monitor population movements and conduct contact tracing, and adherence to safe burial practices. All three require a strong and capable state and, importantly, community cooperation and trust. However, in eastern DRC, weak state capacity, ongoing conflict, and deep mistrust of authorities make implementing the 14 pillars difficult to achieve. 

Photo by Thom Gonzalez, pexel.com
Challenges of containment

Efforts to contain the recent Ebola outbreak are marred by fragile health systems, frequent population migration, and chronic conflict that repeatedly disrupts the ability to deliver an effective healthcare response.

Firstly, conflict and chronic underdevelopment in the eastern DRC have compromised healthcare infrastructure and thus the ability to respond effectively to public health crises. Patients with symptoms of Ebola often must travel considerable distances to reach a treatment centre, and some areas may be inaccessible due to conflict. Even when patients reach treatment facilities, inadequate resources can undermine treatment:ย more than 150 patients have reportedly escapedsince late May, some in search of food amid a deepening hunger crisis. These weaknesses are further compounded by global funding cutsย and high death rates among health workers themselves, which erodes the quality of care and the capacity for contact tracing. This is illustrated by theย recent strikes in Ituri, where doctors and nurses protested going months without pay.ย 

Another issue is population mobility, which is exceptionally high in the affected area. The outbreak is believed to have begun in Mongbwalu, a mining region with large refugee communities and which attracts workers seeking economic opportunity, creating highly mobile populations, temporary settlements, and regional migration networks across porous borders. Furthermore, much of this mining is informal or illegal, making local actors wary of outside scrutiny and unwilling to cooperate with health teams.

Another major obstacle to controlling the outbreak is mistrust of government, healthcare workers, and foreign responders, fuelling the spread of conspiracy theories and misinformation about the virus. In the early stages of the outbreak,ย theories circulatedย amongst miners that the disease was caused by a particular coffin or was an โ€œoccult sacrifice brought about by a mine manager.โ€ย Othersย believe Westerners created the disease, and some think it is part of a scheme to extract national resources. The Guardian reports that these ideas are spreading faster than everย due to social media and AI.

Suspicions around Ebola outbreaks are also reinforced by the high death rates amongst those who enter treatment centres, fuelling rumours that the centres themselves are dangerous, and conspiracy theories that they are being used to harvest organs or conceal the truth of the virus. Such beliefs can result in people refusing to enter treatment centres, report cases or cooperate with contact-tracing teams.

Burial practices have become a particular flashpoint because they bring public-health measures into conflict with local customs. As noted,ย traditional funeralsย involve close contact with the body, including washing and touching. Safe-burial teams therefore must disinfect bodies and limit physical contact, but this can result in clashes with families. Inย one case in a village in eastern Congo, health workers arriving to conduct an Ebola burial were told that armed rebels would be called if they remained. The team was forced to leave and the family carried out the burial themselves, potentially exposing many more to the virus. Inย another caseย this May, health authorities prevented a family from retrieving the body of a man who had died from suspected Ebola, creating a confrontation in which an angry crowd threw objects and set fire to Ebola isolation tents. It was reported some patients being treated at the centre may have fled in the mayhem.

Ebola in a Region at War 

As we can see, the public-health response to the recent outbreak of Ebola in DRC is undermined by the wider social, political and, importantly, security context of the affected region. Many of the challenges facing Ebola response efforts are closely intertwined with the security environment of eastern Congo, a region shaped by decades of political instability, regional intervention, and protracted armed conflict.

Although instability in the region predates the 1990s, a crucial turning point was the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, in which about 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed. When the Rwandan Patriotic Front took control of the country and ended the genocide, over one million Hutu fled into eastern DRC. That number included members of groups involved in the killings, who proceeded to set up militarised refugee camps on Rwandaโ€™s border and conduct raids into Rwanda. The influx of refugees in eastern Congo also inflamed existing ethnic tensions between Congolese Tutsi and โ€˜autochthonousโ€™ groups in the area, some of which made alliances with Rwandan Hutus.

These factors contributed to the First Congo War (1996 - 97), which involved Rwanda and Uganda helping to topple DRCโ€™s then-president, Mobutu Sese Seko. However, the underlying tensions were not resolved. Following a breakdown in relations between Laurent Kabila, Mobutuโ€™s successor, and his former Rwandan and Ugandan allies, the Second Congo War (1998 - 2003) broke out, eventually involving several African countries into a Great War.

While the Second Congo War officially ended in 2003, violence persisted in the east. Armed groups remained active, partly because of unresolved political and ethnic tensions, weak state authority and competition over territory and natural resources. The international community attempted to stabilise the country through UN peacekeeping missions, however, these attempts have failed to establish security and authority across parts of the east.

One of the most significant rebel movements is the March 23 Movement (M23), which emerged in 2012 and defends the interests of Congolese Tutsi. Having been initially defeated, it re-emerged in 2021 and has since captured significant territory in North and South Kivu, retaking Goma (the capital of North Kivu) in January 2025. Rwanda's alleged support for M23 has made the conflict an important source of regional tension, as UN experts have reported the country has de facto control of the group.

Hence, as [lp1]ย WHOย puts it, the current Ebola outbreak is โ€œunfolding against a complex epidemiological, humanitarian and security backdrop characterized by insecurityโ€. The decades of armed conflict in eastern Congo have weakened state institutions and healthcare infrastructure, with WHO reporting in 2025 thatย 70% of health facilities in North Kivu were non-functional. It has contributed to the displacement of large populations, many of whom move repeatedly in search of safety and livelihoods, making it difficult to identify and follow contacts over the 21-day monitoring period required for Ebola, while overcrowding and inadequate access to clean water, sanitation and healthcare can increase opportunities for transmission. The conflict has also fragmented territorial control, meaning that access to affected communities is dependent on both physical infrastructure and the actors controlling particular areas - medical responders can only reachย an estimated 30% of infected individuals. Furthermore, locals who have experienced violence, displacement and contested state authority lack trust in government institutions and international organisations, sometimes resulting in violence against healthcare workers.

Conclusion 

As we have seen, explaining the intensity of the recent Ebola outbreak in the DRC requires understanding both the nature of the disease, and the environment in which it is spreading. While Ebolaโ€™s high fatality rate, modes of transmission, and the challenges of safe treatment and burial make containment difficult under any circumstances, attention to the social and political context of eastern DRC reveals how these difficulties are compounded by vulnerabilities arising from decades of conflict, insecurity, and underdevelopment. Theย outbreakย shouldย thereforeย beย understoodย notย onlyย asย aย publicย healthย emergencyย butย alsoย withinย theย broaderย politicalย andย securityย contextย ofย theย DRC,ย whereย institutionalย weaknesses,ย regionalย competitionย overย naturalย resourcesย andย persistentย instabilityย haveย complicatedย effortsย toย establishย lastingย peace. Moreover, this has all been further compounded by the recent cuts to international aid. In this context, the outbreak can be understood as another crisis faced by the regionโ€™s population. More widely, the outbreak demonstrates that controlling infectious disease requires functioning institutions, community trust, and a stable environment in which public-health interventions can operate effectively.

October 19, 2026 — No Comments

How the Iran Conflict Is Redrawing the Middle East’s Strategic Map

By Shahin Modarres, Will Kingston-Cox, Shir Mor, and Martina Ferraresi - Iran Team

Introduction 

When Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz in early 2026, it did not merely disrupt oil tankers - it detonated a geopolitical order that had been quietly reconstructing itself since the Abraham Accords. The closure of the world's most consequential maritime chokepoint has simultaneously exposed the fragility of the global energy and food system, handed Moscow a fiscal lifeline, and accelerated an unprecedented strategic realignment across the Middle East. The Iran War is not simply a bilateral conflict: it is a stress test of the entire post-Cold War regional architecture, and its aftershocks are reshaping alliances, economies, and threat perceptions from Riyadh to Rome.

This article first looks at why Tehran chose to close the Strait, then draws on three analytical perspectives - the economic shock radiating from the Strait itself, the geopolitical windfall accruing to Russia, and the accelerating strategic convergence between Israel and Persian Gulf states - to offer a composite assessment of the war's structural consequences.ย 

Tehran's Calculus: Why Close the Strait?

For decades, closing Hormuz was the threat Tehran kept in reserve. Iranian officials raised it during the sanctions crisis of 2011โ€“12 and again in 2018, and in June 2025, after the American strikes on Fordow, the Majlis voted in favour of closure. The final decision was left to the Supreme National Security Council, and it was never taken. The reasons for holding back were obvious. Iran ships its own oil through the same waters, and China, its most important customer, depends on the Strait more than almost anyone. So why did the leadership decide in March 2026 that the price was now worth paying?

Part of the answer lies in how this war began. The US-Israeli strikes of 28 February went after nuclear sites, military facilities and the leadership itself, and killed Ali Khamenei. Seen from Tehran, this was no longer a limited exchange like the twelve-day war of June 2025. It was a campaign against the survival of the system, and in that situation the old arguments for restraint carry much less weight. Mona Yacoubian has observed that the Islamic Republic appears to treat this as its 'final war', and its behaviour fits: within six days it had struck targets in fourteen countries (Yacoubian, 2026). Iran cannot compete with American or Israeli air power. What it can do is choose where the costs of the war land, and Hormuz is the one place where it can make them land on almost everyone.

The closure is also a bargaining chip. Tehran has presented it as a response to American and Israeli attacks, one that will last as long as those attacks do. Daniel Byman argues that the Iranian leadership believes it can outlast Washington: for Tehran the conflict is existential, while most Americans would rather see it over and forgotten. A capability that had been discussed for years but never tested has become Iran's best lever for extracting concessions (Byman, 2026). The aim is to make the war expensive enough for importers, insurers and, in the end, American voters that the pressure for a ceasefire comes from outside, and Iran never has to be the one asking for it (Frantzman, 2026).

How the closure has been enforced says a good deal about its purpose. Iran has not tried to stop all traffic. In late March, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi put it bluntly: 'There is no reason to allow the enemy to pass through the strait.' Vessels linked to the United States, Israel and the Persian Gulf states involved in the war were turned away, while ships serving China, Russia, India, Iraq and Pakistan were allowed through (IANS, 2026). Tehran wants to punish Washington and its regional partners while keeping Beijing and New Delhi on side and some of its own revenue flowing. Whether that balance can hold is doubtful. As the sections below show, the same pressure is pushing Persian Gulf capitals closer to Israel, and every pipeline built around the Strait weakens the lever Tehran is now pulling. But the decision was a calculated one, taken by a leadership that believed it had very little left to lose.

The Strait of Hormuz: Anatomy of a Crisis

The Strait of Hormuz has long served as the circulatory system of the international energy order. Through this narrow corridor flows approximately 20% of the world's oil and 20% of globally traded liquefied natural gas. Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and the UAE together produce nearly a third of the world's oil output and hold almost half of global reserves, making Hormuz the indispensable shipping lane of the global commodity system (Exiger, 2026; Reuters, 2026).

Yet the most critical dimension of the Hormuz crisis is not oil or gas. One-third of the global seaborne fertiliser trade - essential for the nitrogen inputs that sustain global agriculture - also passes through the Strait. Persian Gulf states import up to 90% of their food through this corridor. The conflict has compounded this with a secondary supply shock: Iran has blocked food exports and is itself a primary supplier of fruit and vegetables to the UAE (NDTV, 2026;ย DW, 2026). Beyond food and energy, Qatar and Bahrain together supply nearly 10% of global aluminium. Iranian drones and missiles have directly targeted critical supply chain infrastructure - most notably the Ras Laffan facility in Qatar, which produces one-third of the global helium supply (Exiger, 2026). The macroeconomic toll is severe: the UAE faces a projected GDP contraction of 8โ€“10% in 2026, while Saudi Arabia's GDP is expected to decline by 5% (Bloomberg, 2026).

Russia's Windfall: War by Proxy Benefit

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has transformed the Iran War into a strategic windfall for Moscow - and Russia does not need to be directly involved to reap the benefits. Indeed, direct military involvement would stretch its already beleaguered capacity while it remains entrenched in its war of attrition against Ukraine. Nevertheless, the war is altering the structure of global energy markets decisively in the Kremlin's favour.

Since 2022, Russian oil has been subject to embargoes, sanctions, and price cap mechanisms designed to keep Russian barrels on the market - avoiding global shortages given Russia's commodity superpower status - while limiting Kremlin revenues. The Hormuz closure has fundamentally altered that calculus. The Strait carried around a quarter of all global seaborne oil trade in 2025, with China, India, Japan, and South Korea accounting for 74% of Hormuz crude and condensate flows in the first half of the year. When Persian Gulf supply is disrupted, buyers face stronger incentives to tolerate sanctions risk, higher freight costs, shadow fleet logistics, and compliance ambiguity in order to secure Russian oil.

Before the crisis, pressure on Russia was mounting.ย Chatham House notedย that in February 2026 Russian oil and petroleum-product revenues had fallen to $9.5 billion - their lowest level since the full-scale invasion - while export volumes dropped to 6.6 million barrels per day. The Hormuz shock has reversed that squeeze entirely.ย CREA estimatesย that in April 2026, Russian fossil-fuel revenues rose to โ‚ฌ733 million per day, the highest in two and a half years, despite a 7% fall in export volumes; crude revenues were 68% above February levels and 44% above April 2025, while sanctioned 'shadow' tankers carried a record 54% of exports. Price caps function most effectively under conditions of oversupply. In scarcity - a direct consequence of the Hormuz closure - discounts narrow, waivers become tempting, and elevated prices increase the revenues available to sustain Russiaโ€™s war effort.

The Abraham Accords Reborn: Strategic Convergence in the Persian Gulf

While the war extracts an enormous economic cost from Persian Gulf states, it has simultaneously accelerated unprecedented strategic cooperation between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Shared concerns over the Islamic Republic's regional ambitions, missile capabilities, and Iran-aligned armed groups and proxy networks have created new opportunities for political, military, and technological partnerships that would have been unimaginable a decade ago.

Photo by Hisham Zayadneh

The clearest illustration is the deepening partnership between Israel and the United Arab Emirates. During the war, reports revealed that Israel deployed Iron Dome systems and military personnel to the UAE to assist in defending Emirati territory from Iranian missile and drone attacks - a historic milestone in regional security cooperation that demonstrated the operational depth of trust now underpinning the Abraham Accords (Rosenberg, 2026). Bahrain and other Abraham Accords states have similarly strengthened cooperation with Israel in maritime security, intelligence sharing, and regional defense coordination. Bahrain's strategic location in the Persian Gulf and its close ties with the United States make it a pivotal partner in efforts to counter Iranian influence and protect regional stability.

In parallel, cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia appears to be deepening despite the absence of formal diplomatic normalisation. While Riyadh publicly maintains a cautious posture - conditioning normalisation on meaningful progress toward a Palestinian state - regional assessments point to growing quiet coordination in intelligence and security matters (Washington Institute, 2026;ย Khuzaie, 2026). Saudi leaders now perceive greater political risks in openly aligning with Israel, particularly given strong domestic support for the Palestinian cause. Yet the shared threat posed by Tehran continues to drive quiet convergence behind the scenes.

More broadly, the conflict has catalysed discussions across Persian Gulf states about integrated air-defence systems, joint intelligence-sharing mechanisms, and coordinated responses to missile and drone threats. Israel's advanced defence technologies, combined with Persian Gulf financial and logistical capabilities, are generating durable incentives for long-term security architecture. Crucially, the shared economic devastation wrought by the Hormuz closure appears to be reshaping regional threat perception: for many Persian Gulf states, Iran appears to have increasingly displaced Israel as the most immediate strategic security concern, opening the possibility of a meaningful expansion of the Abraham Accords framework.

Conclusion

The Iran War has exposed the degree to which geography, energy, and geopolitics remain inextricably intertwined. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has simultaneously disrupted the global food and energy system, handed Russia a fiscal reprieve that Western sanctions were designed to foreclose, and compressed decades of cautious Arab-Israeli diplomatic evolution into months of operational military partnership. These are not isolated shocks - they are structurally connected consequences of a single chokepoint losing its freedom of navigation.

The emerging picture is a difficult paradox: the states bearing the greatest costs from the war, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and their neighbours, are also the ones moving closer to Israel most rapidly. In that sense, the conflict appears to be accelerating a process that diplomacy had already set in motion. Some analysts argue that this wartime cooperation could lead to deeper regional integration, while others caution that many of the underlying political disputes remain unresolved. Whether these new partnerships prove durable will depend on how the conflict ends, the future of Palestinian statehood discussions, and whether the economic shock of 2026 leads to lasting institutional cooperation or simply a partnership of convenience. What is already clear, however, is that the regional order that existed before the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is unlikely to return unchanged.

October 18, 2026 — No Comments

Rear Admiral Monty Khanna (Retd.) on Sea Power in South Asia

In this episode, Rear Admiral Khanna (Retd.) draws on his extensive experience in the Indian Navy and strategic affairs to examine the changing role of naval power, China and wider regional dynamics, and the strategic challenges facing India and other actors across the Indo-Pacific. The discussion also explores how shifts in the international security environment are influencing maritime strategy and the future balance of power at sea. This conversation offers valuable insights into the intersection of geopolitics, military strategy, and maritime security at a time of growing strategic competition.

Rear Admiral Monty Khanna (Retd.) is a decorated former Indian Navy submariner and national security expert with a 36-year career (1983โ€“2019). He is an alumnus of the DSSC Wellington and U.S. Naval War College who won the Sword of Honor, and served as Naval Attachรฉ in Washington, D.C. His senior leadership roles included Commandant of the Naval War College and Assistant Chief of Naval Staff. Post-retirement, he served at the National Security Council Secretariat (2019โ€“2023) and currently contributes as a National Security Advisory Board member, editor-in-chief, and Distinguished Fellow at the National Maritime Foundation, publishing extensively on maritime strategy.

Interviewer: Zorawar Gill - South Asia Team

October 1, 2026 — No Comments

A new nuclear doctrine for France and its European allies

By Alessandro Spada โ€“ UK & European Affairs Team

Introduction

On 2 March 2026, the French President, Emmanuel Macron, delivered a remarkable speech at the heart of the รŽle Longue base. On this occasion, he announced for the first time the progressive implementation of a new doctrine, known as โ€œforward deterrenceโ€. The purpose is to strengthen French nuclear deterrence against the combination of current threats, defending what France considers โ€œvital interestsโ€. For the first time, the new military strategy would be extended across the European continent, but with full respect for French sovereignty. These days, the geopolitical context is putting at serious risk the endurance of French and European security. President Macron listed the following causes as foundation for the new nuclear deterrence: Beijing and Moscow are increasing and modernising constantly their own nuclear capabilities; the decline of validity of several of nuclear arms-control treaties; last and not least, the ongoing ambiguity of the long-term US role as Europeโ€™s ultimate security guarantor.

What does โ€œdissuasion avancรฉeโ€ mean?

Beyond the UK and Germany, Macron declared that other European countries โ€“ Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Denmark and Greece โ€“ decided to join the new "advanced deterrence" strategy. The eight European countries will be able to host France's nuclear bombers stationed in their air bases and also participate in exercises of France's air-launched nuclear capacity โ€“ or force de frappe. This atomic strategy would allow Franceโ€™s partners to also share the development of "auxiliary" capacities: long-range missiles; air defence to shoot down incoming drones and missiles; and space-based alarm systems.

If, on the one hand, there are some advantages for the other European partners,  on the other hand, the strategy has some controversial points. First, their current level of around 290 warheads would be increased. Second, from now on, the number of nuclear warheads in its possession will no longer be communicated to the world. Third, the plan will never provide for any explicit โ€œguaranteeโ€ to partner countries, and the sole decision-making power over when to launch a nuclear missile will be entitled to only the President of France. Fourth, Macron did state the meaning of vital interests vaguely, although confirming that an attack on a European country could initiate a French response if affecting Franceโ€™s vital interests.

The French President highlighted that this new cooperation will never replace NATO and the USAโ€™s nuclear deterrent, but will be complementary. However, it would solidify France's strategy of being an independent geopolitical player, possibly moving towards offering itself as an alternative nuclear deterrent for European neighbours in the future. 

Characteristics and evolution of the doctrine

Initially, the main purpose of the French nuclear arsenal was to safeguard France's great power status and independence from the USA and NATO. Its primary scope was to defend national territory against attack, while impacting adversariesโ€™ strategic calculations by adding further uncertainty. Franceโ€™s nuclear doctrine has been based constantly on the principle of entire strategic independence. For this reason, the only NATO member that has never joined the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) is France. If, on the one hand, the French strategy is intended for the use of nuclear weapons in self-defence and in defence of its vital interests, on the other hand, Franceโ€™s nuclear capability is oriented toward strengthening both NATO and Europeโ€™s security. Despite the limited scale of its nuclear arsenal compared to that of a potential adversary (first the USSR and subsequently Russia), France does not exclude the option of being the first to resort to nuclear weapons. 

However, the use of nuclear weapons went through an evolution of doctrinal principles over time. Whereas during the Cold War the political and deterrent character of nuclear weapons was the dominant principle, intended as a means of immediate and massive retaliation in response to a Soviet attack, after 1989 the possibility of the limited use of nuclear weapons started to become established, in response to threats from a proliferant state or one supporting terrorism. As a substantial consequence, the number of warheads was reduced to the minimum required to guarantee the credibility of deterrence. Additionally, the use of nuclear weapons as battlefield weapons was explicitly ruled out, complying with the basic principle, known as strict sufficiency (stricte suffisance).

During his mandate, President Macron expressed the intent to adapt Franceโ€™s post-Cold War nuclear doctrine to the current conventional threats, especially from an increasingly aggressive Russia. These changes have been followed by the modernisation of Franceโ€™s nuclear forces. In accordance with the principles declared by the Presidentโ€™s speech of February 2020, nuclear weapons pursue a strictly defensive nature, and their use is only provided for imminent threats to the stateโ€™s vital interests, the definition of which is deliberately kept unclear. A single warning strike can be an envisaged possibility to โ€œrestore deterrenceโ€, Macron also said. 

Challenges

A further increase in the warhead stockpile could implicate very complex challenges. One of them, a further strengthening of the nuclear arsenal, could bring the public debt out of control and breach the rules of the EU Stability and Growth Pact, exceeding  116% of its GDP in 2025. In the meantime, this could involve cuts in other areas of public spending, raising strong domestic discontent. 

Illustration generated using OpenAI for visualisation purposes.

Second, Macron's presidency will expire in April 2027, and the current polls continue to project that National Rally, the French far-right party, is ahead. If Marine Le Penโ€™s party should win the presidential election, this could mean weakening the Europeanisation attempt of nuclear deterrence, as well as the creation of a European common army.

Third, resolving an apparent paradox dominating the heart of this French impetus. If, on the one hand, this initiative aims to reinforce nuclear deterrence, on the other hand, the maximum aspiration remains a world with no nuclear weapons, as expressed by Macron in his speech.

In the end, there is a sequence of tricky questions to answer.  How would a French-led nuclear deterrent align with NATO and U.S. nuclear deterrence, considering that France is the only NATO nuclear power outside the Nuclear Planning Group? Given the small size of the French nuclear arsenal, how could Paris and its European allies fill the strategic gap without relying on the American nuclear arsenal in the event of Washingtonโ€™s disengagement from Europe? What kind of reassurances could Macron guarantee its European allies in terms of implementation, coordination, consultation, functioning, and especially objectives? Indeed, Macron did not clarify the meaning of โ€œvital interestsโ€ in case of imminent threats yet, and any decision to employ nuclear weapons will be under the responsibility of France.

Conclusions

According to what has been examined in the previous paragraphs, one might assume some possible scenarios.

The first scenario concerns the next French Presidential elections in 2027. If the National Rally should win the next elections, the new strategy developed by President Macron could have its first setback, and, in the worst case of the hypothesis, the immediate end of the project extended to the other European allies. Although they could be strongly in favour of the warhead number increase, the evident euro-scepticism of the far-right party led by Marine Le Pen could impede the implementation of the new doctrine.

A further increase in nuclear military spending could place additional pressure on Franceโ€™s public finances, potentially diverting resources from welfare and other public services. This could force the French government to ask the other European allies to contribute to the cost of deterrence.

In conclusion, there could be one plausible solution to overcome most of the main challenges. It could be that Germany, the UK, and the other European allies ask for more transparency and clarification about the meaning of vital interests, threat assessment, consultation mechanisms, doctrine implementation, coordination, and guarantees concerning the steering group's role, composed of Germany, the UK, and France, after bilateral agreements.

September 29, 2026 — No Comments

Analysing artificial intelligence and human (sex) trafficking

By Maria Makurat - Human Rights Team

Introduction

Human rights are now more than even challenged where one has to ask, how to keep the human factor. As has been pointed out before, the study of AI and its impact on several security and human rights issues is very much interdisciplinary combining fields such as international relations, sociology, psychology, social work and criminology. Room is left to consider the micro level of human rights such as human (sex) trafficking in relation to cyber and AI factors. This blog article aims to further open up the debate on applying international relations theories and taking an interdisciplinary approach on analysing AI in relation to human (sex) trafficking. For the sake of argument, several human rights issues such as human trafficking, sex trafficking and child pornography will be considered together. Questions can be on a societal and possibly an existential level on how we react with AI in relation to human (sex) trafficking. It becomes clear that the human factor remains essential and that one needs to find a common strand to analyse several theories.

Cyber human (sex) trafficking in 2026 and beyond

Both human (sex) trafficking and child pornography are being influenced by AI and prove to become increasingly a challenge to human rights. 2025 a major online child pornography darknet page was taken down named โ€œKidflixโ€. German authorities in cooperation with Europol managed to make dozen arrests (79 arrests and 1400 identifications) dismantling this criminal network that was sharing and distributing child sexual abuse material (CSAM) using advanced crypto-tracing and automated reporting tools. โ€œAI is now being used throughout the cycle of child sexual exploitation. Offenders can create fake identities and even automate the grooming of victims, allowing them to scale up exploitation across languages and platforms.โ€ Furthermore, open-source AI models pose the challenge that criminal networks can alter and de-age normal photographsand turn them into CSAM, without having much training or the need for expertise. 

One could think, โ€˜So what? Crime networks are always there, and technology will always evolveโ€™. What this brings to mind is that these perpetrators can and will move very swift, adjust their tactics and create harmful content at an alarming speed challenging law enforcement and scholars. 

The United Nations on Drug Office and Crime and the EU warn of more human trafficking being committed in order for the victims to commit cyber-crime in certain scam centres. Crime networks use AI to deceive victims into false job advertisement and deceive them into scams whilst evading trace and detection. The European Commission strives for a new EU Strategy on combating Trafficking in Human Beings.

This shows how the issues have become complex, and the development of new or adapted criminal networks prove to be a challenge which means, sorting through theories that analyse these issues are also a task.

This leaves room for analysing theories and methodologies, tackle them with an interdisciplinary approach and eventually come up with possible ways forward. It also makes all the clearer, that keeping the humans in the loop remains a vital part in tackling these issues. Additionally, there already seems to be a co-dependence developing that namely law enforcement is applying AI in battling online human trafficking which will be explored in the following paragraph.

Theories on AI and human (sex) trafficking and the way forward?

If we consider an interdisciplinary approach, then it is all the more important to find a common ground and a strategy that one can keep adapting when wanting to apply AI to โ€˜combatโ€™ human sex trafficking and preserve human rights. The many issues seem to be connected with each other which makes a separate approach challenging. There seems to be room for empirical research and developing methodologies when wanting to assess how criminals use the cyber domain to recruit people for sex trafficking. Gezinski and Pons for instance (2024) point out: โ€œDespite undertaking this systematic review, the prevalence of online- facilitated sex trafficking is still unknown, and large-scale representative studies are needed. (โ€ฆ) Overall, very few empirical studies have been conducted on the relationship between sex trafficking and technology.โ€[1] Garkish et al (2025) for instance concludes that an interdisciplinary approach should be focused on when wanting to find a unified way of applying AI in social work and other disciplines whilst also considering the ethics behind of using AI. This should also ensure that ethical work is ensured.[2]  Garkish also points out that social-work needs to remain โ€œface-to-โ€œfaceโ€. This is very similar to the debate in international relations (IR) to โ€˜keeping the humans in the loopโ€™. Kjellgren (2022) also calls for a closer look at the sex trafficking schemes themselves and that one should not run the risk of being distracted by the emerging technologies in the first place.[3]

Do we take out the humans to make decisions faster when it comes to safety or is the risk still too great to make fatal decisions? What if AI search engines can detect underage faces but those faces have been altered deepfake technology? What if sex trafficking rings recruit minors but later the videos and images to click are just barely coming of age faces. Xi Wang and Noelle E. Fearn have summarised models of AI to combat human trafficking which seem to be now about 48.[4] Models exists to detect emojis, clothing, operating hours from businesses, language etc but major setbacks exist: โ€œTheir implementation in practice calls for interdisciplinary collaboration among technologists, law enforcement, and civil society to ensure usability and fairness.โ€[5]

It becomes clear that social media companies must monitor together with governmental authorities the online presence of possible perpetrators. The question also needs to be asked: can social media platforms continue to stay truly โ€˜civilianโ€™ or โ€˜privateโ€™ or must one accept that they will be monitored by states more strongly? What about the recent development of banning social media for under 16 year olds and states that have raised allegations against Meta due to the platformโ€™s โ€˜addictiveโ€™ features? Will this perhaps have an influence and help keep young people safe in the cyber domain?

At the moment it seems that the various fields involved in researching this topic (e.g. international relations, criminology, sociology, lawyers, social workers to name a few) should try to structure several clear (research) questions to tackle this vast developing complex issue. It becomes therefore all the more vital to try to combine these theories into few strands in order to not lose focus which will be looked at more in detail in the following paragraph whilst also having the focus on the human factor.

Photo byย Kate Oseenย onย Unsplash

Challenging the human rights questions on AI and human (sex) trafficking

Do we have to keep coming up with new theories or methodologies? When one searches in the web an article or a peer reviewed essay on a certain topic, the certainty that one finds something is by now very high. What if one runs the risk of losing track of the many theories and questions that need to be answered when thinking about AI and human (sex) trafficking. The next challenge would be: to find a way through a dense amount of material and ideas and streamlining it into few focused โ€˜strandsโ€™. As the conflicts become increasingly interwoven due to e.g hybrid warfare and the cyber domain being almost inseparable from the real world, so one needs to even more strongly find a way forward.

When looking more on the sociological and dare one says, philosophical level, by taking several steps back, one can try to look at this issue in a broader sense. One has the cyber domain, that is here to stay for sure. Then comes the issue of cyber criminals for instance in this case sex trafficking. At the moment individuals seem to be in a dilemma. Several individuals (especially younger people) navigate towards the trend of using analogue technology, not wanting to be dependent on streaming services and be possibly addicted to social media services. Speak, just now Meta has agreed to pay 17.1 bn dollars for creating addictive search algorithms and promises to alter the issue of creating a safe space for children and young people.

Looking at other articles, interesting aspects arise that we can no longer close the โ€˜doorโ€™ when switching off the internet. When looking back, one was able to leave the cyber domain when one was finished with their work but now, one is almost forced to stay online. Individuals have a second identity in the cyber domain as well as the security sector. One could say, a certain type of cyber conflict in relation to human rights and child pornography is taking place in the cyber domain that one cannot โ€˜switch offโ€™ so easily anymore.  So like Platonwho said there is not only the physical world but also something beyond (theory of forms), must we accept now that we truly need to exist both in the real and cyber world? Hypothetically, what would happen if a collective mass โ€˜hystericโ€™ or after chaos theory, everyone were to do the same and delete all their social media accounts for instance? Would this truly happen? Would this be beneficial for human rights? Or is the interdependence and co-dependence too strong already? 

Marcus Aurelius also wrote in his meditations[6], that one should not fight reality and just follow the world order however, the cyber domain is purely manmade, so how much can we accept that it is the flow of our time or the development of a greater world order? 

Researchers such as Valeriano, Jensen and Maness (Cyber Strategy, 2018, Oxford University Press) agree that sanctions are still very useful when wanting to alter an โ€˜enemyโ€™sโ€™ attitude in the cyber domain, in other words the typical โ€˜tit-for-tatโ€™ strategy. Within the human sex trafficking scene, one does not only want to alter the perpetrators behaviour, one wants to identify the rings and stop trafficking. Europol calls the criminals network in itโ€™s report a โ€œA FLUID CRIMINAL ECOSYSTEM : Why do criminal networks continue to resist and emerge?โ€[7] so therefore one should also consider a strategy in the age of AI also fluid when wanting to tackle the many issues at hand.

It might be a challenge to combine different disciplines and methodologies to continue researching and combating said conflicts however, it seems to be a necessary step in the long-term run. What about applying feminist theories into this debate? Feminist theories discussed by scholars (e.g. Sjolberg, Cockburn) agree that one cannot understand the causes of war without looking or considering the gender[8]. While it is debatable but one could consider issues such as cyber (sex) trafficking part of a certain cyber war. Sjolberg discusses that feminist theories take more different types of sources into account which could contribute to researching cyber violence. [9]This can in turn be useful when wanting to understand how criminals exploit AI and the cyber domain to conduct cyber (sex) trafficking and establish networks of child pornography. 

Conclusion

Many human rights questions remain. Will humans be living a double life in the cyber domain? Will the stricter social media laws for young people under the age of 16 help in combating possible online grooming and recruitment? The problems are interwoven and connected which challenges several disciplines in analysing said issues.

One thing that one should not forget in this equation: communicating. With digitalisation individuals are able to communicate faster yet there have also been setbacks. That is why it is all the more important to strengthen word to word communication between young people, elders, parents but also on a security level. This could possibly contribute to a safer exchange of ideas and taking precautions. One should also consider the impact of AI centres on other areas of human and possible environmental rights which leaves rooms for further discussion in another article. There is already a lot of emerging literature, but it seems there is for now a need to organise the new articles and ideas into several strands in order to not lose focus when analysing human rights issues.


[1] Lindsay B. Gezinski & Kwynn M. Gonzalez-Pons (2024) Sex Trafficking and Technology: A Systematic Review of Recruitment and Exploitation, Journal of Human Trafficking, 10:3, 497-511, DOI: 10.1080/23322705.2022.2034378

[2] Garkisch, M., Goldkind, L. Considering a Unified Model of Artificial Intelligence Enhanced Social Work: A Systematic Review. J. Hum. Rights Soc. Work 10, 23โ€“42 (2025). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41134-024-00326-y: 34.

[3] Kjellgren R (2022) Good tech, bad tech: Policing sex trafficking with big data. International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 11(1): 149-166. https://doi.org/10.5204/ijcjsd.2139

[4] Xi Wang and Noelle E. Fearn pg 308-315 in Ruopeng An, Michael A. Lindsey, โ€œArtificial Intelligence in Social Work: Bridging Technology and Humanity,โ€ GCTU Repository, accessed August 26, 2026, https://repository.gctu.edu.gh/items/show/3228.

[5]  Ruopeng An, Michael A. Lindsey, โ€œArtificial Intelligence in Social Work: Bridging Technology and Humanity,โ€ GCTU Repository, accessed August 12, 2026, https://repository.gctu.edu.gh/items/show/3228.: Pg: 322

[6] Aurelius, Marcus. 2014. Meditations. Translated by Martin Hammond. Penguin Pocket Hardbacks. London, England: Penguin Classics. 

[7] https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/Blueprint-of-criminal-opportunism.pdf : pg 30

[8] Laura Sjoberg (2024) Feminist Theories and Thinking Security Otherwise, Security Studies, 33:5, 860-884, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2024.2449334 

[9] Ibid. 874

References:

Agovic, A., Wagner, D.L. and Fisher, M. (2026) Abuse at scale: Artificial intelligence is reshaping child sexual exploitation. Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. Available at: https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/abuse-at-scale-artificial-intelligence-is-reshaping-child-sexual-exploitation/ (Accessed: 29 August 2026).

An, R. and Lindsey, M.A. (2026) Artificial Intelligence in Social Work: Bridging Technology and Humanity. GCTU Repository. Available at: https://repository.gctu.edu.gh/items/show/3228 (Accessed: 26 August 2026).

Aurelius, M. (2014) Meditations. Translated by Martin Hammond. London: Penguin Classics.

Digital Strategy โ€“ European Commission (n.d.) European approach to artificial intelligence. Available at: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/european-approach-artificial-intelligence (Accessed: 29 August 2026).

Europol (2025) Europeโ€™s most innovative law enforcement projects honoured at Europolโ€™s 2025 Excellence Awards. Available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/europe%E2%80%99s-most-innovative-law-enforcement-projects-honoured-europol%E2%80%99s-2025-excellence-awards (Accessed: 29 August 2026).

Europol (2026) Blueprint of criminal opportunism. Available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/Blueprint-of-criminal-opportunism.pdf (Accessed: 29 August 2026).

Garkisch, M. and Goldkind, L. (2025) โ€˜Considering a unified model of artificial intelligence enhanced social work: a systematic reviewโ€™, Journal of Human Rights and Social Work, 10, pp. 23โ€“42. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41134-024-00326-y.

Gezinski, L.B. and Gonzalez-Pons, K.M. (2024) โ€˜Sex trafficking and technology: a systematic review of recruitment and exploitationโ€™, Journal of Human Trafficking, 10(3), pp. 497โ€“511. https://doi.org/10.1080/23322705.2022.2034378.

ITSS Verona (2025) โ€˜The growing issues of violence against women in the cyber domainโ€™. Available at: https://www.itssverona.it/the-growing-issues-of-violence-against-women-in-the-cyber-domain (Accessed: 29 August 2026).

ITSS Verona (2026) โ€˜AI, ICT infrastructures, and social media in todayโ€™s conflictsโ€™. Available at: https://www.itssverona.it/ai-ict-infrastructures-and-social-media-in-todays-conflicts (Accessed: 29 August 2026).

Kjellgren, R. (2022) โ€˜Good tech, bad tech: policing sex trafficking with big dataโ€™, International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy, 11(1), pp. 149โ€“166. https://doi.org/10.5204/ijcjsd.2139.

Reichart, J. (2025) โ€˜So gelang bayerischen Ermittlern der Schlag gegen Kidflixโ€™, BR24, 4 April. Available at: https://www.br.de/nachrichten/bayern/so-gelang-bayerischen-ermittlern-der-schlag-gegen-kidflix,UgLaM9T (Accessed: 29 August 2026).

ScienceDirect Topics (n.d.) Chaos theory. Available at: https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/earth-and-planetary-sciences/chaos-theory (Accessed: 29 August 2026).

Sjoberg, L. (2024) โ€˜Feminist theories and thinking security otherwiseโ€™, Security Studies, 33(5), pp. 860โ€“884. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2024.2449334.

Vogue Adria (n.d.) Offline analog trend. Available at: https://vogueadria.com/offline-analog-trend/ (Accessed: 29 August 2026).

Wang, X. and Fearn, N.E. (2026) โ€˜Artificial Intelligence in Social Work: Bridging Technology and Humanityโ€™, in An, R. and Lindsey, M.A., Artificial Intelligence in Social Work: Bridging Technology and Humanity. GCTU Repository, pp. 308โ€“315. Available at: https://repository.gctu.edu.gh/items/show/3228 (Accessed: 26 August 2026).

BBC, โ€œUS states call for big changes to Instagram and Facebook as Meta child privacy trial beginsโ€, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clyqpx6xk69o , Date accessed: 18 August 2026

BBC, โ€œMeta to pay up to $18bn to settle claims its platforms harm children,โ€ https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cd68q3wynnqo#google_vignette , Date accessed: 26 August 2026

Medium โ€“ โ€œWe Used to Log Offโ€ , https://uxdesign.cc/we-used-to-log-off-36771c18926b , Date accessed: 15 July 2026

Daily Philosophy โ€“ โ€œPlatoโ€™s Theory of Forms - Stepping out of the shadows and into the light,โ€ Matthias, Andreas, https://daily-philosophy.com/platos-theory-of-forms/

Political Science Institute โ€“ โ€œFeminist Perspectives in International Relationsโ€, https://polsci.institute/international-relations-world-history/feminist-perspectives-in-international-relations/?utm_source=chatgpt.com , Date accessed: 10 Jult 2026

September 12, 2026 — No Comments

CIAโ€™s push to temper Putin may ring hollow inside the Kremlin

By Sorin Andrei Dojan - Russia Team

Russian President Vladimir Putin is no stranger to US intelligence reports of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Two weeks ago, John Ratcliffe, the CIA director, travelled to Moscow to deliver a bleak assessment of the Kremlinโ€™s debacle in Ukraine to Aleksandr Bortnikov, head of Russiaโ€™s FSB, urging him to reach a deal with Kyiv before things spiral out of control, both economically and politically.

It would be naรฏve to assume Bortnikov knows nothing about Russiaโ€™s ailments on the battlefront. According to Russian independent media outlet Mediazona, over 240,000 Russian troops have died since Moscow launched its full-scale invasion over four years ago. These are all confirmed names, with the real figure expected to be higher.

However, if that is the reason behind Ratcliffeโ€™s latest visit to Russia, his warning to Russian officials including Putin would unlikely prompt any changes in behaviour. That is because, for a political system built on conformity and loyalty, truth-seeking is of secondary importance to strategic goals and regime survival. 

Military and intelligence preparations before 24 February 2022 illustrate how these assessments alter strategic considerations. Russian intelligence collection before the full-scale invasion had been insufficient to determine Ukraineโ€™s strong will to fight back. One reason for failure stands out: the Kremlinโ€™s preference for its own biases. That is because, in Russia, intelligence collection it seems to be guided by a system that incentivises delivering information aligned with the leaderโ€™s ambitions and discourages contradictory perspectives.1. 

Take, for instance, its limited effort to diversify intelligence sources in Ukraine. Instead, Russian intelligence collection efforts depended, for the most part, on Russian-speaking informants, an approach described by several professors from Kingโ€™s College London as โ€œlikely a methodological oversight or just plain lazy for Russian case officers who did not speak Ukrainianโ€.2 Or consider the series of FSB-backed polls in Ukraine, shortly before the invasion began, highlighting low trust in Ukrainian political institutions and intelligence services (27% trusted the office of the President of Ukraine, 23% trusted domestic security services) and moderate trust in the Armyโ€™s ability to repel an invasion (51%). However, most poll respondents were located in the south and east of the country, where a significant Russian minority lived3 and had historically been more distrustful of the Ukrainian government. 

Russia and the Soviet Union offers several examples of leaders  preferring their own assumptions. Joseph Stalin, for instance, refused to listen to intelligence analysts, preferring instead to interpret information on his own. This proved to be a critical miscalculation , since he didnโ€™t believeAdolf Hitler would have invaded  his country, despitethe vast buildup of Nazi troops near the German-Soviet border at the time4.

ะฎั€ะธะน ะ”.ะš., CC BY 4.0 , via Wikimedia Commons

Today, however, the obstacle is no longer Putinโ€™s ability to obtain accurate information. It is difficult to imagine that the Russian leadership is still unaware of how four years of war have depleted Moscowโ€™s army and navy of men and military hardware. Instead, it is the regimeโ€™s own struggle for survival that will keep Western engagement at bay. That is because accepting peace on unfavourable terms will puncture the regimeโ€™s image-projection efforts to appear competent in the face of a much smaller neighbour and enemy. Therefore, failing to achieve even the Kremlinโ€™s more limited goal of securing control over the Donbas could weaken Putinโ€™s efforts to present the war as a success and potentially put more domestic pressure on the Russian leader.

If history holds any lessons for him, Nikita Khrushchevโ€™s removal from power would be one. In 1964, after several crises, including the Cuban Missile debacle that brought the world to the brink of nuclear conflict, Khrushchev was removed from power in a non-violent leadership transition. 

For now, tighter domestic repression and constraints on political dissent appear to have reduced visible challenges to Putin's rule. Anti-war protests have become a scarcity in Russia. Instead of taking to the streets, there has recently been a surge in traffic across Russiaโ€™s border with Georgia, as many Russians now fear another call-up for military mobilisation. That is understandable, given that anti-war protests have led to arrests and lengthy prison sentences. The suppression of organised dissent may reduce domestic pressure on the Kremlin, although its longer-term impact on the regime remains difficult to predict.

Ratclifeโ€™s visit to Moscow should therefore not necessarily be interpreted as a sign that the war will come to an end. If anything, the problem lies not in the content of the message, but in the options it espouses: heed the advice and seek peace, or face worsening conditions on the battlefield; yet choose to make peace on unfavourable terms, and risk appearing politically weakened at home. 


  1. ย Dylan, Huw, David V. Gioe, and Elena Grossfeld. โ€œThe autocratโ€™s intelligence paradox: Vladimir Putinโ€™s (mis)management of Russian strategic assessment in the Ukraine War.โ€ The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 25, no. 3. (2023): 385โ€“404. https://doi.org/10.1177/13691481221146113.

    โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  2. Ibid. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  3. Riehle, Kevin. โ€œThe Ukraine war and the shift in Russian intelligence priorities.โ€ Intelligence & National Security 39, no. 3 (2024): 458โ€“474. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2024.2322807. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  4. Andrew, Cristopher and Julie Elkner. โ€œStalin and Foreign Intelligence.โ€ Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 4, no. 1 (2003): 69-94. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14690760412331326088. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ

September 7, 2026 — No Comments

Who Controls the Sea Controls the World

By Patrick Nicchiarelli - Asia & China Team

The aphorism, related to Sir Walter Raleigh, โ€œWhoever commands the sea commands the trade; whoever commands the trade commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itselfโ€ (Raleigh, 1614), has never seemed truer. 

From the Persian Gulf to the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, the contest for mastery of the seas is accelerating, and while the classical maritime theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan and, even more so, Julian Corbett remain relevant today, it is being fought with new weapons no navies of the past could have imagined: autonomous submarines, AI-guided drone swarms, and cutting tools designed to sever the underwater cables that carry the world's data. At the centre of this transformation stands the People's Liberation Army Navy.

The theory

Alfred Thayer Mahan: Command of the Sea

In 1890, American naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan published The Influence of Sea Power upon History (Mahan, 1890). At the core of his theory, the decisive instrument was the battle fleet, a concentrated force with capital ships designed to seek out and destroy the enemy's fleet, seizing command of the sea in a single, culminating engagement.

He identified six key elements determining a nationโ€™s capacity for sea power : 

An  access to open seas and proximity to major trade routes, the quality of coastline, harbours and navigable rivers, the length of coastline relative to population, sufficient manpower to crew a fleet, a population's aptitude for commerce and seafaring and a political will to invest in and sustain a navy.

The central idea of Mahanโ€™s theory lies in the control of the chokepoint and strategic straits through a powerful battle fleet. The control of strategic straits, where maritime traffic is forced to travel through, confers a disproportionately large advantage relative to the military force required to hold them.

As a result, the United States, Britain, Japan, and Germany all embarked on massive battleship programmes in the 1890s and 1900s, contributing directly to the conditions that produced the First World War. His influence persisted through the carrier-centric doctrine of the Second World War and into the Cold War's nuclear deterrence calculus (Till, 2018). The US Navy's enduring emphasis on aircraft carrier strike groups, concentrated, and designed to dominate the sea, reflects modern-day Mahanian doctrine.

Julian Corbett: Sea Denial and Limited Warfare

For his part, Sir Julian Corbett, a British naval historian, offered a more nuanced counterpoint. Where Mahan saw the sea as an arena for decisive battle, Corbett regarded it as an operational environment to be managed. In his book, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Corbett, 1911), he argued that the real objective of naval power was not the annihilation of the enemy fleet, but the control of maritime communications, the sea lanes along which troops, supplies, and goods must pass. The difference lies in the fact that you don't need to control the whole ocean, you only need to deny it to your adversary.

Corbett introduced the concept of sea denial, where a weaker naval power could frustrate a stronger one not by meeting it in open battle, but by making the sea too dangerous to use freely. Mines, submarines, coastal batteries, hit-and-run raids โ€” these were the tools of the weaker party that could impose costs without seeking decisive engagement. 

For the landlubber that you may be, letโ€™s make a parallel with the Thermopylae battle, in 480 BC, staged in the film 300 (Snyder 2006) (Pic. 1), where 300 Spartans (and thousand Greek allies) held the narrow pass against the Persian army estimated at several hundred thousand men. They did not seek to defeat Xerxes. They sought to deny him the use of the terrain for as long as possible.

Image generated by AI: Artistic reproduction of the Battle of Thermopylae

Nowadays, this strategy is called Anti-Access / Area Denial (A2/AD). The defender's objective is to make the cost of using the sea unacceptably high for the opponent. 

Applying this theoretical framework to China's maritime strategy, it becomes apparent that its drone programme in particular, follows a distinctly Corbettian logic. Beijing does not seek global Mahanian Sea command yet. Its actual strategy is to deny its adversaries (which at the moment could be considered being the United States and its allies) access to and freedom of navigation within the South China Sea. 

Drones, mines, underwater sensor networks, anti-ship missiles, and satellites are the tools of asymmetric warfare. Those devices are sea-denial weapons deployed in a Corbettian framework by Chinaโ€™s Peopleโ€™s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).

Thus, as PLANโ€™s capabilities grow, we may wonder whether this posture is a permanent doctrine or a transitional phase on the road to Mahanian ambition possibly related to the String of Pearls, a network of naval facilities and commercial infrastructure stretching from mainland China through the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf and East Africa.

The practice: the Strait of Hormuz

Before diving into the heart of the subject, let us take advantage of current events to observe Corbett's theory in real time, with the crisis unfolding in the Strait of Hormuz. Since February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel have been conducting military operations against Iran, and Iran's principal strategic response has been the closure of one of the world's most critical maritime chokepoints, stopping mostly the maritime traffic.

The Strait of Hormuz is, at its narrowest, 33 kilometers wide. Through this corridor flows approximately 25 percent of the world's crude oil and a significant fraction of its liquefied natural gas (EIA, 2025). Every major oil producer on the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, are virtually landlocked, related to global markets, without passage through Hormuz (map1). 

This is Corbett chokepoint doctrine in its starkest form. Iran, with an inferior military navy to that of the US, possesses the capacity to threaten, if not fully execute, such a closure, thereby threatening to restrain one-fifth of global oil supply. 

What the current crisis demonstrates is the gap between the threat of closure and its actual execution. At the time of writing, Iran has chosen to implement a selective closure of the strait, allowing passage to allied and neutral vessels while targeting US and their allied flagged ships, effectively operating a discriminatory chokepoint regime (Alโ€‘Mohanadi and Obaid, 2026), then it was to paying vessels.

This partial closure is not a decisive battle, but continuous friction. The cost is immense, war-risk insurance premiums for Hormuz transit have doubled or tripled bringing maritime traffic to an effective standstill, causing oil prices to rise, thus generating mounting pressure on the United States, both from domestic opposition and the international community calling for de-escalation. As a result, Washington was compelled to impose its own counter-blockade to prevent Iran's regional partners from benefiting from the crisis. This is a textbook illustration of Corbett's insight that sea denial, even when conducted by the weaker party, can compel the dominant naval power to expend disproportionate effort simply to preserve the status quo.

Corbett updated: sea denial as economic statecraft

Selective closure deserves particular attention. Indeed, Chinese vessels have in some part been able to continue to pass, until the US started a blockade (Prรฉtat et al., 2026). As a fellow BRICS member, Iran's relationship with Beijing goes beyond simple commercial ties, and there is a message there and from both parts. Letโ€™s not forget that it is also an economic dependency which function as a form of strategic insurance. For Beijing, by remaining Iran's indispensable economic lifeline, absorbing approximately 80 percent of its oil exports, averaging 1.38 million barrels per day in 2025 (Downs, 2026) (table 1), China effectively purchased immunity from chokepoint disruption, ensuring that its energy supply lines were never reduced to zero.

Table 1 generated by the author: Chinaโ€™s crude oil imports

Tehran, in turn, ran a discriminatory chokepoint: closed to its enemies, open to its patron, with at least two paying transit fees denominated in yuan, brokered by a Chinese maritime services company acting as intermediary (Lloydโ€™s List 2026). 

Iran's Foreign Minister confirmed that the strait remained open to countries that neither participated in nor supported acts of aggression against Iran (Al Jazeera, 2026). This is a preview of how great-power competition over maritime chokepoints will be fought in the coming decades, not only with armament, but with energy contracts and economic architecture.

Indeed, there is something very important here, what it reveals goes well beyond a simple passage fee. The strait is being used as a tool to boost the Chinese yuan as an alternative to the US dollar in global energy transactions, which is a long-standing strategic objective for Beijing. The Hormuz crisis offered a test case for yuan-denominated energy payments at scale, as China already did with the iron ore trade settlement (IDNFinancials, 2025). So, while Western financial infrastructure is being weaponised against Iran, China demonstrated that a parallel payment channel exists for those unwilling to remain hostage to dollar hegemony. 

On the other part, allowing allied and neutral vessels to continue trading with minimal disruption, Iran simultaneously preserves its economic relationships, creates new diplomatic relation or commercial channels, and erodes the usual western ยซ cohesion ยป forcing US allies into publicly questioning Washingtonโ€™s operations. To counter that strategy, its opponent had no choice but to enforce the blockade to ensure that neither Iranโ€™s allies nor countries with agreements could pass through, at the risk of alienating everyone, its own allied included.

Those are consequences to the chokepoint politics that Corbett's original framework did not account for, and that the Hormuz crisis has brought into sharp focus. When a weaker power successfully weaponises a strait, it does not merely inconvenience the dominant naval force, it simultaneously signals to every third-party nation in the international system that alignment with the chokepoint holder carries tangible economic value. Countries with no ideological affinity for Tehran such as India and France, quietly negotiated passage arrangements, prioritising the continuity of their trade flows over solidarity with the Western coalition (Euronews, 2026). 

Taken together, these dynamics point to something more consequential than the tactical outcome of the strait closure. By resisting the US attack and imposing its own terms on maritime traffic, Iran effectively established itself as a regional hegemon. The message to surrounding states was unambiguous: no transit through the Strait of Hormuz, nor through the Bab el-Mandeb (controlled via the Houthi proxy in Yemen), occurs without Tehran's consent.

In sum, a regime operating under degraded, sanctioned military capacity and sustained bombardment nonetheless succeeded in restricting maritime traffic through one of the world's most strategically vital chokepoints.Now imagine the same doctrine with a nation possessing a huge industrial capacity, with autonomous submarines, AI-guided drone swarms, the world's largest coast guard, and a militarised fishing fleet permanently deployed. This nation is the People's Republic of China.

The South China Sea

The South China Sea: Where History, Commerce, and Strategy Converge

To comprehend China's naval strategy in 2026, one must first understand how the era, known as the Century of Humiliation, happened at a time China had no navy worth the name. The consequences still resonate today as this memory has been institutionalized and is still used as a motivating tool in Chinaโ€™s posture toward the West (Nicchiarelli, 2023).

Indeed, during the Opium Wars (1839โ€“1842 and 1856โ€“1860), China was unable to oppose the foreign navies sent to force the Qing government to accept the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 and the Convention of Peking (1860). The enemy fleets navigated the same routes that todayโ€™s oil tankers and container ships follow: the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea, offering access to Chinaโ€™s coastline (map 2).

Map 2: Created map of the naval route of the two Opium Wars

Western navies did not attack China via land, they used the sea Chinaโ€™s navy was too weak to defend. Today, Xi Jinpingโ€™s Chinese Dream rests, in part, on a naval ambition: to ensure that no foreign fleet can ever again impose its will on China from its own waters (Eudeline, 2023).

The South China Sea today: the nine-dash line and the artificial islands

This is precisely why China invokes the nine-dash line, asserting historical rights over nearly 90% of the South China Sea, bypassing the distance-based framework established by UNCLOS) (pic 2), and encroaching on neighboring countries maritimeโ€™ borders (map 3).

Picture 2: Created chart of UNCLOS Law of the Sea distance
Map 3: Created map of  Maritime claims of the South China Sea

The securitisation of the nine-dash line area serves several purposes. While there is an economic dimension to this situation which encompasses hydrocarbon extraction, fisheries control, seabed mineral rights, dominance over global shipping lanes, and the protection of China's Belt and Road maritime infrastructure, I will focus on the security part.ย 

To appreciate China's A2/AD strategy in the South China Sea, we must highlight what can be seen as one of the most impressive engineering projects in modern military history. The dredging and building of artificial islands across the disputed Spratly archipelago, transforming submerged reefs into fortified military bases enabling power projection across the entire southern half of the South China Sea.

Nevertheless, Beijing is not the only actor engaged in establishing outposts. In total, seven parties hold overlapping territorial and maritime claims across the area: the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia.   Indeed, while together, the Chinese fortified islands, Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef create an area covering approximately over 1,200 hectares of new land (Newsweek, 2025), Vietnam alone had created more than 931 hectares of artificial land, expanding all 21 of its occupied territories. However what sets China's construction apart, is the military grade building: full-length military airstrips, radar arrays, hardened missile batteries, and deep-water naval berths capable of hosting the PLA Navy's largest ships, forming the core foundation on which Chinaโ€™s A2/AD architecture in the South China Sea will rest.

China's Maritime Forces

As outlined, two complementary or competing theories frame our analysis: Mahan's emphasis on decisive naval power and sea control, and Corbett's focus on sea denial. China's approach to control in the South China Sea may be conceptualised in three stages. The first is illustrated by the People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM), which operate in the grey zone between peacetime, and helps sustain the narrative of Chinese fishermen having operated these waters for centuries while simultaneously serving as an instrument of Beijing's surveillance. The second involves the Coast Guard, deployed as a police force signaling a de facto Chinese sovereignty (since police service can, by definition, only operate within national jurisdiction). Both are related to the civilian world and peace time. The third is the PLAN, serving a dual function: providing a deterrent shield for Coast Guard operations, and forming the outer layer of the A2/AD architectureย (Nicchiarelli, 2023), on which we will focus.ย 

The Peopleโ€™s Liberation Army Navy

The PLAN has undergone the most rapid naval expansion in peacetime history. Nevertheless, while China's navy is by far the largest of any country (table 2), surpassing the US Navy in sheer numbers of ships, in terms of tonnage the US Navy is still the number one (table 3).

What these figures reveal are two distinct naval strategies. The US Navy has fewer and older hulls, but considerably larger and heavier, and a fleet architecture deeply rooted in Mahanian doctrine, built to be able to sustain its presence across multiple oceanic theatres simultaneously, in theory. China's navy, by contrast, is more numerous and markedly newer, a direct consequence of the PLAN's relatively recent and still-ongoing transformation from a coastal defense force into a blue-water navy as shown in tables 2 and 3. As it stands, the fleet is designed primarily for regional sea denial and luring to a power projection within the First and Second Island Chains, and later on, for the protection of China's extended maritime interests along the String of Pearls stretching from the South China Sea through the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf. 

Chinaโ€™s Industrial Advantage

However, these figures also reveal a deeper concern about the US ability to sustain an active combat presence across multiple theaters. The defense industry does not currently appear able to build ships and produce the weapons systems needed to arm them fast enough to absorb the cost of several simultaneous battlefields. Indeed, the ongoing war against Iran has provided a clear illustration of this industrial and logistical challenge. To sustain Epic Fury, the Pentagon has diverted munitions to the Middle East from bases in Asia and Europe. This situation created a sense of frustration from regional allies whose stockpiles were drawn down, leaving them less able to sustain military operations if required. And it also raised concern about the US ability to maintain its defense commitments and the capacity of its defense industry to meet operational and contractual demands simultaneously (Dennis and Gettinger, 2026). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that recently, the U.S. Air Force developed the Rusty Dagger cruise missile (AGM-188A) in record time. AEDC built and tested a scale model in under three days, delivering results in 67 hours. The overall program went from contract to live-fire testing in under 16 months, versus the decade such efforts normally take. This shows that full U.S. commitment can produce rapid, unexpected breakthroughs.

Concerning naval assets, according to the US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Chinese shipyards possess the capacity to produce approximately 23,250,000 tons, compared with less than 100,000 tons for the United States (The War Zone) per year. To highlight this situation, in 2024, the Shanghai-based China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC), built more commercial vessels by tonnage than the entire US shipbuilding industry has produced since World War II.

Interestingly, while the Western narrative regarding the gap in shipbuilding between China and the US is portrayed as alarming, from a Chinese perspective it is the opposite. This gap represents a catch-up, thus, the military-civilian integration ensuring that Beijing will not need to rely again on foreign powers for its defense. It should be noted that the Trump administration has also asked civilian companies to contribute to the manufacturing of military equipment (Fox Business, 2026), to ramp up the production of military equipment.

But the conflicts in Ukraine and, more recently, the Persian Gulf have brought a new reality into sharp focus. The growing prevalence of asymmetric warfare with the large use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), changing the balance of forces and the way combat is fought. Thus, what about a similar production capacity but for the drones, and more specifically to less visible but equally consequential systems, unmanned surface and underwater vehicles (USV & UUV), which may also quietly rewrite the rules of naval warfare.

The Shift Toward Maritime Drones

Since the 1950s, starting with the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) a network of acoustic sensors designed to detect Soviet submarines, Washington has progressively expanded its monitoring capabilities around China's surrounding seas with fixed and mobile seabed sensors, surface surveillance vessels, anti-submarine aircraft, maritime drones and low-Earth-orbit reconnaissance satellites, creating an intelligence network aimed at tracking Chinese naval activities (Martinson, 2025).

But Beijing only really started to improve the PLAN capabilities after the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, when China conducted missile tests and military exercises near Taiwan due to the Taiwan's president, Lee Teng-hui visit to the United States.  In response the US deployed two carrier battle groups, centered on the aircraft carriers USS Nimitz (CVN-68) and USS Independence (CV-62), near Taiwan. The conclusion for China was that it could not prevent U.S. naval forces from entering what it considers its area, due to its weak coastal navy and lack of surveillance systems to monitor the region. Thus the idea to make an U.S. intervention near China prohibitively costly (Ding, 2003), if the PLAN could not match the US NAVY.

The first improvement was done by purchasing Russian military assets. In the 2000s China started to develop its own military industry which led in the 2010s to the emergence of a blue-water navy. At the same time, in 2014 Professor Wu Lixin launched the โ€œTransparent Oceanโ€ Program. It implied a four-layer network composed by satellites, USVs, UUVs and a seabed sensor network and was presented as a civilian project aiming to make the marine environment observable in near real time from the surface down to the deep sea.

While the presented goals were to improve ocean forecasting, climatology, and study of marine resources, its military advantage is undeniable as it allows to generate highly detailed data on temperature, salinity, currents, acoustic properties, and seabed topography, critical information in undersea warfare. Even more valuable when the data coverage extends from the South China Sea, to the western Pacific, near Guam, the east of the Philippines, some parts of the Indian Ocean, around the approaches to the Strait of Malacca, and more recently into selected Arctic areas (McKenzie, 2026). So, in many aspects, the Transparent Ocean program can be regarded as the twenty-first century equivalent of the U.S. SOSUS network, combining undersea surveillance with modern digital technologies. In clear, Beijing is again trying to equalise the situation with the US.

The backbone of this โ€œSubmarine Great Wallโ€ consists of 64 oceanographic research vessels, and its centerpiece is the Zhu Hai Yun, a dedicated mothership that can deploy and control more than 50 unmanned platforms, including aerial drones, autonomous surface vessels, and underwater gliders (Smith, 2026). The development of Chinese Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) can be considered as a response to the extensive U.S. maritime surveillance architecture in the region, therefore the modern embodiment of Corbettโ€™s Sea Denial theory. They are low cost compared with missiles, submarines and ships, and operating in swarms they are capable of saturating a maritime area such as a strait or a littoral without risking the life of military personnel. And, by the way, underwater they are difficult to detect. Reason why maritime drones appear in different sizes and with diverse capabilities, from small ones to submarine size (Pic 6).

ไธญๅ›ฝๆ–ฐ้—ป็คพ, CC BY 4.0 via Wikimedia Commons

One tactic commonly linked to drone warfare is the swarm attack. The main idea rests on an inversion of the cost of maritime defence. By saturating the defender's defences with cheap mass-produced platforms, the attacker imposes a structurally losing exchange. High-value interceptors expended against low-value targets, until the ammunition is depleted, forcing withdrawal or de-escalation. The asymmetry is economic and logistical, and it operates regardless of whether the engagement is won. This scheme theorised as the ยซinterceptor trapยป by Rudraksh Pathak, was illustrated with Iran at the regional scale. The South China Sea could see the same logic being reproduced, and prove, once again, that generals are always fighting the last war, as the US is also investing in USV swarms, by deploying thousands of them in the Indo-Pacific Asia Times.

Quantitative comparison between China and the United States

At first glance, the balance of naval drone power seems to favor the U.S., though only marginally. In 2023, the US Navy and Coast Guard deployed more than 80 USVs for surveillance and reconnaissance missions, while China deployed over 150 for coastal and riverine surveillance (Future Market Insights). These figures should be read with caution, however, as they make no distinction between combat platforms, ISR assets and scientific research vessels. 

The picture becomes clearer when we look at what each side has announced for the years ahead. On paper, the advantage shifts decisively toward Washington. During the Sea-Air-Space Symposium in 2026, Captain Garrett Miller, commander of Surface Development Group One, projected more than 30 medium unmanned surface vessels and thousands of small USVs in the Indo-Pacific by 2030, based on requirements looking out to 2045 (USNI News, 2026). The May 2026 shipbuilding plan backs this up with concrete numbers: 47 MUSVs are planned, alongside the Orca XLUUV program, funded at $135.8 million in FY2027 for two vehicles and roughly $1.13 billion across the Future Years Defense Program for a total of 16 vehicles by FY2031 (The Defense News, 2026). No equivalent Chinese program has been disclosed at this level of detail,

Yet, the question is who can actually build at scale?  Morgan Stanley estimated in November 2025 that China's drone production capacity is a significant multiple of America's, a gap that prompted Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll to announce plans to purchase at least one million drones within two to three years, up from roughly 50,000 units today (Investing.com ). It appears that China can produce an estimated 500,000 drones per month, compared with 8,000 to 10,000 for Taiwan and a Ukrainian target of 4 million per year (Global Taiwan Institute, 2025). China also counts more than 90 component manufacturers, controls around 80 percent of the global supply chain and holds over 70 percent of the world market. Even in the USV segment, where Turkey currently leads and the United States is set to nearly triple its investment from $176 million to $469.3 million by 2034 (Campbell, 2024), industrial depth remains the decisive variable. In short, Washington holds the technological race, but Beijing holds the industrial one. 

The escape routes: China's merchant marine under blockade

Before concluding, let us reverse the perspective. This article has examined China as the architect of sea denial; but what happens when the People's Republic finds itself on the receiving end, with the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea closed to its merchant fleet, as the Trump administration did in response to Iran's closure of the strait. History, for once, offers a direct answer, because China has already lived through exactly this scenario, and for thirty years.

Indeed, from 1949 to 1979, the Republic of China (ROC) enforced the Guanbi ('closure') policy, a de facto naval blockade of Communist-held ports designed to disrupt trade and logistics to the newly established PRC. ROC naval forces patrolled and intercepted ships in the Taiwan Strait and adjacent waters, stopping or detaining numerous foreign merchant vessels, including British, Polish and Soviet ships, (Guanbi policy). The blockade was only formally lifted on 12 September 1979, in the wake of the US-PRC normalization. For three decades, therefore, traffic bound for the mainland had to sail around Taiwan. While not often remembered, it adds one more layer alongside the Century of Humiliation discussed in section III, in the institutional memory that drives today's naval build-up.

Nevertheless, the stakes of a modern closure of the Taiwan strait are of a different magnitude. Nearly 1.4 trillion dollars of Chinese trade transits through it each year; in 2024, about 33 percent of China's imports and 16 percent of its exports passed through it, against 21 and 14 percent respectively for the Strait of Malacca (CSIS ChinaPower). The CSIS concludes that Beijing faces less a 'Malacca dilemma' than a 'Taiwan Strait dilemma': a conflict that closes the strait would hurt China's economy even more than a disruption of Malacca (Prรฉtat et al., 2026). So what are the options for the Chinese merchant marine? Three escape routes exist, and each of them, as we shall see, reproduces the very problem it is supposed to solve (map 4).

The first is the eastern detour. If the strait is impassable, vessels can route through the Luzon Strait and sail east of Taiwan. This is not theoretical: during the August 2022 exercises that followed Nancy Pelosi's visit, traffic in the strait collapsed from roughly 250 ships a day to 15-20, and shipping was rerouted around the eastern side of the island at the cost of about three days' delay (TIME, 2022). But the detour has two weaknesses: the route east of Taiwan is exposed to cyclones (Uren, 2022), and above all, ships forced through the Luzon or Miyako straits become vulnerable to a distant blockade by US and Japanese forces, the very scenario that has haunted Chinese planners since Hu Jintao's 'Malacca dilemma' speech of 2003.

The second is the Indonesian archipelago. Should Malacca itself be closed, tankers can reroute through the Sunda Strait, whose shallow draft excludes the largest vessels, then through the Lombok and Makassar straits, and, in the worst case, around Australia and up the eastern side of the Philippines, adding days or weeks of sailing and billions in extra costs (CSIS, 2026). Shifting cargo overland is hardly better: moving goods by road from Guangzhou to Tianjin costs about three times the sea freight. Every southern alternative, in short, remains within reach of the US Navy.

Map 4: created map of China's rerouting options around the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea chokepoints.

The third escape route runs over the Artic Ocean (map 5). Under the banner of the 'Polar Silk Road', the Arctic extension of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has been turning the Northern Sea Route (NSR) along Russia's Arctic coast into a usable, if seasonal, component of its logistics. A Dalian-Rotterdam voyage takes around 33 days via the NSR against 48 via Suez (The Diplomat, 2023), and it bypasses every single chokepoint the US Navy could hold, from Malacca to Bab el-Mandeb. In late 2025 the container ship Istanbul Bridge inaugurated the first 'China-Europe Arctic Express' liner service (CNN, 2025), and the 2025 season saw 103 transit voyages along the corridor, up from 97 in 2024 (Corporate Knights, 2026).

Yet the Arctic option comes with its own toll booth. The NSR is seasonal, dangerous and thinly covered by search-and-rescue; more importantly, it is administered by Russia through a permit regime, with mandatory pilotage and icebreaker escort, the fees being collected by a subsidiary of Rosatom (Corporate Knights, 2026). Plus, the route is a legal and financial chokepoint as much as a physical one: after 2022, COSCO all but suspended its NSR operations for fear of secondary sanctions linked to the war in Ukraine (The Arctic Institute, 2026). In other words, by going north China does not escape the chokepoint problem, it merely exchanges a vulnerability to the US Navy for a dependency on Moscow (Eurasia Review, 2026).

Map 5: created map of the Northern Sea Route compared with the Suez route.

Conclusion

It appears that the nation building the world's most sophisticated sea-denial arsenal is also the one whose trade is most exposed to the sea denial of others. Its three escape routes lead, respectively, into a US-Japanese surveillance net, back into the US Navy's operating area, and under a Russian toll booth. Seen from Beijing, the conclusion writes itself: if the chokepoints cannot be escaped, they must be mastered. Hence the artificial islands, the Transparent Ocean, the drone swarms and the 23 million tons of annual shipbuilding capacity, wall of which point to the same strategic imperative. Raleigh's aphorism has simply been updated: whoever controls the chokepoints controls the trade, and whoever controls the trade, in the end, controls the world.