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May 5, 2026 — No Comments

Euro-American Intel Sharing: Trumpโ€™s Second Term Threat

By Elena de Mitri - UK & European Affairs Team

Intelligence cooperation has always been fundamental for allied countries that share similar interests, values, and objectives in order to rationalise resources and expertise. Cooperation is particularly developed among transatlantic allies, including the US and many European countries.ย 

While it tends to be relatively stable, even in the face of disagreements with a partnerโ€™s actions and policies, concerns have recently been raised in many European countries regarding the current Trump administration and the stability of such cooperation, due to the fear that the US government could weaponise and politicise intelligence flows and information shared by the partners in order to achieve political objectives. Among confrontational behaviour by the US administration, European partners are learning how to deal with an increasingly risky relationship.

An increasingly shaky relationship?

Soon after the start of the second Trump presidency in January 2025, European intelligence agencies started voicing concerns about the risk of over-relying on US intelligence. Tariffs and frequent political quarrels havenโ€™t helped either as disagreements with the current administration could endanger transatlantic relationships in an unprecedented way. Transatlantic relations have been under strain since then. The changing tide was particularly represented by the March 2025 suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine. Lasted only for a few days, the suspension was enacted to push Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to engage in diplomatic talks with Russia to reach a peace deal. However, such a move also sent a clear message to US allies: lack of cooperation towards US objectives could have grave consequences, including the weaponisation of intelligence. 

Other developments have strengthened this view. This yearโ€™s Annual Threat Assessment and its dismissal of transatlantic security cooperation, coupled with the unusual appointments of politically aligned individuals as directors of US intelligence agencies, usually reserved for established non-partisan practitioners, has marked a significant change in the countryโ€™s policy towards the war in Ukraine, as both moves were partially reflecting Russian positions on the conflict. More recently, the appointment of General Joshua Rudd, who previously served in the Indo-Pacific Command, as head of the National Security Agency, one of the main intelligence agencies in the US, strengthened this shift towards a stronger focus on China. Finally, purges of established US intelligence officers, due to their involvement in cases perceived as anti-Trump, might ultimately undermine established relations among practitioners from allied countries, as trust heavily relies on personal relationships. 

Intelligence cooperation has always been upheld through subsequent administrations. However, the instability and opaqueness brought about by the second Trump administration has left allies wondering whether they should become more self-sufficient. After theย Signal scandalย in March 2025, the denial of any wrongdoing by involved US officials and the grave breach of operations security rules left allied intelligence services wondering whether sharing sensitive information with US government officials remains feasible as its disclosure couldย compromise sources and operations. Perceptions of unreliability might threaten trust among national intelligence services, which is fundamental to maintaining the current high-level cooperation. As a consequence, many European intelligence agencies showed increased worries that the intelligence they were sharing with the US would either be leaked or, even worse, be shared to non-allied countries without their permission, thus breaking a long-established rule. Some of them, including theย Dutch intelligence agencies, have scaled down intelligence sharing with the US due to concerns that the current administration may politicise intelligence and possibly share sensitive information with Russia, in line with the countryโ€™s repositioning along Russian narratives of the conflict in Ukraine.ย 


Finally, US increasingly assertive and coercive behaviour towards traditionally allied countries has made European intelligence services even more worried about sharing information with the US. As president Trump was publicly talking about annexing Canada, one of his closest advisers was pushing toย remove Canada from the Five Eyes, the most important intelligence-sharing network in the world, in order to pressure the country into becoming the 51st state. While this remained a suggestion, it was reported that US government officials were actively discussing it. On the other hand, after theย US government declared its intention to take control of Greenland, which is part of the Danish Kingdom, due to security concerns in the Arctic, the Danish Defence Intelligence Servicesย categorised the US as a threatย to the country, amid alleged demands from the US government to gather intelligence on Greenland.

The importance of transatlantic intelligence cooperation

Intelligence cooperation has long been fundamental to achieve security objectives, especially as the nature of the current threats has become increasingly transnational. Intelligence agencies face numerous, complex threats and resources are usually too scarce to effectively deal with threats by themselves. As a consequence, cooperation among intelligence agencies of countries with similar objectives and values has greatly increased since the Cold War, in order to combine resources and fill expertise gaps. This is especially important nowadays, as current threats are increasingly ambiguous, murky and well-concealed. Cooperation is quite consistent in areas such as terrorism and transnational crime, in which reaching shared goals is relatively easier. 

Continued cooperation relies on and reinforces aย shared worldview and perception of current threats. It is no surprise then that US and European intelligence agencies have developed a strong relationship in this field. The US has currently various levels of partnerships with European countries, dating back to the Second World War. While some countries are considered privileged partners, other are "less important" so information sharing with them is more limited. However, they remain critical partners for the US due to theirย easier access and specific expertise, including linguistic expertise. Moreover, multilateral forms of cooperation with other European partners happen in the context of specific alliances, such as NATO, or informal organizations.ย 

Even when transatlantic allies were involved in disputes and fights about each othersโ€™ foreign policy and trade policies, intelligence sharing was upheld. As a matter of fact, when European countries disagreed with US military actions during the War on Terror, they would still provide important intelligence to help the US government achieve its objectives. This continued cooperation has highlighted how strong relations and shared interests, including especially the fight against terrorism, allowed intelligence agencies to overcome political disagreements. However, the behaviour of the current US administration has been threatening these relationships in an unprecedented way. This has brought European countries to discuss the possibility of reducing their cooperation with the US, in order to protect their national interests.

Prospects for a more independent Europe

Replacing the US intelligence contribution is not an easy task. While European countries have advanced tools and capabilities, they lack the scale and coordination role that the US possesses. Such scale allows US intelligence agencies to provide more timely and higher quality assessments, as they can benefit from the use of big data techniques and artificial intelligence. As a consequence, if the US was to stop or greatly limit intelligence sharing, European countries, along with Ukraine, would have to rely on a lower quantity and quality of information. Indeed, replacing US capabilities would require long term investments in human capabilities and advanced tools. 

President Donald Trump poses for a family photo with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine and European leaders before their multilateral meeting, Monday, August 18, 2025, in the Cross Hall on the State Floor of the White House. (Official White House Photo by Andrea Hanks)

However, it is not an impossible task. In January 2026, it was reported that France was providing a growing amount of technical intelligence to Ukraine, likely referring primarily to satellite imagery. Such intelligence was previously mostly provided by the US, but the March 2025 suspension of intelligence sharing and the subsequent pause in some weapon shipments to Ukraine prompted European countries to take a more prominent role. While intelligence sharing was quickly restored, this suspension amplified already existing worries about the politicisation of intelligence by the US government. Amongst calls to replace resources and capabilities offered by the US and work towards European independence in the security sector, progress tends to be quite slow. A key factor in this struggle is the size and structure of actors in the field. No actor, including the European Union, possesses the same financial resources and in-house capabilities as the US, the latter requiring a long time to be developed. 

At the same time, the Trump administration is also seeking to reduce its involvement in the continent and has openly taken a more hostile approach to its European allies. As a consequence, European intelligence services are expanding cooperation among them, with important steps taken at the EU level. As prominent officials from European intelligence agencies have started giving more importance to EU-wide agencies and the number of intelligence officials embedded in representation offices in Brussels has grown, internal pushes to develop autonomous capabilities have been growing, although emphasising the importance of maintaining cooperation with the US. Some are instead calling for the creation of an intelligence cooperation agency dedicated to the European Union to make better use of intelligence provided by member states. However, such an agency would have to overcome numerous challenges, including the voluntary nature of intelligence sharing in the European block, which leaves critical information in the hands of member states that have repeatedly been wary of sharing too much. Moreover, some European countries are widely considered untrustworthy due to their ties to third party countries such as Russia and China. As a consequence, cooperation will likely include a limited group of countries that share generally stronger ties, including in security. This is already happening inside NATO, as more and more intelligence is now being shared on a smaller scale rather than with all the member states. Bilaterally, cooperation among key countries, including the UK, France and Germany, has already been strengthened in order to deal with the instability caused by the current US administration. This strengthened cooperation will likely mark an important, and possibly permanent, shift from the critical role that the US attained until now.

Conclusion

Relations among European and US intelligence services have been described recently as generally good, as high ranking officers of European intelligence services have stressed the importance to keep up cooperation with the US. However, evolving and multifaceted tensions between the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean are increasingly affecting transatlantic relations, especially in regard to security. The shift towards the Russian narrative of the conflict in Ukraine and frequent disagreements between European countries and the US have positioned the latter as a riskier alliance for European countries. Such repositioning might impact intelligence sharing, which is considered fundamental in many fields. While some countries are reconsidering their intelligence ties to the US, others have already started scaling down sharing, especially in areas of particular concerns. European intelligence officials have openly stated that cooperation in this field hasnโ€™t stopped and that the US remains an ally, as US intelligence agencies are trying to ease European worries. However, further transatlantic tensions might have an unprecedented impact on security relations.

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April 21, 2026 — No Comments

Narcotrafficking in Latin America: Limits and Future Challenges

By Elisabetta Semeraro and Anna Hasaniย - Crime, Extremism and Terrorism Team

Narcotrafficking represents a persistent transnational threat for security worldwide and affects Latin American countries greatly. Despite decades of anti-drug policies and the proliferation of control instruments, ranging from law enforcement and militarisation to border control and international cooperation, the region continues to experience high levels of trafficking, violence, and criminal diversification. This paradox raises a central analytical problem. States have invested heavily in anti-drug policies, yet their effectiveness remains highly contested. This is especially true given the growing development of hybrid narco-trafficking. This article aims to analyse primarily the anti-drug control measures at regional level in Latin America and theirย lack ofย effectiveness. In this analysis, effectiveness refers to the capacity of anti-drug instruments to reduce trafficking flows. It also includes their ability to disrupt criminal networks and limit the systemic violence associated with drug economies. This definition deliberately moves beyond a narrow focus on drug seizures or arrests, metrics that often reflect enforcement activity rather than structural impact, and encompasses the broader question of whether existing policies are adequate to address the evolving nature of the threat.

Anti-drug instruments

Theย World Drug Report 2025ย from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, referred to data from 2023, shows a sustained increase in cocaine production and trafficking in South America, consolidating long-established routes from the Andean region towards North America and Europe. The data shows geographic diversification and route adaptation. This is particularly visible across the Caribbean region and key maritime corridors.

The report also highlights a connection between trafficking routes and rising levels of violence, especially in strategic transit countries where organised criminal groups compete over territorial control over export routes. The expansion of cocaine markets has increased competition between criminal groups. In some areas, this has led to higher homicide rates. It has also strengthened the role of criminal networks within political and administrative structures.

In parallel to the global drug control architecture led by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Latin America has developed a regional framework aimed at coordinating anti-drug policies. The central institutional actor in this framework is the Organisation of American States (OAS), within which the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) operates as the principal technical and policy body on drug-related issues. Established in 1986,ย CICADย was designed to promote hemispheric cooperation, policy harmonisation, and capacity-building among Member States. It operates through specialised units addressing both demand reduction (through prevention and rehabilitation programmes) and supply reduction, including capacity building for law enforcement across maritime, aerial and emerging threat areas.ย 

At the regional level, Latin America is not lacking institutional instruments. On the contrary, it has a dense network of cooperative mechanisms. These include technical assistance, training programs, maritime interdiction coordination, and intelligence exchange. The persistence of trafficking flows documented by the UNODC data does not stem from a vacuum of governance, but rather from the complex interaction between institutional capacity, political prioritisation, and criminal adaptability with the concerning emergence of new trends in drug trafficking.ย The MEM, for instance, operates as a peer-review mechanism without binding sanctions or enforcement powers: compliance depends entirely on the political will of individual member States rather than on external obligation. As a result, implementation is highly uneven across the region.ย Countries with stronger institutionsย and more stable governance structures tend to engage more substantively with CICAD's recommendations, while States characterised by weaker rule of law, limited institutional capacity, or high levels of corruption within law enforcement agencies apply these instruments selectively or superficially. In contexts where criminal networks have penetrated political and administrative structures, anti-drug policies may be formally adopted but systematically undermined in practice.

Additionally, traditional law enforcement mechanisms, built on the logic of territorial control, physical interdiction, and centralised criminal structures, are meeting their structural limits. Crucially,ย this is not merely a matter of insufficient resources or political will:ย it is a question of conceptual design. The existing anti-drug architecture was constructed to address a problem defined by geography: ports, borders, production zones, transit corridors. As criminal organisations have recognized this enforcement gap, they have not simply adapted their routes; they have begun to migrate toward an entirely different operational dimension, one for which current frameworks offer no adequate response. It is precisely this failure of territorially-bound policies that has created the conditions enabling the digital transformation of drug trafficking.

Building on this structural shift, one of the most significant developments for the future of drug trafficking is theย growing role of digital technologiesย in the distribution and commercialisation of illicit substances. Historically, Latin American criminal organisations relied on territorial control and physical routes; contemporary markets increasingly integrate clearnet online platforms, forums, encrypted messaging applications, and digital payment systems (such as Bitcoin and Monero). This evolution completely reconfigures the territorial dimension: production, payment, and distribution are connected by a digital thread.

An analysis conducted by UNODC e Web-IQ on shipping advertisements for synthetic drugs on darknet marketplaces shows that, in the observed sample (June-July 2021), Mexico appears as the main declared shipping origin (45.51%), followed by Colombia (14.74%) and Brazil (13.46%). These data make clear that the phenomenon is particularly widespread in the geographic area under examination.

What may be even more surprising is the ease with which online trafficking can be accessed. The dark web is no longer the primary trend. Social media platforms, open forums (Reddit and Dread), dating applications (Grindr and Tinder), and Telegram channels are now far more accessible, require minimal technical skills, and involve lower exposure to risk. The use of hashtags and emojis takes on an entirely different function from the one we are accustomed to: they convey messages related to the sale and/or purchase of illicit substances. In this context, images, icons, or symbols that visually reference the product replace conventional textual language, reducing the risk of content removal by platforms.

From an investigative standpoint, this model introduces structural challenges: access to platforms, such as Telegram,  can occur through SIM-hosting services, and users can select a country different from their residence, further complicating geolocation. Even a State with strong control over ports and borders may face a transactional chain that separates communication, payment and delivery. 

While online platforms have modified how sellers and buyers establish contact,ย cryptocurrencies have redefined the financial foundations of contemporary narcotrafficking.ย Recent literatureย highlights how transnational criminal organisations exploit the pseudonymous and decentralised nature of blockchain systems to transfer money rapidly, but mostly, opaquely.

Traditionally, laundering the proceeds of drug trafficking followed the three classic stages of placement, layering, and integration: introducing money into the financial system, stratifying it through complex transactions, and reintegrating it into the legal economy.ย In the digital context, these stages do not disappear but ratherย hybridiseย and compress over time.ย Proceeds derived from drug sales can be converted almost immediately into Bitcoin, Ethereum, or stablecoins, transferred across multiple wallets, fragmented through mixing services or tumblers, and subsequently sent to exchanges located in jurisdictions with weaker controls.

Image by Tima Miroshnichenko, pixels.com

The relevance of this phenomenon in Latin America also emerges clearly from empirical data.ย Between July 2019 and June 2020 the region received significant volumes of cryptocurrencies, with Brazil exceeding 8 billion dollars, followed by Venezuela, Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia, all with flows in the order of billions. In Latin America, this transformation has assumed even greater significance. Mexican cartels, Colombian organisations, and criminal networks active in Brazil or the Andean countries haveย historically built their powerย onย cash management, networks of front men, and strong territorial entrenchment.ย With the integration of cryptocurrencies, value is no longer necessarily stored in physical deposits, real estate, or cover businesses, but in cryptographic keys accessible from anywhere. However,ย the effectiveness of investigative toolsย depends heavily on the level of cooperation, regulatory harmonisation, and the technical capacity of national authorities. In Latin American contexts where investigative resources are limited or where judicial assistance requests take significant time, the temporal window between transaction and possible State intervention narrows dramatically.

Ultimately, digital finance represents the new field of competition between States and criminal organisations.ย It is not merely a matter of repressing individual transactions, but of understanding and dismantling a financial ecosystem that enables criminal groups to operate on a transnational scale. The financial dimension is therefore not an accessory element of online trafficking, but its strategic foundation: it is there that the economic sustainability of criminal networks - and consequently the effectiveness of countermeasures - is determined.

Conclusions

The analysis developed in this article points to a structural tension at the heart of contemporary anti-drug policy in Latin America. On one side, a dense institutional architecture, built around the UN drug control system, CICAD's technical instruments, and bilateral cooperation agreements, provides a formal framework for regional coordination. On the other hand, the persistence and growth of trafficking flows documented by the UNODC's most recent data reveals the limits of this architecture when confronted with criminal organisations that are adaptive, transnational, and increasingly operating beyond territorial logic.

The core weakness, as argued throughout, is not merely one of resources or political commitment, though both remain critical variables. It is fundamentally a problem of design: the existing instruments were built to address a territorially-defined threat, relying on physical interdiction, border control, and supply-side enforcement. Criminal networks have exposed this limitation by shifting to digital infrastructure. They now rely on encrypted platforms, automated distribution systems, and cryptocurrency-based financial flows. These developments dissolve the spatial anchors on which traditional enforcement depends.

This evolution demands a corresponding shift in policy thinking. Effective responses will require not only updated technical capabilities in digital investigation and blockchain analysis, but deeper structural reforms: greater binding commitment among States, reduced tolerance for institutional corruption, and a recognition that anti-drug policy cannot be separated from broader matters of governance, inequality, and State legitimacy. As long as enforcement frameworks remain anchored to a model of territorial control while criminal economies operate across digital and physical dimensions simultaneously, the gap between institutional effort and actual impact will persist, and likely widen.

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April 20, 2026 — No Comments

How the Energy Crisis Impacts Womenโ€™s Safety and Rights

By Maria Makurat - Human Rights and AI, Cyber Team

Introduction

The conflict in the Middle East and the dilemma over the Strait of Hormuz is proving to be a new challenge for the world on both the macro and  micro levels. As energy and gas fuel prices increase, other prices, such as food, pesticides,and supplies, go up as well. This crisis goes beyond certain borders and has both short and  long-lasting effects on several impacts areas at both the economic and social levels. The European Parliamentโ€™s Policy Department for Citizensโ€™ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the FEMM Committee have conducted  an analysis from  a gendered viewpoint when considering the consequences of rising energy prices on costs of living in 2024. This should  also be continuously used to highlight current conflicts and their impact on the safety of women. Rising energy costs are undermining womenโ€™s safety by limiting access to healthcare, humanitarian aid, and essential services. Considering, that one cannot tell for sure how long this conflict will persist and what the long-term effects of the closing of the Strait of Hormuz will entail for the EU and the rest of the World, questions should be asked in order to make possible predictions for the future. Using international relations  theories, whilst considering some new challenging views such as quantum international relations and the debate between positivist and non-positivist approaches will be taken into account when trying to analyse the rapid changing landscape and conflicts that have an impact on the safety of women.

Rising energy costs and possible impacts on women

Since 2019, the world has been experiencing many conflicts, challenges and new hurdles. During 2020, the coronavirus pandemic hit world-wide, causing many institutions to close but also provided vital assistance to women during that time. The pandemic caused a significant increase in domestic violence which has also been called by UN Women โ€œThe Shadow Pandemicโ€. Now, countries face long-term challenges resulting from the pandemic but also climate change policies, economic hurdles due to increased EU spending on defence as well as investment in alternative resources. In Germany, during the last international womenโ€™s day 2025, social help institutions such as โ€œFrauennotrufโ€ have called for a strike in order to raise awareness of how cutting funds for such said institutions can have negative impacts on the safety of women. Already in 2022, the DKG (German Hospital Society) has warned that due to rising energy costs, hospitals face the risk of bankruptcy which can again  have severe consequences for  access to supplies for women in terms of pregnancy and other support.

Women in Germany are increasingly facing a problem: there is not only a general decline in doctors in the regional areas but the number ofย women doctorsย is also descreasing.. Looking at the newย household funding, many cuts will have to be made in both smallerย ย larger cities in Germany. Cities are considering to close certain cultural institutionsย (e.g Berlin wants to save up 130 million euros)ย to save money as well asย closing around 18 emergency rooms in Baden-Wรผrttembergย alone which could impact around 90 000 patients increasing the strain on the social health system. When analysing said issues, diving into the micro and macro level becomes complex but necessary when wanting to find possible explanations and suggestions for further research. The micro level, when leaning more towards feminist theories is vital when wanting to understand the impact specifically on women however, also considering a more realism and constructivism approach is necessary since one also must take the institutions (e.g EU, UN, other country-specific institutions) into account.

Dr. med. Alicia Baier for instance has released a study on how women increasingly face issues when wanting to receive abortion or just medical advice concerning abortion. She writes that for instance in Germany, there is an alarming trend, that due to having less and less doctors available (especially in the outskirts of cities) and Hospitals decreasing their capacities in order to save up costs, women face the danger of not receiving enough medical treatment. Women face the danger of giving birth on their way to the hospital.[1] These developments show that rising energy costs are not only an economic issue, but also a security concern, as they reduce womenโ€™s access to healthcare and essential services. Using international relations methodologies remain essential when wanting to analyse this issue.

What about international relations theories and new strands of thought?

The impact of the conflicts on the safety of women remains complex and should be continuously analysed through an international relations lens whilst also considering new possible ways of researching such as quantum international relations, feminist debate between positivist and non-positivist approaches.

Looking further at the consequences of closing the Strait of Hormuz and the overall energy crisis, one also has to consider the humanitarian aid for women and children such as in Sudan: โ€œHumanitarian supply chains are fragile. When routes close and costs surge, the help we can deliver shrinks โ€“ and the people who need it most are the ones who lose it first.โ€ Again when using a macro viewpoint whilst also considering the micro level, one has to consider the long-term consequences of these crises for the safety of women and children. Could these shortages lead to further local conflicts in Sudan and other areas that need humanitarian aid? Considering, for instance, Sjoberg, gender perspectives are essential to understanding how conflict and economic crises affect security at the individual level. (Sjoberg 2024), one should also consider here the impact of institutions and state behaviour, considering realism and liberalism, when wanting to continuously assess the impact of the energy crisis on the safety of women. 

Photo by Alexander Grey on Unsplash

Looking further, humanitarian aid is strained for instance also for women in Afghanistan: โ€œThe cost of delivering $172,000 worth of nutrition supplies to children and pregnant women in Afghanistan via freight air was $316,000, nearly double the cost of the goods themselves.โ€ Ships are forced to take the long route around Cape of Good Hope which causes delays, more costs and of course rising insecurities. Considering further the micro level, delayed necessities such as also childbirth supplies, maternal care and food in general can increase vulnerability for women and potential unrest as well as conflicts in refugee camps. A feminist approach in analysing the conflict here is essential to understand the impact on a micro level however, also taking the larger scope by including positivist (quantitative data) as well as non-positivist (interviews) methods into account is equally important to find potential solutions and new trains of thought. As Sjoberg also points out that a multimethod is best when tackling international relations issues in relation to womenโ€™s peace and security, one also has to take caution in having clear aims and research questions when analysing certain conflicts.

An interesting new approach in international relations is considered to even implement quantitative ways of thinking when analysing international relations issues such as by Der Derian and Wendt. The theory focuses on the human science arguing that world politics is not fixed but more entangled (especially individuals), uncertain, shaped by observers and that due to a superposition, actors can hold multiple overlapping state identities.[2] Putting emphasis on individuals and the connectivity would also fit with a

 feminist approach due to the micro cantered view. The theory still requires further development to find a clear path of analysis, which is also pointed by the researchers that one grand theory is not strived here, but the development of using more strongly sociological and human science trains of thought in international relations is of importance when wanting to understand the impact of conflicts on the safety and security of women.

Concluding thoughts and openย questions

As can be seen, research has already started taking place to look more specifically at the impact of the energy crisis and overall world crisis (e.g. Iran war) on the safety of women. What one can say for sure at this point is the following: women are specifically impacted by the conflicts and energy crisis such as in receiving aid, maternal supplies and the general cost of living. Using classical international relations theories isessential however, the more strongly emerging human science approach is taking shape when wanting to fully understand how women are impacted. Here one can ask further questions, do we need one grand theory, orshould we continue with a multimethod approach? Does one run the risk of losing sight when using too many trainsof thought or is it indeed necessary to understand the micro individual level? Perhaps one can for the sake of argument  try to develop one grand theory to analyse a specific womenโ€™s security conflict (e.g. energy crisis on women) and see how far one can go.

[1] Dr. med. Alicia Baier, โ€œDas Patriachat im Uterusโ€, Droemer Verlag, 2025, pg 156, 

[2] Der Derian, James, and Alexander Wendt (eds), โ€œQuantum International Relations: A Human Science for World Politicsโ€ (New York, 2022; online edn, Oxford Academic, 23 June 2022), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197568200.001.0001, accessed 31 Mar. 2026. 

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April 13, 2026 — No Comments

Are Russian-Serbian relations more vulnerable now than ever?

By Sorin Dojan - Russia Team

Take a stroll through the streets of Pristina, Kosovo, and at one point you will come across the statue of a smiling Bill Clinton, a stoneโ€™s throw away from a chic boutique named Hillary. 

To many wondering how a presidential couple became the unlikely heroes in a partially recognised country like Kosovo, 1999 might offer a clue. Between March and June that year, a NATO coalition bombed Yugoslavia in response to Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevicโ€™s ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo. 

To Russians, this marked the beginning of a tumultuous relationship with the West. To Serbs, it reminded them of how vulnerable their country was when, after the 1990s Yugoslav wars, they found themselves surrounded by NATO and the European Union (EU), as the two expanded eastwards. Yet both Russia and Serbia found an ally in each other.

Ever since Kosovoโ€™s declaration of independence in 2008, Russia has been Serbiaโ€™s main backer of sovereignty claims over Kosovo. This has proven particularly handy amid rising EU pressure on Belgrade to normalise ties with Pristina as a precondition for accession[1]. And while the Serbian Government remains on track to join the EU[2], this has not stopped the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) from securing another three months of Russian gas imports at the end of March 2026.

Call it โ€˜hedgingโ€™ or the practice of foreign policy balancing between competing forces[3]. Serbia has done so since 2009, when it announced its โ€˜Four Pillarsโ€™ strategy to balance between the West, Russia and China[4] at a time of EU โ€˜enlargement fatigueโ€™[5].

Yet rising tensions nowadays between Serbia, the EU and the US, as well as the formerโ€™s foreign policy inconsistencies, could dash Moscowโ€™s hopes for a sustainable relationship, as Belgrade sticks to its strategic ambitions to join the EU.

Serbia, Russia and the wider geopolitical nexus

Russiaโ€™s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has turned Serbiaโ€™s multi-vector foreign policy into a much more challenging tool to navigate. For once, it led to more criticism from the EU Commission, among other things, over Belgradeโ€™s choice not to impose sanctions on Moscow following the full-scale attack. If, in 2021, the Commission had only 12 references to Russia in its Serbia report, that number rose to 57 in 2022 and 2023, and remained high thereafter[6]. 

Yet a much stronger reply came from Washington. In November 2023, the US State Department targeted multiple individuals and entities over their alleged connection to what it described as Russian influence in the Western Balkans. As recently as September 2025, US officials sanctioned Serbiaโ€™s oil company NIS over its ties to the Kremlinโ€™s energy sector. 

For a small state like Serbia, sanctions translate into significant economic hardship. Belgrade could seek to buy more time by obtaining sanctions waivers from the US (it secured one at the end of March due to the US-Iran war) or by securing contract extensions with the Kremlin, but this would not make its multi-vector policy more sustainable. 

Image generated using AI (DALLยทE)

The EU remains Serbiaโ€™s largest trading partner, accounting for little over 58% of the countryโ€™s total trade in 2024. Yet European patience could be running thin: during a visit to Belgrade, EUโ€™s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, urged the Serbian government to deliver on the reforms critical to accession prospects, adding that there are no โ€˜shortcuts for [EU] membershipโ€™. This includes aligning its foreign policies with the bloc, including those on Russia, with Brussels arguing in its 2022 report that Serbiaโ€™s close ties to Moscow raise questions about its strategic direction.

This is enough of a signal for the Kremlin to understand that Serbiaโ€™s hedging policy is under severe pressure at the moment. Relations between the two countries were already fraught after โ‚ฌ800m of Serbian ammunition ended up in Ukraine through Belgradeโ€™s trading partners between 2022 and 2024, prompting criticism from the Russian foreign intelligence service, the SVR. And overall trade, energy, and defence ties between Moscow and Belgrade have declined in recent years, despite the two continuing to tout their โ€œSlavic brotherhoodโ€ as the underpinning of their relations. China, which is Serbiaโ€™s other significant non-Western partner, was the countryโ€™s second-largest source of foreign direct investment in 2024[7].

If anything, Moscowโ€™s leverage over Belgrade remains mostly in the energy sector and through its membership of the United Nations Security Council, where it can still oppose any Western-led move on Kosovo (although that did not prevent the US and its allies from bombing Yugoslavia in 1999). This will reassure the Kremlin in its relations with Serbia, particularly as Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic clings to power following a year marked by severe student-led anti-corruption protests. For now, the relationship still holds.

[1] Vuk Vuksanovic, Serbiaโ€™s Balancing Act: Between Russia and the West (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2025), 73.

[2] Republic of Serbia, โ€œEuropean Union Remains Serbiaโ€™s Strategic Development Framework,โ€ srbija.gov.rs, January 19, 2026, https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/en/267475/european-union-remains-serbias-strategic-development-framework.php.

[3] Evelyn Goh, โ€œUnderstanding โ€˜Hedgingโ€™ in Asia-Pacific Security,โ€ PacNet 43 (Pacific Forum CSIS, August 31, 2006), https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/pac0643.pdf.

[4] Vuksanovic, Serbiaโ€™s Balancing Act: Between Russia and the West.

[5] Anna Szolucha, โ€œThe EU and Enlargement Fatigue: Why has the European Union not been able to counter enlargement fatigue?โ€, Journal of Contemporary European Research 6, no 1.

[6] European Commission, Serbia 2022 Report (Brussels: European Commission, October 12, 2022); European Commission, Serbia 2023 Report(Brussels: European Commission, 11 November 2023); European Commission, Serbia 2024 Report (Brussels: European Commission, 30 October 2024); European Commission, Serbia 2025 Report (Brussels: European Commission, 4 November 2025).

[7] Filipoviฤ‡, Slobodan, and Katarina Zakiฤ‡, โ€œEconomic Implications of Serbiaโ€™s Multi-Vector Foreign Policy,โ€ The Review of International Affairs 76, no. 1195 (2025): 503โ€“28, https://doi.org/10.18485/iipe_ria.2025.76.1195.6.

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April 7, 2026 — No Comments

Dr Graziella Piga on Womenโ€™s Role in Peacebuilding in Ukraine

ย In this session, Dr Piga discusses womenโ€™s active engagement and influential bottom-up contributions to key components of peacebuilding in the complex context of Ukraine, what a gender-just peace would look like in Ukraine, and the current state of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in Ukraine.

Dr Graziella Piga talks about the role of Ukrainian women in peacebuilding efforts in the context of the war in Ukraine. Dr Piga isย an international expert, researcher and practitioner with over 20 years of experience in gender equality, human rights, and the Women, Peace and Security agenda. She is a Research Fellow at the University of Surrey.ย 

Interviewers: Camilla Braito and Giulia Panfiloย - Russiaย Team

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March 30, 2026 — 1 Comment

Dr Lauren Prather on US Politics Before 2026 Midterms

Dr Lauren Prather talks about the US internal political landscape, ongoing litigation over ballot access and redistricting, as well as debates over federal versus state control of elections and the effect on public trust, institutional legitimacy, and the broader stability of US democracy. Dr Lauren Prather is Associate Professor of Political Science at UC San Diegoโ€™s School of Global Policy and Strategy and co-Director of the Centre for Transparent and Trusted Elections.

In this session, Dr Lauren Prather analyses the complex US political landscape ahead of the 2026 midterms. During the interview, Dr Prather investigates peopleโ€™s sentiments regarding the SAVE America Act and its impact on individuals who may not have access to proof of citizenship. She also addresses the possibility of President Trump postponing or influencing the election to keep control over the representative institutions and the effect of the current US-Israeli operations in Iran, claiming that if the USโ€™s active involvement decreases or ceases, it will have no impact on the midterms.

Interviewers:ย Federico Sergio and Anurag Mishra - US Team

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March 17, 2026 — No Comments

SDG 5 at Risk: The Global Backlash Against Gender Equality

By Sofia Sutera - Human Rights Team

Gender equality has long been considered one of the central pillars of the international human rights system. Throughย Sustainable Development Goal 5, the United Nations committed the global community to achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls by 2030.

Yet today the challenge appears increasingly different from what many policymakers envisioned a decade ago. Rather than focusing primarily on how to accelerate progress, governments, researchers, and human rights advocates are increasingly confronted with another question: how to respond to what many observers describe as a growing global backlash against gender equality.

Across multiple regions, the rise of anti-gender mobilisations and the diffusion of narratives portraying gender equality as a threat to social order are reshaping public debates. These developments raise serious concerns about the future of SDG 5. If these dynamics continue, progress toward gender equality may slow significantly, potentially making it more difficult to achieve the SDG 5 targets by the 2030 deadline.

From a human rights perspective, this shift is particularly alarming. Gender equality is not simply a policy objective. It is a fundamental component of the international human rights framework, embedded in instruments such asย theย Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)ย and recognised as essential for the protection of dignity, equality, and democratic participation.

Gender Equality as a Contested Concept

A key factor contributing to the current backlash is the transformation of the concept of โ€œgenderโ€ itself. Originally developed as an analytical category in social sciences to understand how power relations shape expectations and opportunities for women and men, the term has increasingly been reframed as a controversial ideological project.

In many political discourses, โ€œgenderโ€ is portrayed as a concept that critics argue threatens the family, cultural traditions, or national identity. Rather than engaging with concrete questions of equality, anti-gender actors frequently frame gender-related policies as part of a broader ideological agenda imposed by international institutions, academic communities, or progressive elites.

This discursive strategy has proven remarkably effective. By framing gender equality as a broader cultural conflict, this narrative can shift public debate away from structural inequalities and toward concerns about social transformation. Discussions about wage gaps, political representation, reproductive rights, or gender-based violence are replaced by narratives centred on protecting children, defending traditions, or resisting external influence, as discussed in the work ofย Judith Butler.

Scholars have described this dynamic as the construction of gender as a โ€œsymbolic glueโ€ capable of uniting diverse actors across religious, political, and nationalist movements. As highlighted in the volumeย Gender as Symbolic Glue, anti-gender narratives allow otherwise heterogeneous groups to mobilise around a shared sense of cultural threat.

Anti-gender Mobilisations in Europe

Europe has become one of the most visible arenas where these dynamics unfold. Over the past two decades, anti-gender campaigns have increasingly moved from religious discourse into broader political mobilisation.

These movements often present themselves as spontaneous civic initiatives defending families or parental rights. Research suggests that these movements often operate through networks linking religious organisations, civil society groups, and political actors. In several cases, mobilisations initially framed as grassroots initiatives have later been integrated into broader populist or nationalist political agendas.

Italy offers a particularly revealing example. Large-scale mobilisations such as theย Family Day protestsย have demonstrated the ability of anti-gender actors to influence public debates and shape legislative processes. Campaigns opposing civil unions, gender equality education, or anti-discrimination laws have mobilised broad segments of society by framing gender equality policies as threats to cultural identity.

Research on these developments, including the work ofย Massimo Prearo, highlights how these mobilisations have contributed to a broader reconfiguration of political Catholicism and its interaction with right wing populist actors. In this context, gender equality becomes a central battleground in struggles over national identity, morality, and political authority.

Photo byย Peaย onย Unsplash.

Global Circulation of Anti-gender Narratives

Importantly, these dynamics are not confined to Europe. Anti-gender narratives circulate transnationally, adapting to local contexts while maintaining remarkably similar rhetorical structures.

Recent research on information environments and political narratives highlights how gender equality debates can be strategically framed within geopolitical and ideological struggles. As discussed in the ITSS Verona articleย Civil Resistance in the Digital Age: Gender Narratives and Information Integrity, different political contexts show how equality discourses are manipulated for political purposes.

In Turkey, for instance, state institutions have been observed invoking equality discourse while simultaneously reinforcing womenโ€™s traditional roles within society. In parts of Eastern Europe, particularly Russia and Poland, political narratives centred on โ€œfamily valuesโ€ promote motherhood as a national duty while marginalising LGBTQ+ activism. In these cases, womenโ€™s rights are often invoked selectively, gaining support only when they align with patriarchal and anti-Western narratives.

This selective use of gender equality illustrates how human rights language can be appropriated and reinterpreted in ways that may weaken its intended emancipatory goals.

The Significance of the United States

Recent developments in the United States further illustrate the global relevance of these dynamics. Political debates around gender and sexuality have become increasingly polarised, with some actors framing gender equality initiatives as ideological threats rather than democratic commitments.

The 2022 decision ofย theย United States Supreme Court in Dobbs vs. Jackson Womenโ€™s Health Organization, which overturned federal protections for abortion rights, represents a significant turning point. For decades, access to reproductive healthcare had been widely considered an essential element of womenโ€™s autonomy and equality.

The rollback of these protections demonstrates how quickly established rights can be challenged and reconfigured within changing political environments.

Given the global influence of political debates in the United States, these developments have repercussions far beyond national borders. Narratives emerging in the United States political arena often circulate internationally, reinforcing existing backlash movements and shaping policy discussions elsewhere.

Defending Gender Equality as a Human Rights Imperative

These developments point to a fundamental shift in the politics of gender equality. For many years, international institutions focused primarily on promoting womenโ€™s empowerment and expanding rights protections. Today, the challenge increasingly includes responding to organised political opposition to gender equality initiatives.

This shift has direct implications for the future of SDG 5. Achieving gender equality by 2030 requires not only policies designed to reduce discrimination and empower women, but also strategies capable of addressing the narratives and political forces that seek to delegitimise equality itself.

From a human rights perspective, defending gender equality means reaffirming that equality is not an ideological preference but a core democratic principle. Without gender equality, the broader system of human rights protection cannot function effectively.

With less than five years remaining before the 2030 deadline, the urgency of this challenge is clear. If the international community is serious about achieving SDG 5, it must recognise that many scholars argue that gender equality norms are currently experiencing one of the most significant global backlashes in decades.

The success of the Sustainable Development Agenda may therefore depend not only on promoting new policies, but also on defending the fundamental human rights principles on which gender equality is built.

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March 11, 2026 — No Comments

AI, ICT infrastructures, and social media in today’s conflicts

By Giulia Saccone - AI, Cyberspace and Space Team

Introduction

The XXI century seems to be characterised by a redefinition of the international security scenario. Warfare is no exception. In this decade, the rapid evolution in the cybersphere, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and disinformation techniques has led a wide range of experts to gradually focus on the impact of these technologies on human decision-making. This has led to the emergence of a new concept: cognitive warfare.

While there is no univocal definition of it, the one provided by NATO's Allied Command Transformation (ACT), under the input of the Science and Technology Organisation (STO) in 2024 is as follows:

โ€œCognitive Warfare integrates cyber, information, psychological, and social engineering capabilities. These activities, conducted in synchronisation with other Instruments of Power, can affect attitudes and behavior by influencing, protecting, or disrupting individual and group cognition to gain advantage over an adversary.โ€

According to the 2025 Chief Scientist Research Report, we can classify cognitive warfare as a standalone grey-zone, military and social issue. In this type of conflict, technology is the catalyst for its reach and effectiveness, and is also part of the solution to counteract cognitive campaigns, along with further understanding of the threat actors, information environment, and social implications of the phenomenon. This definition served as a notable input for further studies, but especially as legitimisation of this new warfare domain, allowing the development of a corresponding doctrine, and shifting the focus of psychological operations from the content to its effects.

In understanding cognitive warfare, we must point out the differences with its sibling: information warfare. Information warfareย focuses on controllingย disinformation and misinformation flows in their various forms, taking advantage of technologies without changing the nature of war. On the contrary, cognitive warfare aims at eliciting a psychological reaction, leveraging both technologies and neuroscience, involving information and activities that can take place online and offline.1 The different focus avoids a misinterpretation of cognitive warfare as โ€œa rebrand of an old conceptโ€, helping us to understand how technology is exploited.

How Cognitive Warfare is conducted

To evoke precise reactions, cognitive warfare triggers pathways that manage cognitive load, such as cognitive biases and heuristics (i.e., predicting outcomes by interpreting data inductively or through analogies), as well as emotional responses2. Taking into account the OODA loop (observe-orient-decide-act), cognitive warfare techniques affect the orientation step: the moment when information is filtered, analysed, and interpreted through prior experiences, analytical and synthetic strategies, and cultural features.

To achieve this, antagonistic actors expose targets to vivid, repetitive, and biased information, distorting heuristic reasoning, especially during uncertain times, causing people to misjudge the likelihood of events based on superficial similarities, neglect objective facts, and make anxious or irrational decisions3. These effects are exacerbated by the anchoring bias: the first-hand exposure to a variable that will condition all the subsequent evaluations.

This bias might appear similar to the priming effect, which has a different outcome. It consists of exposing an individual to the association between a subject and a certain set of characteristics, which, through association mechanisms, profoundly shapes the perception of the subject. This mechanism is effective in manipulating public opinion, since the repeated exposure to the association between a characteristic and a subject leads to an overreaction of the general public against the alleged antagonist, even when the subject does not clearly present that attribute4.

The diffusion of false narratives can also impact the confirmation bias: our tendency to privilege information that confirms our initial beliefs. This is particularly useful in radicalisation processes, which elicit an emotive response on the subject and deepen cognitive divides among groups, eroding social cohesion, which can then be exploited by malign actors against institutions5.

The event that marked the beginning of the exploitation of cognitive warfare, and well exemplifies its functioning, is the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, where Russian forces instrumentalised historical facts, legal ambiguities and exacerbation of political divide through the support of the Russian minority, which was leveraged to erode social cohesion, undermining institutions and confusing public international opinion on the interpretation of the events6. While Russiaโ€™s information campaigns are among the most studied examples, cognitive influence operations are conducted by a wide range of state and non-state actors.


Technological enablers of cognitive warfare: AI, ICT infrastructures and cyberattacks to undermine trust

The shift from hybrid to cognitive warfare is enabled by the rising centrality of the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) infrastructures in social processes, and the advent of AI-powered data mining, algorithmic profiling, and deepfakes. In cognitive warfare, ICT infrastructures are deployed as a vector for infodemic campaigns, taking advantage of the rising use of social media as the main source of information.

A fundamental characteristic of ICT infrastructures is the speed and variety of news diffusion. This creates an infodemic environment that gradually weakens cognitive processes through information overload, creating uncertainty and consequential regression to heuristic reasoning ruled by biases. Fake news proliferates on social media, thanks to their algorithm-friendly design, which allows them to be omnipresent and function as an anchoring bias for distorted facts and narratives, molding the perception of the individual who is constantly driven to this cognitive-overloading environment7. Algorithms also help social polarisation and ideological manipulation: a recent study on the algorithm of X has demonstrated that its algorithmsย boost the engagement of inflammatory posts, expanding the role of social networks from enablers of cognitive warfare to active players8.

Anonymity also plays a role in cognitive load due to the time-consuming practice of verification of facts that increases the cognitive cost-to-scale and hence gets avoided by users9. Another effectiveย instrument is the use of social media influencers, thanks to their friendliness, relatability, interaction frequency, and capacity to create parasocial relations similar to friendships10, along with their capacity to convey emotion-driven, yet credible messages, they can become enablers of confirmation bias and tools of cognitive warfare, as in the case of Russian interference with Romanian elections in 2024.

The outreach of malicious influencers and the pervasiveness of bots and troll farms are maximised by the increasing sophistication of AI-based content,11 which is rapidly and progressively blurring the distinction between real and AI-generated content and profiles. Bots and troll farms were among the first applications of AI for cognitive warfare, which, thanks to their characteristic inflammatory language employed directly towards users, are optimal tools for controlling the narrative. They are often employed during geopolitical events to control the narrative and influence public support for electoral outcomes, consultative democratic processes, direct democracy, policy decisions, alliances, and traditional media12.

Image by emerson23work on Pixabay

Indeed, AI is a perfect force multiplier of cognitive warfare, enabled by relentless data mining, which enables targeting individuals based on their preferred content13 and personalities at a superhuman speed.
Data are then operationalised to produce information that targets and elicits every individualโ€™s personal bias, and through the cognitive effect of an infodemic environment, impairs effective elaboration of external data, leading us to instinctive reactions14.

The emergence of the metaverse could be the next enhancer of cognitive warfare: further blurring the border between digital and physical reality, it allows the collection of biometric data through wearable devices. Malicious forces can collect them to create a more precise profile of a userโ€™s reaction to certain stimuli and modify the circumstantial scenario in which they are immersed, creating another domain for psychological operations15. However, despite the attention given by the research on cognitive warfare, studies suggest that these predictions are not coherent with the current maturity and diffusion of this technology.16


Conclusions

The article aims to trace how ICT infrastructure, social media and AI operate on our cognitive functions within the context of cognitive warfare, affecting how information is filtered, analysed, and interpreted through prior experiences, analytical and synthetic strategies, and cultural features. The emergence of this new dimension of conflict has caught the attention of scholars from psychological, international relations, war studies, and numerous other fields, with the 2021 NATO definition contributing to the conceptualisation and legitimisation of this phenomenon.

The cognitive domain has increasingly been described as a stand-alone type of warfare that situates itself within the grey-zone spectrum, involving both the military and civil society. It distinguishes itself from information warfare since it aims not only to control information flows but also to manipulate information in order to distort our perception of events. One of the earliest examples is the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea. In this context, as well as in the 2016 American elections, distorted information was disseminated by exploiting the characteristics of ICT infrastructures: anonymity and rapid diffusion, as well as the algorithmic dynamics of social media and the use of troll farms to influence individualsโ€™ perception of reality.

These examples illustrate how digital technologies have enabled the expansion of cognitive warfare, further amplified by data mining and AI-driven personalisation, which are progressively blurring the distinction between authentic and fabricated content.

As digital ecosystems become increasingly central to political and social life, cognitive warfare is likely to become a persistent feature of geopolitical competition. This raises important questions for democratic resilience, including the need for stronger media literacy, improved platform governance, and more effective mechanisms to detect and counter coordinated influence operations.

References:

  1. Hung, Tzu-Chieh, and Tzu-Wei Hung. โ€œHow Chinaโ€™s Cognitive Warfare Works: A Frontline Perspective of Taiwanโ€™s Anti-Disinformation Wars.โ€ย Journal of Global Security Studiesย 7, no. 4 (2022): ogac016.ย https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac016.
    Marsili, Marco. โ€œCognitive Warfare in Historical Perspective: From Cold War Psychological Operations to AI-Driven Information Campaigns.โ€ Preprint, Social Sciences, December 17, 2025.ย https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202512.1596.v1. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  2. Hung and Hung (202) โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  3. Kim, Daeun.ย Psychological Mechanisms of Cognitive Warfareย  on Decision-Making. 27, no. 2 (2025): 249โ€“66. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  4. Ibidem. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  5. Ibidem
    Hung and Hung (2022)
    Deppe, Christoph, and Gary S. Schaal. โ€œCognitive Warfare: A Conceptual Analysis of the NATO ACT Cognitive Warfare Exploratory Concept.โ€ย Frontiers in Big Dataย 7 (November 2024): 1452129.ย https://doi.org/10.3389/fdata.2024.1452129. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  6. Marsili, Marco. โ€œCognitive Warfare in Historical Perspective: From Cold War Psychological Operations to AI-Driven Information Campaigns.โ€ Preprint, Social Sciences, December 17, 2025.ย https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202512.1596.v1.
    ย Danet (2019)
    โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  7. Datta, Pratim, Mark Whitmore, and Joseph K. Nwankpa. โ€œA Perfect Storm: Social Media News, Psychological Biases, and AI.โ€ย Digital Threats: Research and Practiceย 2, no. 2 (2021): 1โ€“21.ย https://doi.org/10.1145/3428157.
    Ferreira, Vinรญcius Marques Da Silva, Carlos Alberto Nunes Cosenza, Alfredo Nazareno Pereira Boente, et al.ย โ€œGUERRA COGNITIVA NAS REDES SOCIAIS: AMEAร‡AS, DESAFIOS E IMPLICAร‡ร•ES PARA A SOCIEDADE.โ€ย ARACรŠย 7, no. 3 (2025): 14287โ€“303.ย https://doi.org/10.56238/arev7n3-240. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  8. Gauthier, Germain, Roland Hodler, Philine Widmer, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. โ€œThe Political Effects of Xโ€™s Feed Algorithm.โ€ย Nature, ahead of print, February 18, 2026.ย https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-026-10098-2. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  9. Datta et al. (2021). โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  10. Kim and Kimย (2022) โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  11. Fenstermacher, Laurie H., David Uzcha, Kathleen G. Larson, Christine A. Vitiello, and Stephen M. Shellman. โ€œNew Perspectives on Cognitive Warfare.โ€ Inย Signal Processing, Sensor/Information Fusion, and Target Recognition XXXII, edited by Lynne L. Grewe, Erik P. Blasch, and Ivan Kadar.ย SPIE, 2023.ย https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2666777.. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  12. Paziuk, Andrii, Dmytro Lande, Elina Shnurko-Tabakova, and Phillip Kingston. โ€œDecoding Manipulative Narratives in Cognitive Warfare: A Case Study of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict.โ€ย Frontiers in Artificial Intelligenceย 8 (September 2025): 1566022.ย https://doi.org/10.3389/frai.2025.1566022.
    Da Silva et al. (2025). โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  13. Marsili 2025
    Fenstermacher, Laurie H., David Uzcha, Kathleen G. Larson, Christine A. Vitiello, and Stephen M. Shellman. โ€œNew Perspectives on Cognitive Warfare.โ€ Inย Signal Processing, Sensor/Information Fusion, and Target Recognition XXXII, edited by Lynne L. Grewe, Erik P. Blasch, and Ivan Kadar. SPIE, 2023.ย https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2666777.. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  14. Merilรคinen, Niina. โ€œArtificial Intelligence as a Tool in Cognitive Warfare on Digital Platforms.โ€ย International Conference on AI Researchย 5, no. 1 (2025): 306โ€“12.ย https://doi.org/10.34190/icair.5.1.4353. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  15. Marsili, Marco. โ€œGuerre ร  La Carte: Cyber, Information, Cognitive Warfare and the Metaverse.โ€ย Applied Cybersecurity & Internet Governanceย 2, no. 1 (2023): 1โ€“11.ย https://doi.org/10.60097/ACIG/162861.
    Fenstermacher et al (2023). โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  16. Liu, Zhiguo, Yan Huang, Junyu Mai, Wei Li, Zhipeng Cai, and Yingshu Li. โ€œIs the Metaverse Really Coming to Fruition? A Survey of Applied Metaverse and Extended Reality.โ€ย High-Confidence Computing, December 2025, 100376.ย https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hcc.2025.100376. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
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March 9, 2026 — No Comments

Of War and Peace in southern Syria

By Marco Malaguzzi - Middle East Team

Introduction

The tumultuous events in northeastern Syria have shifted the mediaโ€™s attention away from the As-Suwayda Governorate in the countryโ€™s south. Nonetheless, the strategic relevance of this area should not be underestimated. As-Suwayda is the only region of Syria where the new administration led by President al-Shara has not yet managed to assert its control. It is adjacent to the Golan Heights and Mount Hermon, key military positions for Israel to defend its northern border. Moreover, the different sectarian and ethnic groups that comprise As-Suwaydaโ€™s population have varying political loyalties. Bedouin clans are aligned with the new Syrian government, while the Druzes share sectarian links with their co-religionaries in Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan. This article presents the events that have taken place in the area since the collapse of Bashar al-Assadโ€™s regime and outlines how various actors are vying for power both locally and internationally.

As-Suwayda Governorate โ€“ mapchart.net

Background 

When rebel troops entered Damascus on the 8th of December 2024, long-time president Bashar al-Assad fled the country. His escape brought the regime that had ruled Syria since 1970 to an inglorious end. Syrians looked at the future with hope, and celebrations took place in many cities. However, the divisions caused by a decade of civil war, intertwined with external interventions, did not disappear with the departure of al-Assad. Syria was fragmented into various fiefdoms controlled by armed groups. Moreover, years of conflict had deepened the sectarian and ethnic divisions that have always characterised the country. Finding a political arrangement that reunified the country once more seemed a far-fetched plan. Al-Shara, leader of the militia that had spearheaded the military operations against the al-Assadโ€™s regime, managed to assert control over Damascus. A former jihadist who had fought against the American occupation of Iraq, al-Shara had risen to the position of leader of an Islamist armed group that controlled the province of Idlib in northern Syria. In January 2025, al-Shara assumed the presidency. In his first address to the country, he highlighted the need to rebuild state institutions and maintain peace, but this spirit did not come to fruition. In March, clashes broke out in Latakia, in the west of Syria, between the new government and supporters of the previous regime. The brutal repression that followed, which indiscriminately targeted the local Alawite community, made it clear that the reunification of Syria will be neither smooth nor bloodless.

The events in As-Suwayda  

In an attempt to prevent similar events from taking place in As-Suwayda, where unidentified individuals were setting up armed ambushes and conducting assassinations, the new Syrian government scrambled to negotiate a deal with local notables. On March 12, a memorandum of understanding was signed by Mustafa Bakour, the governor, and various local stakeholders. According to its text, troops loyal to al-Shara would take over the area, salaries to public employees would come from Damascus, and regular consultations between the central government and local dignitaries would be held. Nonetheless, , Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, one of the spiritual leaders of the Druze population of As-Suwayda, opposed this deal. He denounced the extremist nature of the new government and rejected any compromise with Damascus. On the following day, armed individuals raised the Druze flag on government buildings all over the governorate. They were affiliated with the Suwayda Military Council (SMC), a predominantly Druze militia that formed after the collapse of al-Assadโ€™s regime to prevent a security void. These incidents did not lead to a major escalation. However, they were the beginning of an uneasy, and ultimately short-lived, truce. In April, a blasphemous audio which insulted Prophet Muhammad went viral. It was attributed to Marwan Kiwan, a Druze cleric. He rejected all allegations, but the recording was enough to ignite a vicious cycle of violence. According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, 113 individuals lost their lives during these clashes. External powers also played a role. On the 29th of April, the Druze minority in Israel took to the streets to protest against the sectarian violence against their co-religionaries in Syria. On the following day, the Israeli air force conducted a drone strike in As-Suwayda targeting the Syrian security forces, which were converging on the area. Various parties tried to de-escalate the situation. Walid Jumblatt, the political leader of the Druze minority in Lebanon, contacted his co-religionaries in As-Suwayda and the new Syrian administration in an attempt to find an agreement. SANA, a press agency linked to the government of Damascus, announced a ceasefire had been negotiated between the governor and local notables. Nonetheless, the violence continued unabated. On the 2nd of May, Israel dropped a bomb in the proximity of the presidential palace in Syriaโ€™s capital, warning that it would not allow the government to deploy forces south of Damascus and harm the Druze population of As-Suwayda . Tรผrkiye, the main ally of al-Sharaโ€™s new administration, also got involved. When Israeli planes entered the Syrian airspace on the following night, Turkish fighter jets attempted to jam their communications. After this incident, the situation calmed down because neither Israel nor Tรผrkiye were interested in a military escalation, but one figure, once again, stood out for his opposition to any deal with Damascus: the aforementioned Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri. Distancing himself from the Druze clerics who had negotiated the deal with Damascus, he declared:

โ€œWe no longer trust a group that calls itself a government, because the government doesnโ€™t kill its own people through extremist gangs that are loyal to it, and after the massacre claims they are loose forcesโ€

Despite his uncompromising statements, the situation in As-Suwayda calmed down for a few months. However, on the 11th of July 2025, Bedouin gunmen kidnapped a Druze vegetable seller.  Druze militias reacted by taking hostage several members of As-Suwaydaโ€™s Bedouin clans. Violence spread quickly, and Bedouin fighters, supported by other Bedouin clans from the Daraa Governorate, began attacking Druze villages with heavy weapons. In some instances, they fought against the Syrian security forces that attempted to de-escalate the situation. In other instances, videos show troops loyal to Damascus joining the onslaught against the Druzes. The arrival of foreign fighters loyal to Syriaโ€™s Defence Ministry only exacerbated the fears of the Druze population of As-Suwayda because these units are known for having carried out massacres against religious minorities in Latakia. On the 14th of July, Israel intervened once more, this time by carrying out strikes that destroyed a Syrian Army convoy. On the following day, dozens of Israeli Druze civilians illegally crossed the border with Syria to support their co-religionaries. Moreover, the Israeli air force bombed the Syrian Defence Ministry in Damascus multiple times. Tรผrkiye issued statements in support of Syriaโ€™s sovereignty and unity. Nonetheless, this time it did not deploy fighter jets to defend al-Sharaโ€™s security forces. On the 16th of July, the Syrian army announced its pullout from As-Suwayda. Thousands of Bedouin civilians also began evacuating the region, fearing that the victorious Druze militias would carry out ethnic violence. Since the withdrawal of Syrian troops, As-Suwayda is administered by the Supreme Legal Committee (SLC), a government body โ€“ unsurprisingly โ€“ created under the auspices of Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri. On the 23rd of August 2025, the SLC announced the creation of a National Guard, a new force made up of 40 militias, including the Suwayda Military Council. A joint plan announced by Jordan, the United States and the Syrian government to de-escalate the situation has yielded some results. Bedouin families have begun returning to their homes. Moreover, the Syrian security forces and the Druze militias that control the region of As-Suwayda have conducted a prisoner exchange on the 26th of February 2026. However, the reintegration of As-Suwayda into a unified Syrian state seems a far-fetched dream.

Photo by Ahmed Akacha โ€“ pexels.com

As-Suwayda and the regional context

When the government of Bashar al-Assad was overthrown, two regional players began jousting for power in Syria. As shown by the events outlined above, they were Israel and Tรผrkiye. The former occupied the territories surrounding Mount Hermon and played a very active role in As-Suwayda. The latter positioned itself as the closest ally of the new administration in Damascus. Since the fall of the regime, Tรผrkiye has pledged to provide Syria with gas and electricity. Moreover, the Turkish defence ministry has stipulated a deal with its counterpart in Damascus, committing to provide the new Syrian armed forces with modern weapon systems and training. Lacking the economic muscle of the Gulf monarchies, Tรผrkiye is capitalising on the strength of its defence industry and its energy sector. The recent developments in Syria have given the Turkish government an opportunity to expand its role as a regional security provider and transform Anatolia into a major energy hub. Israelโ€™s ambitions in Syria are of a different nature. The actions undertaken by the government of Benjamin Netanyahu show that its primary concern is to enhance Israelโ€™s security by creating a new buffer zone at its northern border. Moreover, Israel wants to ensure that Syria stays weak by supporting groups such as the National Guard in As-Suwayda and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in the northeast of the country. It mistrusts al-Shara because of his jihadist past and close relationship with Tรผrkiye. Repeated American efforts to negotiate a deal between the new government in Damascus and Israel have not led to an Israeli withdrawal from the Syrian territories it occupies, nor to a Syrian recognition of the Jewish state. Nonetheless, Israelโ€™s shipments of military supplies to the Druzes in As-Suwayda have become smaller and less frequent. The lack of an Israeli reaction to the Syrian military offensive against the Kurds in northeast Syria, which stands in stark contrast to Israelโ€™s air campaign when the government of Damascus deployed troops in As-Suwayda, may show the division of Syria into spheres of influence. The Turkish inaction following Israelโ€™s bombing of the Syrian defence ministry in July also points to a tacit agreement between Ankara and the Jewish state. The south of Syria seems to lie within Israelโ€™s domain. The rest of the country, instead, is controlled by the government of Damascus and its Turkish sponsors. Of course, other regional powers also play a role. The Gulf countries have pledged significant investments to rebuild Syriaโ€™s battered economy. Russia maintains military bases in Latakia, and the United States remains interested in conducting counter-terrorism operations to contain ISIS. Nonetheless, Israel and Tรผrkiye are the most powerful stakeholders in the country at the time of writing. Following the American withdrawal and the downsizing of the Russian military presence caused by the war in Ukraine, Israel and Tรผrkiye are the only countries that maintain a substantial military presence in Syria. How their rivalry plays out will shape the future not only of As-Suwayda but of the whole country.

Photo by Dimitrisvetsikas1969 โ€“ pixabay.com
The local power struggle in As-Suwayda

Regional dynamics are reflected in local power struggles in As-Suwayda, where the frontline remains blurred, and alliances shift quickly. In 2012, Hikmat al-Hijri became one of three Sheikhs of Reason โ€“ the spiritual leaders of the Druze community in Syria โ€“ inheriting the position from his brother, who had died in a suspicious car accident many blamed on al-Assadโ€™s regime. For a while, al-Hijri aligned himself with the regime in Damascus, probably having been intimidated by the death of his brother. However, in 2020, as popular discontent with the worsening economic situation grew, al-Hijri distanced himself from Bashar al-Assad. In the meantime, he had sidelined the other two Sheikhs of Reasons and had moved to Qanawat, a small village in the Druze heartland on the mountains of southern Syria, where it was easier to ensure his personal safety. Thanks to his manoeuvring, when the al-Assad regime fell in 2024, al-Hijri could present himself as the leader of the Druze community. However, there were other leaders who also claimed to speak on behalf of the Druze population. One of them was Laith al-Balous, the son of an influential Druze cleric assassinated by the regime in 2015. After his fatherโ€™s death, al-Balous and his brother founded a militia that clashed with al-Assadโ€™s forces on multiple occasions. Consequently, he has better revolutionary credentials than al-Hijri. When the regime was overthrown, al-Balous immediately aligned himself with the new government of al-Shara in Damascus. As mentioned before, when tensions in As-Suwayda escalated, al-Hijri opposed any compromise. Al-Balous instead was one of the notables who negotiated the aforementioned memorandum of understanding in March. There were two cowboys in town. In May, al-Balous survived a mysterious assassination attempt. Despite his luck, the violence in April and in July made his policies unpopular. Various Druze notables and armed groups distanced themselves from al-Balous, and he was forced to flee from As-Suwayda, where one of his advisors was murdered, and the grave of his father was razed to the ground. Al-Hijri has won the match and is now the undisputed leader of both the National Guard and the Supreme Legal Committee. From his exile, al-Balous has condemned the Israeli intervention in As-Suwayda and plauded Tรผrkiyeโ€™s role in preserving Syriaโ€™s unity. However, Damascusโ€™s man seems to have lost all his influence on the ground. Al-Hijriโ€™s victory was facilitated by his close relationship with Sheikh Mowafaq Tarif, the Druze spiritual leader in Israel. Tarif exercised his considerable influence to convince Israeli Druzes to take to the street in support of al-Hijri. He also lobbied with the Israeli government to convince them to repeatedly intervene in As-Suwayda. Al-Balous instead could not count on direct support from the Druze communities in the surrounding countries, although his efforts to mediate with the government in Damascus paralleled those of the aforementioned Walid Jumblatt, political leader of the Druze minority in Lebanon. Jumblatt has an adversarial relationship with both Mowafaq Tarif. Moreover, he has criticised al-Hijri for his close relationship with Israel. The undeclared alliance between Jumblatt and al-Balous can even count on a historical precedent. In 2015, Jumblatt condemned Druze clerics who supported the regime against al-Balousโ€™s father. Nonetheless, Lebanese Druzes could not provide al-Balous with military support even if they wanted to. Once a mighty warlord, Jumblatt disbanded his militia after the end of the Lebanese Civil War. 

Final considerations

The situation in As-Suwayda has stabilised in recent months. However, the new government in Damascus seems committed to unifying Syria under its control, as shown by its successful offensive against the Kurds in the northeast of the country. Tension in southern Syria may escalate quickly. There was very little warning before the military operations against the Syrian Democratic Forces. There will be very little warning before a government offensive against As-Suwayda. As shown above, the consequences of an escalation in this region will go way beyond its borders. Israel and Tรผrkiye will be drawn in. They may have a tacit agreement on the partition of Syria. However, in the Middle East, no deal lasts forever, and new developments such as the war between Iran, the United States, and Israel can open windows of opportunity. Tรผrkiye and the government of al-Shara have already surprised the world in the past, with the sudden offensive that overthrew Assad in 2024, and will be eager to exploit any opportunity. If al-Hijri, the uncontested winner of the local power struggle, continues to be uncompromising with the government in Damascus, diplomacy may have little space left for manoeuvre. However, his inflexibility should not be taken for granted. Al-Hijri already changed sides in the past, when he stopped supporting the Assad government. If offered the right deal, he may do so again, and the fortunes of As-Suwayda and its inhabitants will change with him. Undoubtedly, Israel will have a say in any decision al-Hijri takes. However, the importance of local dynamics should not be underestimated. The Druze minority in Syria and beyond is not a cohesive unit. Various leaders claim to represent the Druze community, which spans four countries. How their rivalry plays out will shape the future of As-Suwayda at least as much as the competition between Tรผrkiye and Israel. The events outlined in this article show that religious bonds do not deter Druze powerholders from exercising violence against each other. The government of al-Shara could attempt to find new interlocutors in the two Sheikhs of Reasons who had been sidelined by al-Hijri. In any case, for the reunification of Syria to take place, its sectarian groups must find a way to coexist. Only if the new government in Damascus succeeds in negotiating a deal with the different minorities that make up the population can Syria truly turn the page on the Civil War. 

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March 2, 2026 — No Comments

Assessing the Role of the AFRIPOL in Combating Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime

By Ilas Touaziย - Africa Team

Introduction

The growing link between transnational organised crime and terrorism has become a serious threat to human, national, and regional security. In areas such as the Sahel, West Africa, and the Great Lakes, these trends are intensifying humanitarian crises, poverty, and vulnerability, creating a โ€˜crime-terrorism continuumโ€™ that spreads across the black hole spectrum of dynamics linked to state failure and grey zones. Since the creation of the African Union Police Cooperation Mechanism (AFRIPOL), security governance has undergone a process of institutionalisation and operationalisation, actively addressing the complex intersections between transnational terrorism and hybrid organised crime.

Genesis, context, and milestones in the creation of the African Police Cooperation Organisation

In a postmodern and globalised international context, there are close links with terrorist groups and organised crime networks at the national, regional, and transnational levels, through interconnected and destabilising challenges, which create heightened vulnerabilities in several African regions, thus threatening peace and security, exacerbating conflicts and fragility, and undermining development efforts. This is why the African continent has taken steps to establish the link between organised crime and terrorism, reflecting the connection between the concept of regional and global security emphasised in a post-Cold War context characterised by the breakdown of internal and external borders. Terrorist organisations in Africa are involved in organised crime, particularly jihadist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda and Islamic State. Groups such as Jamaโ€™at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen (JNIM), Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab have carried out targeted operations exploiting weak state structures, regional criminal dynamics, and widespread corruption to engage in kidnapping for ransom and drug trafficking. As a result, African countries have been forced to take preventive measures to strengthen national and regional law enforcement and border control capabilities. This led to the creation of the African Police Cooperation Organisation (AFRIPOL), which is considered the new African Union for promoting cooperation against transnational organised crime, terrorism, and cybercrime, and for responding more effectively to the evolving and interconnected security threats facing the continent.

The establishment of AFRIPOL reflects Africa's awareness of the need for a preventive approach to the trans-nationalisation and hybrid nature of security threats linked to terrorism and organised crime, as part of a process that was initially developed at the 22nd Interpol African Regional Conference in 2013 in Oran, followed by the Algiers Declaration in 2014 at the African Conference of Directors and Inspectors General of Police on AFRIPOL. However, at the 23rd African Union Summit held in Equatorial Guinea in 2014, through the Algiers Declaration, the AU adopted โ€˜the common vision shared by police chiefs'. The meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Operationalisation of AFRIPOL played a pivotal role in creating this institutional architecture by reiterating the importance of cooperation, given the changing nature and modus operandi of organised crime and terrorist groups. African efforts continued with the adoption of the African Union's Agenda 2063 in 2015, an action plan aimed at establishing security and peace on the continent by strengthening intra-African cooperation in cybersecurity and border management. Subsequently, the AFRIPOL Statute was adopted in 2017 as a constitutive step in the institutionalisation of the joint African fight against the nexus between crime and terrorism. That is why, at the AU summit in Addis Ababa, working groups were set up to combat cross-border organised crime, cybercrime, terrorism, and violent extremism in all its forms, covering a wide range of complex threats, in particular organised terrorism in conflict zones, foreign terrorist fighters, and radicalised โ€˜lone wolvesโ€™.

AFRIPOL: Objectives, Missions, Legal System, and Organisational architecture 

AFRIPOL's main objectives were clearly defined in its 2017 legislative statute, in Article 3, paragraphs (a) to (g), with regional and international objectives. AFRIPOL aims to establish enhanced police cooperation at the strategic and operational levels by facilitating the prevention of transnational organised crime and terrorism. The creation of AFRIPOL is therefore in line with the AU's efforts to develop continental mechanisms for the sustainable promotion of peace and security. At the same time, AFRIPOL's missions are established under Article 4. They are specifically aimed at strengthening law enforcement agencies across the continent through operations to prevent and combat transnational organised crime, terrorism, and cybercrime. This enables public security agencies in Africa to respond more effectively to the evolving and interconnected security threats facing the continent. Nevertheless, AFRIPOL is specifically the African Union's technical institution responsible for strengthening and harmonising the capabilities of law enforcement agencies, including the framework capacity-building, coordination, and information-sharing missions of national police services.

The legal framework governing AFRIPOL also operates in accordance with the Constitutive Act and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, without interfering with the internal affairs of Member States and with full respect for their national legislation and democratic principles, as well as strict adherence to good governance and police ethics. AFRIPOL is a cooperative and consultative body within the AU's continental framework, designed as a step towards a more centralised transnational police force, partly inspired by the Europol security governance model. The establishment of AFRIPOL in 2015 marks a move away from fragmented, sub-regional forums towards a continent-level hub. AFRIPOL's institutions operate within the framework of exchanges of expertise and best practices, particularly in forensics and criminal analysis and in the use of new technologies and innovative security solutions. Furthermore, the Specialised Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security (CTSDSS) is responsible for providing leadership and guidance on policing issues in Africa. The organisational structure of the African Police Cooperation Organisation comprises main and subsidiary bodies. According to Article 7 of AFRIPOL's basic regulations, the organisational architecture comprises the General Assembly, the Steering Committee, the Secretariat, and the National Liaison Offices. Decision-making procedures are based on consensus; failing which, a two-thirds majority of member states present and entitled to vote shall suffice.

AFRIPOL mechanisms for cooperation in countering organised crime and transnational terrorism

AFRIPOL's cooperation and coordination mechanisms in the fight against crime and terrorism are structured around a triangular axis at the interregional, regional, and international levels. Article 19 of its statutes stipulates that cooperation shall be carried out with member states. With this in mind, AFRIPOL is actively engaged in an integrated partnership process with the African Union and the Peace and Security Council (PSC), and this is also being implemented through enhanced coordination with specialised institutions, namely the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) and the Committee on Intelligence and Security Services (CISSA). AFRIPOL plays a central role in inter-regional integration with African law enforcement bodies, led by regional police organisations such as EAPCCO, WAPCCO, CAPCCO, and SARPCOO, covering the eastern, western, central, and southern parts of the continent. AFRIPOL's sub-regional cooperation activities focus primarily on combating crime, transnational terrorism, money laundering, small arms trafficking, border management, human trafficking, environmental crime, and cybercrime. Operational security coordination is implemented on the ground through annual meetings of the directors of AFRIPOL liaison offices. The security and legal strategy to combat crime and terrorism has focused on operational achievements through the creation of a secret communication system for African police interoperability (AFSECOM) and the development of a system for disseminating research publications aimed at preventing, detecting, and investigating transnational organised crime and terrorism, in coordination with African national liaison offices (NLO) and regional institutions. 

At the international level, AFRIPOL has established a reinforced framework of strategic partnerships to anticipate the security impacts of transnational crime. In doing so, a commitment to multidimensional cooperation has been launched with specialised UN agencies, in particular the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). INTERPOL cooperates closely with African institutions in the fight against corruption, financial crime, fraud, and money laundering, having signed an agreement with the African Development Bank Group. Meanwhile, the INTERPOL Support Programme for AFRIPOL (ISPA) was launched, covering the period from 2020 to 2026, with the primary aim of helping the institution to carry out its functions across the continent. The ISPA programme provides enhanced support for AFRIPOL's governance and bolsters its capacity to combat criminal networks. More importantly, this cooperation has led to technical improvements in information and communication systems and support for AFRIPOL's Criminal Analysis Unit. At the transregional level, AFRIPOL is engaged in enhanced, tailored cooperation with Europol, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX). In addition, AFRIPOL is seeking to institutionalise the operationalisation of the fight against crime and terrorism with regional police organisations, namely ASEANAPOL, AMERIPOL, GCCPOL, and AIMC, with a focus on harmonising strategic planning and common global policing standards. 

Image by Gerd Altmann from Pixabay

Assessing the Role of the AFRIPOL in Countering Organised Criminal Terrorism: Opportunities, Challenges and Shortcomings 

African police cooperation is recognised as a key pillar in promoting regional peace and security through a shared operational front among Member States to combat crime and terrorism, with a focus on enforcing security policies and legal instruments relating to police cooperation and collaboration in Africa. Evidently, AFRIPOL plays a leading role in combating organised crime and transnational terrorism through prevention, detection, investigation, and coordination with national and regional institutions. AFRIPOL also provides technical assistance to its Member States, acting as an intermediary between African police forces and regional institutions, which is seen as an indicator of progress made in improving cooperation and information sharing at all levels. In this regard, partnerships with specialised international institutions, particularly INTERPOL, have made significant advances in combating the growing threat of cybercrime, such as Operation Serengeti 2.0, involving 18 African countries, which led to the arrest of 1,209 cybercriminals, the recovery of $97.4 million, and the dismantling of 11,432 malicious infrastructures. Indeed, the creation of AFRIPOL has been a major step forward in terms of strategic security vigilance and awareness, with a view to developing a harmonised African strategy against organised crime, terrorism, and cybercrime, and strengthening coordination under an operational technical architecture focused on intelligence sharing, harmonisation of methods, joint operations, and common databases and communication systems.

The mechanisms established by AFRIPOL remain inadequate and obsolete to combat hybrid threats at the regional and continental levels in response to the jihadist breakthrough and its unprecedented exploitation of transnational criminal networks, which is placing pressure on the African security apparatus. However, despite some operational advances, many shortcomings remain, particularly the lack of a truly coordinated strategy with consistent and disparate measures and the problems of overlap and duplication of mechanisms to combat organised crime and terrorism in the same theatre of operations. The AFRIPOL institution, on the other hand, faces major challenges, including financial constraints, internal security and state-sovereignty barriers, political interference, and problems related to information technology systems. Systemic contradictions also exist in the functioning of AFRIPOL, which is based on the mechanisms of the African Union, characterised like all pan-African organisations, and reflects the deep contradictions between countries on the continent. Alongside this, there is a certain ambiguity about the nature and limits of the AFRIPOL mechanism, especially in its legal status, which repeatedly emphasises the terms โ€œassistanceโ€ and โ€œfacilitationโ€, thus highlighting the ineffectiveness of governance and the lack of coercive power to compel states to share data or participate in joint operations, leaving security coordination de facto to the sole discretion of the states, unlike other regional police organisations, primarily Europol, which operates within a dense, effective, and legally binding EU governance framework. 

Conclusions

The analysis highlighted the impact of the causal interrelationship between transnational organised crime and terrorism, with the changing nature of hybrid, multidimensional security threats acting as an accelerating factor that has prompted African countries to strengthen their institutional and operational governance capacities in terms of renewed security risk management within the framework of AFRIPOL. Undoubtedly, the establishment of these transregional police cooperation mechanisms has been an important step for African countries in strengthening security coordination, information sharing, capacity building for national police services, and joint cross-border operations, particularly in partnership with international and regional police bodies such as INTERPOL. Despite progress in institutional architecture to address the nexus between terrorism and organised crime in Africa, limitations and constraints remain, particularly when it comes to political conflicts and sovereignty issues, the precarious nature of non-binding legal status, and a glaring lack of financial resources.

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