Russian President Vladimir Putin is no stranger to US intelligence reports of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Two weeks ago, John Ratcliffe, the CIA director, travelled to Moscow to deliver a bleak assessment of the Kremlinโs debacle in Ukraine to Aleksandr Bortnikov, head of Russiaโs FSB, urging him to reach a deal with Kyiv before things spiral out of control, both economically and politically.
It would be naรฏve to assume Bortnikov knows nothing about Russiaโs ailments on the battlefront. According to Russian independent media outlet Mediazona, over 240,000 Russian troops have died since Moscow launched its full-scale invasion over four years ago. These are all confirmed names, with the real figure expected to be higher.
However, if that is the reason behind Ratcliffeโs latest visit to Russia, his warning to Russian officials including Putin would unlikely prompt any changes in behaviour. That is because, for a political system built on conformity and loyalty, truth-seeking is of secondary importance to strategic goals and regime survival.
Military and intelligence preparations before 24 February 2022 illustrate how these assessments alter strategic considerations. Russian intelligence collection before the full-scale invasion had been insufficient to determine Ukraineโs strong will to fight back. One reason for failure stands out: the Kremlinโs preference for its own biases. That is because, in Russia, intelligence collection it seems to be guided by a system that incentivises delivering information aligned with the leaderโs ambitions and discourages contradictory perspectives.1.
Take, for instance, its limited effort to diversify intelligence sources in Ukraine. Instead, Russian intelligence collection efforts depended, for the most part, on Russian-speaking informants, an approach described by several professors from Kingโs College London as โlikely a methodological oversight or just plain lazy for Russian case officers who did not speak Ukrainianโ.2 Or consider the series of FSB-backed polls in Ukraine, shortly before the invasion began, highlighting low trust in Ukrainian political institutions and intelligence services (27% trusted the office of the President of Ukraine, 23% trusted domestic security services) and moderate trust in the Armyโs ability to repel an invasion (51%). However, most poll respondents were located in the south and east of the country, where a significant Russian minority lived3 and had historically been more distrustful of the Ukrainian government.
Russia and the Soviet Union offers several examples of leaders preferring their own assumptions. Joseph Stalin, for instance, refused to listen to intelligence analysts, preferring instead to interpret information on his own. This proved to be a critical miscalculation , since he didnโt believeAdolf Hitler would have invaded his country, despitethe vast buildup of Nazi troops near the German-Soviet border at the time4.
ะฎัะธะน ะ.ะ., CC BY 4.0 , via Wikimedia Commons
Today, however, the obstacle is no longer Putinโs ability to obtain accurate information. It is difficult to imagine that the Russian leadership is still unaware of how four years of war have depleted Moscowโs army and navy of men and military hardware. Instead, it is the regimeโs own struggle for survival that will keep Western engagement at bay. That is because accepting peace on unfavourable terms will puncture the regimeโs image-projection efforts to appear competent in the face of a much smaller neighbour and enemy. Therefore, failing to achieve even the Kremlinโs more limited goal of securing control over the Donbas could weaken Putinโs efforts to present the war as a success and potentially put more domestic pressure on the Russian leader.
If history holds any lessons for him, Nikita Khrushchevโs removal from power would be one. In 1964, after several crises, including the Cuban Missile debacle that brought the world to the brink of nuclear conflict, Khrushchev was removed from power in a non-violent leadership transition.
For now, tighter domestic repression and constraints on political dissent appear to have reduced visible challenges to Putin's rule. Anti-war protests have become a scarcity in Russia. Instead of taking to the streets, there has recently been a surge in traffic across Russiaโs border with Georgia, as many Russians now fear another call-up for military mobilisation. That is understandable, given that anti-war protests have led to arrests and lengthy prison sentences. The suppression of organised dissent may reduce domestic pressure on the Kremlin, although its longer-term impact on the regime remains difficult to predict.
Ratclifeโs visit to Moscow should therefore not necessarily be interpreted as a sign that the war will come to an end. If anything, the problem lies not in the content of the message, but in the options it espouses: heed the advice and seek peace, or face worsening conditions on the battlefield; yet choose to make peace on unfavourable terms, and risk appearing politically weakened at home.
ย Dylan, Huw, David V. Gioe, and Elena Grossfeld. โThe autocratโs intelligence paradox: Vladimir Putinโs (mis)management of Russian strategic assessment in the Ukraine War.โ The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 25, no. 3. (2023): 385โ404. https://doi.org/10.1177/13691481221146113.
The aphorism, related to Sir Walter Raleigh, โWhoever commands the sea commands the trade; whoever commands the trade commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itselfโ (Raleigh, 1614), has never seemed truer.
From the Persian Gulf to the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, the contest for mastery of the seas is accelerating, and while the classical maritime theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan and, even more so, Julian Corbett remain relevant today, it is being fought with new weapons no navies of the past could have imagined: autonomous submarines, AI-guided drone swarms, and cutting tools designed to sever the underwater cables that carry the world's data. At the centre of this transformation stands the People's Liberation Army Navy.
The theory
Alfred Thayer Mahan: Command of the Sea
In 1890, American naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan published The Influence of Sea Power upon History (Mahan, 1890). At the core of his theory, the decisive instrument was the battle fleet, a concentrated force with capital ships designed to seek out and destroy the enemy's fleet, seizing command of the sea in a single, culminating engagement.
He identified six key elements determining a nationโs capacity for sea power :
An access to open seas and proximity to major trade routes, the quality of coastline, harbours and navigable rivers, the length of coastline relative to population, sufficient manpower to crew a fleet, a population's aptitude for commerce and seafaring and a political will to invest in and sustain a navy.
The central idea of Mahanโs theory lies in the control of the chokepoint and strategic straits through a powerful battle fleet. The control of strategic straits, where maritime traffic is forced to travel through, confers a disproportionately large advantage relative to the military force required to hold them.
As a result, the United States, Britain, Japan, and Germany all embarked on massive battleship programmes in the 1890s and 1900s, contributing directly to the conditions that produced the First World War. His influence persisted through the carrier-centric doctrine of the Second World War and into the Cold War's nuclear deterrence calculus (Till, 2018). The US Navy's enduring emphasis on aircraft carrier strike groups, concentrated, and designed to dominate the sea, reflects modern-day Mahanian doctrine.
Julian Corbett: Sea Denial and Limited Warfare
For his part, Sir Julian Corbett, a British naval historian, offered a more nuanced counterpoint. Where Mahan saw the sea as an arena for decisive battle, Corbett regarded it as an operational environment to be managed. In his book, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Corbett, 1911), he argued that the real objective of naval power was not the annihilation of the enemy fleet, but the control of maritime communications, the sea lanes along which troops, supplies, and goods must pass. The difference lies in the fact that you don't need to control the whole ocean, you only need to deny it to your adversary.
Corbett introduced the concept of sea denial, where a weaker naval power could frustrate a stronger one not by meeting it in open battle, but by making the sea too dangerous to use freely. Mines, submarines, coastal batteries, hit-and-run raids โ these were the tools of the weaker party that could impose costs without seeking decisive engagement.
For the landlubber that you may be, letโs make a parallel with the Thermopylae battle, in 480 BC, staged in the film 300 (Snyder 2006) (Pic. 1), where 300 Spartans (and thousand Greek allies) held the narrow pass against the Persian army estimated at several hundred thousand men. They did not seek to defeat Xerxes. They sought to deny him the use of the terrain for as long as possible.
Image generated by AI: Artistic reproduction of the Battle of Thermopylae
Nowadays, this strategy is called Anti-Access / Area Denial (A2/AD). The defender's objective is to make the cost of using the sea unacceptably high for the opponent.
Applying this theoretical framework to China's maritime strategy, it becomes apparent that its drone programme in particular, follows a distinctly Corbettian logic. Beijing does not seek global Mahanian Sea command yet. Its actual strategy is to deny its adversaries (which at the moment could be considered being the United States and its allies) access to and freedom of navigation within the South China Sea.
Drones, mines, underwater sensor networks, anti-ship missiles, and satellites are the tools of asymmetric warfare. Those devices are sea-denial weapons deployed in a Corbettian framework by Chinaโs Peopleโs Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).
Thus, as PLANโs capabilities grow, we may wonder whether this posture is a permanent doctrine or a transitional phase on the road to Mahanian ambition possibly related to the String of Pearls, a network of naval facilities and commercial infrastructure stretching from mainland China through the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf and East Africa.
The practice: the Strait of Hormuz
Before diving into the heart of the subject, let us take advantage of current events to observe Corbett's theory in real time, with the crisis unfolding in the Strait of Hormuz. Since February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel have been conducting military operations against Iran, and Iran's principal strategic response has been the closure of one of the world's most critical maritime chokepoints, stopping mostly the maritime traffic.
The Strait of Hormuz is, at its narrowest, 33 kilometers wide. Through this corridor flows approximately 25 percent of the world's crude oil and a significant fraction of its liquefied natural gas (EIA, 2025). Every major oil producer on the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, are virtually landlocked, related to global markets, without passage through Hormuz (map1).
This is Corbett chokepoint doctrine in its starkest form. Iran, with an inferior military navy to that of the US, possesses the capacity to threaten, if not fully execute, such a closure, thereby threatening to restrain one-fifth of global oil supply.
What the current crisis demonstrates is the gap between the threat of closure and its actual execution. At the time of writing, Iran has chosen to implement a selective closure of the strait, allowing passage to allied and neutral vessels while targeting US and their allied flagged ships, effectively operating a discriminatory chokepoint regime (AlโMohanadi and Obaid, 2026), then it was to paying vessels.
This partial closure is not a decisive battle, but continuous friction. The cost is immense, war-risk insurance premiums for Hormuz transit have doubled or tripled bringing maritime traffic to an effective standstill, causing oil prices to rise, thus generating mounting pressure on the United States, both from domestic opposition and the international community calling for de-escalation. As a result, Washington was compelled to impose its own counter-blockade to prevent Iran's regional partners from benefiting from the crisis. This is a textbook illustration of Corbett's insight that sea denial, even when conducted by the weaker party, can compel the dominant naval power to expend disproportionate effort simply to preserve the status quo.
Corbett updated: sea denial as economic statecraft
Selective closure deserves particular attention. Indeed, Chinese vessels have in some part been able to continue to pass, until the US started a blockade (Prรฉtat et al., 2026). As a fellow BRICS member, Iran's relationship with Beijing goes beyond simple commercial ties, and there is a message there and from both parts. Letโs not forget that it is also an economic dependency which function as a form of strategic insurance. For Beijing, by remaining Iran's indispensable economic lifeline, absorbing approximately 80 percent of its oil exports, averaging 1.38 million barrels per day in 2025 (Downs, 2026) (table 1), China effectively purchased immunity from chokepoint disruption, ensuring that its energy supply lines were never reduced to zero.
Table 1 generated by the author: Chinaโs crude oil imports
Tehran, in turn, ran a discriminatory chokepoint: closed to its enemies, open to its patron, with at least two paying transit fees denominated in yuan, brokered by a Chinese maritime services company acting as intermediary (Lloydโs List 2026).
Iran's Foreign Minister confirmed that the strait remained open to countries that neither participated in nor supported acts of aggression against Iran (Al Jazeera, 2026). This is a preview of how great-power competition over maritime chokepoints will be fought in the coming decades, not only with armament, but with energy contracts and economic architecture.
Indeed, there is something very important here, what it reveals goes well beyond a simple passage fee. The strait is being used as a tool to boost the Chinese yuan as an alternative to the US dollar in global energy transactions, which is a long-standing strategic objective for Beijing. The Hormuz crisis offered a test case for yuan-denominated energy payments at scale, as China already did with the iron ore trade settlement (IDNFinancials, 2025). So, while Western financial infrastructure is being weaponised against Iran, China demonstrated that a parallel payment channel exists for those unwilling to remain hostage to dollar hegemony.
On the other part, allowing allied and neutral vessels to continue trading with minimal disruption, Iran simultaneously preserves its economic relationships, creates new diplomatic relation or commercial channels, and erodes the usual western ยซ cohesion ยป forcing US allies into publicly questioning Washingtonโs operations. To counter that strategy, its opponent had no choice but to enforce the blockade to ensure that neither Iranโs allies nor countries with agreements could pass through, at the risk of alienating everyone, its own allied included.
Those are consequences to the chokepoint politics that Corbett's original framework did not account for, and that the Hormuz crisis has brought into sharp focus. When a weaker power successfully weaponises a strait, it does not merely inconvenience the dominant naval force, it simultaneously signals to every third-party nation in the international system that alignment with the chokepoint holder carries tangible economic value. Countries with no ideological affinity for Tehran such as India and France, quietly negotiated passage arrangements, prioritising the continuity of their trade flows over solidarity with the Western coalition (Euronews, 2026).
Taken together, these dynamics point to something more consequential than the tactical outcome of the strait closure. By resisting the US attack and imposing its own terms on maritime traffic, Iran effectively established itself as a regional hegemon. The message to surrounding states was unambiguous: no transit through the Strait of Hormuz, nor through the Bab el-Mandeb (controlled via the Houthi proxy in Yemen), occurs without Tehran's consent.
In sum, a regime operating under degraded, sanctioned military capacity and sustained bombardment nonetheless succeeded in restricting maritime traffic through one of the world's most strategically vital chokepoints.Now imagine the same doctrine with a nation possessing a huge industrial capacity, with autonomous submarines, AI-guided drone swarms, the world's largest coast guard, and a militarised fishing fleet permanently deployed. This nation is the People's Republic of China.
The South China Sea
The South China Sea: Where History, Commerce, and Strategy Converge
To comprehend China's naval strategy in 2026, one must first understand how the era, known as the Century of Humiliation, happened at a time China had no navy worth the name. The consequences still resonate today as this memory has been institutionalized and is still used as a motivating tool in Chinaโs posture toward the West (Nicchiarelli, 2023).
Indeed, during the Opium Wars (1839โ1842 and 1856โ1860), China was unable to oppose the foreign navies sent to force the Qing government to accept the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 and the Convention of Peking (1860). The enemy fleets navigated the same routes that todayโs oil tankers and container ships follow: the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea, offering access to Chinaโs coastline (map 2).
Map 2: Created map of the naval route of the two Opium Wars
Western navies did not attack China via land, they used the sea Chinaโs navy was too weak to defend. Today, Xi Jinpingโs Chinese Dream rests, in part, on a naval ambition: to ensure that no foreign fleet can ever again impose its will on China from its own waters (Eudeline, 2023).
The South China Sea today: the nine-dash line and the artificial islands
This is precisely why China invokes the nine-dash line, asserting historical rights over nearly 90% of the South China Sea, bypassing the distance-based framework established by UNCLOS) (pic 2), and encroaching on neighboring countries maritimeโ borders (map 3).
Picture 2: Created chart of UNCLOS Law of the Sea distance
Map 3: Created map of Maritime claims of the South China Sea
The securitisation of the nine-dash line area serves several purposes. While there is an economic dimension to this situation which encompasses hydrocarbon extraction, fisheries control, seabed mineral rights, dominance over global shipping lanes, and the protection of China's Belt and Road maritime infrastructure, I will focus on the security part.ย
To appreciate China's A2/AD strategy in the South China Sea, we must highlight what can be seen as one of the most impressive engineering projects in modern military history. The dredging and building of artificial islands across the disputed Spratly archipelago, transforming submerged reefs into fortified military bases enabling power projection across the entire southern half of the South China Sea.
Nevertheless, Beijing is not the only actor engaged in establishing outposts. In total, seven parties hold overlapping territorial and maritime claims across the area: the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia. Indeed, while together, the Chinese fortified islands, Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef create an area covering approximately over 1,200 hectares of new land (Newsweek, 2025), Vietnam alone had created more than 931 hectares of artificial land, expanding all 21 of its occupied territories. However what sets China's construction apart, is the military grade building: full-length military airstrips, radar arrays, hardened missile batteries, and deep-water naval berths capable of hosting the PLA Navy's largest ships, forming the core foundation on which Chinaโs A2/AD architecture in the South China Sea will rest.
China's Maritime Forces
As outlined, two complementary or competing theories frame our analysis: Mahan's emphasis on decisive naval power and sea control, and Corbett's focus on sea denial. China's approach to control in the South China Sea may be conceptualised in three stages. The first is illustrated by the People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM), which operate in the grey zone between peacetime, and helps sustain the narrative of Chinese fishermen having operated these waters for centuries while simultaneously serving as an instrument of Beijing's surveillance. The second involves the Coast Guard, deployed as a police force signaling a de facto Chinese sovereignty (since police service can, by definition, only operate within national jurisdiction). Both are related to the civilian world and peace time. The third is the PLAN, serving a dual function: providing a deterrent shield for Coast Guard operations, and forming the outer layer of the A2/AD architectureย (Nicchiarelli, 2023), on which we will focus.ย
The Peopleโs Liberation Army Navy
The PLAN has undergone the most rapid naval expansion in peacetime history. Nevertheless, while China's navy is by far the largest of any country (table 2), surpassing the US Navy in sheer numbers of ships, in terms of tonnage the US Navy is still the number one (table 3).
What these figures reveal are two distinct naval strategies. The US Navy has fewer and older hulls, but considerably larger and heavier, and a fleet architecture deeply rooted in Mahanian doctrine, built to be able to sustain its presence across multiple oceanic theatres simultaneously, in theory. China's navy, by contrast, is more numerous and markedly newer, a direct consequence of the PLAN's relatively recent and still-ongoing transformation from a coastal defense force into a blue-water navy as shown in tables 2 and 3. As it stands, the fleet is designed primarily for regional sea denial and luring to a power projection within the First and Second Island Chains, and later on, for the protection of China's extended maritime interests along the String of Pearls stretching from the South China Sea through the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf.
Chinaโs Industrial Advantage
However, these figures also reveal a deeper concern about the US ability to sustain an active combat presence across multiple theaters. The defense industry does not currently appear able to build ships and produce the weapons systems needed to arm them fast enough to absorb the cost of several simultaneous battlefields. Indeed, the ongoing war against Iran has provided a clear illustration of this industrial and logistical challenge. To sustain Epic Fury, the Pentagon has diverted munitions to the Middle East from bases in Asia and Europe. This situation created a sense of frustration from regional allies whose stockpiles were drawn down, leaving them less able to sustain military operations if required. And it also raised concern about the US ability to maintain its defense commitments and the capacity of its defense industry to meet operational and contractual demands simultaneously (Dennis and Gettinger, 2026). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that recently, the U.S. Air Force developed the Rusty Dagger cruise missile (AGM-188A) in record time. AEDC built and tested a scale model in under three days, delivering results in 67 hours. The overall program went from contract to live-fire testing in under 16 months, versus the decade such efforts normally take. This shows that full U.S. commitment can produce rapid, unexpected breakthroughs.
Concerning naval assets, according to the US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Chinese shipyards possess the capacity to produce approximately 23,250,000 tons, compared with less than 100,000 tons for the United States (The War Zone) per year. To highlight this situation, in 2024, the Shanghai-based China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC), built more commercial vessels by tonnage than the entire US shipbuilding industry has produced since World War II.
Interestingly, while the Western narrative regarding the gap in shipbuilding between China and the US is portrayed as alarming, from a Chinese perspective it is the opposite. This gap represents a catch-up, thus, the military-civilian integration ensuring that Beijing will not need to rely again on foreign powers for its defense. It should be noted that the Trump administration has also asked civilian companies to contribute to the manufacturing of military equipment (Fox Business, 2026), to ramp up the production of military equipment.
But the conflicts in Ukraine and, more recently, the Persian Gulf have brought a new reality into sharp focus. The growing prevalence of asymmetric warfare with the large use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), changing the balance of forces and the way combat is fought. Thus, what about a similar production capacity but for the drones, and more specifically to less visible but equally consequential systems, unmanned surface and underwater vehicles (USV & UUV), which may also quietly rewrite the rules of naval warfare.
The Shift Toward Maritime Drones
Since the 1950s, starting with the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) a network of acoustic sensors designed to detect Soviet submarines, Washington has progressively expanded its monitoring capabilities around China's surrounding seas with fixed and mobile seabed sensors, surface surveillance vessels, anti-submarine aircraft, maritime drones and low-Earth-orbit reconnaissance satellites, creating an intelligence network aimed at tracking Chinese naval activities (Martinson, 2025).
But Beijing only really started to improve the PLAN capabilities after the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, when China conducted missile tests and military exercises near Taiwan due to the Taiwan's president, Lee Teng-hui visit to the United States. In response the US deployed two carrier battle groups, centered on the aircraft carriers USS Nimitz (CVN-68) and USS Independence (CV-62), near Taiwan. The conclusion for China was that it could not prevent U.S. naval forces from entering what it considers its area, due to its weak coastal navy and lack of surveillance systems to monitor the region. Thus the idea to make an U.S. intervention near China prohibitively costly (Ding, 2003), if the PLAN could not match the US NAVY.
The first improvement was done by purchasing Russian military assets. In the 2000s China started to develop its own military industry which led in the 2010s to the emergence of a blue-water navy. At the same time, in 2014 Professor Wu Lixin launched the โTransparent Oceanโ Program. It implied a four-layer network composed by satellites, USVs, UUVs and a seabed sensor network and was presented as a civilian project aiming to make the marine environment observable in near real time from the surface down to the deep sea.
While the presented goals were to improve ocean forecasting, climatology, and study of marine resources, its military advantage is undeniable as it allows to generate highly detailed data on temperature, salinity, currents, acoustic properties, and seabed topography, critical information in undersea warfare. Even more valuable when the data coverage extends from the South China Sea, to the western Pacific, near Guam, the east of the Philippines, some parts of the Indian Ocean, around the approaches to the Strait of Malacca, and more recently into selected Arctic areas (McKenzie, 2026). So, in many aspects, the Transparent Ocean program can be regarded as the twenty-first century equivalent of the U.S. SOSUS network, combining undersea surveillance with modern digital technologies. In clear, Beijing is again trying to equalise the situation with the US.
The backbone of this โSubmarine Great Wallโ consists of 64 oceanographic research vessels, and its centerpiece is the Zhu Hai Yun, a dedicated mothership that can deploy and control more than 50 unmanned platforms, including aerial drones, autonomous surface vessels, and underwater gliders (Smith, 2026). The development of Chinese Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) can be considered as a response to the extensive U.S. maritime surveillance architecture in the region, therefore the modern embodiment of Corbettโs Sea Denial theory. They are low cost compared with missiles, submarines and ships, and operating in swarms they are capable of saturating a maritime area such as a strait or a littoral without risking the life of military personnel. And, by the way, underwater they are difficult to detect. Reason why maritime drones appear in different sizes and with diverse capabilities, from small ones to submarine size (Pic 6).
One tactic commonly linked to drone warfare is the swarm attack. The main idea rests on an inversion of the cost of maritime defence. By saturating the defender's defences with cheap mass-produced platforms, the attacker imposes a structurally losing exchange. High-value interceptors expended against low-value targets, until the ammunition is depleted, forcing withdrawal or de-escalation. The asymmetry is economic and logistical, and it operates regardless of whether the engagement is won. This scheme theorised as the ยซinterceptor trapยป by Rudraksh Pathak, was illustrated with Iran at the regional scale. The South China Sea could see the same logic being reproduced, and prove, once again, that generals are always fighting the last war, as the US is also investing in USV swarms, by deploying thousands of them in the Indo-Pacific Asia Times.
Quantitative comparison between China and the United States
At first glance, the balance of naval drone power seems to favor the U.S., though only marginally. In 2023, the US Navy and Coast Guard deployed more than 80 USVs for surveillance and reconnaissance missions, while China deployed over 150 for coastal and riverine surveillance (Future Market Insights). These figures should be read with caution, however, as they make no distinction between combat platforms, ISR assets and scientific research vessels.
The picture becomes clearer when we look at what each side has announced for the years ahead. On paper, the advantage shifts decisively toward Washington. During the Sea-Air-Space Symposium in 2026, Captain Garrett Miller, commander of Surface Development Group One, projected more than 30 medium unmanned surface vessels and thousands of small USVs in the Indo-Pacific by 2030, based on requirements looking out to 2045 (USNI News, 2026). The May 2026 shipbuilding plan backs this up with concrete numbers: 47 MUSVs are planned, alongside the Orca XLUUV program, funded at $135.8 million in FY2027 for two vehicles and roughly $1.13 billion across the Future Years Defense Program for a total of 16 vehicles by FY2031 (The Defense News, 2026). No equivalent Chinese program has been disclosed at this level of detail,
Yet, the question is who can actually build at scale? Morgan Stanley estimated in November 2025 that China's drone production capacity is a significant multiple of America's, a gap that prompted Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll to announce plans to purchase at least one million drones within two to three years, up from roughly 50,000 units today (Investing.com ). It appears that China can produce an estimated 500,000 drones per month, compared with 8,000 to 10,000 for Taiwan and a Ukrainian target of 4 million per year (Global Taiwan Institute, 2025). China also counts more than 90 component manufacturers, controls around 80 percent of the global supply chain and holds over 70 percent of the world market. Even in the USV segment, where Turkey currently leads and the United States is set to nearly triple its investment from $176 million to $469.3 million by 2034 (Campbell, 2024), industrial depth remains the decisive variable. In short, Washington holds the technological race, but Beijing holds the industrial one.
The escape routes: China's merchant marine under blockade
Before concluding, let us reverse the perspective. This article has examined China as the architect of sea denial; but what happens when the People's Republic finds itself on the receiving end, with the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea closed to its merchant fleet, as the Trump administration did in response to Iran's closure of the strait. History, for once, offers a direct answer, because China has already lived through exactly this scenario, and for thirty years.
Indeed, from 1949 to 1979, the Republic of China (ROC) enforced the Guanbi ('closure') policy, a de facto naval blockade of Communist-held ports designed to disrupt trade and logistics to the newly established PRC. ROC naval forces patrolled and intercepted ships in the Taiwan Strait and adjacent waters, stopping or detaining numerous foreign merchant vessels, including British, Polish and Soviet ships, (Guanbi policy). The blockade was only formally lifted on 12 September 1979, in the wake of the US-PRC normalization. For three decades, therefore, traffic bound for the mainland had to sail around Taiwan. While not often remembered, it adds one more layer alongside the Century of Humiliation discussed in section III, in the institutional memory that drives today's naval build-up.
Nevertheless, the stakes of a modern closure of the Taiwan strait are of a different magnitude. Nearly 1.4 trillion dollars of Chinese trade transits through it each year; in 2024, about 33 percent of China's imports and 16 percent of its exports passed through it, against 21 and 14 percent respectively for the Strait of Malacca (CSIS ChinaPower). The CSIS concludes that Beijing faces less a 'Malacca dilemma' than a 'Taiwan Strait dilemma': a conflict that closes the strait would hurt China's economy even more than a disruption of Malacca (Prรฉtat et al., 2026). So what are the options for the Chinese merchant marine? Three escape routes exist, and each of them, as we shall see, reproduces the very problem it is supposed to solve (map 4).
The first is the eastern detour. If the strait is impassable, vessels can route through the Luzon Strait and sail east of Taiwan. This is not theoretical: during the August 2022 exercises that followed Nancy Pelosi's visit, traffic in the strait collapsed from roughly 250 ships a day to 15-20, and shipping was rerouted around the eastern side of the island at the cost of about three days' delay (TIME, 2022). But the detour has two weaknesses: the route east of Taiwan is exposed to cyclones (Uren, 2022), and above all, ships forced through the Luzon or Miyako straits become vulnerable to a distant blockade by US and Japanese forces, the very scenario that has haunted Chinese planners since Hu Jintao's 'Malacca dilemma' speech of 2003.
The second is the Indonesian archipelago. Should Malacca itself be closed, tankers can reroute through the Sunda Strait, whose shallow draft excludes the largest vessels, then through the Lombok and Makassar straits, and, in the worst case, around Australia and up the eastern side of the Philippines, adding days or weeks of sailing and billions in extra costs (CSIS, 2026). Shifting cargo overland is hardly better: moving goods by road from Guangzhou to Tianjin costs about three times the sea freight. Every southern alternative, in short, remains within reach of the US Navy.
Map 4: created map of China's rerouting options around the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea chokepoints.
The third escape route runs over the Artic Ocean (map 5). Under the banner of the 'Polar Silk Road', the Arctic extension of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has been turning the Northern Sea Route (NSR) along Russia's Arctic coast into a usable, if seasonal, component of its logistics. A Dalian-Rotterdam voyage takes around 33 days via the NSR against 48 via Suez (The Diplomat, 2023), and it bypasses every single chokepoint the US Navy could hold, from Malacca to Bab el-Mandeb. In late 2025 the container ship Istanbul Bridge inaugurated the first 'China-Europe Arctic Express' liner service (CNN, 2025), and the 2025 season saw 103 transit voyages along the corridor, up from 97 in 2024 (Corporate Knights, 2026).
Yet the Arctic option comes with its own toll booth. The NSR is seasonal, dangerous and thinly covered by search-and-rescue; more importantly, it is administered by Russia through a permit regime, with mandatory pilotage and icebreaker escort, the fees being collected by a subsidiary of Rosatom (Corporate Knights, 2026). Plus, the route is a legal and financial chokepoint as much as a physical one: after 2022, COSCO all but suspended its NSR operations for fear of secondary sanctions linked to the war in Ukraine (The Arctic Institute, 2026). In other words, by going north China does not escape the chokepoint problem, it merely exchanges a vulnerability to the US Navy for a dependency on Moscow (Eurasia Review, 2026).
Map 5: created map of the Northern Sea Route compared with the Suez route.
Conclusion
It appears that the nation building the world's most sophisticated sea-denial arsenal is also the one whose trade is most exposed to the sea denial of others. Its three escape routes lead, respectively, into a US-Japanese surveillance net, back into the US Navy's operating area, and under a Russian toll booth. Seen from Beijing, the conclusion writes itself: if the chokepoints cannot be escaped, they must be mastered. Hence the artificial islands, the Transparent Ocean, the drone swarms and the 23 million tons of annual shipbuilding capacity, wall of which point to the same strategic imperative. Raleigh's aphorism has simply been updated: whoever controls the chokepoints controls the trade, and whoever controls the trade, in the end, controls the world.
By Anurag Mishra (US Team) and Martina Ferraresi (Iran Team)
Introduction
Divergent foreign policy philosophies have produced recurring patterns in US policy toward Iran since 2001. Rather than tracing a single ideological arc, three analytical drivers - security imperatives, economic instruments, and alliance commitments - better explain the continuities and ruptures across administrations, revealing why engagement and confrontation have repeatedly alternated without resolving the underlying strategic dilemma.
Security: The Nuclear File and the Proxy Threatย
In 2002,ย President Bushย labelled Iran part of the โAxis of Evilโ over its nuclear program. Aย 2007 US National Intelligence Estimateย found Iran had likely halted covert weaponisation by 2003, followed byย 2006 UN sanctions. Diplomacy under President Obama produced theย JCPOAย in 2015, restricting Iranโs program in exchange for sanctions relief.ย President Trumpย withdrew the US from the agreements in 2018, despite the IAEAโs verified Iranian compliance; by July 2019, Iran breached its limits on its stockpile of low-enriched uranium, going beyond theย JCPOAโs cap.ย President Bidenโsย Vienna talks in 2021 stalled by 2022, with sanctions remaining in place. Iran began enriching toย 60%, reaching roughlyย 3,800ย kg by August 2022, with experts warning that it contained sufficient fissile material for at least one nuclear device, although weaponisation would require additional technical steps.
Furthermore, Iranโs strategic doctrine relies deeply onย proxy warfareย through the โAxis of Resistanceโ, a decentralised network including Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Shiสฟa militias. Rather than deploying its own forces directly,ย Iranchannels weapons, training, and funding through the IRGCโs Quds Force, often via Hezbollah, to partners whose local agendas align with Tehranโs goal of pressuring Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the US. This asymmetric architecture lets each actor pursue its own interests while serving Iranian power at low cost. Theย 2020 killingย of Quds Force commanderย Qassem Soleimaniย struck this networkโs operational core but did not dismantle it: after Hamasโs October 7, 2023, attack, the entire axis mobilised in coordination, closing what little remained of any diplomatic window and locking the region into a new cycle of escalation.
Economy: Sanctions as Strategyย
Sanctions have functioned as the USโs primary lever of coercive diplomacy against Iranโs nuclear program. In July 2010, Congress passed CISADA, marking the shift from targeted export controls to systemic financial warfare. The meaning of CISADA was to sanction foreign banks and companies for doing business with Iranโs energy sector or sanctioned Iranian entities, effectively forcing them to choose between access to Iran and access to the US financial system. The EU further escalated pressure in 2012 with an oil embargo, banning imports of Iranian petroleum products, sanctioning Iranโs energy, financial, and transport sectors, and freezing the Central Bank of Iranโs assets. Subsequently, Iranian banks were expelled from SWIFT, cutting Iran off from international banking and severely constraining its ability to sell oil or access hard currency. After withdrawing from the JCPOA in 2018, Trump launched his first โMaximum Pressureโ campaign, reimposing sanctions on Iranโs energy, shipping, and financial sectors and designating the IRGC a Foreign Terrorist Organisation. In February 2025, Trump reinstated the campaign, aiming to drive Iranโs oil exports to zero, with the stated goal of making Iranโs economy collapse by shutting down its oil sector.
Alliances: Israel, the Gulf, and Europe
Israel
Israel has shifted from a proxy war to a direct engagement with Iran. In April and October of 2024, the two nations faced direct state-to-state strikes that broke the decades-old tradition of โshadow warโ, and Israel launched an open-air war on Iranโs nuclear and military infrastructure in June 2025, dubbed the Twelve-Day War, that included a one-off US strike on Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan, before a ceasefire took effect on June 24, 2025. Israelโs air power has been widely assessed to have weakened, but not destroyed, Iranโs nuclear program, which is why American bunker-buster bombs were reportedly needed to strike the deeply buried Fordow facility. This delicate balance was once again upset in February 2026, when on February 28 joint US-Israeli missile attack launched against Iranโs military struck senior Iranian military officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and initiated five weeks of regional conflict that ended with a ceasefire agreement on April 7-8, 2026, which was followed by a formal memorandum ending the conflict signed by Presidents Trump and Pezeshkian on June 17, 2026. Washingtonโs relationship with Israel appears to have moved from arms sales and diplomatic backing toward something closer to direct co-belligerency, which many read as a strong signal that for Washington and Israel, a nuclear-armed Iran is treated as a red line rather than mere rhetoric.
Arab / Gulf Partners
The Gulf countries have been hedging rather than aligning themselves. Riyadhโs 2023 Chinese-brokered deal with Tehran signalled a willingness to reduce risks as opposed to confronting Tehran, but Israelโs air strike on Hamas leaders in Doha over a US ally that hosted a US air base complicated existing doubts about the USโs security guarantees in the Gulf region. The Saudi-Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement of September 17, 2025 was signed by the two nations, both of which agreed to consider an attack on one as an attack on the other, and was widely interpreted not only as a hedge against an uncertain Washington, but also against an unchecked Israel as well. Some have suggested the deal could extend a nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, although analysts caution against reading it as a formal war guarantee. Analysts have also pointed out that the agreement may lead to a new UAE-India defence cooperation, adding another layer to the Gulf security architecture, but not necessarily replacing it. The net result is a Gulf that is apparently diversifying its security guarantors, while staying formally in the US orbit.
Photo: Creative Commons - Ali Khamenei e Mojtaba Khamenei
European Allies
Through the JCPOA, Europe has primarily exercised its influence through diplomacy, sanctions, and multilateral institutions rather than military means. Following years of patience, France, Germany and the UK applied theย โsnapbackโย mechanism of the JCPOA on 28 August 2025, overย Iranโs repeated failure to complyย with its nuclear obligations, including the production of highly enriched uranium without any apparent civilian purpose. The E3 said the enriched-uranium stockpile in Iran was about 48 times the limit imposed by the JCPOA and that there are ten โsignificant quantitiesโ of highly enriched uranium in Iran. Sanctions that had been lifted under the 2015 deal were therefore restored, and by the end of September 2025, the EU also reimposed its own nuclear sanctions, such as asset freezes and travel bans. At the time, Russia and China argued the E3 lacked a legal mandate to trigger a snapback, as the Security Councilโs authority over the file had expiredย -ย and did so until the Council split over the issue along the same lines it has before. So, now, Europeโs role in Washingtonโs alliance is more about legal and multilateral legitimacy than military readiness: the E3 provided a UN Security Council seal of approval on Iranโs isolation that the unilateral US sanctions could not.
Conclusion
Security considerations remain the unalterable policy of the United States government, and, regardless of the differences in administration temperament over the course of four different administrations, no administration appears to have accepted a nuclear-armed Iran as a tolerable outcome. By 2025-26, this red line was enforced not only through sanctions but also through direct military strikes against Iranian nuclear infrastructure and leadership - a shift that many analysts see as marking a new phase in US policy. However, its long-term durability remains to be seen.
Alliance commitments have been fulfilled on paper, but not in practice. Israelโs evolution from an โactiveโ to a โco-belligerentโ has drawn the US-Israel relationship closer, while also placing strain on US relations with the Gulf states.Among these, Saudi Arabia appears to be leading efforts to diversify its security architecture, notably through its agreement with Pakistan, with a possible parallel arrangement with the UAE reportedly under discussion. Meanwhile, European allies have shown that legal and multilateral instruments can still carry weight even without direct US military backing, having reinstated UN sanctions in a context where unilateral US measures could not achieve the same effect.
The economic sanctions are the most flexible instrument in the policy toolkit, however - reversible, calibrated and renewable - and there is room to manoeuvre towards negotiations even after the outbreak of military conflict, provided that Tehranโs nuclear ambitions are kept in check.
What has been most important in the evolution of US Iran policy since 2001 is this asymmetry: rigid security boundaries, malleable economic measures and more and more varied rather than monolithic alliance pledges.
Authors: Camilla Cormegna (Operations Associate), Isabelle Despicht (Executive Assistant), Sarah Toubman (Central & South America Team), Shams Jouve (Crime, Extremism & Terrorism Team), Daria Keyvan Khosrow (Middle East Team), Sofia Sutera (Human Rights Team), Michele Groppi (President of ITSS Verona), and Sonia Martรญnez Girรณn (Executive Director).
On June 6th, 2026, ITSS Verona and Kingโs College London hosted a closed-door, Chatham House Rule panel discussion amongst EU, NATO and academia representatives, focusing onโEurope as an Actor Amid War: Challenges and the Way Forwardโ. The event explored the potential reshuffling of the international order, Europeโs role in supporting regional security, and possible pathways for sustainable conflict resolution.
The Union Mediating
A high EU officer opened the panel by stating that de-escalation and prosperity in the region seem to heavily rely on seeking the deal between Iran and the United States. They specified that negotiations might prove to be more conditions-based than time-bound, with pressing nuclear aspects yielding matters linked to Lebanon and Hormuz. Yet, it is understood that the United States will have to balance Israeli interests and would probably benefit from Israeli limited operations in Lebanon in order to facilitate a deal with Iran.
The EUโs support towards mediation between the U.S. and Iran during the Biden administration led to a nearly complete return of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), for a final deal was essentially ready to be implemented. However, Iranโs drone support for Russia following the invasion of Ukraine and, most importantly, the regional escalation involving Israel and Iranโs allies suspended such negotiations. Building on this example, the speaker pointed to continuous dialogue, including with opposing counterparts, as key to achieving a sustainable agreement - even though, to be fair, the EUโs late reaction to the crisis following Operation Epic Fury, reflecting the experience of the war in Ukraine, has been characterised by internal division based on risk and dependence on U.S. strategic direction.
Concerning the EUโs support in the resolution of the crisis, the speaker wished to recall previous historical failures, including Afghanistan and Libya, emphasising the need for a region-led process meant to rebuild and strengthen the regional security architecture. Furthermore, amid the current geopolitical context, the EU should secure strategic autonomy without completely separating from the U.S. To the speaker, the EU should be more supportive of its bilateral partners in the Gulf, develop multilateral partnerships with both the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and its member states, and equip the latter with knowledge and tools to tackle the conflict without direct European intervention.
Amongst Recalibration of Alliances
All in all, one of the most high-level impactful consequences of Operation Epic Fury has been the emergence of new regional dynamics which could be described as the โCold War of the Gulfโ. Iranโs retaliatory strikes on GCC states have disrupted Gulf diplomacy and regional ties: GCC countries that had attempted to normalise ties with Iran in the past few years are now reassessing them, pushing Iran towards a long-term regional isolation despite any tactical results against the U.S. Crucially, the war is provoking substantial change more outside of Iran than within it. New alignments and alliances are forming across the region: Bahrain and the UAE are broadly on the same side against Iran, while Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are coordinating on ceasefire efforts. What is significant about these new alignments is their depth, as regional actors are switching from political alliances to defence commitments, filling the vacuum left by the collapse of a relatively functioning multipolar balance.
Alongside diplomatic repositioning, GCC countries are also rethinking their security partnerships, as their trust in the U.S. as the sole guarantor of security has been called into question, potentially benefiting the EU. The caveat noted by the speaker is that security diversification should not be framed as replacing the U.S. but, rather, as building resilience in a context where reliance on a sole partner has proven risky.
Energy security is also a concern in the context of this conflict, forcing countries to reshape regional energy infrastructures. Iranโs retaliatory strikes disrupted Qatari LNG production whilst closing or somehow impeding the flow of goods through the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabiaโs East-West pipeline, the Petroline, has allowed Saudi Arabia to circumvent the closure, but major issues remain. In any case, long-term implications are clear. First, new alternative pipelines or energy routes will be needed in the region. Second, the question of maritime security through Hormuz will need to be addressed.
The EU officer concluded that the most optimistic current future scenario is a โno peace, no warโ situation, where the conflict freezes rather than resolves. Strong reputational and economic incentives such as EXPO 2030 in Saudi Arabia, as well as trade and export relationships, give actors reasons to avoid prolonged conflict, although these have not been sufficient to produce a lasting peace. Thus, the risk is not a further escalation but the stalling of the conflict, an indefinite Gulf Cold War.
The Role of NATO
In light of this, our NATO speaker took a step back to illustrate the evolving security panorama and the need for NATO to upgrade to address the new features defining contemporary conflicts. While the Alliance continues to be founded on its three core tasksโcrisis management, defence and deterrenceโthe current geopolitical context is increasingly shaped by overlapping crises, which naturally translates into major pressure to strengthen military capabilities. As a consensus-based organisation, NATO has to face different coalitions among its Allies, reflecting diverging views on the nature of contemporary warfare and on the most appropriate responses to current security challenges.
In line with the current developments, NATO has allocated particular attention to its engagement in the Middle East. Unlike the EUโs decision to appoint a High Representative for the GCC, NATO only features limited institutional presence in the region, with structures in Kuwait (and previously in Iraq), with no broader, permanent infrastructure. This was presented as a constraint on NATOโs ability to develop cooperative security, especially considering the importance of sustained political dialogue and direct engagement with regional partners. At the same time, Ukraine remains NATOโs primary strategic priority, while current discussions also reflect the influence of different Allied positions on the organisationโs future direction.
Human Security?
The situation in the Middle East brings another central topic to the forefront: the predominance of military considerations in contemporary security debates vs the absence of the human dimension. Current conflicts are increasingly discussed in terms of warfighting and military preparedness, while less attention is devoted to the impact on civilians and society as a whole. The war in Ukraine was identified as a significant example of this transformation, where civilians are no longer affected only as collateral damage. This development raises questions about whether existing normative frameworks remain sufficient to address the realities of contemporary warfare.
In response to these challenges, NATO ought to increasingly concentrate upon a whole-of-society approach to security. Training armed forces alone may be no longer sufficient; societies must become more resilient through the involvement of public institutions, the private sector and civil society. Security should therefore be understood as a shared responsibility that extends beyond military structures and incorporates the protection of civilians, critical infrastructure and democratic institutions.
Middle Powersโ Momentum
Finally, the last academic panellist highlighted the growing role of the Gulf states in conflict in the Middle East, the unique position occupied by middle powers, and the need for a shifting conceptualisation of women in modern warfare in particular, underscoring that wars in the Middle East can no longer be understood simply as a proxy for great power politics. An interesting case study in this context would be Tรผrkiye. According to the speaker, Tรผrkiye would have embraced the role of mediator to stop the war in Iran from escalating in the first place. This reinforces the conviction that Tรผrkiye is fully stepping into its position as a middle power, particularly as it allows it to act as a primary negotiator in geopolitical conflict.
Voices within Tรผrkiye are also stressing the need to prepare for the security implications of an escalating war with Iran, both domestically and in relation to its international priorities, the speaker reported. Concerns about the strength of Tรผrkiye's borders and migration flows linked to the conflict were said to be increasing. After all, a middle power like Tรผrkiye cannot and does not operate in isolation, but has to make sense of other important regional and global actorsโ ambitions.
Finally, the panellist also questioned the United Statesโ military aims in Iran, asking whether Washington is eventually aiming for full regime change or merely the installation of a government that is more receptive to collaboration with the U.S.
Discussion
During the Q&A, major emphasis was placed on the role women might play in conflict. Participants stressed that womenโs roles in conflict were shifting, particularly when it comes to the future of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda following adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. After 25 years, principles remain valid but both language and implementation must evolve to reflect todayโs security environment.
Instead of framing the debate around the traditional distinction between participation and protection, the WPS Agenda should be presented as an enabler of a gender-sensitive security umbrella. Significantly, this requires recognising women not only as those affected by conflict but also as active contributors to security and resilience, and leaving behind old notions of women as merely as victims of human rights abuses. More importantly, this angle highlights the importance of an understanding of the particular gendered context in peacebuilding efforts. For example, part of the problem of the WPS agenda is that women have not been registered as agents of conflict, but only as passive civilians in charge of care duties. In the case of the Rwandan War, women are known to have contributed to genocide, with former Rwandan Minister for Family Affairs and Womenโs Development Pauline Nyiramasuhuko ordering the rape of Tutsi women. omen today are also combatants and active participants in war. It was noted that 75,000 women have joined the Ukrainian army as volunteers, and are occupying roles as drone operators, engineers, and driving gender-responsive recovery efforts.
When it comes to the Middle East, women's direct involvement in regional conflicts, including Iran, is less visible than in other contexts. Yet a significant number of female protestors against the regime have been killed or jailed, whereas Iranian Kurdish women have actively taken up arms against the regime. Looking ahead, it is not clear whether co-development of military equipment, such as drones, between Ukraine and the Gulf states will offer women more prominent roles within the warfighting establishment, but there will most likely be new developments in this sense too.
What is clear, however, is that wars in the Middle East are not just an extension of ideological and military conflicts among great powers, and contributors to modern warfare extend far beyond those typically considered. Middle powers such as Tรผrkiye are becoming increasingly impactful, Gulf states are occupying a prominent role, and women are becoming agents and drivers of modern conflict.
In conclusion, the event has offered substantial opportunity for reflection and critical engagement. Whilst Europe remains central, most of the notions presented by the panel would require further discussion, debate, and, above all, implementation. Thanking all speakers and actors, ITSS Verona wishes this to be nothing but a great starting point to spark debate on the role of Europe in Iran and beyond.
In this session, Dr. Ellis discusses the main forms Chinese organised crime takes in the region, from money laundering to illegal mining, timber, and fishing. He explains how to distinguish purely criminal networks from activity connected to the Chinese state, and how the phenomenon is becoming a growing strategic concern for the region.
Dr. R. Evan Ellis speaks about the growth of Chinese organised crime in Latin America. He is a Research Professor of Latin American Studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, where his work focuses on the region's engagement with China, transnational organised crime, and populism.
Interviewer: Sarah Toubman and Rabiah Ryklief - Central & Latin America Team
During Indiaโs 73rd Independence day speech in 2019, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the creation of the position of a โChief of Defence Staffโ (CDS) who would be responsible for enhancing the integration of the Indian Armed Forces and โto bring about synergy in operation, logistics, transport, training, support services, communications, repairs and maintenance, etc of the three Services.โ (Press Information Bureau, 2020). The years following the announcement were marred by inter-service rivalries and concerns over the division of assets, expressed particularly by the Indian Air Force (IAF) until April 2026 when the then CDS General Anil Chauhan stated that a proposal on theaterisation would soon be shared with the government following a โ100 per cent agreement on the concept of theaterisationโ even as minor differences on the implementation persisted. While a specific timeline for when these reforms will be implemented has not yet been specified, given Indiaโs position as a major, if not premier, military power in the South Asia, these are likely to have a significant impact on South Asian security.
Impact on the Indian Armed Forces
At present, the three branches of the Indian Armed Forces operate largely independently of each other and are organised under โcommandsโ. The Army has seven commands (six operations and one training command), the Air Force has seven (five operational and two functional), and the Navy has three. This has resulted in issues such as parallel command structures, resource duplication, and slower decision-making. Committees such as the Kargil Review Committee (1999) and the Shekatkar Committee (2016) have emphasised the need for Indiaโs armed forces to develop a more joint method of functioning, and theaterisation seeks to model Indiaโs military more along the lines of Western ones, where the assets of all branches work in tandem to enhance operational effectiveness.
From India's perspective, theaterisation promises several operational advantages. First, integrated commands could improve intelligence sharing, streamline logistics, and enable faster responses during military crises. Second, unified command structures may also reduce bureaucratic friction between services and improve the efficient allocation of defence resources. This is particularly relevant in the context of India's security challenges. The 2020 Galwan Valley clashes with China highlighted the need for rapid coordination between ground forces, air assets, surveillance systems, and logistical networks. Similarly, India's continuing rivalry with Pakistan requires the capability to respond effectively across multiple domains and fronts, as seen in the clashes in May 2025.
A more integrated military structure could therefore enhance India's deterrence capabilities by increasing the credibility of its conventional military power. Potential adversaries may perceive a theaterised Indian military as more capable of executing coordinated operations, thereby raising the costs associated with military escalation.
Impact on the India-Pakistan Military Balance
The impact of theaterisation of Indian Armed Forces on India-Pakistan relations is likely to be mixed. On one hand, enhanced military coordination could strengthen deterrence by reducing uncertainty regarding India's ability to mobilise and conduct operations. A more effective conventional force may discourage Pakistan from engaging in limited military provocations or supporting cross-border militant activities and Op. Sindoor showcased Indiaโs willingness to respond to terror attacks in India with conventional force, including the targeting of assets and infrastructure belonging to the Pakistani armed forces.
On the other hand, Pakistan may interpret theaterisation as part of a broader effort by India to achieve conventional military superiority. Given the asymmetry in economic and military resources between the two states, Pakistanhas traditionally relied on nuclear deterrence to offset India's conventional advantages. Any reform that significantly enhances India's operational capabilities could reinforce Pakistani concerns regarding strategic vulnerability.ย This perception may further encourage Pakistan to modernise its military capabilities, leading to reforms within Pakistan as seen with the establishment of the Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC), invest in advanced missile systems, and continue expanding its tactical nuclear arsenal. Such developments could contribute to a regional security dilemma, whereby measures taken by one state to increase its security are perceived as threatening by another, resulting in reciprocal military build-ups.
Furthermore, the reality of the India-Pakistan rivalry has gradually been altered since the Uri attacks in 2016. The Modi-led government, during each major terror attack in its tenure, has shown a willingness to go up the escalation ladder from limited surgical strikes in 2016, limited airstrikes in 2019, to now an exchange of missiles and drones targeting military assets and infrastructure. The ruling Bhartiya Janata Party governmentโs voters now expect a โstrongโ response (targeting the Pakistani army directly) whenever a terror attack occurs in Indian territory, meaning the window and scope for a negotiated resolution have become significantly smaller. To add to this, Pakistanโs continued and growing cooperation with China in countering Indiaโs traditional military advantage will likely also be furthered by Indiaโs military reforms, besides impacting the relationship between India and China, as discussed below.
The most important strategic driver behind Indiaโs theaterisation of its armed forces is arguably China's growing military power. Since the 2020 border crisis, Indian defence planners have increasingly focused on the challenge posed by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). China's own military reforms offer an important point of comparison. Between 2015 and 2017, Beijing undertook extensive military restructuring, replacing its traditional military regions with integrated theatre commands designed to improve joint operations. Chinese reforms have significantly enhanced the PLA's ability to coordinate forces across different domains and operational theatres.
Indian policymakers view theaterisation partly as a response to this changing military balance. By integrating its own command structures, India seeks to improve readiness and operational effectiveness in the event of future border confrontations. Enhanced jointness may enable India to better coordinate surveillance, airpower, logistics, and ground operations across the Himalayan frontier.
However, this dynamic may also contribute to intensifying strategic competition between Asia's two rising powers. As both states continue to modernise their militaries and improve operational capabilities, the risk of military rivalry becoming increasingly institutionalised cannot be dismissed. While theaterisation itself is not inherently destabilising, it forms part of a broader pattern of military modernisation occurring on both sides of the border. Furthermore, an increase in tensions between China and India has the potential to spill over into a wider regional confrontation where both states may seek to increase their influence in other South Asian countries and see attempts by the other to do the same as a potentially hostile act by the third state.
In conclusion, Indiaโs theaterisation reforms may be aimed solely at enhancing its own military readiness and the joint operational capability of its armed forces and may be without an offensive goal in mind. However, this may not be how other states, particularly Pakistan and China view it, and reciprocal reforms and measures to enhance their own capability have the potential to lead to an increased risk of conventional conflict in South Asia, a reality which was briefly seen in the India-Pakistan conflict in 2025.
In this session, Davide Colombi will discuss what the new Return Regulation could mean for the future of EU migration policy, the rights of individuals affected by return procedures, and the broader human rights implications of this evolving framework.
By Maria Makurat - Human Rights and Cyber Security Teams
Introduction
โCouldnโt we just shut it off? You know, cut the wires?โ โThere is no if, it cannot be shut offโ.(Oceanโs 13, 2007). Nearly 20 years later, the thought of implementing an artificial intelligence (AI) machine is now very likely and no longer a fiction when thinking about casinos or other institutions. With the continuous rise of AI new cybersecurity threats are and will take place so, โpick your natural disasterโ (Oceanโs 13, 2007). The development of autonomous weapons (AWs) and large language models (LLMs) are increasingly playing a role in testing cyber defence strategies of countries such as Germany and the rest of the EU. The international affairs field is continuously asking questions about: ethics in cyber warfare, cognitive warfare and AI, how to describe certain attacks, how can one analyse a countryโs cyber strategy in the first place to name a few. AI is rapidly evolving, and new threats are on the rise. โMythosโ is a new development in AI that can cause great damage in hacking and cyber-attacks. Mythos is able to identify the vulnerabilities of systems making it thus for hackers a tool to identify the chinks in the chain and use it for their own gain. But what also about the changing trends of using technology in the first place? Younger generations such as Gen Z are favouring analogue technology and one sees a trend of people having the desire to go back to โphysical mediaโ. Could this possibly have an influence on the future of cyber defence if individuals are favouring not to use technology?
With this in mind, can Europe for instance develop a certain AI cyber strategy (favouring the offensive active side) and continue to ensure the safety of all sectors? How do individual needs and trends fit into this?
The development of an AI cyber strategy?
Researchers (e.g. Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Wilhelm Vosse) are talking more about Active Cyber Defence (ACD). Meaning there is a shift in cyber strategy that it is no longer solemnly about Cyber Defence (CD) but also proactively taking steps and measurements to prevent attacks from happening in the first place. However as early as 2017, scholars such as Scott Jasper already encouraged an automated cyber defence in order to halt attacks before they can even begin to cause damage. The recent G7 summit has taken place in รvian, also hosted for the first time CEOโs from :Open AI, Google DeepMind and Anthropic. This shows how strongly at the moment states combine their strategy with industry innovation since both go hand in hand in terms of continuously developing a cyber-strategy or what we might see, an AI active cyber-strategy. The meeting called upon guidelines where the US should have a pivotal regulating role and avoiding chips manufactured by China. The dynamics become even more complex as conflicts and different situations amongst states influence the development of an AI cyber strategy and even push states to regulating access to certain systems. Anthropic has released the statement: โThe US government, citing national security authorities, has issued an export control directive to suspend all access to Fable 5 and Mythos 5 by any foreign national, whether inside or outside the United States, including foreign national Anthropic employees.โ
It seems that one is moving into the debate of how one can have a single state determine for us what is safe and what isnโt whilst at the same time ensuring that individuals are regularly kept โup-to-dateโ with latest possible malicious activities? Should we head towards a single regulating โbodyโ that makes sure that our cyber domain is safe? Will we have more cyber laws and push people โlivingโ more in the cyber realm? It is a tandem of focusing on the macro and micro level whilst keeping up with the overall rapid (malicious) development of technology. Each country seems to share of course resources to develop a strategy against the rising threat of AI yet, still each state faces individual hurdles and challenges that makes a unified AI active cyber strategy difficult to consider. Germany for instance has now taken a step towards a more active cyber strategy whilst France has now put talent development at the top of their strategy preferring , the individual level when speaking from a sociological point of view. South Koreaโs biggest issues remains North Koreaโs cyber-attacks so their focus lies there.
If we were to dive deeper into thinking about the methodology and taking the factors โsocietyโ and โindividualsโ into account, the development of an AI cyber strategy and the mere thought of states and countries continuing to โwage warโ against each other in the cyber domain, becomes more complex. Max Weber for instance claims that one has to take the factor โdisciplineโ into account when analysing war and societal changes. Weber states the following: โThe kind of weapon has been the result and not the cause of discipline.โ So if we refer to cyber-attacks and hacking systems such as โMythosโ indeed as โweaponsโ, then they are apparently the result of discipline and should be treated with great care. When we consider discipline, then one also has to take the individual person into account. In the following, hypothetical questions will be asked in order to allow future debates to take place regarding how generations are using technology, especially younger ones. Whilst a macro viewpoint is essential, a micro approach focusing strongly on the individuals is equally important.
Trends amongst younger generations in using technology
Perhaps the recent trend with young people using more old digital technology will be the solution to be safer? There even is an initiative or a so-called โAI resistance movementโ with individuals wanting customised computers and technology that does not have any AI integrated. Looking at the creative sector, news stories talk about the trend of individuals (especially younger generations gen z) coming together to create physical mood boards from magazines, reading physical books at the library in groups or for instance having a hobby group where one is not allowed to open any technology device.
These questions are of course speculative and hypothetical and up for debate however, taking one step back and looking at the society through a different lens may open up new ways of thinking. What if the civilians start moving โbackwardsโ in the cyber world? What if one develops active cyber strategies but eventually, civilians might find it โsaferโ to avoid said technologies in the first place? Perhaps individuals will go back completely to using flip phones with no access to AI or prefer having a physical magazine or book instead of exposing their data to algorithms that suggest them reading lists. Some researchers (Anurushmitha, J et al) even suggest that younger generations are less prepared for malicious cyber attacks due to being โover-confidentโ with technology. So in this regard, it would be interesting for future research to keep analysing how generations are interacting with emerging technologies and whether one sees a decline in the use of advanced technology or a growing confident secure way.
As of this moment it seems like patchwork: one is running to catch up with the emerging problems that AI causes. For example, artists were very much against AI (in 2022) because they wanted to protect their art and copyright. An overall AI cyber strategy for Europe would entail a strategy that goes through all niches and little โcracksโ in our society, not only pure defence of military capabilities. The strategy needs to protect critical infrastructure as well as go through our society and directly entail individualโs needs. Scholars such as Henschaw also argue in favour of focusing on the human factor when developing a cyber strategy.
However, one also needs to consider, humans want to act first which is much discussed in disciplines of psychology and sociology. Consultants also can have an interesting take on this matter when one tries to apply for instance Stephen R Coveyโs methods. Covey points out when discussing his 7 habits, that โIn addition to self-awareness, imagination, and conscience, it is the fourth human endowment -- independent will โ that really makes effective self-management possible (โฆ) It is the ability to act rather than to be acted upon, to proactively carry out the program we have developed through the other three endowments.โ These questions and concerns show, that the field of analysing cyber issues very much correlates with human interactions which is also highlighted by scholars such as Cavelty et al: โOverreliance on quantitative data could result in technically sound but inadequately human-centred policies that fail to address underlying societal concerns.โ
Concluding thoughts and open questions
Can the EU develop one comprehensive AI cyber strategy to combat malicious AI cyber-attacks from the outside? As of this moment, each EU country regularly releases its own (active) cyber defence strategy and also puts emphasis on its own needs, making therefore an EU AI cyber strategy as of this moment a challenging task. It would be interesting to conduct field research on how younger generations are acting with analogue technology and whether they would truly prefer a space with less AI and advanced technology. The Art of War by Zhang Yu states: โAdaptions means not clinging to fixed methods, but changing appropriately according to events, acting as is suitable.โ
References:
Alexis Henshaw, Anwar Mhajne, Beyond the Basics: Critical Perspectives on Cybersecurity in International Relations,ย Global Studies Quarterly, Volume 5, Issue 3, July 2025, ksaf067,ย https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksaf067
Anurushmitha, J., Nikhitha, D. and Pramod, J.P. (2026) โCyber Security Awareness Among GenZโ, International Journal of Scientific Research and Technology, 3(3), pp. 159โ167.ย
Covey, S.R. (1989) The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People. First Fireside Edition.
Dunn Cavelty, M., Pulver, T. and Smeets, M. (2024) โThe Evolution of Cyberconflict Studiesโ, International Affairs, 100(6), pp. 2317โ2339. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiae175.
Gerth, H.H. and Mills, C. Wright (1947) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd.
Henshaw, A. and Mhajne, A. (2025) โBeyond the Basics: Critical Perspectives on Cybersecurity in International Relationsโ, Global Studies Quarterly, 5(3), ksaf067. https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksaf067.
Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Tobias Pulver, Max Smeets, The evolution of cyberconflict studies, International Affairs, Volume 100, Issue 6, November 2024, Pages 2317โ2339, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiae175, pg:2338
Stephen R Covey, โthe 7 Habits of Highly Effective Peopleโ First Fireside Edition, 1989, pg 147-148
Sun Tzu (2003) The Art of War: Complete Texts and Commentaries. Translated by Thomas Cleary. Shambhala, Boston and London.
Whatโs Chinaโs AI policy? Rejuvenation of the nation through security and development
Generally, China is regarded as an innovative player in the AI race but an unlikely protagonist in the global governance dimension: this is given by its state-driven government, and AI national governance based on sovereigntyโfirst, securityโheavy, surveillanceโenabled principles. [1] However, the reconfiguration of the international order, and the US withdrawal from UN-based institutions provide China the occasion to promote an image of a responsible leader in the field of AI governance, pursuing a strategy grounded on the values of inclusion and fairness, with Chinese characteristics.
This input is based on its foundational goals: economic growth and security, as stated in the 2017ย Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan. For the former, AI can be used as a propeller for the rejuvenation of the nation: the aim of restoring national wealth and power under the guidance of the CCP.ย ย Regarding the latter, AI-generated content presents a risk of jeopardizing social stability, hence political and national security.ย [2]ย Therefore, China has to leverage the international stage: it has to ensure that the current institutions that foster growth and security are upheld and promote policies that enable innovation and the activity of Chinese stakeholders, amid the US containment or the EU decoupling strategy and the criticism on its human rights policy. This reflects China's attempt to position itself as an alternative to US and European approaches to AI governance.
The impact of Chinese AI policy on the international stage: international competition trough norm setting and equipment export
In order to achieve development and ensure security, while hedging criticism and achieving strategic parity with the US, China has pursued a strategy aimed at projecting the image of a committed major player, capable of ensuring an equitable AI development for the Global South. This is enacted by the 2025 Global AI Governance Action Plan (GAIGI), which creates a strategy focused on UN-based multilateralism, human-centered AI, laws and consensus-based development of AI governance and respect for countriesโ sovereignty.
This latter value in particular is a concept developed based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, [3]used by China as a counterargument towards international criticism over its human rights policies. The other element that we should specify is the commitment under the UN-based multilateralism: in the GAIGI institutions like the UN should be a starting point for consultations on soft laws that countries can then adopt and adapt into their national law, as corroborated by Beijingโs endorsement of UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterresโs proposal to create a new international body to govern AI under the UN framework. [4]
The commitment towards human-centered AI has to be understood as the objective of creating an AI development that involves all layers of the population, as corroborated by its statement in the UN Human Rights Council regarding the protection of the rights of specific vulnerable groups from AI-related harms. Moreover, UNESCO has been the most fertile ground for Beijingโs AI diplomatic activities, also due to the US withdrawal from 2017 to 2022 and its forthcoming second exit in December 2026. There, China has financed the Beijing Consensus on AI and Education, implemented through the International Forum on AI and the Futures of Education and its contributions to the Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. This first global ethical framework to foster the role of AI in achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Other fertile grounds are the standard development organizations, like the International Telecommunications Union and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, which are leveraged for creating standards favorable to Beijingโs trade stakeholders and investors in their trade portfolios. [5]
The GAIGI is complemented by the AI Safety Governance Framework: a set of guidelines on the classification of AI safety risks and for the development and application for stakeholders. Another supporting policy is the 2023 Global Data Security Initiative, which projects the image of a responsible player, addressing the primary engine of AI, and aims at fostering an environment committed to data security and espionage by other countries, and responsible use for innovation and e-commerce. The significance of these documents resides in the fact that they are among the few to be available in English, hence targeted for foreign audiences to stimulate the necessary consensus-building in the field and to counter accusations of espionage. [6]
Beijingโs objective of achieving a whole-of-society development is enacted by the 2024 AI Capacity-Building Action Plan for Good and for All, along with its flagship programs, the Belt and Road initiatives (BRI) and Digital Silk Road (DSR). These programs aim at creating infrastructure connectivity and personnel training to bridge the โintelligence gapโ, while functioning also as vectors for Tencent, Alibaba and other stakeholders' investments, aimed at securing technology lock-ins, promoting the mutual recognition of tech standards, and integrating Chinese technology into foreign markets.[7]
So far, these plans have found fertile ground in the Middle East, Africa and especially among South Asian countries, while encountering skepticism in Latin America. [8] Nonetheless, the Global South functions as the ideal recipient thanks to Chinaโs self-positioning in the middle ground between technological superpower and developing nation, [9] allowing a rhetoric that frames it as an enabler of the Global South development. This allows the region to become the solution for Beijingโs crisis of internal demand due to its large pool of new customers, and as an opportunity to acquire embargoed chips, as happened with Nvidia products. [10]
Hedging the oppositions
Nevertheless, the strategy is not free from criticism due to Chinaโs state-centric approach to AI governance, which leads to breaches in human rights that Western actorsย like the USย and theย EU regardย as unacceptable and incompatible with their own agendas.ย On the Sino-American relations, this factor is coupled with a strategic competition in emerging technologies, which has led toย interdependenciesย andย mutual strategic vulnerabilities.ย
China has opposed this situation, challenging its technological hegemony and the American-centric global order with a confrontational rhetoric, especially in the field of semiconductors.ย [11]ย At the practical level, this is coupled with activities in the UN fora, the GAIGI and the Capacity Building Action Plan, enabling the creation of alternative pathways of supply chain, economic exports and pools of data from the Global South to equip and create Chinaโs AI models. Therefore, this strategy aims at creating a virtuous cycle, an alternative to the US circuit, involving other international actors. These issues have gained sufficient prominence to feature among the key topics discussed during the Xi-Trump summitย of May 2026, which, however, have seen onlyย timid developments.
The criticism of Chinaโs human rights policy (whether in the digital field or not) is especially upheld by the EU and its 27 member states. Furthermore, Brussels has manifested the intention of achieving strategic autonomy through the Chips and AI acts, which have resulted in its recent proposal of curbing the ties with China in the digital technology field due to security concerns.
The EU is an important factor in Chinaโs global AI governance strategy due to its role as a rule-maker: its ability to set trade and technology standards can affect relations with Chinaโs third-largest trade partner. However, in this case, Beijing is pursuing an ambivalent strategy, characterized by an emphasis on shared commitments to human rights and development, [12] while threatening retaliation against measures deemed discriminatory. The strategy targets the EU's core commitment to human rights while leveraging considerable trade relations to retain the EU Member Statesโ engagement, demonstrating alignment while simultaneously seeking alternative support on the global stage.
What future is China envisaging for AI governance?
ย China is attempting to extend its role from innovator to driver of the discourse over international AI governance, trying to take the space left by the US in traditional institutions, leveraging its self-positioning as a middle ground between a technological powerhouse and a member of the Global South. China has sought to position itself as a supporter of an inclusive approach grounded in human rights. This strategy is grounded in its need to balance the US in the AI strategic competition and EU strategic autonomy, while not burning the Sino-European relations entirely, and expanding its outreach in the field to third actors.ย
Therefore, China is trying to transpose its ultimate goals of rejuvenation of the nation through economic development and protection of the state and political security on the international stage with a series of capacity-building initiatives, projecting an image of a committed actor through international institutions. It is in its perception of the former, and in its value of respecting โevery countryโs national contextโ that resides its desired capability of achieving the security goal: international fora are seen as a flexible institution for finding common grounds, but refrain from imposing legally binding rules, and Beijingโs commitment to respect all actorsโ internal situations attempts to establish a logic for which national policies are free from international scrutiny.
[1] Hung, Ho Ting. โExploring Chinaโs Cyber Sovereignty Concept and Artificial Intelligence Governance Model: A Machine Learning Approach.โ Journal of Computational Social Science 8, no. 1 (2025): 24. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42001-024-00346-8.
Zeng, Jinghan. โArtificial Intelligence and Chinaโs Authoritarian Governance.โ International Affairs 96, no. 6 (2020): 1441โ59. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa172.
[3] Dunford, Michael, and Weidong Liu. โChinaโs Evolving International Economic Engagement: China Threat or a New Pole in an Equitable Multipolar World Order?โ Area Development and Policy 9, no. 2 (2024): 131โ68. https://doi.org/10.1080/23792949.2023.2225092.
[9] Dunford, Michael, and Weidong Liu. โChinaโs Evolving International Economic Engagement: China Threat or a New Pole in an Equitable Multipolar World Order?โ Area Development and Policy 9, no. 2 (2024): 131โ68. https://doi.org/10.1080/23792949.2023.2225092.
By Giovanni Giacalone - Central & South America Team
In recent years, Peru has experienced a dramatic increase in extortion targeting small and medium-sized business owners, transport operators, market vendors, construction contractors, and informal entrepreneurs. What had long existed as localized criminal racketeering has evolved into a broader system of organized extortion linked to transnational criminal groups, weakened institutions, prison-based networks, and the rapid expansion of urban insecurity. The phenomenon has become one of the central public security concerns in Peru, particularly in Lima and northern coastal cities.
The perpetrators seek to extract regular payments, commonly known as cupos, from businesses in exchange for โprotection,โ meaning immunity from violence carried out by the extortionists themselves. Extortion has spread across transportation companies, mototaxi associations, neighborhood stores, restaurants, construction sites, nightclubs, and even schools. Media reports and police investigationsindicate that refusal to pay often results in shootings, grenade attacks, arson, or targeted killings.
A major factor in this transformation has been the expansion of the Venezuelan-origin criminal network known as theย Tren de Araguaย into Peru. According to investigations by the Peruvian National Police (PNP) and reporting byย La Repรบblica, factions associated with the group, including โLos Gallegos,โ โDinastรญa Alayรณn,โ and โLos Injertos de Aragua,โ have established extortion operations in Lima, Callao, Trujillo, and other urban areas. Primary sources from the Peruvian state also confirmed the scale of the problem. While the expansion of Tren de Aragua has contributed to the growth and sophistication of extortion networks in Peru, the problem itself is not new. Extortion long predates the group's arrival and is closely linked to broader issues such as urban insecurity, economic informality, and limited state presence in some communities.
One of the sectors most affected has been urban transportation. Bus companies and informal transport associations in Lima and Callao have reported systematic threats demanding daily or weekly payments. According to La Repรบblica, members of โLos Injertos de Araguaโ extorted public transportation firms through digital payment systems such as Yape, allowing criminals to collect payments anonymously while reducing physical exposure. The use of fintech applications illustrates how extortion practices have modernized technologically alongside Peruโs expanding informal digital economy.
Data published by Gestiรณn, citing the Peruvian Attorney Generalโs Officeโs Crime Observatory, documented at least 125 attacks related to extortion in Lima and Callaoโs transportation sector between August 2024 and December 2025. The report noted that most victims were drivers, followed by passengers and fare collectors. This demonstrates that extortion has evolved beyond isolated threats into sustained systems of coercion affecting entire economic sectors.
Peruvian media coverage also highlights the psychological dimension of extortion. Victims frequently receive WhatsApp messages containing videos of firearms, photographs of family members, or recordings of previous murders. In one reported case involving a transportation entrepreneur in San Martรญn de Porres, criminals demanded 10,000 soles per month and threatened to โblow upโ the victimโs house if payments stopped. The combination of digital intimidation and spectacular violence creates a climate of fear that discourages denunciation and weakens public trust in authorities.
Another important feature of the phenomenon is its relationship with Peruโs informal economy. A large proportion of Peruvian small businesses operate with limited legal protection, precarious access to banking, and minimal police presence. Extortion networks exploit these vulnerabilities. Informal transport operators, street vendors, and neighborhood businesses often lack insurance, legal representation, or the resources necessary to resist criminal pressure. In many districts, extortion effectively becomes an unofficial tax imposed by armed actors.
The testimonies of some of the extortion victims, who asked to remain anonymous, provide a rather clear modus operandi on the part of these criminal groups:
A 34-year-old dance teacher from central Lima told us that her business had been thriving until she began receiving disturbing WhatsApp messages demanding large sums of money in exchange for being allowed to continue operating safely. The messages included threats against her and her family, along with photos of places she frequently visited. One day, a funeral wreath was delivered to her apartment. That was the moment she decided to close her business and move abroad.
Another former business owner had to close his restaurant in Trujillo as it had become impossible for him to even reach the end of the month as the gang planning to extort him wanted all of his monthly income. Eventually, he moved to another area of โโthe country and then abroad.
In some cases, the individuals involved in the extortion rings are as young as twelve, as explained by the Peruvian police and reported by Infobae in May 2026:
โCriminal organizations have begun recruiting even younger children for serious crimes in Callao. General Espinoza detailed that there have been โseveral casesโ of 12-year-old children armed and participating as hitmen or extortionists.โ
Scholars and journalists have noted that Peruโs extortion crisis differs from earlier forms of criminal taxation seen during the internal conflict of the 1980s and 1990s. Contemporary extortion networks are decentralized, entrepreneurial, and highly adaptive. Rather than operating through ideological insurgency, they function through flexible criminal markets. Investigative reporting in El Comercio revealed how some organizations linked to the Tren de Aragua combined extortion with shell companies and international money transfers, indicating increasing financial sophistication.
For instance, on April 19, 2026, the National Police of Peru (PNP) managed to dismantle the criminal gang โBunker Gota Colombo,โ dedicated to extortion, inside its center of operations located in the southern Lima district of Villa El Salvador.
The detainees, eight foreign nationals and one Peruvian citizen, are being investigated for the alleged crimes of illegal manufacture and possession of firearms, as well as aggravated extortion linked to predatory lending practices. During the searches, authorities seized four sticks of dynamite allegedly used to intimidate victims. Officers also confiscated 33 cell phones, seven notebooks containing detailed records of loans and collections, 13 motorcycles, and one car.
The operation began following a complaint filed by a woman living in Villa El Salvador, who reported receiving constant threats demanding that she make payments through a digital wallet.
The consequences for Peruโs economy and civil society are substantial. Extortion increases operating costs for small businesses, discourages entrepreneurship, reduces investment in vulnerable neighborhoods, and reinforces informality. For many entrepreneurs, paying cupos becomes normalized as a cost of survival. In some cases, business owners close operations entirely or migrate internally to avoid threats. The burden falls disproportionately on lower-income Peruvians whose livelihoods depend on small-scale commerce.
Ultimately, the recent extortion phenomenon in Peru reveals a broader crisis of governance and the institutional capability to provide efficient urban security. The expansion of criminal organizations, the weakness of institutional enforcement, the growth of informal labor markets, and the technological adaptation of extortion practices have combined to create an environment in which violence becomes economically rational for criminal actors. As long as state legitimacy remains fragile and economic precarity widespread, extortion is likely to remain one of the defining challenges facing Peruvian society and for law enforcement.
