Dr Lauren Prather talks about the US internal political landscape, ongoing litigation over ballot access and redistricting, as well as debates over federal versus state control of elections and the effect on public trust, institutional legitimacy, and the broader stability of US democracy. Dr Lauren Prather is Associate Professor of Political Science at UC San Diegoโs School of Global Policy and Strategy and co-Director of the Centre for Transparent and Trusted Elections.
In this session, Dr Lauren Prather analyses the complex US political landscape ahead of the 2026 midterms. During the interview, Dr Prather investigates peopleโs sentiments regarding the SAVE America Act and its impact on individuals who may not have access to proof of citizenship. She also addresses the possibility of President Trump postponing or influencing the election to keep control over the representative institutions and the effect of the current US-Israeli operations in Iran, claiming that if the USโs active involvement decreases or ceases, it will have no impact on the midterms.
Interviewers:ย Federico Sergio and Anurag Mishra - US Team
Gender equality has long been considered one of the central pillars of the international human rights system. Throughย Sustainable Development Goal 5, the United Nations committed the global community to achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls by 2030.
Yet today the challenge appears increasingly different from what many policymakers envisioned a decade ago. Rather than focusing primarily on how to accelerate progress, governments, researchers, and human rights advocates are increasingly confronted with another question: how to respond to what many observers describe as a growing global backlash against gender equality.
Across multiple regions, the rise of anti-gender mobilisations and the diffusion of narratives portraying gender equality as a threat to social order are reshaping public debates. These developments raise serious concerns about the future of SDG 5. If these dynamics continue, progress toward gender equality may slow significantly, potentially making it more difficult to achieve the SDG 5 targets by the 2030 deadline.
From a human rights perspective, this shift is particularly alarming. Gender equality is not simply a policy objective. It is a fundamental component of the international human rights framework, embedded in instruments such asย theย Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)ย and recognised as essential for the protection of dignity, equality, and democratic participation.
Gender Equality as a Contested Concept
A key factor contributing to the current backlash is the transformation of the concept of โgenderโ itself. Originally developed as an analytical category in social sciences to understand how power relations shape expectations and opportunities for women and men, the term has increasingly been reframed as a controversial ideological project.
In many political discourses, โgenderโ is portrayed as a concept that critics argue threatens the family, cultural traditions, or national identity. Rather than engaging with concrete questions of equality, anti-gender actors frequently frame gender-related policies as part of a broader ideological agenda imposed by international institutions, academic communities, or progressive elites.
This discursive strategy has proven remarkably effective. By framing gender equality as a broader cultural conflict, this narrative can shift public debate away from structural inequalities and toward concerns about social transformation. Discussions about wage gaps, political representation, reproductive rights, or gender-based violence are replaced by narratives centred on protecting children, defending traditions, or resisting external influence, as discussed in the work ofย Judith Butler.
Scholars have described this dynamic as the construction of gender as a โsymbolic glueโ capable of uniting diverse actors across religious, political, and nationalist movements. As highlighted in the volumeย Gender as Symbolic Glue, anti-gender narratives allow otherwise heterogeneous groups to mobilise around a shared sense of cultural threat.
Anti-gender Mobilisations in Europe
Europe has become one of the most visible arenas where these dynamics unfold. Over the past two decades, anti-gender campaigns have increasingly moved from religious discourse into broader political mobilisation.
These movements often present themselves as spontaneous civic initiatives defending families or parental rights. Research suggests that these movements often operate through networks linking religious organisations, civil society groups, and political actors. In several cases, mobilisations initially framed as grassroots initiatives have later been integrated into broader populist or nationalist political agendas.
Italy offers a particularly revealing example. Large-scale mobilisations such as theย Family Day protestsย have demonstrated the ability of anti-gender actors to influence public debates and shape legislative processes. Campaigns opposing civil unions, gender equality education, or anti-discrimination laws have mobilised broad segments of society by framing gender equality policies as threats to cultural identity.
Research on these developments, including the work ofย Massimo Prearo, highlights how these mobilisations have contributed to a broader reconfiguration of political Catholicism and its interaction with right wing populist actors. In this context, gender equality becomes a central battleground in struggles over national identity, morality, and political authority.
Importantly, these dynamics are not confined to Europe. Anti-gender narratives circulate transnationally, adapting to local contexts while maintaining remarkably similar rhetorical structures.
Recent research on information environments and political narratives highlights how gender equality debates can be strategically framed within geopolitical and ideological struggles. As discussed in the ITSS Verona articleย Civil Resistance in the Digital Age: Gender Narratives and Information Integrity, different political contexts show how equality discourses are manipulated for political purposes.
In Turkey, for instance, state institutions have been observed invoking equality discourse while simultaneously reinforcing womenโs traditional roles within society. In parts of Eastern Europe, particularly Russia and Poland, political narratives centred on โfamily valuesโ promote motherhood as a national duty while marginalising LGBTQ+ activism. In these cases, womenโs rights are often invoked selectively, gaining support only when they align with patriarchal and anti-Western narratives.
This selective use of gender equality illustrates how human rights language can be appropriated and reinterpreted in ways that may weaken its intended emancipatory goals.
The Significance of the United States
Recent developments in the United States further illustrate the global relevance of these dynamics. Political debates around gender and sexuality have become increasingly polarised, with some actors framing gender equality initiatives as ideological threats rather than democratic commitments.
The 2022 decision ofย theย United States Supreme Court in Dobbs vs. Jackson Womenโs Health Organization, which overturned federal protections for abortion rights, represents a significant turning point. For decades, access to reproductive healthcare had been widely considered an essential element of womenโs autonomy and equality.
The rollback of these protections demonstrates how quickly established rights can be challenged and reconfigured within changing political environments.
Given the global influence of political debates in the United States, these developments have repercussions far beyond national borders. Narratives emerging in the United States political arena often circulate internationally, reinforcing existing backlash movements and shaping policy discussions elsewhere.
Defending Gender Equality as a Human Rights Imperative
These developments point to a fundamental shift in the politics of gender equality. For many years, international institutions focused primarily on promoting womenโs empowerment and expanding rights protections. Today, the challenge increasingly includes responding to organised political opposition to gender equality initiatives.
This shift has direct implications for the future of SDG 5. Achieving gender equality by 2030 requires not only policies designed to reduce discrimination and empower women, but also strategies capable of addressing the narratives and political forces that seek to delegitimise equality itself.
From a human rights perspective, defending gender equality means reaffirming that equality is not an ideological preference but a core democratic principle. Without gender equality, the broader system of human rights protection cannot function effectively.
With less than five years remaining before the 2030 deadline, the urgency of this challenge is clear. If the international community is serious about achieving SDG 5, it must recognise that many scholars argue that gender equality norms are currently experiencing one of the most significant global backlashes in decades.
The success of the Sustainable Development Agenda may therefore depend not only on promoting new policies, but also on defending the fundamental human rights principles on which gender equality is built.
The XXI century seems to be characterised by a redefinition of the international security scenario. Warfare is no exception. In this decade, the rapid evolution in the cybersphere, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and disinformation techniques has led a wide range of experts to gradually focus on the impact of these technologies on human decision-making. This has led to the emergence of a new concept: cognitive warfare.
While there is no univocal definition of it, the one provided by NATO's Allied Command Transformation (ACT), under the input of the Science and Technology Organisation (STO) in 2024 is as follows:
โCognitive Warfare integrates cyber, information, psychological, and social engineering capabilities. These activities, conducted in synchronisation with other Instruments of Power, can affect attitudes and behavior by influencing, protecting, or disrupting individual and group cognition to gain advantage over an adversary.โ
According to the 2025 Chief Scientist Research Report, we can classify cognitive warfare as a standalone grey-zone, military and social issue. In this type of conflict, technology is the catalyst for its reach and effectiveness, and is also part of the solution to counteract cognitive campaigns, along with further understanding of the threat actors, information environment, and social implications of the phenomenon. This definition served as a notable input for further studies, but especially as legitimisation of this new warfare domain, allowing the development of a corresponding doctrine, and shifting the focus of psychological operations from the content to its effects.
In understanding cognitive warfare, we must point out the differences with its sibling: information warfare. Information warfareย focuses on controllingย disinformation and misinformation flows in their various forms, taking advantage of technologies without changing the nature of war. On the contrary, cognitive warfare aims at eliciting a psychological reaction, leveraging both technologies and neuroscience, involving information and activities that can take place online and offline.1 The different focus avoids a misinterpretation of cognitive warfare as โa rebrand of an old conceptโ, helping us to understand how technology is exploited.
How Cognitive Warfare is conducted
To evoke precise reactions, cognitive warfare triggers pathways that manage cognitive load, such as cognitive biases and heuristics (i.e., predicting outcomes by interpreting data inductively or through analogies), as well as emotional responses2. Taking into account the OODA loop (observe-orient-decide-act), cognitive warfare techniques affect the orientation step: the moment when information is filtered, analysed, and interpreted through prior experiences, analytical and synthetic strategies, and cultural features.
To achieve this, antagonistic actors expose targets to vivid, repetitive, and biased information, distorting heuristic reasoning, especially during uncertain times, causing people to misjudge the likelihood of events based on superficial similarities, neglect objective facts, and make anxious or irrational decisions3. These effects are exacerbated by the anchoring bias: the first-hand exposure to a variable that will condition all the subsequent evaluations.
This bias might appear similar to the priming effect, which has a different outcome. It consists of exposing an individual to the association between a subject and a certain set of characteristics, which, through association mechanisms, profoundly shapes the perception of the subject. This mechanism is effective in manipulating public opinion, since the repeated exposure to the association between a characteristic and a subject leads to an overreaction of the general public against the alleged antagonist, even when the subject does not clearly present that attribute4.
The diffusion of false narratives can also impact the confirmation bias: our tendency to privilege information that confirms our initial beliefs. This is particularly useful in radicalisation processes, which elicit an emotive response on the subject and deepen cognitive divides among groups, eroding social cohesion, which can then be exploited by malign actors against institutions5.
The event that marked the beginning of the exploitation of cognitive warfare, and well exemplifies its functioning, is the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, where Russian forces instrumentalised historical facts, legal ambiguities and exacerbation of political divide through the support of the Russian minority, which was leveraged to erode social cohesion, undermining institutions and confusing public international opinion on the interpretation of the events6. While Russiaโs information campaigns are among the most studied examples, cognitive influence operations are conducted by a wide range of state and non-state actors.
Technological enablers of cognitive warfare: AI, ICT infrastructures and cyberattacks to undermine trust
The shift from hybrid to cognitive warfare is enabled by the rising centrality of the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) infrastructures in social processes, and the advent of AI-powered data mining, algorithmic profiling, and deepfakes. In cognitive warfare, ICT infrastructures are deployed as a vector for infodemic campaigns, taking advantage of the rising use of social media as the main source of information.
A fundamental characteristic of ICT infrastructures is the speed and variety of news diffusion. This creates an infodemic environment that gradually weakens cognitive processes through information overload, creating uncertainty and consequential regression to heuristic reasoning ruled by biases. Fake news proliferates on social media, thanks to their algorithm-friendly design, which allows them to be omnipresent and function as an anchoring bias for distorted facts and narratives, molding the perception of the individual who is constantly driven to this cognitive-overloading environment7. Algorithms also help social polarisation and ideological manipulation: a recent study on the algorithm of X has demonstrated that its algorithmsย boost the engagement of inflammatory posts, expanding the role of social networks from enablers of cognitive warfare to active players8.
Anonymity also plays a role in cognitive load due to the time-consuming practice of verification of facts that increases the cognitive cost-to-scale and hence gets avoided by users9. Another effectiveย instrument is the use of social media influencers, thanks to their friendliness, relatability, interaction frequency, and capacity to create parasocial relations similar to friendships10, along with their capacity to convey emotion-driven, yet credible messages, they can become enablers of confirmation bias and tools of cognitive warfare, as in the case of Russian interference with Romanian elections in 2024.
The outreach of malicious influencers and the pervasiveness of bots and troll farms are maximised by the increasing sophistication of AI-based content,11 which is rapidly and progressively blurring the distinction between real and AI-generated content and profiles. Bots and troll farms were among the first applications of AI for cognitive warfare, which, thanks to their characteristic inflammatory language employed directly towards users, are optimal tools for controlling the narrative. They are often employed during geopolitical events to control the narrative and influence public support for electoral outcomes, consultative democratic processes, direct democracy, policy decisions, alliances, and traditional media12.
Indeed, AI is a perfect force multiplier of cognitive warfare, enabled by relentless data mining, which enables targeting individuals based on their preferred content13 and personalities at a superhuman speed. Data are then operationalised to produce information that targets and elicits every individualโs personal bias, and through the cognitive effect of an infodemic environment, impairs effective elaboration of external data, leading us to instinctive reactions14.
The emergence of the metaverse could be the next enhancer of cognitive warfare: further blurring the border between digital and physical reality, it allows the collection of biometric data through wearable devices. Malicious forces can collect them to create a more precise profile of a userโs reaction to certain stimuli and modify the circumstantial scenario in which they are immersed, creating another domain for psychological operations15. However, despite the attention given by the research on cognitive warfare, studies suggest that these predictions are not coherent with the current maturity and diffusion of this technology.16
Conclusions
The article aims to trace how ICT infrastructure, social media and AI operate on our cognitive functions within the context of cognitive warfare, affecting how information is filtered, analysed, and interpreted through prior experiences, analytical and synthetic strategies, and cultural features. The emergence of this new dimension of conflict has caught the attention of scholars from psychological, international relations, war studies, and numerous other fields, with the 2021 NATO definition contributing to the conceptualisation and legitimisation of this phenomenon.
The cognitive domain has increasingly been described as a stand-alone type of warfare that situates itself within the grey-zone spectrum, involving both the military and civil society. It distinguishes itself from information warfare since it aims not only to control information flows but also to manipulate information in order to distort our perception of events. One of the earliest examples is the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea. In this context, as well as in the 2016 American elections, distorted information was disseminated by exploiting the characteristics of ICT infrastructures: anonymity and rapid diffusion, as well as the algorithmic dynamics of social media and the use of troll farms to influence individualsโ perception of reality.
These examples illustrate how digital technologies have enabled the expansion of cognitive warfare, further amplified by data mining and AI-driven personalisation, which are progressively blurring the distinction between authentic and fabricated content.
As digital ecosystems become increasingly central to political and social life, cognitive warfare is likely to become a persistent feature of geopolitical competition. This raises important questions for democratic resilience, including the need for stronger media literacy, improved platform governance, and more effective mechanisms to detect and counter coordinated influence operations.
References:
Hung, Tzu-Chieh, and Tzu-Wei Hung. โHow Chinaโs Cognitive Warfare Works: A Frontline Perspective of Taiwanโs Anti-Disinformation Wars.โย Journal of Global Security Studiesย 7, no. 4 (2022): ogac016.ย https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac016. Marsili, Marco. โCognitive Warfare in Historical Perspective: From Cold War Psychological Operations to AI-Driven Information Campaigns.โ Preprint, Social Sciences, December 17, 2025.ย https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202512.1596.v1. โฉ๏ธ
Ibidem Hung and Hung (2022) Deppe, Christoph, and Gary S. Schaal. โCognitive Warfare: A Conceptual Analysis of the NATO ACT Cognitive Warfare Exploratory Concept.โย Frontiers in Big Dataย 7 (November 2024): 1452129.ย https://doi.org/10.3389/fdata.2024.1452129. โฉ๏ธ
Marsili, Marco. โCognitive Warfare in Historical Perspective: From Cold War Psychological Operations to AI-Driven Information Campaigns.โ Preprint, Social Sciences, December 17, 2025.ย https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202512.1596.v1. ย Danet (2019) โฉ๏ธ
Datta, Pratim, Mark Whitmore, and Joseph K. Nwankpa. โA Perfect Storm: Social Media News, Psychological Biases, and AI.โย Digital Threats: Research and Practiceย 2, no. 2 (2021): 1โ21.ย https://doi.org/10.1145/3428157. Ferreira, Vinรญcius Marques Da Silva, Carlos Alberto Nunes Cosenza, Alfredo Nazareno Pereira Boente, et al.ย โGUERRA COGNITIVA NAS REDES SOCIAIS: AMEAรAS, DESAFIOS E IMPLICAรรES PARA A SOCIEDADE.โย ARACรย 7, no. 3 (2025): 14287โ303.ย https://doi.org/10.56238/arev7n3-240. โฉ๏ธ
Gauthier, Germain, Roland Hodler, Philine Widmer, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. โThe Political Effects of Xโs Feed Algorithm.โย Nature, ahead of print, February 18, 2026.ย https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-026-10098-2. โฉ๏ธ
Fenstermacher, Laurie H., David Uzcha, Kathleen G. Larson, Christine A. Vitiello, and Stephen M. Shellman. โNew Perspectives on Cognitive Warfare.โ Inย Signal Processing, Sensor/Information Fusion, and Target Recognition XXXII, edited by Lynne L. Grewe, Erik P. Blasch, and Ivan Kadar.ย SPIE, 2023.ย https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2666777.. โฉ๏ธ
Paziuk, Andrii, Dmytro Lande, Elina Shnurko-Tabakova, and Phillip Kingston. โDecoding Manipulative Narratives in Cognitive Warfare: A Case Study of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict.โย Frontiers in Artificial Intelligenceย 8 (September 2025): 1566022.ย https://doi.org/10.3389/frai.2025.1566022. Da Silva et al. (2025). โฉ๏ธ
Marsili 2025 Fenstermacher, Laurie H., David Uzcha, Kathleen G. Larson, Christine A. Vitiello, and Stephen M. Shellman. โNew Perspectives on Cognitive Warfare.โ Inย Signal Processing, Sensor/Information Fusion, and Target Recognition XXXII, edited by Lynne L. Grewe, Erik P. Blasch, and Ivan Kadar. SPIE, 2023.ย https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2666777.. โฉ๏ธ
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The tumultuous events in northeastern Syria have shifted the mediaโs attention away from the As-Suwayda Governorate in the countryโs south. Nonetheless, the strategic relevance of this area should not be underestimated. As-Suwayda is the only region of Syria where the new administration led by President al-Shara has not yet managed to assert its control. It is adjacent to the Golan Heights and Mount Hermon, key military positions for Israel to defend its northern border. Moreover, the different sectarian and ethnic groups that comprise As-Suwaydaโs population have varying political loyalties. Bedouin clans are aligned with the new Syrian government, while the Druzes share sectarian links with their co-religionaries in Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan. This article presents the events that have taken place in the area since the collapse of Bashar al-Assadโs regime and outlines how various actors are vying for power both locally and internationally.
When rebel troops entered Damascus on the 8th of December 2024, long-time president Bashar al-Assad fled the country. His escape brought the regime that had ruled Syria since 1970 to an inglorious end. Syrians looked at the future with hope, and celebrations took place in many cities. However, the divisions caused by a decade of civil war, intertwined with external interventions, did not disappear with the departure of al-Assad. Syria was fragmented into various fiefdoms controlled by armed groups. Moreover, years of conflict had deepened the sectarian and ethnic divisions that have always characterised the country. Finding a political arrangement that reunified the country once more seemed a far-fetched plan. Al-Shara, leader of the militia that had spearheaded the military operations against the al-Assadโs regime, managed to assert control over Damascus. A former jihadist who had fought against the American occupation of Iraq, al-Shara had risen to the position of leader of an Islamist armed group that controlled the province of Idlib in northern Syria. In January 2025, al-Shara assumed the presidency. In his first address to the country, he highlighted the need to rebuild state institutions and maintain peace, but this spirit did not come to fruition. In March, clashes broke out in Latakia, in the west of Syria, between the new government and supporters of the previous regime. The brutal repression that followed, which indiscriminately targeted the local Alawite community, made it clear that the reunification of Syria will be neither smooth nor bloodless.
The events in As-Suwayda
In an attempt to prevent similar events from taking place in As-Suwayda, where unidentified individuals were setting up armed ambushes and conducting assassinations, the new Syrian government scrambled to negotiate a deal with local notables. On March 12, a memorandum of understanding was signed by Mustafa Bakour, the governor, and various local stakeholders. According to its text, troops loyal to al-Shara would take over the area, salaries to public employees would come from Damascus, and regular consultations between the central government and local dignitaries would be held. Nonetheless, , Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, one of the spiritual leaders of the Druze population of As-Suwayda, opposed this deal. He denounced the extremist nature of the new government and rejected any compromise with Damascus. On the following day, armed individuals raised the Druze flag on government buildings all over the governorate. They were affiliated with the Suwayda Military Council (SMC), a predominantly Druze militia that formed after the collapse of al-Assadโs regime to prevent a security void. These incidents did not lead to a major escalation. However, they were the beginning of an uneasy, and ultimately short-lived, truce. In April, a blasphemous audio which insulted Prophet Muhammad went viral. It was attributed to Marwan Kiwan, a Druze cleric. He rejected all allegations, but the recording was enough to ignite a vicious cycle of violence. According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, 113 individuals lost their lives during these clashes. External powers also played a role. On the 29th of April, the Druze minority in Israel took to the streets to protest against the sectarian violence against their co-religionaries in Syria. On the following day, the Israeli air force conducted a drone strike in As-Suwayda targeting the Syrian security forces, which were converging on the area. Various parties tried to de-escalate the situation. Walid Jumblatt, the political leader of the Druze minority in Lebanon, contacted his co-religionaries in As-Suwayda and the new Syrian administration in an attempt to find an agreement. SANA, a press agency linked to the government of Damascus, announced a ceasefire had been negotiated between the governor and local notables. Nonetheless, the violence continued unabated. On the 2nd of May, Israel dropped a bomb in the proximity of the presidential palace in Syriaโs capital, warning that it would not allow the government to deploy forces south of Damascus and harm the Druze population of As-Suwayda . Tรผrkiye, the main ally of al-Sharaโs new administration, also got involved. When Israeli planes entered the Syrian airspace on the following night, Turkish fighter jets attempted to jam their communications. After this incident, the situation calmed down because neither Israel nor Tรผrkiye were interested in a military escalation, but one figure, once again, stood out for his opposition to any deal with Damascus: the aforementioned Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri. Distancing himself from the Druze clerics who had negotiated the deal with Damascus, he declared:
When the government of Bashar al-Assad was overthrown, two regional players began jousting for power in Syria. As shown by the events outlined above, they were Israel and Tรผrkiye. The former occupied the territories surrounding Mount Hermon and played a very active role in As-Suwayda. The latter positioned itself as the closest ally of the new administration in Damascus. Since the fall of the regime, Tรผrkiye has pledged to provide Syria with gas and electricity. Moreover, the Turkish defence ministry has stipulated a deal with its counterpart in Damascus, committing to provide the new Syrian armed forces with modern weapon systems and training. Lacking the economic muscle of the Gulf monarchies, Tรผrkiye is capitalising on the strength of its defence industry and its energy sector. The recent developments in Syria have given the Turkish government an opportunity to expand its role as a regional security provider and transform Anatolia into a major energy hub. Israelโs ambitions in Syria are of a different nature. The actions undertaken by the government of Benjamin Netanyahu show that its primary concern is to enhance Israelโs security by creating a new buffer zone at its northern border. Moreover, Israel wants to ensure that Syria stays weak by supporting groups such as the National Guard in As-Suwayda and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in the northeast of the country. It mistrusts al-Shara because of his jihadist past and close relationship with Tรผrkiye. Repeated American efforts to negotiate a deal between the new government in Damascus and Israel have not led to an Israeli withdrawal from the Syrian territories it occupies, nor to a Syrian recognition of the Jewish state. Nonetheless, Israelโs shipments of military supplies to the Druzes in As-Suwayda have become smaller and less frequent. The lack of an Israeli reaction to the Syrian military offensive against the Kurds in northeast Syria, which stands in stark contrast to Israelโs air campaign when the government of Damascus deployed troops in As-Suwayda, may show the division of Syria into spheres of influence. The Turkish inaction following Israelโs bombing of the Syrian defence ministry in July also points to a tacit agreement between Ankara and the Jewish state. The south of Syria seems to lie within Israelโs domain. The rest of the country, instead, is controlled by the government of Damascus and its Turkish sponsors. Of course, other regional powers also play a role. The Gulf countries have pledged significant investments to rebuild Syriaโs battered economy. Russia maintains military bases in Latakia, and the United States remains interested in conducting counter-terrorism operations to contain ISIS. Nonetheless, Israel and Tรผrkiye are the most powerful stakeholders in the country at the time of writing. Following the American withdrawal and the downsizing of the Russian military presence caused by the war in Ukraine, Israel and Tรผrkiye are the only countries that maintain a substantial military presence in Syria. How their rivalry plays out will shape the future not only of As-Suwayda but of the whole country.
The situation in As-Suwayda has stabilised in recent months. However, the new government in Damascus seems committed to unifying Syria under its control, as shown by its successful offensive against the Kurds in the northeast of the country. Tension in southern Syria may escalate quickly. There was very little warning before the military operations against the Syrian Democratic Forces. There will be very little warning before a government offensive against As-Suwayda. As shown above, the consequences of an escalation in this region will go way beyond its borders. Israel and Tรผrkiye will be drawn in. They may have a tacit agreement on the partition of Syria. However, in the Middle East, no deal lasts forever, and new developments such as the war between Iran, the United States, and Israel can open windows of opportunity. Tรผrkiye and the government of al-Shara have already surprised the world in the past, with the sudden offensive that overthrew Assad in 2024, and will be eager to exploit any opportunity. If al-Hijri, the uncontested winner of the local power struggle, continues to be uncompromising with the government in Damascus, diplomacy may have little space left for manoeuvre. However, his inflexibility should not be taken for granted. Al-Hijri already changed sides in the past, when he stopped supporting the Assad government. If offered the right deal, he may do so again, and the fortunes of As-Suwayda and its inhabitants will change with him. Undoubtedly, Israel will have a say in any decision al-Hijri takes. However, the importance of local dynamics should not be underestimated. The Druze minority in Syria and beyond is not a cohesive unit. Various leaders claim to represent the Druze community, which spans four countries. How their rivalry plays out will shape the future of As-Suwayda at least as much as the competition between Tรผrkiye and Israel. The events outlined in this article show that religious bonds do not deter Druze powerholders from exercising violence against each other. The government of al-Shara could attempt to find new interlocutors in the two Sheikhs of Reasons who had been sidelined by al-Hijri. In any case, for the reunification of Syria to take place, its sectarian groups must find a way to coexist. Only if the new government in Damascus succeeds in negotiating a deal with the different minorities that make up the population can Syria truly turn the page on the Civil War.
The growing link between transnational organised crime and terrorism has become a serious threat to human, national, and regional security. In areas such as the Sahel, West Africa, and the Great Lakes, these trends are intensifying humanitarian crises, poverty, and vulnerability, creating a โcrime-terrorism continuumโ that spreads across the black hole spectrum of dynamics linked to state failure and grey zones. Since the creation of the African Union Police Cooperation Mechanism (AFRIPOL), security governance has undergone a process of institutionalisation and operationalisation, actively addressing the complex intersections between transnational terrorism and hybrid organised crime.
Genesis, context, and milestones in the creation of the African Police Cooperation Organisation
In a postmodern and globalised international context, there are close links with terrorist groups and organised crime networks at the national, regional, and transnational levels, through interconnected and destabilising challenges, which create heightened vulnerabilities in several African regions, thus threatening peace and security, exacerbating conflicts and fragility, and undermining development efforts. This is why the African continent has taken steps to establish the link between organised crime and terrorism, reflecting the connection between the concept of regional and global security emphasised in a post-Cold War context characterised by the breakdown of internal and external borders. Terrorist organisations in Africa are involved in organised crime, particularly jihadist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda and Islamic State. Groups such as Jamaโat Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen (JNIM), Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab have carried out targeted operations exploiting weak state structures, regional criminal dynamics, and widespread corruption to engage in kidnapping for ransom and drug trafficking. As a result, African countries have been forced to take preventive measures to strengthen national and regional law enforcement and border control capabilities. This led to the creation of the African Police Cooperation Organisation (AFRIPOL), which is considered the new African Union for promoting cooperation against transnational organised crime, terrorism, and cybercrime, and for responding more effectively to the evolving and interconnected security threats facing the continent.
The establishment of AFRIPOL reflects Africa's awareness of the need for a preventive approach to the trans-nationalisation and hybrid nature of security threats linked to terrorism and organised crime, as part of a process that was initially developed at the 22nd Interpol African Regional Conference in 2013 in Oran, followed by the Algiers Declaration in 2014 at the African Conference of Directors and Inspectors General of Police on AFRIPOL. However, at the 23rd African Union Summit held in Equatorial Guinea in 2014, through the Algiers Declaration, the AU adopted โthe common vision shared by police chiefs'. The meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Operationalisation of AFRIPOL played a pivotal role in creating this institutional architecture by reiterating the importance of cooperation, given the changing nature and modus operandi of organised crime and terrorist groups. African efforts continued with the adoption of the African Union's Agenda 2063 in 2015, an action plan aimed at establishing security and peace on the continent by strengthening intra-African cooperation in cybersecurity and border management. Subsequently, the AFRIPOL Statute was adopted in 2017 as a constitutive step in the institutionalisation of the joint African fight against the nexus between crime and terrorism. That is why, at the AU summit in Addis Ababa, working groups were set up to combat cross-border organised crime, cybercrime, terrorism, and violent extremism in all its forms, covering a wide range of complex threats, in particular organised terrorism in conflict zones, foreign terrorist fighters, and radicalised โlone wolvesโ.
AFRIPOL: Objectives, Missions, Legal System, and Organisational architecture
AFRIPOL's main objectives were clearly defined in its 2017 legislative statute, in Article 3, paragraphs (a) to (g), with regional and international objectives. AFRIPOL aims to establish enhanced police cooperation at the strategic and operational levels by facilitating the prevention of transnational organised crime and terrorism. The creation of AFRIPOL is therefore in line with the AU's efforts to develop continental mechanisms for the sustainable promotion of peace and security. At the same time, AFRIPOL's missions are established under Article 4. They are specifically aimed at strengthening law enforcement agencies across the continent through operations to prevent and combat transnational organised crime, terrorism, and cybercrime. This enables public security agencies in Africa to respond more effectively to the evolving and interconnected security threats facing the continent. Nevertheless, AFRIPOL is specifically the African Union's technical institution responsible for strengthening and harmonising the capabilities of law enforcement agencies, including the framework capacity-building, coordination, and information-sharing missions of national police services.
The legal framework governing AFRIPOL also operates in accordance with the Constitutive Act and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, without interfering with the internal affairs of Member States and with full respect for their national legislation and democratic principles, as well as strict adherence to good governance and police ethics. AFRIPOL is a cooperative and consultative body within the AU's continental framework, designed as a step towards a more centralised transnational police force, partly inspired by the Europol security governance model. The establishment of AFRIPOL in 2015 marks a move away from fragmented, sub-regional forums towards a continent-level hub. AFRIPOL's institutions operate within the framework of exchanges of expertise and best practices, particularly in forensics and criminal analysis and in the use of new technologies and innovative security solutions. Furthermore, the Specialised Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security (CTSDSS) is responsible for providing leadership and guidance on policing issues in Africa. The organisational structure of the African Police Cooperation Organisation comprises main and subsidiary bodies. According to Article 7 of AFRIPOL's basic regulations, the organisational architecture comprises the General Assembly, the Steering Committee, the Secretariat, and the National Liaison Offices. Decision-making procedures are based on consensus; failing which, a two-thirds majority of member states present and entitled to vote shall suffice.
AFRIPOL mechanisms for cooperation in countering organised crime and transnational terrorism
AFRIPOL's cooperation and coordination mechanisms in the fight against crime and terrorism are structured around a triangular axis at the interregional, regional, and international levels. Article 19 of its statutes stipulates that cooperation shall be carried out with member states. With this in mind, AFRIPOL is actively engaged in an integrated partnership process with the African Union and the Peace and Security Council (PSC), and this is also being implemented through enhanced coordination with specialised institutions, namely the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) and the Committee on Intelligence and Security Services (CISSA). AFRIPOL plays a central role in inter-regional integration with African law enforcement bodies, led by regional police organisations such as EAPCCO, WAPCCO, CAPCCO, and SARPCOO, covering the eastern, western, central, and southern parts of the continent. AFRIPOL's sub-regional cooperation activities focus primarily on combating crime, transnational terrorism, money laundering, small arms trafficking, border management, human trafficking, environmental crime, and cybercrime. Operational security coordination is implemented on the ground through annual meetings of the directors of AFRIPOL liaison offices. The security and legal strategy to combat crime and terrorism has focused on operational achievements through the creation of a secret communication system for African police interoperability (AFSECOM) and the development of a system for disseminating research publications aimed at preventing, detecting, and investigating transnational organised crime and terrorism, in coordination with African national liaison offices (NLO) and regional institutions.
At the international level, AFRIPOL has established a reinforced framework of strategic partnerships to anticipate the security impacts of transnational crime. In doing so, a commitment to multidimensional cooperation has been launched with specialised UN agencies, in particular the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). INTERPOL cooperates closely with African institutions in the fight against corruption, financial crime, fraud, and money laundering, having signed an agreement with the African Development Bank Group. Meanwhile, the INTERPOL Support Programme for AFRIPOL (ISPA) was launched, covering the period from 2020 to 2026, with the primary aim of helping the institution to carry out its functions across the continent. The ISPA programme provides enhanced support for AFRIPOL's governance and bolsters its capacity to combat criminal networks. More importantly, this cooperation has led to technical improvements in information and communication systems and support for AFRIPOL's Criminal Analysis Unit. At the transregional level, AFRIPOL is engaged in enhanced, tailored cooperation with Europol, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX). In addition, AFRIPOL is seeking to institutionalise the operationalisation of the fight against crime and terrorism with regional police organisations, namely ASEANAPOL, AMERIPOL, GCCPOL, and AIMC, with a focus on harmonising strategic planning and common global policing standards.
Assessing the Role of the AFRIPOL in Countering Organised Criminal Terrorism: Opportunities, Challenges and Shortcomings
African police cooperation is recognised as a key pillar in promoting regional peace and security through a shared operational front among Member States to combat crime and terrorism, with a focus on enforcing security policies and legal instruments relating to police cooperation and collaboration in Africa. Evidently, AFRIPOL plays a leading role in combating organised crime and transnational terrorism through prevention, detection, investigation, and coordination with national and regional institutions. AFRIPOL also provides technical assistance to its Member States, acting as an intermediary between African police forces and regional institutions, which is seen as an indicator of progress made in improving cooperation and information sharing at all levels. In this regard, partnerships with specialised international institutions, particularly INTERPOL, have made significant advances in combating the growing threat of cybercrime, such as Operation Serengeti 2.0, involving 18 African countries, which led to the arrest of 1,209 cybercriminals, the recovery of $97.4 million, and the dismantling of 11,432 malicious infrastructures. Indeed, the creation of AFRIPOL has been a major step forward in terms of strategic security vigilance and awareness, with a view to developing a harmonised African strategy against organised crime, terrorism, and cybercrime, and strengthening coordination under an operational technical architecture focused on intelligence sharing, harmonisation of methods, joint operations, and common databases and communication systems.
The mechanisms established by AFRIPOL remain inadequate and obsolete to combat hybrid threats at the regional and continental levels in response to the jihadist breakthrough and its unprecedented exploitation of transnational criminal networks, which is placing pressure on the African security apparatus. However, despite some operational advances, many shortcomings remain, particularly the lack of a truly coordinated strategy with consistent and disparate measures and the problems of overlap and duplication of mechanisms to combat organised crime and terrorism in the same theatre of operations. The AFRIPOL institution, on the other hand, faces major challenges, including financial constraints, internal security and state-sovereignty barriers, political interference, and problems related to information technology systems. Systemic contradictions also exist in the functioning of AFRIPOL, which is based on the mechanisms of the African Union, characterised like all pan-African organisations, and reflects the deep contradictions between countries on the continent. Alongside this, there is a certain ambiguity about the nature and limits of the AFRIPOL mechanism, especially in its legal status, which repeatedly emphasises the terms โassistanceโ and โfacilitationโ, thus highlighting the ineffectiveness of governance and the lack of coercive power to compel states to share data or participate in joint operations, leaving security coordination de facto to the sole discretion of the states, unlike other regional police organisations, primarily Europol, which operates within a dense, effective, and legally binding EU governance framework.
Conclusions
The analysis highlighted the impact of the causal interrelationship between transnational organised crime and terrorism, with the changing nature of hybrid, multidimensional security threats acting as an accelerating factor that has prompted African countries to strengthen their institutional and operational governance capacities in terms of renewed security risk management within the framework of AFRIPOL. Undoubtedly, the establishment of these transregional police cooperation mechanisms has been an important step for African countries in strengthening security coordination, information sharing, capacity building for national police services, and joint cross-border operations, particularly in partnership with international and regional police bodies such as INTERPOL. Despite progress in institutional architecture to address the nexus between terrorism and organised crime in Africa, limitations and constraints remain, particularly when it comes to political conflicts and sovereignty issues, the precarious nature of non-binding legal status, and a glaring lack of financial resources.
Republika Srpska (RS), one of the three political divisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), has had elections before that mattered for the whole region, but the snap RS presidential election on 23 November 2025 was unusually political: it happened because the wider constitutional conflict in BiH had reached a breaking point after Milorad Dodik, a Bosnian Serb politician who served twice as President of RS and once as a member of BiHโs presidency, was removed from office and placed under legal restrictions. The court of BiH banned him from politics for six years over anti-constitutional conduct, after he defied the authority of the High Representative, Christian Schmidt, and introduced laws in RS aimed at nullifying his decisions and barring state-level judicial and security institutions.
Therefore, the RS presidency became the main battlefield for legitimacy. The snap vote was then framed by many actors as a choice between โcontinuityโ and โa reset,โ even if the real choice was more limited than that. The result was a narrow victory (50.89%) for Siniลกa Karan (SNSD), the candidate backed by Dodikโs camp, who pledged to continue Dodikโs policies โwith even greater determination.โ He added that โas always, when times were difficult, the Serb people have prevailed.โ However, opposition alleged irregularities and pushing for repeat voting in some places. Consequently, BiH's Central Election Commission announced that voting will be Repeated in 17 municipalities at 136 polling stations.
This close and contested outcome matters because it shapes how Serbia and Russia operate in the Western Balkans. Neither Belgrade nor Moscow โcontrolsโ RS. But both can gain influence when RS politics becomes more confrontationalโespecially when BiH institutions are blocked and the international community is forced into crisis management.
What the 2025 snap election really signaled inside RS
Karanโs victory with roughly 50 percent of the vote, while the opposition candidate backed by the SDS and others followed very closely behind, shows that the SNSD machine can be challenged, even if it still controls power at the entity level. The narrow margin reflects growing public dissatisfaction with SNSDโs long rule, widely associated with corruption scandals, institutional capture, and worsening economic conditions in RS. At the same time, it reveals clear vulnerabilities ahead of the 2026 general elections.
Politically, this weak result is costly for Dodikโs camp. Rather than consolidating authority, it exposes the limits of administrative control and patronage-based mobilisation and may incentivise Dodik to compensate through renewed political escalation. For the opposition, however, the outcome provides concrete evidence that SNSD can be challenged even in a structurally unfair political environment. This is likely to encourage stronger opposition cooperation, more professional campaigning, and greater investment in election monitoring.
Serbia: stronger as RSโs anchor, but with tight limits
Serbiaโs role in RS is often described as a mix of solidarity, coordination, and careful ambiguity. Belgrade wants to remain the key external partner of RS. After Dodikโs verdict, Vuฤiฤ first summoned Serbiaโs National Security Council and then flew to Banja Luka in a show of support for Dodik, condemning the verdict as shameful and illegal and accusing its authors of seeking to undermine Republika Srpska and the Serb population.
One concrete sign of how institutionalised the SerbiaโRS link has become is the joint session and the adoption of the โDeclaration on the Protection of National and Political Rights and the Common Future of the Serbian Peopleโ in June 2024, reported on Serbiaโs official government website. Most recently, during events marking 8 January 2026 in Banja Luka, Serbian Prime Minister ฤuro Macut reaffirmed that Serbia will continue to strengthen its โspecial and parallel tiesโ with Republika Srpska, highlighting expanded cooperation not only in culture and infrastructure but increasingly in science, healthcare, and education.
While officially framed as cultural and developmental cooperation, the All-Serbian Assembly and the Declaration adopted in June 2024 go beyond symbolic partnership and increasingly blur the line between inter-state cooperation and political integration. By calling on the institutions of Serbia and Republika Srpska to act in a โunified and coordinated manner,โ the Assembly constructs a transborder political space that implicitly treats RS not as an entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina, but as part of a broader Serbian political community.
Russia: more leverage through crisis, not through popularity
Russia appears in the crisis as Milorad Dodikโs principal external political backer and a potential diplomatic shield. Dodik announced that he would seek Moscowโs help after Bosnian state prosecutors ordered his arrest, including asking Russia to veto the extension of the EU peacekeeping mission (EUFOR) at the UN Security Council. Russia has publicly supported Dodik and rejected the Bosnian courtโs ruling, which Moscow described as a blow to regional stability.
Regional impact: why the RS election affects the Western Balkans
The snap presidential election exposed a weakening of the SNSDโs long-standing dominance in Republika Srpska. The razor-thin and contested result did not consolidate power but revealed growing public dissatisfaction and the erosion of Dodikโs control-based political model. Rather than stabilising authority, the outcome signals vulnerability ahead of the 2026 Bosnian general electionand creates incentives for political escalation as a substitute for declining domestic legitimacy.
As internal legitimacy weakens, external backing becomes more important. Serbia is therefore positioned to play an even stronger role as RSโs political anchor through diplomatic support, institutionalised cooperation, and symbolic alignment. Russia, in turn, operates as a strategic shield, challenging Bosniaโs state institutions and international oversight while internationalising the crisis. Together, these dynamics turn the RS election from a local contest into a regional pressure point, deepening Bosniaโs crisis and reinforcing geopolitical competition in the Western Balkans.
By Maria Makurat - Human Rights & Cyber Security Teams
Germanyโs critical infrastructures
Germany is facing more cyber-attacks ever since the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and is also forced to deal with potential hybrid warfare scenarios due to drone sightings in 2025 (see drone article and interview by the president of the BKI ). Just in 2025, Germanyโs train system faced cyber-attacks as well as the Berlin airport, causing major disruptions and delays. The Global Cyber Security Outlook report 2026 by the World Economic Forum (WEF) highlights the increasing use and issue of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in relation to cyber-attacks, as well as how countries such as Germany and Denmark are shifting their cloud solutions away from foreign dependency towards regional managed cloud solutions.This shows the continuously changing world order and how countries and states are redefining their priorities and security agenda in recent years of globalisation and complex interdependence.
Will states continue to retreat back to their own methods, or will we see new cooperations and treaties being made? The theory of complex interdependence is strong in international relations theory and is a major driver for states to ensure that the risk of conflict remains low; however, no longer purely financial and trade major factors, since security has become increasingly important in the light of emerging conflicts, which makes the application of said theory difficult. Consequently, it is essential to continuously analyse and reassess the cyber strategies of states such as Germany and examine how the evolving international landscape both shapes and is shaped by these strategies.
Analysing Germanyโs cyber strategy through the international relations lens
Germany has gradually expanded its cyber strategy through institutional development, including the strengthening of the BSI and increased cooperation between civilian and military cyber units, calling it โIntegrated Security for Germanyโ. These efforts demonstrate a recognition that cyber security is no longer a niche issue but a central component of national security policy.
Many scholars, such as Nye, Thomas Rid, Valeriano and Jagoda, have and are (re)discussing the security of the cyber-domain and how one can apply theories. Can we apply realism and liberalism? Is Clausewitz appropriate in the realm of cybersecurity? An interesting note is the comparison of cyber-attacks and the human body by Allan Friedman and P.W. Singer, saying they bypass our skin like a viral infection.[1] Making a connection between the human body and international affairs theory can also be led back to sociological theories, such as โfunctionalismโ by Herbert Spencer and analysts comparing cyber-attacks directly to the human body and viruses. This can also be an interesting point of view to look at Germanyโs cyber-strategy. As the Integrated Security Report states, Germanyโs cyber strategy adopts a whole-of-society approach, encompassing civilians as well as the public and private sectors. Much like the human body, all parts must function together; if one fails, effective defence against external threats becomes impossible. However, with AI increasingly becoming part of our lives, how can we ensure this?
Valeriano and Maness discuss Kelloโs view: โNew theories and new ways of thinking are required, and Kello (2013: 8) asserts that the social science field is ill-equipped to offer anything of value now.โ[2] They further assess that one must also consider what is โeasierโ in the cyber domain: offence or defence? Nye points out that at the moment (note the analysis was 2010), the offense has an advantage in the cyber domain due to the unpredictable nature of cyber-attacks.[3]Now, in 2026, after having seen many more cyber-attacks and their consequences, it still remains difficult to make a sound statement on this but, one can say that when looking at Germany, the defence needs to be focused on more since cyber-attacks on Germany caused a cost of roughly 300 bln Euros. Furthermore, it is stated that the lines between cyber espionage and cyber-attacks from states such as China and Russia are blurring, making defence increasingly difficult when also speaking of โinformation warfareโ.
Valeriano and Maness suggest a โJust Warโ approach: โa system of justice for the use of cyber technologies where states are incentivised to maintain continued restraint.โ[4] This has also been suggested by Weber by urging Germany and other states to deepen norms in order to ensure that critical infrastructure is not being attacked. Seeing recent developments, this may be complicated since hybrid warfare and changing interdependence between states is having an influence on how states are perceiving world order. The changing order causes much unrest, which could prove problematic to ensure that states practice a constrained cyber practice. One can also bring in some theoretical viewpoints from sociology, such as how states and societies can act โmorally. Sociologists such as Sigmund already raised the question in 2001 about, how much automation, disappearance of institutionally prescribed traditions and values leads to the disappearance of social order.[5] Meaning with now more questions arising whether young people under the age of 16 should even have access to social media due to the dangers of mental health as well as cyber bullying and AI taking over more tasks, states such as Germany see themselves questioning how such a morally and ethically right cyber strategy with other states can take place when other states such as Russia have a โdifferent understanding of warfareโ (Oscar Jonsson).
The developments in the past years show that a multidimensional strategy, where one has to consider different methodologies and schools of thought when analysing these incidents to then make suggestions for further research, seems to still be the best way forward. Realism, liberalism and constructivism all have their place in international relations when analysing cyber domains.
Whilst the blackout in Germany was not a direct cyber-attack but a result of physically damaging the cable wires, the consequences were still severe. When developing a โcyberโ strategy in the light of the Ukraine Russia war and other conflicts, Germany must not only invest in cyber security, but also physically protect the critical infrastructures more strongly.
Other scholars say that the solution to a secure cyber domain is not more privacy but more openness[6]. Jagoda, for instance, argues that a lack of knowledge plays a big role for cyber security and threats. Schneider makes a point which is also discussed by Jagoda, namely that โonly bad security relies on secrecy; good security works even if all the details of it are publicโ.[7] In other words, security through obscurity, but this still seems contested. Germany is now also considering banning social media apps for individuals under the age of 16 to ensure safety and protection. Closing off access seems to be for now, the strategy forward to try and minimise danger.
Further thoughts?
This article does not claim to find the ultimate solution for a cyber-strategy. When considering many theories, methodologies and having not only an international relations lens but also an interdisciplinary lens, it becomes clear that many questions remain as to how one analyses a cyber-strategy and how can states such as Germany can move forward?
It is a difficult task for Germany and other states, since it seems that, especially for a cyber-strategy, the macro level (states and international relations in this case) is just as important as the micro level (civilians and private sector). A cyber-strategy pushes states to increasingly focus on the private sector since those remain vulnerable if not continuously โupdatedโ and educated about the cyber domain.
Recent discussions at the WEF reveal that states are increasingly reassessing their strategies and international partnerships, which will have significant implications for security and the cyber domain. Germany must continue to invest in both cyber and physical defences whilst also involving private actors and citizens in resilience-building efforts. Only through a comprehensive and adaptive approach can Germany effectively respond to the evolving challenges of cyber and hybrid warfare. Future developments, such as Germanyโs plan to develop a kind of โcyber dome against cyber-attacksโwill show whether it is possible to prevent such attacks or also the issue of โinformation warfareโ, which could not be thoroughly discussed in this article. Perhaps states must consider that cyber-attacks cannot be prevented 100% and that a certain cyber-war will, for now, always be part of our society.
[1] P. W. Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 34โ39. (from Discussion: โResilience and is cyber resilience more attainable than cybersecurity?โ)
[2] Valeriano, Brandon, and Ryan C. Maness, 'International Relations Theory and Cyber Security: Threats, Conflicts, and Ethics in an Emergent Domain', in Chris Brown, and Robyn Eckersley (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Political Theory, Oxford Handbooks (2018; online edn, Oxford Academic, 5 Apr. 2018), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198746928.013.19, accessed 23 Jan. 2026: pg 264
[3] Valeriano, Brandon, and Ryan C. Maness, 'International Relations Theory and Cyber Security: Threats, Conflicts, and Ethics in an Emergent Domain', in Chris Brown, and Robyn Eckersley (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Political Theory, Oxford Handbooks (2018; online edn, Oxford Academic, 5 Apr. 2018), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198746928.013.19, accessed 23 Jan. 2026: pg 266
[4] Valeriano, Brandon, and Ryan C. Maness, 'International Relations Theory and Cyber Security: Threats, Conflicts, and Ethics in an Emergent Domain', in Chris Brown, and Robyn Eckersley (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Political Theory, Oxford Handbooks (2018; online edn, Oxford Academic, 5 Apr. 2018), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198746928.013.19, accessed 23 Jan. 2026: pg 268.
[5] Sigmund, Steffen (2001): Zwischen Altruismus und symbolischer Anerkennung. รberlegungen zum stifterischen Handeln in mondernen Gesellschaften. In: Jansen, A. et al (Hg): Eigeninteresse und Gemeinwohlbindung. Frankfurt/M.S. S 213.
[6] โSpeculative Security.โ pg 21-36, Patrick Jagoda, โSpeculative Security.โ In Cyber Space and National Security: Threats, Opportunities, and Power in a Virtual World edited by Derek S. Reveron (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 21โ36.
[7] โSpeculative Security.โ pg 21-36, Patrick Jagoda, โSpeculative Security.โ In Cyber Space and National Security: Threats, Opportunities, and Power in a Virtual World edited by Derek S. Reveron (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012) pg 31.
By Alessia Maira (Culture, Society & Security Team)ย & Giulia Panfilo (Russia Team)
Civil resistance in the 21st century
In 1994, Randle defined the 20th century as the time a new term entered the world vocabulary: People Power. In contrast to power by defence (the idea that power stems from violence and weaponry), power by people signifies the citizens' ability to fight dictatorships, repressive governments, and military regimes. When people come together to exercise power, this is rooted in voluntary collective cooperation and is called โcivil resistanceโ. From the Latin words โcivisโ (citizen) and โresistereโ (to stand up against something), civil resistance is a relatively recent phenomenon of non violent people-led collective action against the political or economic status quo: as a conflict, it mobilises people sharing collective political struggle with protests, demonstrations, even petitions or boycotts; yet, as an act of resistance, it distinguishes itself from warfare, guerrilla, or para-military action as it must reject violence. Civil resistance is also essentially non-institutional: while citizens may conduct actions through existing institutions, the very spirit of civil resistance depends on confronting them (the legal system, governments, or even major industries) often through disruptive tactics that challenge those same structures.
Still, the impact of civil resistance on dismantling oppressive systems remains debated. Does civil resistance truly stand a chance at creating lasting change? How much power do ordinary people hold in building peace compared to military forces or usual institutional peacebuilding actions? Researcher Abbs argues that its strength lies in its power to mobilise diverse groups across social backgrounds, genders, and generations, united around a shared purpose. He concludes that nonviolent movements have instead shaped negotiations and supported democratic transitions in numerous cases - in Europe, such movements include the fall of Communism in East Germany, the rise of the Solidarnoลฤ movement in Poland, and the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia. On the characteristics and status of civil resistance, researcher Bartkowki lays down an incredible collection of โcivil strugglesโ in his book, โRecovering Non-Violent Historyโ, and argues that civil resistance is often kept in the shadow of history and is even deemed unpatriotic, ineffective, and even un-masculine: this very last point raises a question of gender. Is civil resistance seen as a weak version of political action? Why is this weakness, if any, frowned upon as โtoo feminineโ?
The link to femininity is not new, as gender and civil resistance intersect on two levels: first, womenโs significant yet underrecognised contributions to nonviolent movements; second, the way gendered perceptions of strength and legitimacy shape how such movements are publicly valued; and third, how gender affects the repression of civil resistance groups. Back to Randle, if the 20th century marked the age of civil resistance, the 21st has redefined it through the digital revolution, which offers new tools to challenge dominant institutions. Yet, the same online spaces that empower activism also enable mis/disinformation, smear campaigns, and digital harassment, often undermining both the legitimacy of civil resistance and the credibility of gender-based narratives.
Digital spaces as arenas of civil resistance
If civil resistance has historically relied on physical presence and collective action in shared offline spaces, its contemporary expressions increasingly take place in digital environments. Social media platforms, messaging applications, and online networks have allowed for the expansion of collective action, allowing for mobilisation, coordination, and visibility far beyond geographical constraints. In this sense, it can be argued that digital spaces do not replace traditional forms of resistance but extend them, allowing collective action to circulate virtually through images, testimonies, and narratives in real time.
However, these spaces of digital collective action and coordination are often deeply contested, criticised, and at the centre of ongoing debate. Digital platforms are now shaped by algorithms and commercial interests, which in turn influence whose voice gets promoted and whose voice gets marginalised. State and non-state actors are known for increasingly exploiting these algorithmic dynamics through coordinated information operations - one example being the widely documented interference in the 2016 US Elections, attributed to Russian-linked actors. Nowadays, as a consequence of how algorithms work for social media, visibility can be seen both as a resource and a liability. And while digital spaces may serve to amplify civil resistance and collective action, they also pose the risk of surveillance, repression, and counter-narratives, presenting new risks for the dynamics of contemporary civil resistance in digital spaces.
Gendered dimensions of digital resistance
Why a gendered perspective? Womenโs mobilisation in collective actions has long been linked to a decline in violent campaigns. Between 1945 and 2014, nonviolent movements saw a growing presence of women on the frontlines. Studies show that womenโs participation in collective action often encourages broader involvement, including among men. During the 2011 Egyptian revolution, activist Asmaa Mahfouz urged men to join the protests, framing her appeal as a call to โprotect their women on the streets.โ Yet this notion of protection served more as a strategic guise than a genuine vulnerability. In Pinochetโs Chile, women fought poverty through handmade arpilleras, embroidered tapestries that carried coded messages and were smuggled abroad to expose Chileโs internal repression. Similarly, in Argentina between the 1970s and 1980s, motherhood was used as a political shield: middle-aged women mothers to disappeared people (Los Desaparecidos) used their moral authority and presumed harmlessness to demand justice for their missing sons. They did not meet any military confrontation.
However, in this contemporary context, narratives are key in shaping how collective action is conducted, interpreted, legitimised or delegitimised by the wider public, institutions, and international audiences. Gender (and womanhood) could be played in a twisted way. With digital platforms expanding and authoritarian regimes tightening control, going online has become a means of survival rather than a choice, marking the 2010s as the decade of gendered transnational activism - the โhybrid world of activism.โ In Germany, the AfD instrumentalises gender narratives to oppose immigration; In Turkey, state institutions twist equality discourses to reinforce womenโs traditional roles, while in some Eastern European countries, especially Russia and Poland, debates on โfamily valuesโ promote motherhood and exclude LGBTQ+ mobilisation. Across these cases, womenโs equality is instrumentalised for political gain, their activism supported only within patriarchal, antiโWestern frames.
Access to accurate information is one of the cornerstones of democratic societies, enabling informed decisions and social cohesion. According to the United Nations, โInformation integrity refers to an information ecosystem in which freedom of expression is fully enjoyed and information that is accurate, reliable, free from discrimination and hate is available to all in an open, inclusive, safe and secure information environmentโ. Information integrity, therefore, is not only a mere technical task of removing mis/disinformation, but a social condition in itself: the ability of societies to access, trust, and interpret information at any given time.
However, in modern times, mis/disinformation tactics are increasingly part of broader strategies of political contestation and civil resistance suppression. Rather than aiming to convince audiences of a single false narrative, these tactics often seek to cause confusion and overwhelm information environments through narrative flooding, selective amplification, and other false engagement tactics. In this context, attacks of this type are often aimed at specific groups online: seven in ten women report experiencing targeted abuse through online harassment, sexualised disinformation, credibility attacks, and other similar tactics. The architecture of digital platform algorithms often amplifies these dynamics, allowing misleading content to circulate rapidly, with consequences on collective sense-making and on the informational foundations upon which civil resistance lies.
Shaping something new, navigating old struggles
Civil resistance in the digital age is no longer confined to streets or institutions: it increasingly takes place in online spaces in the form of a struggle over meaning, visibility, and credibility. Digital spaces now amplify both the possibilities and the vulnerabilities of collective action, while narratives and algorithmic structure influence who is heard, seen, trusted, or silenced.
Civil resistance has the power to unite people across ages, classes, and genders. Gender - understood as the set of societal and political expectations embodied by women, men, and people of all genders - offers a particularly insightful lens through which to analyse civil resistance in the digital age. Whether mobilised as a strategic guise or as a moral shield under especially violent regimes, gendered performances of resistance have become increasingly visible as direct, on-the-ground confrontation is diminished or rendered impossible. This shift raises a crucial question: what are the advantages and risks of resisting online? Digital resistance is a double-edged sword. While it amplifies visibility and enables new forms of mobilisation, it also exposes activists to surveillance and gender-specific threats. Another risk is attracting dominant power narratives that seek to instrumentalise gender discourses for political gain. How, then, is this struggle narrated or delegitimised by dominant and oppositional actors across the world?
As digital information environments continue to evolve, understanding collective resistance as a struggle over meaning, visibility, and credibility is essential to grasp how power, participation and democracy are being reshaped in contemporary societies.
By Isabella Marchese - AI, Cybersecurity, Space Team
In todayโs rapidly evolving security landscape, artificial intelligence (AI) has emerged as a powerful force multiplier in defense. Among the most advanced examples of this trend is the Maven Smart System (MSS), a cutting-edge command and control platform that uses machine learning and data fusion to enhance decision-making and situational awareness ( Advocacy Alliance, 2025; U.S. Army, 2025).
One of the most forward-looking applications of Maven can be found in the U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF), a headquarters responsible for coordinating Army operations across Europe and Africa. In this context, SETAF-AF provides a real example of how AI is transitioning from experimental to operational doctrine, altering the way modern military plans, decide, and act (U.S. Army, 2025; Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance).
What Is the Maven Smart System?
Maven originated as a US Department of Defense program to automate the analysis of massive amounts of video and sensor data. It gradually evolved into the Maven Smart System, a fully integrated command and control (C2) platform. MSS integrates satellite images, logistical data, open-source intelligence, and operational inputs into a unified Common Operating Picture (COP), allowing for quick analysis and visualization of high-impact events (Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, 2025). Unlike traditional C2 systems, Maven is designed to continuously adapt through real-time data ingestion and user feedback, reducing decision-making cycles from hours to minutesโor even seconds. Built using an agile DevSecOps approach, the system is constantly tested and refined through live exercises such as Scarlet Dragon and Yama Sakura (U.S. Department of Defense, XVIII Airborne Corpsโ Scarlet Dragon brings military and industry together to test artificial intelligence and cutting-edge technology, DVIDS, 2025.;U.S. Army, 2025).
SETAF-AF: AI in Action
In two strategically linked areas, SETAF-AF is essential to preserving U.S. Army preparedness and quick reaction capabilities. The incorporation of Maven into its everyday operations signifies a significant doctrinal shift rather than merely a technological advancement (Defense News, 2025).
SETAF-AF uses MSS to assist operations throughout the information environment, wargaming, and emergency planning during planning and field exercises. The command can evaluate different options, simulate crisis situations, and make quicker, better decisions by integrating AI-driven tools into these procedures.
One notable exercise in 2025 saw SETAF-AF planners using Maven to stress-test crisis response plans under complex and dynamic conditions. The system enabled teams to adapt strategies in near real time while also exploring scenarios in which AI capabilities were deliberately degraded or unavailable, reinforcing operational resilience in contested environments (Defense News, 2025).
Public Affairs and the Information Advantage
Beyond kinetic operations, SETAF-AF has expanded Mavenโs application into the information domainThe tool is currently used by the public affairs directorate to keep an eye on the information landscape, get alerts almost instantly, and react quickly to new disinformation efforts (U.S. Army, 2025).
Weekly wargaming sessions allow communication teams to train with Maven under simulated stress, improving coordination with other functional areas such as G39 Information Operations (U.S. Army, 2025).
The integration of external platforms such as Dataminr First Alert and Sprinklr further enhances this capability by providing real-time news detection and social media sentiment analysis. By fusing these inputs into the Maven COP, SETAF-AF can identify emerging narratives earlier and act proactively within the information space rather than reacting once narratives have already gained traction (U.S. Army, 2025).
Image generated with AI
NATO Integration and Strategic Interoperability
Mavenโs relevance extends well beyond U.S. forces. The Maven Smart System is being included into major international drills like STEADFAST DUEL 2025 by NATO's Joint Warfare Center (JWC) in Stavanger, Norway (NATO Joint Warfare Centre, 2025).
This project is a component of a larger endeavor to use AI-enabled capabilities to update NATO's command and control system. NATO is enhancing cross-domain coordination, boosting interoperability, and speeding up decision-making by standardizing the use of MSS among partner forces. Maven serves as a catalyst for further digital transformation throughout the Alliance as it integrates more deeply into alliance structures (NATO JWC, 2025).
Critical Reflections and Future Outlook
As demonstrated by research centers such as ITSS Verona, incorporating AI into military decision-making creates important ethical, legal, and strategic concerns. While AI may significantly speed up analysis and planning, human judgment must still be respected (Department of Defense, โResponsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathwayโ. The SETAF-AF approach represents this compromise. Maven is used as a decision-support tool to improve staff performance, streamline data operations, and reduce operational friction, but decision-making authority remains with humans. This strategy emphasises the need of combining technological innovation with theoretical clarity and accountable leadership.
Conclusion
The integration of the Maven Smart System within SETAF-AF offers a compelling example of how artificial intelligence is reshaping modern military command. From operational planning and crisis response to the information environment, Maven is more than just a technology enabler; it is becoming an essential component of modern command systems. As AI evolves, the SETAF-AF experience demonstrates a key lesson for modern militaries: innovation must be accompanied by doctrine, human judgment, and strategic responsibility.
U.S. Army, SETAF-AF Public Affairs Experiment with Emerging Technology to Shape the Information Environment, 2025. https://www.army.mil/article/289747
This question related to Top Gun: Maverick (Kosinski, 2022), can be put in parallel with the events of May 2025, when a Pakistan Air Force Jโ10CE, shot down an Indian Rafale with a longโrange PLโ15 airโtoโair long range missile. The episode came as a surprise to many analysts as the Rafale is considered an excellent 4.5 generation aircraft, and highlighted how little was still understood about the real operational performance of contemporary Chinese military aviation.
Beyond the โBest Aircraftโ Debate
While opinions may differ on which aircraft truly deserves the title of โbest,โ the debate inevitably points to a broader and more consequential question. How many fighters China actually field, at what pace their rolling off production lines, and what they compare to the their Western counterparts?
Ultimately, these considerations lead to the question that matters most: what would a direct confrontation between the US and China look like, should tensions over Taiwan ever escalate into open conflict?
It is worth noting that this final question cannot be answered with certainty, given the number of critical variables that must be taken into account: the distance U.S. forces need to traverse to reach the battlefield; the availability and use of military bases in neighbouring regions; the volume of missiles and other munitions that could be sustained through resupply; the strength of Chinaโs anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy, which is widely regarded as highly effective (Pacific Forum, 2025); and the experience of the military personnel and material engaged (the use of J-10Cs by Pakistan mark the first time a recent Chinese aircraft is used in combat).
A Shrinking Fleet, but a More Capable One
Let us begin with the numbers. A study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) highlights that the number of aircraft in active service has declined over time. While this trend has been observed across several armed forces, due to a secure environments or economic constraints, Table 1 shows that older assets have been phased out, while third-generations aircraft, such as the J-7, are in the process of disappearing. This leaves the Peopleโs Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) equipped predominantly with late-generation and advanced aircraft, such as the J-20 being the latest. If we take into account all the Chinese military branch, the number is in between of 2000 and 2300 (Edson and Saunders, 2025). (A comparative table on the generation of PLAAF aircraft in active service is available in Volume 125, Issue 1 (2025) of The Military Balance).
If you are not familiar with military aviation, this may sound like foreign language. Before digging further, letโs clarify what aircraft generations mean with the following table. Basically, generations are categorised according to the technological development of fighter aircraft. It is important to note that there are different understandings of fighter generations, which may vary depending on the author or institution. There are at least six other classifications, including one used by the Peopleโs Liberation Army (PLA).
Now let's turn our attention to production. Without delving into the full history of Chinese security and capability doctrine, it's important to understand that China has moved from static homeland and coastal air defence, where the PLA was the major actor, to "limited war actions under high-tech conditions" (USCC, 2007), and then toward a strategic force capable of deep strikes and independent missions with a greater involvement of the PLAAF and the Peopleโs Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).
This paradigm shift is linked to the Gulf War (1990โ91), which demonstrated the dominance of high-tech Western air power and questioned a PLAAF numerically large but technologically lagging behind, highlighting both its technological and doctrinal gap. Added to this is the need to protect Chinese interests located at distance or overseas, such as Taiwan, the South/East China Sea, and the "string of pearls" (sea lines of communication). This has led the PLAAF's missions to expand beyond air defence and support to the army/navy, adding roles like long-range precision strike, air superiority over contested regions, strategic transport, and contribution to joint aerospace operations.
Naturally, replacing older aircraft with more technologically advanced models comes at a cost, increasing China's defence spending from around $77 billion in 2011 to $250 billion in 2025 (ECNS, 2025). China is not clearly stating how much money it allocates to its diverse branches of the military; it is generally considered being between 21% and 25% of the budget. Therefore, it can be assumed that at least $52.5 to $62.5 billion is spent on aviation. By way of comparison, the estimated air force expenditure of the United States (air force, navy, army) for the same year was between $273 and $308 billion, and that of Russia between $30 and $45 billion (SimpleFlying, 2025).
To add a further layer to the fog of war, production figures for Chinese military aircraft are also not disclosed. Nevertheless, current estimates suggest, for multi-role fighter aircraft, that the number of aircraft produced per year by Chinese companies exceed 240. This output is broadly broken down as follows: 40 for the J-10C Vigorous Dragon, and more than 100 for the J-16 Hidden Dragons and for the J-20 Mighty Dragon.
Annual Aircraft Output
By comparison, the US has announced approximately 36 F-16s, 36 F-15s, 150 F-35s (it seems that 43% of the F-35 production is for export) and an unknown number of F-18s (which are gradually phased out), for a total of more than 222 aircraft (SimpleFlying, 2025). Even accounting for this significant export share, the numbers speak for themselves: China produces more combat aircraft each year for its own forces than the US, a trend mirrored at sea where the PLAN has already surpassed the US Navy in terms of tonnage.
In addition to Chinese-built aircraft, China continues to operate Russian-made combat aircraft (among others), namely 32 Su-27s, 97 Su-30s and 24 Su-35s (IISS, The Military Balance 2007, 2012 and 2025). While not part of the latest generation, they are potent aircraft.
Picture by Dmitriy Pichugin - PLAAF Su-30 fighter jet, commons file, CC BY-SA 4.0
Despite higher US military spending, China appears to be leading the 2025 rankings as the country with the largest number of aircraft, namely 2,747, while the US peaks at 2,123, (it should kept in mind, however, that while indicative of industrial capacity, these figures reflect quantity only, leaving aside critical variables such as training, sustainment, and combat experience). Nevertheless, if we delve more in detail at the aircraft category (Table 3), it appears that the US has more tankers and transport aircraft than its Chinese counterpart. This highlights a greater strategic flexibility than China.
Two Strategies, Two Air Forces
This divergence is the consequence of two fundamentally different strategies. Until relatively recently, Chinaโs strategy was mostly defensive, focused over territorial integrity and the protection of its immediate periphery, hence the anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) architecture designed to deter or complicate an intervention by a foreign country. This is the reason why it possesses almost twice as many fighter jets and a substantial fleet of AWACS and electronic aircraft, while not requiring long-range air-power projection capabilities (for now).
By contrast, the US has oriented its military strategy toward global power projection, working on its capabilities to operate and sustain prolonged deployments across multiple theatres simultaneously. (A comparative table of the aircraft number Russia, the U.S. and China is available on Defense Blog)
Yet, as we have seen, the numbers alone tell only part of the story. Beyond fleet size and production rates lies, the question of how these last generation aircrafts compare in terms of capability and strategic purpose. Although the latest generation aircraft in service with the PLAAF and PLAN is the J35A, which appeared at the military parade in Beijing on 3 September 2025, information about it is extremely scarce. Thus, we will focus on how the J-20 fits into China's defence strategy.
Although many details regarding the J-20 remain unknown, what is certain is that it possesses a small radar signature (stealth capabilities), the capacity to low super cruise (fly supersonic without using afterburner), and the ability to datalink with drones and other friendly platforms (exchange data in real time via a secure digital link). In addition, its passive sensor should allow the detection of aircraft by their thermal and visual/infrared signature, instead of emitting radar waves (which makes the aircraft detectable), allowing the J-20 to see without being seen, in theory (CSIS ChinaPower, 2025).
Consequently, the J-20 is equipped with long-range air-to-air missiles such as the PL-15 - the same as the one used by the Pakistani against the Rafale - and is believed to possess a 145 km range (DefenseFeeds, 2025). It is also equipped with the PL-21, which is believed to be capable of engagement beyond 200km. It thus gives the aircraft extraordinary air superiority and long-range interception capabilities. These characteristics allow the aircraft to integrate perfectly within a dense sensor network, ground-based air defences such as those deployed by Beijing in the south China sea.
Joint exercises with Russia and Pakistan have also confirmed an increase in the mastery of beyond visual range combat, based on stealth technology, sensors and long-range missiles (Leiter, 2023), perhaps detrimental to traditional dogfighting skill. This echoes the U.S. experience in the Vietnam War, when confidence in missiles led to the belief that dogfighting, and even cannons, had become obsolete, resulting in early F-4 Phantom variants being fielded without internal cannon. The disastrous result in terms of US aircrafts that were shot down, led the military to reinstate the cannon and set up the famous Top Gun program.
One might argue that the US operates broadly comparable systems that cancel each other in the end, placing a greater emphasis on the pilot skills. This is both true and misleading, because, like a football team, China enjoys the advantage of "playing at home". Thus, it benefits from the knowledge of its geography and meteorology, the distance from Taiwan (short response times), and inherently strategic position, as illustrated by the basing layout shown on the map below.
Furthermore, if the stealth factor is set aside due to modern detection capabilities constantly evolving the balance gets more subtle. These modernisation include multi-band radar, new passive electromagnetic detection systems, and "trans-horizon" radars that exploit atmospheric layers for very long-range early warning detection, such as the Franceโs Nostradamus system (Ministรจre des Armรฉes, 2025) and Chinaโs JY-27A (Odin, 2025). In addition to this are bistatic radar sets (RadarTutorial, 2025), where the transmitter and receiver are not in the same locations.
Taken together, these constant improvements suggest that the decisive factor could ultimately come down to a more traditional indicator: the number of aircraft available. As a reminder, an American F-117 was shot down by the Yugoslav forces in 1999, using radar operating in the VHF or UHF bands, underscoring that stealth aircrafts are not invisible when confronted with adaptive air-defence systems (theaviationgeekclub, 2025).
Conclusion
This inevitably highlights alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. The United States benefit from a network of partners from Japan and South Korea to Australia and the Philippines, with further support from Singapore and possibly India. In theory, this network of alliances reinforces Washington's ability to project power and conduct operations close to China's periphery (Carnegie endowment, 2025).
China, on the other hand, does not possess a comparable system of alliances. However, it compensates this weakness through its geographical and geopolitical position and its economic weight over neighboring states, and the number of military assets.
In the end, allied support involves constant trade-offs between economic risk and security obligations.
In the end, allied support cannot be taken for granted, as partners must balance security commitments against the risk of economic retaliation. This complexity is particularly salient today, amid growing uncertainty over the Trump administration to uphold its alliance commitments and security agreements. Yet this complexity remains preferable to operating without meaningful alliances, particularly for sustained operations that depend on access, resupply and extensive logistical networks.
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