Artificial Intelligence Archives

September 29, 2026 — No Comments

Analysing artificial intelligence and human (sex) trafficking

By Maria Makurat - Human Rights Team

Introduction

Human rights are now more than even challenged where one has to ask, how to keep the human factor. As has been pointed out before, the study of AI and its impact on several security and human rights issues is very much interdisciplinary combining fields such as international relations, sociology, psychology, social work and criminology. Room is left to consider the micro level of human rights such as human (sex) trafficking in relation to cyber and AI factors. This blog article aims to further open up the debate on applying international relations theories and taking an interdisciplinary approach on analysing AI in relation to human (sex) trafficking. For the sake of argument, several human rights issues such as human trafficking, sex trafficking and child pornography will be considered together. Questions can be on a societal and possibly an existential level on how we react with AI in relation to human (sex) trafficking. It becomes clear that the human factor remains essential and that one needs to find a common strand to analyse several theories.

Cyber human (sex) trafficking in 2026 and beyond

Both human (sex) trafficking and child pornography are being influenced by AI and prove to become increasingly a challenge to human rights. 2025 a major online child pornography darknet page was taken down named “Kidflix”. German authorities in cooperation with Europol managed to make dozen arrests (79 arrests and 1400 identifications) dismantling this criminal network that was sharing and distributing child sexual abuse material (CSAM) using advanced crypto-tracing and automated reporting tools. “AI is now being used throughout the cycle of child sexual exploitation. Offenders can create fake identities and even automate the grooming of victims, allowing them to scale up exploitation across languages and platforms.” Furthermore, open-source AI models pose the challenge that criminal networks can alter and de-age normal photographsand turn them into CSAM, without having much training or the need for expertise.

One could think, ‘So what? Crime networks are always there, and technology will always evolve’. What this brings to mind is that these perpetrators can and will move very swift, adjust their tactics and create harmful content at an alarming speed challenging law enforcement and scholars.

The United Nations on Drug Office and Crime and the EU warn of more human trafficking being committed in order for the victims to commit cyber-crime in certain scam centres. Crime networks use AI to deceive victims into false job advertisement and deceive them into scams whilst evading trace and detection. The European Commission strives for a new EU Strategy on combating Trafficking in Human Beings.

This shows how the issues have become complex, and the development of new or adapted criminal networks prove to be a challenge which means, sorting through theories that analyse these issues are also a task.

This leaves room for analysing theories and methodologies, tackle them with an interdisciplinary approach and eventually come up with possible ways forward. It also makes all the clearer, that keeping the humans in the loop remains a vital part in tackling these issues. Additionally, there already seems to be a co-dependence developing that namely law enforcement is applying AI in battling online human trafficking which will be explored in the following paragraph.

Theories on AI and human (sex) trafficking and the way forward?

If we consider an interdisciplinary approach, then it is all the more important to find a common ground and a strategy that one can keep adapting when wanting to apply AI to ‘combat’ human sex trafficking and preserve human rights. The many issues seem to be connected with each other which makes a separate approach challenging. There seems to be room for empirical research and developing methodologies when wanting to assess how criminals use the cyber domain to recruit people for sex trafficking. Gezinski and Pons for instance (2024) point out: “Despite undertaking this systematic review, the prevalence of online- facilitated sex trafficking is still unknown, and large-scale representative studies are needed. (…) Overall, very few empirical studies have been conducted on the relationship between sex trafficking and technology.”^[1] Garkish et al (2025) for instance concludes that an interdisciplinary approach should be focused on when wanting to find a unified way of applying AI in social work and other disciplines whilst also considering the ethics behind of using AI. This should also ensure that ethical work is ensured.^[2] Garkish also points out that social-work needs to remain “face-to-“face”. This is very similar to the debate in international relations (IR) to ‘keeping the humans in the loop’. Kjellgren (2022) also calls for a closer look at the sex trafficking schemes themselves and that one should not run the risk of being distracted by the emerging technologies in the first place.^[3]

Do we take out the humans to make decisions faster when it comes to safety or is the risk still too great to make fatal decisions? What if AI search engines can detect underage faces but those faces have been altered deepfake technology? What if sex trafficking rings recruit minors but later the videos and images to click are just barely coming of age faces. Xi Wang and Noelle E. Fearn have summarised models of AI to combat human trafficking which seem to be now about 48.^[4] Models exists to detect emojis, clothing, operating hours from businesses, language etc but major setbacks exist: “Their implementation in practice calls for interdisciplinary collaboration among technologists, law enforcement, and civil society to ensure usability and fairness.”^[5]

It becomes clear that social media companies must monitor together with governmental authorities the online presence of possible perpetrators. The question also needs to be asked: can social media platforms continue to stay truly ‘civilian’ or ‘private’ or must one accept that they will be monitored by states more strongly? What about the recent development of banning social media for under 16 year olds and states that have raised allegations against Meta due to the platform’s ‘addictive’ features? Will this perhaps have an influence and help keep young people safe in the cyber domain?

At the moment it seems that the various fields involved in researching this topic (e.g. international relations, criminology, sociology, lawyers, social workers to name a few) should try to structure several clear (research) questions to tackle this vast developing complex issue. It becomes therefore all the more vital to try to combine these theories into few strands in order to not lose focus which will be looked at more in detail in the following paragraph whilst also having the focus on the human factor.

Challenging the human rights questions on AI and human (sex) trafficking

Do we have to keep coming up with new theories or methodologies? When one searches in the web an article or a peer reviewed essay on a certain topic, the certainty that one finds something is by now very high. What if one runs the risk of losing track of the many theories and questions that need to be answered when thinking about AI and human (sex) trafficking. The next challenge would be: to find a way through a dense amount of material and ideas and streamlining it into few focused ‘strands’. As the conflicts become increasingly interwoven due to e.g hybrid warfare and the cyber domain being almost inseparable from the real world, so one needs to even more strongly find a way forward.

When looking more on the sociological and dare one says, philosophical level, by taking several steps back, one can try to look at this issue in a broader sense. One has the cyber domain, that is here to stay for sure. Then comes the issue of cyber criminals for instance in this case sex trafficking. At the moment individuals seem to be in a dilemma. Several individuals (especially younger people) navigate towards the trend of using analogue technology, not wanting to be dependent on streaming services and be possibly addicted to social media services. Speak, just now Meta has agreed to pay 17.1 bn dollars for creating addictive search algorithms and promises to alter the issue of creating a safe space for children and young people.

Looking at other articles, interesting aspects arise that we can no longer close the ‘door’ when switching off the internet. When looking back, one was able to leave the cyber domain when one was finished with their work but now, one is almost forced to stay online. Individuals have a second identity in the cyber domain as well as the security sector. One could say, a certain type of cyber conflict in relation to human rights and child pornography is taking place in the cyber domain that one cannot ‘switch off’ so easily anymore. So like Platonwho said there is not only the physical world but also something beyond (theory of forms), must we accept now that we truly need to exist both in the real and cyber world? Hypothetically, what would happen if a collective mass ‘hysteric’ or after chaos theory, everyone were to do the same and delete all their social media accounts for instance? Would this truly happen? Would this be beneficial for human rights? Or is the interdependence and co-dependence too strong already?

Marcus Aurelius also wrote in his meditations^[6], that one should not fight reality and just follow the world order however, the cyber domain is purely manmade, so how much can we accept that it is the flow of our time or the development of a greater world order?

Researchers such as Valeriano, Jensen and Maness (Cyber Strategy, 2018, Oxford University Press) agree that sanctions are still very useful when wanting to alter an ‘enemy’s’ attitude in the cyber domain, in other words the typical ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy. Within the human sex trafficking scene, one does not only want to alter the perpetrators behaviour, one wants to identify the rings and stop trafficking. Europol calls the criminals network in it’s report a “A FLUID CRIMINAL ECOSYSTEM : Why do criminal networks continue to resist and emerge?”^[7] so therefore one should also consider a strategy in the age of AI also fluid when wanting to tackle the many issues at hand.

It might be a challenge to combine different disciplines and methodologies to continue researching and combating said conflicts however, it seems to be a necessary step in the long-term run. What about applying feminist theories into this debate? Feminist theories discussed by scholars (e.g. Sjolberg, Cockburn) agree that one cannot understand the causes of war without looking or considering the gender^[8]. While it is debatable but one could consider issues such as cyber (sex) trafficking part of a certain cyber war. Sjolberg discusses that feminist theories take more different types of sources into account which could contribute to researching cyber violence. ^[9]This can in turn be useful when wanting to understand how criminals exploit AI and the cyber domain to conduct cyber (sex) trafficking and establish networks of child pornography.

Conclusion

Many human rights questions remain. Will humans be living a double life in the cyber domain? Will the stricter social media laws for young people under the age of 16 help in combating possible online grooming and recruitment? The problems are interwoven and connected which challenges several disciplines in analysing said issues.

One thing that one should not forget in this equation: communicating. With digitalisation individuals are able to communicate faster yet there have also been setbacks. That is why it is all the more important to strengthen word to word communication between young people, elders, parents but also on a security level. This could possibly contribute to a safer exchange of ideas and taking precautions. One should also consider the impact of AI centres on other areas of human and possible environmental rights which leaves rooms for further discussion in another article. There is already a lot of emerging literature, but it seems there is for now a need to organise the new articles and ideas into several strands in order to not lose focus when analysing human rights issues.

^[1] Lindsay B. Gezinski & Kwynn M. Gonzalez-Pons (2024) Sex Trafficking and Technology: A Systematic Review of Recruitment and Exploitation, Journal of Human Trafficking, 10:3, 497-511, DOI: 10.1080/23322705.2022.2034378

^[2] Garkisch, M., Goldkind, L. Considering a Unified Model of Artificial Intelligence Enhanced Social Work: A Systematic Review. J. Hum. Rights Soc. Work 10, 23–42 (2025). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41134-024-00326-y: 34.

^[3] Kjellgren R (2022) Good tech, bad tech: Policing sex trafficking with big data. International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 11(1): 149-166. https://doi.org/10.5204/ijcjsd.2139

^[4] Xi Wang and Noelle E. Fearn pg 308-315 in Ruopeng An, Michael A. Lindsey, “Artificial Intelligence in Social Work: Bridging Technology and Humanity,” GCTU Repository, accessed August 26, 2026, https://repository.gctu.edu.gh/items/show/3228.

^[5] Ruopeng An, Michael A. Lindsey, “Artificial Intelligence in Social Work: Bridging Technology and Humanity,” GCTU Repository, accessed August 12, 2026, https://repository.gctu.edu.gh/items/show/3228.: Pg: 322

^[6] Aurelius, Marcus. 2014. Meditations. Translated by Martin Hammond. Penguin Pocket Hardbacks. London, England: Penguin Classics.

^[7] https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/Blueprint-of-criminal-opportunism.pdf : pg 30

^[8] Laura Sjoberg (2024) Feminist Theories and Thinking Security Otherwise, Security Studies, 33:5, 860-884, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2024.2449334

^[9] Ibid. 874

References:

Agovic, A., Wagner, D.L. and Fisher, M. (2026) Abuse at scale: Artificial intelligence is reshaping child sexual exploitation. Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. Available at: https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/abuse-at-scale-artificial-intelligence-is-reshaping-child-sexual-exploitation/ (Accessed: 29 August 2026).

An, R. and Lindsey, M.A. (2026) Artificial Intelligence in Social Work: Bridging Technology and Humanity. GCTU Repository. Available at: https://repository.gctu.edu.gh/items/show/3228 (Accessed: 26 August 2026).

Aurelius, M. (2014) Meditations. Translated by Martin Hammond. London: Penguin Classics.

Digital Strategy – European Commission (n.d.) European approach to artificial intelligence. Available at: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/european-approach-artificial-intelligence (Accessed: 29 August 2026).

Europol (2025) Europe’s most innovative law enforcement projects honoured at Europol’s 2025 Excellence Awards. Available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/europe%E2%80%99s-most-innovative-law-enforcement-projects-honoured-europol%E2%80%99s-2025-excellence-awards (Accessed: 29 August 2026).

Europol (2026) Blueprint of criminal opportunism. Available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/Blueprint-of-criminal-opportunism.pdf (Accessed: 29 August 2026).

Garkisch, M. and Goldkind, L. (2025) ‘Considering a unified model of artificial intelligence enhanced social work: a systematic review’, Journal of Human Rights and Social Work, 10, pp. 23–42. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41134-024-00326-y.

Gezinski, L.B. and Gonzalez-Pons, K.M. (2024) ‘Sex trafficking and technology: a systematic review of recruitment and exploitation’, Journal of Human Trafficking, 10(3), pp. 497–511. https://doi.org/10.1080/23322705.2022.2034378.

ITSS Verona (2025) ‘The growing issues of violence against women in the cyber domain’. Available at: https://www.itssverona.it/the-growing-issues-of-violence-against-women-in-the-cyber-domain (Accessed: 29 August 2026).

ITSS Verona (2026) ‘AI, ICT infrastructures, and social media in today’s conflicts’. Available at: https://www.itssverona.it/ai-ict-infrastructures-and-social-media-in-todays-conflicts (Accessed: 29 August 2026).

Kjellgren, R. (2022) ‘Good tech, bad tech: policing sex trafficking with big data’, International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy, 11(1), pp. 149–166. https://doi.org/10.5204/ijcjsd.2139.

Reichart, J. (2025) ‘So gelang bayerischen Ermittlern der Schlag gegen Kidflix’, BR24, 4 April. Available at: https://www.br.de/nachrichten/bayern/so-gelang-bayerischen-ermittlern-der-schlag-gegen-kidflix,UgLaM9T (Accessed: 29 August 2026).

ScienceDirect Topics (n.d.) Chaos theory. Available at: https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/earth-and-planetary-sciences/chaos-theory (Accessed: 29 August 2026).

Sjoberg, L. (2024) ‘Feminist theories and thinking security otherwise’, Security Studies, 33(5), pp. 860–884. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2024.2449334.

Vogue Adria (n.d.) Offline analog trend. Available at: https://vogueadria.com/offline-analog-trend/ (Accessed: 29 August 2026).

Wang, X. and Fearn, N.E. (2026) ‘Artificial Intelligence in Social Work: Bridging Technology and Humanity’, in An, R. and Lindsey, M.A., Artificial Intelligence in Social Work: Bridging Technology and Humanity. GCTU Repository, pp. 308–315. Available at: https://repository.gctu.edu.gh/items/show/3228 (Accessed: 26 August 2026).

BBC, “US states call for big changes to Instagram and Facebook as Meta child privacy trial begins”, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clyqpx6xk69o , Date accessed: 18 August 2026

BBC, “Meta to pay up to $18bn to settle claims its platforms harm children,” https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cd68q3wynnqo#google_vignette , Date accessed: 26 August 2026

Medium – “We Used to Log Off” , https://uxdesign.cc/we-used-to-log-off-36771c18926b , Date accessed: 15 July 2026

Daily Philosophy – “Plato’s Theory of Forms - Stepping out of the shadows and into the light,” Matthias, Andreas, https://daily-philosophy.com/platos-theory-of-forms/

Political Science Institute – “Feminist Perspectives in International Relations”, https://polsci.institute/international-relations-world-history/feminist-perspectives-in-international-relations/?utm_source=chatgpt.com , Date accessed: 10 Jult 2026

July 6, 2026 — No Comments

Active cyber defence and generational trends in using technology

By Maria Makurat - Human Rights and Cyber Security Teams

Introduction

“Couldn’t we just shut it off? You know, cut the wires?” “There is no if, it cannot be shut off”.(Ocean’s 13, 2007). Nearly 20 years later, the thought of implementing an artificial intelligence (AI) machine is now very likely and no longer a fiction when thinking about casinos or other institutions. With the continuous rise of AI new cybersecurity threats are and will take place so, “pick your natural disaster” (Ocean’s 13, 2007). The development of autonomous weapons (AWs) and large language models (LLMs) are increasingly playing a role in testing cyber defence strategies of countries such as Germany and the rest of the EU. The international affairs field is continuously asking questions about: ethics in cyber warfare, cognitive warfare and AI, how to describe certain attacks, how can one analyse a country’s cyber strategy in the first place to name a few. AI is rapidly evolving, and new threats are on the rise. “Mythos” is a new development in AI that can cause great damage in hacking and cyber-attacks. Mythos is able to identify the vulnerabilities of systems making it thus for hackers a tool to identify the chinks in the chain and use it for their own gain. But what also about the changing trends of using technology in the first place? Younger generations such as Gen Z are favouring analogue technology and one sees a trend of people having the desire to go back to ‘physical media’. Could this possibly have an influence on the future of cyber defence if individuals are favouring not to use technology?

With this in mind, can Europe for instance develop a certain AI cyber strategy (favouring the offensive active side) and continue to ensure the safety of all sectors? How do individual needs and trends fit into this?

The development of an AI cyber strategy?

Researchers (e.g. Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Wilhelm Vosse) are talking more about Active Cyber Defence (ACD). Meaning there is a shift in cyber strategy that it is no longer solemnly about Cyber Defence (CD) but also proactively taking steps and measurements to prevent attacks from happening in the first place. However as early as 2017, scholars such as Scott Jasper already encouraged an automated cyber defence in order to halt attacks before they can even begin to cause damage. The recent G7 summit has taken place in Évian, also hosted for the first time CEO’s from :Open AI, Google DeepMind and Anthropic. This shows how strongly at the moment states combine their strategy with industry innovation since both go hand in hand in terms of continuously developing a cyber-strategy or what we might see, an AI active cyber-strategy. The meeting called upon guidelines where the US should have a pivotal regulating role and avoiding chips manufactured by China. The dynamics become even more complex as conflicts and different situations amongst states influence the development of an AI cyber strategy and even push states to regulating access to certain systems. Anthropic has released the statement: “The US government, citing national security authorities, has issued an export control directive to suspend all access to Fable 5 and Mythos 5 by any foreign national, whether inside or outside the United States, including foreign national Anthropic employees.”

It seems that one is moving into the debate of how one can have a single state determine for us what is safe and what isn’t whilst at the same time ensuring that individuals are regularly kept ‘up-to-date’ with latest possible malicious activities? Should we head towards a single regulating ‘body’ that makes sure that our cyber domain is safe? Will we have more cyber laws and push people ‘living’ more in the cyber realm? It is a tandem of focusing on the macro and micro level whilst keeping up with the overall rapid (malicious) development of technology. Each country seems to share of course resources to develop a strategy against the rising threat of AI yet, still each state faces individual hurdles and challenges that makes a unified AI active cyber strategy difficult to consider. Germany for instance has now taken a step towards a more active cyber strategy whilst France has now put talent development at the top of their strategy preferring , the individual level when speaking from a sociological point of view. South Korea’s biggest issues remains North Korea’s cyber-attacks so their focus lies there.

If we were to dive deeper into thinking about the methodology and taking the factors “society” and “individuals” into account, the development of an AI cyber strategy and the mere thought of states and countries continuing to ‘wage war’ against each other in the cyber domain, becomes more complex. Max Weber for instance claims that one has to take the factor “discipline” into account when analysing war and societal changes. Weber states the following: “The kind of weapon has been the result and not the cause of discipline.” So if we refer to cyber-attacks and hacking systems such as “Mythos” indeed as ‘weapons’, then they are apparently the result of discipline and should be treated with great care. When we consider discipline, then one also has to take the individual person into account. In the following, hypothetical questions will be asked in order to allow future debates to take place regarding how generations are using technology, especially younger ones. Whilst a macro viewpoint is essential, a micro approach focusing strongly on the individuals is equally important.

Trends amongst younger generations in using technology

Perhaps the recent trend with young people using more old digital technology will be the solution to be safer? There even is an initiative or a so-called “AI resistance movement” with individuals wanting customised computers and technology that does not have any AI integrated. Looking at the creative sector, news stories talk about the trend of individuals (especially younger generations gen z) coming together to create physical mood boards from magazines, reading physical books at the library in groups or for instance having a hobby group where one is not allowed to open any technology device.

These questions are of course speculative and hypothetical and up for debate however, taking one step back and looking at the society through a different lens may open up new ways of thinking. What if the civilians start moving ‘backwards’ in the cyber world? What if one develops active cyber strategies but eventually, civilians might find it ‘safer’ to avoid said technologies in the first place? Perhaps individuals will go back completely to using flip phones with no access to AI or prefer having a physical magazine or book instead of exposing their data to algorithms that suggest them reading lists. Some researchers (Anurushmitha, J et al) even suggest that younger generations are less prepared for malicious cyber attacks due to being ‘over-confident’ with technology. So in this regard, it would be interesting for future research to keep analysing how generations are interacting with emerging technologies and whether one sees a decline in the use of advanced technology or a growing confident secure way.

*Unsplash: Photo by Curology on Unsplash*

As of this moment it seems like patchwork: one is running to catch up with the emerging problems that AI causes. For example, artists were very much against AI (in 2022) because they wanted to protect their art and copyright. An overall AI cyber strategy for Europe would entail a strategy that goes through all niches and little ‘cracks’ in our society, not only pure defence of military capabilities. The strategy needs to protect critical infrastructure as well as go through our society and directly entail individual’s needs. Scholars such as Henschaw also argue in favour of focusing on the human factor when developing a cyber strategy.

However, one also needs to consider, humans want to act first which is much discussed in disciplines of psychology and sociology. Consultants also can have an interesting take on this matter when one tries to apply for instance Stephen R Covey’s methods. Covey points out when discussing his 7 habits, that “In addition to self-awareness, imagination, and conscience, it is the fourth human endowment -- independent will – that really makes effective self-management possible (…) It is the ability to act rather than to be acted upon, to proactively carry out the program we have developed through the other three endowments.” These questions and concerns show, that the field of analysing cyber issues very much correlates with human interactions which is also highlighted by scholars such as Cavelty et al: “Overreliance on quantitative data could result in technically sound but inadequately human-centred policies that fail to address underlying societal concerns.”

Concluding thoughts and open questions

Can the EU develop one comprehensive AI cyber strategy to combat malicious AI cyber-attacks from the outside? As of this moment, each EU country regularly releases its own (active) cyber defence strategy and also puts emphasis on its own needs, making therefore an EU AI cyber strategy as of this moment a challenging task. It would be interesting to conduct field research on how younger generations are acting with analogue technology and whether they would truly prefer a space with less AI and advanced technology. The Art of War by Zhang Yu states: “Adaptions means not clinging to fixed methods, but changing appropriately according to events, acting as is suitable.”

References:

Alexis Henshaw, Anwar Mhajne, Beyond the Basics: Critical Perspectives on Cybersecurity in International Relations, Global Studies Quarterly, Volume 5, Issue 3, July 2025, ksaf067, https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksaf067

Anurushmitha, J., Nikhitha, D. and Pramod, J.P. (2026) ‘Cyber Security Awareness Among GenZ’, International Journal of Scientific Research and Technology, 3(3), pp. 159–167.

https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18928049.

Covey, S.R. (1989) The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People. First Fireside Edition.

Dunn Cavelty, M., Pulver, T. and Smeets, M. (2024) ‘The Evolution of Cyberconflict Studies’, International Affairs, 100(6), pp. 2317–2339. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiae175.

Gerth, H.H. and Mills, C. Wright (1947) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd.

Henshaw, A. and Mhajne, A. (2025) ‘Beyond the Basics: Critical Perspectives on Cybersecurity in International Relations’, Global Studies Quarterly, 5(3), ksaf067. https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksaf067.

Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Tobias Pulver, Max Smeets, The evolution of cyberconflict studies, International Affairs, Volume 100, Issue 6, November 2024, Pages 2317–2339, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiae175, pg:2338

Stephen R Covey, “the 7 Habits of Highly Effective People” First Fireside Edition, 1989, pg 147-148

Sun Tzu (2003) The Art of War: Complete Texts and Commentaries. Translated by Thomas Cleary. Shambhala, Boston and London.

Anthropic (2026) Fable Mythos access. Available at: https://www.anthropic.com/news/fable-mythos-access (Accessed: 13 June 2026).

CNBC (2026) Anthropic, Amodei, Google, Hassabis: US AI coalition G7. Available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/17/anthropic-amodei-google-hassabis-us-ai-coalition-g7.html (Accessed: 20 June 2026).

Cyble (2026) France national cybersecurity strategy 2026. Available at: https://cyble.com/blog/france-national-cybersecurity-strategy-2026/ (Accessed: 12 June 2026).

Digital Strategy – European Commission (n.d.) European approach to artificial intelligence. Available at: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/european-approach-artificial-intelligence (Accessed: 1 June 2026).

DIG Watch (2026) Germany approves draft law expanding cyber defense powers for federal authorities. Available at: https://dig.watch/updates/germany-approves-draft-law-expanding-cyber-defense-powers-for-federal-authorities (Accessed: 1 June 2026).

Euronews (2026) Wars, tariffs and AI: what to expect from the G7 summit in Evian. Available at: https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/06/14/wars-tariffs-and-ai-what-to-expect-from-the-g7-summit-in-evian (Accessed: 14 June 2026).

ITSS Verona (2026) AI, ICT infrastructures, and social media in today’s conflicts. Available at: https://www.itssverona.it/ai-ict-infrastructures-and-social-media-in-todays-conflicts (Accessed: 20 March 2026).

July 22, 2025 — No Comments

Riding the Wave: The Opportunity for AI Collaboration in South Asia

By Dhruv Banerjee - South Asia Desk

Regional Cooperation in South Asia: A Tale of Ups and Downs

South Asia’s struggle to achieve effective regional integration has been well documented. Previously, World Bank estimates have indicated that intra-regional trade accounts for a meager 5 percent of the total trade in South Asia. For context, the percentage for intra-regional trade in South-east Asia is about five times as much, a significant difference. In turn, a combined lack of regional integration and stability has led to a dearth of foreign direct investment flowing into the region. A multitude of reasons have held back regional integration. These include border instability between countries, diverging economic goals, and uncertainty about each other’s intentions.

Initially, the path to overcoming these issues was institutionally conceived in the form of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), established in 1985. However, since 2014, there have been a total of zero summits, primarily because of increased tensions between India and Pakistan following the 2016 Pulwama terror attack. SAARC’s institutional deadlock was a deeply worrying event with regard to the prospect of regional cooperation in South Asia. SAARC’s failure led to a re-evaluation of neighbourhood policy for countries like India, with the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) now viewed as an alternative institutional approach. The idea was that connectivity along the Bay of Bengal would be a strategically effective measure to spur regional interconnectivity.

Over the last nine years or so, India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, Thailand, Bhutan, and Myanmar have ramped up participation within the organisation. They have focused on several different areas of cooperation, held frequent meetings, and streamlined the organisational structure. There have been six BIMSTEC summits, the latest one taking place in Thailand in April 2025. A notable exception to collaboration under BIMSTEC, however, is the lack of measures around Artificial Intelligence. This is even more surprising given that technology is one of the key areas of collaboration in the organisation. Thus far, there are no concrete initiatives under BIMSTEC that seek to explicitly address Artificial Intelligence as a means of cooperation. There are no expert groups explicitly seeking to address AI, and no official frameworks, agreements, or MoUs specifically aimed towards AI. Not capitalising on the prospect of strengthening cooperation by focusing on AI would be a big opportunity foregone for BIMSTEC.

Given the rapid diffusion of the technology, most member states do not yet have comprehensive regulatory frameworks in place. This is actually an opportunity, since they can now coordinate their respective domestic policies, which in turn would reduce the compliance costs for companies in a BIMSTEC state to work across borders. Reports on the Asia-Pacific demonstrate that intergovernmental collaboration on AI can have a two-fold effect of attracting foreign investment and improving public service delivery. Converging AI policies can also improve technical and technological transfer between countries. Certainly, global AI summits and the spread of AI Safety Institutes (AISI) seem to suggest a global consensus that AI collaboration is indeed fruitful. All of this is to suggest something intuitive: It is time for South Asia, and more specifically, BIMSTEC, to focus on collaboration in Artificial Intelligence.

How AI Collaboration Can Be Effective for BIMSTEC

Given the breadth and sheer scale of developments related to AI globally, it can be tempting to try to dabble in every possible policy angle related to AI. However, for a multilateral organisation such as BIMSTEC, with relatively limited funding, it would be prudent to focus on a few specific factors. There are four main considerations with regard to AI cooperation in BIMSTEC.

Firstly, cooperation on AI could lead to regional economic growth and attract more investment from abroad. This is a sentiment echoed by the BIMSTEC Secretary General, who stated that “regional collaboration on AI standards” was essential in achieving “collective development goals”. Certainly, the conditions are conducive for such growth. After all, the BIMSTEC countries have a young population, and therefore a strong workforce, with a majority of people below the age of 30. Collaboration on upskilling this workforce to be adept at developing and using AI is thus a lucrative opportunity for members. A good way to do this would, of course, be to facilitate cross-border exchange programs and education opportunities specifically designed for AI and related fields, perhaps through a flagship BIMSTEC AI scholars program. Providing a platform to AI companies in BIMSTEC countries in the form of a workshop or a startup summit would further allow cross-order exchange of ideas and facilitate a young and vibrant regional AI innovation ecosystem.

Secondly, collaborating on AI could help BIMSTEC members collectively address issues in critical sectors. For context, BIMSTEC has 7 priority “sectors” of cooperation, which have further sub-sectors. Coordination between members on the use of AI technologies in key sectors such as agriculture, connectivity, and disaster management (sub-sector under security) would be highly beneficial. The 2nd BIMSTEC ministerial meeting on Agriculture called for coordination in using “new agriculture technology, including artificial intelligence”, and such efforts across each of the sectors would make the Bay of Bengal region a hub for incorporating emerging technologies into critical sectors. This, in turn, would also prove attractive to investors.

Thirdly, AI safety and cooperation are relatively non-political subjects, making cooperation easier. Naturally, issues related to security or even economic integration tend to be harder to build consensus around, due to the potentially politically divergent objectives of members in these areas. A number of security-related conventions and agreements in BIMSTEC have taken a long time to finalise, or have seen really slow progress. In contrast, AI is a relatively less contentious issue. Agreeing on the broad tenets of AI safety, or technology transfer of low-risk Artificial Intelligence, is unlikely to elicit much opposition. Since all the countries within BIMSTEC are developing nations, they also largely share the dilemma of balancing AI for economic growth with regulation to ensure AI safety.

*Photo by Amar Preciado: https://www.pexels.com/photo/detailed-vintage-globe-showing-south-asia-region-30792665/*

Finally, AI-oriented collaboration is logistically plausible if the existing measures under the technology sub-sector can be leveraged effectively. Currently, technology is a sub-sector under the broader science, technology, and innovation sector, which is led by Sri Lanka. Under this sub-sector, the Technology Transfer Facility (TTF) can be particularly useful in the context of AI collaboration. The mandate of the TTF (defined in an MoA signed in 2022) should be modified to include Artificial Intelligence. Following this, it can run “diagnostic studies” to assess the AI needs of each member state. Then, this information can be used by the TTF to provide targeted recommendations for AI-related technology transfer between member states. Additionally, the BIMSTEC Expert Group on Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) Cooperation, which has previously met in 2023 and 2024, could focus on broader objectives. The expert group should gear its third meeting towards addressing the potential of establishing a BIMSTEC framework on AI safety. This would help harmonise the currently divergent AI regulatory approaches undertaken by member states. In this vein, a prudent area to focus on would be to recommend that all the member states set up AI Safety Institutes to become part of the global AISI network, with India having decided to set up an AISI earlier this year.

Keeping all of this in mind, it is fair to conclude that collaboration on AI can serve as an effective path to increased regional cooperation in South Asia. In particular, BIMSTEC should consider increasing its focus on AI, in terms of both discourse and funding. After all, coordinating approaches to AI would be beneficial for member states in terms of both economic and security considerations, while also providing a relatively non-political area of cooperation. The future can be a bright one for South Asia, provided it works together to embrace the technologies that define it.

April 14, 2025 — No Comments

AI and Autonomous Weapons: How Tech Firms Are Transforming Global Defence

By Idriss El Alaoui Talibi, Mahssan Afzali, & Michele Mignogna - Defence and Procurement Desk

Introduction

While early forms of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) have existed for decades, the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) has pushed these technologies beyond simple automation, making them more independent, adaptive, and more lethal than ever before. A groundbreaking innovation or a dangerous gamble?

AWS, defined as military systems or “weapons that select and apply force to targets without human intervention” by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), are no longer futuristic concepts, but rather on-field realities.

Applications on the Field

Recently, several uses of AI-driven weapons have been recorded in both Ukraine and Gaza, further underscoring how modern battlefields are undergoing a fundamental shift. These incidents signal the dawn of an era where machines transcend their traditional roles as tools and become active combatants.

While Ukraine has leveraged AI-driven drone swarms for reconnaissance and precision strikes, Israel has, in turn, deployed systems such as “Lavender” or “Gospel” in bombing campaigns in Palestine. These battlefield realities embody this shift toward machine-driven decision-making in warfare, hinting at a future where AWS plays decisive roles in combat scenarios, raising several ethical, legal, but also strategic concerns.

The Third Revolution in Warfare

This shift, often called the “third revolution in warfare,” is being driven by rapid advancements in AI. As the global race for AI dominance intensifies—especially between the U.S. and China—its impact is reaching far beyond the social and economic realms, reshaping military power and defense strategies.

With innovation largely led by the private sector, governments are no longer the primary drivers of technological change. Instead, they must adapt—either by cooperating with or controlling tech firms. The U.S. and China represent two competing models: one focused on aligning public and private innovation, the other on centralising power under a single-party state. How these models perform will shape future global power dynamics and success on the battlefield.

As said, at the heart of this revolution is the private sector, which is rapidly transforming the defence landscape, and its players. Traditionally, military technology was dominated by established defence contractors such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, or BAE systems. However, lately, a new wave of tech-driven defence firms is challenging this status quo. Indeed, according to groundbreaking reports from the U.S., Palantir, Anduril, OpenAI, and SpaceX have formed a consortium to bid for defense contracts, leveraging their cutting-edge technologies to introduce AI-enhanced military capabilities to the defense industry. Recent data shows that between 2019 and 2022, U.S. military and intelligence agencies awarded major tech companies contracts worth at least $53 billion. Altogether, these firms aim at offering more agile and cost-effective solutions, potentially, reshaping, not only, modern warfare, but also the industry of defence.

The Involvement of Tech Companies

Tech companies are driving innovation at a pace that traditional defence contractors struggle to match. For example, Skydio, a San Francisco-based startup, has developed autonomous drones utilising artificial intelligence to execute missions without GPS. On the other hand, collaborations between OpenAI and Anduril Industries aim to integrate advanced AI technologies into military systems to enhance capabilities such as countering drone threats. This contribution, by nature, has resulted in vigorous competition in the pursuit of profit maximization and market dominance in defense technologies. Tech firms are increasingly engaging in defense contracts to expand their market presence. For instance, companies like Palantir and Anduril along with SpaceX and OpenAI are in pursuit of Pentagon contractswhile Skydio has secured significant contracts with the U.S. Department of Defense and its allies.

But regardless of their significant effect on military capabilities, these innovations can lead to reduced government control and therefore a cause for concern for national security. According to the World Economic Forum, non-state actors can convert civilian devices, like commercial drones, into lethal AW using open-source AI and lightweight processing. Once such software is adapted for military purposes, its global dissemination becomes challenging to control.

Additionally, the deployment of AWS has its own ethical complications. A central concern is the delegation of life-and-death decisions to machines without meaningful human control, especially when adhering to principles of distinction and proportionality under International Humanitarian Law. There is growing concern over the ability of these systems to effectively differentiate between combatants and non-combatants and to assess the proportionality of an attack. More complicated would be situations in which AI has picked up biases from underlying data sets and may wrongly determine who a legitimate target is based on factors including gender, age, race, and ability.

Conclusion

The integration of AI and AWS is ushering in a new era of warfare—one increasingly shaped not by governments alone, but by private tech companies whose innovation cycles far outpace traditional defence procurement models. This shift presents both unprecedented opportunities and complex challenges. On the one hand, firms like Palantir, Anduril, SpaceX, OpenAI, and Skydio are redefining what is technologically possible on the battlefield. On the other hand, their growing role in national security raises urgent questionsabout control, accountability, and ethical use.

As the arms race in AI intensifies—particularly between the U.S. and China—it is not only state power but industrial ecosystems that will determine strategic advantage. The success of future military operations may depend less on the quantity of traditional assets and more on the ability to harness real-time data, autonomous systems, and AI-enhanced decision-making. This transforms procurement priorities, requiring defence institutions to adapt procurement frameworks, ensure effective oversight, and navigate a landscape where innovation is driven by market incentives rather than strategic necessity.

If left unchecked, the proliferation of AWS could destabilize existing deterrence models and accelerate a global arms race where lethal capabilities are deployed with reduced human oversight. Conversely, responsible integration—backed by clear policy, ethical safeguards, and intergovernmental coordination—could enhance operational effectiveness while maintaining international legal and moral standards.

Ultimately, the battlefield of tomorrow is being built today—not only in labs and war rooms, but in boardrooms, investment rounds, and strategic alliances between governments and the private sector. The question is no longer if tech companies will reshape global security, but how states will respond to remain in control of it.

December 30, 2024 — No Comments

The Hi-Tech Alliance: Big Tech and US Defence

by Francesco Cirillo - USA Team

With Donald Trump's victory, the US Big Tech, with the second Trump administration, could significantly influence and consolidate the strong interconnection between the federal government and American technology companies.

In recent years, the relationship between the military industrial complex and the US tech companies (Amazon, Microsoft and Google in the lead) has strengthened, especially on technology renewal issues coming from the Pentagon in the political-military sphere. This connects the relationship between Silicon Valley and the military-industrial complex in national security matters.

In the context of the future Trump administration, which will take office on 20 January 2025, the latter could grant Big Tech ample room to manoeuvres in exchange for support in national security matters.

The strong concern is the partnership that could emerge in a public-private collaboration. According to a recent 2024 paper by Costs of War/Brown University's WATSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, entitled ‘How Big Tech and Silicon Valley are Transforming the Military-Industrial Complex’, the link between the Department of Defence and the tech company sector is gradually influencing and directing the Pentagon's investments and the Defence Budget ($886 billion for the year 2024). In the current context, the role of Tech companies such as Amazon, Google, and Microsoft is increasing dramatically, competing with traditional US defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin.

Besides the classic Big Tech companies, other companies such as Palantir Technologies also carve out important spaces for themselves. Founded in 2003 by Peter Thiel and Alex Karp to develop software for analyzing large amounts of data, this company is one of the best known cases of start-ups backed by military and intelligence funds that have become key players in providing services and technologies to the Department of Defence (DoD) and other federal agencies.

During its early stages, Palantir received around $2 million in funding from In-Q-Tel, the CIA's venture capital fund, which enabled the start-up to grow rapidly and acquire contracts with various government agencies. This helped Palantir to be able to grow, giving it important resources to be able to strengthen its relationships with major government agencies.

For several insiders, Palantir's role, linked to its potential, would grant it the cards to transform itself into a figure similar to Raytheon or Lockheed Martin, historically dominant companies in the defense sector. Indeed, it is theorized that Palantir and other technology companies, such as Microsoft and Amazon, may soon get to acquire traditional defence contractors, blurring the distinction between the technology industry and the US defence sector.

*Image Source: Generated with ChatGPT/DALL·E*

The role of tech companies has started to strengthen since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine of growing tensions with China. Linked to these geopolitical tensions, several start-ups operating in the tech sector are receiving significant investments. Among these is Anduril, a company operating in the production of military systems and drones with a focus on AI integration, which recently completed a $1.5 billion funding round, bringing its valuation to $14 billion.

As a matter of fact, the role of Big Tech in the coming years could be consolidated also in view of the geopolitical competition with Beijing.

March 11, 2024 — No Comments

Beijing and Washington try to talk to each other about AI

Author: Francesco Cirillo - U.S. Team

The sudden emergence of applications related to artificial intelligence, which combine different fields of work, is at the centre of international agendas and governments. The issue of the possible risks of AI has focused the debate on the need to find common ground, especially between China and the United States, the two major global economic powers and key players in AI research and development, both in the public and private Big Tech sectors, both in the US and in China.

In recent months, following the San Francisco Summit in November 2023, where a very important bilateral meeting between Joe Biden and Xi Jinping took place, China and the US have started to engage in a dialogue to create global governance on AI. For several experts, Sino-American cooperation is crucial to avoid a political-military race in the AI sector, as was also said by Sam Altman, CEO of OpenAI. From Beijing's perspective, the issue remains a priority due to the delicate diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing. Between December 2023 and January 2024, two Chinese academics wrote two papers attempting to define the new China-US relationship from Beijing's perspective.

Da Wei, a professor at Tsinghua University, highlights four key concepts needed to analyse the new 'normal' in Sino-US relations after the San Francisco summit. The paper points out that relations will remain predominantly negative in the long term, but analyses the condition that neither power wants a direct confrontation on the economic level. From the point of view of Chinese academics, there seems to be the idea that both China and the US must find the need to coexist, especially to consolidate dialogue on issues of artificial intelligence.

Here too, Chinese academics and experts reiterate the need for high-level dialogue to build global governance on AI.

Even the world of independent academic research is moving to protect the impartiality of scientific research on AI.

On 5 March, a team of MIT experts published a letter, "A Safe Harbor for AI Evaluation and Red Teaming," calling on tech companies involved in generative AI research to implement independent evaluation systems for AI-related risks. The letter, signed by several experts, refers to the confidentiality and corporate security issues that many Big Techs, most notably OpenAI, have within their R&D teams, preventing an unbiased assessment of the risks associated with the sudden development of AI, accelerated from December 2022.

Artificial Intelligence issues have entered the international debate because of their potential in various sectors, but also because of the competition/cooperation that both China and the United States will have to face in the coming years on issues related to the integration of AI systems in the economic, political and military spheres.

International competition and the race to dominate AI could change the current status of global governance, but it would not change the game and the competition between the great powers, since technological innovation has always played a key role in the global hegemony of the superpower that would gain a strategic advantage over all the other great global powers.

October 4, 2023 — No Comments

The tension between China and the US also has an impact on the technological world

Author: Francesco Cirillo - U.S. Team

Washington and Beijing have planned strategies to increase semiconductor production with the advent of Artificial Intelligence. For this reason, Washington is somewhat concerned about China's chip production capabilities; the concern increased after the unveiling of the new Mate 60 Pro smartphone by Huawei. The chip component of this product is unique: in fact, semiconductor companies in Beijing and the People's Republic produce them entirely. US analysts think this demonstrates Beijing's technological capabilities and China's ability to become independent in technology production.

It is crucial for many companies, particularly Nvidia, to maintain a steady relationship with the People's Republic; this is a different view for the US government. To slow the growth of the industry, especially the development of the artificial intelligence field, the White House, Congress, and the defence and intelligence apparatuses should implement a containment strategy in the supply chain of the semiconductor industry. The New York Times states that China has used artificial intelligence tools, in particular, to pursue disinformation actions. This, according to Microsoft researchers, indicates that Beijing is eager to use generative AI to produce images and disseminate them online to apply disinformation actions.

For Beijing, one of the ways China could obtain the resources to compete with the US in that area is through the technology race. In a recent report translated by the CSIS (Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP, 2023), At the Seventh Collective Study Session of the CCP Central Committee Politburo, Xi Jinping Emphasized Comprehensively Strengthening Military Governance and Using High-Standard Governance to Promote High- Quality Military Development [习近平在中共中央政治局第七次集体学习时强调全面加强军事治理以高水平治理推动我军高质量发展]. Interpretation: China (originally published 2023), a working group of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, outlines guidelines for the integration of HiTech tools into the Chinese armed forces.

*Source*: https://www.pexels.com/it-it/foto/luce-blu-e-rossa-dal-computer-1933900/

Beijing recently announced the launch of a new approximately USD 40 billion investment fund intending to support the industrial growth of technology companies. The contention between the People's Republic of China and the US has also affected the artificial intelligence sector. The US is trying to impose restrictions on US companies operating and selling technology products to Chinese companies to hinder China's access to the industrial chain.

The Semiconductor Industry Association has stated that China will purchase chips and semiconductors worth around $180 billion in 2022 and only a few companies, including Intel, Nvidia and Qualcomm, have a significant relationship with Beijing. These companies are the only ones authorised by the US authorities to sell chips for Huawei's smartphones. In an economic and technological competition that Washington hopes will limit China's growth and development in the HiTech sector, further trade conflicts could also hurt US companies themselves.

November 21, 2022 — No Comments

Artificial Intelligence in the World of Art: A Human Rights Dilemma

Author: Maria Makurat.

Artificial Intelligence or “AI” is already being widely used for various purposes whether it be in analysing marketing trends, modern warfare or as of recently: reproducing artwork. Around 2021 and up till now, various articles have been released discussing the issue of AI being developed to reproduce an artist’s style and even recreate new artwork and therefore bringing up ethical issue of whether artists are in danger of losing their copyright claim on their own work. Whilst this issue is very new and one cannot say for sure where this development is going and whether one should be concerned in the first place. This article explains the recent debate and issues that are being addressed while drawing upon classical AI theory from warfare and highlighting possible suggestions.

Artificial intelligence not only in the military realm

“In April this year, the company announced DALL-E 2, which can generate photos, illustrations, and paintings that look like they were produced by human artists. This July OpenAI announced that DALL-E would be made available to anyone to use and said that images could be used for commercial purposes.”

An article by Wired “Algorithms Can Now Mimic Any Artist. Some Artists Hate It,” discusses how an AI called “DALL- E 2” can reproduce an artist’s style and make new photos, digital art and paintings. In theory anyone can use the programme to mimic another artist, or artists can sue it to make new art based on their old work. This of course brings many issues to light such as whether one can put a copyright on an art style (as is also discussed in the article), what exactly one wants to achieve with using AI to recreate more art and how this will be discussed in the future if indeed art work will be stolen. An earlier article by the Los Angeles Times from 2020 “Edison, Morse ... Watson? Artificial intelligence poses test of who’s an inventor,” already addressed this issue by discussing who is exactly the “inventor” when AI can develop for instance computer games and other inventions. It is true that a human being must develop the AI programme however, can that person also then be called the inventor if that said programme develops own ideas and perhaps own artwork? In relation to the general debate, one should consider “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights” Article 27: “Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.”

Some recent debate centres not only around whether it is a question of the “ethics” in artificial intelligence but going one step back to understand the term “intelligence”. Joanna J Bryson writes: “Intelligence is the capacity to do the right thing at the right time. It is the ability to respond to the opportunities and challenges presented by context.”^[i] Whilst the authors consider AI in relation to law, they do point out that: “Artificial intelligence only occurs by and with design. Thus, AI is only produced intentionally, for a purpose, by one or more member of the human society.”^[ii] Joanna further discusses that the word artificial means that something has been made by humans and therefore again brings up a key concept in AI of whether the human or the programme is responsible.^[iii] When we consider this in relation to human rights issues and ethics, it may be true that AI in the world of art can be produced with a purpose by humans, but it remains the problematic issue of what the purpose is. We need the clear outline of why this AI programme has been made in the art world and for what purpose in order to then be able to answer further questions.

It has been pointed out that one should consider this development as nothing new since AI has been already used in the 1950s and 1960s to generate certain patterns and shapes. It is seen by many as a tool that helps the artists in these areas to work faster and be more precise however, it’s been debated that one should not be worried at all that the AI can replace humans since it lacks the human touch in the first place. This remains to be seen how far the AI can learn and adapt since it is programmed that way. If one should not be concerned by AI replacing human artists, then why is the debate happening in the first place?

The continues need for clearer definitions

It is not only a matter of the AI replicating art, but how we can define whether the system has crossed the line of copyright infringement: “(…) lawsuits claiming infringement are unlikely to succeed, because while a piece of art may be protected by copyright, an artistic style cannot.” This only shows again that one needs to quickly define more clearly what is an “artistic style”, “artwork” in relation to how AI would be even allowed to replicate the style.

One can draw a comparison to AI in warfare with debates concerning following themes: responsibility gap, moral offloading and taking humans out of the loop (discussed by scholars such as Horowitz, Asaro, Krischnan and Schwarz). Keith argues for example that psychological analyses show that we suffer from cognitive bias and that AI (in terms of military defence) will change our decision-making process.^[iv] If we use the example of drone warfare and the campaign “Stop Autonomous Weapons”, it depicts how drones can be used without directly sending humans into battle and shows the system getting out of hand and people distancing themselves from responsibility. Such type of warfare has an impact on the decision-making process, distancing the soldiers and strategists from the battle field. With of course taking into mind that using an AI in the art world does not involve possible casualties, one still can consider how we have a similar distancing from responsibility and moral offloading. It comes back to the recurring issues of who is responsible if an AI system decides by itself which choices to make, how to make them and determine the output. There are no humans involved during the process of making or “replicating” the art pieces however, there was an individual present during the development of the AI – I would like to call it a problematic ethical circle of debate in the art world.

Even though the idea of using AI to copy an art style or artworks altogether is quite new and perhaps even undeveloped, one should consider more strongly certain methods in order to bring a certain control and a managing system into the game. Nick Bostrom for instance discusses what a superintelligence in relation to AI would entail saying that one would need certain incentive methods in order for the AI to learn and adapt to the human society: “Capability control through social integration and balance of power relies upon diffuse social forces rewarding and penalizing the AI. (…) A better alternative might be to combine the incentive method with the use of motivation selection to give the AI a final goal that makes it easier to control.”^[v]

Conclusion

It is not only problematic for the art world that an AI is able to copy any artist’s style -it is concerning how much further this development could go in terms of taking an artist’s style and creating an entire new series and diluting therefore the line between where the old and fictional artist lies. As has also already pointed out by others then need for better definitions however it needs to be stressed more strongly: one needs clearer definitions of who is an “artist”, “inventor”, “digital artist” when AI enters the discussion and is apparently here to stay. One needs to make a clear distinction between a human artist and a ‘programme artist (AI)’. Can an artist call himself artist when he or she uses AI to produce art? All these questions should be discussed further in the near future since it seems to be the case that AI has entered the art realm and will continue to stay playing maybe a larger role in the future perhaps even with the development of the Meta verse.

^[i] Markus Dirk Dubber, Frank Pasquale, Sunit Das, (2020) The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of AI Oxford handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 4

^[ii] Ibid, pp. 6.

^[iii] Ibid, pp. 5

^[iv] Keith, Dear, “Artificial intelligence and decision making,” pp. 18.

^[v] Bostrom, Nick, “Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies,” pp. 132.

June 18, 2022 — No Comments

AI goes to War: Observations from the Battlefields in Ukraine

Author: Andrea Rebora, Federica Montanaro and Oleg Abdurashitov.

Although the concept of artificial intelligence is quite complex and nuanced, many people imagine its use in warfare as a brutal slaughter conducted by evil robots. The reality is much different, and the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine offers a glimpse of what AI is being used for on today’s battlefields.

Researchers and military experts have spent years trying to visualize and understand military operations conducted with the support of artificial intelligence systems. One of the most prominent examples is the use of lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs), systems designed to locate, identify, and engage targets based on programmed information without requiring constant human control. Russia is using its KUB-BLA during the invasion in Ukraine, a loitering munition (commonly known as kamikaze drone) designed to identify and attack ground targets using AI technology.^[1]However, the Russian aerial campaign leveraging these drones appears weak overall, and its fleet surprisingly small.^[2] On the Ukrainian side, the Bayraktar TB2 drone fleet arguably appears to be its most potent force,^[3] alongside the “kamikaze drone fleet,” with an estimated 20-30% of the registered Ukrainian kills to be the result of the successful employment of these systems.^[4]

Another application envisioned on the battlefield is the use of AI to automate the mobility of vehicles, such as tanks and vessels, and make them more effective at identifying routes and prioritizing target selection and engagement.

AI is being increasingly included in the military decision-making process, from the straightforward calculation of aircraft or missile trajectories to the identification of targets during sensitive operations via automated target recognition. In 2021, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall confirmed that AI had already been used during at least one “live operational kill chain,” demonstrating its effectiveness on the battlefield.^[5]

Finally, the idea of artificial intelligence being applied to cyber operations is a thought that keeps many professionals up at night. Cyberattacks have already become one the most pervasive issues of this decade and, if enhanced by AI, they could be used to cause significant damage and potentially destabilize entire countries.^[6]

The war in Ukraine, however, seems to be a far cry from swarms of unmanned drones and autonomous vehicles clashing with robotic systems of the adversary, as envisioned by several researchers of future warfare^[7]. While AI algorithms reveal themselves on the battlefield, they do so in far more mundane aspects.

The most illustrative example is the use of Ukraine’s specialist application for artillery (GIS Arta), which combines the conventional geo-mapping tools with the ability to sift information on the enemy’s location from a variety of sources and data types, including military and civilian drones and smartphones, GPS trackers and radars.^[8] The intuitive and data-agnostic system has since become a force multiplier for the outgunned Ukrainian artillery, increasing the precision of their strikes.

The algorithmic geo-mapping itself, however, is not new and both high-resolution maps and image and processing algorithms are widely available and used among a range of civilian apps - from online maps to food delivery. The GIS Arta allows the blending of imagery intelligence (IMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) feeds into an actionable solution for cheap and proves the ingenuity of Ukrainian developers and army in adopting civilian AI and machine learning technology for military use, but also highlights that the use of technology is shaped by the conditions and demands of the battlefield, not vice versa.

Russia, in turn, claims it is working on updating its reconnaissance and reconnaissance-strike drones with “electronic [optical and infrared] images of military equipment adopted in NATO countries” obtained through the application of neural network training algorithms.^[9] With images and videos of NATO-supplied equipment requested by Ukraine widely available on the internet in almost ready-made datasets, the use of neural networks may be justified. Given that both Russia and Ukraine rely on human operators of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), whose ability to identify snippets of objects is dramatically outmatched by the image recognition technology, such an AI-augmented approach may lead to better prioritization and increased accuracy of the Russian strikes targeting.

Another example is the use of AI-enabled face recognition algorithms largely thanks to the ubiquity of visual content, ranging from smartphone videos and security camera feeds to social media pages.^[10] The use of face recognition ranges from inspecting people and vehicles at checkpoints to identifying the potential perpetrators of war crimes. While lacking the immediacy often required on a battlefield, face recognition may become an essential deterring component of warfare preventing the most horrendous crimes on the battlefield.

The use and credibility of such technology are not without controversy since AI algorithms are prone to bias and software flaws. In particular, the first person officially accused by Ukraine of war crimes in Bucha, who was caught on camera in a courier service office in a Belarus town used by Russian soldiers to send looted goods back to Russia, is a Belarusian citizen who vehemently denies even serving in the military.^[11]

What emerges from this evolving environment is that the employment of AI on the Ukrainian battlefield is very human-centered and not very different from what has been seen in other conflicts. Despite the technological progress and innovations, there is still no clear evidence of the use of fully autonomous weapons in Ukraine. The presence of human beings “in the loop” still prevents us from finding a paradigmatic change in the employment of AI in this conflict. Artificial intelligence is leveraged as an instrument, which shapes and facilitates decision making and enables the implementation of decisions already taken, but is still not allowed to, or capable of, making autonomous decisions.

Despite the relatively limited use of advanced AI systems, the conflict in Ukraine provides a significant amount of operational and technical information. On the operational side, AI systems are being examined, tested, and deployed in various degrees and scope of application, allowing researchers and officials to understand the advantages and challenges in leveraging such systems in active conflict. On the technical side, the data collected such as images, audio, and geographical coordinates, can be used to train and improve current and future systems capable of, for example, recognizing camouflaged enemy vehicles, identifying optimal attack and counterattack routes, and predicting enemy movements.

The conflict in Ukraine provides an overview of the AI military capabilities of the two countries and the level of risk they are willing to accept with their top-of-the-line AI systems. After all, the cost-benefit analysis associated with using autonomous weapons in low-intensity conflict is much different from using the same weapons in open conflict, where the risk of losing just one AI-powered system is very high and particularly expensive. The military invasion of Ukraine is unfortunately not over yet, but militaries around the world will study its execution and aftermath for years to understand how to leverage AI systems for offensive and, most importantly, defensive applications.

February 28, 2022 — No Comments

Agriculture 4.0 – The Revolutionary Power of Artificial Intelligence

Author: Zrinka Boric, Giorgia Zaghi, and Beatrice Gori

According to the estimates, the global population will reach 9.7 billion people by 2050. To meet such growing food demand, the food production in the world will need to increase by 70% in the upcoming decades. At the same time, the agricultural sector is currently facing several challenges, such as limited availability of arable land and fresh water, a slowdown in the growth of crop yields, consequences of climate change, and covid-19. The UN's second Sustainable Development Goal (SDG2) targets to end hunger, double agricultural productivity, and ensure sustainable food production systems by 2030. To successfully address the challenges and achieve food security digital technologies are expected to become a foundation in future food production. At the World Summit on Food Security 2009, the four pillars of food security were identified as availability, access, utilization, and stability.

Recently the Focus Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Internet of Things (IoT) for Digital Agriculture (FG-AI4A) was formed, in cooperation with Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), to explore the potential of technologies (AI, IoT) in the acquisition and handling of necessary data, optimization of agricultural production processes, and to ultimately identify best ways (and possible challenges) to use such technologies within the agricultural domain.Artificial intelligence (AI) technologies are forecast to add US$15 trillion to the global economy by 2030. According to the Government AI Readiness Index 2019, the governments of high income-countries have better odds to utilize these gains than low-income countries. Therefore, there is a risk that low-income countries could be left behind by the fourth industrial revolution.

*Image Source*: https://www.pexels.com/it-it/foto/piante-a-foglia-verde-2132171/

Examples of the use of digital technologies in agriculture

TECHNOLOGY	USE IN AGRICULTURE
AI	The utilization of AI and Human Intelligence can increase the capabilities and knowledge of farmers and improve the sustainability of their productions. Meanwhile, farmers can better manage their resources and obtain superior production rates. Sustainable green farms with optimal yielding are a fundamental step towards the Sustainable Development Goal 12 which provides for a “responsible consumption and production."Farms produce massive amounts of data daily, which AI and machine learning models could utilize to increase agricultural productivity while minimizing harmful practices (i.e. extensive use of pesticides, monocropping).
*Image Data (drones & satellites)*	For instance, agricultural technology or AgriTech drones are powerful tools that can help monitor the most inaccessible and vulnerable areas and design and support adequate farming operations. By surveying and mapping the fields, drones provide information and predictions on the crops' growth and help prevent anomalies and disruption of the productions.Satellite image data paired with AI technology aims to help governments and organizations address agricultural challenges by providing granular insight and data analysis.
*GPS (Global Positioning System) remote sensing technology*	GPS technology is already steadily used to enhance agricultural processes and productivity and provides insight into the quantity of food produced proportionately to units of water.
*Internet of Things*	The IoT refers to devices with a sensor that enables them to transmit data through a network. IoT enables the collection and analysis of data and enables better tracking of performance, making informed decisions, and increasing efficiency and sustainability.
*Yield monitoring and mapping*	During the harvest, a dataset is collected (using different sensors and GPS technology) which can later be analyzed through specified software.This valuable dataset provides relevant information that helps to improve yield management, rational use of available resources, develop future nutrient strategies, and ultimately achieve more sustainable agriculture with lowered production costs.
*Automation*	Different forms of automation are used in agriculture to help farms operate more efficiently and increase productivity. Automation appears in many forms, from simple automatic watering systems used in many households, to specialized agricultural drones, robots (like harvest robots), and even driverless tractors.

AI in low-income countries

AI has the potential to have relevant impacts on low-income countries as it could bring about more opportunities to current problems in agriculture and numerous other fields. AI is a tool directed towards development enhancement, the so-called “AI4D” (AI for development). AI could bring about infrastructural and qualitative development, in terms of societal empowerment and change.

Moreover, one of the most relevant improvements in the agricultural sector would be rendering more efficient use of scarce resources.

Specified technologies and systems can target specific needs and/or problems in the exact timing and/or quantities. The specific cases of Israel and China exemplify the relevance of AI for development and resilience.

Both countries have massively invested in smart agriculture to increase yields, productivity and improve precision agriculture given the constraints of the growing scarcity of natural resources. China and Israel managed to improve their agricultural output to an extent where it is possible to consider them as “nations that feed the world”. Moreover, they both could export basic technologies to other countries to implement such “smart tools” to strengthen the latter’s agricultural export sector. For instance, this would be the case for Israel in countries like Indonesia and Thailand that have successfully utilized Israeli technology to improve their agricultural sector and export.

While the adoption of AI technology in agricultural practices of low-income countries seems like an easy way to solve relevant problems related to development, there are still many risks and barriers that ought to be considered. More specifically, compared to the costs of traditional systems, initial infrastructure costs for AI are extremely high – this would call for more participation from transnational organizations and technology companies to assist and supply basic infrastructure in low-income countries.

Conclusion

To conclude, the opportunities that AI holds in the agricultural sector seem to have the potential to accomplish part of the SDGs agenda for 2030. This is certainly an argument that can be applied to Western countries with the investment capacity to carry on a fourth agricultural revolution. Optimization of precision agriculture and the efficient use of scarce resources are essential steps to fight world hunger and climate change.

However, new technologies come with high entry-level costs and such investment could be too risky or too high for low-income countries and small-scale food producers.

While a new agricultural revolution will benefit countries and food producers who can afford to bring about sustainable development, it is necessary to acknowledge that a significant risk lies ahead: leaving out the have-nots in favor of the sole development of the haves.

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