Upgrading Espacio Lejano Deep Space Station: What China's Request in Argentina Reveals About Its Global Space Network
China has requested to upgrade one of its most important space facilities abroad, installing new equipment at its Espacio Lejano deep space station in Argentina that could sharpen the station's sensitivity, data processing and monitoring. The request is technical in form, but in substance it tests how Beijing maintains a growing network of ground stations on foreign soil, and on what terms its host states remain willing to accept it.
The request, first reported by Argentine media in August 2026, concerns the station near Bajada del Agrio, in Neuquén province. It is one of only three Chinese deep space ground stations, and the only one outside China's borders. The Argentine government has referred the request to the Ministry of Defence for a military opinion.
That referral produced a detailed official assessment of the request. The Argentine Air Force examined the proposed equipment and found no evidence that China intends to add a new antenna. It did find a significant upgrade to the station's capabilities, one with potential use in tracking objects in orbit, the same capability militaries use to monitor other states' satellites. On that basis, the Air Force advised against automatic approval and set out conditions: an equipment inventory, inspections before and after installation, and notice of any future changes. The decision is now with Buenos Aires, but the more revealing choice is whether Beijing will accept these conditions.
Why the station matters to Beijing
For China, Espacio Lejano enables access geography would otherwise not allow. Its other two deep space stations, at Kashgar and Jiamusi, sit inside China. A dish on the opposite side of the globe allows the Beijing Aerospace Control Center, which directs China's lunar and deep space missions, to stay in contact with spacecraft when they are out of view from Chinese territory. Analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) have noted this permits more frequent communication with Chinese satellites. The station played a critical role in China's 2019 landing on the far side of the Moon. It remains part of the infrastructure behind China's lunar programme, including the Chang'e-7 mission to the Moon's south pole, postponed in August 2026 and now expected in 2027, and the planned International Lunar Research Station.
The operator matters as much as the location. The station is run by China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General, part of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) space tracking system. In April 2024, the PLA dissolved its Strategic Support Force and placed space operations under a new Aerospace Force. According to the Jamestown Foundation, the Xi'an Satellite Control Center, known as Base 26, now manages a worldwide network of ground stations and control centres under that force. The station's chain of command changed, but its public description did not: Beijing still presents it as a civilian facility for space technology cooperation with Argentina, open and transparent in its operations.
This is the core of the debate, often framed as a choice between two readings. Argentine visitors to the station have reported a small civilian staff, consistent with Beijing's account. Critics point to its place within a tracking network run by the military. These are not rival explanations. Espacio Lejano is a dual-use facility, serving scientific and strategic purposes at once, and that is what makes any upgrade contentious.
China's growing ground station network, and its limits
Espacio Lejano is one node in a fast-expanding network. The United States (US) Defense Intelligence Agency's 2026 space assessment describes overseas sites as an important source of supplementary satellite-tracking data. A CSIS study published in January 2026 documented Chinese-built or expanded ground stations and space facilities in Pakistan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Venezuela and Namibia, many within the last five years. A month later, a US House select committee report identified at least eleven China-linked space facilities across Argentina, Venezuela, Bolivia, Chile and Brazil. At Swakopmund, in Namibia, satellite imagery shows a new antenna at a station China first established in 2001. That station is also managed by Base 26.
China has also learned that access abroad can be withdrawn. In 2020, the Swedish Space Corporation announced it would not renew contracts supporting Chinese satellites at its ground stations, including in Sweden, Chile and Australia, citing changes in the geopolitical situation since the contracts were signed in the early 2000s. It did not specify what those changes were or when the contracts would expire, though it noted such contracts typically run for about ten years. A year earlier, Sweden's defence research agency had warned that the officially civilian cooperation could ultimately be controlled by China's military.
In January 2026, Chile went further, cancelling a planned Chinese-backed observatory at Cerro Ventarrones in the Atacama Desert. The project, agreed in 2023 between Chile's Universidad Católica del Norte and the National Astronomical Observatories of China, was intended to study objects near Earth. Chile's foreign ministry cited legal grounds, ruling that international astronomy agreements must be made between states or through the University of Chile. The decision also followed US warnings that the facility could track satellites in orbit. Beijing countered that the project was scientifically comparable to US-funded telescopes in Chile, and attributed its cancellation to geopolitical pressure.
After losing access in Sweden and Chile, China appears to be investing in the stations it already holds. Swakopmund has received a new antenna, and Espacio Lejano is now the subject of an upgrade request. Building a new station abroad is slow, visible and politically costly. Upgrading an existing one, under agreements already in force, is quieter and preserves access that has proven hard to secure. From Beijing, the Espacio Lejano request looks like routine modernisation.
For Argentina, the issue is how little control the original agreements secured. The agreements behind Espacio Lejano run for 50 years and commit Argentina not to interfere with the station's operations. Argentine officials can visit, but only by prior arrangement, accompanied by Chinese staff and limited to what the operator chooses to show. The agreements give Argentina no right to inspect the station's equipment or operations on its own terms, which is why its 2024 visit was described as a scientific visit rather than an inspection. The civilian-use clause was added only in 2016, after construction had begun. Operational control belongs to China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General, now under the PLA Aerospace Force, which limits how far Argentina can exercise sovereignty over a facility on its own territory. Because the station is dual-use, any gain in capability serves both its scientific and strategic purposes. An upgrade request brings these gaps into view.
What Beijing's answer will signal
Argentina's Air Force has recommended three conditions: an equipment inventory, inspections before and after installation, and notice of any future changes. China's response to them will be read well beyond Buenos Aires. Beijing has kept the relationship steady across successive Argentine governments, including one that campaigned against China. In August 2026, Argentina renewed its currency swap with the People's Bank of China, worth about US$19 billion, for a further five years, despite US pressure to end it. On 6 August, in a separate dispute over a Neuquén electricity cooperative's data-centre talks with Huawei, China's embassy accused the US of obstructing cooperation between the two states. Beijing responds from a position of strength.
Beijing has four main options based on its record. First, it could accept the Air Force's conditions, as it accepted the 2016 Additional Protocol limiting Espacio Lejano to civilian use, while the station's operations continued unchanged. The cost is precedent and access: other host states could demand the same, and inspections could reveal what the station may be doing. Second, it could negotiate, offering to formalise Argentina's existing visits on a regular schedule in place of the inspections the Air Force has recommended, keeping access on China's terms. Even so, regular visits would give Argentine experts repeated sight of the station's equipment and any changes to it, and Argentina and the US may still see the offer as evasion. Alternatively, it could argue that the conditions are discriminatory unless Argentina imposes the same requirements on the European Space Agency's deep space station at Malargüe, in Mendoza province. Argentina visited both stations on consecutive days in April 2024, and Beijing made a similar argument over Ventarrones. The argument works better as pressure than an offer: the European Space Agency would likely accept the same conditions, leaving China with no grounds to refuse inspection.
Third, it could reject the conditions and frame them as US interference, as its embassy did in April 2024, when it called the US ambassador's criticism of the station 'inappropriate'. The cost is that this reinforces US concerns and risks Argentina refusing the upgrade. Fourth, it could withdraw or delay the request. China is working to reduce its reliance on overseas ground stations, and Chinese researchers have proposed linking its lunar relay satellites with its Tianlian relay network for that purpose. But the same researchers note that overseas stations such as Espacio Lejano greatly improve communication, so withdrawing would still mean giving up a capability China values. These options are not mutually exclusive. In the sale of CK Hutchison's Panama Canal port terminals, Beijing sought a stake for the state-owned shipping company COSCO while its foreign ministry publicly accused the US of seeking to control the canal. Its approach there was to negotiate quietly while contesting publicly.
None of these options is cost-free. Whichever Beijing chooses will show what it values most: operational freedom at Espacio Lejano, its standing with Argentina, or the precedent it sets for host states across its network. Espacio Lejano's uniqueness weighs on that choice. As China's only deep space station abroad, it is harder to replace than any other site in the network, which makes withdrawal costly and gives Argentina more leverage than most host states.
Other governments hosting Chinese ground stations, from southern Africa to South America, face versions of the same question. So does the European Union (EU). Its March 2026 Ports Strategy calls on member states to screen foreign control of ports treated as strategic dual-use infrastructure, and Regulation 2026/1386, adopted in June, extended EU investment screening to strategic transport infrastructure. Both are designed for the moment of investment.
Israel's 2015 concession for Haifa's Bayport, operated by the state-owned Shanghai International Port Group, goes further: the port stays in Israeli ownership, the operator must follow Israeli security instructions in emergencies, and the state can revoke its licence. Critics argue even these safeguards are incomplete, but they were written in at signature and apply for the life of the concession. Espacio Lejano's agreements had neither form of protection. Argentina's Congress approved the treaty only after construction had begun, and the agreements gave Argentina no right of inspection. As a result, the hardest decisions come years after the contract was signed, when the operator of an asset already in place requests an upgrade. By then, a host state's say depends largely on the terms it secured at the start. Argentina's 2016 Additional Protocol shows that terms can be added later, but it limited how the station may be used, not how Argentina can verify that use.
Conclusion
The request to upgrade the Espacio Lejano deep space station provides a window into how China sustains and entrenches a global space network beyond its borders. This request, the new antenna at Swakopmund and the access China lost in Sweden and Chile together suggest that Beijing's priority is to keep, and improve, the access it already has. For host states, the risk is gradual: sovereignty erodes in practice, one upgrade at a time. Each change made under terms they cannot verify widens an already asymmetric relationship, in which China holds the operational control and the information, and the host holds the territory. How China responds to Argentina's conditions will show whether Beijing is prepared to trade some operational freedom for the consent of its hosts.
In this episode, Rear Admiral Khanna (Retd.) draws on his extensive experience in the Indian Navy and strategic affairs to examine the changing role of naval power, China and wider regional dynamics, and the strategic challenges facing India and other actors across the Indo-Pacific. The discussion also explores how shifts in the international security environment are influencing maritime strategy and the future balance of power at sea. This conversation offers valuable insights into the intersection of geopolitics, military strategy, and maritime security at a time of growing strategic competition.
Rear Admiral Monty Khanna (Retd.) is a decorated former Indian Navy submariner and national security expert with a 36-year career (1983–2019). He is an alumnus of the DSSC Wellington and U.S. Naval War College who won the Sword of Honor, and served as Naval Attaché in Washington, D.C. His senior leadership roles included Commandant of the Naval War College and Assistant Chief of Naval Staff. Post-retirement, he served at the National Security Council Secretariat (2019–2023) and currently contributes as a National Security Advisory Board member, editor-in-chief, and Distinguished Fellow at the National Maritime Foundation, publishing extensively on maritime strategy.
The aphorism, related to Sir Walter Raleigh, “Whoever commands the sea commands the trade; whoever commands the trade commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself” (Raleigh, 1614), has never seemed truer.
From the Persian Gulf to the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, the contest for mastery of the seas is accelerating, and while the classical maritime theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan and, even more so, Julian Corbett remain relevant today, it is being fought with new weapons no navies of the past could have imagined: autonomous submarines, AI-guided drone swarms, and cutting tools designed to sever the underwater cables that carry the world's data. At the centre of this transformation stands the People's Liberation Army Navy.
The theory
Alfred Thayer Mahan: Command of the Sea
In 1890, American naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan published The Influence of Sea Power upon History (Mahan, 1890). At the core of his theory, the decisive instrument was the battle fleet, a concentrated force with capital ships designed to seek out and destroy the enemy's fleet, seizing command of the sea in a single, culminating engagement.
He identified six key elements determining a nation’s capacity for sea power :
An access to open seas and proximity to major trade routes, the quality of coastline, harbours and navigable rivers, the length of coastline relative to population, sufficient manpower to crew a fleet, a population's aptitude for commerce and seafaring and a political will to invest in and sustain a navy.
The central idea of Mahan’s theory lies in the control of the chokepoint and strategic straits through a powerful battle fleet. The control of strategic straits, where maritime traffic is forced to travel through, confers a disproportionately large advantage relative to the military force required to hold them.
As a result, the United States, Britain, Japan, and Germany all embarked on massive battleship programmes in the 1890s and 1900s, contributing directly to the conditions that produced the First World War. His influence persisted through the carrier-centric doctrine of the Second World War and into the Cold War's nuclear deterrence calculus (Till, 2018). The US Navy's enduring emphasis on aircraft carrier strike groups, concentrated, and designed to dominate the sea, reflects modern-day Mahanian doctrine.
Julian Corbett: Sea Denial and Limited Warfare
For his part, Sir Julian Corbett, a British naval historian, offered a more nuanced counterpoint. Where Mahan saw the sea as an arena for decisive battle, Corbett regarded it as an operational environment to be managed. In his book, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Corbett, 1911), he argued that the real objective of naval power was not the annihilation of the enemy fleet, but the control of maritime communications, the sea lanes along which troops, supplies, and goods must pass. The difference lies in the fact that you don't need to control the whole ocean, you only need to deny it to your adversary.
Corbett introduced the concept of sea denial, where a weaker naval power could frustrate a stronger one not by meeting it in open battle, but by making the sea too dangerous to use freely. Mines, submarines, coastal batteries, hit-and-run raids — these were the tools of the weaker party that could impose costs without seeking decisive engagement.
For the landlubber that you may be, let’s make a parallel with the Thermopylae battle, in 480 BC, staged in the film 300 (Snyder 2006) (Pic. 1), where 300 Spartans (and thousand Greek allies) held the narrow pass against the Persian army estimated at several hundred thousand men. They did not seek to defeat Xerxes. They sought to deny him the use of the terrain for as long as possible.
Image generated by AI: Artistic reproduction of the Battle of Thermopylae
Nowadays, this strategy is called Anti-Access / Area Denial (A2/AD). The defender's objective is to make the cost of using the sea unacceptably high for the opponent.
Applying this theoretical framework to China's maritime strategy, it becomes apparent that its drone programme in particular, follows a distinctly Corbettian logic. Beijing does not seek global Mahanian Sea command yet. Its actual strategy is to deny its adversaries (which at the moment could be considered being the United States and its allies) access to and freedom of navigation within the South China Sea.
Drones, mines, underwater sensor networks, anti-ship missiles, and satellites are the tools of asymmetric warfare. Those devices are sea-denial weapons deployed in a Corbettian framework by China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).
Thus, as PLAN’s capabilities grow, we may wonder whether this posture is a permanent doctrine or a transitional phase on the road to Mahanian ambition possibly related to the String of Pearls, a network of naval facilities and commercial infrastructure stretching from mainland China through the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf and East Africa.
The practice: the Strait of Hormuz
Before diving into the heart of the subject, let us take advantage of current events to observe Corbett's theory in real time, with the crisis unfolding in the Strait of Hormuz. Since February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel have been conducting military operations against Iran, and Iran's principal strategic response has been the closure of one of the world's most critical maritime chokepoints, stopping mostly the maritime traffic.
The Strait of Hormuz is, at its narrowest, 33 kilometers wide. Through this corridor flows approximately 25 percent of the world's crude oil and a significant fraction of its liquefied natural gas (EIA, 2025). Every major oil producer on the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, are virtually landlocked, related to global markets, without passage through Hormuz (map1).
This is Corbett chokepoint doctrine in its starkest form. Iran, with an inferior military navy to that of the US, possesses the capacity to threaten, if not fully execute, such a closure, thereby threatening to restrain one-fifth of global oil supply.
What the current crisis demonstrates is the gap between the threat of closure and its actual execution. At the time of writing, Iran has chosen to implement a selective closure of the strait, allowing passage to allied and neutral vessels while targeting US and their allied flagged ships, effectively operating a discriminatory chokepoint regime (Al‑Mohanadi and Obaid, 2026), then it was to paying vessels.
This partial closure is not a decisive battle, but continuous friction. The cost is immense, war-risk insurance premiums for Hormuz transit have doubled or tripled bringing maritime traffic to an effective standstill, causing oil prices to rise, thus generating mounting pressure on the United States, both from domestic opposition and the international community calling for de-escalation. As a result, Washington was compelled to impose its own counter-blockade to prevent Iran's regional partners from benefiting from the crisis. This is a textbook illustration of Corbett's insight that sea denial, even when conducted by the weaker party, can compel the dominant naval power to expend disproportionate effort simply to preserve the status quo.
Corbett updated: sea denial as economic statecraft
Selective closure deserves particular attention. Indeed, Chinese vessels have in some part been able to continue to pass, until the US started a blockade (Prétat et al., 2026). As a fellow BRICS member, Iran's relationship with Beijing goes beyond simple commercial ties, and there is a message there and from both parts. Let’s not forget that it is also an economic dependency which function as a form of strategic insurance. For Beijing, by remaining Iran's indispensable economic lifeline, absorbing approximately 80 percent of its oil exports, averaging 1.38 million barrels per day in 2025 (Downs, 2026) (table 1), China effectively purchased immunity from chokepoint disruption, ensuring that its energy supply lines were never reduced to zero.
Table 1 generated by the author: China’s crude oil imports
Tehran, in turn, ran a discriminatory chokepoint: closed to its enemies, open to its patron, with at least two paying transit fees denominated in yuan, brokered by a Chinese maritime services company acting as intermediary (Lloyd’s List 2026).
Iran's Foreign Minister confirmed that the strait remained open to countries that neither participated in nor supported acts of aggression against Iran (Al Jazeera, 2026). This is a preview of how great-power competition over maritime chokepoints will be fought in the coming decades, not only with armament, but with energy contracts and economic architecture.
Indeed, there is something very important here, what it reveals goes well beyond a simple passage fee. The strait is being used as a tool to boost the Chinese yuan as an alternative to the US dollar in global energy transactions, which is a long-standing strategic objective for Beijing. The Hormuz crisis offered a test case for yuan-denominated energy payments at scale, as China already did with the iron ore trade settlement (IDNFinancials, 2025). So, while Western financial infrastructure is being weaponised against Iran, China demonstrated that a parallel payment channel exists for those unwilling to remain hostage to dollar hegemony.
On the other part, allowing allied and neutral vessels to continue trading with minimal disruption, Iran simultaneously preserves its economic relationships, creates new diplomatic relation or commercial channels, and erodes the usual western « cohesion » forcing US allies into publicly questioning Washington’s operations. To counter that strategy, its opponent had no choice but to enforce the blockade to ensure that neither Iran’s allies nor countries with agreements could pass through, at the risk of alienating everyone, its own allied included.
Those are consequences to the chokepoint politics that Corbett's original framework did not account for, and that the Hormuz crisis has brought into sharp focus. When a weaker power successfully weaponises a strait, it does not merely inconvenience the dominant naval force, it simultaneously signals to every third-party nation in the international system that alignment with the chokepoint holder carries tangible economic value. Countries with no ideological affinity for Tehran such as India and France, quietly negotiated passage arrangements, prioritising the continuity of their trade flows over solidarity with the Western coalition (Euronews, 2026).
Taken together, these dynamics point to something more consequential than the tactical outcome of the strait closure. By resisting the US attack and imposing its own terms on maritime traffic, Iran effectively established itself as a regional hegemon. The message to surrounding states was unambiguous: no transit through the Strait of Hormuz, nor through the Bab el-Mandeb (controlled via the Houthi proxy in Yemen), occurs without Tehran's consent.
In sum, a regime operating under degraded, sanctioned military capacity and sustained bombardment nonetheless succeeded in restricting maritime traffic through one of the world's most strategically vital chokepoints.Now imagine the same doctrine with a nation possessing a huge industrial capacity, with autonomous submarines, AI-guided drone swarms, the world's largest coast guard, and a militarised fishing fleet permanently deployed. This nation is the People's Republic of China.
The South China Sea
The South China Sea: Where History, Commerce, and Strategy Converge
To comprehend China's naval strategy in 2026, one must first understand how the era, known as the Century of Humiliation, happened at a time China had no navy worth the name. The consequences still resonate today as this memory has been institutionalized and is still used as a motivating tool in China’s posture toward the West (Nicchiarelli, 2023).
Indeed, during the Opium Wars (1839–1842 and 1856–1860), China was unable to oppose the foreign navies sent to force the Qing government to accept the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 and the Convention of Peking (1860). The enemy fleets navigated the same routes that today’s oil tankers and container ships follow: the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea, offering access to China’s coastline (map 2).
Map 2: Created map of the naval route of the two Opium Wars
Western navies did not attack China via land, they used the sea China’s navy was too weak to defend. Today, Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream rests, in part, on a naval ambition: to ensure that no foreign fleet can ever again impose its will on China from its own waters (Eudeline, 2023).
The South China Sea today: the nine-dash line and the artificial islands
This is precisely why China invokes the nine-dash line, asserting historical rights over nearly 90% of the South China Sea, bypassing the distance-based framework established by UNCLOS) (pic 2), and encroaching on neighboring countries maritime’ borders (map 3).
Picture 2: Created chart of UNCLOS Law of the Sea distance
Map 3: Created map of Maritime claims of the South China Sea
The securitisation of the nine-dash line area serves several purposes. While there is an economic dimension to this situation which encompasses hydrocarbon extraction, fisheries control, seabed mineral rights, dominance over global shipping lanes, and the protection of China's Belt and Road maritime infrastructure, I will focus on the security part.
To appreciate China's A2/AD strategy in the South China Sea, we must highlight what can be seen as one of the most impressive engineering projects in modern military history. The dredging and building of artificial islands across the disputed Spratly archipelago, transforming submerged reefs into fortified military bases enabling power projection across the entire southern half of the South China Sea.
Nevertheless, Beijing is not the only actor engaged in establishing outposts. In total, seven parties hold overlapping territorial and maritime claims across the area: the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia. Indeed, while together, the Chinese fortified islands, Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef create an area covering approximately over 1,200 hectares of new land (Newsweek, 2025), Vietnam alone had created more than 931 hectares of artificial land, expanding all 21 of its occupied territories. However what sets China's construction apart, is the military grade building: full-length military airstrips, radar arrays, hardened missile batteries, and deep-water naval berths capable of hosting the PLA Navy's largest ships, forming the core foundation on which China’s A2/AD architecture in the South China Sea will rest.
China's Maritime Forces
As outlined, two complementary or competing theories frame our analysis: Mahan's emphasis on decisive naval power and sea control, and Corbett's focus on sea denial. China's approach to control in the South China Sea may be conceptualised in three stages. The first is illustrated by the People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM), which operate in the grey zone between peacetime, and helps sustain the narrative of Chinese fishermen having operated these waters for centuries while simultaneously serving as an instrument of Beijing's surveillance. The second involves the Coast Guard, deployed as a police force signaling a de facto Chinese sovereignty (since police service can, by definition, only operate within national jurisdiction). Both are related to the civilian world and peace time. The third is the PLAN, serving a dual function: providing a deterrent shield for Coast Guard operations, and forming the outer layer of the A2/AD architecture (Nicchiarelli, 2023), on which we will focus.
The People’s Liberation Army Navy
The PLAN has undergone the most rapid naval expansion in peacetime history. Nevertheless, while China's navy is by far the largest of any country (table 2), surpassing the US Navy in sheer numbers of ships, in terms of tonnage the US Navy is still the number one (table 3).
What these figures reveal are two distinct naval strategies. The US Navy has fewer and older hulls, but considerably larger and heavier, and a fleet architecture deeply rooted in Mahanian doctrine, built to be able to sustain its presence across multiple oceanic theatres simultaneously, in theory. China's navy, by contrast, is more numerous and markedly newer, a direct consequence of the PLAN's relatively recent and still-ongoing transformation from a coastal defense force into a blue-water navy as shown in tables 2 and 3. As it stands, the fleet is designed primarily for regional sea denial and luring to a power projection within the First and Second Island Chains, and later on, for the protection of China's extended maritime interests along the String of Pearls stretching from the South China Sea through the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf.
China’s Industrial Advantage
However, these figures also reveal a deeper concern about the US ability to sustain an active combat presence across multiple theaters. The defense industry does not currently appear able to build ships and produce the weapons systems needed to arm them fast enough to absorb the cost of several simultaneous battlefields. Indeed, the ongoing war against Iran has provided a clear illustration of this industrial and logistical challenge. To sustain Epic Fury, the Pentagon has diverted munitions to the Middle East from bases in Asia and Europe. This situation created a sense of frustration from regional allies whose stockpiles were drawn down, leaving them less able to sustain military operations if required. And it also raised concern about the US ability to maintain its defense commitments and the capacity of its defense industry to meet operational and contractual demands simultaneously (Dennis and Gettinger, 2026). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that recently, the U.S. Air Force developed the Rusty Dagger cruise missile (AGM-188A) in record time. AEDC built and tested a scale model in under three days, delivering results in 67 hours. The overall program went from contract to live-fire testing in under 16 months, versus the decade such efforts normally take. This shows that full U.S. commitment can produce rapid, unexpected breakthroughs.
Concerning naval assets, according to the US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Chinese shipyards possess the capacity to produce approximately 23,250,000 tons, compared with less than 100,000 tons for the United States (The War Zone) per year. To highlight this situation, in 2024, the Shanghai-based China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC), built more commercial vessels by tonnage than the entire US shipbuilding industry has produced since World War II.
Interestingly, while the Western narrative regarding the gap in shipbuilding between China and the US is portrayed as alarming, from a Chinese perspective it is the opposite. This gap represents a catch-up, thus, the military-civilian integration ensuring that Beijing will not need to rely again on foreign powers for its defense. It should be noted that the Trump administration has also asked civilian companies to contribute to the manufacturing of military equipment (Fox Business, 2026), to ramp up the production of military equipment.
But the conflicts in Ukraine and, more recently, the Persian Gulf have brought a new reality into sharp focus. The growing prevalence of asymmetric warfare with the large use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), changing the balance of forces and the way combat is fought. Thus, what about a similar production capacity but for the drones, and more specifically to less visible but equally consequential systems, unmanned surface and underwater vehicles (USV & UUV), which may also quietly rewrite the rules of naval warfare.
The Shift Toward Maritime Drones
Since the 1950s, starting with the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) a network of acoustic sensors designed to detect Soviet submarines, Washington has progressively expanded its monitoring capabilities around China's surrounding seas with fixed and mobile seabed sensors, surface surveillance vessels, anti-submarine aircraft, maritime drones and low-Earth-orbit reconnaissance satellites, creating an intelligence network aimed at tracking Chinese naval activities (Martinson, 2025).
But Beijing only really started to improve the PLAN capabilities after the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, when China conducted missile tests and military exercises near Taiwan due to the Taiwan's president, Lee Teng-hui visit to the United States. In response the US deployed two carrier battle groups, centered on the aircraft carriers USS Nimitz (CVN-68) and USS Independence (CV-62), near Taiwan. The conclusion for China was that it could not prevent U.S. naval forces from entering what it considers its area, due to its weak coastal navy and lack of surveillance systems to monitor the region. Thus the idea to make an U.S. intervention near China prohibitively costly (Ding, 2003), if the PLAN could not match the US NAVY.
The first improvement was done by purchasing Russian military assets. In the 2000s China started to develop its own military industry which led in the 2010s to the emergence of a blue-water navy. At the same time, in 2014 Professor Wu Lixin launched the “Transparent Ocean” Program. It implied a four-layer network composed by satellites, USVs, UUVs and a seabed sensor network and was presented as a civilian project aiming to make the marine environment observable in near real time from the surface down to the deep sea.
While the presented goals were to improve ocean forecasting, climatology, and study of marine resources, its military advantage is undeniable as it allows to generate highly detailed data on temperature, salinity, currents, acoustic properties, and seabed topography, critical information in undersea warfare. Even more valuable when the data coverage extends from the South China Sea, to the western Pacific, near Guam, the east of the Philippines, some parts of the Indian Ocean, around the approaches to the Strait of Malacca, and more recently into selected Arctic areas (McKenzie, 2026). So, in many aspects, the Transparent Ocean program can be regarded as the twenty-first century equivalent of the U.S. SOSUS network, combining undersea surveillance with modern digital technologies. In clear, Beijing is again trying to equalise the situation with the US.
The backbone of this “Submarine Great Wall” consists of 64 oceanographic research vessels, and its centerpiece is the Zhu Hai Yun, a dedicated mothership that can deploy and control more than 50 unmanned platforms, including aerial drones, autonomous surface vessels, and underwater gliders (Smith, 2026). The development of Chinese Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) can be considered as a response to the extensive U.S. maritime surveillance architecture in the region, therefore the modern embodiment of Corbett’s Sea Denial theory. They are low cost compared with missiles, submarines and ships, and operating in swarms they are capable of saturating a maritime area such as a strait or a littoral without risking the life of military personnel. And, by the way, underwater they are difficult to detect. Reason why maritime drones appear in different sizes and with diverse capabilities, from small ones to submarine size (Pic 6).
One tactic commonly linked to drone warfare is the swarm attack. The main idea rests on an inversion of the cost of maritime defence. By saturating the defender's defences with cheap mass-produced platforms, the attacker imposes a structurally losing exchange. High-value interceptors expended against low-value targets, until the ammunition is depleted, forcing withdrawal or de-escalation. The asymmetry is economic and logistical, and it operates regardless of whether the engagement is won. This scheme theorised as the «interceptor trap» by Rudraksh Pathak, was illustrated with Iran at the regional scale. The South China Sea could see the same logic being reproduced, and prove, once again, that generals are always fighting the last war, as the US is also investing in USV swarms, by deploying thousands of them in the Indo-Pacific Asia Times.
Quantitative comparison between China and the United States
At first glance, the balance of naval drone power seems to favor the U.S., though only marginally. In 2023, the US Navy and Coast Guard deployed more than 80 USVs for surveillance and reconnaissance missions, while China deployed over 150 for coastal and riverine surveillance (Future Market Insights). These figures should be read with caution, however, as they make no distinction between combat platforms, ISR assets and scientific research vessels.
The picture becomes clearer when we look at what each side has announced for the years ahead. On paper, the advantage shifts decisively toward Washington. During the Sea-Air-Space Symposium in 2026, Captain Garrett Miller, commander of Surface Development Group One, projected more than 30 medium unmanned surface vessels and thousands of small USVs in the Indo-Pacific by 2030, based on requirements looking out to 2045 (USNI News, 2026). The May 2026 shipbuilding plan backs this up with concrete numbers: 47 MUSVs are planned, alongside the Orca XLUUV program, funded at $135.8 million in FY2027 for two vehicles and roughly $1.13 billion across the Future Years Defense Program for a total of 16 vehicles by FY2031 (The Defense News, 2026). No equivalent Chinese program has been disclosed at this level of detail,
Yet, the question is who can actually build at scale? Morgan Stanley estimated in November 2025 that China's drone production capacity is a significant multiple of America's, a gap that prompted Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll to announce plans to purchase at least one million drones within two to three years, up from roughly 50,000 units today (Investing.com ). It appears that China can produce an estimated 500,000 drones per month, compared with 8,000 to 10,000 for Taiwan and a Ukrainian target of 4 million per year (Global Taiwan Institute, 2025). China also counts more than 90 component manufacturers, controls around 80 percent of the global supply chain and holds over 70 percent of the world market. Even in the USV segment, where Turkey currently leads and the United States is set to nearly triple its investment from $176 million to $469.3 million by 2034 (Campbell, 2024), industrial depth remains the decisive variable. In short, Washington holds the technological race, but Beijing holds the industrial one.
The escape routes: China's merchant marine under blockade
Before concluding, let us reverse the perspective. This article has examined China as the architect of sea denial; but what happens when the People's Republic finds itself on the receiving end, with the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea closed to its merchant fleet, as the Trump administration did in response to Iran's closure of the strait. History, for once, offers a direct answer, because China has already lived through exactly this scenario, and for thirty years.
Indeed, from 1949 to 1979, the Republic of China (ROC) enforced the Guanbi ('closure') policy, a de facto naval blockade of Communist-held ports designed to disrupt trade and logistics to the newly established PRC. ROC naval forces patrolled and intercepted ships in the Taiwan Strait and adjacent waters, stopping or detaining numerous foreign merchant vessels, including British, Polish and Soviet ships, (Guanbi policy). The blockade was only formally lifted on 12 September 1979, in the wake of the US-PRC normalization. For three decades, therefore, traffic bound for the mainland had to sail around Taiwan. While not often remembered, it adds one more layer alongside the Century of Humiliation discussed in section III, in the institutional memory that drives today's naval build-up.
Nevertheless, the stakes of a modern closure of the Taiwan strait are of a different magnitude. Nearly 1.4 trillion dollars of Chinese trade transits through it each year; in 2024, about 33 percent of China's imports and 16 percent of its exports passed through it, against 21 and 14 percent respectively for the Strait of Malacca (CSIS ChinaPower). The CSIS concludes that Beijing faces less a 'Malacca dilemma' than a 'Taiwan Strait dilemma': a conflict that closes the strait would hurt China's economy even more than a disruption of Malacca (Prétat et al., 2026). So what are the options for the Chinese merchant marine? Three escape routes exist, and each of them, as we shall see, reproduces the very problem it is supposed to solve (map 4).
The first is the eastern detour. If the strait is impassable, vessels can route through the Luzon Strait and sail east of Taiwan. This is not theoretical: during the August 2022 exercises that followed Nancy Pelosi's visit, traffic in the strait collapsed from roughly 250 ships a day to 15-20, and shipping was rerouted around the eastern side of the island at the cost of about three days' delay (TIME, 2022). But the detour has two weaknesses: the route east of Taiwan is exposed to cyclones (Uren, 2022), and above all, ships forced through the Luzon or Miyako straits become vulnerable to a distant blockade by US and Japanese forces, the very scenario that has haunted Chinese planners since Hu Jintao's 'Malacca dilemma' speech of 2003.
The second is the Indonesian archipelago. Should Malacca itself be closed, tankers can reroute through the Sunda Strait, whose shallow draft excludes the largest vessels, then through the Lombok and Makassar straits, and, in the worst case, around Australia and up the eastern side of the Philippines, adding days or weeks of sailing and billions in extra costs (CSIS, 2026). Shifting cargo overland is hardly better: moving goods by road from Guangzhou to Tianjin costs about three times the sea freight. Every southern alternative, in short, remains within reach of the US Navy.
Map 4: created map of China's rerouting options around the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea chokepoints.
The third escape route runs over the Artic Ocean (map 5). Under the banner of the 'Polar Silk Road', the Arctic extension of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has been turning the Northern Sea Route (NSR) along Russia's Arctic coast into a usable, if seasonal, component of its logistics. A Dalian-Rotterdam voyage takes around 33 days via the NSR against 48 via Suez (The Diplomat, 2023), and it bypasses every single chokepoint the US Navy could hold, from Malacca to Bab el-Mandeb. In late 2025 the container ship Istanbul Bridge inaugurated the first 'China-Europe Arctic Express' liner service (CNN, 2025), and the 2025 season saw 103 transit voyages along the corridor, up from 97 in 2024 (Corporate Knights, 2026).
Yet the Arctic option comes with its own toll booth. The NSR is seasonal, dangerous and thinly covered by search-and-rescue; more importantly, it is administered by Russia through a permit regime, with mandatory pilotage and icebreaker escort, the fees being collected by a subsidiary of Rosatom (Corporate Knights, 2026). Plus, the route is a legal and financial chokepoint as much as a physical one: after 2022, COSCO all but suspended its NSR operations for fear of secondary sanctions linked to the war in Ukraine (The Arctic Institute, 2026). In other words, by going north China does not escape the chokepoint problem, it merely exchanges a vulnerability to the US Navy for a dependency on Moscow (Eurasia Review, 2026).
Map 5: created map of the Northern Sea Route compared with the Suez route.
Conclusion
It appears that the nation building the world's most sophisticated sea-denial arsenal is also the one whose trade is most exposed to the sea denial of others. Its three escape routes lead, respectively, into a US-Japanese surveillance net, back into the US Navy's operating area, and under a Russian toll booth. Seen from Beijing, the conclusion writes itself: if the chokepoints cannot be escaped, they must be mastered. Hence the artificial islands, the Transparent Ocean, the drone swarms and the 23 million tons of annual shipbuilding capacity, wall of which point to the same strategic imperative. Raleigh's aphorism has simply been updated: whoever controls the chokepoints controls the trade, and whoever controls the trade, in the end, controls the world.
In this session, Dr. Ellis discusses the main forms Chinese organised crime takes in the region, from money laundering to illegal mining, timber, and fishing. He explains how to distinguish purely criminal networks from activity connected to the Chinese state, and how the phenomenon is becoming a growing strategic concern for the region.
Dr. R. Evan Ellis speaks about the growth of Chinese organised crime in Latin America. He is a Research Professor of Latin American Studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, where his work focuses on the region's engagement with China, transnational organised crime, and populism.
Interviewer: Sarah Toubman and Rabiah Ryklief - Central & Latin America Team
During India’s 73rd Independence day speech in 2019, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the creation of the position of a ‘Chief of Defence Staff’ (CDS) who would be responsible for enhancing the integration of the Indian Armed Forces and “to bring about synergy in operation, logistics, transport, training, support services, communications, repairs and maintenance, etc of the three Services.” (Press Information Bureau, 2020). The years following the announcement were marred by inter-service rivalries and concerns over the division of assets, expressed particularly by the Indian Air Force (IAF) until April 2026 when the then CDS General Anil Chauhan stated that a proposal on theaterisation would soon be shared with the government following a “100 per cent agreement on the concept of theaterisation” even as minor differences on the implementation persisted. While a specific timeline for when these reforms will be implemented has not yet been specified, given India’s position as a major, if not premier, military power in the South Asia, these are likely to have a significant impact on South Asian security.
Impact on the Indian Armed Forces
At present, the three branches of the Indian Armed Forces operate largely independently of each other and are organised under ‘commands’. The Army has seven commands (six operations and one training command), the Air Force has seven (five operational and two functional), and the Navy has three. This has resulted in issues such as parallel command structures, resource duplication, and slower decision-making. Committees such as the Kargil Review Committee (1999) and the Shekatkar Committee (2016) have emphasised the need for India’s armed forces to develop a more joint method of functioning, and theaterisation seeks to model India’s military more along the lines of Western ones, where the assets of all branches work in tandem to enhance operational effectiveness.
From India's perspective, theaterisation promises several operational advantages. First, integrated commands could improve intelligence sharing, streamline logistics, and enable faster responses during military crises. Second, unified command structures may also reduce bureaucratic friction between services and improve the efficient allocation of defence resources. This is particularly relevant in the context of India's security challenges. The 2020 Galwan Valley clashes with China highlighted the need for rapid coordination between ground forces, air assets, surveillance systems, and logistical networks. Similarly, India's continuing rivalry with Pakistan requires the capability to respond effectively across multiple domains and fronts, as seen in the clashes in May 2025.
A more integrated military structure could therefore enhance India's deterrence capabilities by increasing the credibility of its conventional military power. Potential adversaries may perceive a theaterised Indian military as more capable of executing coordinated operations, thereby raising the costs associated with military escalation.
Impact on the India-Pakistan Military Balance
The impact of theaterisation of Indian Armed Forces on India-Pakistan relations is likely to be mixed. On one hand, enhanced military coordination could strengthen deterrence by reducing uncertainty regarding India's ability to mobilise and conduct operations. A more effective conventional force may discourage Pakistan from engaging in limited military provocations or supporting cross-border militant activities and Op. Sindoor showcased India’s willingness to respond to terror attacks in India with conventional force, including the targeting of assets and infrastructure belonging to the Pakistani armed forces.
On the other hand, Pakistan may interpret theaterisation as part of a broader effort by India to achieve conventional military superiority. Given the asymmetry in economic and military resources between the two states, Pakistanhas traditionally relied on nuclear deterrence to offset India's conventional advantages. Any reform that significantly enhances India's operational capabilities could reinforce Pakistani concerns regarding strategic vulnerability. This perception may further encourage Pakistan to modernise its military capabilities, leading to reforms within Pakistan as seen with the establishment of the Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC), invest in advanced missile systems, and continue expanding its tactical nuclear arsenal. Such developments could contribute to a regional security dilemma, whereby measures taken by one state to increase its security are perceived as threatening by another, resulting in reciprocal military build-ups.
Furthermore, the reality of the India-Pakistan rivalry has gradually been altered since the Uri attacks in 2016. The Modi-led government, during each major terror attack in its tenure, has shown a willingness to go up the escalation ladder from limited surgical strikes in 2016, limited airstrikes in 2019, to now an exchange of missiles and drones targeting military assets and infrastructure. The ruling Bhartiya Janata Party government’s voters now expect a ‘strong’ response (targeting the Pakistani army directly) whenever a terror attack occurs in Indian territory, meaning the window and scope for a negotiated resolution have become significantly smaller. To add to this, Pakistan’s continued and growing cooperation with China in countering India’s traditional military advantage will likely also be furthered by India’s military reforms, besides impacting the relationship between India and China, as discussed below.
The most important strategic driver behind India’s theaterisation of its armed forces is arguably China's growing military power. Since the 2020 border crisis, Indian defence planners have increasingly focused on the challenge posed by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). China's own military reforms offer an important point of comparison. Between 2015 and 2017, Beijing undertook extensive military restructuring, replacing its traditional military regions with integrated theatre commands designed to improve joint operations. Chinese reforms have significantly enhanced the PLA's ability to coordinate forces across different domains and operational theatres.
Indian policymakers view theaterisation partly as a response to this changing military balance. By integrating its own command structures, India seeks to improve readiness and operational effectiveness in the event of future border confrontations. Enhanced jointness may enable India to better coordinate surveillance, airpower, logistics, and ground operations across the Himalayan frontier.
However, this dynamic may also contribute to intensifying strategic competition between Asia's two rising powers. As both states continue to modernise their militaries and improve operational capabilities, the risk of military rivalry becoming increasingly institutionalised cannot be dismissed. While theaterisation itself is not inherently destabilising, it forms part of a broader pattern of military modernisation occurring on both sides of the border. Furthermore, an increase in tensions between China and India has the potential to spill over into a wider regional confrontation where both states may seek to increase their influence in other South Asian countries and see attempts by the other to do the same as a potentially hostile act by the third state.
In conclusion, India’s theaterisation reforms may be aimed solely at enhancing its own military readiness and the joint operational capability of its armed forces and may be without an offensive goal in mind. However, this may not be how other states, particularly Pakistan and China view it, and reciprocal reforms and measures to enhance their own capability have the potential to lead to an increased risk of conventional conflict in South Asia, a reality which was briefly seen in the India-Pakistan conflict in 2025.
What’s China’s AI policy? Rejuvenation of the nation through security and development
Generally, China is regarded as an innovative player in the AI race but an unlikely protagonist in the global governance dimension: this is given by its state-driven government, and AI national governance based on sovereignty‑first, security‑heavy, surveillance‑enabled principles. [1] However, the reconfiguration of the international order, and the US withdrawal from UN-based institutions provide China the occasion to promote an image of a responsible leader in the field of AI governance, pursuing a strategy grounded on the values of inclusion and fairness, with Chinese characteristics.
This input is based on its foundational goals: economic growth and security, as stated in the 2017 Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan. For the former, AI can be used as a propeller for the rejuvenation of the nation: the aim of restoring national wealth and power under the guidance of the CCP. Regarding the latter, AI-generated content presents a risk of jeopardizing social stability, hence political and national security. [2] Therefore, China has to leverage the international stage: it has to ensure that the current institutions that foster growth and security are upheld and promote policies that enable innovation and the activity of Chinese stakeholders, amid the US containment or the EU decoupling strategy and the criticism on its human rights policy. This reflects China's attempt to position itself as an alternative to US and European approaches to AI governance.
The impact of Chinese AI policy on the international stage: international competition trough norm setting and equipment export
In order to achieve development and ensure security, while hedging criticism and achieving strategic parity with the US, China has pursued a strategy aimed at projecting the image of a committed major player, capable of ensuring an equitable AI development for the Global South. This is enacted by the 2025 Global AI Governance Action Plan (GAIGI), which creates a strategy focused on UN-based multilateralism, human-centered AI, laws and consensus-based development of AI governance and respect for countries’ sovereignty.
This latter value in particular is a concept developed based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, [3]used by China as a counterargument towards international criticism over its human rights policies. The other element that we should specify is the commitment under the UN-based multilateralism: in the GAIGI institutions like the UN should be a starting point for consultations on soft laws that countries can then adopt and adapt into their national law, as corroborated by Beijing’s endorsement of UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’s proposal to create a new international body to govern AI under the UN framework. [4]
The commitment towards human-centered AI has to be understood as the objective of creating an AI development that involves all layers of the population, as corroborated by its statement in the UN Human Rights Council regarding the protection of the rights of specific vulnerable groups from AI-related harms. Moreover, UNESCO has been the most fertile ground for Beijing’s AI diplomatic activities, also due to the US withdrawal from 2017 to 2022 and its forthcoming second exit in December 2026. There, China has financed the Beijing Consensus on AI and Education, implemented through the International Forum on AI and the Futures of Education and its contributions to the Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. This first global ethical framework to foster the role of AI in achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Other fertile grounds are the standard development organizations, like the International Telecommunications Union and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, which are leveraged for creating standards favorable to Beijing’s trade stakeholders and investors in their trade portfolios. [5]
The GAIGI is complemented by the AI Safety Governance Framework: a set of guidelines on the classification of AI safety risks and for the development and application for stakeholders. Another supporting policy is the 2023 Global Data Security Initiative, which projects the image of a responsible player, addressing the primary engine of AI, and aims at fostering an environment committed to data security and espionage by other countries, and responsible use for innovation and e-commerce. The significance of these documents resides in the fact that they are among the few to be available in English, hence targeted for foreign audiences to stimulate the necessary consensus-building in the field and to counter accusations of espionage. [6]
Beijing’s objective of achieving a whole-of-society development is enacted by the 2024 AI Capacity-Building Action Plan for Good and for All, along with its flagship programs, the Belt and Road initiatives (BRI) and Digital Silk Road (DSR). These programs aim at creating infrastructure connectivity and personnel training to bridge the “intelligence gap”, while functioning also as vectors for Tencent, Alibaba and other stakeholders' investments, aimed at securing technology lock-ins, promoting the mutual recognition of tech standards, and integrating Chinese technology into foreign markets.[7]
So far, these plans have found fertile ground in the Middle East, Africa and especially among South Asian countries, while encountering skepticism in Latin America. [8] Nonetheless, the Global South functions as the ideal recipient thanks to China’s self-positioning in the middle ground between technological superpower and developing nation, [9] allowing a rhetoric that frames it as an enabler of the Global South development. This allows the region to become the solution for Beijing’s crisis of internal demand due to its large pool of new customers, and as an opportunity to acquire embargoed chips, as happened with Nvidia products. [10]
Hedging the oppositions
Nevertheless, the strategy is not free from criticism due to China’s state-centric approach to AI governance, which leads to breaches in human rights that Western actors like the US and the EU regard as unacceptable and incompatible with their own agendas. On the Sino-American relations, this factor is coupled with a strategic competition in emerging technologies, which has led to interdependencies and mutual strategic vulnerabilities.
China has opposed this situation, challenging its technological hegemony and the American-centric global order with a confrontational rhetoric, especially in the field of semiconductors. [11] At the practical level, this is coupled with activities in the UN fora, the GAIGI and the Capacity Building Action Plan, enabling the creation of alternative pathways of supply chain, economic exports and pools of data from the Global South to equip and create China’s AI models. Therefore, this strategy aims at creating a virtuous cycle, an alternative to the US circuit, involving other international actors. These issues have gained sufficient prominence to feature among the key topics discussed during the Xi-Trump summit of May 2026, which, however, have seen only timid developments.
The criticism of China’s human rights policy (whether in the digital field or not) is especially upheld by the EU and its 27 member states. Furthermore, Brussels has manifested the intention of achieving strategic autonomy through the Chips and AI acts, which have resulted in its recent proposal of curbing the ties with China in the digital technology field due to security concerns.
The EU is an important factor in China’s global AI governance strategy due to its role as a rule-maker: its ability to set trade and technology standards can affect relations with China’s third-largest trade partner. However, in this case, Beijing is pursuing an ambivalent strategy, characterized by an emphasis on shared commitments to human rights and development, [12] while threatening retaliation against measures deemed discriminatory. The strategy targets the EU's core commitment to human rights while leveraging considerable trade relations to retain the EU Member States’ engagement, demonstrating alignment while simultaneously seeking alternative support on the global stage.
What future is China envisaging for AI governance?
China is attempting to extend its role from innovator to driver of the discourse over international AI governance, trying to take the space left by the US in traditional institutions, leveraging its self-positioning as a middle ground between a technological powerhouse and a member of the Global South. China has sought to position itself as a supporter of an inclusive approach grounded in human rights. This strategy is grounded in its need to balance the US in the AI strategic competition and EU strategic autonomy, while not burning the Sino-European relations entirely, and expanding its outreach in the field to third actors.
Therefore, China is trying to transpose its ultimate goals of rejuvenation of the nation through economic development and protection of the state and political security on the international stage with a series of capacity-building initiatives, projecting an image of a committed actor through international institutions. It is in its perception of the former, and in its value of respecting “every country’s national context” that resides its desired capability of achieving the security goal: international fora are seen as a flexible institution for finding common grounds, but refrain from imposing legally binding rules, and Beijing’s commitment to respect all actors’ internal situations attempts to establish a logic for which national policies are free from international scrutiny.
[1] Hung, Ho Ting. “Exploring China’s Cyber Sovereignty Concept and Artificial Intelligence Governance Model: A Machine Learning Approach.” Journal of Computational Social Science 8, no. 1 (2025): 24. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42001-024-00346-8.
Zeng, Jinghan. “Artificial Intelligence and China’s Authoritarian Governance.” International Affairs 96, no. 6 (2020): 1441–59. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa172.
[3] Dunford, Michael, and Weidong Liu. “China’s Evolving International Economic Engagement: China Threat or a New Pole in an Equitable Multipolar World Order?” Area Development and Policy 9, no. 2 (2024): 131–68. https://doi.org/10.1080/23792949.2023.2225092.
[9] Dunford, Michael, and Weidong Liu. “China’s Evolving International Economic Engagement: China Threat or a New Pole in an Equitable Multipolar World Order?” Area Development and Policy 9, no. 2 (2024): 131–68. https://doi.org/10.1080/23792949.2023.2225092.
The April 2026 Chinese State Council regulations on industrial and supply chain security introduce a compliance trap with no clean exit. Foreign companies operating in both Western and Chinese markets now face a structural dilemma: complying with Western export controls or sanctions may qualify as grounds for designation and penalty under Chinese law, while failing to comply risks Western penalties. This is not an incidental feature of the regulations. It is their strategic function. The regulations comprise two instruments, the Provisions on the Security of Industrial and Supply Chains and the Provisions on Countering Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction by Foreign States, and expand the capacity to investigate, restrict, and penalise foreign companies and governments accordingly. They are the latest iteration of a framework treating economic interdependence as an instrument of state power, one that has grown more institutionalised and operationally precise over time.
The Expanding Toolkit
China has built a set of interwoven economic pressure tools over the past several years. The April 2025 licensing controls on seven medium and heavy rare earth elements (samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium) established Beijing's capacity to restrict access to materials where it controls over 80 percent of global processing capacity. While some extraterritorial features of later 2025 measures were suspended until November 2026, the core licensing framework remains active. The April 2026 supply chain security regulations extend this framework. The Provisions on Security of Industrial and Supply Chains permit Chinese authorities to designate foreign entities as threats to industrial security and impose escalating responses including trade restrictions, investment blocks, and visa limitations. The criteria for designation are extensive and include acts as routine as complying with foreign export controls or sanctions.
The counter-extraterritorial provisions operationalise this trap. The Provisions on Countering Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction give Chinese authorities broad discretion to penalise companies that comply with foreign controls, without requiring proof of intent. Complying with European Union (EU) or United States (US) rules is sufficient grounds for designation. The practical consequences are hesitation, delayed investment decisions, and in some cases withdrawal from market positions that would otherwise support allied supply chain goals. The legal framework does not require companies to choose China. It requires them to avoid choosing against it.
Strategic Patterns and Objectives
This approach follows patterns established in earlier measures where Beijing arranged economic instruments in response to actions it opposed, whether on Taiwan, technology security, or alliance coordination. The consistent objective has been to encourage restraint among governments and self-censorship among firms without crossing into armed conflict. The G7 trade ministers addressed this in their May 2026 statement from Paris, expressing concern about economic coercion through export restrictions that risk supply chain disruptions, particularly for critical minerals, and undermine economic security and resilience. That G7 trade ministers felt compelled to address this directly in a formal communiqué reflects how far the issue has moved from technical trade policy into the domain of security strategy. Western policy frameworks have yet to fully institutionalise that shift. The strategic logic is to slow or complicate moves toward supply-chain independence in sectors including defence, electric vehicles, renewables, and advanced manufacturing. By concentrating leverage at processing chokepoints rather than raw material extraction alone, the approach creates costs that are asymmetric and difficult for individual states to absorb unilaterally.
Implications for Europe and Allied Partners
European states, including Italy, face direct exposure. Many industries remain dependent on Chinese processing capacity for critical minerals used in batteries, defence systems, and green technology. European defence procurement in particular relies on rare earth elements for guidance systems, radar, and propulsion technologies where alternative processing capacity outside China remains limited. The April 2026 regulations mean companies with exposure in both markets now face that compliance trap directly. The compliance trap does not affect companies in isolation. When one state faces economic pressure, others frequently hesitate to act in solidarity, which deepens instead of eases vulnerability. This fragmentation is what the regulatory framework exploits. But fragmentation is not inevitable. It reflects political incentives that individual states have so far been unwilling to override. Understanding why collective hesitation persists matters as much as documenting it.
North America illustrates both the exposure and the gap. American companies operating in China that comply with US forced labour due diligence or technology transfer requirements now risk designation under the new regulations. What a compliance officer treats as routine legal obligation, Chinese authorities may treat as a qualifying act. Canada's experiencefollowing the Meng Wanzhou arrest demonstrated how targeted pressure can leave a middle power with limited unilateral options, and the broader pattern holds: collective resistance breaks down as individual states calculate that bilateral accommodation is less costly than holding a common line. For middle powers, the compliance trap is easier to navigate collectively than alone. Canada's positioning on critical minerals compounds this. The advantage cited in recent policy discussions rests on extraction capacity, not processing capacity. Canada extracts. Others process. That is the specific gap the current regulatory leverage exploits.
Addressing this challenge requires treating economic coercion as structural, not periodic trade friction. Generic diversification language understates what that requires. Public investment should target processing capacity in allied jurisdictions directly, since extraction diversification alone does not address the chokepoint through which current leverage operates. For the G7 and EU, this means jointly funding processing infrastructure rather than leaving it to market incentives that have so far failed to close the gap. Within NATO, early warning and coordinated response mechanisms for economic coercion deserve the same institutional attention currently given to cyber threats. For companies, resilience planning should map exposure at the processing stage specifically, not just at the extraction or finished goods level, since that is where the compliance trap bites hardest. Due diligence frameworks and open market arrangements among allied and partner states would reduce the dilemmas companies currently face, but only if governments provide clarity on which compliance obligations take precedence and under what conditions. The compliance trap is a legal design. Dismantling it requires a legal and institutional response, not only a supply chain one.
Concluding Assessment
The April 2026 regulations add legal precision and institutional reach to a framework that has been developing for several years. The compliance trap they formalise is not a byproduct of competing regulatory systems. It is a structural feature designed to raise the cost of coordinated responses while remaining below the threshold of direct confrontation. The chokepoint is processing, not extraction, and current Western policy responses have not consistently targeted it. Treating these instruments with the same analytical seriousness as military or cyber threats is warranted, not because the risks are equivalent, but because the effects on industrial capacity, alliance cohesion, and strategic autonomy are consequential and harder to reverse. The vulnerabilities are understood. The processing gap is specific enough to act on. The question is whether policy follows analysis.
This question related to Top Gun: Maverick (Kosinski, 2022), can be put in parallel with the events of May 2025, when a Pakistan Air Force J‑10CE, shot down an Indian Rafale with a long‑range PL‑15 air‑to‑air long range missile. The episode came as a surprise to many analysts as the Rafale is considered an excellent 4.5 generation aircraft, and highlighted how little was still understood about the real operational performance of contemporary Chinese military aviation.
Beyond the “Best Aircraft” Debate
While opinions may differ on which aircraft truly deserves the title of “best,” the debate inevitably points to a broader and more consequential question. How many fighters China actually field, at what pace their rolling off production lines, and what they compare to the their Western counterparts?
Ultimately, these considerations lead to the question that matters most: what would a direct confrontation between the US and China look like, should tensions over Taiwan ever escalate into open conflict?
It is worth noting that this final question cannot be answered with certainty, given the number of critical variables that must be taken into account: the distance U.S. forces need to traverse to reach the battlefield; the availability and use of military bases in neighbouring regions; the volume of missiles and other munitions that could be sustained through resupply; the strength of China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy, which is widely regarded as highly effective (Pacific Forum, 2025); and the experience of the military personnel and material engaged (the use of J-10Cs by Pakistan mark the first time a recent Chinese aircraft is used in combat).
A Shrinking Fleet, but a More Capable One
Let us begin with the numbers. A study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) highlights that the number of aircraft in active service has declined over time. While this trend has been observed across several armed forces, due to a secure environments or economic constraints, Table 1 shows that older assets have been phased out, while third-generations aircraft, such as the J-7, are in the process of disappearing. This leaves the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) equipped predominantly with late-generation and advanced aircraft, such as the J-20 being the latest. If we take into account all the Chinese military branch, the number is in between of 2000 and 2300 (Edson and Saunders, 2025). (A comparative table on the generation of PLAAF aircraft in active service is available in Volume 125, Issue 1 (2025) of The Military Balance).
If you are not familiar with military aviation, this may sound like foreign language. Before digging further, let’s clarify what aircraft generations mean with the following table. Basically, generations are categorised according to the technological development of fighter aircraft. It is important to note that there are different understandings of fighter generations, which may vary depending on the author or institution. There are at least six other classifications, including one used by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Now let's turn our attention to production. Without delving into the full history of Chinese security and capability doctrine, it's important to understand that China has moved from static homeland and coastal air defence, where the PLA was the major actor, to "limited war actions under high-tech conditions" (USCC, 2007), and then toward a strategic force capable of deep strikes and independent missions with a greater involvement of the PLAAF and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).
This paradigm shift is linked to the Gulf War (1990–91), which demonstrated the dominance of high-tech Western air power and questioned a PLAAF numerically large but technologically lagging behind, highlighting both its technological and doctrinal gap. Added to this is the need to protect Chinese interests located at distance or overseas, such as Taiwan, the South/East China Sea, and the "string of pearls" (sea lines of communication). This has led the PLAAF's missions to expand beyond air defence and support to the army/navy, adding roles like long-range precision strike, air superiority over contested regions, strategic transport, and contribution to joint aerospace operations.
Naturally, replacing older aircraft with more technologically advanced models comes at a cost, increasing China's defence spending from around $77 billion in 2011 to $250 billion in 2025 (ECNS, 2025). China is not clearly stating how much money it allocates to its diverse branches of the military; it is generally considered being between 21% and 25% of the budget. Therefore, it can be assumed that at least $52.5 to $62.5 billion is spent on aviation. By way of comparison, the estimated air force expenditure of the United States (air force, navy, army) for the same year was between $273 and $308 billion, and that of Russia between $30 and $45 billion (SimpleFlying, 2025).
To add a further layer to the fog of war, production figures for Chinese military aircraft are also not disclosed. Nevertheless, current estimates suggest, for multi-role fighter aircraft, that the number of aircraft produced per year by Chinese companies exceed 240. This output is broadly broken down as follows: 40 for the J-10C Vigorous Dragon, and more than 100 for the J-16 Hidden Dragons and for the J-20 Mighty Dragon.
Annual Aircraft Output
By comparison, the US has announced approximately 36 F-16s, 36 F-15s, 150 F-35s (it seems that 43% of the F-35 production is for export) and an unknown number of F-18s (which are gradually phased out), for a total of more than 222 aircraft (SimpleFlying, 2025). Even accounting for this significant export share, the numbers speak for themselves: China produces more combat aircraft each year for its own forces than the US, a trend mirrored at sea where the PLAN has already surpassed the US Navy in terms of tonnage.
In addition to Chinese-built aircraft, China continues to operate Russian-made combat aircraft (among others), namely 32 Su-27s, 97 Su-30s and 24 Su-35s (IISS, The Military Balance 2007, 2012 and 2025). While not part of the latest generation, they are potent aircraft.
Picture by Dmitriy Pichugin - PLAAF Su-30 fighter jet, commons file, CC BY-SA 4.0
Despite higher US military spending, China appears to be leading the 2025 rankings as the country with the largest number of aircraft, namely 2,747, while the US peaks at 2,123, (it should kept in mind, however, that while indicative of industrial capacity, these figures reflect quantity only, leaving aside critical variables such as training, sustainment, and combat experience). Nevertheless, if we delve more in detail at the aircraft category (Table 3), it appears that the US has more tankers and transport aircraft than its Chinese counterpart. This highlights a greater strategic flexibility than China.
Two Strategies, Two Air Forces
This divergence is the consequence of two fundamentally different strategies. Until relatively recently, China’s strategy was mostly defensive, focused over territorial integrity and the protection of its immediate periphery, hence the anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) architecture designed to deter or complicate an intervention by a foreign country. This is the reason why it possesses almost twice as many fighter jets and a substantial fleet of AWACS and electronic aircraft, while not requiring long-range air-power projection capabilities (for now).
By contrast, the US has oriented its military strategy toward global power projection, working on its capabilities to operate and sustain prolonged deployments across multiple theatres simultaneously. (A comparative table of the aircraft number Russia, the U.S. and China is available on Defense Blog)
Yet, as we have seen, the numbers alone tell only part of the story. Beyond fleet size and production rates lies, the question of how these last generation aircrafts compare in terms of capability and strategic purpose. Although the latest generation aircraft in service with the PLAAF and PLAN is the J35A, which appeared at the military parade in Beijing on 3 September 2025, information about it is extremely scarce. Thus, we will focus on how the J-20 fits into China's defence strategy.
Although many details regarding the J-20 remain unknown, what is certain is that it possesses a small radar signature (stealth capabilities), the capacity to low super cruise (fly supersonic without using afterburner), and the ability to datalink with drones and other friendly platforms (exchange data in real time via a secure digital link). In addition, its passive sensor should allow the detection of aircraft by their thermal and visual/infrared signature, instead of emitting radar waves (which makes the aircraft detectable), allowing the J-20 to see without being seen, in theory (CSIS ChinaPower, 2025).
Consequently, the J-20 is equipped with long-range air-to-air missiles such as the PL-15 - the same as the one used by the Pakistani against the Rafale - and is believed to possess a 145 km range (DefenseFeeds, 2025). It is also equipped with the PL-21, which is believed to be capable of engagement beyond 200km. It thus gives the aircraft extraordinary air superiority and long-range interception capabilities. These characteristics allow the aircraft to integrate perfectly within a dense sensor network, ground-based air defences such as those deployed by Beijing in the south China sea.
Joint exercises with Russia and Pakistan have also confirmed an increase in the mastery of beyond visual range combat, based on stealth technology, sensors and long-range missiles (Leiter, 2023), perhaps detrimental to traditional dogfighting skill. This echoes the U.S. experience in the Vietnam War, when confidence in missiles led to the belief that dogfighting, and even cannons, had become obsolete, resulting in early F-4 Phantom variants being fielded without internal cannon. The disastrous result in terms of US aircrafts that were shot down, led the military to reinstate the cannon and set up the famous Top Gun program.
One might argue that the US operates broadly comparable systems that cancel each other in the end, placing a greater emphasis on the pilot skills. This is both true and misleading, because, like a football team, China enjoys the advantage of "playing at home". Thus, it benefits from the knowledge of its geography and meteorology, the distance from Taiwan (short response times), and inherently strategic position, as illustrated by the basing layout shown on the map below.
Furthermore, if the stealth factor is set aside due to modern detection capabilities constantly evolving the balance gets more subtle. These modernisation include multi-band radar, new passive electromagnetic detection systems, and "trans-horizon" radars that exploit atmospheric layers for very long-range early warning detection, such as the France’s Nostradamus system (Ministère des Armées, 2025) and China’s JY-27A (Odin, 2025). In addition to this are bistatic radar sets (RadarTutorial, 2025), where the transmitter and receiver are not in the same locations.
Taken together, these constant improvements suggest that the decisive factor could ultimately come down to a more traditional indicator: the number of aircraft available. As a reminder, an American F-117 was shot down by the Yugoslav forces in 1999, using radar operating in the VHF or UHF bands, underscoring that stealth aircrafts are not invisible when confronted with adaptive air-defence systems (theaviationgeekclub, 2025).
Conclusion
This inevitably highlights alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. The United States benefit from a network of partners from Japan and South Korea to Australia and the Philippines, with further support from Singapore and possibly India. In theory, this network of alliances reinforces Washington's ability to project power and conduct operations close to China's periphery (Carnegie endowment, 2025).
China, on the other hand, does not possess a comparable system of alliances. However, it compensates this weakness through its geographical and geopolitical position and its economic weight over neighboring states, and the number of military assets.
In the end, allied support involves constant trade-offs between economic risk and security obligations.
In the end, allied support cannot be taken for granted, as partners must balance security commitments against the risk of economic retaliation. This complexity is particularly salient today, amid growing uncertainty over the Trump administration to uphold its alliance commitments and security agreements. Yet this complexity remains preferable to operating without meaningful alliances, particularly for sustained operations that depend on access, resupply and extensive logistical networks.
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