In this session, Dr. Ellis discusses the main forms Chinese organised crime takes in the region, from money laundering to illegal mining, timber, and fishing. He explains how to distinguish purely criminal networks from activity connected to the Chinese state, and how the phenomenon is becoming a growing strategic concern for the region.
Dr. R. Evan Ellis speaks about the growth of Chinese organised crime in Latin America. He is a Research Professor of Latin American Studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, where his work focuses on the region's engagement with China, transnational organised crime, and populism.
Interviewer: Sarah Toubman and Rabiah Ryklief - Central & Latin America Team
During India’s 73rd Independence day speech in 2019, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the creation of the position of a ‘Chief of Defence Staff’ (CDS) who would be responsible for enhancing the integration of the Indian Armed Forces and “to bring about synergy in operation, logistics, transport, training, support services, communications, repairs and maintenance, etc of the three Services.” (Press Information Bureau, 2020). The years following the announcement were marred by inter-service rivalries and concerns over the division of assets, expressed particularly by the Indian Air Force (IAF) until April 2026 when the then CDS General Anil Chauhan stated that a proposal on theaterisation would soon be shared with the government following a “100 per cent agreement on the concept of theaterisation” even as minor differences on the implementation persisted. While a specific timeline for when these reforms will be implemented has not yet been specified, given India’s position as a major, if not premier, military power in the South Asia, these are likely to have a significant impact on South Asian security.
Impact on the Indian Armed Forces
At present, the three branches of the Indian Armed Forces operate largely independently of each other and are organised under ‘commands’. The Army has seven commands (six operations and one training command), the Air Force has seven (five operational and two functional), and the Navy has three. This has resulted in issues such as parallel command structures, resource duplication, and slower decision-making. Committees such as the Kargil Review Committee (1999) and the Shekatkar Committee (2016) have emphasised the need for India’s armed forces to develop a more joint method of functioning, and theaterisation seeks to model India’s military more along the lines of Western ones, where the assets of all branches work in tandem to enhance operational effectiveness.
From India's perspective, theaterisation promises several operational advantages. First, integrated commands could improve intelligence sharing, streamline logistics, and enable faster responses during military crises. Second, unified command structures may also reduce bureaucratic friction between services and improve the efficient allocation of defence resources. This is particularly relevant in the context of India's security challenges. The 2020 Galwan Valley clashes with China highlighted the need for rapid coordination between ground forces, air assets, surveillance systems, and logistical networks. Similarly, India's continuing rivalry with Pakistan requires the capability to respond effectively across multiple domains and fronts, as seen in the clashes in May 2025.
A more integrated military structure could therefore enhance India's deterrence capabilities by increasing the credibility of its conventional military power. Potential adversaries may perceive a theaterised Indian military as more capable of executing coordinated operations, thereby raising the costs associated with military escalation.
Impact on the India-Pakistan Military Balance
The impact of theaterisation of Indian Armed Forces on India-Pakistan relations is likely to be mixed. On one hand, enhanced military coordination could strengthen deterrence by reducing uncertainty regarding India's ability to mobilise and conduct operations. A more effective conventional force may discourage Pakistan from engaging in limited military provocations or supporting cross-border militant activities and Op. Sindoor showcased India’s willingness to respond to terror attacks in India with conventional force, including the targeting of assets and infrastructure belonging to the Pakistani armed forces.
On the other hand, Pakistan may interpret theaterisation as part of a broader effort by India to achieve conventional military superiority. Given the asymmetry in economic and military resources between the two states, Pakistanhas traditionally relied on nuclear deterrence to offset India's conventional advantages. Any reform that significantly enhances India's operational capabilities could reinforce Pakistani concerns regarding strategic vulnerability. This perception may further encourage Pakistan to modernise its military capabilities, leading to reforms within Pakistan as seen with the establishment of the Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC), invest in advanced missile systems, and continue expanding its tactical nuclear arsenal. Such developments could contribute to a regional security dilemma, whereby measures taken by one state to increase its security are perceived as threatening by another, resulting in reciprocal military build-ups.
Furthermore, the reality of the India-Pakistan rivalry has gradually been altered since the Uri attacks in 2016. The Modi-led government, during each major terror attack in its tenure, has shown a willingness to go up the escalation ladder from limited surgical strikes in 2016, limited airstrikes in 2019, to now an exchange of missiles and drones targeting military assets and infrastructure. The ruling Bhartiya Janata Party government’s voters now expect a ‘strong’ response (targeting the Pakistani army directly) whenever a terror attack occurs in Indian territory, meaning the window and scope for a negotiated resolution have become significantly smaller. To add to this, Pakistan’s continued and growing cooperation with China in countering India’s traditional military advantage will likely also be furthered by India’s military reforms, besides impacting the relationship between India and China, as discussed below.
The most important strategic driver behind India’s theaterisation of its armed forces is arguably China's growing military power. Since the 2020 border crisis, Indian defence planners have increasingly focused on the challenge posed by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). China's own military reforms offer an important point of comparison. Between 2015 and 2017, Beijing undertook extensive military restructuring, replacing its traditional military regions with integrated theatre commands designed to improve joint operations. Chinese reforms have significantly enhanced the PLA's ability to coordinate forces across different domains and operational theatres.
Indian policymakers view theaterisation partly as a response to this changing military balance. By integrating its own command structures, India seeks to improve readiness and operational effectiveness in the event of future border confrontations. Enhanced jointness may enable India to better coordinate surveillance, airpower, logistics, and ground operations across the Himalayan frontier.
However, this dynamic may also contribute to intensifying strategic competition between Asia's two rising powers. As both states continue to modernise their militaries and improve operational capabilities, the risk of military rivalry becoming increasingly institutionalised cannot be dismissed. While theaterisation itself is not inherently destabilising, it forms part of a broader pattern of military modernisation occurring on both sides of the border. Furthermore, an increase in tensions between China and India has the potential to spill over into a wider regional confrontation where both states may seek to increase their influence in other South Asian countries and see attempts by the other to do the same as a potentially hostile act by the third state.
In conclusion, India’s theaterisation reforms may be aimed solely at enhancing its own military readiness and the joint operational capability of its armed forces and may be without an offensive goal in mind. However, this may not be how other states, particularly Pakistan and China view it, and reciprocal reforms and measures to enhance their own capability have the potential to lead to an increased risk of conventional conflict in South Asia, a reality which was briefly seen in the India-Pakistan conflict in 2025.
What’s China’s AI policy? Rejuvenation of the nation through security and development
Generally, China is regarded as an innovative player in the AI race but an unlikely protagonist in the global governance dimension: this is given by its state-driven government, and AI national governance based on sovereignty‑first, security‑heavy, surveillance‑enabled principles. [1] However, the reconfiguration of the international order, and the US withdrawal from UN-based institutions provide China the occasion to promote an image of a responsible leader in the field of AI governance, pursuing a strategy grounded on the values of inclusion and fairness, with Chinese characteristics.
This input is based on its foundational goals: economic growth and security, as stated in the 2017 Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan. For the former, AI can be used as a propeller for the rejuvenation of the nation: the aim of restoring national wealth and power under the guidance of the CCP. Regarding the latter, AI-generated content presents a risk of jeopardizing social stability, hence political and national security. [2] Therefore, China has to leverage the international stage: it has to ensure that the current institutions that foster growth and security are upheld and promote policies that enable innovation and the activity of Chinese stakeholders, amid the US containment or the EU decoupling strategy and the criticism on its human rights policy. This reflects China's attempt to position itself as an alternative to US and European approaches to AI governance.
The impact of Chinese AI policy on the international stage: international competition trough norm setting and equipment export
In order to achieve development and ensure security, while hedging criticism and achieving strategic parity with the US, China has pursued a strategy aimed at projecting the image of a committed major player, capable of ensuring an equitable AI development for the Global South. This is enacted by the 2025 Global AI Governance Action Plan (GAIGI), which creates a strategy focused on UN-based multilateralism, human-centered AI, laws and consensus-based development of AI governance and respect for countries’ sovereignty.
This latter value in particular is a concept developed based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, [3]used by China as a counterargument towards international criticism over its human rights policies. The other element that we should specify is the commitment under the UN-based multilateralism: in the GAIGI institutions like the UN should be a starting point for consultations on soft laws that countries can then adopt and adapt into their national law, as corroborated by Beijing’s endorsement of UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’s proposal to create a new international body to govern AI under the UN framework. [4]
The commitment towards human-centered AI has to be understood as the objective of creating an AI development that involves all layers of the population, as corroborated by its statement in the UN Human Rights Council regarding the protection of the rights of specific vulnerable groups from AI-related harms. Moreover, UNESCO has been the most fertile ground for Beijing’s AI diplomatic activities, also due to the US withdrawal from 2017 to 2022 and its forthcoming second exit in December 2026. There, China has financed the Beijing Consensus on AI and Education, implemented through the International Forum on AI and the Futures of Education and its contributions to the Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. This first global ethical framework to foster the role of AI in achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Other fertile grounds are the standard development organizations, like the International Telecommunications Union and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, which are leveraged for creating standards favorable to Beijing’s trade stakeholders and investors in their trade portfolios. [5]
The GAIGI is complemented by the AI Safety Governance Framework: a set of guidelines on the classification of AI safety risks and for the development and application for stakeholders. Another supporting policy is the 2023 Global Data Security Initiative, which projects the image of a responsible player, addressing the primary engine of AI, and aims at fostering an environment committed to data security and espionage by other countries, and responsible use for innovation and e-commerce. The significance of these documents resides in the fact that they are among the few to be available in English, hence targeted for foreign audiences to stimulate the necessary consensus-building in the field and to counter accusations of espionage. [6]
Beijing’s objective of achieving a whole-of-society development is enacted by the 2024 AI Capacity-Building Action Plan for Good and for All, along with its flagship programs, the Belt and Road initiatives (BRI) and Digital Silk Road (DSR). These programs aim at creating infrastructure connectivity and personnel training to bridge the “intelligence gap”, while functioning also as vectors for Tencent, Alibaba and other stakeholders' investments, aimed at securing technology lock-ins, promoting the mutual recognition of tech standards, and integrating Chinese technology into foreign markets.[7]
So far, these plans have found fertile ground in the Middle East, Africa and especially among South Asian countries, while encountering skepticism in Latin America. [8] Nonetheless, the Global South functions as the ideal recipient thanks to China’s self-positioning in the middle ground between technological superpower and developing nation, [9] allowing a rhetoric that frames it as an enabler of the Global South development. This allows the region to become the solution for Beijing’s crisis of internal demand due to its large pool of new customers, and as an opportunity to acquire embargoed chips, as happened with Nvidia products. [10]
Hedging the oppositions
Nevertheless, the strategy is not free from criticism due to China’s state-centric approach to AI governance, which leads to breaches in human rights that Western actors like the US and the EU regard as unacceptable and incompatible with their own agendas. On the Sino-American relations, this factor is coupled with a strategic competition in emerging technologies, which has led to interdependencies and mutual strategic vulnerabilities.
China has opposed this situation, challenging its technological hegemony and the American-centric global order with a confrontational rhetoric, especially in the field of semiconductors. [11] At the practical level, this is coupled with activities in the UN fora, the GAIGI and the Capacity Building Action Plan, enabling the creation of alternative pathways of supply chain, economic exports and pools of data from the Global South to equip and create China’s AI models. Therefore, this strategy aims at creating a virtuous cycle, an alternative to the US circuit, involving other international actors. These issues have gained sufficient prominence to feature among the key topics discussed during the Xi-Trump summit of May 2026, which, however, have seen only timid developments.
The criticism of China’s human rights policy (whether in the digital field or not) is especially upheld by the EU and its 27 member states. Furthermore, Brussels has manifested the intention of achieving strategic autonomy through the Chips and AI acts, which have resulted in its recent proposal of curbing the ties with China in the digital technology field due to security concerns.
The EU is an important factor in China’s global AI governance strategy due to its role as a rule-maker: its ability to set trade and technology standards can affect relations with China’s third-largest trade partner. However, in this case, Beijing is pursuing an ambivalent strategy, characterized by an emphasis on shared commitments to human rights and development, [12] while threatening retaliation against measures deemed discriminatory. The strategy targets the EU's core commitment to human rights while leveraging considerable trade relations to retain the EU Member States’ engagement, demonstrating alignment while simultaneously seeking alternative support on the global stage.
What future is China envisaging for AI governance?
China is attempting to extend its role from innovator to driver of the discourse over international AI governance, trying to take the space left by the US in traditional institutions, leveraging its self-positioning as a middle ground between a technological powerhouse and a member of the Global South. China has sought to position itself as a supporter of an inclusive approach grounded in human rights. This strategy is grounded in its need to balance the US in the AI strategic competition and EU strategic autonomy, while not burning the Sino-European relations entirely, and expanding its outreach in the field to third actors.
Therefore, China is trying to transpose its ultimate goals of rejuvenation of the nation through economic development and protection of the state and political security on the international stage with a series of capacity-building initiatives, projecting an image of a committed actor through international institutions. It is in its perception of the former, and in its value of respecting “every country’s national context” that resides its desired capability of achieving the security goal: international fora are seen as a flexible institution for finding common grounds, but refrain from imposing legally binding rules, and Beijing’s commitment to respect all actors’ internal situations attempts to establish a logic for which national policies are free from international scrutiny.
[1] Hung, Ho Ting. “Exploring China’s Cyber Sovereignty Concept and Artificial Intelligence Governance Model: A Machine Learning Approach.” Journal of Computational Social Science 8, no. 1 (2025): 24. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42001-024-00346-8.
Zeng, Jinghan. “Artificial Intelligence and China’s Authoritarian Governance.” International Affairs 96, no. 6 (2020): 1441–59. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa172.
[3] Dunford, Michael, and Weidong Liu. “China’s Evolving International Economic Engagement: China Threat or a New Pole in an Equitable Multipolar World Order?” Area Development and Policy 9, no. 2 (2024): 131–68. https://doi.org/10.1080/23792949.2023.2225092.
[9] Dunford, Michael, and Weidong Liu. “China’s Evolving International Economic Engagement: China Threat or a New Pole in an Equitable Multipolar World Order?” Area Development and Policy 9, no. 2 (2024): 131–68. https://doi.org/10.1080/23792949.2023.2225092.
The April 2026 Chinese State Council regulations on industrial and supply chain security introduce a compliance trap with no clean exit. Foreign companies operating in both Western and Chinese markets now face a structural dilemma: complying with Western export controls or sanctions may qualify as grounds for designation and penalty under Chinese law, while failing to comply risks Western penalties. This is not an incidental feature of the regulations. It is their strategic function. The regulations comprise two instruments, the Provisions on the Security of Industrial and Supply Chains and the Provisions on Countering Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction by Foreign States, and expand the capacity to investigate, restrict, and penalise foreign companies and governments accordingly. They are the latest iteration of a framework treating economic interdependence as an instrument of state power, one that has grown more institutionalised and operationally precise over time.
The Expanding Toolkit
China has built a set of interwoven economic pressure tools over the past several years. The April 2025 licensing controls on seven medium and heavy rare earth elements (samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium) established Beijing's capacity to restrict access to materials where it controls over 80 percent of global processing capacity. While some extraterritorial features of later 2025 measures were suspended until November 2026, the core licensing framework remains active. The April 2026 supply chain security regulations extend this framework. The Provisions on Security of Industrial and Supply Chains permit Chinese authorities to designate foreign entities as threats to industrial security and impose escalating responses including trade restrictions, investment blocks, and visa limitations. The criteria for designation are extensive and include acts as routine as complying with foreign export controls or sanctions.
The counter-extraterritorial provisions operationalise this trap. The Provisions on Countering Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction give Chinese authorities broad discretion to penalise companies that comply with foreign controls, without requiring proof of intent. Complying with European Union (EU) or United States (US) rules is sufficient grounds for designation. The practical consequences are hesitation, delayed investment decisions, and in some cases withdrawal from market positions that would otherwise support allied supply chain goals. The legal framework does not require companies to choose China. It requires them to avoid choosing against it.
Strategic Patterns and Objectives
This approach follows patterns established in earlier measures where Beijing arranged economic instruments in response to actions it opposed, whether on Taiwan, technology security, or alliance coordination. The consistent objective has been to encourage restraint among governments and self-censorship among firms without crossing into armed conflict. The G7 trade ministers addressed this in their May 2026 statement from Paris, expressing concern about economic coercion through export restrictions that risk supply chain disruptions, particularly for critical minerals, and undermine economic security and resilience. That G7 trade ministers felt compelled to address this directly in a formal communiqué reflects how far the issue has moved from technical trade policy into the domain of security strategy. Western policy frameworks have yet to fully institutionalise that shift. The strategic logic is to slow or complicate moves toward supply-chain independence in sectors including defence, electric vehicles, renewables, and advanced manufacturing. By concentrating leverage at processing chokepoints rather than raw material extraction alone, the approach creates costs that are asymmetric and difficult for individual states to absorb unilaterally.
Implications for Europe and Allied Partners
European states, including Italy, face direct exposure. Many industries remain dependent on Chinese processing capacity for critical minerals used in batteries, defence systems, and green technology. European defence procurement in particular relies on rare earth elements for guidance systems, radar, and propulsion technologies where alternative processing capacity outside China remains limited. The April 2026 regulations mean companies with exposure in both markets now face that compliance trap directly. The compliance trap does not affect companies in isolation. When one state faces economic pressure, others frequently hesitate to act in solidarity, which deepens instead of eases vulnerability. This fragmentation is what the regulatory framework exploits. But fragmentation is not inevitable. It reflects political incentives that individual states have so far been unwilling to override. Understanding why collective hesitation persists matters as much as documenting it.
North America illustrates both the exposure and the gap. American companies operating in China that comply with US forced labour due diligence or technology transfer requirements now risk designation under the new regulations. What a compliance officer treats as routine legal obligation, Chinese authorities may treat as a qualifying act. Canada's experiencefollowing the Meng Wanzhou arrest demonstrated how targeted pressure can leave a middle power with limited unilateral options, and the broader pattern holds: collective resistance breaks down as individual states calculate that bilateral accommodation is less costly than holding a common line. For middle powers, the compliance trap is easier to navigate collectively than alone. Canada's positioning on critical minerals compounds this. The advantage cited in recent policy discussions rests on extraction capacity, not processing capacity. Canada extracts. Others process. That is the specific gap the current regulatory leverage exploits.
Addressing this challenge requires treating economic coercion as structural, not periodic trade friction. Generic diversification language understates what that requires. Public investment should target processing capacity in allied jurisdictions directly, since extraction diversification alone does not address the chokepoint through which current leverage operates. For the G7 and EU, this means jointly funding processing infrastructure rather than leaving it to market incentives that have so far failed to close the gap. Within NATO, early warning and coordinated response mechanisms for economic coercion deserve the same institutional attention currently given to cyber threats. For companies, resilience planning should map exposure at the processing stage specifically, not just at the extraction or finished goods level, since that is where the compliance trap bites hardest. Due diligence frameworks and open market arrangements among allied and partner states would reduce the dilemmas companies currently face, but only if governments provide clarity on which compliance obligations take precedence and under what conditions. The compliance trap is a legal design. Dismantling it requires a legal and institutional response, not only a supply chain one.
Concluding Assessment
The April 2026 regulations add legal precision and institutional reach to a framework that has been developing for several years. The compliance trap they formalise is not a byproduct of competing regulatory systems. It is a structural feature designed to raise the cost of coordinated responses while remaining below the threshold of direct confrontation. The chokepoint is processing, not extraction, and current Western policy responses have not consistently targeted it. Treating these instruments with the same analytical seriousness as military or cyber threats is warranted, not because the risks are equivalent, but because the effects on industrial capacity, alliance cohesion, and strategic autonomy are consequential and harder to reverse. The vulnerabilities are understood. The processing gap is specific enough to act on. The question is whether policy follows analysis.
This question related to Top Gun: Maverick (Kosinski, 2022), can be put in parallel with the events of May 2025, when a Pakistan Air Force J‑10CE, shot down an Indian Rafale with a long‑range PL‑15 air‑to‑air long range missile. The episode came as a surprise to many analysts as the Rafale is considered an excellent 4.5 generation aircraft, and highlighted how little was still understood about the real operational performance of contemporary Chinese military aviation.
Beyond the “Best Aircraft” Debate
While opinions may differ on which aircraft truly deserves the title of “best,” the debate inevitably points to a broader and more consequential question. How many fighters China actually field, at what pace their rolling off production lines, and what they compare to the their Western counterparts?
Ultimately, these considerations lead to the question that matters most: what would a direct confrontation between the US and China look like, should tensions over Taiwan ever escalate into open conflict?
It is worth noting that this final question cannot be answered with certainty, given the number of critical variables that must be taken into account: the distance U.S. forces need to traverse to reach the battlefield; the availability and use of military bases in neighbouring regions; the volume of missiles and other munitions that could be sustained through resupply; the strength of China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy, which is widely regarded as highly effective (Pacific Forum, 2025); and the experience of the military personnel and material engaged (the use of J-10Cs by Pakistan mark the first time a recent Chinese aircraft is used in combat).
A Shrinking Fleet, but a More Capable One
Let us begin with the numbers. A study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) highlights that the number of aircraft in active service has declined over time. While this trend has been observed across several armed forces, due to a secure environments or economic constraints, Table 1 shows that older assets have been phased out, while third-generations aircraft, such as the J-7, are in the process of disappearing. This leaves the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) equipped predominantly with late-generation and advanced aircraft, such as the J-20 being the latest. If we take into account all the Chinese military branch, the number is in between of 2000 and 2300 (Edson and Saunders, 2025). (A comparative table on the generation of PLAAF aircraft in active service is available in Volume 125, Issue 1 (2025) of The Military Balance).
If you are not familiar with military aviation, this may sound like foreign language. Before digging further, let’s clarify what aircraft generations mean with the following table. Basically, generations are categorised according to the technological development of fighter aircraft. It is important to note that there are different understandings of fighter generations, which may vary depending on the author or institution. There are at least six other classifications, including one used by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Now let's turn our attention to production. Without delving into the full history of Chinese security and capability doctrine, it's important to understand that China has moved from static homeland and coastal air defence, where the PLA was the major actor, to "limited war actions under high-tech conditions" (USCC, 2007), and then toward a strategic force capable of deep strikes and independent missions with a greater involvement of the PLAAF and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).
This paradigm shift is linked to the Gulf War (1990–91), which demonstrated the dominance of high-tech Western air power and questioned a PLAAF numerically large but technologically lagging behind, highlighting both its technological and doctrinal gap. Added to this is the need to protect Chinese interests located at distance or overseas, such as Taiwan, the South/East China Sea, and the "string of pearls" (sea lines of communication). This has led the PLAAF's missions to expand beyond air defence and support to the army/navy, adding roles like long-range precision strike, air superiority over contested regions, strategic transport, and contribution to joint aerospace operations.
Naturally, replacing older aircraft with more technologically advanced models comes at a cost, increasing China's defence spending from around $77 billion in 2011 to $250 billion in 2025 (ECNS, 2025). China is not clearly stating how much money it allocates to its diverse branches of the military; it is generally considered being between 21% and 25% of the budget. Therefore, it can be assumed that at least $52.5 to $62.5 billion is spent on aviation. By way of comparison, the estimated air force expenditure of the United States (air force, navy, army) for the same year was between $273 and $308 billion, and that of Russia between $30 and $45 billion (SimpleFlying, 2025).
To add a further layer to the fog of war, production figures for Chinese military aircraft are also not disclosed. Nevertheless, current estimates suggest, for multi-role fighter aircraft, that the number of aircraft produced per year by Chinese companies exceed 240. This output is broadly broken down as follows: 40 for the J-10C Vigorous Dragon, and more than 100 for the J-16 Hidden Dragons and for the J-20 Mighty Dragon.
Annual Aircraft Output
By comparison, the US has announced approximately 36 F-16s, 36 F-15s, 150 F-35s (it seems that 43% of the F-35 production is for export) and an unknown number of F-18s (which are gradually phased out), for a total of more than 222 aircraft (SimpleFlying, 2025). Even accounting for this significant export share, the numbers speak for themselves: China produces more combat aircraft each year for its own forces than the US, a trend mirrored at sea where the PLAN has already surpassed the US Navy in terms of tonnage.
In addition to Chinese-built aircraft, China continues to operate Russian-made combat aircraft (among others), namely 32 Su-27s, 97 Su-30s and 24 Su-35s (IISS, The Military Balance 2007, 2012 and 2025). While not part of the latest generation, they are potent aircraft.
Picture by Dmitriy Pichugin - PLAAF Su-30 fighter jet, commons file, CC BY-SA 4.0
Despite higher US military spending, China appears to be leading the 2025 rankings as the country with the largest number of aircraft, namely 2,747, while the US peaks at 2,123, (it should kept in mind, however, that while indicative of industrial capacity, these figures reflect quantity only, leaving aside critical variables such as training, sustainment, and combat experience). Nevertheless, if we delve more in detail at the aircraft category (Table 3), it appears that the US has more tankers and transport aircraft than its Chinese counterpart. This highlights a greater strategic flexibility than China.
Two Strategies, Two Air Forces
This divergence is the consequence of two fundamentally different strategies. Until relatively recently, China’s strategy was mostly defensive, focused over territorial integrity and the protection of its immediate periphery, hence the anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) architecture designed to deter or complicate an intervention by a foreign country. This is the reason why it possesses almost twice as many fighter jets and a substantial fleet of AWACS and electronic aircraft, while not requiring long-range air-power projection capabilities (for now).
By contrast, the US has oriented its military strategy toward global power projection, working on its capabilities to operate and sustain prolonged deployments across multiple theatres simultaneously. (A comparative table of the aircraft number Russia, the U.S. and China is available on Defense Blog)
Yet, as we have seen, the numbers alone tell only part of the story. Beyond fleet size and production rates lies, the question of how these last generation aircrafts compare in terms of capability and strategic purpose. Although the latest generation aircraft in service with the PLAAF and PLAN is the J35A, which appeared at the military parade in Beijing on 3 September 2025, information about it is extremely scarce. Thus, we will focus on how the J-20 fits into China's defence strategy.
Although many details regarding the J-20 remain unknown, what is certain is that it possesses a small radar signature (stealth capabilities), the capacity to low super cruise (fly supersonic without using afterburner), and the ability to datalink with drones and other friendly platforms (exchange data in real time via a secure digital link). In addition, its passive sensor should allow the detection of aircraft by their thermal and visual/infrared signature, instead of emitting radar waves (which makes the aircraft detectable), allowing the J-20 to see without being seen, in theory (CSIS ChinaPower, 2025).
Consequently, the J-20 is equipped with long-range air-to-air missiles such as the PL-15 - the same as the one used by the Pakistani against the Rafale - and is believed to possess a 145 km range (DefenseFeeds, 2025). It is also equipped with the PL-21, which is believed to be capable of engagement beyond 200km. It thus gives the aircraft extraordinary air superiority and long-range interception capabilities. These characteristics allow the aircraft to integrate perfectly within a dense sensor network, ground-based air defences such as those deployed by Beijing in the south China sea.
Joint exercises with Russia and Pakistan have also confirmed an increase in the mastery of beyond visual range combat, based on stealth technology, sensors and long-range missiles (Leiter, 2023), perhaps detrimental to traditional dogfighting skill. This echoes the U.S. experience in the Vietnam War, when confidence in missiles led to the belief that dogfighting, and even cannons, had become obsolete, resulting in early F-4 Phantom variants being fielded without internal cannon. The disastrous result in terms of US aircrafts that were shot down, led the military to reinstate the cannon and set up the famous Top Gun program.
One might argue that the US operates broadly comparable systems that cancel each other in the end, placing a greater emphasis on the pilot skills. This is both true and misleading, because, like a football team, China enjoys the advantage of "playing at home". Thus, it benefits from the knowledge of its geography and meteorology, the distance from Taiwan (short response times), and inherently strategic position, as illustrated by the basing layout shown on the map below.
Furthermore, if the stealth factor is set aside due to modern detection capabilities constantly evolving the balance gets more subtle. These modernisation include multi-band radar, new passive electromagnetic detection systems, and "trans-horizon" radars that exploit atmospheric layers for very long-range early warning detection, such as the France’s Nostradamus system (Ministère des Armées, 2025) and China’s JY-27A (Odin, 2025). In addition to this are bistatic radar sets (RadarTutorial, 2025), where the transmitter and receiver are not in the same locations.
Taken together, these constant improvements suggest that the decisive factor could ultimately come down to a more traditional indicator: the number of aircraft available. As a reminder, an American F-117 was shot down by the Yugoslav forces in 1999, using radar operating in the VHF or UHF bands, underscoring that stealth aircrafts are not invisible when confronted with adaptive air-defence systems (theaviationgeekclub, 2025).
Conclusion
This inevitably highlights alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. The United States benefit from a network of partners from Japan and South Korea to Australia and the Philippines, with further support from Singapore and possibly India. In theory, this network of alliances reinforces Washington's ability to project power and conduct operations close to China's periphery (Carnegie endowment, 2025).
China, on the other hand, does not possess a comparable system of alliances. However, it compensates this weakness through its geographical and geopolitical position and its economic weight over neighboring states, and the number of military assets.
In the end, allied support involves constant trade-offs between economic risk and security obligations.
In the end, allied support cannot be taken for granted, as partners must balance security commitments against the risk of economic retaliation. This complexity is particularly salient today, amid growing uncertainty over the Trump administration to uphold its alliance commitments and security agreements. Yet this complexity remains preferable to operating without meaningful alliances, particularly for sustained operations that depend on access, resupply and extensive logistical networks.
In this espisode, Dr. Simona Grano discusses the geopolitical implications of Chinese and Taiwanese influence in Southeast Asia and Oceania, and how this influence is being perceived and addressed by regional actors.
This podcast analyses how China is applying its strategic initiatives to influence infrastructure development and economic integration in Southeast Asia and Oceania examining Taiwan's counterbalancing efforts. It also investigates how regional nations navigate their relations with both China and Taiwan, the function of regional organisations, and the security ramifications of China's growing military might and a potential AUKUS alliance during the Trump era.
Dr. Grano is a distinguished expert in China and Taiwan issues. Dr. Grano serves as the Senior Fellow on Taiwan at the Asia Society Policy Institute's (ASPI) Center for China Analysis (CCA). She is also currently a Senior Lecturer and Director of the Taiwan Studies Project at the University of Zurich.
Interviewer: Kristina Kovalenko - Southeast Asia & Oceania Desk
Mat Youkee speaks about the role of the US and China in shaping Panama’s current security situation. He is a freelance journalist and independent consultant based in Panama.
In this session, Mat Youkee discusses how Panama’s security situation has been affected by recent statements by US President Donald Trump. He looks at what is currently shaping Panama’s strategic decision making in the international arena, including US and Chinese political and business interests. He also considers what is next for the nation in light of these competing geopolitical interests.
Interviewers: Sarah Toubman & Dr. Rabiah Ryklief - Central & South America Desk
With Donald Trump's victory, the US Big Tech, with the second Trump administration, could significantly influence and consolidate the strong interconnection between the federal government and American technology companies.
In recent years, the relationship between the military industrial complex and the US tech companies (Amazon, Microsoft and Google in the lead) has strengthened, especially on technology renewal issues coming from the Pentagon in the political-military sphere. This connects the relationship between Silicon Valley and the military-industrial complex in national security matters.
In the context of the future Trump administration, which will take office on 20 January 2025, the latter could grant Big Tech ample room to manoeuvres in exchange for support in national security matters.
The strong concern is the partnership that could emerge in a public-private collaboration. According to a recent 2024 paper by Costs of War/Brown University's WATSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, entitled ‘How Big Tech and Silicon Valley are Transforming the Military-Industrial Complex’, the link between the Department of Defence and the tech company sector is gradually influencing and directing the Pentagon's investments and the Defence Budget ($886 billion for the year 2024). In the current context, the role of Tech companies such as Amazon, Google, and Microsoft is increasing dramatically, competing with traditional US defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin.
Besides the classic Big Tech companies, other companies such as Palantir Technologies also carve out important spaces for themselves. Founded in 2003 by Peter Thiel and Alex Karp to develop software for analyzing large amounts of data, this company is one of the best known cases of start-ups backed by military and intelligence funds that have become key players in providing services and technologies to the Department of Defence (DoD) and other federal agencies.
During its early stages, Palantir received around $2 million in funding from In-Q-Tel, the CIA's venture capital fund, which enabled the start-up to grow rapidly and acquire contracts with various government agencies. This helped Palantir to be able to grow, giving it important resources to be able to strengthen its relationships with major government agencies.
For several insiders, Palantir's role, linked to its potential, would grant it the cards to transform itself into a figure similar to Raytheon or Lockheed Martin, historically dominant companies in the defense sector. Indeed, it is theorized that Palantir and other technology companies, such as Microsoft and Amazon, may soon get to acquire traditional defence contractors, blurring the distinction between the technology industry and the US defence sector.
Image Source: Generated with ChatGPT/DALL·E
The role of tech companies has started to strengthen since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine of growing tensions with China. Linked to these geopolitical tensions, several start-ups operating in the tech sector are receiving significant investments. Among these is Anduril, a company operating in the production of military systems and drones with a focus on AI integration, which recently completed a $1.5 billion funding round, bringing its valuation to $14 billion.
As a matter of fact, the role of Big Tech in the coming years could be consolidated also in view of the geopolitical competition with Beijing.
by Miguel Jiménez, Ingrid Heggstad, & Dan Ziebarth - Political Economy, Development, & Energy Security Team
Introduction
It was announced on Tuesday, November 5th that Donald Trump, the candidate for the right-wing Republican Party, had won the 2024 Presidential Election in the United States of America and would officially become the President-Elect. Kamala Harris, the left-wing Democratic Party candidate, conceded defeat in a speech on Wednesday, December 6th, urging voters to accept the election results. While Harris and her vice presidential running mate, Time Walz, received significant party support ahead of the election and were seen as a new phase for the Democratic Party, the party will be weakened following the election results. Even though during the campaign she lacked a compelling economic narrative and often avoided answering how to fund any proposal she brought to the table, in terms of global economic relations, a Harris presidency was expected to maintain continuity with the current Biden administration's approach largely.
The second Trump presidency is expected to have major ramifications for global politics, particularly global economic relations, particularly as Trump has been a vocal proponent of protectionist trade policies. The Republican Party, led by Trump, will also control both chambers of the legislature, while conservative justices make up 6 of the 9 seats on the Supreme Court of the United States. These conditions could give Trump a strong mandate for policy change. In particular, economic relations with China, the European Union, and Russia are expected to be affected by a second Trump presidency.
China
Trump has announced that, if re-elected, he will impose a 10–20 per cent across-the-board tariff on imports into the United States, with an additional 60 per cent tariff on all imports from China. Trump has also pledged to terminate the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) passed by the Biden administration, which would be expected to increase domestic production and reduce Chinese imports. This is in contrast to what would have been expected under a Kamala Harris administration, where the usage of tools to inhibit the arrival of Chinese goods would have come from domestic policies with the continuation of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the single largest climate investment in American history. Based on building domestic champions in the field of energy transition, which is currently dominated by China, being the world’s leader in clean energy production and the refinement of the majority of mineral inputs.
European Union
The second Trump presidency could challenge Europe through an “America First” trade policy, focused on reducing the U.S. trade deficit, with tariffs as high as 20 per cent on imports and even more on Chinese goods. These tariffs would increase costs for European exporters and consumers, impacting the EU’s economy. Ongoing disputes from the Biden era, such as steel and aluminium tariffs and green subsidies, may also escalate, while the expiration of paused EU retaliatory tariffs in 2025 and the Airbus-Boeing subsidy conflict in 2026 could further strain EU-U.S. trade relations, adding to Europe’s economic uncertainty. It is noteworthy that during his tenure as president, Donald Trump's imposition of tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from the European Union and China resulted in the implementation of retaliatory tariffs on U.S. agricultural products.
Russia
A renewed Trump presidency could also impact global economic relations with Russia. In his 2024 campaign, Trump promised to swiftly resolve the Ukraine conflict, asserting he could achieve peace within 24 hours through negotiation. However, if Russia resists a settlement, Trump has signalled he would impose tougher economic sanctions, potentially targeting Russia’s central bank and curtailing energy exports to key markets like India and China. This intensified economic pressure, coupled with increased US energy production to lower global prices, would squeeze Russia’s vital oil revenue.
Additionally, Trump’s scepticism toward ongoing US aid to Ukraine, which has amounted to $92.7 billion since 2022, raises concerns over a potential reduction in support, which could compromise Ukraine’s defence and shift the regional balance in Russia’s favour. Trump has also suggested that Europe should shoulder more responsibility for its security, which may lead to a reevaluation of US commitments to NATO. It is possible that a reduction in the US role in NATO could have the effect of weakening collective defenses, which might in turn expose Europe to greater tensions with Russia. This approach indicates a shift toward a more isolationist US foreign policy, with strategic economic measures as leverage to influence Russia's actions.
Additionally, Trump’s expected policies in oil and gas could intensify competition with Russia and reshape global energy markets. Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska has predicted that Trump’s support for US oil production might drive global prices down to around $50 per barrel by 2025, creating pressure on Russia’s oil-dependent economy. Trump’s approach would likely include promoting US LNG exports, reviving paused projects, and further challenging Russia’s position in Europe’s energy market.
His stance on projects like the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which he previously sanctioned to limit Russia’s influence, suggests he might continue efforts to curb Russia’s global LNG ambitions while supporting policies to maintain affordable oil prices for US consumers. By influencing OPEC+ to stabilise prices favourable to the US, Trump could further impact Russia’s revenue, potentially reducing its leverage in Europe and heightening competition in the global energy sector.
Conclusion
Taken together, based upon a previous presidency led by Donald Trump and his recent claims on the campaign trail, global economic relations could become increasingly tense between the United States and other nations and political unions.
In particular, trade relations between China and the United States are expected to worsen, with major increases in tariffs on Chinese goods entering into the United States possibly leading to retaliatory tariffs and an intensification of trade competition between the two countries. The European Union could also be affected by the competition between the United States and China, as well as the possibility of increased tariffs on goods from the EU going into the United States. The conflict in Ukraine also casts a shadow over Trump’s second term and whether the Trump administration continues to provide funding to Ukraine and keep sanctions on Russia in place will affect both the war in Ukraine, as well as economic relations between the United States and Russia.
These considerations will all have ripple effects across the entire world, meaning it is important for policymakers, scholars, and citizens alike to continue watching the effects of the second Trump presidency on global economic relations.
In this episode, Marco Volpe talks about China's current and future role in the Arctic region, China's polar strategy including Antarctica, and academic bridge building between the Arctic and the Third Pole. Marco Volpe is a visiting researcher at the Arctic Centre in Rovaniemi.
In this session, Mr. Volpe lays out the scientific, economic, and geopolitical spheres of China's engagement in the Arctic region. He highlights China's long-term planning capabilities and looks at China's overall polar strategy, including Antarctica, through the lens of investments in polar climate science. Mr. Volpe also discusses the efforts of building bridges between Arctic and Third Pole (Himalaya) research, focusing on indigenous peoples and indigenous knowledge.
Interviewers: Irene Senfter and Max Giordano - Arctic Team
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