Europe Archives – ITSS Verona

August 12, 2026 — No Comments

Europe as an Actor: Challenges and the Way Forward

On June 6th, 2026, ITSS Verona and King’s College London hosted a closed-door, Chatham House Rule panel discussion amongst EU, NATO and academia representatives, focusing on “Europe as an Actor Amid War: Challenges and the Way Forward”. The event explored the potential reshuffling of the international order, Europe’s role in supporting regional security, and possible pathways for sustainable conflict resolution.

The Union Mediating

A high EU officer opened the panel by stating that de-escalation and prosperity in the region seem to heavily rely on seeking the deal between Iran and the United States. They specified that negotiations might prove to be more conditions-based than time-bound, with pressing nuclear aspects yielding matters linked to Lebanon and Hormuz. Yet, it is understood that the United States will have to balance Israeli interests and would probably benefit from Israeli limited operations in Lebanon in order to facilitate a deal with Iran.

The EU’s support towards mediation between the U.S. and Iran during the Biden administration led to a nearly complete return of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), for a final deal was essentially ready to be implemented. However, Iran’s drone support for Russia following the invasion of Ukraine and, most importantly, the regional escalation involving Israel and Iran’s allies suspended such negotiations. Building on this example, the speaker pointed to continuous dialogue, including with opposing counterparts, as key to achieving a sustainable agreement - even though, to be fair, the EU’s late reaction to the crisis following Operation Epic Fury, reflecting the experience of the war in Ukraine, has been characterised by internal division based on risk and dependence on U.S. strategic direction.

Concerning the EU’s support in the resolution of the crisis, the speaker wished to recall previous historical failures, including Afghanistan and Libya, emphasising the need for a region-led process meant to rebuild and strengthen the regional security architecture. Furthermore, amid the current geopolitical context, the EU should secure strategic autonomy without completely separating from the U.S. To the speaker, the EU should be more supportive of its bilateral partners in the Gulf, develop multilateral partnerships with both the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and its member states, and equip the latter with knowledge and tools to tackle the conflict without direct European intervention.

Amongst Recalibration of Alliances

All in all, one of the most high-level impactful consequences of Operation Epic Fury has been the emergence of new regional dynamics which could be described as the “Cold War of the Gulf”. Iran’s retaliatory strikes on GCC states have disrupted Gulf diplomacy and regional ties: GCC countries that had attempted to normalise ties with Iran in the past few years are now reassessing them, pushing Iran towards a long-term regional isolation despite any tactical results against the U.S. Crucially, the war is provoking substantial change more outside of Iran than within it. New alignments and alliances are forming across the region: Bahrain and the UAE are broadly on the same side against Iran, while Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are coordinating on ceasefire efforts. What is significant about these new alignments is their depth, as regional actors are switching from political alliances to defence commitments, filling the vacuum left by the collapse of a relatively functioning multipolar balance.

Alongside diplomatic repositioning, GCC countries are also rethinking their security partnerships, as their trust in the U.S. as the sole guarantor of security has been called into question, potentially benefiting the EU. The caveat noted by the speaker is that security diversification should not be framed as replacing the U.S. but, rather, as building resilience in a context where reliance on a sole partner has proven risky.

Energy security is also a concern in the context of this conflict, forcing countries to reshape regional energy infrastructures. Iran’s retaliatory strikes disrupted Qatari LNG production whilst closing or somehow impeding the flow of goods through the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline, the Petroline, has allowed Saudi Arabia to circumvent the closure, but major issues remain. In any case, long-term implications are clear. First, new alternative pipelines or energy routes will be needed in the region. Second, the question of maritime security through Hormuz will need to be addressed.

The EU officer concluded that the most optimistic current future scenario is a “no peace, no war” situation, where the conflict freezes rather than resolves. Strong reputational and economic incentives such as EXPO 2030 in Saudi Arabia, as well as trade and export relationships, give actors reasons to avoid prolonged conflict, although these have not been sufficient to produce a lasting peace. Thus, the risk is not a further escalation but the stalling of the conflict, an indefinite Gulf Cold War.

The Role of NATO

In light of this, our NATO speaker took a step back to illustrate the evolving security panorama and the need for NATO to upgrade to address the new features defining contemporary conflicts. While the Alliance continues to be founded on its three core tasks—crisis management, defence and deterrence—the current geopolitical context is increasingly shaped by overlapping crises, which naturally translates into major pressure to strengthen military capabilities. As a consensus-based organisation, NATO has to face different coalitions among its Allies, reflecting diverging views on the nature of contemporary warfare and on the most appropriate responses to current security challenges.

In line with the current developments, NATO has allocated particular attention to its engagement in the Middle East. Unlike the EU’s decision to appoint a High Representative for the GCC, NATO only features limited institutional presence in the region, with structures in Kuwait (and previously in Iraq), with no broader, permanent infrastructure. This was presented as a constraint on NATO’s ability to develop cooperative security, especially considering the importance of sustained political dialogue and direct engagement with regional partners. At the same time, Ukraine remains NATO’s primary strategic priority, while current discussions also reflect the influence of different Allied positions on the organisation’s future direction.

Human Security?

The situation in the Middle East brings another central topic to the forefront: the predominance of military considerations in contemporary security debates vs the absence of the human dimension. Current conflicts are increasingly discussed in terms of warfighting and military preparedness, while less attention is devoted to the impact on civilians and society as a whole. The war in Ukraine was identified as a significant example of this transformation, where civilians are no longer affected only as collateral damage. This development raises questions about whether existing normative frameworks remain sufficient to address the realities of contemporary warfare.

In response to these challenges, NATO ought to increasingly concentrate upon a whole-of-society approach to security. Training armed forces alone may be no longer sufficient; societies must become more resilient through the involvement of public institutions, the private sector and civil society. Security should therefore be understood as a shared responsibility that extends beyond military structures and incorporates the protection of civilians, critical infrastructure and democratic institutions.

Middle Powers’ Momentum

Finally, the last academic panellist highlighted the growing role of the Gulf states in conflict in the Middle East, the unique position occupied by middle powers, and the need for a shifting conceptualisation of women in modern warfare in particular, underscoring that wars in the Middle East can no longer be understood simply as a proxy for great power politics. An interesting case study in this context would be Türkiye. According to the speaker, Türkiye would have embraced the role of mediator to stop the war in Iran from escalating in the first place. This reinforces the conviction that Türkiye is fully stepping into its position as a middle power, particularly as it allows it to act as a primary negotiator in geopolitical conflict.

Voices within Türkiye are also stressing the need to prepare for the security implications of an escalating war with Iran, both domestically and in relation to its international priorities, the speaker reported. Concerns about the strength of Türkiye's borders and migration flows linked to the conflict were said to be increasing. After all, a middle power like Türkiye cannot and does not operate in isolation, but has to make sense of other important regional and global actors’ ambitions.

Finally, the panellist also questioned the United States’ military aims in Iran, asking whether Washington is eventually aiming for full regime change or merely the installation of a government that is more receptive to collaboration with the U.S.

Discussion

During the Q&A, major emphasis was placed on the role women might play in conflict. Participants stressed that women’s roles in conflict were shifting, particularly when it comes to the future of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda following adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. After 25 years, principles remain valid but both language and implementation must evolve to reflect today’s security environment.

Instead of framing the debate around the traditional distinction between participation and protection, the WPS Agenda should be presented as an enabler of a gender-sensitive security umbrella. Significantly, this requires recognising women not only as those affected by conflict but also as active contributors to security and resilience, and leaving behind old notions of women as merely as victims of human rights abuses. More importantly, this angle highlights the importance of an understanding of the particular gendered context in peacebuilding efforts. For example, part of the problem of the WPS agenda is that women have not been registered as agents of conflict, but only as passive civilians in charge of care duties. In the case of the Rwandan War, women are known to have contributed to genocide, with former Rwandan Minister for Family Affairs and Women’s Development Pauline Nyiramasuhuko ordering the rape of Tutsi women. omen today are also combatants and active participants in war. It was noted that 75,000 women have joined the Ukrainian army as volunteers, and are occupying roles as drone operators, engineers, and driving gender-responsive recovery efforts.

When it comes to the Middle East, women's direct involvement in regional conflicts, including Iran, is less visible than in other contexts. Yet a significant number of female protestors against the regime have been killed or jailed, whereas Iranian Kurdish women have actively taken up arms against the regime. Looking ahead, it is not clear whether co-development of military equipment, such as drones, between Ukraine and the Gulf states will offer women more prominent roles within the warfighting establishment, but there will most likely be new developments in this sense too.

What is clear, however, is that wars in the Middle East are not just an extension of ideological and military conflicts among great powers, and contributors to modern warfare extend far beyond those typically considered. Middle powers such as Türkiye are becoming increasingly impactful, Gulf states are occupying a prominent role, and women are becoming agents and drivers of modern conflict.

In conclusion, the event has offered substantial opportunity for reflection and critical engagement. Whilst Europe remains central, most of the notions presented by the panel would require further discussion, debate, and, above all, implementation. Thanking all speakers and actors, ITSS Verona wishes this to be nothing but a great starting point to spark debate on the role of Europe in Iran and beyond.

May 5, 2026 — No Comments

Euro-American Intel Sharing: Trump’s Second Term Threat

By Elena de Mitri - UK & European Affairs Team

Intelligence cooperation has always been fundamental for allied countries that share similar interests, values, and objectives in order to rationalise resources and expertise. Cooperation is particularly developed among transatlantic allies, including the US and many European countries.

While it tends to be relatively stable, even in the face of disagreements with a partner’s actions and policies, concerns have recently been raised in many European countries regarding the current Trump administration and the stability of such cooperation, due to the fear that the US government could weaponise and politicise intelligence flows and information shared by the partners in order to achieve political objectives. Among confrontational behaviour by the US administration, European partners are learning how to deal with an increasingly risky relationship.

An increasingly shaky relationship?

Soon after the start of the second Trump presidency in January 2025, European intelligence agencies started voicing concerns about the risk of over-relying on US intelligence. Tariffs and frequent political quarrels haven’t helped either as disagreements with the current administration could endanger transatlantic relationships in an unprecedented way. Transatlantic relations have been under strain since then. The changing tide was particularly represented by the March 2025 suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine. Lasted only for a few days, the suspension was enacted to push Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to engage in diplomatic talks with Russia to reach a peace deal. However, such a move also sent a clear message to US allies: lack of cooperation towards US objectives could have grave consequences, including the weaponisation of intelligence.

Other developments have strengthened this view. This year’s Annual Threat Assessment and its dismissal of transatlantic security cooperation, coupled with the unusual appointments of politically aligned individuals as directors of US intelligence agencies, usually reserved for established non-partisan practitioners, has marked a significant change in the country’s policy towards the war in Ukraine, as both moves were partially reflecting Russian positions on the conflict. More recently, the appointment of General Joshua Rudd, who previously served in the Indo-Pacific Command, as head of the National Security Agency, one of the main intelligence agencies in the US, strengthened this shift towards a stronger focus on China. Finally, purges of established US intelligence officers, due to their involvement in cases perceived as anti-Trump, might ultimately undermine established relations among practitioners from allied countries, as trust heavily relies on personal relationships.

Intelligence cooperation has always been upheld through subsequent administrations. However, the instability and opaqueness brought about by the second Trump administration has left allies wondering whether they should become more self-sufficient. After the Signal scandal in March 2025, the denial of any wrongdoing by involved US officials and the grave breach of operations security rules left allied intelligence services wondering whether sharing sensitive information with US government officials remains feasible as its disclosure could compromise sources and operations. Perceptions of unreliability might threaten trust among national intelligence services, which is fundamental to maintaining the current high-level cooperation. As a consequence, many European intelligence agencies showed increased worries that the intelligence they were sharing with the US would either be leaked or, even worse, be shared to non-allied countries without their permission, thus breaking a long-established rule. Some of them, including the Dutch intelligence agencies, have scaled down intelligence sharing with the US due to concerns that the current administration may politicise intelligence and possibly share sensitive information with Russia, in line with the country’s repositioning along Russian narratives of the conflict in Ukraine.

Finally, US increasingly assertive and coercive behaviour towards traditionally allied countries has made European intelligence services even more worried about sharing information with the US. As president Trump was publicly talking about annexing Canada, one of his closest advisers was pushing to remove Canada from the Five Eyes, the most important intelligence-sharing network in the world, in order to pressure the country into becoming the 51st state. While this remained a suggestion, it was reported that US government officials were actively discussing it. On the other hand, after the US government declared its intention to take control of Greenland, which is part of the Danish Kingdom, due to security concerns in the Arctic, the Danish Defence Intelligence Services categorised the US as a threat to the country, amid alleged demands from the US government to gather intelligence on Greenland.

The importance of transatlantic intelligence cooperation

Intelligence cooperation has long been fundamental to achieve security objectives, especially as the nature of the current threats has become increasingly transnational. Intelligence agencies face numerous, complex threats and resources are usually too scarce to effectively deal with threats by themselves. As a consequence, cooperation among intelligence agencies of countries with similar objectives and values has greatly increased since the Cold War, in order to combine resources and fill expertise gaps. This is especially important nowadays, as current threats are increasingly ambiguous, murky and well-concealed. Cooperation is quite consistent in areas such as terrorism and transnational crime, in which reaching shared goals is relatively easier.

Continued cooperation relies on and reinforces a shared worldview and perception of current threats. It is no surprise then that US and European intelligence agencies have developed a strong relationship in this field. The US has currently various levels of partnerships with European countries, dating back to the Second World War. While some countries are considered privileged partners, other are "less important" so information sharing with them is more limited. However, they remain critical partners for the US due to their easier access and specific expertise, including linguistic expertise. Moreover, multilateral forms of cooperation with other European partners happen in the context of specific alliances, such as NATO, or informal organizations.

Even when transatlantic allies were involved in disputes and fights about each others’ foreign policy and trade policies, intelligence sharing was upheld. As a matter of fact, when European countries disagreed with US military actions during the War on Terror, they would still provide important intelligence to help the US government achieve its objectives. This continued cooperation has highlighted how strong relations and shared interests, including especially the fight against terrorism, allowed intelligence agencies to overcome political disagreements. However, the behaviour of the current US administration has been threatening these relationships in an unprecedented way. This has brought European countries to discuss the possibility of reducing their cooperation with the US, in order to protect their national interests.

Prospects for a more independent Europe

Replacing the US intelligence contribution is not an easy task. While European countries have advanced tools and capabilities, they lack the scale and coordination role that the US possesses. Such scale allows US intelligence agencies to provide more timely and higher quality assessments, as they can benefit from the use of big data techniques and artificial intelligence. As a consequence, if the US was to stop or greatly limit intelligence sharing, European countries, along with Ukraine, would have to rely on a lower quantity and quality of information. Indeed, replacing US capabilities would require long term investments in human capabilities and advanced tools.

President Donald Trump poses for a family photo with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine and European leaders before their multilateral meeting, Monday, August 18, 2025, in the Cross Hall on the State Floor of the White House. (Official White House Photo by Andrea Hanks)

However, it is not an impossible task. In January 2026, it was reported that France was providing a growing amount of technical intelligence to Ukraine, likely referring primarily to satellite imagery. Such intelligence was previously mostly provided by the US, but the March 2025 suspension of intelligence sharing and the subsequent pause in some weapon shipments to Ukraine prompted European countries to take a more prominent role. While intelligence sharing was quickly restored, this suspension amplified already existing worries about the politicisation of intelligence by the US government. Amongst calls to replace resources and capabilities offered by the US and work towards European independence in the security sector, progress tends to be quite slow. A key factor in this struggle is the size and structure of actors in the field. No actor, including the European Union, possesses the same financial resources and in-house capabilities as the US, the latter requiring a long time to be developed.

At the same time, the Trump administration is also seeking to reduce its involvement in the continent and has openly taken a more hostile approach to its European allies. As a consequence, European intelligence services are expanding cooperation among them, with important steps taken at the EU level. As prominent officials from European intelligence agencies have started giving more importance to EU-wide agencies and the number of intelligence officials embedded in representation offices in Brussels has grown, internal pushes to develop autonomous capabilities have been growing, although emphasising the importance of maintaining cooperation with the US. Some are instead calling for the creation of an intelligence cooperation agency dedicated to the European Union to make better use of intelligence provided by member states. However, such an agency would have to overcome numerous challenges, including the voluntary nature of intelligence sharing in the European block, which leaves critical information in the hands of member states that have repeatedly been wary of sharing too much. Moreover, some European countries are widely considered untrustworthy due to their ties to third party countries such as Russia and China. As a consequence, cooperation will likely include a limited group of countries that share generally stronger ties, including in security. This is already happening inside NATO, as more and more intelligence is now being shared on a smaller scale rather than with all the member states. Bilaterally, cooperation among key countries, including the UK, France and Germany, has already been strengthened in order to deal with the instability caused by the current US administration. This strengthened cooperation will likely mark an important, and possibly permanent, shift from the critical role that the US attained until now.

Conclusion

Relations among European and US intelligence services have been described recently as generally good, as high ranking officers of European intelligence services have stressed the importance to keep up cooperation with the US. However, evolving and multifaceted tensions between the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean are increasingly affecting transatlantic relations, especially in regard to security. The shift towards the Russian narrative of the conflict in Ukraine and frequent disagreements between European countries and the US have positioned the latter as a riskier alliance for European countries. Such repositioning might impact intelligence sharing, which is considered fundamental in many fields. While some countries are reconsidering their intelligence ties to the US, others have already started scaling down sharing, especially in areas of particular concerns. European intelligence officials have openly stated that cooperation in this field hasn’t stopped and that the US remains an ally, as US intelligence agencies are trying to ease European worries. However, further transatlantic tensions might have an unprecedented impact on security relations.

June 4, 2024 — No Comments

US Military Aid to Ukraine: A Pivotal Move Amid Ongoing Conflict and Global Implications

By Maida Pollinari - Russia Team

The war between Russia and Ukraine, now in its third year, continues to be intensely volatile and dynamic. Recent developments, particularly the approval of a significant US military aid package, mark a critical juncture in international support for Ukraine. This article delves into the US decision, its ripple effects across Europe, and the broader implications for all parties involved.

US Military Aid Package to Ukraine

On April 24, 2024, US President Joe Biden approved a substantial $61 billion aid package for Ukraine. This decision concluded prolonged and intense negotiations within the US Congress, characterised by a bipartisan struggle. Notably, Republican Mike Johnson, initially a staunch opponent, reversed his stance after a confidential briefing, citing the existential threat posed by an "axis of evil" comprising Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Iran. Johnson emphasised that supporting Ukraine was crucial to US national security and a testament to American leadership in defending democracy.

Strategic and Political Motivations

Analysts suggest that this aid package is not only a pragmatic political move but also a strategic necessity. The aid aims to stabilise Ukraine's frontlines, mitigating fears of a Russian breakthrough or Ukrainian collapse. This stabilisation is crucial as it sets the stage for potential Ukrainian offensives in the coming months. Furthermore, the timing of this aid is significant given the approaching US presidential elections. Prolonging the conflict could adversely affect former President Donald Trump's approval ratings, possibly benefiting Biden among undecided voters.

European Response

The US decision has resonated strongly across Europe, prompting several nations to announce their own aid packages. On April 23, 2024, during a visit to Warsaw, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak unveiled the UK's largest military aid package to date for Ukraine, worth £500 million. Sunak underscored the importance of defending Ukraine not just for regional security but for the entire European continent, warning that a victorious Putin would not halt at Poland's border.

Similarly, Sweden has committed 13 billion kronor ($1.23 billion) in military aid, marking the largest Scandinavian contribution. The Czech Republic has pledged to deliver at least 1.5 million artillery shells by year's end, part of a covert supply strategy involving unnamed countries, likely including some BRICS nations like India and South Africa.

Broader Implications and Russian Reaction

The widespread European support highlights a unified front against Russian offensive and a collective effort towards Ukraine's post-war reconstruction. However, the approval of the US aid package has not been well-received by Russia. Kremlin spokesman Dmitri Peskov condemned the decision, suggesting it would enrich the US at Ukraine's expense and result in further Ukrainian casualties. Former Russian President Dmitri Medvedev expressed hostility, wishing for internal US turmoil, while President Putin acknowledged the increased costs of Russia's military operations and committed to record war spending of 6% of GDP in 2024.

Economic and Military Considerations

Despite current economic stability, bolstered by domestic fiscal policies and import substitution, Russia's financial sustainability remains uncertain. Continued Western support is vital for Ukraine, especially given the critical timing of arms deliveries and their deployment on the battlefield. This window of delay provides the Russian military with opportunities to target Ukrainian infrastructure, particularly its energy sector. Moscow's propaganda leverages these delays to project Western disunity and ongoing internal US discord, which Russia finds reassuring.

*Source: Image by Beverly Lussier from Pixabay*

Future Outlook

The conflict's trajectory remains uncertain, with the upcoming US presidential elections poised to influence future dynamics and support for Ukraine. The sustained cohesion and determination of Western allies are essential for Ukraine's long-term resilience against Russian aggression. The new aid package from the US represents a pivotal moment, demonstrating substantial international support for Ukraine with profound implications for the global power balance and the conflict's future.

Conclusion

In summary, the approval of the $61 billion US military aid package signifies a crucial step in international backing for Ukraine. The response from European nations further consolidates a collective stance against Russian offensive, highlighting a significant geopolitical shift. Meanwhile, Russian reactions underscore the persistent challenges and the importance of continued, coordinated support for Ukraine. The coming months and years will be decisive in shaping the conflict's outcome and the broader geopolitical landscape.

July 3, 2023 — No Comments

Latin American street gangs in Europe

Paolo Grassi is an Assistant professor at the University of Milano Bicocca (Department of Human Sciences for Education “R.Massa”).

He has carried out ethnographic research in the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Italy in the field of urban anthropology, focusing on the relationship between urban space and violence, gangs, youth cultures, and dynamics of socio-economic marginalization.

He was a research fellow at the Politecnico di Milano (2019-2022) and the University of Padua (2017-2019), visiting fellow at the Universidad del Valle de Guatemala (2019), the University of Utrecht (2018) and the Laboratoire Architecture Anthropologie (LAA) de l'École Nationale Supérieure d'Architecture de Paris La Villette (2017).

He has collaborated with the European projects "TRANSGANG: Transnational gangs as agents of mediation", coordinated by the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona and "Gangs, Gangsters, and Ganglands: Towards a Global Comparative Ethnography” coordinated by the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva.

He is the author of articles published in national and international journals and four monographs (including “Terreur à Guatemala-ville: Conflits territoriaux, violence et gangs”, L’Harmattan 2018).

Interviewer: Giovanni Giacalone - South America Team

May 2, 2022 — No Comments

European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) and its problematic impact on the rights of the people on the move

Image from Unsplash: https://unsplash.com/photos/kWeQAvVeboA by Christian Lue

European border management practices have undergone an astonishing transformation in the last few decades, and this process is both co-constitutive of and constituted by technological advancement. New dynamics and effects are unfolding every day.

The objective of this article is to point out some of the complexities and controversies of the relationship between technological development and the securitisation of migration. This objective is achieved by analysing the functioning of one of the more important European border management instruments: the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR).

What is EUROSUR

“EUROSUR”, was launched on October 10th 2013: It is “a framework for information exchange and cooperation between Member States and Frontex to improve situational awareness and increase reaction capability at the external borders.” EUROSUR is run by Frontex, and uses advanced technology such as drones and satellites as a form of surveillance. It can be understood as a large data bank that allows information on refugees that cross illegally into the EU border to be shared and aggregated amongst member states and Frontex in order to improve border management.

Eurosur can be viewed as a “system of systems” a digital infrastructure with several nodes dislocated around Europe. Each Member State, in fact, has a National Coordination Centre (NCC) that exchanges information with all authorities responsible for external border monitoring, as well as with other NCCs and Frontex.

Figure 1 (Source: Frontex 2015) : Visualizing Eurosur, an interconnecting infrastructure

The NCCs maintain national situational pictures, which aggregate in the European situational picture, that provides a nearly real time mapping of the relevant events occurring at the EU external border, and determines the type and amount of assets that need to be deployed, according to the impact and risk level associated to a border section (green means low, yellow means medium and red means high - as the reader can see in the picture below). A higher impact level means that a given border section is more likely to be subjected to strong migratory pressures, and therefore, more resources should be preventively deployed to that area in order to improve border stress capacities. This calculation occurs through the collection of historical data and the detection of patterns of events in order to evaluate possible future risk scenarios. EUROSUR hence both serves an archiving and anticipatory function.

Figure 2: Demonstration of border sections and their respective impact levels (Source: European Commission 2013): https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/schengen-borders-and-visa/border-crossing/eurosur_en

By: Federica Montanaro, Maria Makurat, Giovanni Tricco

EUROSUR: Challenges and controversies

As stated by the dedicated regulation, EUROSUR is being used to achieve three major goals: increasing situational awareness; improving border authorities' reaction capability; and finally, saving the lives of immigrants at sea, particularly in cases of overloaded vessels, as Dirk Vande Ryse, Frontex's Director of Monitoring, Analysis, and Vulnerability, pointed out.

Human rights implications with EUROSUR

In general, political elites usually focus on saving lives at sea, the core priority of EUROSUR. For example, in the aftermath of the 2013 infamous shipwreck near Lampedusa, the EU commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom presented the incoming deployment of Eurosur as a strategic move aimed at improving the EU efficacy in search and rescue (SAR) operations. However, already during its launch, concerns were expressed whether refugees would truly benefit from this type of surveillance. Opinions were split on whether Frontex and EUROSUR actually had the goal to save refugees or if deterrence was the main concern. A harsh debate is still ongoing, but its openness and democratic nature is heavily contested; scholars and experts are struggling to find reliable information which allows the monitoring and evaluation of the functioning of such said system. This is mainly due to the classified or reserved nature attached to the work it performs. One improvement shows that the system is being scrutinized more closely and undergoing new regulations such as the Regulation (EU) 2021/581 introduced in April 2021 with the following goals: more secure information exchange, more effective reporting, better efficient rescue operations, better cooperation with third countries involved and setting up an independent Security Accreditation Board. This should bring about improvements to tackling the issues of transparency and secrecy, however questions remain such as whether the willingness to share data will take place and which criteria are in the end important to deem such a system effective in the long term run?

However, looking at the bigger picture, the virtually nonexistent impact of the Eurosur on the SAR capability of the EU and its member states can be easily demonstrated by considering 2013 (the year of the deployment of the apparatus) as a benchmark, and by considering the death rate in the Mediterranean Sea before and after this critical date. An International Organisation for Migration report shows that before and after 2013 there has been no significant change in the fluctuation of the death rate. On the contrary, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) denounced that in some instances the death toll was rising even in periods in which the number of arrivals was declining. This is even more astonishing if we consider the 2011 Frontex statement about the incredibly high number of boats (98%) that they were able to detect at sea even before their arrival to the European shores.

Conclusion

In conclusion, while technological progress is central to the management and surveillance of the Mediterranean, it is not clear whether it is also as important for the safety of migrants at sea. The numbers seem to prove that with or without EUROSUR people on the move continue to die at European shores, testifying that higher visibility does not automatically lead to a lower death rate. The objective of this article was to shed some light on the issue, while calling for further and in depth research.

March 21, 2022 — No Comments

Russia-Ukraine War Fact Sheet

By: Sofia Staderini

The Russian tactic is that of a pincer encirclement of entire Ukraine – from Russian territory and occupied Crimea, Donbas, and Belarus - and inside they follow the same tactic as Kyiv's focus, methodically destroying civilian infrastructure and nuclear power plants. The attempt is to demoralize and coerce Ukrainians. Yet morale is rising and these same civilians are becoming soldiers. Such support somewhat offsets the quantitative advantage of the Russian army in manpower and equipment. Now, Russian troops make advances into Ukrainian territory only at the cost of hundreds of soldiers every day, failing for now to take control of any regional center.

Their qualitative advantage is very reduced, as can be inferred from the high level of losses, which seems to be well above 5%, in men and materials. Russia could take control of the territory, but only with long times and high destruction. Reservist and conscript call-ups, as well as the ongoing shipment of Syrian and Chechen militants to Russia and Belarus, will not be able to affect the balance of troops around Kyiv in the coming week, slowing down the Russian tactic as it is momentarily unable to conduct simultaneous attacks.

*Image Source*: https://it.depositphotos.com/folder/La%20verità%20sulla%20guerra%20della%20Russia%20in%20Ucraina-299150880.html?offset=200&qview=551211048&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ntf_ruby_war&utm_term=100_images

Russia is now deploying maneuverable Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, reported by Russian state news agencies as a “next-generation weapon”. While it is very unlikely that the deployment of Kh-47M2 missiles will have a major impact on the current stall of the invasion, It could likely point out a shortage of other weapons and a propagandistic effort to distort Russia’s military failure.

However, after an end of decades of deterrence orthodoxy, the danger of a possible escalation involving nuclear weapons is real. Indeed, Putin has used nuclear threats to create a wide perimeter in which he may pursue a conventional war in Europe. NATO countries are doing everything to avoid escalations, complying with a policy of non-intervention for avoiding direct contact with the Russian military.

While not directing intervening in Ukraine, NATO countries are deploying significant military aid to the country while drastically raising defense spending, reclaiming the alliance's historical role as a protective haven against Moscow's military activities. Germany in particular is now increasing its defense spending to more than 2% of its economic output: a historic departure from its postwar commitment not to transfer armaments to combat zones. Moreover, the European Union's recent investments (€500 million) in arms and other aid to the Ukrainian military mark a “watershed moment” in its history.

*Image Source*: https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/russia-now-global-economic-pariah-ruble-worth-less-than-one-penny-us-2811892

However, many countries are starting to be bitten by the economic effects of the war, especially those with currencies linked to the rubble. More sanctions implications are quite likely to emerge in the coming weeks, particularly in a case like the EU-Russia energy partnership, where dependency is significant. Indeed, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is now serving as a geopolitical catalyst on key strategic, economic, and societal issues and will certainly bring to consider re-alignments, particularly in Post-Soviet countries and the Middle East. NATO's deterrent posture must be strengthened as well as cooperation and dialogue with the various regional actors in order to figure out the next evolutions in the geopolitical chessboards.

February 28, 2022 — No Comments

ITSS Verona 2021/22 Webinar Series: “Energy Security: The View from Post-Brexit UK”, with Vicky Pryce

For the first ITSS Verona - Hume Institute joint event, members Carlotta Rinaudo and Elena Bascone - along with the Political Economy, Development, and Energy Security Team - discuss energy security and its importance for Europe with Ms Vicky Pryce, one of Britain's top economists, and with Prof Mohammed Abdel-Haq.

July 7, 2021 — 3 Comments

G7 Summit 2021: China’s Rise vs the West

By: Mariam Qureshi

The contest for supremacy between the United States and People’s Republic of China has increasingly intensified in the recent years. China has accelerated its efforts for supremacy not only in Asia but across the world under the leadership of President Xi Jinping. The 2021 G7 Summit held in Cornwall, United Kingdom was a stark reminder of how the West stands disputed on the China question. The United States wants to bring together its allies to adopt a hard-line approach towards China, but they remain wary. This ‘cautious’ approach of the West is also reflective of how President Xi is succeeding in making China a major player in the global arena.

China saw Iraq and Afghanistan quagmire, the 2008 financial crisis, the 2016 British vote to exit the European Union, the election of Donald Trump as the US President, and the January 6 riot at the Capitol as events accelerating the decline of the West. This, coupled with China’s efforts of land reclamation in the South China Sea, its launch of the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank reflected on China’s recent moves to counter the US influence in its neighbourhood and the global economy. In particular, China’s massive transnational infrastructure project known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) reflects on its dominating hand in its contest for supremacy against the United States.

During this year’s G7 Summit, President Biden reiterated the challenges China’s rise might pose for the West and tried to bring together the US allies to curb Chinese ambitions. The foremost step was to bring forth a rival plan to counter China’s rapidly expanding BRI Project. The West’s ‘Build Back Better World B3W’ initiative aims to provide the developing countries an alternative and transparent infrastructure partnership which is reflective of West’s values, standards, and way of doing business. The White House elaborated that the project would emphasize on environment-friendly policies, corruption-free and transparent financing terms to help developing countries avoid excessive debt. The United States and its allies aim to bring together the private sector to narrow the $40 trillion required by developing countries for their infrastructure development. The details of how exactly the plan would be executed, the timescale and the extent to which the West would contribute towards the plan remain unclear. Beyond the obvious tussle for power and influence over the developing countries, the B3W aims to supersede BRI to prove that Western values can prevail.

For example, the United States strongly condemns the use of forced labour in the global supply chains, hinting to the human rights abuse in the Chinese Xinjiang Province against the Uyghur Muslims. However, West’s insistence on environmentally-friendly policies and human rights might not be as welcomed by the developing countries as China’s ease of dealing with a single group of builders, financiers and government officials along with a no-questions-asked approach.

Furthermore, the other European countries remain wary of sharing the US hard-line stance on China. The G7 communiqué accepted that the countries are willing to cooperate on a collective approach where Chinese policies “undermine the fair and transparent operation of the global economy” but only as long as “it is in our mutual interest”. Further, the officials of Germany, Italy, and EU expressed qualms over risking their trade and investment deals with China revealing how the West was unclear on whether to approach China as a friend or foe or an outright security threat.

Thus, reiterating how most of the European countries have now started to digress from United States’ hard-line approach towards China. A week after the Summit, Armin Laschet, the frontrunner to become Germany’s next Chancellor, stressed on how the European Union needs to propel a ‘cautious’ stance towards China as a more aggressive approach to ‘restrain’ it might trigger a new Cold War. He accepted that though China is a competitor and systemic rival because of a diverging ideology, but it is also a partner in efforts to fight climate-change and in trade and investment opportunities. “The 21st century is very different and the prism of how the world looked before 1989 offers limited advice,” he said. “We have a multipolar world [now] with different actors.”

Previously, France much like Germany, were wary of banning Huawei and other Chinese-made networking equipment for fear of retaliation on their investments in China. Similarly, Italy’s inclusion in the Belt and Road Initiative back in 2019 further highlights how China has achieved some success to its efforts to build influence in Europe.

A Chinese spokesperson communicated China’s response to the B3W proposal by stating how “the days when global decisions were dictated by a small group of countries are long gone”. This reiterated China’s determination to quell the Western monopoly on the world stage and establish for itself a commanding voice in world affairs. The centennial celebrations of the Communist Party of China on July 1^st, 2021, marked the achievement of the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’. President Xi attributed the rise of modern China to the party and its system and reiterated his determination of expanding China’s sphere of influence by saying that “we will never allow anyone to bully, oppress or subjugate China”.

As China continues to expand its influence in the political and economic spheres of affairs throughout the continents, the western countries are forced to re-evaluate their policy towards China. On one hand, in the age of interconnectedness and globalization, the European countries are unwilling to risk hefty trade deals and investment opportunities with China’s emerging economy. On the other hand, however, United States feels its grip loosening over world affairs and fears a Chinese substitute to the Liberal Order it established in the recent decades. Therefore, it used the G7 Summit as an opportunity to bring together the West against China in a bid to uphold the Western democratic values. However, the Summit was nothing more than a reminder of the fact that there is no consensus on how the West should interact with China. Moving forward, it appears that the disconnect among western countries is likely to ease China’s way towards a steady rise.

July 1, 2021 — No Comments

European Security Challenges II: Russia

By: Alessandro Spada

Picture via West vs Russia: the Clash of Narratives | Madan

The tensions between the European Union (EU) and Russia have considerably increased over the last years. In this context, Ukraine has become a crucial geopolitical flashpoint. Ever since the annexation of Crimea and Russian military intervention in Ukraine in 2014, the relations between Russia and the EU have deteriorated progressively with the adoption of severe sanctions by the latter.

In addition to the Ukrainian crisis, both the Russian intervention in the Syrian war and the attempted poisoning of the former Russian military intelligence officer Sergei Skipral and his daughter by Kremlin agents in 2018 are worth recollecting. Besides, the use of targeted actions to influence and to destabilise European countries such as disinformation, cyber-attacks and support for pro-Kremlin political parties and NGOs, and in the end, the attempted murder by poisoning of Alexei Navalny, one of the most fearsome opposition leaders of Vladimir Putin, have imposed EU to take further countermeasures.

The Russian threat can be subdivided into the following three categories:

Military threat: The high-risk level of Baltic States to be invaded by Russian troops in just a few days and short-range Iskander missiles stationed in “the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad” with high capacity to deliver nuclear warheads attack and to reach Poland and Eastern Germany in 2013. In this regard, it is worth highlighting that the repeated NATO airspace and sea space violations have often provoked several skirmishes between the Russian and NATO planes and warships in the Black and the Baltic Seas. In addition, more than 100,000 Russian troops have been deployed to the border between Russia and Ukraine and Russia’s navy presence around the whole Crimean Peninsula, including also the Sea of Azov, are not absolutely less alarming for Ukraine, NATO and European allies.
Hybrid threat: This is meant as financial and political support for pro-Kremlin parties and NGOs, also spreading disinformation. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning the cyber-attacks to influence and cause instability within European Countries and borders. For example, Moscow was able to build strong ties with populist and mostly far-right political parties such as Rassemblement National (RN) in France, Lega in Italy, Alternative für Deutschland(AfD) in Germany, Vlaams Belang (VB) in Belgium and Catalan independence movement in Spain. Among Russian hybrid tools, the state-owned RT news channel and Sputnik news agency, are considered propaganda instruments, which disseminate anti-establishment conspiracy theories, aim at creating divisions on sensitive issues such as migration and Islamic terrorism. At last, it is worth recalling the Internet Research Agency (IRA), the St. Petersburg-based “troll factory”, specialized in fake social media profiles on Facebook and Twitter.
Energy threat: Russia supplies a third or more of EU oil and gas demand and “a large share of this is delivered via pipelines crossing Ukraine, a country whose relations with Moscow are even more problematic than the EU's, raising the possibility that Europe's gas supplies could be held hostage to geopolitical tensions”. Indeed, the energy crisis in 2006 and 2009 created serious warnings for gas supplies.

In reaction to these threats, 4500 troops have been stationed on a rotational basis in Poland and Baltic countries by NATO since 2017 and Lithuania approved the reintroduction of compulsory military service in 2015. The three Baltic countries have significantly raised their defence budget and two neutral countries as Finland and Sweden strengthened partnership with NATO. Furthermore, this year, many European countries took part in DEFENDER-Europe 21, “an annual large-scale U.S. Army-led, multinational, joint exercise designed to build readiness and interoperability between U.S., NATO and partner militaries”. Last May, 600 NATO and non-NATO forces, including troops from Ukraine and Georgia, were involved in the "Trojan Footprint" military exercise across five Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Georgia, and Romania). The drill took place “alongside much larger Defender-Europe 21 NATO joint exercises”, mentioned before, which had “some 28,000 forces participating from 26 different countries”.

Numerous countermeasures have been taken by EU countries to counter Russian disinformation. For example, media literacy training has been introduced in school curricula by several countries and “regulators have clamped down on pro-Kremlin outlets such as RT for failing to comply with media standards”. In 2015, EU created a special task force as East StratCom Task Force for a weekly publication of Disinformation Review identifying and unmasking disinformation from pro-Russia sources. Moreover, it has the purpose to cooperate with Eastern Partnership countries for building resilience to pro-Kremlin disinformation, for example explaining EU policies to audiences from the region by producing Russian-language materials and training journalists. In 2018, the disinformation Code of Practice and the Action Plan were both adopted by the European Union. Several media companies signed the Code of Practice, committing to remove fake profiles and allowing users to see who pays for online political adverts.

The EU has taken meaningful measures to mitigate energy shortage. For example, it has started to build new energy infrastructures - such as interconnecting pipelines enabling EU Member States to share gas, building terminals to import LNG from USA and Qatar and storage facilities to keep gas in reserve. In this context, NATO plays a fundamental role as well, establishing “three main priorities regarding energy security. The first is to enhance allies’ strategic awareness of the security implications of energy developments. The second goal is to support the protection of critical energy infrastructure, including tankers and offshore energy installations. Third, NATO has prioritized enhancing energy efficiency in the military”.

The EU will have to support Eastern European member countries politically, military and economically to counter Russian threats. It will have to promote major policies of economic development, social inclusions fighting inequalities created by pandemic, more cooperation and investments in counter-intelligence and cybersecurity technologies. Additionally, it will have to invest more financial resources to rebuild the economy based on renewable energies, being less hostage by the Russian oil and gas. In the end, it will need to be more independent from the American influence and speaking with a common and single voice. If Europe does not follow this path, it would put at risk the foundations of European democratic institutions, causing their disintegration, paving the way to antidemocratic and populist political parties and lastly it would continue to be subject to energy blackmail of the Kremlin.

What is sure for now is that Russia is still perceived as a real threat to the whole Western world, as also demonstrated by the UK and USA. Indeed, concerning this last one, in spite of the constructive U.S.-Russia Summit in Geneva on 16th June 2021, the deep underlying tension between the superpowers seems less than solved.

Here you can read the first part of this article.

June 24, 2021 — No Comments

Balance of power Russian and Europe. An Interview with Dr Gonzalo Pozo-Martin Stockholm University.

Dr Gonzalo Pozo-Martin from the Department of Academic History and International Relations at Stockholm University is answering the questions on the topic whether the balance of power between Russia and Europe has changed in recent years.

Interviewing Team: Igor Shchebetun.

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