European Union Archives

May 18, 2026 — No Comments

Putin Hints at Ending Ukraine War, Can Russia’s Economy cope?

By Sorin Dojan - Russia Team

Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Saturday (9 May) that he thought the war with Ukraine is “coming to an end”, more than four years after the start of Russia’s large-scale military campaign in Ukraine, which significantly altered European security dynamics and regional trade patterns. Three days later, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said the government now forecasts GDP growth of 0.4% in 2026, significantly down from the 1.3% previously expected.

For many looking at the latest string of data coming from the Kremlin, ending a four-year war that has driven consumer prices higher in the process sounds like the first hurdle in a series of challenges to overcome. These range from stubbornly persistent inflation and high interest rates to a militarised economy losing momentum and a shrinking GDP growth. Russia's economy entered recession in 2022, and the recovery that followed was uneven, marked by persistent declines in retail sales, sluggish income growth in some parts of the country, and regional budget constraints^[1].

Amid the economic disruptions caused by sanctions, certain industries emerged to keep the economy afloat. But the winners that underpinned Russia’s economy during the war could suffer disproportionately from any future economic redress. The challenge for the regime will then be to find alternative paths to growth in a heavily sanctioned economy with limited export strings and partners.

What to do with the military industrial complex?

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the world witnessed a highly coordinated sanctions response, with the West collectively imposing almost 24,000 punitive measures against individuals, entities, vessels, and aircraft as of August 2025, according to Castellum.AI, an AI-powered agency specialising in Anti-Money Laundering (AML).

The Russian economic revival that emerged later was highly volatile and disproportionate, with weapons-producing regions among the war’s economic winners, as evidenced by regional tax collection data. On the other hand, the regions mostly pressured were the ones bordering Ukraine, those specialising in ferrous metal production and places with industries heavily sanctioned by the West^[2].

The Russian military-industrial complex operates differently from its American counterpart. Whereas the US defence industry relies heavily on private investment, Russian companies in this industry largely depend on state subsidies, making the government a major contributor to the military-industrial complex^[3].

There is no doubt that Russia has overinvested in its military to boost production and growth, but above all to replace the hardware damaged in the war. In 2025, the defence sector absorbed 15.9 trillion roubles in 2025, or around 7.2% of the country’s revised GDP forecast for that year. For comparison, its close ally, China, spent around 1.7% of its GDP on the military, according to World Bank data, yet Beijing is not involved in a costly war forcing the state to implement extensive stabilisation measures.

The question that then emerges is what happens to such government spending once the war comes to an end?

One would be tempted to assume a return to the pre-2022 status quo, but that would depend on the West lifting sanctions and allowing Russia’s once-productive industries (particularly Europe-destined commodities) to resume humming at full speed.

There is no guarantee of success. As recently as last week, European diplomats and officials cited by POLITICO said the bloc was getting ready to impose a fresh wave of sanctions, this time targeting Moscow’s shadow fleet of ageing tankers. The EU is also eyeing the opportunity to impose sanctions that were previously opposed by ex-Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, including punitive measures against Patriarch Kirill and other members of the Russian Orthodox Church. French politician and Minister Delegate for Europe Benjamin Haddad said in April that it was not the time to lift sanctions on the Kremlin but rather “step up […] pressure”, namely on the Russian energy sector.

For now, it is expected that Russia will maintain the same level of military investment to replenish military stockpiles and replace personnel lost on the battlefield^[4]. Yet for how long that can be justified is subject to debate. As one Carnegie analyst put it: “Any attempt to rapidly cut spending will result in collapse. But nor can the military machine be fed indefinitely.”

NVO, CC BY-SA 3.0 , via Wikimedia Commons

Defence investment is not necessarily conducive to a thriving economy. According to a RUSI study, defence expenditure plays little role in promoting economic growth; a European Commission report separately stated that “it is impossible to determine if this tendency [to spend more on defence] is favourable or negative to growth.”

It is not hard to imagine why. The military-industrial complex is part of a command economy, largely detached from market forces that drive flexibility and a more efficient resource reallocation. At the macro level, such inflated expenditure is only justified in times of war^[5].

In Russia’s case, being left with an overinflated military-industrial complex that serves as one of the few engines of growth is dangerous to its future economic recovery. Disinvest too soon and you might risk upsetting an overexpanded industrial workforce. But choosing to continue allocating resources toward military procurement rather than civilian economic activity is equally unproductive.

Either way, Putin’s speech in early May signals more than just a willingness to pull out from a war that has cost the Kremlin thousands of lives. Instead, his remarks come against the backdrop of a Russian economy showing signs of “stagflation”. The central bank interest rate stands at 14.5% as of April 2026, significantly higher than the rates in Western economies. Core inflation hovered at 6.3% in Q1 2026, up from 5% registered in the previous quarter.

If Novak’s statement serves any good in this context, it might be that it could force the Kremlin to give peace a genuine chance after four years of sustained military operations with significant economic and human consequences. At what cost could peace come for the national economy? It remains to be seen.

^[1] Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Iikka Korhonen, and Elina Ribakova, War-Induced Economic Convergence in Russian Regions (Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2025).

^[2] Andrey Yushkov and Michael Alexeev. “Russian Regions in Wartime: Fiscal and Economic Effects of the Russo-Ukrainian War,” Post-Soviet Affairs 40, no. 4 (2024): 313–325. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2024.2355047.

^[3] Gorodnichenko, Korhonen and Ribakova, War-Induced Economic Convergence, 6.

^[4] Maria Snegovaya, Nicholas Fenton, Tina Dolbaia, and Max Bergmann, The Russian Wartime Economy: From Sugar High to Hangover(Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2025).

^[5] Dmitry Gorenburg, Samuel Bendett, Ken Gause, Pavel Luzin, Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez, Paul Schwartz, and Elizabeth Wishnick, Crafting the Russian War Economy: The Effects of Export Controls on Russia’s Defense Industrial Production (CNA Corporation, 2024).

November 11, 2025 — No Comments

Is the EU’s fragmented political will weakening its actorness?

By Leif Niendorf and Eline Stensen Gulliksen - UK & European Affairs Desk

Has the European Union aimed too high in trying to establish itself as a multi-dimensional power? And is it a weakening project? As the EU is being put to the test by Donald Trump’s re-election and a war on the European continent, its identity has once again become a subject of debate. Created as an economic union after World War II, the EU has expanded its power beyond the purely economic sphere, driven by integration and path dependency, into a comprehensive political union with growing military capabilities.

The EU wields multi-dimensional power, manifesting as a normative power, market power, and, notably, an emerging realist power that is currently a significant topic of discussion in Europe. The Union’s economic power is substantial and is often used to pursue policy goals; it uses its market power as “carrots and sticks” to influence countries to comply; hence, the EU’s market power can be a tool for achieving normative goals. However, what happens when the two perceptions of the Union’s identity clash, and the EU must choose between them? What identity wins, and what is the main factor that shapes EU foreign policy?

Having started as a peace project and as an advocate of the rule of law, human rights, and liberal values in Europe and worldwide, it makes only sense that the EU also seeks to maintain its position as a normative power. Since the early 2000s, the EU has also opened increasingly loud debates about its capacities in the realms of security and defence, culminating in the establishment of the common security and defence policy (CSDP). However, it can be argued that ever since Russia started its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Donald Trump’s re-appropriation of power in the US, traditionally the primary provider of military security for many EU members, it was no longer a mere desire, but an actual necessity to become a realist power as well.

Now, the EU finds itself stuck in a complex situation: it is a market power, wants to be a normative power, and needs to become a realist power. In reality, due to serious inherent obstacles, it is highly challenging to fulfil a credible role across all these interlinked dimensions of power simultaneously.

Not only are there different pledges of allegiance to NATO, strategic cultures, and threat perceptions within the EU, all of which are long-known impediments to the EU as a unified realist power alongside domestic politics, but different foreign policy approaches nowadays even actively undermine the EU's efforts to be recognised as such. The most apparent is this in differing stances on sanctions and weapons deliveries in the context of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

As a realist power, the EU pushes to support Ukraine with military equipment (partly also to sustain its values, thus holding up the flag as a normative power, indicating how intertwined the realms really are), yet Hungary, as the prime example, vetoes such decisions regularly. Simultaneously, Hungary is put under pressure by the EU for its rule of law violations. The situation illustrates the difficulty: Firstly, it underscores the inability of the EU to speak with one voice as a realist power. Secondly, and maybe even more dramatically, it undermines its assumed role as a normative power when Hungary uses its veto to pressure the EU —for example, in the context of funding held back due to the transgression of EU values —and succeeds. If the EU needs to grant exceptions in the normative realm to pursue goals in the realist realm, an inextricable dilemma emerges, where it can’t be both a full normative and a realist power at the same time. In the case of sanctions, a realist tool that market powers can apply, the situation is similar. With Prime Minister Robert Fico in Slovakia and the recent electoral success of Andre Babiš in the Czech Republic, the number of EU members inclined to torpedo harsh measures on Russia has risen.

*Source: illustration generated using OpenAI for visualisation purposes.*

Notwithstanding, even outside Eastern and Central Europe, some instances can potentially hamper the EU’s triad of being a market, normative and realist power all at once. For example, did Belgium veto the use of frozen Russian assets to aid Ukraine due to large parts of these currently being custodied in the country? Moreover, Spain’s reluctance to raise its defence budget significantly, as demanded by its allies, given its location far from Europe’s frontlines and strategically contested areas, shows that the perception of urgency is not necessarily equally distributed across Union members.

The picture of the EU’s power is confused in a time that calls for unity and stringent action. How unhandy it comes in presently; at large, it alludes to the complexity that the EU, as an object “sui generis” and with all its heterogeneity, has always lived with. These current, challenging times will therefore be a real test of the extent to which the EU can be a plausible power beyond markets.

The EU’s evolution into a multi-faceted power highlights both its aspirations and inherent contradictions. Though it seeks to promote normative values worldwide, the situation in Hungary underscores the limitations of these ideals when confronted with complex political and economic realities. Amid the current geopolitical landscape—characterised by Trump’s re-election and a nearby conflict—the EU faces a significant identity crisis. Pressures for defence integration and strategic autonomy intensify, but they encounter institutional blockages and varying national priorities.

To exceed its role as merely an economic powerhouse with fragmented political will, it must align its values with its actions and move beyond half-measures. The Union is now at a pivotal point: it can either establish itself as a unified strategic actor or remain a more economically motivated Union with political ambitions. The next few months will reveal whether the notion of being “stronger together” is a genuine commitment or merely a catchphrase.

February 26, 2025 — No Comments

EU’s bottlenecks and opportunities for further defence integration

by Eline Stensen Gulliksen - UK & European Desk

Introduction

Increased geopolitical tensions caused by a war on the European continent and the re-election of Donald Trump, a NATO sceptic, as president of the United States have brought the question of the EU's military capabilities back to the agenda. America has been a well-recognised backbone of European security through NATO; however, recent discussions concerning the need for a “stronger Europe” with more capabilities have arisen. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is the umbrella that covers EU defence matters, and the European Defence Agency (EDA) is a body under the CSDP aiming to improve the defence capabilities of the EU by coordinating efforts with member states. This blog article will examine some structural bottlenecks that the EU needs to face on their way to the strategic autonomy it has longed for.

Challenges and opportunities for further EU defence cooperation.

The EDA's work coordinating efforts between member states has numerous positive effects for member states and the EU. Firstly, this joint procurement will make spending more effective and, hence, more targeted, enabling member states to spend better. This can further lead to more specialised military equipment and innovation. Initiatives the EDA has launched, such as permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and the new project on hybrid drive trains for military vehicles launched on December 11^th 2024, show a positive trend towards cooperation on EDA projects with positive outcomes.

The EDA assists member states' militaries in collaborating effectively, maintaining “open doors” for cooperation among two or more states. This can help prevent the emergence of different systems that create bottlenecks for efficient collaboration in areas such as information sharing and the ability to manage one another's weapon systems when it is necessary to coordinate actions, either through CSDP or NATO missions where EU states are to take the lead. Although efforts and initiatives through the EDA, such as PESCO, have been launched to help EU member states coordinate efforts more effectively to increase the capabilities of the CSDP, some structural bottlenecks need to be addressed. Integrating defence projects and industries can be tricky due to the intergovernmental nature of the CSDP in the EDA. Projects depend on member states’ initiatives and willingness to cooperate on these matters, as defence and military are core interests to sovereign states due to the anarchic nature of the international system. States may be cautious about further integrating within these areas because of security implications.

Building on the above, the diverging national interests of member states based on various aspects such as geography, resources, threat perception and strategic culture create differences among states' willingness to enter EDA projects. Another aspect that needs to be considered is the EU’s reliance on the United States. As long as many EU states see the US as a security guarantor, it does not incentivise member states to increase the military capabilities of the EU. However, with Donald Trump's recent election as President of the United States, the EU should re-evaluate this idea and strive for more autonomy, especially after the Munich security conference where tensions with the US developed further, and now, as discussions arise about negotiating a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine, and the EU does not have a seat at the table.

The EDA has numerous opportunities if member states align and integrate properly and effectively through joint projects. The EU has a strong political will, and increasing its capabilities through the EDA will make it a more credible actor in the international system and make it more autonomous in its neighbourhood, which is precisely what the EU needs in these critical times. With a more “capable” CSDP through EDA projects, the EU could finally get the strategic autonomy it has longed for and cut reliance on the US as a security guarantor while balancing them, which would reverse the security implications of the US threatening to leave NATO. Improving the EU´s crisis response could be a massive opportunity for the EU, further building on the credibility of the EU in the international system. Looking at when EU states, France and the UK (the UK left the EU in 2020) were to take the lead in the 2011 NATO-led operation in Libya, it clearly showed the weaknesses of the EU to act autonomously in its neighbourhood due to a divergence in systems and a lack of capabilities. If EU member states coordinate efforts through EDA initiatives, this could provide great opportunities for the EU’s actorness.

*Flag of Ukraine in liberated Kherson - rawpixels.com*

Potential threats that successful EDA cooperations could face include friction with NATO. Further defence integration between EU states and increasing the capabilities of the EU could be seen as undermining NATO, which could further affect the EU’s relationship with the US. Therefore, the EU needs to have close dialogues with the US as they are improving its capabilities. Divergence in member states' economies in the EU could lead to budgetary constraints and inequitable burden-sharing between member states. This could create fragmentation between EU member states since the EDA projects are “volunteer” and create inefficiency and potential new problems for the EU to face internally.

Conclusion

Concluding this blog article, a recommendation is for the EU to cooperate closely with NATO, especially the US, through the processes of EDA projects. Keeping NATO and the US in the loop could prevent friction with crucial powers and security guarantors on Europe´s way to gaining more autonomy. As mentioned earlier in this article, a structural bottleneck for successful projects is the intergovernmental nature of the CSDP and the EDA. A recommendation is, therefore, to make more projects mandatory for all EU member states and have a set percentage of GDP that each country should contribute to prevent friction over burden-sharing internally.

March 25, 2024 — No Comments

Prof. Thijs van Dooremalen on Climate Crisis and Strategies of Western Nations

In this session, Professor Thijs van Dooremalen delves into the strategies of the European Union and Western nations. We dissect how each region tackles the climate crisis through policy frameworks, focusing on how they communicate the urgency and navigate political challenges. While also exploring the human cost of climate change and how extreme weather events impact human security.

Thijs van Dooremalen is an Assistant Professor within the Governance of Crises research group at Universiteit Leiden. He researches how and why events can cause transformations within national public spheres (media, politics, and policy-making). In his PhD thesis, he analyzed this for the case of 9/11 in the United States, France, and the Netherlands. He is currently particularly interested in the impact of extreme weather events on climate crisis politics.

Interviewer: Kelly Mikelatou - Human Security Team

May 29, 2023 — No Comments

Mali: the next stage for power competition?

Counterterrorism in the wake of EU’s withdrawal and Wagner Group’s operations in the country

Authors: Camilla Cormegna and Liz Morán - Crime, Extremism, and Terrorism Team

The Sahel: the epicenter of terrorism

The emergence of extremism in the Sahel did not take place in a vacuum. Poverty, unemployment, and weak social infrastructures have fostered local support for extremism groups, as supported by the latest UNDP report. More importantly, two events have also been cited as contributors to the Sahel’s instability and insecurity: first, the disintegration of the Libyan state in 2011, which flooded the Sahel with cheap arms and attracted and stirred up violent religious extremism; and second, the Malian civil war of 2012.^[1] A decade forward from these events, the Global Terrorism Index warns that the Sahel has become the epicenter of terrorism, with Mali recording its highest number of terrorist attacks and deaths since 2011. Indeed, home to the world’s fastest growing and most-deadly terrorist groups, the region now accounts for 35% terrorism-related deaths of the global total of terrorism deaths in 2021, compared with just 1% in 2007.

Unsurprisingly, such a security challenge has caught the attention of global leaders. In May 2023, Martha Ama Akyaa Pobee, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, warned, in a UNSC and G5 Sahel meeting, that the devastating effects of the persistent destabilization of the Sahel will be felt far beyond the region. Such an understanding also reigns in the minds of European leaders and policymakers, with the Sahel being framed as a security matter to the EU as irregular migration to Europe and violent extremism rose. In this vein, Josep Borrell, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, stated that “instability and terrorism in the Sahel directly threaten our security. It is therefore our duty of solidarity, and also in our interest, to stand by the people and countries of the Sahel.” Moreover, key EU foreign policy documents (Global Strategy, 2016, i.e.) have reinforced the “internal-external security nexus”.

Thus far, efforts to curb extremism and terrorism have largely failed, prompting the entrance of new security actors into the region and the departure of French troops from Mali. The entrance of these new “(in)security providers”, however, have not been eagerly welcomed by all actors involved in the region. In such a scenario, the Sahel, and especially Mali, may become an important arena for power competition, as a result of the balancing between Europe, the United States, and Russia.

Voices have highlighted the importance to rethink the international community’s approaches to supporting regional security mechanisms. Precisely, this article will reflect both on the EU and Wagner groups’ counterterrorism efforts, assessing their impact in the region.

A failed ‘patchwork of counterterrorism’

Instability in Mali has been shaped by the socio-political crisis that fed the expansion of terrorist groups. The main movements in the region are the Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS), active since 2015, and Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda-affiliated umbrella group that appeared in 2017. The conflict, however, has been wrongly framed internationally: these groups are not proxies of the global jihad but have sought to exploit the weaknesses of the region and aim at solving local problems through violence. State absence, the fragility of the rule of law, poverty, poor access to justice and basic services are some of the drivers of extremism in Mali, and terrorist groups have successfully recruited from marginalized communities.

Since 2012, Mali has been defined as a ‘laboratory’ for counterterrorism (CT) interventions, leading to undesired effects on the overall security of the country. The interventions were divided between UN-led peacekeeping operations and France-led military operations based on capacity-building and international and regional cooperation. However, state CT interventions were obscured by human rights abuses. The Malian army adopted Western CT concepts to address the local insurgency issue, pursuing a military-only stance overlooking the root causes of said insurgency, further fueling extremism. National forces have also carried out extra-judicial killings towards the ethnic communities that supported the terrorist groups that offered them protection, fostering grievances against the Malian government and reinforcing the support for insurgency groups.

France’s CT operations in Mali started after the 2012 coup d’état. France, thus, developed Opération Serval in 2013 alongside the Malian army, succeeding in ousting Islamic militants from Mali. Then, in 2014, Opération Serval was transformed into Opération Barkhane to permanently eliminate the jihadi threat and train Malian armies. Barkhane was successful in neutralizing several operational leaders of JNIM and ISGS, crippling their capabilities and leading to an overall reduction of large-scale attacks. Still, Barkhane has been accused of strategic ineffectiveness, as France would seem to have made several mistakes that hindered the operation. Indeed, France’s indiscriminate attacks on groups’ leaders made the Malian community distrustful of them. French and Malian authorities overlooked the role played by economic and political factors that allowed jihadists to acquire a secure position within the region and recruit from marginalized communities. It also failed to evolve its responsiveness towards insurrection’s escalation, which turned into a turf war. The coup de grace was France’s disagreement towards Mali’s decision to negotiate with the terrorist groups. This increased the suspicion towards France’s motives, as the Metropole allowed negotiations for the release of European hostages while negating cooperation when it came to Malian security.

*Source:* wikicommons-Opération Barkhane

Consequences

Overall, the potential role of European peacekeeping and CT operations did not bear the anticipated fruit. More CT did not equal more security in Mali, which experienced a surge in internal displacement and humanitarian crisis. Purely military responses have proven to be ineffective at reducing terrorism and have had the opposite result, pushing local populations towards jihadists. European CT strategies have further empowered the Malian junta, accused of human rights abuses as well as corruption, and the local community may perceive European help as complicity. Moreover, CT operations can be fruitful in the short-term but ineffective in the long run if not paired with strategies that target the drivers of extremism, such as socio-economic issues and state absence. Indeed, the “war on religious terrorism” mentality has diverted attention from governance problems, while the paradigm based on the “terrorist” label is problematic because it does not exist in vernacular dialects. For local communities, insurgents are not the main security challenge but armed robbers, cattle thieves, and ethnic tensions.

France’s unwillingness to negotiate with terrorists was the last straw, leading to a deterioration of French-Malian diplomatic and political relationship. The military junta, in power since the 2021 coup, hampered France’s operations while anti-Western sentiments exploded in the region and the Wagner Group increased its presence. In 2022, France and the EU halted all capacity-building programmes, with Barkhane coming to an end. They also relocated their military resources to neighboring countries and ISGS took advantage of France’s withdrawal.

The Wagner Group in Africa

The Wagner Group, a private military contractor, has been expanding its footprint into various African countries, with Mali its most recent conquest, by leveraging “Western policy missteps, anti-European sentiment, and the long-standing failures of international and local actors to address the root causes of regional instability”. Russia’s interests in Africa, however, precede the recent involvement of the Wagner Group: since 2006, Russian President Vladimir Putin has sought to rebuild Russia's presence and influence in Africa. Some argue that it is precisely to achieve such an end that Russia has used mercenary groups to advance Moscow's interests in the region.

Since its involvement, the Group has been engaging in activities such as leading training exercises, fighting anti-government forces, and suppressing protests. Now, while the Wagner Group often aligns with Russia’s foreign policy interests, its status as an independent contractor allows it to maintain a level of unpredictability and gives Russia plausible deniability for its actions. This, thus, seems to make the Group a valuable tool in the hands of Russian policymakers to balance Western presence in the region and test new military cooperation environments –without appearing overly involved.

Some commentators have argued that the partnership between Russian proxies and African governments is not solely the result of major regional disinformation campaigns. Instead, it stems from a conscious decision by African leaders and civil society actors who actively seek cooperation with Russia. In this sense, African states seek greater agency in managing their own affairs, resisting Western imposition and being receptive to narratives against Western colonialism. Russia, thus, has identified a window opportunity and adapted its foreign policy discourse: Russian Foreign Affairs Minister, Sergei Lavrov, remarked that Moscow remains supportive of Africans’ efforts to push back against the West and works with partners in Africa to counter “European colonialism”.

Certainly, the Group’s involvement in the region is not exempt from criticism. Some argue that Russian forces tend to use Malian soldiers as “cannon fodder”, exposing them to greater risks. Others have stated that the group's objective is not to stabilize the countries where it operates, but rather to provide security to several regimes in exchange for access to valuable natural resources. Likewise, it has been said that the Group's presence in Africa is likely to further destabilize the countries where it operates. First, because its transactional relationships with Sahelian governments undermine their legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Second, because the Group’s approach focuses primarily on providing security through kinetic means, neglecting critical aspects of counterinsurgency, such as strengthening the rule of law and promoting good governance. Indeed, experts have argued that the Wagner Group's approach may have yielded isolated short-term results but has ultimately failed to address the underlying challenges. Moreover, the absence of French airstrikes, which Islamists feared, has emboldened insurgents, leading to a significant increase of violence in Mali. Finally, the Group's human rights abuses contribute to grievances among the population, creating a fertile ground for terrorist groups to recruit new members. Studies have, in fact, shown that the Group engages in high levels of civilian targeting in Central African Republic and Mali, with it accounting for a significant portion of Wagner's involvement in political violence.

Conclusion

The Malian situation has revealed the insufficient effectiveness of European-led CT to combat local insurgencies. A securitized and purely military approach has shown tactical success and has aggravated the situation by contributing to pushing local marginalized communities into the arms of jihadists. Moreover, the various strategies have been hindered by the unwillingness of local authorities to change their clientele-based political systems. This has opened new opportunities for other international actors such as Russia, which has fueled already existing anti-Western grievances.

Wagner’s presence in the region has caused more insecurity but the belief that their aid is contributing to the fight against terrorism is emboldening the current junta. However, it is unlikely that Wagner’s assistance to the Malian army will be successful in leading a fruitful CT strategy. There is concern that the departure of EU allies could accelere the reconstruction of supply routes and fundings for terrorist groups in the region. Security experts are also concerned about the risk of terrorism spreading over neighboring countries in the Gulf of Guinea which have already been subjected to terrorist attacks attributed to JNIM and other al Qaeda-affiliated groups. The Sahel can be the next arena of competition for power, therefore future CT strategies should address the capacity of Sahelian states through a governance-focused approach and address the drivers of extremism.

^[1] Since the year 2015, Mali has experienced a continued upward trend in terrorist attacks and deaths related to it. This trend began with the 2015 declaration of a state of emergency in the wake of the Radisson Blu Hotel attack in Bamako.

April 3, 2023 — No Comments

Mapping the European Defense Research landscape

Author: Iris Raith - Defense & Procurement Team

Introduction

The war in Ukraine has forced the European Union (EU) fundamentally to rethink its stance on defence policies. While the EU is still, first and foremost, a peace project, it can simply no longer keep defence cooperation and innovation in the background considering its borders are actively threatened by increasingly undemocratic regimes. The EU has the means and the knowledge to become an autarkic defence power which will rely less on the protective umbrella of the United States, which has been in place since the end of World War II. A newly drafted agreement allowing for easier US-EU defence project collaboration already explicitly excludes joint research cooperation. The first steps towards more independent EU defence can be noticed, such as introducing the Directorate General for Defence industry and Space (DG DEFIS) in 2021 or creating the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in 2017.

It is interesting to note the various developments that can be observed regarding research and development (R&D) in European defence, especially since most EU Member States have not invested in defence R&D until now. As such, this article will outline the steps taken in recent years to promote increased collaboration and cooperation to establish a leading EU-focused R&D related to defence.

The European Defense Agency (EDA)

The EDA was created in 2004 to promote collaboration among the Member States' militaries. Nevertheless, the Agency has become quite active over the last few years. It supports joint projects to ensure the diversification of military assets within the EU. Moreover, it manages and coordinates over 140 joint development and research projects among Member States. Notably, the EDA serves as the joint Hub for the coming together of research institutions, universities, start-ups and established industry actors to encourage defence innovation.

The EDA has a specialised Research, Technology & Innovation Directorate (RTI), which coordinates, develops and manages research activities as well as the implementation of the European Defence Fund presented further down. In addition, the EDA hosts a crucial activity in order to heighten preparedness for what the future might bring: it regularly conducts technology foresight exercises. The study of ‘futures’ has become an essential tool for researchers and policymakers despite being often neglected by the latter. However, the activity of foresight allows for educated scenario buildings, presenting a long-term vision of where technological innovation might bring the defence sector and security more generally. As a result, foresight enables policymakers and states, in general, to effectively prepare for possible ‘futures’. In the specific case of technology foresight, developing scenarios around future technological defence capabilities for the next 20 to 30 years provides defence actors with concrete, educated guesses to develop strategies and agendas.

Source:https://pixabay.com/photos/europe-european-european-union-flag-60918/

Institutes and Fora

The emergence of an array of think tanks and research institutes specialised in European security and defence research has enormously contributed to multiple EU researchers collaborating and setting up policy recommendations and analysing possible future defence cooperation. It is also interesting to note that the 2005-established European Security and Defence College (ESDC), targeted primarily towards military personnel, encourages research cooperation by offering a Doctoral programme on CSDP and publishing an academic journal. This encourages experienced military personnel from Member States to have academic exchanges regarding best practices and their thought on CSDP. Moreover, renowned think-tanks such as RAND Europe and the Dutch Clingendael Institute have also established research teams dedicated to European defence and security research.

One of the well-established think tanks already in place since 2002 is the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). It was set up as an autonomous EU Agency tasked with supporting CFSP/CSDP implementation and knowledge production. It regularly produces insightful publications on timely matters, such as examining existing EU cyber defence policy and related suggestions for its development or the important discussion on the EU’s defence partnerships with recommendations for a more effective way forward.

Moreover, the EUISS is notably always present at an ever-increasing number of conferences and fora organised around EU defence cooperation. The first-ever ‘Schuman Security and Defence Forum’ was organised this year in March 2023. This has been designed as an event which will happen every two years and is aimed at providing grounds for discussion among politicians, decision-makers, military representatives and civil society representatives, all engaged in security and defence. This initiative represents a significant opportunity for a plethora of actors to come together, effectively establishing tighter cooperation to promote more autonomous and empowering EU security and defence mechanisms.

Funding military independence

A notable increase has slowly joined the above-outlined increased research regarding EU Defence cooperation in EU funding dedicated to this field. This is particularly important given that according to the latest EDA report for 2020-2021, only two Member States invest 20% of their defence budget into R&D, and the other 24 states remain well under 10%. However, a significant increase could be observed regarding Research and Technology (R&T) investment, reaching an aggregate of €3.6 billion in 2021 compared to around €1.7 billion in 2019. Nevertheless, the agreed-upon 2% benchmark has not yet been reached. However, the investment surge shows that Member States have acknowledged the increased role of technology in defence, recognising that investing in researching technology will ultimately improve the EU’s defence capabilities in a future of omnipresent technology.

The European Defence Fund (EDF) has recently been inaugurated for a project period of 2021-2027 with a current budget of €8 billion to promote EU cooperation regarding defence technology. Incentives to participate in a joint collaboration between member states include the involvement of SMEs with a funding bonus awarded in such cases. It is important to highlight that EDF grants are solely awarded to projects in collaboration with at least three EU member states. This effectively encourages companies, state agencies and general defence actors to cooperate on a cross-border level, enabling them to lead more extensive projects.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this article laid out the multitude of actors and initiatives engaged in enhanced research cooperation in European defence—these range from state-level collaboration on the EU level to research institutes and multi-actor fora of discussion. As can be noticed, a lot has been done in recent years, but the war in Ukraine has served as a decisive push towards a truly independent European defence sector. This does not mean that the road towards a unified EU army is now wide open. However, the efforts mentioned above show that EU Member States and the EU institutions have recognised that the EU’s security relies on ever-closer cooperation in the various defence sectors. Intensive research cooperation has the advantages of cost benefits, EU-wide standardised capabilities and increased innovation opportunities bringing together European minds.

January 23, 2023 — No Comments

Liberté, fraternité ou renvoyer: France -Italy feud highlights EU’s incompetence in harmonizing shared responsibility

Author: Isabel Dekker and Federico Alistair D'Alessio.

Between the 22^nd and 26^th of October 2022, 234 migrants (including over 40 minors) were rescued by the Ocean Viking, a rescue boat managed by SOS Méditerranée, a humanitarian organization that rescues people in distress at sea. Before being allowed to dock in Toulon (France) on the 11^th of November, the boat was stranded at sea for almost three weeks leading to a rapid decline in the passengers’ health. The vessel landed in France after Italy refused to allow the ship to dock on their shores, intensifying their bitter dispute over migration. Since 2015, the EU has forwarded numerous initiatives to improve the coordination and handling of the arrival of migrants. Nevertheless, EU’s migration policies are often executed in an ad hoc fashion resulting in diplomatic tensions across the European continent.

FRANCE’S POINT OF VIEW

The French government condemned Italy’s refusal to welcome the vessel carrying over 200 migrants: the French Minister of the Interior Gérald Darmanin referred to Italy’s actions as ’incomprehensible’ and ’unacceptable’, in addition to emphasizing on ‘strong consequences’ for the relations between the two countries.

France has also adjourned its collaboration in the relocation mechanism which was proposed last June. This plan concerned a dozen European Union member states, including France, The Netherlands and Germany, which voluntarily decided to welcome 8,000 migrants arriving in countries of first entry to Europe, such as Italy. The Interior Ministry announced that the planned relocation of 3,500 people to France in support of Italy between the summer of 2022 and 2023 is suspended, while also inviting other EU member states to do so. Moreover, France has also strengthened its border controls with Italy.

‘’It’s the Italian government that’s losing out’’ – Mr. Darmanin (Minister of Interior)

Nevertheless, France has had its own political rows over accepting the ship, as far-right opposition leader Marine Le Pen called Macron ‘dramatically’ soft on migration and justified and praised the decisions taken by the Italian government.

ITALY’S STANCE

By denying the Ocean Viking to dock in Catania, the Italian government has reiterated a message often emphasized by the countries most affected by migration: the responsibility of receiving and integrating migrants must be shared equally by all EU member states. Italian PM Giorgia Meloni strongly criticizes the Dublin III Regulation, according to which each asylum application must be examined only by the first country where the migrants disembark in. This represents a significant disadvantage for Mediterranean countries as they are always considered the nearest place of safety when dealing with boats coming from Africa.

Criticism also concerns the lack of a clear and effective European framework regarding the relocation of migrants. The most recent plan was arranged last summer, but it did not lead to the expected outcome. A voluntary redistribution of 8000 migrants was agreed, but just 117 of them have been resettled so far, of which only 38 to France. As a result of this perceived failure, a joint statement issued in November by Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Malta laments the little support shown by other member states to share the burden of asylum applications, as well as the absence of a common strategy to adequately support frontline countries.

Meloni criticizes what she referred to as an ‘incomprehensible and unjustified’ reaction of the French government, which decided to freeze the abovementioned plan and suggested the rest of the EU to act accordingly. France also chose to strengthen its control over borders with Italy, even though similar measures in the past have brought to light to questionable tactics used by French authorities to pushback migrants.

Moreover, the Italian government underlines that the country has dealt with more than 100 thousand arrivals by sea in 2022, which represents a sharp increase in comparison to previous years. Considering this evidence and given that the Italian government allowed three ships out of four to disembark, the Ministry of Interior deemed reasonable for France to accommodate the last migrant rescue boat.

EU REACTION

The Vice President of the European Commission, Margaritis Schinas, criticized Italy for its ambiguous approach: the government requested more European solidarity, but at the same time did not allow the docking of the Ocean Viking ship, which was carrying people in deteriorating sanitary conditions. Schinas claims that migrants must be first allowed to disembark in the closest location before any resettlement operations can be carried out. In fact, a 2002 annex to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea states that people rescued at sea must be promptly taken to the nearest place of safety.

On the 25^th of November, EU officials met at an extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting and reiterated the immediate necessity of a common resolution that would increase the support to all countries and organizations most involved in searching and rescuing migrants, in such a way as to avoid further deaths in the Mediterranean. In addition, home affairs ministers stressed the need to focus on human smuggling and the roots of migration in order to prevent departures. The meeting also highlighted the urgency to reinforce the existing migration pact, which allows frontline countries to either relocate a share of the migrants in other states or request funds from those EU members that reject any sort of responsibility.

CONCLUSION

A French-Italian dispute has the potential to become a full-blown European issue: this bilateral crisis reflects the state of the EU on the management of migration flows, which has not been successfully addressed since the refugee crisis of 2015-16. The union has not been able to unanimously reform its rules of asylum which currently put the burden of applications solely on the arrival country. Moreover, the state deemed competent to examine the application often ends up being also the place in which refugees remain once protection has been obtained. It could be thus discussed that this mechanism undermines the concept of shared responsibility among EU members. Arguably, it also does not take into account the aspirations of displaced people, nor their concrete prospects of finding a job in other European countries.

As a result, aside from a revision of the Dublin accords, there is the necessity to make the resettlement scheme compulsory because of its inefficiency when dealing with governments who have a harder stance against migration and thus refuse to comply with voluntary accords. A comprehensive agreement that would deal with the migrant flux on an ongoing basis is also needed, rather than relying on ad-hoc resolutions: for instance, the EU may benefit from a pact in which each member state is assigned a specific set of responsibilities and a quota of migrants according to its economic and demographic availability.

Furthermore, the European Union requires alternative solutions for migrants that are not eligible for international protection (e.g. economic migrants), who currently represent the majority of people reaching Europe through the central Mediterranean route – as stated by Ylva Johansson, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs. Focus should also be put on the Balkan situation, as it is the second most used route by migrants in order to reach Europe.

In conclusion, these are some of the challenges that the EU must face as whole, although the reality shows several obstacles when trying to reach collective decisions that would benefit all the parties involved.

*Featured image: via Flickr

December 5, 2022 — No Comments

Rule of Law and European Arrest Warrants

How persistent violations of the Rule of Law can influence the execution of European Arrest Warrants?

Author: Vittoria Brunazzo.

Recently, the European Union (EU) has been facing one of the biggest challenges of its system: the disrespect of the rule of law by Poland and Hungry. Those countries have advanced antidemocratic changes in their juridical system, going against the core principles of the EU. Due to the interconnection between European Member-States, actions taken by Hungary and Poland can be affecting all the European System of Justice, and if not fixed could even jeopardize the functioning of the area of freedom, security and justice of the European Union. The discussions surrounding the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) are one example on how the actions of Poland and Hungary are affecting the functioning of the European judiciary cooperation.

What is the EAW and the principle of mutual recognition?

The EAW is a cross-border judicial surrender procedure for prosecution or execution of a custodial sentence or detention order in all the EU territory. It is one of many juridical mechanisms, introduced after the implementation of the area of freedom, security and justice by the EU, to further develop cooperation among States on criminal matters. In the absence of border control, the EAW aim to ensure a safe environment in all Union and prevent the use of the right of free movement to evade justice. The EAW is based on the principle of mutual recognition among member States, and it presumes that Members will trust each other’s juridical decisions and execute an arrest warrant without questioning the validity of it.

The mutual recognition principle has its foundation on the respect of the rule of law, meaning that sovereign powers are bound by the States’ law and cannot act unlawfully. In this principle it is also included the respect of the separation of power and the right of an equal trial. Nevertheless, we can only speak about the rule of law if the law-making process is considered democratic, accountable, transparent and pluralistic. The rule of law is considered a fundamental principle of the European Union, as stated in Art.2 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, […] the rule of law and respect for human rights […]. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.”

The consequences of the disrespect of the rule of law

In the EAW Framework Decision there is no direct mention to the rule of law, however, the text bounds the warrant to the rule of law indirectly. Recital n.10 of the Framework Decision indicates that the implementation of the EAW shall be “suspended only in the event of a serious and persistent breach by one of the Member States of the principles of the European Union”, which are found in art.2 TEU. Thus, for the suspension of the EAW mechanism, it is not sufficient the risk of violation of art.2, but a serious and persistent breach of those principles asserted unanimously by the European Council.

The issue relies exactly in this situation: a unanimous decision by the European Council, under the procedure of art.7 TEU to contrast actions of Member States from advancing policies that threaten their democratic system, rarely happens. Since its implementation, with the Treaty of Amsterdam, the procedure was invoked just twice, in 2017 against Poland and in 2018 against Hungary. Still, the Council never determined the existence of a serious and persistent breach of art.2 by those States.

In April 2021, two EAW issued by the Polish courts requesting the arrest of a Polish citizen were not executed by the authorities in the Netherlands. According to the Rechtbank Amsterdam Court (Dutch District Court) it was not possible to execute the warrant since there were serious doubts on the effectiveness of the Polish judiciary system which could affect the right of a fair trial of the individual. The case was taken to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to confirm if the denial was possible based on the allegations of the Dutch Court.

The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union

According to the ”Judgment in Joined Cases C-562/22 PPU and C-563/21 PPU Openbaar Ministerie” of the CJEU the evidence presented in the case by the Rechtbank Amsterdam Court was not sufficient to refuse the execution of the EAW. The Court analysis was made based on a two-step examination of the EAW. Firstly the CJEU declared that the ongoing procedure under art.7 against Poland in the European Council, the decision on the case of the Polish Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) and other relevant documents against the reforms adopted by the Polish government cannot be considered sufficient material to deny the execution of an EAW. Secondly, the Court did not find reasonable evidence that the judges involved in the case could not be considered impartial, therefore there is no evidence that fundamental rights of the concerned individual could be violated.

Conclusions

The judgment of those two cases opened a precedent for future non-executions of EAWs. In cases where the concerned individual can provide information demonstrating a lack of impartiality by the judges involved in his case, or in cases where the procedure under art.7 succeeds in asserting the violation of the rule of law, the execution of EAW could be suspended by concerning authorities. Furthermore, the disrespect of the rule of law could challenge the EAW entire system. Hypothetically speaking cases of systematic discrimination of a specific group, persistent deficiencies regarding the right of defence and lack of judicial capacities, and corruption in the judiciary system, could justify the suspension of the States’ right to request the execution of EAWs.

In conclusion one could argue that the violation of the rule of law by Hungary and Poland could be influencing not only the judicial procedure within their territory, but influencing all the European system of security, by putting in discussion tools such as the EAW and other judiciary procedures which were created to improve European cooperation and integration and avoid a lack of justice within the European Union.

November 7, 2022 — No Comments

Critical Raw Materials and EU’s Open Strategic Autonomy

Authors: Riccardo Bosticco, Miguel Jimenez and Michele Mignogna.

Introduction

As the energy transition is one of our age's greatest challenges, developments in this direction are likely to exert notable impacts on broader international political and economic processes. In the European Union (EU) case, Russia’s war on Ukraine has taught the importance of avoiding dangerous dependencies and adapting to an increasingly conflictive world. The EU wants to achieve Open Strategic Autonomy (OSA) for this purpose. Moreover, this is of particular significance to understanding the EU’s policy on Critical Raw Materials (CRMs). Thus, this article explains the EU’s approach to CRMs and its connection to the concept of OSA.

The CRMs Landscape

CRMs are crucial materials for the construction of wind turbines and solar panels, batteries for electric storage and cars and the development of technologies for digitalisation. The energy transition cannot be achieved without their availability. Among them, some of the most familiar are lithium, cobalt, platinum, and tungsten, yet the latest Act by the European Commission identifies around 30. A distinctive feature of CRMs is their limited and concentrated supply. According to the forecasts of the International Energy Agency, the net-zero equation will be solved with renewables such as wind and solar, predicted to account for 70% of power generation by 2050. Those countries where these materials are abundant would become green-commodity superpowers. Indeed, by 2040, those nations could pocket an estimated annual revenue of $1.2trn. CRMs share some features with fossil fuels. They are unevenly distributed. For instance, one-half of the world’s cobalt supply is located in the Democratic Republic of the Congo alone, South Africa possesses around 40% of the world’s manganese, while lithium is heavily concentrated in Chile, Argentina and Australia. Secondly, this endowment is mostly located in recognised autocracies, making them uncertain suppliers considering the instability of this type of governments. If there is one country which is way ahead in the race, not only in terms of being the major source to many of them but also by controlling 80% of the processing capacity, that is China. The current arm-wrestling with Russia has made EU countries aware of the vulnerabilities of relying on external sources for indispensable materials in the future. Thus, they have deployed measures to decrease dependency on China for these materials, which currently satisfies 98% of the demand for rare earth permanent magnets, a subcategory of rare earths.

The EU’s Approach to CRMs

After the experience of the European Battery Alliance (EBA), in September 2020, European Commission Vice President Šefčovič and Commissioner Breton launched the European Raw Materials Alliance (ERMA) as part of theAction Plan on Critical Raw Materials. The alliance aims to secure access to CRMs, advanced materials, and processing know-how for EU industrial ecosystems. Equally to the EBA, the ERMA involves relevant industries along the CRMs value chain, Member States and regions, trade unions, research and technology organisations, investors, and NGOs. To better understand the EU’s approach to CRMs, it is helpful to look at previous policy inputs by the EU in this field. In 2008, the European Parliament (EP) resolution on trade in raw materials and commodities made the point that access to raw materials is vital for the EU economy and highlighted the minor involvement of European industries in the exploration of such materials in third countries. The same year, the Raw Materials Initiative proposed an integrated strategy based on ensuring access, proper framework conditions to guarantee supplies, and resource efficiency to reduce consumption and dependencies. Later resolutions extended the actors involved, including the European External Action Service and other relevant stakeholders, to engage in resource diplomacy. In February 2012, a European Innovation Partnership on Raw Materials proposal was published. It expressed the need to create a “critical mass towards the single objective of ensuring sustainable access to raw materials” by stimulating synergies between different policy instruments and Member States. Moreover, the Communication on CRMs Resilience stressed the strategic priority of securing CRMs and acknowledged their relevance to achieving open strategic autonomy. Hence, ERMA was given birth to create synergies among European CRMs stakeholders to address concentrated global markets, overcome technical barriers to investments and innovations, and ensure public awareness and policy acceptance, thus making the EU autonomous and strategic in this sector. While designing the ERMA’s role, the Commission Staff Working Document on Strategic Dependencies and Capacities indicated its purposes to create resilient value chains and investment pipelines, identify mining and investment projects and facilitate contacts with investors to compete on global markets. Yet, such developments have to be analysed in the cadre of overall EU policy directions, and for this purpose, the concept of OSA needs further discussion.

Expanding Horizons: the EU Open Strategic Autonomy

The debate on the EU’s strategic autonomy has been central in the agenda of the EU’s institutions since the 2010s. As the 2016 Council defined it, strategic autonomy is “the capacity to act autonomously when and where necessary and with partners wherever possible”. In 2022, the EP has been more specific by stating that “the EU strategic autonomy refers to the capacity of the EU to act autonomously – that is, without being dependent on other countries – in strategically important policy areas [which] range from defence policy to the economy, and the capacity to uphold democratic values.” Notably, strategic autonomy expands well beyond the military and defence, with an increasing number of strategic sectors identified, and it has now evolved into the concept of Open Strategic Autonomy. As Josep Borrell has observed, after Covid-19, “strategic autonomy has been widened to new subjects of an economic and technological nature". In a recent study by the EP, OSA is defined as “the ability to act autonomously, to rely on one’s own resources in key strategic areas and to cooperate with partners whenever needed”. Specifically, the new concept deals with emerging challenges and future chances, encompassing five dimensions and looking at them holistically: geopolitics, technology, economy, environment, and society. OSA drives the EU to be economically and geopolitically stronger by reinforcing its economic assets and industries. It strengthens the international role of the Euro to sustain the economy, finance the recovery from the crisis, and stay competitive and connected to the rest of the world. It makes the EU sustainable and responsible by solidifying existing alliances, cooperating with like-minded partners, and increasing its internal political cohesion to lead the construction of a greener and more equitable society. It aspires to act assertively against unfair trade practices, keeping its liberal soul by favouring global cooperation and multilateralism to address complex issues. In this view, the trade dimension of OSA focuses on supply chain resilience and sustainability. For instance, it might encompass the repatriation of strategic industries back to the EU or reshoring. Yet, this should not mean that international trade or partnerships would be jeopardised. It gives the opportunity to act more assertively by choosing trade partners more selectively without losing normative ambitions to fight for a healthier society and environment. Moreover, it requires the EU to avoid past misunderstandings, for instance, by reducing its vulnerability to external sources of supply. As argued by Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič at the Raw Materials Security of Europe Conference, this is exactly the case with CMRs.

Conclusion

Global economic developments challenge the ambitions of the EU. Indeed, the prior balance between interdependence and autonomy is being rearranged as a result of structural shifts in the global economy and world order. Some have identified such developments as a geoeconomic turn, namely a shift away from the liberal international order. With a particular focus on a crucial sector at the heart of the green transition, this article has outlined how the EU is trying to adapt to the challenge of a changing environment. As it has demonstrated, the EU looks like it cannot rely on market forces anymore. If this is the case, as the flourishing literature on geoeconomics suggests, then the next challenge for the EU will be to act cohesively and effectively on the global ground without losing its market competitiveness.

May 30, 2022 — No Comments

The Geopolitics of the Energy Transition’s Momentum

Authors: Riccardo Bosticco and Michele Mignogna.

Introduction

The main result that Putin has achieved until now with the aggression of Ukraine is a solid stance from the European Member States to halt gas imports from Russia. This and other green commitments have pushed the EU and the whole world to give renewed impetus to renewable energy. Moreover, the relation between climate and industry policies is increasingly evident. In a broader context of power competition trade, investment policies in the energy and climate sectors play an ambivalent role: energy dependencies have been conceptualized as mutually benefitting; yet, the current war unveils their risky nature. After a brief description of the renewables’ geopolitical dimensions, this article outlines what is at stake for the EU’s primary areas of energy cooperation.

The Impact of Renewable Energy on Geopolitics

Renewable energies have the potential to transform interstate energy relations. Renewables have fundamentally distinct geographic and technological properties than coal, oil, and natural gas. Sources are plentiful but intermittent; their production is increasingly decentralized and utilizes rare earth resources in clean tech equipment and, lastly, their distribution is predominantly electric and entails tight management standards and long-distance losses. This contrasts sharply with fossil fuel resources’ geographically fixed and finite character, their reliance on massive centralized production and processing facilities, and their ease of storage and transit as solids, liquids, or gases worldwide.

The energy transition provides a chance to rethink and revise long-standing trading relationships. It also allows countries to engage in previously closed energy value chains. Significantly, the future of the energy world will likely redefine the concept of energy security. However, in this society, the impulse to produce things domestically will collide with the logic of size and global supply networks. The energy transition will rewire the planet, but how much of it will transcend international borders is still unclear. A crucial element will be the commerce of minerals, distinct from that of oil, gas, and coal in terms of location. Nonetheless, such business will follow a familiar pattern: resources will be harvested in one region of the world, transported to refineries and processing centers, and then transformed into final goods. Diversification, bottlenecks, extraction disputes, and rent-seeking dynamics will all be present, although with different details.

Such developments will require a significant shift in energy strategies, indicating that areas pursuing industrial policies rather than decarbonization may reap climatic advantages. The previous energy map established a link between natural resources and markets. Yet, the new energy map will be much more complex.

The Geopolitics of the Energy Transition and the EU

Bringing together the words ’geopolitics’ and ‘renewables’ leads to the study of renewables and related security risks, the effects of the energy transition on traditional energy relations, possibilities of mutually beneficial ties, and windows of opportunity for countries to move up in the global power hierarchy. The energy transition is indeed a process where the industrial advantage is likely to bring with itself political benefits and leadership status. In the context of the current war in Ukraine, this is becoming clearer every day. Yet, the energy transition is expected to become part of power competition as the most impellent challenge – posed by the war as well as climate change and the security risks with it – of our times and will likely create amities and enmities.

Take the example of Russia. In the past decade, Russia has perceived the EU’s energy transition problematically. The EU-Russia energy relationship was primarily based on gas, oil, and coal. Nonetheless, the association is characterized by different conceptions of energy and energy security, although both actors recognize the potential of energy interdependence. While the EU and European countries are more enthusiastic concerning the transition, Russia’s discourses are more conservative yet try to defend the role of natural gas in the energy transition.

While it is difficult to predict an essential role played by Russia nowadays, given the progressive isolation it is forced to, the energy wire will see China having high stakes in renewable developments and geopolitics. Concerning relations with the EU, some have argued that the energy transition is likely to be the determinant of the future of EU-China relations. Energy in EU-China relations does not play the same role as relations with Russia. While the renewable sector has encouraged interdependence between the two powers in the past, more recently, nationally oriented policies have hindered the precedent path.

Still, the energy transition will significantly shape relations between the EU and the Arab states. While Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are challenged by balancing relating with the US and China, managing regional crises, the pandemic, and containing Iran as the primary regional rival, the last point precisely is preventing some of the Arab states in the Gulf region to act assertively against Russia. Nonetheless, looking ahead to the 2020s, how those countries manage the energy transition will have consequences on internal and external political and economic environments. Especially Gulf countries envision a sustainable future, thus setting the stage for redrawing energy investments. In this context, the EU will play a crucial role, opening to the Gulf’s market interests and advancing regional security interests.

Conclusion

Overall, the current war is not only highlighting the strategic value of energy resources and energy ties but also how the transition to new energy systems is likely to rewire the world. In a context where the main political divide on the global stage is between liberal and illiberal forces and strong energy dependences revealed security threats, future systems of alliances will have to account for this. For the EU, the energy transition will have to deal with Russia, act as cohesively as possible, and strengthen its strategic thinking concerning big partners such as China and the Gulf States. The transitions’ stakes entail a strategic opportunity to avoid past errors.

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