September 2, 2025No Comments

Italy’s approach to the Mediterranean crisis: Focus on Libya and Syria

By Francesco Foti & Giacomo Prosperini - Italy Desk

Introduction

Italy’s strategic engagement in the Mediterranean is characterised by the intricate relationship between energy security, migration management, counter-terrorism and regional stability. This is particularly evident in Libya and Syria, where Italian interests intersect with broader European and global dynamics.

In Libya, Italy is confronted with the ongoing challenges of political fragmentation, competing local authorities, and the increasing influence of external powers. These factors constrain Rome’s capacity to fulfil its traditional role. Energy ties, migration control and managing local armed groups remain crucial levers, yet their effectiveness is increasingly undermined by militia activities, institutional deadlock and disruptive behaviour. The Greenstream pipeline and strategic oil and gas fields, for example, highlight the interdependence between Italian energy security and Libyan stability. However, reliance on fragile authoritarian systems carries great risks. Migration flows and criminal networks further exacerbate the challenges to Italian security, exposing the country to ethical dilemmas and limiting the effectiveness of regulatory strategies. In order to navigate this arena of geostrategic interests, it seems essential to strike a balance between short-term priorities, such as ensuring an adequate energy supply and controlling immigration, and long-term objectives, such as promoting institutional reforms to foster stability and coordinating effectively with European partners.

Conversely, the long civil war and ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria have exacerbated Europe’s security and migration challenges. Italy must strike a delicate balance, engaging with the new regime, countering extremist networks and managing refugee flows, all the while coordinating with European partners whose policies are often fragmented and reactive. Iranian and Turkish activities in the region further complicate Italy’s strategic calculations by influencing local governance and regional security dynamics. In response, Italy has pushed for Syria to be included in the EU’s external action agenda, proposing a broader strategy to address the complex challenges arising from the civil war, particularly the pressure on migration routes. However, this effort faces significant obstacles: the lack of a coherent policy from Western partners, coupled with the unresolved nature of the Syrian government, means that Rome must adopt a carefully calibrated approach that tackles the root causes of instability, migration flows and potential terrorist threats in order to mitigate them.

Taken together, these cases illustrate the limitations of a purely reactive or ad hoc approach. Italy should combine pragmatic diplomacy with long-term strategic planning, leveraging its historical ties primarily with Libya, expanding the external action in Syria, an economic presence, and enhancing regional credibility compared to France and the UK in Libya and Syria. The following analysis examines the Italian approach to Libya and Syria, highlighting the key dilemmas, vulnerabilities and opportunities that currently define its Mediterranean policy.

The Italian Perspective on the Libyan Crisis

By Giacomo Prosperini

Photo by Jametlene Reskp on Unsplash

Post-Gaddafi Libya: Fragmentation and Political Deadlock

Among the multiple crises shaping the Mediterranean region, Libya remains a test case for Italy's ability to convert its geographical proximity into tangible influence. Rome’s interests - namely energy partnerships through ENI’s long-standing operations; containment of irregular migration; and broader regional stability - have been persistently undermined by Libya's political fragmentation since Gaddafi's regime collapsed in 2011. However, rather than redefining its strategy, Italy has tended to oscillate between ad hoc crisis management and a reliance on international processes that have produced limited results.

The post-2011 landscape in Libya remains marked by deep political and territorial tensions. Since Gaddafi's downfall, the country has been divided into two rival authorities: the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNA) in Tripoli, backed by Turkey and Qatar, and General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) in the east, supported by by Russia, Egypt, and the UAE. The existence of these two factions turned the conflict into a proxy arena for regional and global powers. This foreign interference has further weakened Italy’s previously privileged position, highlighting its diplomatic inferiority compared to more assertive external actors. Moreover, the proliferation of several armed groups with tribal and regional roots has created a security environment in which no single actor can guarantee stability.

Despite international initiatives, such as the Palermo Conference (2018) promoted by Italy and the Berlin Process (2020) Libya remains in deadlock. Tensions between historical Libyan provinces, rivalries between revolutionary and pro-Gaddafi factions, and competition over control of resources have undoubtedly fuelled instability. The repeated postponement of elections, most notably in December 2021, exposed the legal ambiguities of Libya’s institutional framework, as well as the reluctance of key stakeholders to embark on a genuine political transition. The absence of a coherent EU external action in the Mediterranean, coupled with minimal US involvement, has restricted Italy’s freedom of action in Libya. This has contributed to the country adopting temporary policies instead of pursuing a strategic and forward-looking approach.

This persistent stalemate raises uncomfortable questions for Italy: should Rome continue to invest in fragile diplomatic efforts that have yielded little progress, or should it recalibrate its approach by prioritising narrower interests, such as energy and migration management? Either option involves significant trade-offs between short-term stability and long-term credibility.

Italy and Libya Energy Nexus

Italy's involvement in Libya has long been influenced by its reliance on energy ties, with ENI playing a key role in diplomatic engagement and economic influence, particularly in the energy sector through ENI. The Italian multinational oil and gas company’s operations in the Wafa and El Feel oil and gas fields, directly connected to Sicily through the Greenstream pipeline underline how closely linked Italy’s energy security is to Libyan stability. Yet this reliance, which once gave Rome leverage, is increasingly revealing its fragility. ENI’s strategic assets are at the mercy of Libya’s internal rivalries and armed groups' bargaining, which turns energy security into a structural vulnerability rather than a source of strength.

The war in Ukraine has further enlarged this paradox. As Europe seeks to diversify away from Russian energy dependence, Libya is seen as a key alternative for Italy and the EU. However, production remains subject to political instability and militia activity, as demonstrated by the blockade of the Ras Lanuf oil terminal in 2023. These events demonstrate that Italian energy policy relies on the temporary support of local groups, which ultimately renders it incapable of influencing the Libyan economy. This vulnerability is worsened by the absence of an EU external action strategy in the Mediterranean, bringing Italy to largely manage these challenges on its own and to take on responsibilities that could better be shared at the EU level.

Italy therefore faces a strategic dilemma. While an approach that prioritises energy guarantees immediate supplies, it risks binding Rome to a model of dependence on fragile authorities and undermining its ability to act as a regional stabiliser. Alternatively, Italy could leverage its presence in the energy sector for diplomatic gain, but only if reforms are implemented to stabilise and transparently manage the country's political and economic affairs. The choice is both technical and geopolitical: Italy can either remain a passive observer of the instability in Libya, or it can take an active role in ensuring security in the Mediterranean through energy diplomacy.

Migration, Security, and Human Rights

Libya remains one of the main departure points for migration to Europe, particularly along the Central Mediterranean route to Italy. Due to its proximity to Italy, the Libyan coast is a key “hotspot” where thousands of migrants and refugees, primarily from Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, attempt dangerous sea crossings to reach Italian shores. For Italy, this influx of migrants is not only a humanitarian concern, but also an increasing security issue.

In response, the country has pursued a containment strategy, supporting the Libyan Coast Guard in intercepting and returning migrants before they reach European waters. However, these practices have sparked widespread criticism from various NGOs and the UN, who argue that Italian support effectively enables the return of migrants to Libyan detention centres, where conditions are described as inhumane and characterised by torture, extortion, continuous violence and abuse. The absence of effective border control, coupled with the fragmentation of the Libyan security apparatus, encourages the mobility of jihadist groups and foreign fighters, especially in southern Libya and across the Sahel. For Italy, the intersection of human trafficking, organised crime, and potential terrorist infiltration poses a multidimensional threat to national and regional security. By relying on Libyan authorities, Italy risks associating its migration policy with serious human rights violations. This tension is augmented by the lack of a unified European approach in terms of migratory policy. The limitations of the Dublin Regulation and the ambiguities of the EU’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum highlight the absence of a true European solidarity system, leaving frontline states such as Italy with a disproportionate amount of responsibility. This tension highlights a deeper dilemma, as short-term containment could come at the expense of international credibility and moral authority.

The suspension of operations for ten international NGOs and the UNHCR by the Libyan Internal Security Agency (LISA) in April 2025 further complicates the landscape. This suspension is a clear sign of Libya's increasingly securitarian and repressive shift, where international cooperation on migration is becoming increasingly subordinate to political and military interests.  Italy and the EU now face a critical dilemma: should they continue to support authoritarian and violent actors in order to contain migration flows, or should they rethink their foreign policy in light of international law and human rights principles? Every path involves trade-offs. Disengagement could lead to uncontrolled migration flows, while continued support could reinforce inhumane authoritarian practices and destabilise the region.

Italian-Turkish Competition

Turkey's military and political presence in Tripoli has greatly challenged Italy's historical influence in Libya. Historically, Italy occupied a dominant position in Libya's European relations, underpinned by its colonial legacy, robust diplomatic and commercial engagement, and its status as the first destination country for Libyan exports.

The 2019 Memorandum of Understanding between Turkey and the GNA Turkey expanded Turkey's territorial waters in the Mediterranean, raising tensions with Greece and Cyprus. This Turkish expansion has created a new geopolitical dynamic in the Eastern Mediterranean, making it more difficult for Italy to assert its influence in Libya. By relying on its traditional influence and bilateral relations, Rome risks being marginalized in decision-making processes affecting both Libya and the wider region. Indeed, Turkey's increased presence in Tripoli means direct competition for control of energy resources, migration routes, and political alliances within Libya. 

Should Italy adopt a proactive approach to limit Turkish influence and risk exacerbating regional tensions, or should it pursue multilateral coordination within the EU and NATO to preserve access and long-term stability? Either way, there are risks. A confrontational approach could provoke retaliation and further instability, while inaction could further erode Italy's strategic influence.

Italy and the Syrian Crisis: A Geopolitical, Security and Migratory Perspective

By Francesco Foti

By FeaturingDallas - Own work, CC BY 4.0

Post-Assad Syria and Impacts on European Security

Following the collapse of the Assad regime, the West has been dealing with the consequences of a new Syria. Southeastern European countries have borne the brunt of the instability caused by the 14-year civil war. Southern EU countries' capacity to process migrants at their first point of entry into Europe has been significantly impacted by it. The disproportionate burden could also be posing a security risk, including instances of radicalisation and terrorism documented in Italy that reverberate at the single EU country’s level. A fragmented Syria complicates the security crisis. An extremist or ineffectual government that harbours or exports radical violent individualsshould not be ruled out, given the past of HTS and the explosions of violence involving former loyalists, Alawites, Druze, and Christians.

EU Policy Failures on Syrian Migration

At the EU level, inconsistent application and failure to reform or uniform the Dublin Regulation have contributed to the instability in the Mediterranean and impacted Italy’s capabilities, thus signalling a lack of European approach. The refusal to reform the Dublin treaty and the lack of a broad approach to the security crisis by relying only on Libya, Egypt, and Turkey as a way to stem the flow underscore the European limited role in addressing the Syrian issue. The 2016 migration between Turkey and the EU exemplifies the European strategy of exchanging political concessions and funding for assistance in curbing migration flows.

Italy’s Legal and Diplomatic Response to the Syrian Crisis

Italy has temporarily suspended aspects of the asylum registration process under emergency measures, currently contested in court. To help manage migration, the Albania Agreement (2023) served as an option currently under discussion at the European level. The Italian government has passed a restrictive Law n. 187/2024 on immigration, and the annual immigration quota decree. The agreement and the laws implemented have been impugned by the courts which has limited their enforceability. The same impasse is observable across other EU countries.

An Italian geopolitical approach?

Due to European limitations and approach, the Italian position is limited to diplomatic, investment and humanitarian initiatives. Italy thinks that dealing with the Syrian government, whether in the form of Assad or HTS, is the starting point to address the question of immigration from instability. Lifting sanctions was presented as leading to cooperation in terms of infrastructure and business opportunities, which could boost the recovery and bring about stability to address the root causes. Italy should be watching the interregnum phase as this might precipitate another immigration crisis.Italian pragmatism should take into consideration the Turkish role, activism and exceptionalism of which Greece and Cyprus have long been vocal. Italy should clearly demand Turkey halt any unilateral actions in Northern Syria that have not been agreed upon with NATO and EU allies. Turkish military operations targeting the Kurds risk destabilising by triggering artificial resettlement, increased displacement and growth of refugee camps amid deterioration of humanitarian conditions. Furthermore, as shown by the 2020 Turko-Greek crisis, Turkish use of immigration as a hybrid threat exposes European inaction and the limits of the Italo-Turkish partnership in the face of unchecked Turkish militarism. Turkish actions frequently blur the distinction between support for moderates and extremists, thus undermining both the security of Syrian-controlled areas and prospects for the eventual, gradual return of refugees to Europe.

Italy should also reassess its approach to Iranian influence in Syria and the broader Levantine region. A critical component of this reassessment involves evaluating Iran’s use of sectarian dynamics to extend its regional influence, a strategy that has historically contributed to instability and, in turn, increased migration pressures toward Europe. While Iran will still remain an actor to reckon with in Syria, particularly through its support of the Shias and Alewites, the evolving political landscape in Damascus warrants close scrutiny. Italy should remain vigilant to any Iranian efforts to recalibrate its role and maintain leverage in the region, as this may have implications for both regional stability and require Italy’s bilateral relations with Tehran to be re-evaluated.

Israel's recent actions show awareness of the need to ensure Syria does not spiral into all-out sectarianism. However, Italy’s relationship with Israel has come under strain in light of recent developments in Gaza. Unlike countries such as the United Kingdom, France, or Spain, Italy has avoided openly criticizing Israel’s actions. However, it has also refrained from vocally supporting Israeli airstrikes in Syria, which Israel claims are aimed at protecting the Druze minority from government aggression. This ambiguous stance reflects an inconsistent policy line that fails to address the broader challenge of sectarianism in the region.

In light of the Lebanese government's recent call for the disarmament of Hezbollah—a paramilitary Shia organization—Italy should formally support this initiative as a necessary measure to curb the regional spread of sectarianism from Lebanon into Syria. Such a stance is particularly warranted given Hezbollah’s alignment with the Iran-backed "axis of resistance”. So far, the Syrian government declined to take decisive steps.

A Western response

The West lacks a broad commitment to the Syrian issue, other than previously supporting rebels, much like with Libya’s Gaddafi and the French-led regime change without clear post-intervention commitment. A cautious approach requires that the EU and US pressure should not be lifted, avoiding a quick diplomatic clout, until the course of Ahmed al-Sharaa becomes clear without ambiguity and sectarianism. A long-term plan comprising stabilisation, limiting the influence of geopolitical rivals and continuous pressure could tackle the root causes for massive immigration to Europe. Activism within the EU framework requires the US to be involved, and the easing pressure not be too speedy, given the uncertain direction of HTS. The Western powers should refrain from arming HTS and pressure others, such as Ukraine, not to overreach.

A new approach?

The Albanian model should be internalised and made into EU law, thus securing funding and being administered by the EU itself, and a quota system approved at the European level. The Italian government should stress the security dimension of the deal to frame it as a public safety tool and a faster, more humane processing. Italy should invite other countries in a joint governance of the centres to share the burden but also show the profits of the model. The EU should have an updated approach to cooperate with the Syrian authorities on repatriations, limit Turkish, Iranian and Qatari influence and pressure them not to engage in sectarianism. Italy should also take centre stage and bring the issue of the future West-Syria relations to the fore to help form a broad Western initiative that should, however, be security-based and geopolitical before focusing on immigration, trade and investment. This requires a new perspective on the actors in the Syrian playground based on the Libyan case that saw the rushed support for rebels that replaced the dictator turning out to breed chaos and new security challenges met inconsistently by the western powers.

Conclusions 

Analyses of the situations in Libya and Syria highlight several key lessons for Italy’s Mediterranean strategy. Firstly, both crises demonstrate the limitations of reactive or ad hoc approaches. Short-term interventions in areas such as energy, migration and security often fail to address the root causes of political fragmentation and the influence of external actors. Secondly, while Italy’s traditional levers, such as energy diplomacy, migration management and engagement with local authorities, are necessary, they are insufficient in contexts marked by instability and unpredictable actors. Thirdly, these cases demonstrate that external influences, such as those from Turkey and Russia in Libya and Turkey and Iran in Syria, can significantly restrict Italy’s ability to act alone, making it essential for Italy to coordinate with other EU and NATO partners. Finally, the dilemmas faced in both countries illustrate the persistent tension between immediate interests, such as energy security and migration governance, and long-term objectives, including institutional reform, human rights protection and regional stability.

In light of these lessons, Italy must reassess its strategy in Libya, taking into account the growing influence of Turkey, the ongoing engagement of Iran, and the persistent institutional fragmentation, while also addressing migration management.  The continuing stalemate between Tripoli and the eastern authorities, the repeated blockading of oil terminals and the fragility of local governance structures demonstrate that the ad hoc diplomatic and reactive intervention-focused approaches adopted after Gaddafi's fall are no longer sufficient. Yet the limited engagement of the EU in defining a coherent Mediterranean policy compounds these challenges, leaving Rome to act in a largely unilateral way. Italy must therefore combine traditional diplomatic tools with innovative approaches, promoting stability in energy production and reforming local institutions. Together with the need to ensure stability and defend human rights, this will require a comprehensive European approach aimed at preventing Libya from becoming a permanent centre of insecurity along the EU’s southern border.

At the same time, there has been a welcome in Italy for the prospect of closer engagement with the new Syrian authorities. However, these proposals must be carefully evaluated. Rome must consider whether the Al Jolani government can realistically unify diverse communities, combat terrorism and curb extremism. Effective engagement will depend on a holistic Western approach combining incentives and pressure to ensure the new authorities commit to inclusive governance, reject sectarian policies and contribute to long-term stability. A coherent strategy integrating political, security and humanitarian dimensions is essential for mitigating migration flows to Europe and for consolidating Italy’s credibility as a stabilising force in the Mediterranean and the wider Middle East.

 

May 17, 2024No Comments

U.S. Ukraine Aid: A Part of a Larger Strategy

U.S. Ukraine aid needs to be part of a larger strategic vision that aims for Russian defeat in Ukraine. 

Author: Samuel Dempsey - USA Team

Four days after President Biden approved the $61 billion in military aid, on April 28, 2024, Ukraine received the first wave of anti-armor rockets, missiles, and 155-millimeter artillery shells. While Ukraine welcomed the needed U.S. aid, it came months late considering the on-the-ground requirements of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. As a result, much of this aid package is attempting to make up for lost time and reinforce the depleted defence supply chain.

In H.R.815 - Making emergency supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2024, and for other purposes, $23 billion of the aid supplement replenishes military stockpiles, enabling future U.S. military transfers to Ukraine; $14 billion is designated for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which allows the DoD to buy advanced new weapon systems for Ukraine directly from U.S. defence contractors; $11 billion will fund current U.S. military operations in the region, and about $8 billion goes to non-military assistance through a loan to the Ukrainian government to cover basic operating costs. 

The supplement comes at a time when Russia is increasingly exerting pressure across the 600-mile front line. Ukrainian brigades are spread thin, with little time for recuperation or new training, and much of the aid, including separate packages from the U.K. and Germany, will take months to arrive to truly bolster Ukraine’s defences on the ground. 

As Jack Waltling, an expert in land warfare at RUSI, discussed in Foreign Affairs, at present Russia has a “ten-to-one advantage over Ukraine in available artillery,” and with the new U.S. aid package, this is projected to shrink to “three to one in some regions.” This is a substantial improvement, but he argues that current Western support has only come in time to “stave off a Ukrainian collapse.” As Eugene Rumer at the Carnegie Endowment observed, the calculations vehemently demonstrate that even with support from the U.S. and allies, “the size of Russia’s population, economy, stocks of military hardware, and defense-industrial base far exceeds those of Ukraine.” 

The new supplement's legislation acknowledges this reality and emphasizes the need to agree on a new multi-year support strategy "to hasten Ukrainian victory against Russia's invasion forces." This U.S. supplement is very likely the only piece of Ukraine aid that will be able to take effect before the next U.S. presidential election, and despite having aspirational goals for greater support, it has focused on buying more time. Given the possible change in U.S. administration and the confidence and firmness with which Russia is continuing this illegal invasion, even recently allegedly conducting an assassination attempt against President Zelenskyy, the question is: how does this supplement fit within a greater Ukraine strategy of the United States? 

U.S. Stated Goals  

The April 24 Ukraine supplement was the Biden administration's fifty-sixth allotment of DoD inventory equipment to Ukraine since August 2021. Post-Russian invasion, the Biden administration has stood behind Ukraine, with the official Department of State position being that the U.S. and allies are “united in support of Ukraine in response to Russia’s premeditated, unprovoked, and unjustified war against Ukraine.” The U.S. has demonstrated this by asserting that Kyiv will determine the war’s outcome. As Alexander Ward at Politico pointed out, this has resulted in a strategic misalignment, where the U.S. perceives its support as a means to either force Russia back or negotiate a settlement with Russia, while the Zelenskyy administration maintains that Ukraine will not relent until it reaches its pre-2014 borders, including Crimea. According to Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, "only Russia's defeat and the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity will guarantee stability and peace," and "the Black Sea must become a sea of NATO, peace, and stability."

After the recent U.S. supplement passed, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated that Ukraine throughout the rest of the year will have the capacity to “hold the line” and “to ensure Ukraine withstands the Russian assault,” with the chance to enable Ukraine in 2025 “to move forward to recapture the territory that the Russians have taken from them.” Concurrently, Avril D. Haines, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, told Congress that, in addition to the anticipated Russian offensive this month, Russia has the means to break through the Eastern Ukrainian front lines. According to Director Haines’ statements, the current U.S. strategy may now come up short, and according to Sullivan’s statements, the U.S. strategy has postponed any possible Ukrainian counteroffensive to 2025. Even then, numerous analysts, including Olga Tokariuk at Chatham House, have stressed that any future Ukrainian military offensive or even the ability to maintain a stable frontline is contingent upon a “steady flow of Western military assistance,” including with approval from the White House. 

If the U.S., regardless of administration, wants to back Ukraine’s goal of the Black Sea being "a sea of NATO peace and stability," a clear articulation of its own political goals is required to ensure a sound strategic vision.

A U.S. Strategy for Ukrainian Victory and Russian Defeat   

“Russia can lose. And it should lose, for the sake of the world — and for its own sake,” wrote Timothy Snyder, a Levin Professor of History at Yale. Snyder, in his CNN opinion piece and while lecturing at the University Club of New York, articulated the four principal reasons for which a Russian defeat is necessary in Ukraine: (1) For an imperial power to restrain its imperial ambitions, defeat is necessarySnyder argued that the European project itself is only the result of lost imperial wars around the world after WWII. (2) If Russia wins, it not only affirms its imperial ambitions but also demonstrates to the rest of the world that imperial conquest is an option. (3) Historically, the most effective Western policy towards Russia is an effective U.S. policy towards Ukraine, i.e., supporting their self-determination and strategic objectives that align with Western values and systems has positive indirect impacts on developments in Russia. (4) Russia's history is replete with defeats; the Crimean War in 1856, the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, World War I in 1917, the Soviet Union's defeat by Poland in 1920, by Nazi Germany in 1945, and Afghanistan's decade-long invasion in 1979 are just a few examples. Snyder argues that in each case, Russia lost without existential risk.

In addition, Snyder emphasizes that Russia’s greatest successes in its invasion of Ukraine (still minor in total scale) occurred in the last six months when the U.S. “was delaying Ukraine aid rather than supplying it.” As Jack Waltling also emphasized, a Ukrainian defeat would also signal to Russia that it has and can defeat the West through prolonged exhaustion. 

To develop a cognizant and successful strategy towards Russia, the U.S. must first articulate the requirement of a Russian defeat in Ukraine.

Source: Image by MotionStudios from Pixabay

Strategic Steps to Russian Defeat

As Rob Lee, a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program, wrote over X, Ukraine’s three primary hurdles are: ammunition, manpower, and fortifications. Lee, alongside colleagues Michael Kofman and Dara Massicot, propose a strategy “premised on three central elements: hold, build, and strike.” The strategy and commentary do an excellent job of articulating how the Ukrainian Armed Forces can, in the face of Russia’s growing manpower, distribute and train current brigades, absorb Russian offensives, and create challenges for Russia “far behind the front lines.” 

Creating threats and challenges deeper behind the front lines is an immediate way in which the U.S. can support Ukraine’s ability to hold the front and fortify further. As Mark T. Kimmitt, the former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, wrote, the U.S. and allies must loosen restrictions on military aid that inhibit cross-border attacks and prevent Ukraine from targeting Russia in the Black Sea. Loosening these restrictions will immediately add a new dimension to Russian risk, giving Ukrainians more space and time to develop a successful counter-offensive. Any alleviation of pressure from the front will provide the currently stagnant and exhausted Ukrainian brigades with the necessary resources for recuperation and training.

A key area of support could be a financing strategy that enhances Ukraine's ability to acquire munitions. Recent Ukraine aid legislation allows for the potential use of frozen Russian central bank assets for reconstruction efforts. Building on the Council of Europe proposal that references U.S. initiatives, the international community could explore the establishment of a multilateral legal mechanism to manage these assets. This mechanism could potentially provide compensation for reconstruction costs and free up Ukrainian resources for munitions procurement. Allies and partners hold approximately $300 billion in frozen Russian assets, with the U.S. holding at least $38 billion. Additionally, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has proposed a $100 billion fund for Ukraine's defenses, although this proposal faces internal opposition within the Alliance. Such a fund could facilitate greater coordination of security aid for Ukraine.

After the signing of Ukraine aid and in the lead-up to a challenging election, the Biden administration may be inclined to place Ukraine on the back burner of political communication. Yet, the discussion and growth of a larger Ukraine strategy must be articulated not only on the international stage but also communicated to the general American public. “It’s the president’s responsibility to make the case to the American people why Ukraine and our support matter. While he has done this a few times, the narrative has not been clear enough to most Americans,” said Alina Polyakova to Politico, president and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis. At the NATO Washington Summit this July, the U.S. has the opportunity to hone its strategic vision and make these initiatives a primary agenda while presenting its case to the American people as to why the United States should support Ukraine and ensure Russian defeat. Whether it's Trump or Biden in the Oval Office come January 2025, Ukraine will need assistance, and the American people will need to know why. 

March 9, 2024No Comments

Prof. Paola Rivetti on Iran and Mahsa Amini

Prof. Paola Rivetti is an Associate professor in Politics and International Relations at Dublin City University. Her expertise lies in Iranian politics, gender and sexuality, social and political mobilisation and the Middle East Region. 

In this session, prof. Rivetti talks about Iran in the aftermath of Mahsa Amini's death, dwelling into the movement Women Life Freedom, Iran's geopolitical position after the protests, and future prospect for the country (de)stabilisation. 

Interviewers: Ilaria Lorusso, Shahin Modarres, Margherita Ceserani. - Iran Team

January 29, 2024No Comments

Dr Andreas Østhagen on Arctic Geopolitics and Governance

Dr Andreas Østhagen talks about Arctic power relations, the nexus between traditional and non-traditional security in the Arctic region, US Arctic strategy, and the complexities of Arctic governance. 

Dr Østhagen is a Senior Researcher at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute in Oslo and an Associate Professor at Nord University Business School

In this session, Dr Østhagen unpacks how US-China posturing and increased human activity in the Arctic are shaping the region's geopolitical significance. He outlines how increased US engagement in the Arctic is driven by security concerns, especially US-China competition. Moreover, Dr Østhagen believes it is unlikely that Russia will challenge the Law of the Sea in the Arctic. Furthermore, he suggests that the Nordic countries, as a bloc, could play a role in lowering tensions in the Arctic

Interviewer: Irene Senfter - USA Team

December 30, 2023No Comments

ITSS Verona 2023/2024 Webinar Series – A Constructive Dialogue on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

For our second Webinar of the 2023/2024 season, we were truly honored to host Dr. Magen Inon, an Israeli educator who lost his parents during the October 7 attacks. Magen told us about his work as a peace advocate, through which he is trying to forge a safe space for dialogue and mutual understanding between everybody who is affected by the conflict, rejecting hatred and polarization.

Following his contribution, our ITSS Verona researchers from the Middle East Team, Omri Brinner and Chantal Elisabeth Hohe, together with our ITSS Verona Director, Dr. Michele Groppi, analyzed other important dimensions of the Israeli-Palestinian issue: the question of a two-state solution, the need for imagination and creativity in geopolitics, the involvement of regional actors like Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iran, Israel's strategic culture, and finally, the understated role played by emotions on both sides.

March 21, 2023No Comments

Vladimir Radunovic and Anastasia Kazakova on Cyber Diplomacy

Vladimir Radunovic and Anastasia Kazakova talk about cyber diplomacy, the geopolitics of cyberspace, and the roles of state and non-state actors.


Vladimir Radunovic is Director, E-diplomacy and Cybersecurity Programmes, and Anastasia Kazakova is a Cyber Diplomacy Knowledge Fellow at DiploFoundation. This Swiss-Maltese non-governmental organisation specialises in capacity development in the field of Internet governance and digital policy.

Interviewer: Oleg Abdurashitov - Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence and Space Team.

May 30, 2022No Comments

The Geopolitics of the Energy Transition’s Momentum

Authors: Riccardo Bosticco and Michele Mignogna.

Introduction

The main result that Putin has achieved until now with the aggression of Ukraine is a solid stance from the European Member States to halt gas imports from Russia. This and other green commitments have pushed the EU and the whole world to give renewed impetus to renewable energy. Moreover, the relation between climate and industry policies is increasingly evident. In a broader context of power competition trade, investment policies in the energy and climate sectors play an ambivalent role: energy dependencies have been conceptualized as mutually benefitting; yet, the current war unveils their risky nature. After a brief description of the renewables’ geopolitical dimensions, this article outlines what is at stake for the EU’s primary areas of energy cooperation. 

The Impact of Renewable Energy on Geopolitics

Renewable energies have the potential to transform interstate energy relations. Renewables have fundamentally distinct geographic and technological properties than coal, oil, and natural gas. Sources are plentiful but intermittent; their production is increasingly decentralized and utilizes rare earth resources in clean tech equipment and, lastly, their distribution is predominantly electric and entails tight management standards and long-distance losses. This contrasts sharply with fossil fuel resources’ geographically fixed and finite character, their reliance on massive centralized production and processing facilities, and their ease of storage and transit as solids, liquids, or gases worldwide.

The energy transition provides a chance to rethink and revise long-standing trading relationships. It also allows countries to engage in previously closed energy value chains. Significantly, the future of the energy world will likely redefine the concept of energy security. However, in this society, the impulse to produce things domestically will collide with the logic of size and global supply networks. The energy transition will rewire the planet, but how much of it will transcend international borders is still unclear. A crucial element will be the commerce of minerals, distinct from that of oil, gas, and coal in terms of location. Nonetheless, such business will follow a familiar pattern: resources will be harvested in one region of the world, transported to refineries and processing centers, and then transformed into final goods. Diversification, bottlenecks, extraction disputes, and rent-seeking dynamics will all be present, although with different details.

Such developments will require a significant shift in energy strategies, indicating that areas pursuing industrial policies rather than decarbonization may reap climatic advantages. The previous energy map established a link between natural resources and markets. Yet, the new energy map will be much more complex.

The Geopolitics of the Energy Transition and the EU

Bringing together the words ’geopolitics’ and ‘renewables’ leads to the study of renewables and related security risks, the effects of the energy transition on traditional energy relations, possibilities of mutually beneficial ties, and windows of opportunity for countries to move up in the global power hierarchy. The energy transition is indeed a process where the industrial advantage is likely to bring with itself political benefits and leadership status. In the context of the current war in Ukraine, this is becoming clearer every day. Yet, the energy transition is expected to become part of power competition as the most impellent challenge – posed by the war as well as climate change and the security risks with it – of our times and will likely create amities and enmities.

Take the example of Russia. In the past decade, Russia has perceived the EU’s energy transition problematically. The EU-Russia energy relationship was primarily based on gas, oil, and coal. Nonetheless, the association is characterized by different conceptions of energy and energy security, although both actors recognize the potential of energy interdependence. While the EU and European countries are more enthusiastic concerning the transition, Russia’s discourses are more conservative yet try to defend the role of natural gas in the energy transition.

While it is difficult to predict an essential role played by Russia nowadays, given the progressive isolation it is forced to, the energy wire will see China having high stakes in renewable developments and geopolitics. Concerning relations with the EU, some have argued that the energy transition is likely to be the determinant of the future of EU-China relations. Energy in EU-China relations does not play the same role as relations with Russia. While the renewable sector has encouraged interdependence between the two powers in the past, more recently, nationally oriented policies have hindered the precedent path.

Still, the energy transition will significantly shape relations between the EU and the Arab states. While Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are challenged by balancing relating with the US and China, managing regional crises, the pandemic, and containing Iran as the primary regional rival, the last point precisely is preventing some of the Arab states in the Gulf region to act assertively against Russia. Nonetheless, looking ahead to the 2020s, how those countries manage the energy transition will have consequences on internal and external political and economic environments. Especially Gulf countries envision a sustainable future, thus setting the stage for redrawing energy investments. In this context, the EU will play a crucial role, opening to the Gulf’s market interests and advancing regional security interests.

Conclusion

Overall, the current war is not only highlighting the strategic value of energy resources and energy ties but also how the transition to new energy systems is likely to rewire the world. In a context where the main political divide on the global stage is between liberal and illiberal forces and strong energy dependences revealed security threats, future systems of alliances will have to account for this. For the EU, the energy transition will have to deal with Russia, act as cohesively as possible, and strengthen its strategic thinking concerning big partners such as China and the Gulf States. The transitions’ stakes entail a strategic opportunity to avoid past errors.

February 14, 2022No Comments

Jeremy Garlick on China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

Dr Jeremy Alan Garlick is an Associate Professor of International Studies and International Relations. Currently, he is the Director of the J. Masaryk Centre of International Studies at Prague University of Economics and Business. His research focusses on the Belt and Road Initiative, China's relations with Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), China-Middle East relations, and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). He is the author of books, “Reconfiguring the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Geo-Economic Pipe DreamsVersus Geopolitical Realities” published November 2021 and “The Impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: From Asia to Europe” published December 2019. He has also authored various book chapter, peer reviewed articles, book reviews and conference papers. He is also member of the editorial board of the Journal of Current Chinese Affairs since 2018.

In this interview he talks about his recent book "Reconfiguring the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor" and explains how CPEC may not be such a game-changing endeavour for the region as originally hoped. He explains how almost all projects are centred within Pakistan instead of being cross-border in nature. He also highlights the security risks among other factors within Pakistan that have repeatedly hindered development of the CPEC Projects.

Interviewing Team: Sandra Watson Parcels and Carlotta Rinaudo.

November 12, 2021No Comments

Taiwan, the relations of the Strait and the Indo-Pacific

By: Francesco Cirillo 

Image Source: https://pixabay.com/illustrations/taiwan-flag-roc-republic-of-china-1184108/

In US strategic assessments Taiwan represents the first anti-Chinese containment line in the Indo-Pacific area, which is why it is essential for Washington to guarantee Taipei logistical support to keep its military and deterrence capabilities efficient.

In recent months, Taipei has seen pressure from Beijing increase, both through propaganda and through continuous violations of the Taiwanese air defense zone. In the previous months, the Wall Street Journal had written that US special forces units were present on the Island of Formosa to support and advise the Taiwanese forces, with the aim of preparing the Taipei forces for a possible attack by the PLA forces in Beijing. Over the years, Taiwan has strengthened and modernized its warfare system, with the aim of guaranteeing itself a conventional deterrence to dissuade Beijing from starting a heavy amphibious invasion operation. Called the Doctrine of the Porcupine, it aims to discourage a possible Chinese attack due to the high human and economic costs. For Washington, Taiwan is indirectly part of the strategy of containing Chinese expansionism in the Pacific. It represents a natural barrier to the air and naval forces of the People’s Liberation Army of the People’s Republic, which aims to expand its zone of influence in the Pacific.

Source: https://mapchart.net/

The Taiwan issue is heavily involved in Sino-US relations, especially with the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and the three joint communiques. The TRA obliges Washington to guarantee Taipei a continuous flow of armaments for defensive purposes, with the aim of guaranteeing the Taipei government military capabilities for its own defense. But Taiwan I'm coming! also that Washington, to respect the One China Policy, would not accept any declaration of Independence by Taipei, preferring to maintain the Status Quo.

Even the Taiwanese defense minister himself has declared that Taipei is equipped for a possible attack by the EPL, which according to Beijing itself could have the logistical and military capabilities to invade Taiwan by 2025.

In recent days, US President Joe Biden himself stated that Washington will intervene militarily in support of Taiwan in the event of an attack by the armed forces in Beijing; later, during an interview on CNN, Taiwan's President Tsa-Ing Wen confirmed the Wall Street Journal's early October rumors about the presence of US military units on the island, with advisory and training duties.

In the months preceding the Think Tank of the Center for the New American Security (CNAS) and the Chinese state TV itself have published simulations of invasion of the island of Taiwan, demonstrating that the issue concerning the Taiwanese issue of the strait is a widely discussed debate. and at the heart of US concerns.

For Washington, the concern will also be linked to the nuclear deterrence capabilities that Beijing could acquire by 2030. According to the Pentagon Report Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, the People's Republic of China could increase the Chinese’s nuclear arsenal, up to the one thousand nuclear ballistic carriers ceiling for 2030.

For the American political-military leadership, this scenario could compromise US deterrence in the Indo-Pacific area in the coming years.

September 23, 2021No Comments

Richard Aboulafia on the Geopolitics of next-generation fighter aircraft

Richard Aboulafia talks about the intricacies of combat aircraft acquisition and gives us an overview of the development of the next-generation of fighter aircraft. He also discusses what it means in terms of warfare capabilities, European Defense, and the ties between aircraft exports and foreign policy.  

Richard Aboulafia is the Vice President of Analysis at TealGroup. 

Interviewer: Arnaud Sobrero This is ITSS Verona Member Series Video Podcast by the Defense & Procurement Team. 

ITSS Verona - The International Team for the Study of Security Verona is a not-for-profit, apolitical, international cultural associationdedicated to the study of international security, ranging from terrorism to climate change, from artificial intelligence to pandemics, from great power competition to energy security.