NATO Archives – ITSS Verona

March 11, 2026 — No Comments

AI, ICT infrastructures, and social media in today’s conflicts

By Giulia Saccone - AI, Cyberspace and Space Desk

Introduction

The XXI century seems to be characterised by a redefinition of the international security scenario. Warfare is no exception. In this decade, the rapid evolution in the cybersphere, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and disinformation techniques has led a wide range of experts to gradually focus on the impact of these technologies on human decision-making. This has led to the emergence of a new concept: cognitive warfare.

While there is no univocal definition of it, the one provided by NATO's Allied Command Transformation (ACT), under the input of the Science and Technology Organisation (STO) in 2024 is as follows:

“Cognitive Warfare integrates cyber, information, psychological, and social engineering capabilities. These activities, conducted in synchronisation with other Instruments of Power, can affect attitudes and behavior by influencing, protecting, or disrupting individual and group cognition to gain advantage over an adversary.”

According to the 2025 Chief Scientist Research Report, we can classify cognitive warfare as a standalone grey-zone, military and social issue. In this type of conflict, technology is the catalyst for its reach and effectiveness, and is also part of the solution to counteract cognitive campaigns, along with further understanding of the threat actors, information environment, and social implications of the phenomenon. This definition served as a notable input for further studies, but especially as legitimisation of this new warfare domain, allowing the development of a corresponding doctrine, and shifting the focus of psychological operations from the content to its effects.

In understanding cognitive warfare, we must point out the differences with its sibling: information warfare. Information warfare focuses on controlling disinformation and misinformation flows in their various forms, taking advantage of technologies without changing the nature of war. On the contrary, cognitive warfare aims at eliciting a psychological reaction, leveraging both technologies and neuroscience, involving information and activities that can take place online and offline.¹ The different focus avoids a misinterpretation of cognitive warfare as “a rebrand of an old concept”, helping us to understand how technology is exploited.

How Cognitive Warfare is conducted

To evoke precise reactions, cognitive warfare triggers pathways that manage cognitive load, such as cognitive biases and heuristics (i.e., predicting outcomes by interpreting data inductively or through analogies), as well as emotional responses². Taking into account the OODA loop (observe-orient-decide-act), cognitive warfare techniques affect the orientation step: the moment when information is filtered, analysed, and interpreted through prior experiences, analytical and synthetic strategies, and cultural features.

To achieve this, antagonistic actors expose targets to vivid, repetitive, and biased information, distorting heuristic reasoning, especially during uncertain times, causing people to misjudge the likelihood of events based on superficial similarities, neglect objective facts, and make anxious or irrational decisions³. These effects are exacerbated by the anchoring bias: the first-hand exposure to a variable that will condition all the subsequent evaluations.

This bias might appear similar to the priming effect, which has a different outcome. It consists of exposing an individual to the association between a subject and a certain set of characteristics, which, through association mechanisms, profoundly shapes the perception of the subject. This mechanism is effective in manipulating public opinion, since the repeated exposure to the association between a characteristic and a subject leads to an overreaction of the general public against the alleged antagonist, even when the subject does not clearly present that attribute⁴.

The diffusion of false narratives can also impact the confirmation bias: our tendency to privilege information that confirms our initial beliefs. This is particularly useful in radicalisation processes, which elicit an emotive response on the subject and deepen cognitive divides among groups, eroding social cohesion, which can then be exploited by malign actors against institutions⁵.

The event that marked the beginning of the exploitation of cognitive warfare, and well exemplifies its functioning, is the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, where Russian forces instrumentalised historical facts, legal ambiguities and exacerbation of political divide through the support of the Russian minority, which was leveraged to erode social cohesion, undermining institutions and confusing public international opinion on the interpretation of the events⁶. While Russia’s information campaigns are among the most studied examples, cognitive influence operations are conducted by a wide range of state and non-state actors.

Technological enablers of cognitive warfare: AI, ICT infrastructures and cyberattacks to undermine trust

The shift from hybrid to cognitive warfare is enabled by the rising centrality of the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) infrastructures in social processes, and the advent of AI-powered data mining, algorithmic profiling, and deepfakes. In cognitive warfare, ICT infrastructures are deployed as a vector for infodemic campaigns, taking advantage of the rising use of social media as the main source of information.

A fundamental characteristic of ICT infrastructures is the speed and variety of news diffusion. This creates an infodemic environment that gradually weakens cognitive processes through information overload, creating uncertainty and consequential regression to heuristic reasoning ruled by biases. Fake news proliferates on social media, thanks to their algorithm-friendly design, which allows them to be omnipresent and function as an anchoring bias for distorted facts and narratives, molding the perception of the individual who is constantly driven to this cognitive-overloading environment⁷.

Anonymity also plays a role in cognitive load due to the time-consuming practice of verification of facts that increases the cognitive cost-to-scale and hence gets avoided by users⁸. Another effective instrument is the use of social media influencers, thanks to their friendliness, relatability, interaction frequency, and capacity to create parasocial relations similar to friendships⁹, along with their capacity to convey emotion-driven, yet credible messages, they can become enablers of confirmation bias and tools of cognitive warfare, as in the case of Russian interference with Romanian elections in 2024.

The outreach of malicious influencers and the pervasiveness of bots and troll farms are maximised by the increasing sophistication of AI-based content,¹⁰ which is rapidly and progressively blurring the distinction between real and AI-generated content and profiles. Bots and troll farms were among the first applications of AI for cognitive warfare, which, thanks to their characteristic inflammatory language employed directly towards users, are optimal tools for controlling the narrative. They are often employed during geopolitical events to control the narrative and influence public support for electoral outcomes, consultative democratic processes, direct democracy, policy decisions, alliances, and traditional media¹¹.

Indeed, AI is a perfect force multiplier of cognitive warfare, enabled by relentless data mining, which enables targeting individuals based on their preferred content¹² and personalities at a superhuman speed.
Data are then operationalised to produce information that targets and elicits every individual’s personal bias, and through the cognitive effect of an infodemic environment, impairs effective elaboration of external data, leading us to instinctive reactions¹³.

The emergence of the metaverse could be the next enhancer of cognitive warfare: further blurring the border between digital and physical reality, it allows the collection of biometric data through wearable devices. Malicious forces can collect them to create a more precise profile of a user’s reaction to certain stimuli and modify the circumstantial scenario in which they are immersed, creating another domain for psychological operations¹⁴. However, despite the attention given by the research on cognitive warfare, studies suggest that these predictions are not coherent with the current maturity and diffusion of this technology.¹⁵

Conclusions

The article aims to trace how ICT infrastructure, social media and AI operate on our cognitive functions within the context of cognitive warfare, affecting how information is filtered, analysed, and interpreted through prior experiences, analytical and synthetic strategies, and cultural features. The emergence of this new dimension of conflict has caught the attention of scholars from psychological, international relations, war studies, and numerous other fields, with the 2021 NATO definition contributing to the conceptualisation and legitimisation of this phenomenon.

The cognitive domain has increasingly been described as a stand-alone type of warfare that situates itself within the grey-zone spectrum, involving both the military and civil society. It distinguishes itself from information warfare since it aims not only to control information flows but also to manipulate information in order to distort our perception of events. One of the earliest examples is the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea. In this context, as well as in the 2016 American elections, distorted information was disseminated by exploiting the characteristics of ICT infrastructures: anonymity and rapid diffusion, as well as the algorithmic dynamics of social media and the use of troll farms to influence individuals’ perception of reality.

These examples illustrate how digital technologies have enabled the expansion of cognitive warfare, further amplified by data mining and AI-driven personalisation, which are progressively blurring the distinction between authentic and fabricated content.

As digital ecosystems become increasingly central to political and social life, cognitive warfare is likely to become a persistent feature of geopolitical competition. This raises important questions for democratic resilience, including the need for stronger media literacy, improved platform governance, and more effective mechanisms to detect and counter coordinated influence operations.

References:

Hung, Tzu-Chieh, and Tzu-Wei Hung. “How China’s Cognitive Warfare Works: A Frontline Perspective of Taiwan’s Anti-Disinformation Wars.” Journal of Global Security Studies 7, no. 4 (2022): ogac016. https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac016.
Marsili, Marco. “Cognitive Warfare in Historical Perspective: From Cold War Psychological Operations to AI-Driven Information Campaigns.” Preprint, Social Sciences, December 17, 2025. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202512.1596.v1. ↩︎
Hung and Hung (202) ↩︎
Kim, Daeun. Psychological Mechanisms of Cognitive Warfare on Decision-Making. 27, no. 2 (2025): 249–66. ↩︎
Ibidem. ↩︎
Ibidem
Hung and Hung (2022)
Deppe, Christoph, and Gary S. Schaal. “Cognitive Warfare: A Conceptual Analysis of the NATO ACT Cognitive Warfare Exploratory Concept.” Frontiers in Big Data 7 (November 2024): 1452129. https://doi.org/10.3389/fdata.2024.1452129. ↩︎
Marsili, Marco. “Cognitive Warfare in Historical Perspective: From Cold War Psychological Operations to AI-Driven Information Campaigns.” Preprint, Social Sciences, December 17, 2025. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202512.1596.v1.

Danet (2019)
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Datta, Pratim, Mark Whitmore, and Joseph K. Nwankpa. “A Perfect Storm: Social Media News, Psychological Biases, and AI.” Digital Threats: Research and Practice 2, no. 2 (2021): 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1145/3428157.
Ferreira, Vinícius Marques Da Silva, Carlos Alberto Nunes Cosenza, Alfredo Nazareno Pereira Boente, et al. “GUERRA COGNITIVA NAS REDES SOCIAIS: AMEAÇAS, DESAFIOS E IMPLICAÇÕES PARA A SOCIEDADE.” ARACÊ 7, no. 3 (2025): 14287–303. https://doi.org/10.56238/arev7n3-240. ↩︎
Datta et al. (2021). ↩︎
Kim and Kim (2022) ↩︎
Fenstermacher, Laurie H., David Uzcha, Kathleen G. Larson, Christine A. Vitiello, and Stephen M. Shellman. “New Perspectives on Cognitive Warfare.” In Signal Processing, Sensor/Information Fusion, and Target Recognition XXXII, edited by Lynne L. Grewe, Erik P. Blasch, and Ivan Kadar. SPIE, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2666777.. ↩︎
Paziuk, Andrii, Dmytro Lande, Elina Shnurko-Tabakova, and Phillip Kingston. “Decoding Manipulative Narratives in Cognitive Warfare: A Case Study of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict.” Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence 8 (September 2025): 1566022. https://doi.org/10.3389/frai.2025.1566022.
Da Silva et al. (2025). ↩︎
Marsili 2025
Fenstermacher, Laurie H., David Uzcha, Kathleen G. Larson, Christine A. Vitiello, and Stephen M. Shellman. “New Perspectives on Cognitive Warfare.” In Signal Processing, Sensor/Information Fusion, and Target Recognition XXXII, edited by Lynne L. Grewe, Erik P. Blasch, and Ivan Kadar. SPIE, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2666777.. ↩︎
Meriläinen, Niina. “Artificial Intelligence as a Tool in Cognitive Warfare on Digital Platforms.” International Conference on AI Research 5, no. 1 (2025): 306–12. https://doi.org/10.34190/icair.5.1.4353. ↩︎
Marsili, Marco. “Guerre à La Carte: Cyber, Information, Cognitive Warfare and the Metaverse.” Applied Cybersecurity & Internet Governance 2, no. 1 (2023): 1–11. https://doi.org/10.60097/ACIG/162861.
Fenstermacher et al (2023). ↩︎
Liu, Zhiguo, Yan Huang, Junyu Mai, Wei Li, Zhipeng Cai, and Yingshu Li. “Is the Metaverse Really Coming to Fruition? A Survey of Applied Metaverse and Extended Reality.” High-Confidence Computing, December 2025, 100376. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hcc.2025.100376. ↩︎

December 15, 2025 — No Comments

Thomas Nilsen on the Geopolitics of the High North

Thomas Nilsen talks about the current geopolitical dynamics in the High North, and counters the growing media narrative around the 'inevitable' conflict in the Arctic, clarifying realities on the ground. This video podcast also discusses whether Russia has a military advantage over NATO in the Arctic, and considers how any future peace in Ukraine could reshape Arctic geopolitics.

Thomas Nilsen is the Editor of the Barents Observer, a journalist-owned online newspaper covering the key trends and developments in the Euro-Arctic region and northern Russia, publishing in both English and Russian. Its news-desk is located in Kirkenes, a Norwegian Arctic town situated a few kilometres from the borders of Russia and Finland in Norway’s northernmost county – Finnmark.

Interviewers: Will Quilter and Marco Dordoni - Arctic Desk

May 13, 2024 — No Comments

Sweden, Finland, NATO and Arctic Exceptionalism — New Security Implications for the European High North ?

Authors: Eline Stensen Gulliksen & Leif Niendorf - UK & European Affairs Team

Security in the Arctic

In recent years, the topic of Arctic security has gained significant attention in both scholarly and empirical circles. The Arctic's strategic value is derived from its geography, natural resources, shipping lanes, scientific research potential, and geopolitical influence. However, managing the Arctic is a complex task, as illustrated by conflicting territorial claims made by several countries. As a result, cooperation between multiple states is essential to safeguard and develop the region. The Arctic Council, composed of eight sovereign nations – Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Denmark, Russia, the USA, and Canada – has been established to promote such collaboration. A shift has been seen in how Arctic security is perceived, as it has putatively moved from Arctic Exceptionalism to a more geopolitically induced fragile situation. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia influenced this shift, pushing Sweden and Finish into NATO membership due to increased security concerns. This could potentially strengthen the alliance’s presence in the High North and alter the power balance in the Arctic creating increasing tension in the Arctic Council and beyond.

The notion of "Arctic exceptionalism" delineates the distinct characteristics of politics in the Arctic Council and, more broadly, in the region. This concept aligns with the constructivist approach to international relations, which prioritizes mutual ideas, customs, and values. Essentially, the notion maintains that cooperation trumps competition in the Arctic, where a zero-sum game prevails. Nevertheless, the idea of Arctic exceptionalism has elicited scepticism among scholars who believe it isolates the Arctic from global security discussions.

The Arctic Council experienced a notable shift in dynamics in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea, marking a significant departure from the formerly shared ideals, standards, and identities towards a more practical and geopolitical perspective on global affairs. This shift underscores how the Arctic, once viewed as a unique region, is now impacted by contemporary international security issues and how any disputes beyond the area could affect collaboration within it. Hence, the applicability of the notion of Arctic exceptionalism can be increasingly questioned.

Recent developments in the European High North

In March 2024 and April 2023 respectively, Finland and Sweden as two Arctic states joined NATO in direct response to Russia’s unprovoked full-scale war in Ukraine. It lucidly displays the interconnectedness of regional and global security dynamics, since the abatement of Arctic exceptionalism can be analyzed holistically, but also twofold, namely in terms of inherently regional security challenges and in the shadows of overall geopolitical competition in which China too, amid a race for raw materials, plays a role.

However, in the Northern European and Arctic regions themselves their accession might considerably change security dynamics and strategic proportions since not only the Baltic Sea is now a “NATO inlet“, but also out of the eight Arctic riparian states seven — all except Russia — are now NATO members, rendering Arctic security on this analytical level increasingly bipolar. This is all the more true for the continental European subsection of the Arctic.

The Arctic Council, interpretable as an institutionalised vehicle to uphold Arctic exceptionalism, is “absolutely not operating as normal“. After an initial full halt of cooperation, the seven resumed in the meanwhile to some cooperation without Russia. It can be conjectured that Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO membership further lowers the likelihood that it can return to its once-destined functionality (despite its disallowance to deal with military security). For scenario planners, even complete dissolution is on the table.

Beyond that, Sweden and Finland discontinue being buffer states between Russia and NATO for the largest part in the European High North whilst their strategic value is not to be underestimated. Although they don’t border the Arctic Ocean, there is now a broad and direct linkage between it and the Baltic Sea. Possibilities of regional reinforcements and deterrence are strengthened hereby. It is not to forget that the Kola Peninsula a key location of Russian strategic assets borders the North-Eastern corner of Europe. As there is talk about a “Militarisation of Russian Polar Politics“, Finland and Sweden could prove immensely helpful for NATO to counter such developments and A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) abilities of Russia in the region through own deterrence by denial.

*Source: Foto von Joakim Honkasalo auf Unsplash*

Both countries bring remarkable capabilities with them into the alliance — Finland primarily on land and Sweden in the air — enhancing NATO’s capabilities to operate in the High North. Since, for the first time in history, all Nordic countries are now formally gathered under one collective defence structure, these can now also be further increased with a lower threshold in compound with their neighbours and long-standing NATO members Denmark and Norway. Already existing cooperation, for example within NORDEFCO, could now be substantially extended with positive effects on NATO’s posture in the High North.

The Swedish supreme commander moreover called for the establishment of a permanent military presence in the Arctic by his country. In the same vein, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg demanded to boost the alliance’s presence in the Arctic. With Sweden and Finland in, this experiences facilitation, also concerning exercises in hostile and cold environments. Russia’s confrontational behaviour in the meanwhile doesn’t suggest that it will simply swallow intensified NATO activity in the North European Arctic.

All this is overtly not too compatible with the informal agreement about Arctic exceptionalism that this pristine region shall exclusively be used for unwarlike purposes. This is not to say that Sweden’s and Finland’s accession to NATO solely and already had been the death blow to it, but new layers of security have been added that in tendency complicate the preservation of Arctic exceptionalism.

Conclusion

To summarize, Arctic exceptionalism is under threat. Both geopolitical and regional security dynamics could prove as challenging the notion of it. Sweden’s and Finland’s accession to NATO realistically impact the latter, especially in the European Arctic where NATO and Russia as adversaries are now drawn significantly closer to one another. The years we are in are possibly decisive for its endurance, which will be largely dependent on how NATO and Russia mutually evaluate their actions and their willingness to not sacrifice this unique part of the world to power games.

Nevertheless, to separate the European High North and wider Arctic and geopolitical discourses runs the risk of drawing an incomplete picture. Although regional analysis can be meaningfully carried out, it shall never be forgotten that it is an excerpt of broader security dynamics. The Arctic is nothing different in that, posing thus also a conceptual challenge to the idea of Arctic exceptionalism.

January 25, 2024 — No Comments

Professor Joachim Koops on the future of international interventions following MINUSMA’s withdrawal

Professor Joachim Koops talks about the prospects for international military interventions in light of the new geopolitical scenario, specifically the closure of the UN mission in Mali. Professor Joachim A. Koops is Chair of Security Studies and Scientific Director of the Institute of Security and Global Affairs at Leiden University’s campus in The Hague.

In this session, Professor Koops outlines the factors that led to Mali’s shift from supporting a UN peace mission with high involvement from Western powers to entering the Russian sphere of influence. He highlights how the increased instability in West Africa can be seen through the lens of West-Russia competition and how the war in Ukraine has not particularly influenced NATO’s efforts in its southern flank. He further notes that this will not likely be the end of large-scale UN multi-dimensional peace missions.

Interviewer: Michele Puggia - Military Strategy and Intelligence Team

January 2, 2024 — No Comments

The fragile unity of Europe after the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Authors: Federico Alistair D'Alessio and Alessandro Spada - UK & European Affairs Team.

EU’s response

The European Union has firmly condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, calling for an immediate ceasefire, military withdrawal and the respect of Ukrainian independence and territorial integrity.

European institutions have repeatedly denounced Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine, especially the indiscriminate attacks towards civilian infrastructures, hence accusing Russia of violating international law. Member states have thus strengthened both individual and economic sanctions against Russia while providing Ukraine with military equipment, humanitarian aid and financial support. For fear of an expansion of the conflict, several European governments have also significantly increased their own military spending.

While the Kremlin’s actions were unanimously condemned, the EU approach was not warmly welcomed by everyone in the European community, including the unconditional military support for Ukraine.

Division within the EU

Three apparent factions have emerged. Northern and post-communist member states fiercely supported Ukraine in the war, fearing a Russian victory that would threaten their national security. Western European countries such as France, Germany and Spain insist on vigorous diplomatic efforts and have adopted a more cautious approach. Lastly, the third bloc is composed of those members who have refused to send weapons and have expressed a rather ambiguous stance on the war, such as Hungary and, to a lesser extent, Bulgaria.

Among the first group, the Baltic states and Poland have been the most loyal partners of Ukraine for obvious historical and geopolitical reasons.

Baltic states

The firm reaction of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia did not come as a surprise, given their past experiences with invasions and annexations by the Kremlin. Their warnings on the threat posed by Russia in Central and Eastern Europe were mostly ignored or downplayed by their partners and accused of Russophobia by the Kremlin.

The Baltic States substantially increased their military spending and gradually abandoned their dependence on Russian energy after the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea. Since the 2022 invasion, they have actively supported Kiev with military and humanitarian aid as they feel the fate of their nations is tightly linked to Ukraine.

They believe the only way to achieve peace is to help Ukraine win the war and force Russia back to its borders, as stated by Estonian PM Kaja Kallas. In addition, the Baltics have regularly called for stronger EU and NATO action, fearing that their allies would lose the momentum to stop Russia once and for all. As of December 2023, all three Baltic states rank in the top five GDP contributors of government support to Ukraine.

Poland

Likewise, Poland declared not only full military, financial and humanitarian support for Ukraine, but also the intention of defeating Russia on all fronts as a way to achieve peace. Growing anti-Russian sentiment is evident among Poles, with a peak of 94% viewing Putin as a serious threat post-Ukraine invasion. This sharp rise has consequently brought to more positive attitudes (around 90%) towards the US, NATO and the EU.

In addition to welcoming over 3 million Ukrainian refugees, the Polish government has also mediated between Ukraine and the US, advocating for adequate protection and high-end military equipment. Moreover, their push for Ukraine's EU and NATO integration has significantly reduced EU criticism regarding the rule of law in Poland.

Nevertheless, recent grain embargo disputes have strained relations with Ukraine, leading to a Polish weapons supply halt and a potentially damaging impact on both nations.

United Kingdom

Despite the UK leaving the EU, it is crucial to also analyse the reaction of the British government given its historical role as a security guarantor in Europe. On November 16, 2023, Foreign Secretary David Cameron reaffirmed support for Ukraine against Putin's aggression. The UK, a leading supporter, provides significant military, humanitarian, and financial aid, ranking as the third-largest donor behind the US and Germany. It was the first to supply cruise missilesand depleted uranium munitions to Kyiv and additionally implemented a series of sanctions against Moscow. The British Government advocates for a shorter Ukraine's path to NATO membership by removing the need for a Membership Action Plan, as a result of the summit held in Vilnius last July. Furthermore, secret talks between UK officials and key Russian representatives have reportedly taken place, discussing security matters such as grain shortages and nuclear safety.

France

While President Macron has supported Ukraine since the outbreak of the conflict, he has kept a more diplomatic stance in comparison to other European leaders. A few weeks before Russia's invasion, he attempted to dissuade Putin and emphasised avoiding humiliation for diplomatic solutions. During an April visit to China, Macron urged Xi Jinping for a mediation in favour of a return to the “negotiating table”. Despite fewer arms transfers (data from Sept. 26, 2022, to Nov. 30, 2023) to Ukraine compared to some NATO allies, France ultimately backs Ukraine's NATO accession to increase pressure on Russia and pave the way for post-war negotiations.

Germany

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine forced Germany to reassess its role in the world, shifting from "chequebook diplomacy" to increased military involvement. As the second-largest arms supplier (commitments Jan. 24, 2022, to Oct. 31, 2023) of Ukraine after the US, Germany has invested €100 billion in a military fund for modern weapons and committed to meeting NATO's 2% GDP defence spending target. Chancellor Olaf Scholz also encouraged China to use its influence to promote diplomatic solutions. Germany opposes immediate NATO membership for Ukraine, fearing direct conflict with Russia and citing unresolved border conflicts as a hindrance. Additionally, Germany is pushing for a reform plan where the conditions listed must be met in order to initiate a discussion on the membership.

Hungary

As previously mentioned, Hungary has condemned Russian aggression while adopting a questionable approach to dealing with the Kremlin.

Firstly, PM Viktor Orbán decided to abstain from sending military support to Kiev and even agreed on a new gas deal with Moscow a few months after the invasion started. In addition, state-controlled media outlets have continued to spread pro-Russian propaganda, including criticism against the sanctions imposed on Russia. Orban has also recently requested the EU to reassess their strategy in the war while threatening to halt all support to Ukraine.

This peculiar reaction to the Russian invasion reflects the local population as well. According to a recent poll, only 33% of Hungarians consider Russia a major military threat. Another vital figure to mention is the Hungarian perception of the US and Russia: only 17% believe the United States are an important partner, comparable to the 11% that think Russia is. This data openly displays how divergent Budapest’s attitude is from the rest of the EU.

Conclusion

The EU’s unified reaction was initially seen as an opportunity to create a new and common geopolitical strategy. Despite claims of unity, the EU is increasingly divided between those prioritising peace diplomatically and those insisting on justice achieved solely through a Russian military defeat.

This crisis has also exposed the union’s reliance on the US and NATO in terms of defence and intelligence. This is mainly due to the fact that the EU was conceived as a political and economic institution, rather than a military power. However, given that European cohesion has also emerged thanks to continuous information provided by Washington, this poses the risk of condemning Europe to political and military irrelevance. Historical security leaders, such as the UK and France, face several challenges - with Germany expected to play a pivotal role.

Moreover, debates on EU military independence versus complementarity with NATO face growing divisions among member states, evident in recent controversies and wavering support for Ukraine - such as the case of neighbouring Slovakia. The question remains whether the EU can establish an independent defence system amid increasing uncertainties.

June 18, 2022 — No Comments

Will METO be the new NATO?

Author: Shahin Modarres.

As the light at the end of the tunnel of revitalizing the JCPOA grows weaker the tension between Iran and the international community rises fiercely. Tension can be analyzed on two levels, regional level, and international level. On a regional level whilst Iran's regional competitors express their concerns regarding Iran's nuclear program, Israel has been applying a drastically different approach, a completely physical approach that dances on the edge of initiating a direct regional conflict. For the past month a notable number of high-ranking officers and scientists within the IRGC and Ministry of defense have been targeted and assassinated in the streets of Iran, almost all targets played an important role in the country's nuclear and missile program. Even though the Israeli officials never officially accepted the responsibility but Israel remains to be the main guess behind the calls. At the same time reports have been registered regarding threats against Israeli citizens in Turkey and Thailand. Earlier Israel's minister of foreign affairs asked all citizens to evacuate Istanbul immediately because of a series of imminent threats against their lives.

On another proxy level, the shelling of Iranian infrastructures in Syria by the Israeli Air Force has been intensified. Drones trying to reach Israeli territories through Iraq's airspace have been shot and there have been reports of drone attacks on safe sites of Israel's intelligence operations according to Iranian authorities. Constant cyber war has been going on as well, every now and then, Iranian or Israeli hackers have been claiming victory by accessing infrastructures or personal data from the rival. A full encounter between the countries is now more threatening than ever. That is the main reason why both actors are reinforcing their teams in anticipation.

*Image Source*: https://www.bakerinstitute.org/center-for-the-middle-east/

One of Iran's main bargaining leverages has been its regional influence. A military influent formed of mostly Shiite militant groups in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen running alongside vast support of Sunni groups such as Hamas for years gave Iran an upper hand to proceed with its regional proxy wars but what has changed? Iran's influence in the region has been limited mainly because of two reasons, a technological shift in the defense paradigm and a realistically Machiavellian perception of diplomacy. The aerial defense system known as the "Iron Dome" by Israel has definitely been a game-changer redefining traditional defensive methods through advanced approaches to countering missile attacks. On the diplomatic level, the "Abraham Accords" were none other than a realist perception of "my enemy's enemy can be my friend!" The growing angle of difference between Iran and Arab countries of the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia itself lead the tension between Israel and Arab countries to decrease gradually. Now a new form of an alliance is being formed between them. An alliance that some interpret as a Middle Eastern form of NATO; is METO.

A few days ago Israel's minister of defense called for a new alliance between Israel and its Arab partners against Iran led by the United States. It appears that the defensive circle against Iran is getting tighter but at the same time Iran has decided to deactivate the surveillance set by the IAEA within its nuclear facilities. President Biden's trip to the Middle East will happen soon during which he will visit Israel and Saudi Arabia. Against all odds, the Biden administration appears to be considering its foreign policy legacy none other than peacebuilding between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Hence, his trips will play a crucial role that may affect and form Middle East's near future on different levels.

A Middle Eastern Treaty Organization(METO) on a dynamic scale may only live with the blessing of the United States. But on a regional level, actors are consciously trying to build an independent alliance as well. Almost each and every member of the new alliance at some point during the past two decades has been unhappy regarding US policies in the region hence traces of a collective will to have independent strong regional alliances are quite clear amongst actors. There is already talk regarding Israel sharing parts of its "Iron Dome" technology with Arab partners. Whilst wealthy Arab partners can generously invest in the Israeli technological and scientific R&D, all allies may benefit from the results.

On the other end, Iran has shown a Russo-Oriental turn towards developing military and security cooperation with China and Russia. Also, there has been a fast development of the county's Aerospatiale program, particularly in regards to ballistic missiles program, drones, and satellites. Even though the Iranian economy is facing its most fragile state expenses regarding the doctrines of "Defense and Influence" have indeed increased.

To anticipate the outcome of this equation we all need to think in a Machiavellian context, to simply interpret the equation based on each country's national interest. Will the US join the coalition to form METO? Will Russia and China support their supposed ally if Iran's nuclear program once again ends up in the United Nations Security Council? And eventually, the final unfortunate question is, will we face another devastating war in the Middle East?

April 13, 2022 — 1 Comment

Enlargement of NATO to Eastern Europe: Reasons and Consequences for European Security

By: Alessandro Spada.

Introduction

Today, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) is an intergovernmental military alliance among the US, Canada and 28 European countries – but it has not always been this large. Indeed, when Nato was first conceived in 1949 it was made up of just 12 members: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the UK and the US. The creation of the Alliance pursued three essential purposes: “deterring Soviet expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration”. The accession process is regulated by Article 10 of the Treaty and other European Countries can be invited to participate. The aspiring member countries must meet key requirements and implement a multi-step process including political, economic, defence, resource, security and legal aspects. In case they are experiencing any issue, they can request assistance, practical support and the advice by a NATO programme, which is called the Membership Action Plan (MAP).

*Image Source*: The Expansion of NATO Since 1949

Past enlargements

After the end of the Cold War, we can witness four different waves of NATO expansion to Eastern Europe. The first important wave of expansion to the East was launched by the reunification of Germany in 1990. On 12th September 1990, the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, commonly known as Two Plus Four Treaty, was signed by the foreign ministers of the Federal Republic of Germany, the GDR, France, Russia, the UK and the USA. The Treaty regulated all the foreign policy aspects of German reunification, including the membership to Nato, and imposed the withdrawal of all the foreign troops and the deployment of their nuclear weapons from the former East Germany and also the prohibition to West Germany’s possession of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. On October 3rd 1990, the German Democratic Republic and Federal Republic were reunited again.

As to the second wave, the new member countries were Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. First, on 15th February 1991 they formed the Visegrad Group. Then, on 1st January 1993, Czechoslovakia split into two independent countries: Czech Republic and Slovakia. In 1997, Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary took part in the Alliance’s Madrid Summit and on 12th March 1999, the three former Warsaw Pact members joined NATO. The main reasons were: “to ensure thecountry’s external security”, to impede “the possibility of a great war in unstable Central Europe” and for Poland also “to advance its military capabilities”.

In May 2000, a group of NATO candidate countries created the Vilnius Group (Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia). The Vilnius Group resorted to the Membership Action Plan which was introduced by NATO for the first time at the 1999 Washington Summit. In addition, Croatia joined the Vilnius Group in May 2001. The Summit of the NATO Aspirant countries “Riga 2002: The Bridge to Prague” started the path towards the alliance’s membership which took place in Riga, Latvia, on July 5-6, 2002, where the leaders of NATO member and aspirant countries gathered for the last time before the NATO 2002 Prague Summit in November. On 29th March 2004, the largest wave of enlargement in alliance history materialized, except for Albania and Croatia. For Baltic states and Bulgaria, NATO membership symbolized their wish to be part of the European family. NATO was perceived not just merely as a military alliance with security guarantees under Article 5, but as a symbol of higher development, where Baltic states could find their proper place. Moreover, it was the attempt to escape Russian influence, in favor of the protection provided by the American strategic nuclear umbrella and a collective defence.

The same path of the Vilnius Group was followed by the Adriatic Charter of European countries. The Adriatic Charter was created in Tirana on 2nd May by Albania, Croatia and Macedonia and USA for the purpose to obtain their North Atlantic Alliance admission. Albania and Macedonia were previous participants of MAP since its creation in 1999, while Croatia joined in 2002. Moreover, Macedonia also took part in Nato's Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1995. On 1st April 2009, the North Atlantic Alliance officially annexed Albania and Croatia after their participation in the 2008 Bucharest Summit. Macedonia accession was postponed because of a dispute on the formal name with Greece. Macedonia became NATO's 30th country on 27th March 2020. Montenegro emulated the same path of the latter, but joined three years before on 5th June 2017, after the Accession Protocol signature in May 2016. For Montenegro itself, the major incentives to join NATO were the future eventuality of EU membership, the highest prestige of the Atlantic Alliance and to achieve “Nato’s security guarantee”.

Future enlargements

Bosnia Herzegovina is the only potential candidate which joined the Membership Action Plan on 5th December 2018. In spite of Georgia and Ukraine expressing the will to start their path to the North Atlantic Alliance, their situation is still uncertain. The primary reason remains the need to meet all necessary requirements through important reforms focused on key areas; and, the current Russia-Ukraine war.

Consequences for the European Security

On one hand, many consequences, which were the main reasons for NATO expansion to the East, materialized in reality. For example, the inclusion of Eastern Europe nations in the military agreement have promoted democratic reform and stability there, provided stronger collective defense and an improved ability to address new security concerns, improved relations among the Eastern and Central European states, fostered a more stable climate for economic reform, trade, and foreign investment, and finally, improved NATO's ability to operate as a cooperative security organization with broad European security concern,” as stated in the clear purposes contained in a prepared statement of the Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright on 23rd April 1997.

On the other hand, in spite of NATO's open door policy with Russia, the latter constitutes the largest threat for European security once again in the energy, political and military field. Indeed, the current conflict in Ukraine shows the evident ambition to create a new Russian empire by the Russian President, Vladimir Putin. Many warnings about Russia’s reaction were expressed in the declarations of Biden’s CIA director, William J. Burns, when he worked as counselor for political affairs at the US embassy in Moscow in 1995. On 26th June 1997, a group of 50 prominent foreign policy experts that included former senators, retired military officers, diplomats and academicians, sent an open letter to President Clinton outlining their opposition to NATO expansion”. In the end, the father of the Cold War containment doctrine, George F. Kennan described the NATO expansion as a “tragic mistake”.

Conclusion

The current Russian invasion in Ukraine puts in clear evidence the necessity for the EU countries to accelerate the formation process of the European Army. They will have to achieve energy independence by using Russian gas, diversifying their own supplier countries and to invest massively in the green economy. Moreover, the EU must strengthen its common foreign policy, implementing an effective diplomatic action and speaking with one voice to cope with the great tensions around Europe and the rest of the world. If not, the European project will risk crumbling.

March 21, 2022 — No Comments

Russia-Ukraine War Fact Sheet

By: Sofia Staderini

The Russian tactic is that of a pincer encirclement of entire Ukraine – from Russian territory and occupied Crimea, Donbas, and Belarus - and inside they follow the same tactic as Kyiv's focus, methodically destroying civilian infrastructure and nuclear power plants. The attempt is to demoralize and coerce Ukrainians. Yet morale is rising and these same civilians are becoming soldiers. Such support somewhat offsets the quantitative advantage of the Russian army in manpower and equipment. Now, Russian troops make advances into Ukrainian territory only at the cost of hundreds of soldiers every day, failing for now to take control of any regional center.

Their qualitative advantage is very reduced, as can be inferred from the high level of losses, which seems to be well above 5%, in men and materials. Russia could take control of the territory, but only with long times and high destruction. Reservist and conscript call-ups, as well as the ongoing shipment of Syrian and Chechen militants to Russia and Belarus, will not be able to affect the balance of troops around Kyiv in the coming week, slowing down the Russian tactic as it is momentarily unable to conduct simultaneous attacks.

*Image Source*: https://it.depositphotos.com/folder/La%20verità%20sulla%20guerra%20della%20Russia%20in%20Ucraina-299150880.html?offset=200&qview=551211048&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ntf_ruby_war&utm_term=100_images

Russia is now deploying maneuverable Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, reported by Russian state news agencies as a “next-generation weapon”. While it is very unlikely that the deployment of Kh-47M2 missiles will have a major impact on the current stall of the invasion, It could likely point out a shortage of other weapons and a propagandistic effort to distort Russia’s military failure.

However, after an end of decades of deterrence orthodoxy, the danger of a possible escalation involving nuclear weapons is real. Indeed, Putin has used nuclear threats to create a wide perimeter in which he may pursue a conventional war in Europe. NATO countries are doing everything to avoid escalations, complying with a policy of non-intervention for avoiding direct contact with the Russian military.

While not directing intervening in Ukraine, NATO countries are deploying significant military aid to the country while drastically raising defense spending, reclaiming the alliance's historical role as a protective haven against Moscow's military activities. Germany in particular is now increasing its defense spending to more than 2% of its economic output: a historic departure from its postwar commitment not to transfer armaments to combat zones. Moreover, the European Union's recent investments (€500 million) in arms and other aid to the Ukrainian military mark a “watershed moment” in its history.

*Image Source*: https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/russia-now-global-economic-pariah-ruble-worth-less-than-one-penny-us-2811892

However, many countries are starting to be bitten by the economic effects of the war, especially those with currencies linked to the rubble. More sanctions implications are quite likely to emerge in the coming weeks, particularly in a case like the EU-Russia energy partnership, where dependency is significant. Indeed, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is now serving as a geopolitical catalyst on key strategic, economic, and societal issues and will certainly bring to consider re-alignments, particularly in Post-Soviet countries and the Middle East. NATO's deterrent posture must be strengthened as well as cooperation and dialogue with the various regional actors in order to figure out the next evolutions in the geopolitical chessboards.

March 8, 2022 — No Comments

Taras Kuzio on the Russia-Ukraine Crisis and the War in Donbass

Professor Taras Kuzio from Henry Jackson Society and Kyiv Mohyla Academy shares his insights on the Russo-Ukraine crisis, Russian invasion of Ukraine, the conflict in Donbass and Ukraine’s membership of NATO and EU.

Interviewers: Igor Shchubetun, Fabrizio Napoli and Davide Gobbicchi.

February 2, 2022 — No Comments

Sergey Markedonov on Georgia’s Political and Social Polarisation

Sergey Markedonov is an Associate Professor at Russian State University for the Humanities based in Moscow (Russia). From May 2010 to October 2013, he was a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, DC, USA). In April-May 2015 he was a visiting fellow at the Center for Russia and Central Asia Studies, Institute of International Studies (IIS), Fudan University (Shanghai, China).

He shares his insights on Georgia's political and social polarisation; its use as a field for NATO-Russian confrontation and its key role in the Caucasus region.

Interviewing Team: Igor Shchebetun, Fabrizio Napoli and Davide Gobbicchi.

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