Russia Archives – ITSS Verona

June 13, 2026 — No Comments

How Russia is Reportedly Replacing Spies with Criminals in the UK

By Isabella Sutherland - Military Strategy & Intelligence Team

Over one hundred and fifty arson and explosive plots across Europe have been linked to Russia between February 2022 and Februry 2026, and very few carried out by Russian nationals^[1]. Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Western security services have documented a sharp increase in Russian intelligence operations conducted through criminal proxies, disposable agents, and deniable intermediaries. R v Roussev & Others and R v Dylan Earl & Others together demonstrate that traditional UK counter-espionage frameworks were not designed to address remotely directed intelligence networks and task-based criminal operatives.

Available evidence suggests that Russia’s accelerated use of criminal proxies in the UK is enabled by multiple interacting factors, including the structural degradation of professional HUMINT capacity through mass coordinated diplomatic expulsions; depletion of Russian intelligence in Ukraine; the ideological contrast from Cold War-style long-term communist recruitment with Putin’s Russia, and the technological infrastructure which has made remote proxy control operationally viable at scale. The 2022 invasion was an accelerant rather than the origin of a new tradecraft.

Double Depletion

Russia’s professional HUMINT presence in the UK had begun to decline before 2022. The Salisbury poisoning triggered the expulsion of 23 Russian diplomats in 2018, the largest of its kind since the Cold War, removing a significant layer of embassy-based intelligence officers. Following the full-scale invasion in 2022, a coordinated Western response expelled over 700 Russian officials across more than 34 countries. The overwhelming majority were intelligence officers using diplomatic cover; this huge capacity cannot be quickly or easily replaced ^[2].

The Ukraine war introduced a compounding depletion. Russia’s intelligence services including the FSB, SVR, and GRU have been substantially redirected toward the war effort, consuming intelligence resources which could have otherwise been deployed in Western Europe^[3]. These combined factors made proxy substitution both preferable and increasingly attractive. [al1]

Why ideology cannot fill the gap

Two main enabling conditions explain why proxy actors seem to have become one of the main instruments of Russia in the UK instead of rebuilding its network of professional officers after the mass expulsions.

First is ideology. The Cold War model of espionage depended on Western recruits motivated by a genuine commitment to Soviet communism. Putin’s modern statist nationalist anti-Western ideological framework may not hold the same appeal _[4]. This is not a temporary gap, but a seemingly increasingly entrenched [al2] feature of post-Soviet Russia; money, coercion, and criminal leverage now substitute this void.

Second is technology in the era of the ‘Gig Economy’ defined by a free-market, predominantly online system where short-term positions common and organisations buy workers for temporary engagements ^[al3]^[5]. Encrypted messaging platforms like Telegram, cryptocurrency payments, and remote tasking are central to this on-demand workforce. It creates the operational infrastructure for control over proxy actors without physical presence. Russian handlers direct the local actors anonymously through digital channels, making attribution difficult and the handler-agent relationship difficult to trace. Without this infrastructure, [al4] the expulsion of embassy-based officers would have significantly reduced Russian capability.

The Hitman and the Arsonist

Six Bulgarian nationals, the so-called ‘Minions Ring’, led by Orlin Roussev and directed through Russian intermediary and fugitive Wirecard executive Jan Marsalek, operated in a networked structured utilising fake passports in a layered principal-agent system. The group conducted semi-professional surveillance on journalists, politicians, and military facilities across the UK and Europe between 2020 and 2023, compiling reconnaissance on targets whom they planned to kidnap and kill.[al5] The defendants were recruited and tasked over Telegram, motivated by reward sums of nearly €1 million. No Russian nationals were directly involved in UK operations. This case demonstrates a structured operation purpose-built for intelligence collection and the closest contemporary example to traditional espionage.

The case of Dylan Earl takes a slightly different form. It was a task based, financially motivated operation with less sophistication. The 20 year old from Leicestershire with international criminal links was recruited on Telegram by a Wagner Group handler and tasked to organise arson attacks on London warehouses storing humanitarian aid and Starlink equipment for Ukraine, and to plan the kidnapping of a prominent Russia dissident. He recruited further assisting agents, none of whom had previously met, creating a layered principal-agent system in which the Russian connection was several steps removed from the physical act. The March 2024 arson caused over £1m damage. Earl and his co-defendant Jake Reeves became the first people convicted under the National Security Act 2023 for activity linked to a foreign state. This new legislation was explicitly designed to capture actors whose operations fall short of traditional espionage. Counter Terrorism Policing described this as a clear example of a Russian-state linked organisation using British proxies to carry out serious criminal activity on its behalf ^[6].

Frameworks need fixing

These cases reveal a core tradecraft shift to the absence of Russian nationals physically present in UK operations. No professional intelligence officers; no embassy infrastructure; no ideological commitment.

The National Security Act 2023 represents a genuine institutional acknowledgement of this shift. By extending criminal liability to actors who assist foreign states without formal intelligence roles, it closes a significant legislative gap posed by the proxy model. However, prosecution after the fact is not the same as disrupting recruitment further up the chain. Traditional counter-espionage frameworks built around identifying and expelling professional officers are necessary but no longer sufficient alone. The UK must engage with digital platforms and financial infrastructure through which proxy recruitment operates and pursue closer cooperation with the private sector, especially at a time when transatlantic intelligence-sharing is under unprecedented strain. The Intelligence and Security Committee’s Russia Report 2020 warned that the UK had failed to fully assess the scope of Russian interference, prosecutions since the full-scale invasion suggest that this assessment remains incomplete ^[7].

Russia’s shift towards criminal proxies is not a temporary adaptation to temporary Western pressure, but the path of least resistance to modernising effective tradecraft. It is a structural response to an irreplaceable HUMINT deficit, a post-ideological recruitment environment, and a digital infrastructure purpose-built for deniable covert action. With the escalation of the Ukraine war, comes the parallel escalation of the ‘shadow war’ which cannot be won by expelling diplomats alone.

^[1]Courthouse News Service. (2025, October 24). Men sentenced over London arson attack masterminded by Russia as part of a wider sabotage campaign. Men sentenced over London arson attack masterminded by Russia as part of a wider sabotage campaign | Courthouse News Service

^[2]Riehle, K. P. (2024). Soviet and Russian Diplomatic Expulsions: How Many and Why? International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 37(4), 1238–1263. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2272216

^[3]Congressional Research Service. (2025). Russia’s foreign intelligence services (IF12865). Congress.gov. Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Services | Congress.gov | Library of Congress

^[4]Snegovaya, M., & McGlynn, J. (2025). Dissecting Putin’s regime ideology. Post-Soviet Affairs, 41(1), 42–63. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2024.2386838

^[5]Richterova, D., Grossfeld, E., Long, M. & Bury, P. (2024). Russian Sabotage in the Gig-Economy Era. The RUSI Journal, 169(5), 10–21. Full article: Russian Sabotage in the Gig-Economy Era

^[6] Counter Terrorism Policing. (2025, October 28). Men jailed for London warehouse arson. Counter Terror Business. Men who organised Russia-backed arson at London warehouse jailed | Counter Terrorism Policing

^[7]Intelligence & Security Committee of Parliament. (2020). Russia (HC 632). Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. HC 632 – Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament – Russia

May 18, 2026 — No Comments

Putin Hints at Ending Ukraine War, Can Russia’s Economy cope?

By Sorin Dojan - Russia Team

Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Saturday (9 May) that he thought the war with Ukraine is “coming to an end”, more than four years after the start of Russia’s large-scale military campaign in Ukraine, which significantly altered European security dynamics and regional trade patterns. Three days later, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said the government now forecasts GDP growth of 0.4% in 2026, significantly down from the 1.3% previously expected.

For many looking at the latest string of data coming from the Kremlin, ending a four-year war that has driven consumer prices higher in the process sounds like the first hurdle in a series of challenges to overcome. These range from stubbornly persistent inflation and high interest rates to a militarised economy losing momentum and a shrinking GDP growth. Russia's economy entered recession in 2022, and the recovery that followed was uneven, marked by persistent declines in retail sales, sluggish income growth in some parts of the country, and regional budget constraints^[1].

Amid the economic disruptions caused by sanctions, certain industries emerged to keep the economy afloat. But the winners that underpinned Russia’s economy during the war could suffer disproportionately from any future economic redress. The challenge for the regime will then be to find alternative paths to growth in a heavily sanctioned economy with limited export strings and partners.

What to do with the military industrial complex?

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the world witnessed a highly coordinated sanctions response, with the West collectively imposing almost 24,000 punitive measures against individuals, entities, vessels, and aircraft as of August 2025, according to Castellum.AI, an AI-powered agency specialising in Anti-Money Laundering (AML).

The Russian economic revival that emerged later was highly volatile and disproportionate, with weapons-producing regions among the war’s economic winners, as evidenced by regional tax collection data. On the other hand, the regions mostly pressured were the ones bordering Ukraine, those specialising in ferrous metal production and places with industries heavily sanctioned by the West^[2].

The Russian military-industrial complex operates differently from its American counterpart. Whereas the US defence industry relies heavily on private investment, Russian companies in this industry largely depend on state subsidies, making the government a major contributor to the military-industrial complex^[3].

There is no doubt that Russia has overinvested in its military to boost production and growth, but above all to replace the hardware damaged in the war. In 2025, the defence sector absorbed 15.9 trillion roubles in 2025, or around 7.2% of the country’s revised GDP forecast for that year. For comparison, its close ally, China, spent around 1.7% of its GDP on the military, according to World Bank data, yet Beijing is not involved in a costly war forcing the state to implement extensive stabilisation measures.

The question that then emerges is what happens to such government spending once the war comes to an end?

One would be tempted to assume a return to the pre-2022 status quo, but that would depend on the West lifting sanctions and allowing Russia’s once-productive industries (particularly Europe-destined commodities) to resume humming at full speed.

There is no guarantee of success. As recently as last week, European diplomats and officials cited by POLITICO said the bloc was getting ready to impose a fresh wave of sanctions, this time targeting Moscow’s shadow fleet of ageing tankers. The EU is also eyeing the opportunity to impose sanctions that were previously opposed by ex-Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, including punitive measures against Patriarch Kirill and other members of the Russian Orthodox Church. French politician and Minister Delegate for Europe Benjamin Haddad said in April that it was not the time to lift sanctions on the Kremlin but rather “step up […] pressure”, namely on the Russian energy sector.

For now, it is expected that Russia will maintain the same level of military investment to replenish military stockpiles and replace personnel lost on the battlefield^[4]. Yet for how long that can be justified is subject to debate. As one Carnegie analyst put it: “Any attempt to rapidly cut spending will result in collapse. But nor can the military machine be fed indefinitely.”

NVO, CC BY-SA 3.0 , via Wikimedia Commons

Defence investment is not necessarily conducive to a thriving economy. According to a RUSI study, defence expenditure plays little role in promoting economic growth; a European Commission report separately stated that “it is impossible to determine if this tendency [to spend more on defence] is favourable or negative to growth.”

It is not hard to imagine why. The military-industrial complex is part of a command economy, largely detached from market forces that drive flexibility and a more efficient resource reallocation. At the macro level, such inflated expenditure is only justified in times of war^[5].

In Russia’s case, being left with an overinflated military-industrial complex that serves as one of the few engines of growth is dangerous to its future economic recovery. Disinvest too soon and you might risk upsetting an overexpanded industrial workforce. But choosing to continue allocating resources toward military procurement rather than civilian economic activity is equally unproductive.

Either way, Putin’s speech in early May signals more than just a willingness to pull out from a war that has cost the Kremlin thousands of lives. Instead, his remarks come against the backdrop of a Russian economy showing signs of “stagflation”. The central bank interest rate stands at 14.5% as of April 2026, significantly higher than the rates in Western economies. Core inflation hovered at 6.3% in Q1 2026, up from 5% registered in the previous quarter.

If Novak’s statement serves any good in this context, it might be that it could force the Kremlin to give peace a genuine chance after four years of sustained military operations with significant economic and human consequences. At what cost could peace come for the national economy? It remains to be seen.

^[1] Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Iikka Korhonen, and Elina Ribakova, War-Induced Economic Convergence in Russian Regions (Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2025).

^[2] Andrey Yushkov and Michael Alexeev. “Russian Regions in Wartime: Fiscal and Economic Effects of the Russo-Ukrainian War,” Post-Soviet Affairs 40, no. 4 (2024): 313–325. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2024.2355047.

^[3] Gorodnichenko, Korhonen and Ribakova, War-Induced Economic Convergence, 6.

^[4] Maria Snegovaya, Nicholas Fenton, Tina Dolbaia, and Max Bergmann, The Russian Wartime Economy: From Sugar High to Hangover(Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2025).

^[5] Dmitry Gorenburg, Samuel Bendett, Ken Gause, Pavel Luzin, Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez, Paul Schwartz, and Elizabeth Wishnick, Crafting the Russian War Economy: The Effects of Export Controls on Russia’s Defense Industrial Production (CNA Corporation, 2024).

April 13, 2026 — No Comments

Are Russian-Serbian relations more vulnerable now than ever?

By Sorin Dojan - Russia Team

Take a stroll through the streets of Pristina, Kosovo, and at one point you will come across the statue of a smiling Bill Clinton, a stone’s throw away from a chic boutique named Hillary.

To many wondering how a presidential couple became the unlikely heroes in a partially recognised country like Kosovo, 1999 might offer a clue. Between March and June that year, a NATO coalition bombed Yugoslavia in response to Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo.

To Russians, this marked the beginning of a tumultuous relationship with the West. To Serbs, it reminded them of how vulnerable their country was when, after the 1990s Yugoslav wars, they found themselves surrounded by NATO and the European Union (EU), as the two expanded eastwards. Yet both Russia and Serbia found an ally in each other.

Ever since Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, Russia has been Serbia’s main backer of sovereignty claims over Kosovo. This has proven particularly handy amid rising EU pressure on Belgrade to normalise ties with Pristina as a precondition for accession^[1]. And while the Serbian Government remains on track to join the EU^[2], this has not stopped the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) from securing another three months of Russian gas imports at the end of March 2026.

Call it ‘hedging’ or the practice of foreign policy balancing between competing forces^[3]. Serbia has done so since 2009, when it announced its ‘Four Pillars’ strategy to balance between the West, Russia and China^[4] at a time of EU ‘enlargement fatigue’^[5].

Yet rising tensions nowadays between Serbia, the EU and the US, as well as the former’s foreign policy inconsistencies, could dash Moscow’s hopes for a sustainable relationship, as Belgrade sticks to its strategic ambitions to join the EU.

Serbia, Russia and the wider geopolitical nexus

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has turned Serbia’s multi-vector foreign policy into a much more challenging tool to navigate. For once, it led to more criticism from the EU Commission, among other things, over Belgrade’s choice not to impose sanctions on Moscow following the full-scale attack. If, in 2021, the Commission had only 12 references to Russia in its Serbia report, that number rose to 57 in 2022 and 2023, and remained high thereafter^[6].

Yet a much stronger reply came from Washington. In November 2023, the US State Department targeted multiple individuals and entities over their alleged connection to what it described as Russian influence in the Western Balkans. As recently as September 2025, US officials sanctioned Serbia’s oil company NIS over its ties to the Kremlin’s energy sector.

For a small state like Serbia, sanctions translate into significant economic hardship. Belgrade could seek to buy more time by obtaining sanctions waivers from the US (it secured one at the end of March due to the US-Iran war) or by securing contract extensions with the Kremlin, but this would not make its multi-vector policy more sustainable.

The EU remains Serbia’s largest trading partner, accounting for little over 58% of the country’s total trade in 2024. Yet European patience could be running thin: during a visit to Belgrade, EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, urged the Serbian government to deliver on the reforms critical to accession prospects, adding that there are no ‘shortcuts for [EU] membership’. This includes aligning its foreign policies with the bloc, including those on Russia, with Brussels arguing in its 2022 report that Serbia’s close ties to Moscow raise questions about its strategic direction.

This is enough of a signal for the Kremlin to understand that Serbia’s hedging policy is under severe pressure at the moment. Relations between the two countries were already fraught after €800m of Serbian ammunition ended up in Ukraine through Belgrade’s trading partners between 2022 and 2024, prompting criticism from the Russian foreign intelligence service, the SVR. And overall trade, energy, and defence ties between Moscow and Belgrade have declined in recent years, despite the two continuing to tout their “Slavic brotherhood” as the underpinning of their relations. China, which is Serbia’s other significant non-Western partner, was the country’s second-largest source of foreign direct investment in 2024^[7].

If anything, Moscow’s leverage over Belgrade remains mostly in the energy sector and through its membership of the United Nations Security Council, where it can still oppose any Western-led move on Kosovo (although that did not prevent the US and its allies from bombing Yugoslavia in 1999). This will reassure the Kremlin in its relations with Serbia, particularly as Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic clings to power following a year marked by severe student-led anti-corruption protests. For now, the relationship still holds.

^[1] Vuk Vuksanovic, Serbia’s Balancing Act: Between Russia and the West (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2025), 73.

^[2] Republic of Serbia, “European Union Remains Serbia’s Strategic Development Framework,” srbija.gov.rs, January 19, 2026, https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/en/267475/european-union-remains-serbias-strategic-development-framework.php.

^[3] Evelyn Goh, “Understanding ‘Hedging’ in Asia-Pacific Security,” PacNet 43 (Pacific Forum CSIS, August 31, 2006), https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/pac0643.pdf.

^[4] Vuksanovic, Serbia’s Balancing Act: Between Russia and the West.

^[5] Anna Szolucha, “The EU and Enlargement Fatigue: Why has the European Union not been able to counter enlargement fatigue?”, Journal of Contemporary European Research 6, no 1.

^[6] European Commission, Serbia 2022 Report (Brussels: European Commission, October 12, 2022); European Commission, Serbia 2023 Report(Brussels: European Commission, 11 November 2023); European Commission, Serbia 2024 Report (Brussels: European Commission, 30 October 2024); European Commission, Serbia 2025 Report (Brussels: European Commission, 4 November 2025).

^[7] Filipović, Slobodan, and Katarina Zakić, “Economic Implications of Serbia’s Multi-Vector Foreign Policy,” The Review of International Affairs 76, no. 1195 (2025): 503–28, https://doi.org/10.18485/iipe_ria.2025.76.1195.6.

December 15, 2025 — No Comments

Thomas Nilsen on the Geopolitics of the High North

Thomas Nilsen talks about the current geopolitical dynamics in the High North, and counters the growing media narrative around the 'inevitable' conflict in the Arctic, clarifying realities on the ground. This video podcast also discusses whether Russia has a military advantage over NATO in the Arctic, and considers how any future peace in Ukraine could reshape Arctic geopolitics.

Thomas Nilsen is the Editor of the Barents Observer, a journalist-owned online newspaper covering the key trends and developments in the Euro-Arctic region and northern Russia, publishing in both English and Russian. Its news-desk is located in Kirkenes, a Norwegian Arctic town situated a few kilometres from the borders of Russia and Finland in Norway’s northernmost county – Finnmark.

Interviewers: Will Quilter and Marco Dordoni - Arctic Desk

June 3, 2025 — No Comments

Dr. Arūnas Molis on Energy Security and the War in Ukraine

In this episode of the ITSS Verona Member Series, Dr. Arūnas Molis talks about the changing landscape of European energy security in the context of the current war in Ukraine, with special focus on strategic lessons for the Baltic region.

Specifically, Dr. Molis discusses how energy can be weaponised, used as a tool of political pressure, and financial power in the context of hybrid warfare. He explores Russia’s energy leverage, attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure, and lessons from the Baltic states’ path to energy independence.

Dr. Molis is a policy analyst in Lithuania and has previously held key positions at Klaipeda LNG and NATO Energy Security Center of Excellence.

Interviewers: Alexandra Tsarvulanova & Sara Pastorello - Russia and Post-Soviet Space Desk

December 21, 2024 — No Comments

Should the U.S. Back Zelensky’s Victory Plan? | Elina Beketova Explains

Elina Beketova discusses if Washington D.C. should support Zelensky's 'Victory Plan,’ where Trump may support the plan, and what can be expected from Biden in these last few weeks of his administration.

Ms. Beketova is a democracy fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis in Washington D.C., where she researches temporarily Russian occupied territories in Ukraine. She also has extensive experience as a journalist where she reported in Crimea, Kharkiv, and Kyiv, which included prominent international high profile interviews.

Interviewers: Samuel Dempsey - USA Team

December 9, 2024 — No Comments

Security Challenges in Rojava

by Angelo Calianno & Jaohara Hatabi - Middle East Team

Introduction

In 2016, after years of struggle and political action, the Kurdish-majority Rojava region, located in northeastern Syria, proclaimed itself an autonomous and independent state. Kurdish militias, together with an international coalition led by the United States, reconquered territories occupied by the Islamic States (ISIS) -. News agencies were showing photos of the People’s Protection Unit (YPG) fighters, and especially those of YPJ (Women's Protection Unit) troops, who were hailed as the new champions of freedom.

In their fight against ISIS, the Kurds in Northeastern Syria had become the bulwark against terrorism. Rojava's new democracy was laying the foundations of its constitution: an idea of a State where different religions and ethnicities coexist and most people are represented, regardless of religion, gender, or ideology. After 13 years of struggle since the first autonomy movement founded by the PYD (Democratic Union Party), the Syrian equivalent of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), Syrian Kurds also had their own homeland. This democratic experiment captured the attention and interest of diplomats, journalists, researchers, and onlookers from all over the world. After the initial hype, media interest has dropped dramatically for years, with hardly any reports about this region. That changed two years ago, when Turkey's bombing brought the region back to the headlines.

Inside Rojava: present-day reality

In our analysis, we reported the current situation in Rojava, especially in relation to the continuous attacks by Turkey.

The Kurdish population in Rojava finds itself caught between a rock and a hard place. The southern part of the territory is heavily controlled by the Assad regime, which does not recognize Rojava’s autonomy. The regime maintains dozens of checkpoints that restrict the flow of essential supplies, including building materials, food, and medical equipment. As a result, many of these goods must be smuggled in from Iraq, in an attempt to avoid Damascus' screening.

Southeast of Rojava, ISIS cells still exist, especially in the rural areas of Raqqa, Kobane, and Deir ez-Zor. While these cells have lost much of their former strength and financial resources, they still pose a threat to local populations by perpetrating attacks and raids.

Conflicts in recent years have caused approximately one million Internally Displaced People (IDP), who have lost their homes and now live in semi-detention camps. The suburbs of these cities teem children working amid mountains of garbage looking for material to sell for recycling. The Al-Hol camp, one of the largest, holds around 55,000 people, the majority of whom are women and children, including many who are related to most radical ISIS terrorists. These families are not formally charged with crimes, but the Rojava authorities have adopted controversial measures, such as confining them in camps, as a preventive measure against the potential reorganization of ISIS cells. While the security rationale behind this approach is clear, it has drawn criticism for the humanitarian implications.

The conditions in the tent-city of Al-Hol are difficult, with many living in overcrowded, unsanitary conditions, surrounded by wire nets and armoured vehicles. There is limited access to basic services like water, electricity, and fuel for heating. These challenges are particularly severe for women and children, who are disproportionately affected by the harsh living conditions. The camp remains heavily guarded, with a large security presence due to concerns about radicalisation and the potential for violence. Despite the difficult circumstances, local authorities have faced pressure from international organisations and human rights groups to improve conditions and provide better support for those in the camp.

One of them told us:

“They treat us like criminals, but we have done nothing. Every morning, the military drags us out to search us. Our husbands are in jail, but we are innocent, we do not even know why we are here”. In fact, many of the women here have never committed any crime. Some of them have had no contact with their husbands for years, being in some cases a second or third wife. While they may have been married to members of a terrorist organization, they now face serious consequences for their associations, even if they themselves have not been involved in any criminal activity.

The situation in Rojava caused international responses that are varied and complex, which reflects the intricate web of alliances and conflicts in the Middle East. When Kurdish groups declared the autonomy of Rojava, they were met with a mixture of support and opposition from global and regional powers. The United States, seeking reliable partners in the fight against ISIS, formed a crucial alliance with the YPG, providing military support and training under the broader umbrella of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This partnership significantly contributed to the defeat of ISIS in Syria, garnering international recognition for the Kurdish-led forces.

However, the U.S. support for the YPG strained the former’s relations with Turkey, a NATO ally, which views the YPG as an extension of the PKK, which is designated by Turkey, the US, and the EU as a terrorist organization. Turkey has repeatedly launched military operations against the YPG, most notably Operation Olive Branch in 2018 and Operation Peace Spring in 2019, aiming to create a "safe zone" along its border free of YPG presence. These actions drew international condemnation, with European countries particularly vocal in denouncing Turkey's incursions, citing humanitarian concerns and potential destabilisation of the region. The EU called Turkey to cease its military actions, while several EU member states imposed arms embargoes on Ankara.

Russia's involvement in Rojava has been pragmatic, balancing its alliance with the Syrian government and its strategic interests in the region. Initially, Russia allowed Kurdish autonomy as a counterbalance to U.S. influence, but once the Syrian government regained territory, Russia facilitated agreements between the Kurds and Damascus, aiming to reintegrate Rojava under Syrian sovereignty while ensuring Kurdish rights.

Iran, which supports the Assad regime, has opposed any form of Kurdish autonomy that could inspire Iranian Kurds. Thus, Tehran's policy towards Rojava aligns closely with that of Damascus and, to some extent, Ankara. Meanwhile, international human rights organisations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have reported on human rights abuses by various actors in the conflict, urging all parties to respect international law and protect civilians.

As of now, there are no formal high-profile peace negotiations taking place. Although efforts have been made by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) to engage in dialogue with the Syrian government and other regional powers, they have not resulted in any comprehensive peace agreement.

Arguably, the presence of external powers with their own interests such as Turkey, the US, Russia and Iran, further complicates the situation. However, the US continues to engage diplomatically, balancing its support for the SDF with its broader regional interests, including its relationship with Turkey. European countries have also been involved in providing diplomatic channels and humanitarian aid, advocating for a peaceful resolution and respect for human rights in the region.

*Picture by Angelo Calianno, Rojava, Northeastern Syria*

Final Considerations

In conclusion, the situation in Rojava remains a complex and multifaceted challenge. The region's pursuit of autonomy has led to a diverse set of responses from international actors, highlighting the intricate balance of power and interests at play. The humanitarian crisis, particularly the plight of displaced persons and those in camps like Al-Hol, underscores the urgency of a coordinated international response that prioritises human rights and humanitarian principles. While the Kurdish forces have been instrumental in the fight against ISIS, the geopolitical realities involving major powers such as the United States, Turkey, Russia, and Iran complicate the pathway to a stable and peaceful resolution. Moving forward, it is crucial for the international community to support dialogue and negotiations, respecting the rights and aspirations of all parties involved while ensuring the protection of civilians and the adherence to international law. The future of Rojava will depend significantly on the ability of these various actors to navigate the delicate political landscape and work toward a sustainable and inclusive solution.

* This article was written before the events of December 8, 2024.

November 27, 2024 — No Comments

Dr. Baldaro on Counter-Terrorism Challenges in the Sahel

In this session, Dr. Baldaro discusses the root causes of jihadism in the Sahel, focusing on how civil wars, local grievances, poor governance, and corruption have been inadequately addressed by the European Union’s counter-terrorism strategy in the region, which was heavily securitised. He then expands on Russia’s current counter-insurgency strategy—an even more hardline and militarised approach—that not only fails to address local grievances but also contributes to increased chaos and violence.

Dr. Baldaro concludes by expressing scepticism about the possibility of a future return of European aid, noting that the military juntas governing the various Sahelian states have adopted a strictly repressive approach to tackling the issue. However, he highlights some exceptions, such as Italy’s presence in Niger and the growing involvement of new actors like Turkey, Iran, and the Gulf monarchies.

Dr. Edoardo Baldaro is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Palermo. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Scuola Normale Superiore, Institute of Human and Social Sciences. He is a leading expert on the Sahel region and themes such as state fragility, jihadism and regional conflict management.

Interviewers: Axelle Bougouma, Angelo Saad Hintermayer and Camilla Cormegna - Africa Team

November 25, 2024 — No Comments

The Impacts of Trump Presidency on Global Economic Relations

by Miguel Jiménez, Ingrid Heggstad, & Dan Ziebarth - Political Economy, Development, & Energy Security Team

Introduction

It was announced on Tuesday, November 5th that Donald Trump, the candidate for the right-wing Republican Party, had won the 2024 Presidential Election in the United States of America and would officially become the President-Elect. Kamala Harris, the left-wing Democratic Party candidate, conceded defeat in a speech on Wednesday, December 6th, urging voters to accept the election results. While Harris and her vice presidential running mate, Time Walz, received significant party support ahead of the election and were seen as a new phase for the Democratic Party, the party will be weakened following the election results. Even though during the campaign she lacked a compelling economic narrative and often avoided answering how to fund any proposal she brought to the table, in terms of global economic relations, a Harris presidency was expected to maintain continuity with the current Biden administration's approach largely.

The second Trump presidency is expected to have major ramifications for global politics, particularly global economic relations, particularly as Trump has been a vocal proponent of protectionist trade policies. The Republican Party, led by Trump, will also control both chambers of the legislature, while conservative justices make up 6 of the 9 seats on the Supreme Court of the United States. These conditions could give Trump a strong mandate for policy change. In particular, economic relations with China, the European Union, and Russia are expected to be affected by a second Trump presidency.

China

Trump has announced that, if re-elected, he will impose a 10–20 per cent across-the-board tariff on imports into the United States, with an additional 60 per cent tariff on all imports from China. Trump has also pledged to terminate the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) passed by the Biden administration, which would be expected to increase domestic production and reduce Chinese imports. This is in contrast to what would have been expected under a Kamala Harris administration, where the usage of tools to inhibit the arrival of Chinese goods would have come from domestic policies with the continuation of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the single largest climate investment in American history. Based on building domestic champions in the field of energy transition, which is currently dominated by China, being the world’s leader in clean energy production and the refinement of the majority of mineral inputs.

European Union

The second Trump presidency could challenge Europe through an “America First” trade policy, focused on reducing the U.S. trade deficit, with tariffs as high as 20 per cent on imports and even more on Chinese goods. These tariffs would increase costs for European exporters and consumers, impacting the EU’s economy. Ongoing disputes from the Biden era, such as steel and aluminium tariffs and green subsidies, may also escalate, while the expiration of paused EU retaliatory tariffs in 2025 and the Airbus-Boeing subsidy conflict in 2026 could further strain EU-U.S. trade relations, adding to Europe’s economic uncertainty. It is noteworthy that during his tenure as president, Donald Trump's imposition of tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from the European Union and China resulted in the implementation of retaliatory tariffs on U.S. agricultural products.

Russia

A renewed Trump presidency could also impact global economic relations with Russia. In his 2024 campaign, Trump promised to swiftly resolve the Ukraine conflict, asserting he could achieve peace within 24 hours through negotiation. However, if Russia resists a settlement, Trump has signalled he would impose tougher economic sanctions, potentially targeting Russia’s central bank and curtailing energy exports to key markets like India and China. This intensified economic pressure, coupled with increased US energy production to lower global prices, would squeeze Russia’s vital oil revenue.

Additionally, Trump’s scepticism toward ongoing US aid to Ukraine, which has amounted to $92.7 billion since 2022, raises concerns over a potential reduction in support, which could compromise Ukraine’s defence and shift the regional balance in Russia’s favour. Trump has also suggested that Europe should shoulder more responsibility for its security, which may lead to a reevaluation of US commitments to NATO. It is possible that a reduction in the US role in NATO could have the effect of weakening collective defenses, which might in turn expose Europe to greater tensions with Russia. This approach indicates a shift toward a more isolationist US foreign policy, with strategic economic measures as leverage to influence Russia's actions.

Additionally, Trump’s expected policies in oil and gas could intensify competition with Russia and reshape global energy markets. Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska has predicted that Trump’s support for US oil production might drive global prices down to around $50 per barrel by 2025, creating pressure on Russia’s oil-dependent economy. Trump’s approach would likely include promoting US LNG exports, reviving paused projects, and further challenging Russia’s position in Europe’s energy market.

His stance on projects like the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which he previously sanctioned to limit Russia’s influence, suggests he might continue efforts to curb Russia’s global LNG ambitions while supporting policies to maintain affordable oil prices for US consumers. By influencing OPEC+ to stabilise prices favourable to the US, Trump could further impact Russia’s revenue, potentially reducing its leverage in Europe and heightening competition in the global energy sector.

Conclusion

Taken together, based upon a previous presidency led by Donald Trump and his recent claims on the campaign trail, global economic relations could become increasingly tense between the United States and other nations and political unions.

In particular, trade relations between China and the United States are expected to worsen, with major increases in tariffs on Chinese goods entering into the United States possibly leading to retaliatory tariffs and an intensification of trade competition between the two countries. The European Union could also be affected by the competition between the United States and China, as well as the possibility of increased tariffs on goods from the EU going into the United States. The conflict in Ukraine also casts a shadow over Trump’s second term and whether the Trump administration continues to provide funding to Ukraine and keep sanctions on Russia in place will affect both the war in Ukraine, as well as economic relations between the United States and Russia.

These considerations will all have ripple effects across the entire world, meaning it is important for policymakers, scholars, and citizens alike to continue watching the effects of the second Trump presidency on global economic relations.

October 28, 2024 — No Comments

Dr. Jozef Hrabina on Russia’s Strategic Game: Shifts, Doctrine, and the Ukraine War

Dr. Jozef Hrabina talks about Russia's strategic culture and the effect of the war with Ukraine on regional hierarchy in post-Soviet space. Dr. Hrabina is geopolitical risk advisor, scholar, and founder of GeopoLytics.

In this session, Dr. Hrabina explains the background of Russia's strategic culture helping to understand how it was formed during different historical periods. Together we discussed the effect of the Ukrainian war on post-Soviet Eurasia regional hierarchy and European security architecture. We also could not miss the actual topic of the shifting dynamics in frozen conflicts where Russia used to act as a mediator, as well as we explored key interplay between strategic biases with the West in context of nuclear rhetoric and recent remarks to Russia's nuclear doctrine.

Interviewers: Alexandra Tsarvulanova, Denise Gianotti, Will Kingston-Cox

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