Taiwan Archives – ITSS Verona

June 4, 2025 — No Comments

China and Taiwan’s competition in Southeast Asia and Oceania

In this espisode, Dr. Simona Grano discusses the geopolitical implications of Chinese and Taiwanese influence in Southeast Asia and Oceania, and how this influence is being perceived and addressed by regional actors.

This podcast analyses how China is applying its strategic initiatives to influence infrastructure development and economic integration in Southeast Asia and Oceania examining Taiwan's counterbalancing efforts. It also investigates how regional nations navigate their relations with both China and Taiwan, the function of regional organisations, and the security ramifications of China's growing military might and a potential AUKUS alliance during the Trump era.

Dr. Grano is a distinguished expert in China and Taiwan issues. Dr. Grano serves as the Senior Fellow on Taiwan at the Asia Society Policy Institute's (ASPI) Center for China Analysis (CCA). She is also currently a Senior Lecturer and Director of the Taiwan Studies Project at the University of Zurich.

Interviewer: Kristina Kovalenko - Southeast Asia & Oceania Desk

May 15, 2025 — No Comments

Taiwan’s political gridlock and its implications

By Skylor Ko - China & Asia Desk

Legislative rumble

The idea of a full-on brawl in parliamentary chambers might be alien to a Western observer of Asian politics. Still, to a Taiwanese person, it’s nothing more than a national pastime. The island’s legislature, the Legislative Yuan, has seen its fair share of physical altercations since the 1980s, and it’s so normalised to the point that these brawls are almost like a running joke to Taiwanese citizens. Brawls in the legislature are often jokingly compared to American TV wrestling shows, the point being that they’re both performative acts. This tradition continued into 2024 as the new Lai administration of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) started its term. Taiwanese parliamentarians brawled on four[1] different occasions over policy differences and disagreements. In May, a controversial parliamentary reform bill from the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) that aimed to empower the legislature caused massive brawls in the chamber.[2] In December, three KMT bills once again sparked physical clashes.[3]

DPP’s uphill battle in the legislature

The continued clashes in the legislature indicate the monumental challenges the ruling party DPP is facing. In last year’s presidential election, William Lai Ching-te of the DPP was elected president with a 40% share of the total votes to continue the DPP’s governance of the island since 2016. However, the DPP lost its commanding legislative majority in the same election. The KMT became the largest party in the Legislative Yuan but did not enjoy a complete majority. Instead, the TPP, Taiwan People’s Party, a relative newcomer, was able to obtain enough seats in the legislature to ensure that either KMT or DPP would need their support to push through legislation, becoming a crucial third party in the Legislative Yuan.[4]

The TPP has since formed a coalition with the KMT to pass controversial bills that some would consider to be an attempt to undermine the ruling DPP government. The aforementioned parliamentary reform bill expanded the powers of the KMT-TPP-controlled legislature. Supporters of the bill cited the need for checks and balances against the DPP-controlled executive, while DPP supporters claimed this was an attempt to weaken the presidency.[5] Going into 2025, the DPP continued to fight an uphill battle in the Legislative Yuan. Last month, the legislature slashed the government budget by an unprecedented 7% - cutting NT$207.5 billion from government expenses.[6] The cuts meant that half of the funds allocated to Taiwan’s indigenous defense submarine initiative was frozen by the legislature, which cannot be used until the programme prototype, the Narwhal, completes its sea acceptance tests.[7]

Trump, China, and A Divided Island

The opposition’s efforts to reduce the budget coincide with external pressures on Taiwan to increase military expenditure. U.S. President Donald Trump has publicly called for Taiwan to raise its defence spending to 10% of GDP. [8] Taiwan’s defence minister has expressed concern that budget reductions could send an unfavourable signal to the new U.S. administration.[9] Ongoing tensions in the Taiwan Strait have led some to worry that political deadlock could slow decision-making and weaken international confidence in Taiwan’s defence readiness.

The three main parties have exchanged accusations regarding the causes of recent legislative deadlock. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has criticised the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) for obstructing governance, while the KMT has accused President Lai of consolidating power. The TPP, for its part, characterised the arrest of its leader, Ko Wen-je, on corruption charges as an instance of politically motivated prosecution by the DPP and the current administration.[10]

While perspectives differ, Taiwan’s internal divisions stem from more than performative politics. The island’s geopolitical significance has often drawn international attention away from its domestic challenges. These include an aging population, declining upward mobility, and energy security concerns..[11] In the most recent election, some voters expressed dissatisfaction with the established parties’ responses to these issues, contributing to increased support for the Taiwan People's Party (TPP), which gained a notable presence in the legislature. Taiwan’s political gridlock may be better understood as a reflection of unresolved domestic grievances.

Amid ongoing tensions with China and uncertainty surrounding potential shifts in U.S. policy, the current administration under President Lai faces the complex task of navigating institutional constraints while maintaining unity and addressing public concerns.

[1] https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/02/03/taiwan-constitutional-crisis-dpp-kmt-legislature/

[2] https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-06-01/why-have-taiwan-s-politicians-been-brawling-in-parliament/103915644

[3] https://apnews.com/article/taiwan-legislature-brawl-clash-tussle-lawmakers-a832d9cee2bc99e7f46ba70a3defe3e9

[4] https://www.brookings.edu/articles/taiwans-2024-elections-everyones-a-winner-and-a-loser/

[5] https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/28/taiwan-passes-controversial-reform-bill-after-violence-and-protests

[6] https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202501210031

[7] https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202501210031.

[8] https://edition.cnn.com/2025/01/24/asia/taiwans-budget-freeze-defense-trump-intl-hnk/index.html

[9] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/01/17/taiwan-defense-spending-trump/

[10] https://www.brookings.edu/articles/taiwan-president-lais-three-big-challenges-in-2025/

[11] https://www.brookings.edu/articles/taiwan-president-lais-three-big-challenges-in-2025/

September 28, 2023 — No Comments

Taiwan: What’s Next?

For our first Webinar of the 2023/24 season, we had the pleasure of hosting a great team of experts on Taiwanese affairs: Dr. Dafydd Fell, a distinguished Professor at SOAS University and the Director of the SOAS Centre of Taiwan Studies, and our very own ITSS researchers Sandra Watson Parcels and Ho Ting Hung (Bosco).

Our guests navigated the complexities of Cross-Strait relations, the upcoming Taiwanese elections, and the future of the semiconductor industry.

March 13, 2023 — No Comments

Prof. Inderjeet Parmar on the US and the world in 2023

Prof. Inderjeet Parmar talks about the United States domestic and foreign policy in 2023. Parmar is a professor of international politics at the City, University of London, and co-editor of the book series "Routledge Studies in US Foreign Policy".

In this session, he discusses the future of the Republican Party and former President Trump heading towards the 2024 elections, before shifting the focus overseas. The main issues addressed are American interests in the Indo-Pacific, including discussions on India, QUAD, and Taiwan, the Ukraine war and its impact on the international order, and the special relationship between the US and the UK.

Interviewers: Giovanni Luca Catucci and Anurag Mishra - US Team

December 26, 2022 — No Comments

The Microchip War

Author: Francesco Cirillo.

The geostrategic rivalry between China and the US is affecting the semiconductor and integrated circuit industry.

In recent months, Washington has implemented a clear strategy to contain Chinese geo-economic expansionism, to prevent Beijing from gaining access to semiconductor manufacturing technologies. The technology war between Washington and Beijing has now reached the WTO. A few days ago, Beijing filed a request with the World Trade Organisation, asking it to analyse the restrictive policies imposed by the United States on the export of hi-tech products. This has not stopped companies operating in the sector from moving to protect themselves. First of all, Amazon started to design a new microchip aimed at PCs, with the aim of integrating semiconductor production in-house. In this technology war, other companies are also moving. Nvidia and TSMC have started to design new products for the industry.

Nvidia, as reported by Reuters, has presented a project for a new advanced microchip (called A800), capable of overcoming security controls concerning restrictive rules on the export of high technology to the People's Republic of China. The strategy pursued by TSMC is different. The Taiwanese company, after opening a production plant in the United States, is planning to design new advanced chips to meet Apple's needs. But the companies' business strategies have to cope with the technology war between China and the US. The Biden administration, following in the footsteps of Donald J. Trump's administration, has implemented tools to contain China's geo-economic expansion and prevent it from gaining access to advanced technologies in semiconductor manufacturing. In this scenario, Beijing has started to move. According to the Reuters agency, Beijing has decided to inject some 143 billion dollars into the industrial sector to support its companies. According to rumours, the five-year plan should cover the entire production chain process (from design to production).

For the Chinese government, this economic aid package is part of its strategy to decouple its economic sector from that of the US, reducing its dependence on Washington in technology sectors. While China is one of the largest exporters of rare earths, it has a strong dependence on the US for hi-tech products, which are essential for its military modernisation project. In this context, Beijing aims to break free from its technological dependence on the US within the next three years, with the target of meeting 70% of its domestic needs.

However, this status in the semiconductor industry would risk putting it under great pressure as many companies, anticipating commercial retaliation from the US, might self-impose to stop doing business with China or cut off contact with Chinese companies. Beijing meanwhile has started its plans to support its companies and help them in the China-US competition. Despite the dialogues and communication channels between Beijing and Washington, the two superpowers maintain a certain distance and mutual distrust between them. The Semiconductor War of this millennium has entered its most delicate phase.

October 10, 2022 — No Comments

U.S.-China: The New Normal?

Author: Francesco Cirillo.

Tensions between China and the United States seem frozen at the moment, a consequence of domestic commitments of both Beijing and Washington. On the one hand, Xi Jinping will have to pass a Communist Party Congress to secure a third term as General Secretary of the Party, reappointment to the post of Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and reappointment as President of the People's Republic. Xi has several dossiers. The first is the issue of the anti-covid policy that has blocked production chains in recent months due to continuous lockdowns; the second is the delicate relationship with Moscow, which has seen in its Russian partner a greater weakening and consolidation of Beijing's political position in several areas of influence. For Xi, the October Congress is the turning point for the consolidation of his leadership within the Party. The main international dossier facing Beijing during the Congress session will be relations with Washington and the sensitive Taiwan issue. In the previous months several articles have been published by Chinese academics linked to the Party. CSIS, Center for Strategic of International Studies, translated an article by Liu Jieyi, director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council from a seminar on the Taiwan issue held between August 17 and 18. The seminar was attended by several academics close to Communist Party and government positions. Liu Jieyi in the piece titled "Reunification Has Entered an Irreversible Historical Process [统一进入不可逆转历史进程]" described that the reunification process has now entered an irreversible historical process and that not even Taipei's so-called "anti-Chinese forces" and "independence vagueities" will oppose the unification of the Island with the People's Republic.

*Image Source:* https://pixabay.com/photos/peking-forbidden-travel-china-1908167/

The Diplomatic clash between China and the United States on the Taiwan issue was raised after the visit of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi but two other elements changed the approach of Sino-US relations. The first was the presentation of a new document(Taiwan Policy Act 2022) by the U.S. Senate Foreign Affairs Committee that if approved could allocate some $6.5 billion in aid. If it is approved by both the House and Senate it could further deteriorate Washington-Beijing relations. Another bone of contention is the approval by the U.S. side to sell a $1.1 billion arms package. At the moment, relations between the People's Republic and the U.S. have returned to a certain "new" normalcy, a consequence of the domestic commitments of both Beijing (Party Congress" and Washington ( Mid-Term elections for the renewal of the U.S. Congress) .

On the international context, the war in Ukraine could, in the coming months and early 2023, lead China and the U.S. to engage in consultation given that at the SCO summit in Samarkand a certain Beijing discontent with the war being waged by the Kremlin was noted, a position that after the Party Congress could solidify further reducing Beijing's indirect support for Russia's junior partner.

May 19, 2022 — No Comments

The Consequences of Ukrainian War on U.S.-China Relations

Author: Francesco Cirillo.

The war in Ukraine is shaking the European security system and also influencing Washington's strategies in the Indo-Pacific. With the focus on Europe, the US has slowed down its diplomatic and political activity in Asia while keeping a close eye on Beijing's moves. The latest moves such as Beijing's ratified security agreement with the Solomon Islands has alarmed Canberra, a close US ally, as well as the Americans. For Washington, the move is seen as an attempt by Beijing to strengthen its diplomatic and politico-military position in the South Pacific. Another hot dossier concerns the thorny issue of Taiwan. With the Russian invasion Washington is analysing how it can support Taipei in terms of military aid without bothering the People's Republic of China.

In recent months, with the outbreak of war in Ukraine, there have been growing concerns that in the near future Beijing might attempt an armed attack to occupy and annex Taiwan, which Beijing calls one of its 'rebel provinces'. At the moment, however, there seem to be no signs of a possible Chinese attack. The war has been a total game changer, causing concern within Xi Jinping's leadership. According to the Wall Street Journal, Chinese big tech companies are scaling back their business in the Russian Federation market, as they are intimidated by possible sanctions that the US and the West might apply against them. But recently a War Game was broadcast on NBC news, simulating an invasion of Taiwan by the People's Republic of China and a subsequent military confrontation with the US in the Pacific.

*Image Source*: https://pixabay.com/photos/mao-zedong-mao-tse-tung-chairman-mao-15983/

In fact, within the US federal agencies, preparations are being made for a possible war confrontation with Chinese forces. Despite the tension within some Chinese academic circles, it is theorised that a kind of competitive coexistence could be found with Washington, which would aim to exclude a warlike confrontation. In January 2022, Professor Wang Jisi , lecturer at the School of International Studies and President of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies at Peking University, wrote and published an essay entitled 'A Hot Peace: Is a Paradigm in U.S.-China Relations Emerging?'. In this short essay, the academic theorises that despite the mistrust between Washington and Beijing on various dossiers ranging from the Hong Kong issue to the mistrustful view of international relations via Taiwan, it is necessary to maintain and consolidate a channel of communication between the two leaderships in order to cooperate when the interests of both the People's Republic and the United States converge. According to Wang Jisi, this would lead the current status of Sino-US relations not towards a new 'Cold War' but towards a so-called 'Hot Peace', in which Beijing and Washington, despite competition in various fields, mutual mistrust and different visions concerning the status quo of the international chessboard will necessarily have to cooperate in certain dossiers of global importance.

The war in Ukraine puts Beijing in front of a dangerous strategy: on the one hand it publicly pushes both Moscow and Kiev to find a point of convergence to open a diplomatic mediation table; on the other hand it wants to avoid being included in possible economic sanctions. Moreover, it adds that there could be a remote hypothesis that is at the moment difficult to realise: with a severely weakened post-war Russia, China, in exchange for financial aid, would ask the Kremlin for possible access to military technology in the experimental phase in order to study it and acquire know-how.

At the moment, however, China is focused on other dossiers and preparing for the Party Congress, but with an eye on the economic consequences that the conflict could bring globally.

May 9, 2022 — No Comments

The Need for a Territorial Defence Force in Taiwan

Author: Sandra Watson Parcels.

The Chinese Communist Party is one of the most ruthless regimes in history. There should be no illusion that China, under President Xi, is not only capable, but willing to enact this violence on the people of Taiwan. Mara Karlin, United States Assistant Secretary of Defence for Strategy, Plans and Capabilities stated, "I think the situation we're seeing in Ukraine right now is a very worthwhile case study for them about why Taiwan needs to do all it can to build asymmetric capabilities, to get its population ready, so that it can be as prickly as possible should China choose to violate its sovereignty." Ukraine, under the might of the much larger Russian military, was expected to fall in days, but the Territorial Defence Force has been credited in helping to slow the Russian advance.

A recent article by Michael Hunzeker and Admiral (Ret.) Lee Hsi-ming, former Chief of the General Staff of the Republic of China’s (Taiwan) Armed Forces, and a recent ITSS Verona Interview with the Admiral discusses the need for Taiwan to develop a standing, all-volunteer, Territorial Defence Force against the threat of a Chinese invasion. The Taiwanese military currently has approximately 170,000 active-duty troops, including 90,000 Army, 40,000 Navy,10,000 marines and 40,000 Air Force but just rough-and-ready militias and civil defense groups to counter a ruthless occupation. Territorial Defense Forces are not capable of defeating a large-scale invasion but can prevent a swift victory by ensuring an occupation would be violent and lengthy.

Hunzeker and Admiral Lee’s concept is to build a Territorial Defence Force around special forces units, trained in asymmetrical warfare. A well trained and equipped Territorial Defence Force would make it very difficult and costly for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), should they get passed Taiwan’s coastline defences. In a recent interview, Hunzeker elaborated that Taiwan should have a Territorial Defence Force for two reasons. One, as a message of deterrence that the Taiwanese people are ready, willing, and able to defend Taiwan. Two, a Territorial Defence Force would make it very challenging to conquer the civilian population. This would buy time for Taiwan to defend itself and for allies to intervene and help Taiwan. Retired U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies stated that the United States (U.S.) needs to learn the right lessons from the war in Ukraine, including spending less time ‘worrying about provoking authoritarian bullies’ and more time working todefend threatened democracies before invasions start. The U.S. has also been slow in addressing concerns and requests by U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, that recently warned again that military balance of power in the region continues to become “more unfavorable” for America and its allies. Therefore, although it is likely the U.S. and allies will come to Taiwan’s defence, Taiwan must also show a willingness to fight, just as Ukraine’s Territorial Defence Force inspires the world and garners international support.

*Image Source:* https://aspeniaonline.it/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/taiwan.jpg

The Territorial Defence Force would not need to be extremely large to be effective. Units of thousands, even hundreds of asymmetric trained volunteers would make a big impact, as witnessed now in Ukraine.

The Taiwanese government must play the leading role in building and supplying the Territorial Defence Force. Not only must volunteers be trained, but they will also need to be armed and supplied. Ukraine has land borders that make it easier to resupply fuel, ammunition, weapons, water, food, and medical supplies. As an island, Taiwan has the advantage of island defence but will be at a disadvantage when it comes to resupply. Taiwan’s strategic challenges include knowing China will attempt to cut Taiwan off from the outside world. Therefore, it is vital that the Taiwanese government create a Territorial Defence Force and provide stockpiles throughout the country.

Scenes of ordinary Ukrainians defending their homeland has awakened Taiwan’s own spirit of resistance. The Taiwanese people are inspired, Russia has shown that the threat of invasion is real and Ukraine’s Territorial Defence Force has shown that resistance works. Now is the time for the government of Taiwan to build a strong, fully supplied Territorial Defence Force that will deter and, if need be, defend Taiwan from occupation. The 4^thPresident of the United States, James Madison once said, “A well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained in arms, is the best most natural defense of a free country.”

April 13, 2022 — No Comments

Admiral (Retired) Lee Hsi-Min on Taiwan’s Military Defence

Admiral Lee Hsi-min (retired) is a Senior Fellow at the Project 2049 Institute. He previously served as the Chief of the General Staff of the Republic of China (Taiwan) Armed Forces from 2017 to his retirement in July 2019 after 42 years of service in the ROC Navy. Before his retirement, he was awarded the Order of the Cloud and Banner with Special Grand Cordon by President Tsai Ing-wen in recognition of his service in enhancing the overall capabilities of Taiwan’s military. He has authored articles in The Diplomat and War on the Rocks on issues related to Taiwan.

He answers a series of questions regarding Taiwan’s preparedness against potential Chinese invasion, lessons for Taiwan’s Territorial Defence Force from the Ukrainian experience and the edge it may or may not have as an island state against China when compared to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict.

Interviewing Team: Sandra Watson Parcels and Carlotta Rinaudo

January 7, 2022 — No Comments

Giulia Pompili on the Security in South East Asia

Giulia Pompili discusses South Asian security perspectives. Giulia Pompili is a journalist and author. She currently sits on the South Asia desk at Il Foglio and writes the South Asian newsletter, Katane. She is also the author of Sotto lo stesso cielo, a book on the relationships between Beijing, Seoul, Taipei, and Tokyo.

In this session, Giulia Pompili discusses Australia & New Zealand's place in the US-China tensions over Taiwan, Japan's perspective on the BRI, Secretary Blinkin's visit to Indonesia, and the US diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics.

Interviewers: Austin Parcels, Alberto Trame.

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