In this session, Dr. Baldaro discusses the root causes of jihadism in the Sahel, focusing on how civil wars, local grievances, poor governance, and corruption have been inadequately addressed by the European Union’s counter-terrorism strategy in the region, which was heavily securitised. He then expands on Russia’s current counter-insurgency strategy—an even more hardline and militarised approach—that not only fails to address local grievances but also contributes to increased chaos and violence.
Dr. Baldaro concludes by expressing scepticism about the possibility of a future return of European aid, noting that the military juntas governing the various Sahelian states have adopted a strictly repressive approach to tackling the issue. However, he highlights some exceptions, such as Italy’s presence in Niger and the growing involvement of new actors like Turkey, Iran, and the Gulf monarchies.
Dr. Edoardo Baldaro is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Palermo. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Scuola Normale Superiore, Institute of Human and Social Sciences. He is a leading expert on the Sahel region and themes such as state fragility, jihadism and regional conflict management.
Interviewers: Axelle Bougouma, Angelo Saad Hintermayer and Camilla Cormegna - Africa Team
By Agostino Bono, Rodney Ekow Buah, Isabelle Despicht, Sophie Herzog Sønju - Crime, Extremism and Terrorism Team
Introduction
The name Antifa was first used in Nazi Germany by a coalition of far-left parties which were created to oppose the growing power of Nazism. The term Antifa is a shortened form of antifaschistisch (anti-fascist).Its members were driven and are still driven by beliefs which combat fascist, racist and right-wing ideologies, through any means both legal and illegal.
Antifa, a decentralised movement, follows both anarchist and communist ideologies. This is reflected in the group's symbols, which incorporate the red flag of the 1917 Russian Revolution and the black flag of 19th-century anarchists.
Conservative pundits and politicians, including former President Donald Trump, have repeatedly accused Antifa of participating in left-wing protests against police brutality and racism in the United States, particularly from the mid-2010s and during the 2017 Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia.
This article will explore whether Antifa poses a threat to democracy and whether it can be defined as a terrorist group. Much of the relevant literature suggests that Antifa is not a threat to democracy and lacks the characteristics of a terrorist group. The origins of Antifa are rooted in anti-authoritarianism and anti-fascism, which some argue align it more closely with democratic principles. However, others believe that Antifa's violent and occasionally illegal tactics pose a threat to democracy, emphasizing that such methods may undermine free expression, a fundamental aspect of democratic society.
Historical Background
The Antifa movementemerged in Germany and Italy in opposition to the rising Nazi and fascist ideologies. This is exemplified by groups such as the Antifaschistische Aktion in Germany and the Arditi del Popolo in Italy. The anti-fascist ideology gained momentum and spread its influence beyond Germany and Italy. In October 1936, tens of thousands of anti-fascists reacted to a march of British Union fascists on Cable Street and Whitechapel by throwing rocks and homemade bombs.
While anti-fascism decreased worldwide due to the fall of Nazi Germany, it reemerged in the 1970s to counter an increase in Neo-Nazi activity in Europe, Asia and the United States.
Since the 1980s, the United States has witnessed the highest level of anti-fascist protests. For example, the Anti-Racist Action Network, which operated between 1987 and 2013, and the Puget Sound John Brown Gun Club are examples of active anti-fascist and anti-racist movements.
In 2016, the election of Donald Trump strengthened the activity of anti-fascist groups. Furthermore, following the death of George Floyd in 2020, there was evidence of increased anti-fascist activism as a reaction to police brutality. However, the FBI later stated that ordinary criminals were responsible for the acts of violence and looting and not groups like Antifa.
Antifa groups are also operating in Europe in countries such as Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Ukraine. In Germany, for example,in October 2016, far-left groups in Dresden led a peaceful protest on the occasion of the anniversary of the German reunification on 3 October, for "turning Unity celebrations into a disaster". Furthermore,Antifa sympathizers took to the streets in Hamburg during the 2017 G20 summit, some say, in reaction to Donald Trump’s accusatory rhetoric.
Tactics & Activities of Antifa
The Antifa movement employs a variety of tactics aimed at countering far-right and authoritarian ideologies. Central to its approach is the belief thatdirect action is necessary to confront these threats. Protest demonstrations are a common method, where participants gather to voice their opposition to fascism and xenophobia. These protests often escalate into clashes with far-right extremists, particularly during significant events like the Charlottesville rally and protests in Portland. Antifa’s militant tactics can includephysical altercations, raising concerns about public safety and the ethical implications of violence in political activism.
In addition to street confrontations, Antifa groups engage in community organising and outreach to raise awareness about far-right extremism. They frequently utilise social media to mobilise supporters, disseminate information, and document the activities of far-right organisations. Authorities in various countries have increased scrutiny of Antifa due to concerns about violence and public safety. The EU's TE-SAT report has highlighted the rise in violent actions linked to left-wing extremism, prompting law enforcement to strengthen their responses.
In this context, some Antifa members in Austria took part in 2022 in training camps designed to equip activists with skills for protest, self-defense, and community organisation. These camps serve as spaces for learning techniques related to civil disobedience and strategic communication, but they also raise concerns about radicalisation and the potential for increased violence. While Antifa’s actions are rooted in a commitment to antifascism, they face ongoing scrutiny regarding their methods. Critics argue that violent tactics can undermine broader anti-fascist goals, complicating the movement's public image and effectiveness. As Antifa continues to navigate these challenges, its capacity to adapt its activities in response to the evolving political landscape will be pivotal in determining its long-term impact.
Source: Gregor Fischer - https://www.flickr.com/photos/gonzo_photo/406787012
Global Presence and Influence
Antifa’s global presence has expanded significantly in recent years. Its influence is remarkably evident in countries like the United States, where it engages in direct action against far-right extremism. As a decentralised movement, Antifa lacks a formal structure, allowing it to spread and operate independently across the world. The movement is viewed as “a reaction to the extreme right by concerned left-wing activists”. As far-right extremist politics gain momentum globally, anti-fascist movements have risen in response. According to the European Parliament, Antifa is not a single organisation, but a “collective name” used by various informal, autonomous groups claiming to be anti-fascist”. This broad, open identity allows anyone opposing fascism to align themselves with the movement.
With the growing influence of the far-right political party Alternative für Deutschland there has been a significant increase in the presence and potential threat of the anti-fascist movement in Germany. Modern militant German Antifa groups have been involved in violent confrontations, notably between 2018 and 2020, attacking and singling out German neo-nazis. The same applies to Sweden, where the far right political party Sverigedemokraterna(SD) has had a surge in popularity, with an increase of around 20% in the polls in the past 20 years. Consequently, Swedish Anti-fascist Aktion (AFA) and Swedish Revolutionary Front have carried out acts of political violence, including an attack on former SD politician Vávra Suk.
In the US, Antifa grew in popularity and presence during Donald Trump’s presidency in 2016-2020. This was partly due to his reported alignment with far-right groups such as the Proud Boys, but also due to the increased engagement regarding far-right politics in general in the US. Trump’s rhetoric, including his refusal to condemn white supremacist groups, shifted political discourse and drew attention to Antifa’s opposition. Antifa protesters frequently countered far-right demonstrations, sometimes engaging in violent confrontations. This led to the movement being labeled by critics as rioters and looters, with Trump at one instance saying “Somebody’s got to do something about antifa and the left because this is not a right wing problem.”
Conclusion
Antifa's history, decentralised structure, and focus on anti-fascism have shaped its role as a modern movement. While often associated with far-left ideologies such as anarchism and communism, its primary goal is to resist fascism, racism, and authoritarianism. Although its use of violence and militant tactics has sparked debate, many studies suggest that Antifa is neither a terrorist group nor a direct threat to democracy. Its anti-authoritarian stance is sometimes seen as aligned with democratic values, opposing what it considers oppressive forces. However, critics argue that its violent methods may undermine democracy by limiting free speech and opposing viewpoints.
Looking ahead, Antifa's relevance may depend on the political landscape. As far-right extremism grows in some areas, Antifa could continue to serve as a counterbalance. Its decentralized structure allows for flexibility and adaptability. Nevertheless, reliance on violence could harm its cause in the long term, as public support may decline if it is viewed as more destructive than constructive. Increased scrutiny from authorities is also anticipated if violent incidents continue to be associated with Antifa.
The question of whether Antifa qualifies as an extremist group remains debated. While it employs militant tactics and occasionally breaks the law, its goals are centered on protecting marginalized groups rather than advocating for authoritarian control. This places Antifa in a complex position; despite operating outside mainstream activism, it is not typically regarded as an extremist movement.
In this episode, Prof. Rodrigo Duton discusses the importance of the crime-terror nexus in Brazilian security. Prof. Rodrigo Duton is an Adjunct Faculty member at the George C. Marshall Center, originally from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
Interviewers: Sarah Toubman, Dr. Rabiah Ryklief, & Giovanni Giacalone by the Central & South America Team.
Disclaimer: Rodrigo Duton is participating in this podcast solely in his academic capacity. He is not speaking on behalf of any Brazilian law enforcement agency or the government of Brazil. The views and opinions expressed are his own.
In this session, Professor Mishra discusses the capacity of the security forces to control the territory, the Islamic State Khorasan Province, and the division within the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
Professor Anant Mishra is a Visiting Fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security, University of South Wales.
Interviewers: Agostino Bono and Camilla Cormegna - Crime, Extremism and Terrorism Team
The interlinkages between international phenomena such as the illicit drug economy, transnational organised crime, conflict, and terrorism have become the absolute reality of globalisation and the complex interdependence that reflects its savage side. The spread of Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and their regional affiliates as key predatory actors in global governance through paradoxical guerrilla warfare using theological justifications and political fabrications to promote “narco-jihadism,” exploiting Haram money for a Halal cause, makes Africa the new epicentre of the nexus between organised crime, narcotics, and terrorism's nebulae.
A triptych of terrorism, religion and organized crime: a marriage of carp and rabbit between haram and halal
In Islam, the main source of prohibitions and permissions comes from the Qurʾān. Thus, “Halal” means anything that is permitted or conforms to Islamic law with a set of rules concerning the adherents' principles of life and “Muslim morality.” It includes, among other things, nutritional standards that comply with Sharia law. Conversely, the concept of “haram” refers to matters that are unacceptable or illegal under Islamic law, i.e., all harmful chemical substances (toxins) that are dangerous to human life and health, as well as the consumption of narcotics and drugs are considered prohibited (Haram). While the involvement of al-Qaeda and Daesh in the dirty narcotics business is a heady cocktail under a triangle that combines politics, religion, and jihadist crusades, narcotics and terrorism have no religious hue.
Islamist terrorist groups have justified jihad as halal and part of the acts of “ijtihad” or martyrdom as a necessary religious duty carried out by the “muharribun” against the “kuffar” (infidels), thus constituting a halal and legitimate cause. Although the Qurʾān explicitly forbids the outbreak of war and authorises combat only against real aggressors, jihadist thinking has adapted to political realism, authorising wars of expansion, even using illegitimate means, i.e., Haram. Indeed, with the internationalisation of the jihad, previously focused on the “near enemy,” then towards the “far enemy,” described in the Islamic vision as the “home of war” (dar al-ḥarb), thus making it possible to wage an offensive jihad, using narcotics to spoil Western society with drugs and the ongoing use of mass production and distribution of illicit drugs, intrinsically contrary to Islam, as a pretext to advance religious and ideological objectives and justify the “holy” war against the West.African Jihadist terror-crime nexus spectrum: A cross-trigger-incubator cycle
African Jihadist terror-crime nexus spectrum: A cross-trigger-incubator cycle
“Narco-jihad” is the contradictory and absurd justification of acts of violence in the name of religion, fuelled by the revenues of the illegal drug trade, which consists of spoiling “infidel” Western forces with drugs and consolidating Islamic rule, not by faith but with a well-calculated guerrilla strategy, since the drug economy remains one of the main sources of funding for jihadist-matrix terrorism in Africa. The practice of narco money for jihad dates from the Islamist “mujahideen” groups against the Soviet Union. As for post-modern jihad, the use of cryptocurrencies and bitcoin has overtaken traditional methods of transferring funds as part of “crypto-jihad.” Meanwhile, with globalisation, the end of the Cold War, and the “global war on terror,” the “terrorism-crime continuum” became a growing threat, forming an adaptive alliance to changing circumstances. On others, terrorist and organised crime groups used a dual “modus operandi” nexus, including logistics and material support, and protections under geographical “safe havens” deeply intertwined over “hybrid groups.”
Henceforth, African jihadi narcotics rely on religion, local conflicts, anti-western rhetoric, corruption of government officials, and the general feeling of injustice to gather support. However, the “black hole syndrome,” in which the convergence between terrorist nebulas and transnational organised crime groups is mainly occurring within Sahel’s “ungoverned space,” where a weak or failed state has created conditions ripe for jihadist actors connections, including Niger’s narco-networks to gain economic and political power. In so doing, a complex “glocal jihad” is emerging, linking local, national, regional, transnational, and global levels in a dialectical, blurred, and intertwined process that goes beyond local spatial realities, as applied by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in its strategy of geographical expansion in the Sahel with complex interconnections between smuggling networks and illegal arms and drug trafficking. In this respect, jihadist groups operating in West Africa have maintained their actions and even expanded, opportunistically and pragmatically resorting to various sources of funding, with the smuggling of drugs and narcotics, particularly cocaine and cannabis resin, playing a key role in the entrenchment of “narco-jihadist” activities in the Sahel region. Notably, Al-Mourabitoun and the Gourma Katiba focus on kidnapping for ransom and trafficking in drugs, arms, and transnational criminal activities.
Africa’s narco-jihadism landscape and trends: dual dynamics between hybridization and trans-nationalisation
The African threat landscape has consistently changed, and the narcotics routes are varied, with Guinea-Bissau as a key “narco-state” facilitating the flow of illegal narcotics, with drugs transiting through the Sahara, passing Jihadist zones, North Africa, and then on to Southern Europe. As a result, the east coast of Africa is becoming a hub for the international heroin trade networks and forms an integrated regional criminal economy with its long coastline providing landing sites and safe routes for Afghan heroin destined for markets in Europe and North America. Simultaneously, according to the UNODC World Drug Report 2023, Africa remains a key region for cocaine trafficking, mainly in West Africa, while North Africa is a central axis for the inter-regional smuggling of cannabis resin and cannabis. However, half of the pharmaceutical opioids seized worldwide between 2017 and 2021 were in Africa, largely due to the non-medical use of tramadol. This is why, more recently, tramadol has been a main aspect of “narco-jihadism” under an era of “low-cost terror”, including Captagon, which has become the “drug of Jihad” used initially by Islamic state fighters and militants of narco-terror groups in the Middle East region, also known as the “cocaine of the poor,” “ISIS’s drug,” and then spread through African jihadist operatives as war drugs and money laundering business.
AfricaIndeed, the 2023 Global Terrorism Index report has heightened the relationship between terrorism and ecological threats under a vicious cycle of progressively greater asymmetrical challenges, mainly clustered in African regions. As such, the 2022 Ecological Threat Report (ETR) identified that most African countries have emerged as “hotspots” affected by climate change, terrorism, conflict, and crime, with the highest risk in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). However, African jihadist groups are moving more towards environmental terrorism, which encompasses not only wildlife crime but also smuggling and all kinds of activities, including the illegal taxation of natural resources, which accounts for 38% of conflict financing, drugs (28%), seizures and looting (26%), and money extorted from kidnappings for ransom (3%).While a study conducted in 2023 by UNODC has demonstrated that illicit financial flows (IFFs), including smuggling of migrants (SOM) and trafficking in persons (TIP), especially women and children, with the involvement of non-state armed groups and terrorist and violent extremist groups (VEGs), have cross-border implications through the west African region with Islamic state local affiliates,.
The African franchises of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State: Narco-jihadism, a necessity that allows prohibitions
Some areas of the African continent, have become a new global hotspot for narco-jihadist activities. Local VEGs, claiming inspiration from ideologies espoused by Al-Qaida or Daesh, reflect a “proto-state” version of governance that operates within a wider political economy characterised by “business models” with “Big Man” patron-client organisations or “warlords,” as Mokhtar Belmokhtar's nicknamed “Mister Marlboro,” using cigarette smuggling to finance AQIM and affiliated groups such as Ansar Al-Sharia. However, Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin has engaged with illicit economies and tactical use of economic warfare through its involvement in post-modern razzias (or rezzous), which replaced the ancient caravan trade in the Sahel-Saharan belt with a criminal economy based on cannabis resin (hashish), then cocaine. Indeed, the narco-jihadism networks spread across ethnicities and tribes, namely with “black jihad,”exploited by Ansaroul Islam, building alliances with criminal gangs such as Lahmar and Tuareg traffickers and TilemsiArabs. In West Africa, the drug trade has fuelled the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) with illicit trade networks, particularly synthetic opioids, and charges “transit taxes” to narcotics trafficking. However, Al-Shabaab militants have financial or operational links with the pirates. These close ties are referred to as the “sea jihad.” In fact, in December 2023, a new alliance was formed with Somali pirates operating off the coast, receiving 30% of all ransom proceeds.
Certainly, Al-Qaeda and Islamic State African affiliates have used the religious tax known in Islam as zakat as a source of legitimacy and religious authority, imposed on herders in the Sahel with the demand for cattle as payment for zakat, on the one hand in exchange for protection and on the other for financing jihadism. Although zakat in Islam is not explicitly given in exchange for services, it has been usurped by JNIM and the Islamic State-Sahel Province (ISSP) in the name of religion, becoming a coercive measure and a source of illegitimacy under the new guise of “cow jihad.”Meanwhile, Boko Haram has normalised gender-based violence as a strategy of terror with the commodification and militarization of women as sex slaves; this is built around some theological justifications that permit submission to men and the exploitation of women, including forms of slavery or human trafficking for sexual purposes. Whereas Islamic law considers human trafficking, including violence against women and children, drug trafficking, and smuggling, to be crimes of ta'zir.
Conclusions
The process of terrorist groups using religion to promote narcotics causes, particularly in the African continent, has become part of the postmodern jihadist landscape. That’s why counter-terrorism must be based first and foremost on an understanding of the patterns and modes of jihadist thought, as well as on a solid grasp of the intellectual matrices and theological foundations that represent an effective, preventive tool for building resilience in the face of violent extremism and mitigating the factors behind this globalized phenomenon. Hence, education and academic work in favour of the new moderate discourse are constants to expose their shortcomings and contradictions in the form of a soft approach that must accompany hard structural and operational counter-terrorism.
Ido Levy talks about the deep conflict between ISIS and Al-Qaeda and its possible implications from a strategic point of view, the significance that they believe the West has within this scenario, and whether some recent events such as the war in Ukraine or the upcoming Israeli elections may affect terrorist activities.
Ido Levy is an associate fellow working with the Washington Institute’s Military and Security Studies Program and a PhD student at American University’s School of International Service. His work focuses especially on Near East Policy on counterterrorism and military operations, particularly relating to jihadist groups.
A conversation with Stefano Piazza on the capabilities of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State since the death of Ayman al-Zawahiri and future developments.
(Una conversazione con Stefano Piazza sulla condizione di Al-Qaeda e dello Stato Islamico dopo la morte di Ayman al-Zawahiri, e uno sguardo agli sviluppi futuri).
Over the years, human trafficking has increasingly become a modus operandi used by terrorist groups to finance and carry out their activities. To this extent, as human trafficking constitutes a crime that is usually perpetrated by organized criminal groups, some scholars have stressed that the “crime-terror nexus” implies that both criminal and terrorist organizations might cooperate with each other in the furtherance of their respective goals. Despite the increasing use of organised crime-related tactics deployed by terrorists, in analysing the current legal framework in international law when it comes to trafficking in human beings and terrorism there is still no existing treaty or convention dealing with the nexus between the two phenomena. On the basis of the OSCE paper launched in 2021 on the nexus between human trafficking and terrorism, this article will try to critically evaluate from a juridical and legal point of view the analysis and findings developed by the OSCE on this matter.
Comparing Legal and Policy Frameworks of Anti-Trafficking and anti-terrorism Mechanisms
On the other hand, the international legal framework related to terrorism and counterterrorism is considerably more challenging and complex in comparison to the anti-trafficking international legal system. Indeed, despite the existence of a set of treaties, protocols, conventions, Security Council Resolutions, as well as “soft law” and non-binding mechanisms, there is no comprehensive instrument providing a universal and accepted definition of terrorism, as it is the case for human trafficking with the Palermo Protocol.
Therefore, as the OSCE outlines, in evaluating the link between trafficking in human beings and terrorism from a legal perspective, a useful approach would be one that analyses these three constituent elements when exploited by terrorist groups as a tactic to recruit individuals. In this regard, the analysis of the current legal framework on the nexus between the two crimes shows that a harmonisation in the criminalization of terrorism and human trafficking as two offences connected has not been reached yet. Indeed, despite the existence of several instruments that recognize the growing links between terrorism and transnational organized crime, the lack of a definition of terrorism still hinders the internationally community to adopt an internationally agreed-upon approach to terrorism matters, while it is not the case for human trafficking.
The legal response that has been adopted so far to address cases where the two phenomena intersects has largely focused on criminalizing all individuals related to terrorist activities and groups. The lack of a definition of terrorism has led States to adopt different measures aimed at only criminalizing terrorists and not identifying and protecting victims. Therefore, as highlighted in the research, this approach has showed to have significant consequences for victims, who have risked being held fully accountable for all the crimes they have committed, even though they are victims of human traffickers. Based on these findings, the OSCE research concludes that a human trafficking lens when dealing with terrorist criminal offences should be applied to contribute to victim identification, assistance, rehabilitation and reintegration, and prevention of re-victimization. Therefore, it would be of utmost importance to apply the principle of non-punishment - that already exists in the human trafficking framework – in the anti-terrorism existing legal and policy mechanism.
Conclusion
This critical commentary has analysed from a legal perspective the comprehensive research carried out by the OSCE organization on the nexus between human trafficking and terrorism. It has highlighted how the application of anti-trafficking mechanisms, including the principle of non-punishment, in the context of terrorism could help leading in a better way prosecution of criminal offences related to terrorism. The OSCE research might constitute the basis for an international and agreed-upon definition that considers both a security-oriented approach to prevent and prosecute terrorist offences and a human rights-based one, ensuring that victims of terrorism – and trafficked persons exploited by terrorists – are not held accountable and can access to their rights.
All in all, the OSCE research offers significant food for thought and, using concrete cases, helps filling the knowledge gap of policy makers, academics, practitioners, and legislators on the nexus between human trafficking and terrorism.
The ITSS Verona Middle East team interviews a Syrian gentleman who wishes to remain anonymous for security reasons. He details his experiences of returning to Syrian after 12 years. He recounts his experiences from collecting his allotted rations, to experiencing the energy crisis currently affecting Syria, and more about life under dictatorship and civil war.
Progettomondo is an international non-governmental organization founded in 1966 to promote sustainable development, human rights, and a new form of justice and conscious migration in Latin America and Africa. In Italy and Europe, the NGO promotes global education and the encounter between different cultures. Marianna Mormile is the country director for the Sahel Region and in this podcast, she discusses the role of Italy’s ONGs in the Sahel region, and the situation in this conflict area.
Interviewing Team: Michele Tallarini and Alessandra Gramolini
English Translation of the Interview:
MICHELE: Good day everyone, and welcome back to the ITSS Verona Youtube Channel. We are Alessandra and Michele from the Africa Team. Today we will talk about the situation in the Sahel. For this episode, we are delighted to host Marianna Mormile from Progettomondo, an NGO from Verona which operates in Africa and Latin America. Marianna works as country director for the Sahel, and she lives in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. We would like to start by expressing our gratitude to our guest for accepting our invitation and for sharing her high-level experience and knowledge with us.
MARIANNA: Thanks Alessandra and Michele for this opportunity. Sharing your opinion and experience is always important and often there is no time to do so, so thanks again for the opportunity.
MICHELE: Thank you again. We would like to start with a first general question: what is your point of view as an Italian who lives and works in Burkina Faso regarding the situation in this region? What are, in your opinion, the main problems affecting this area which is one of the most complicated in the world?
MARIANNA: I have a vision of the area's problems through the projects that we implement with Progettomondo, and through direct contact with communities, state actors, and other non-governmental organizations. As regards our interventions, I can tell you that certainly the news arriving in Italy are few but they allow us to give timely information on what are in a certain way stable situations of the presence of terrorist armed groups that organize attacks on populations and local authorities; hence a situation that is quite difficult from a security point of view.
At the beginning, it was an issue of claims and attacks against the central power and therefore with attacks focused more on law enforcement agencies and state actors, such as mayors or other institutional objectives. In this context, the religious component seems to be more of a vehicle than a real justification. In fact, there are villages that are intimidated and subject to certain rules for women and men, forcing the population otherwise to abandon the area, but this seems more like a strategy to recover resources and therefore forage, pushing these flows of displaced persons.
There is therefore certainly a humanitarian crisis, both in Burkina and in Niger (which are the two countries that Progettomondo follows), albeit in a different way due to the different backgrounds of the two countries. At the moment Burkina is at the peak of its crisis, with a high presence of displaced people and the risk of an imminent food crisis. In fact, last year it did not rain and therefore we are waiting for the consequences that will come. International organizations are trying to understand how to frame the interventions in order to respond to this food crisis that is expected very soon. So in conclusion, the main issues are those relating to safety, which sees no improvement, and a food crisis that goes on for periods but which is configured as constant and which could have a peak this year.
ALE: Thank you very much, Marianna. Going back to what you said about Burkina Faso, which is currently reaching the highest level of crisis, do you think the recent coup d’etat will be a turning point on the political agenda as regards the fight against terrorism?
MARIANNA: It must be said that the communiqué of the coup leaders, who are now in power, and who are trying to establish a transitional government, contained a point concerning the fight against terrorism. It says there would be improvements and a specific interest in making Burkina out of this problem of security and instability. To date, however, there is no real improvement, even if it is necessary to specify that the coup happened only 2 months ago.
The situation has not changed to date despite the coup leaders coming from the military world, and in theory they should have the right skills in the security field or in any case have a particular focus on this issue. In the press release, there is also a specific point concerning greater attention to the families of fallen soldiers: this certainly denotes an attitude of greater attention. However, even if the problem has been formally addressed, no real and concrete improvements are seen. In truth, this is not a result that can only be achieved by operating in Burkina and only by operating from a military point of view: it would in fact be necessary to do a wide-ranging work that includes several factors.
MICHELE: You talked about a moment of great crisis for Burkina and how these problems must be addressed in a global way and from different points of view. In this sense, what is the role of the Italian NGOs operating in the Sahel and in particular in Burkina and Niger? And are there any substantial differences in approach in the intervention strategies of the agencies of the various countries?
MARIANNA: It must be emphasized that the intervention in the Sahel is constantly changing. NGOs like us are trying to have a continuous analysis not only of the needs of the territory but also of the strategies to respond to these needs trying to enhance their expertise, and to form gradually. This is because there are various emergencies affecting the communities we work with and it is, therefore, necessary to continually re-calibrate interventions to respond to new needs. For this reason, I would point out, as a common strategy of NGOs, the continuous analysis of the needs of the territories: for example in one of our projects in the north of Burkina, on the border with Mali, we have recently completely redesigned the intervention strategy as regards nutrition and health. Indeed, in few years the situation has changed a lot and therefore the project, as it was originally conceived, risked no longer being operational in all areas.
There is therefore a desire to integrate a humanitarian component more and more: Italian NGOs, and in particular Progettomondo, are helping the populations of some areas to stabilize, thus making the support offered effective and continuous. We see that in Burkina, and recently also in some areas of Niger, the need to find a balance between the two interventions is becoming crucial. Therefore the donors are pushing us in more multi-sectoral interventions, but in reality, it is necessary that we also work on the ground, completing each other and trying to have more elements in such a way as to operate on different levels.
There is certainly a commitment from Italian NGOs to be able to continue to make their contribution in regions in which the situation is changing rapidly. In Niger, Italian cooperation has historically supported the agricultural sector; in Burkina, in addition to the agricultural sector, there is a strong aid in the healthcare sector, with interventions, for example, against malnutrition. Here there are also NGOs from other countries: some have had the most humanitarian fiber even in unsuspected times, due to purely periodic food crises. It must be said that Progettomondo and other Italian NGOs have a more proximity approach, working directly on the field, with direct assistance to the communities. This approach also helps to connect and to support the technical services and the local authorities, thus intervening both in the community and at the institutional level. Another type of approach can be the “substitution,”, mainly for emergencies, in which we intervene to replace the State, but always only until it organizes itself to be able to overcome these difficulties.
ALE: Following this last sentence, according to your experience and your work in the NGO and seeing the work of other NGOs, can international cooperation be able to help make these countries independent of foreign influence?
MARIANNA: Answering this question is very difficult. I can only say that we, as Progettomondo, do not work in geopolitics so we do not have an institutional position, we work following the principle of neutrality, not favoring any kind of deployment but only for the overall improvement of the situation in these territories. We do not enter the political sphere, it must be said that in our work we have to deal with other States' choices in foreign policy. For example, Sahel is a region in which there are constant migratory flows, and in the 2015 Valletta summit, it was made explicit the principle of externalization of borders, i.e. blocking migratory flows at borders really far away from those of the European Union.
Having said that, surely in the Sahel we can recognize France, China, Russia, and Turkey among the countries that have the most influence. Burkina was a former French colony, and therefore they are closely linked to France, which does not renounce to emphasize this link on every occasion. There is also an open debate on the ECOWAS situation and the new currency: the CFA franc is directly correlated to France. Now the idea is to replace it with the ECO, but we do not know yet how things are going to change in reality. Perhaps in Mali after the CEDEAO sanctions, there will be the possibility to replace the CFA franc with the ECO, but in reality, it is still very complicated. So I don't know what kind of answer to give in this regard, certainly in some countries of this region foreign influence is very rooted and very often it is not contested, in some cases, it is even accepted.
ALE: You have been very kind, Michele and I would like to thank you again for your time and for sharing your perspective on the field. It was a pleasure for us to have you as a guest of our video podcast series. Thanks for watching, and stay tuned for all other ITSS initiatives here on youtube and on our official website. Have a nice day