Italy’s approach to the Mediterranean crisis: Focus on Libya and Syria

By Francesco Foti & Giacomo Prosperini - Italy Desk

Introduction

Italy’s strategic engagement in the Mediterranean is characterised by the intricate relationship between energy security, migration management, counter-terrorism and regional stability. This is particularly evident in Libya and Syria, where Italian interests intersect with broader European and global dynamics.

In Libya, Italy is confronted with the ongoing challenges of political fragmentation, competing local authorities, and the increasing influence of external powers. These factors constrain Rome’s capacity to fulfil its traditional role. Energy ties, migration control and managing local armed groups remain crucial levers, yet their effectiveness is increasingly undermined by militia activities, institutional deadlock and disruptive behaviour. The Greenstream pipeline and strategic oil and gas fields, for example, highlight the interdependence between Italian energy security and Libyan stability. However, reliance on fragile authoritarian systems carries great risks. Migration flows and criminal networks further exacerbate the challenges to Italian security, exposing the country to ethical dilemmas and limiting the effectiveness of regulatory strategies. In order to navigate this arena of geostrategic interests, it seems essential to strike a balance between short-term priorities, such as ensuring an adequate energy supply and controlling immigration, and long-term objectives, such as promoting institutional reforms to foster stability and coordinating effectively with European partners.

Conversely, the long civil war and ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria have exacerbated Europe’s security and migration challenges. Italy must strike a delicate balance, engaging with the new regime, countering extremist networks and managing refugee flows, all the while coordinating with European partners whose policies are often fragmented and reactive. Iranian and Turkish activities in the region further complicate Italy’s strategic calculations by influencing local governance and regional security dynamics. In response, Italy has pushed for Syria to be included in the EU’s external action agenda, proposing a broader strategy to address the complex challenges arising from the civil war, particularly the pressure on migration routes. However, this effort faces significant obstacles: the lack of a coherent policy from Western partners, coupled with the unresolved nature of the Syrian government, means that Rome must adopt a carefully calibrated approach that tackles the root causes of instability, migration flows and potential terrorist threats in order to mitigate them.

Taken together, these cases illustrate the limitations of a purely reactive or ad hoc approach. Italy should combine pragmatic diplomacy with long-term strategic planning, leveraging its historical ties primarily with Libya, expanding the external action in Syria, an economic presence, and enhancing regional credibility compared to France and the UK in Libya and Syria. The following analysis examines the Italian approach to Libya and Syria, highlighting the key dilemmas, vulnerabilities and opportunities that currently define its Mediterranean policy.

The Italian Perspective on the Libyan Crisis

By Giacomo Prosperini

Post-Gaddafi Libya: Fragmentation and Political Deadlock

Among the multiple crises shaping the Mediterranean region, Libya remains a test case for Italy's ability to convert its geographical proximity into tangible influence. Rome’s interests - namely energy partnerships through ENI’s long-standing operations; containment of irregular migration; and broader regional stability - have been persistently undermined by Libya's political fragmentation since Gaddafi's regime collapsed in 2011. However, rather than redefining its strategy, Italy has tended to oscillate between ad hoc crisis management and a reliance on international processes that have produced limited results.

The post-2011 landscape in Libya remains marked by deep political and territorial tensions. Since Gaddafi's downfall, the country has been divided into two rival authorities: the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNA) in Tripoli, backed by Turkey and Qatar, and General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) in the east, supported by by Russia, Egypt, and the UAE. The existence of these two factions turned the conflict into a proxy arena for regional and global powers. This foreign interference has further weakened Italy’s previously privileged position, highlighting its diplomatic inferiority compared to more assertive external actors. Moreover, the proliferation of several armed groups with tribal and regional roots has created a security environment in which no single actor can guarantee stability.

Despite international initiatives, such as the Palermo Conference (2018) promoted by Italy and the Berlin Process (2020) Libya remains in deadlock. Tensions between historical Libyan provinces, rivalries between revolutionary and pro-Gaddafi factions, and competition over control of resources have undoubtedly fuelled instability. The repeated postponement of elections, most notably in December 2021, exposed the legal ambiguities of Libya’s institutional framework, as well as the reluctance of key stakeholders to embark on a genuine political transition. The absence of a coherent EU external action in the Mediterranean, coupled with minimal US involvement, has restricted Italy’s freedom of action in Libya. This has contributed to the country adopting temporary policies instead of pursuing a strategic and forward-looking approach.

This persistent stalemate raises uncomfortable questions for Italy: should Rome continue to invest in fragile diplomatic efforts that have yielded little progress, or should it recalibrate its approach by prioritising narrower interests, such as energy and migration management? Either option involves significant trade-offs between short-term stability and long-term credibility.

Italy and Libya Energy Nexus

Italy's involvement in Libya has long been influenced by its reliance on energy ties, with ENI playing a key role in diplomatic engagement and economic influence, particularly in the energy sector through ENI. The Italian multinational oil and gas company’s operations in the Wafa and El Feel oil and gas fields, directly connected to Sicily through the Greenstream pipeline underline how closely linked Italy’s energy security is to Libyan stability. Yet this reliance, which once gave Rome leverage, is increasingly revealing its fragility. ENI’s strategic assets are at the mercy of Libya’s internal rivalries and armed groups' bargaining, which turns energy security into a structural vulnerability rather than a source of strength.

The war in Ukraine has further enlarged this paradox. As Europe seeks to diversify away from Russian energy dependence, Libya is seen as a key alternative for Italy and the EU. However, production remains subject to political instability and militia activity, as demonstrated by the blockade of the Ras Lanuf oil terminal in 2023. These events demonstrate that Italian energy policy relies on the temporary support of local groups, which ultimately renders it incapable of influencing the Libyan economy. This vulnerability is worsened by the absence of an EU external action strategy in the Mediterranean, bringing Italy to largely manage these challenges on its own and to take on responsibilities that could better be shared at the EU level.

Italy therefore faces a strategic dilemma. While an approach that prioritises energy guarantees immediate supplies, it risks binding Rome to a model of dependence on fragile authorities and undermining its ability to act as a regional stabiliser. Alternatively, Italy could leverage its presence in the energy sector for diplomatic gain, but only if reforms are implemented to stabilise and transparently manage the country's political and economic affairs. The choice is both technical and geopolitical: Italy can either remain a passive observer of the instability in Libya, or it can take an active role in ensuring security in the Mediterranean through energy diplomacy.

Migration, Security, and Human Rights

Libya remains one of the main departure points for migration to Europe, particularly along the Central Mediterranean route to Italy. Due to its proximity to Italy, the Libyan coast is a key “hotspot” where thousands of migrants and refugees, primarily from Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, attempt dangerous sea crossings to reach Italian shores. For Italy, this influx of migrants is not only a humanitarian concern, but also an increasing security issue.

In response, the country has pursued a containment strategy, supporting the Libyan Coast Guard in intercepting and returning migrants before they reach European waters. However, these practices have sparked widespread criticism from various NGOs and the UN, who argue that Italian support effectively enables the return of migrants to Libyan detention centres, where conditions are described as inhumane and characterised by torture, extortion, continuous violence and abuse. The absence of effective border control, coupled with the fragmentation of the Libyan security apparatus, encourages the mobility of jihadist groups and foreign fighters, especially in southern Libya and across the Sahel. For Italy, the intersection of human trafficking, organised crime, and potential terrorist infiltration poses a multidimensional threat to national and regional security. By relying on Libyan authorities, Italy risks associating its migration policy with serious human rights violations. This tension is augmented by the lack of a unified European approach in terms of migratory policy. The limitations of the Dublin Regulation and the ambiguities of the EU’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum highlight the absence of a true European solidarity system, leaving frontline states such as Italy with a disproportionate amount of responsibility. This tension highlights a deeper dilemma, as short-term containment could come at the expense of international credibility and moral authority.

The suspension of operations for ten international NGOs and the UNHCR by the Libyan Internal Security Agency (LISA) in April 2025 further complicates the landscape. This suspension is a clear sign of Libya's increasingly securitarian and repressive shift, where international cooperation on migration is becoming increasingly subordinate to political and military interests. Italy and the EU now face a critical dilemma: should they continue to support authoritarian and violent actors in order to contain migration flows, or should they rethink their foreign policy in light of international law and human rights principles? Every path involves trade-offs. Disengagement could lead to uncontrolled migration flows, while continued support could reinforce inhumane authoritarian practices and destabilise the region.

Italian-Turkish Competition

Turkey's military and political presence in Tripoli has greatly challenged Italy's historical influence in Libya. Historically, Italy occupied a dominant position in Libya's European relations, underpinned by its colonial legacy, robust diplomatic and commercial engagement, and its status as the first destination country for Libyan exports.

The 2019 Memorandum of Understanding between Turkey and the GNA Turkey expanded Turkey's territorial waters in the Mediterranean, raising tensions with Greece and Cyprus. This Turkish expansion has created a new geopolitical dynamic in the Eastern Mediterranean, making it more difficult for Italy to assert its influence in Libya. By relying on its traditional influence and bilateral relations, Rome risks being marginalized in decision-making processes affecting both Libya and the wider region. Indeed, Turkey's increased presence in Tripoli means direct competition for control of energy resources, migration routes, and political alliances within Libya.

Should Italy adopt a proactive approach to limit Turkish influence and risk exacerbating regional tensions, or should it pursue multilateral coordination within the EU and NATO to preserve access and long-term stability? Either way, there are risks. A confrontational approach could provoke retaliation and further instability, while inaction could further erode Italy's strategic influence.

Italy and the Syrian Crisis: A Geopolitical, Security and Migratory Perspective

By Francesco Foti

*By FeaturingDallas - Own work, CC BY 4.0*

Post-Assad Syria and Impacts on European Security

Following the collapse of the Assad regime, the West has been dealing with the consequences of a new Syria. Southeastern European countries have borne the brunt of the instability caused by the 14-year civil war. Southern EU countries' capacity to process migrants at their first point of entry into Europe has been significantly impacted by it. The disproportionate burden could also be posing a security risk, including instances of radicalisation and terrorism documented in Italy that reverberate at the single EU country’s level. A fragmented Syria complicates the security crisis. An extremist or ineffectual government that harbours or exports radical violent individualsshould not be ruled out, given the past of HTS and the explosions of violence involving former loyalists, Alawites, Druze, and Christians.

EU Policy Failures on Syrian Migration

At the EU level, inconsistent application and failure to reform or uniform the Dublin Regulation have contributed to the instability in the Mediterranean and impacted Italy’s capabilities, thus signalling a lack of European approach. The refusal to reform the Dublin treaty and the lack of a broad approach to the security crisis by relying only on Libya, Egypt, and Turkey as a way to stem the flow underscore the European limited role in addressing the Syrian issue. The 2016 migration between Turkey and the EU exemplifies the European strategy of exchanging political concessions and funding for assistance in curbing migration flows.

Italy’s Legal and Diplomatic Response to the Syrian Crisis

Italy has temporarily suspended aspects of the asylum registration process under emergency measures, currently contested in court. To help manage migration, the Albania Agreement (2023) served as an option currently under discussion at the European level. The Italian government has passed a restrictive Law n. 187/2024 on immigration, and the annual immigration quota decree. The agreement and the laws implemented have been impugned by the courts which has limited their enforceability. The same impasse is observable across other EU countries.

An Italian geopolitical approach?

Due to European limitations and approach, the Italian position is limited to diplomatic, investment and humanitarian initiatives. Italy thinks that dealing with the Syrian government, whether in the form of Assad or HTS, is the starting point to address the question of immigration from instability. Lifting sanctions was presented as leading to cooperation in terms of infrastructure and business opportunities, which could boost the recovery and bring about stability to address the root causes. Italy should be watching the interregnum phase as this might precipitate another immigration crisis.Italian pragmatism should take into consideration the Turkish role, activism and exceptionalism of which Greece and Cyprus have long been vocal. Italy should clearly demand Turkey halt any unilateral actions in Northern Syria that have not been agreed upon with NATO and EU allies. Turkish military operations targeting the Kurds risk destabilising by triggering artificial resettlement, increased displacement and growth of refugee camps amid deterioration of humanitarian conditions. Furthermore, as shown by the 2020 Turko-Greek crisis, Turkish use of immigration as a hybrid threat exposes European inaction and the limits of the Italo-Turkish partnership in the face of unchecked Turkish militarism. Turkish actions frequently blur the distinction between support for moderates and extremists, thus undermining both the security of Syrian-controlled areas and prospects for the eventual, gradual return of refugees to Europe.

Italy should also reassess its approach to Iranian influence in Syria and the broader Levantine region. A critical component of this reassessment involves evaluating Iran’s use of sectarian dynamics to extend its regional influence, a strategy that has historically contributed to instability and, in turn, increased migration pressures toward Europe. While Iran will still remain an actor to reckon with in Syria, particularly through its support of the Shias and Alewites, the evolving political landscape in Damascus warrants close scrutiny. Italy should remain vigilant to any Iranian efforts to recalibrate its role and maintain leverage in the region, as this may have implications for both regional stability and require Italy’s bilateral relations with Tehran to be re-evaluated.

Israel's recent actions show awareness of the need to ensure Syria does not spiral into all-out sectarianism. However, Italy’s relationship with Israel has come under strain in light of recent developments in Gaza. Unlike countries such as the United Kingdom, France, or Spain, Italy has avoided openly criticizing Israel’s actions. However, it has also refrained from vocally supporting Israeli airstrikes in Syria, which Israel claims are aimed at protecting the Druze minority from government aggression. This ambiguous stance reflects an inconsistent policy line that fails to address the broader challenge of sectarianism in the region.

In light of the Lebanese government's recent call for the disarmament of Hezbollah—a paramilitary Shia organization—Italy should formally support this initiative as a necessary measure to curb the regional spread of sectarianism from Lebanon into Syria. Such a stance is particularly warranted given Hezbollah’s alignment with the Iran-backed "axis of resistance”. So far, the Syrian government declined to take decisive steps.

A Western response

The West lacks a broad commitment to the Syrian issue, other than previously supporting rebels, much like with Libya’s Gaddafi and the French-led regime change without clear post-intervention commitment. A cautious approach requires that the EU and US pressure should not be lifted, avoiding a quick diplomatic clout, until the course of Ahmed al-Sharaa becomes clear without ambiguity and sectarianism. A long-term plan comprising stabilisation, limiting the influence of geopolitical rivals and continuous pressure could tackle the root causes for massive immigration to Europe. Activism within the EU framework requires the US to be involved, and the easing pressure not be too speedy, given the uncertain direction of HTS. The Western powers should refrain from arming HTS and pressure others, such as Ukraine, not to overreach.

A new approach?

The Albanian model should be internalised and made into EU law, thus securing funding and being administered by the EU itself, and a quota system approved at the European level. The Italian government should stress the security dimension of the deal to frame it as a public safety tool and a faster, more humane processing. Italy should invite other countries in a joint governance of the centres to share the burden but also show the profits of the model. The EU should have an updated approach to cooperate with the Syrian authorities on repatriations, limit Turkish, Iranian and Qatari influence and pressure them not to engage in sectarianism. Italy should also take centre stage and bring the issue of the future West-Syria relations to the fore to help form a broad Western initiative that should, however, be security-based and geopolitical before focusing on immigration, trade and investment. This requires a new perspective on the actors in the Syrian playground based on the Libyan case that saw the rushed support for rebels that replaced the dictator turning out to breed chaos and new security challenges met inconsistently by the western powers.

Conclusions

Analyses of the situations in Libya and Syria highlight several key lessons for Italy’s Mediterranean strategy. Firstly, both crises demonstrate the limitations of reactive or ad hoc approaches. Short-term interventions in areas such as energy, migration and security often fail to address the root causes of political fragmentation and the influence of external actors. Secondly, while Italy’s traditional levers, such as energy diplomacy, migration management and engagement with local authorities, are necessary, they are insufficient in contexts marked by instability and unpredictable actors. Thirdly, these cases demonstrate that external influences, such as those from Turkey and Russia in Libya and Turkey and Iran in Syria, can significantly restrict Italy’s ability to act alone, making it essential for Italy to coordinate with other EU and NATO partners. Finally, the dilemmas faced in both countries illustrate the persistent tension between immediate interests, such as energy security and migration governance, and long-term objectives, including institutional reform, human rights protection and regional stability.

In light of these lessons, Italy must reassess its strategy in Libya, taking into account the growing influence of Turkey, the ongoing engagement of Iran, and the persistent institutional fragmentation, while also addressing migration management. The continuing stalemate between Tripoli and the eastern authorities, the repeated blockading of oil terminals and the fragility of local governance structures demonstrate that the ad hoc diplomatic and reactive intervention-focused approaches adopted after Gaddafi's fall are no longer sufficient. Yet the limited engagement of the EU in defining a coherent Mediterranean policy compounds these challenges, leaving Rome to act in a largely unilateral way. Italy must therefore combine traditional diplomatic tools with innovative approaches, promoting stability in energy production and reforming local institutions. Together with the need to ensure stability and defend human rights, this will require a comprehensive European approach aimed at preventing Libya from becoming a permanent centre of insecurity along the EU’s southern border.

At the same time, there has been a welcome in Italy for the prospect of closer engagement with the new Syrian authorities. However, these proposals must be carefully evaluated. Rome must consider whether the Al Jolani government can realistically unify diverse communities, combat terrorism and curb extremism. Effective engagement will depend on a holistic Western approach combining incentives and pressure to ensure the new authorities commit to inclusive governance, reject sectarian policies and contribute to long-term stability. A coherent strategy integrating political, security and humanitarian dimensions is essential for mitigating migration flows to Europe and for consolidating Italy’s credibility as a stabilising force in the Mediterranean and the wider Middle East.

November 27, 2024 — No Comments

Dr. Baldaro on Counter-Terrorism Challenges in the Sahel

In this session, Dr. Baldaro discusses the root causes of jihadism in the Sahel, focusing on how civil wars, local grievances, poor governance, and corruption have been inadequately addressed by the European Union’s counter-terrorism strategy in the region, which was heavily securitised. He then expands on Russia’s current counter-insurgency strategy—an even more hardline and militarised approach—that not only fails to address local grievances but also contributes to increased chaos and violence.

Dr. Baldaro concludes by expressing scepticism about the possibility of a future return of European aid, noting that the military juntas governing the various Sahelian states have adopted a strictly repressive approach to tackling the issue. However, he highlights some exceptions, such as Italy’s presence in Niger and the growing involvement of new actors like Turkey, Iran, and the Gulf monarchies.

Dr. Edoardo Baldaro is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Palermo. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Scuola Normale Superiore, Institute of Human and Social Sciences. He is a leading expert on the Sahel region and themes such as state fragility, jihadism and regional conflict management.

Interviewers: Axelle Bougouma, Angelo Saad Hintermayer and Camilla Cormegna - Africa Team

October 10, 2024 — No Comments

Antifa: Evaluating Claims of Democratic Threat and the Debate over Terrorist Classification

By Agostino Bono, Rodney Ekow Buah, Isabelle Despicht, Sophie Herzog Sønju - Crime, Extremism and Terrorism Team

Introduction

The name Antifa was first used in Nazi Germany by a coalition of far-left parties which were created to oppose the growing power of Nazism. The term Antifa is a shortened form of antifaschistisch (anti-fascist). Its members were driven and are still driven by beliefs which combat fascist, racist and right-wing ideologies, through any means both legal and illegal.

Antifa, a decentralised movement, follows both anarchist and communist ideologies. This is reflected in the group's symbols, which incorporate the red flag of the 1917 Russian Revolution and the black flag of 19th-century anarchists.

Conservative pundits and politicians, including former President Donald Trump, have repeatedly accused Antifa of participating in left-wing protests against police brutality and racism in the United States, particularly from the mid-2010s and during the 2017 Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia.

This article will explore whether Antifa poses a threat to democracy and whether it can be defined as a terrorist group. Much of the relevant literature suggests that Antifa is not a threat to democracy and lacks the characteristics of a terrorist group. The origins of Antifa are rooted in anti-authoritarianism and anti-fascism, which some argue align it more closely with democratic principles. However, others believe that Antifa's violent and occasionally illegal tactics pose a threat to democracy, emphasizing that such methods may undermine free expression, a fundamental aspect of democratic society.

Historical Background

The Antifa movement emerged in Germany and Italy in opposition to the rising Nazi and fascist ideologies. This is exemplified by groups such as the Antifaschistische Aktion in Germany and the Arditi del Popolo in Italy. The anti-fascist ideology gained momentum and spread its influence beyond Germany and Italy. In October 1936, tens of thousands of anti-fascists reacted to a march of British Union fascists on Cable Street and Whitechapel by throwing rocks and homemade bombs.

While anti-fascism decreased worldwide due to the fall of Nazi Germany, it reemerged in the 1970s to counter an increase in Neo-Nazi activity in Europe, Asia and the United States.

Since the 1980s, the United States has witnessed the highest level of anti-fascist protests. For example, the Anti-Racist Action Network, which operated between 1987 and 2013, and the Puget Sound John Brown Gun Club are examples of active anti-fascist and anti-racist movements.

In 2016, the election of Donald Trump strengthened the activity of anti-fascist groups. Furthermore, following the death of George Floyd in 2020, there was evidence of increased anti-fascist activism as a reaction to police brutality. However, the FBI later stated that ordinary criminals were responsible for the acts of violence and looting and not groups like Antifa.

Antifa groups are also operating in Europe in countries such as Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Ukraine. In Germany, for example, in October 2016, far-left groups in Dresden led a peaceful protest on the occasion of the anniversary of the German reunification on 3 October, for "turning Unity celebrations into a disaster". Furthermore, Antifa sympathizers took to the streets in Hamburg during the 2017 G20 summit, some say, in reaction to Donald Trump’s accusatory rhetoric.

Tactics & Activities of Antifa

The Antifa movement employs a variety of tactics aimed at countering far-right and authoritarian ideologies. Central to its approach is the belief that direct action is necessary to confront these threats. Protest demonstrations are a common method, where participants gather to voice their opposition to fascism and xenophobia. These protests often escalate into clashes with far-right extremists, particularly during significant events like the Charlottesville rally and protests in Portland. Antifa’s militant tactics can include physical altercations, raising concerns about public safety and the ethical implications of violence in political activism.

In addition to street confrontations, Antifa groups engage in community organising and outreach to raise awareness about far-right extremism. They frequently utilise social media to mobilise supporters, disseminate information, and document the activities of far-right organisations. Authorities in various countries have increased scrutiny of Antifa due to concerns about violence and public safety. The EU's TE-SAT report has highlighted the rise in violent actions linked to left-wing extremism, prompting law enforcement to strengthen their responses.

In this context, some Antifa members in Austria took part in 2022 in training camps designed to equip activists with skills for protest, self-defense, and community organisation. These camps serve as spaces for learning techniques related to civil disobedience and strategic communication, but they also raise concerns about radicalisation and the potential for increased violence. While Antifa’s actions are rooted in a commitment to antifascism, they face ongoing scrutiny regarding their methods. Critics argue that violent tactics can undermine broader anti-fascist goals, complicating the movement's public image and effectiveness. As Antifa continues to navigate these challenges, its capacity to adapt its activities in response to the evolving political landscape will be pivotal in determining its long-term impact.

*Source: Gregor Fischer - https://www.flickr.com/photos/gonzo_photo/406787012*

Global Presence and Influence

Antifa’s global presence has expanded significantly in recent years. Its influence is remarkably evident in countries like the United States, where it engages in direct action against far-right extremism. As a decentralised movement, Antifa lacks a formal structure, allowing it to spread and operate independently across the world. The movement is viewed as “a reaction to the extreme right by concerned left-wing activists”. As far-right extremist politics gain momentum globally, anti-fascist movements have risen in response. According to the European Parliament, Antifa is not a single organisation, but a “collective name” used by various informal, autonomous groups claiming to be anti-fascist”. This broad, open identity allows anyone opposing fascism to align themselves with the movement.

With the growing influence of the far-right political party Alternative für Deutschland there has been a significant increase in the presence and potential threat of the anti-fascist movement in Germany. Modern militant German Antifa groups have been involved in violent confrontations, notably between 2018 and 2020, attacking and singling out German neo-nazis. The same applies to Sweden, where the far right political party Sverigedemokraterna(SD) has had a surge in popularity, with an increase of around 20% in the polls in the past 20 years. Consequently, Swedish Anti-fascist Aktion (AFA) and Swedish Revolutionary Front have carried out acts of political violence, including an attack on former SD politician Vávra Suk.

In the US, Antifa grew in popularity and presence during Donald Trump’s presidency in 2016-2020. This was partly due to his reported alignment with far-right groups such as the Proud Boys, but also due to the increased engagement regarding far-right politics in general in the US. Trump’s rhetoric, including his refusal to condemn white supremacist groups, shifted political discourse and drew attention to Antifa’s opposition. Antifa protesters frequently countered far-right demonstrations, sometimes engaging in violent confrontations. This led to the movement being labeled by critics as rioters and looters, with Trump at one instance saying “Somebody’s got to do something about antifa and the left because this is not a right wing problem.”

Conclusion

Antifa's history, decentralised structure, and focus on anti-fascism have shaped its role as a modern movement. While often associated with far-left ideologies such as anarchism and communism, its primary goal is to resist fascism, racism, and authoritarianism. Although its use of violence and militant tactics has sparked debate, many studies suggest that Antifa is neither a terrorist group nor a direct threat to democracy. Its anti-authoritarian stance is sometimes seen as aligned with democratic values, opposing what it considers oppressive forces. However, critics argue that its violent methods may undermine democracy by limiting free speech and opposing viewpoints.

Looking ahead, Antifa's relevance may depend on the political landscape. As far-right extremism grows in some areas, Antifa could continue to serve as a counterbalance. Its decentralized structure allows for flexibility and adaptability. Nevertheless, reliance on violence could harm its cause in the long term, as public support may decline if it is viewed as more destructive than constructive. Increased scrutiny from authorities is also anticipated if violent incidents continue to be associated with Antifa.

The question of whether Antifa qualifies as an extremist group remains debated. While it employs militant tactics and occasionally breaks the law, its goals are centered on protecting marginalized groups rather than advocating for authoritarian control. This places Antifa in a complex position; despite operating outside mainstream activism, it is not typically regarded as an extremist movement.

September 16, 2024 — No Comments

Rodrigo Duton on the Crime-Terror Nexus in Brazil

In this episode, Prof. Rodrigo Duton discusses the importance of the crime-terror nexus in Brazilian security. Prof. Rodrigo Duton is an Adjunct Faculty member at the George C. Marshall Center, originally from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Interviewers: Sarah Toubman, Dr. Rabiah Ryklief, & Giovanni Giacalone by the Central & South America Team.

Disclaimer: Rodrigo Duton is participating in this podcast solely in his academic capacity. He is not speaking on behalf of any Brazilian law enforcement agency or the government of Brazil. The views and opinions expressed are his own.

February 19, 2024 — No Comments

Anant Mishra on the current security and political situation in Afghanistan

In this session, Professor Mishra discusses the capacity of the security forces to control the territory, the Islamic State Khorasan Province, and the division within the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

Professor Anant Mishra is a Visiting Fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security, University of South Wales.

Interviewers: Agostino Bono and Camilla Cormegna - Crime, Extremism and Terrorism Team

February 8, 2024 — No Comments

African narco-jihadism among al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates: waging a halal war by haram means

Author: Ilas Touazi - Africa Team

Introduction

The interlinkages between international phenomena such as the illicit drug economy, transnational organised crime, conflict, and terrorism have become the absolute reality of globalisation and the complex interdependence that reflects its savage side. The spread of Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and their regional affiliates as key predatory actors in global governance through paradoxical guerrilla warfare using theological justifications and political fabrications to promote “narco-jihadism,” exploiting Haram money for a Halal cause, makes Africa the new epicentre of the nexus between organised crime, narcotics, and terrorism's nebulae.

A triptych of terrorism, religion and organized crime: a marriage of carp and rabbit between haram and halal

In Islam, the main source of prohibitions and permissions comes from the Qurʾān. Thus, “Halal” means anything that is permitted or conforms to Islamic law with a set of rules concerning the adherents' principles of life and “Muslim morality.” It includes, among other things, nutritional standards that comply with Sharia law. Conversely, the concept of “haram” refers to matters that are unacceptable or illegal under Islamic law, i.e., all harmful chemical substances (toxins) that are dangerous to human life and health, as well as the consumption of narcotics and drugs are considered prohibited (Haram). While the involvement of al-Qaeda and Daesh in the dirty narcotics business is a heady cocktail under a triangle that combines politics, religion, and jihadist crusades, narcotics and terrorism have no religious hue.

Islamist terrorist groups have justified jihad as halal and part of the acts of “ijtihad” or martyrdom as a necessary religious duty carried out by the “muharribun” against the “kuffar” (infidels), thus constituting a halal and legitimate cause. Although the Qurʾān explicitly forbids the outbreak of war and authorises combat only against real aggressors, jihadist thinking has adapted to political realism, authorising wars of expansion, even using illegitimate means, i.e., Haram. Indeed, with the internationalisation of the jihad, previously focused on the “near enemy,” then towards the “far enemy,” described in the Islamic vision as the “home of war” (dar al-ḥarb), thus making it possible to wage an offensive jihad, using narcotics to spoil Western society with drugs and the ongoing use of mass production and distribution of illicit drugs, intrinsically contrary to Islam, as a pretext to advance religious and ideological objectives and justify the “holy” war against the West.African Jihadist terror-crime nexus spectrum: A cross-trigger-incubator cycle

African Jihadist terror-crime nexus spectrum: A cross-trigger-incubator cycle

“Narco-jihad” is the contradictory and absurd justification of acts of violence in the name of religion, fuelled by the revenues of the illegal drug trade, which consists of spoiling “infidel” Western forces with drugs and consolidating Islamic rule, not by faith but with a well-calculated guerrilla strategy, since the drug economy remains one of the main sources of funding for jihadist-matrix terrorism in Africa. The practice of narco money for jihad dates from the Islamist “mujahideen” groups against the Soviet Union. As for post-modern jihad, the use of cryptocurrencies and bitcoin has overtaken traditional methods of transferring funds as part of “crypto-jihad.” Meanwhile, with globalisation, the end of the Cold War, and the “global war on terror,” the “terrorism-crime continuum” became a growing threat, forming an adaptive alliance to changing circumstances. On others, terrorist and organised crime groups used a dual “modus operandi” nexus, including logistics and material support, and protections under geographical “safe havens” deeply intertwined over “hybrid groups.”

Henceforth, African jihadi narcotics rely on religion, local conflicts, anti-western rhetoric, corruption of government officials, and the general feeling of injustice to gather support. However, the “black hole syndrome,” in which the convergence between terrorist nebulas and transnational organised crime groups is mainly occurring within Sahel’s “ungoverned space,” where a weak or failed state has created conditions ripe for jihadist actors connections, including Niger’s narco-networks to gain economic and political power. In so doing, a complex “glocal jihad” is emerging, linking local, national, regional, transnational, and global levels in a dialectical, blurred, and intertwined process that goes beyond local spatial realities, as applied by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in its strategy of geographical expansion in the Sahel with complex interconnections between smuggling networks and illegal arms and drug trafficking. In this respect, jihadist groups operating in West Africa have maintained their actions and even expanded, opportunistically and pragmatically resorting to various sources of funding, with the smuggling of drugs and narcotics, particularly cocaine and cannabis resin, playing a key role in the entrenchment of “narco-jihadist” activities in the Sahel region. Notably, Al-Mourabitoun and the Gourma Katiba focus on kidnapping for ransom and trafficking in drugs, arms, and transnational criminal activities.

Africa’s narco-jihadism landscape and trends: dual dynamics between hybridization and trans-nationalisation

The African threat landscape has consistently changed, and the narcotics routes are varied, with Guinea-Bissau as a key “narco-state” facilitating the flow of illegal narcotics, with drugs transiting through the Sahara, passing Jihadist zones, North Africa, and then on to Southern Europe. As a result, the east coast of Africa is becoming a hub for the international heroin trade networks and forms an integrated regional criminal economy with its long coastline providing landing sites and safe routes for Afghan heroin destined for markets in Europe and North America. Simultaneously, according to the UNODC World Drug Report 2023, Africa remains a key region for cocaine trafficking, mainly in West Africa, while North Africa is a central axis for the inter-regional smuggling of cannabis resin and cannabis. However, half of the pharmaceutical opioids seized worldwide between 2017 and 2021 were in Africa, largely due to the non-medical use of tramadol. This is why, more recently, tramadol has been a main aspect of “narco-jihadism” under an era of “low-cost terror”, including Captagon, which has become the “drug of Jihad” used initially by Islamic state fighters and militants of narco-terror groups in the Middle East region, also known as the “cocaine of the poor,” “ISIS’s drug,” and then spread through African jihadist operatives as war drugs and money laundering business.

*Credit:* https://greydynamics.com/cocaine-cashew-status-quo-in-africas-first-narco-state/

AfricaIndeed, the 2023 Global Terrorism Index report has heightened the relationship between terrorism and ecological threats under a vicious cycle of progressively greater asymmetrical challenges, mainly clustered in African regions. As such, the 2022 Ecological Threat Report (ETR) identified that most African countries have emerged as “hotspots” affected by climate change, terrorism, conflict, and crime, with the highest risk in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). However, African jihadist groups are moving more towards environmental terrorism, which encompasses not only wildlife crime but also smuggling and all kinds of activities, including the illegal taxation of natural resources, which accounts for 38% of conflict financing, drugs (28%), seizures and looting (26%), and money extorted from kidnappings for ransom (3%).While a study conducted in 2023 by UNODC has demonstrated that illicit financial flows (IFFs), including smuggling of migrants (SOM) and trafficking in persons (TIP), especially women and children, with the involvement of non-state armed groups and terrorist and violent extremist groups (VEGs), have cross-border implications through the west African region with Islamic state local affiliates,.

The African franchises of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State: Narco-jihadism, a necessity that allows prohibitions

Some areas of the African continent, have become a new global hotspot for narco-jihadist activities. Local VEGs, claiming inspiration from ideologies espoused by Al-Qaida or Daesh, reflect a “proto-state” version of governance that operates within a wider political economy characterised by “business models” with “Big Man” patron-client organisations or “warlords,” as Mokhtar Belmokhtar's nicknamed “Mister Marlboro,” using cigarette smuggling to finance AQIM and affiliated groups such as Ansar Al-Sharia. However, Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin has engaged with illicit economies and tactical use of economic warfare through its involvement in post-modern razzias (or rezzous), which replaced the ancient caravan trade in the Sahel-Saharan belt with a criminal economy based on cannabis resin (hashish), then cocaine. Indeed, the narco-jihadism networks spread across ethnicities and tribes, namely with “black jihad,”exploited by Ansaroul Islam, building alliances with criminal gangs such as Lahmar and Tuareg traffickers and TilemsiArabs. In West Africa, the drug trade has fuelled the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) with illicit trade networks, particularly synthetic opioids, and charges “transit taxes” to narcotics trafficking. However, Al-Shabaab militants have financial or operational links with the pirates. These close ties are referred to as the “sea jihad.” In fact, in December 2023, a new alliance was formed with Somali pirates operating off the coast, receiving 30% of all ransom proceeds.

Certainly, Al-Qaeda and Islamic State African affiliates have used the religious tax known in Islam as zakat as a source of legitimacy and religious authority, imposed on herders in the Sahel with the demand for cattle as payment for zakat, on the one hand in exchange for protection and on the other for financing jihadism. Although zakat in Islam is not explicitly given in exchange for services, it has been usurped by JNIM and the Islamic State-Sahel Province (ISSP) in the name of religion, becoming a coercive measure and a source of illegitimacy under the new guise of “cow jihad.”Meanwhile, Boko Haram has normalised gender-based violence as a strategy of terror with the commodification and militarization of women as sex slaves; this is built around some theological justifications that permit submission to men and the exploitation of women, including forms of slavery or human trafficking for sexual purposes. Whereas Islamic law considers human trafficking, including violence against women and children, drug trafficking, and smuggling, to be crimes of ta'zir.

Conclusions

The process of terrorist groups using religion to promote narcotics causes, particularly in the African continent, has become part of the postmodern jihadist landscape. That’s why counter-terrorism must be based first and foremost on an understanding of the patterns and modes of jihadist thought, as well as on a solid grasp of the intellectual matrices and theological foundations that represent an effective, preventive tool for building resilience in the face of violent extremism and mitigating the factors behind this globalized phenomenon. Hence, education and academic work in favour of the new moderate discourse are constants to expose their shortcomings and contradictions in the form of a soft approach that must accompany hard structural and operational counter-terrorism.

October 24, 2022 — No Comments

Ido Levy on ISIS vs Al Qaeda

Interviewers: Anna Lorenzini and John Devine.

Ido Levy talks about the deep conflict between ISIS and Al-Qaeda and its possible implications from a strategic point of view, the significance that they believe the West has within this scenario, and whether some recent events such as the war in Ukraine or the upcoming Israeli elections may affect terrorist activities.

Ido Levy is an associate fellow working with the Washington Institute’s Military and Security Studies Program and a PhD student at American University’s School of International Service. His work focuses especially on Near East Policy on counterterrorism and military operations, particularly relating to jihadist groups.

October 5, 2022 — No Comments

Conversation with Stefano Piazza (Italiano)

A conversation with Stefano Piazza on the capabilities of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State since the death of Ayman al-Zawahiri and future developments.

(Una conversazione con Stefano Piazza sulla condizione di Al-Qaeda e dello Stato Islamico dopo la morte di Ayman al-Zawahiri, e uno sguardo agli sviluppi futuri).

Interviewer: Francesco Bruno.

June 8, 2022 — No Comments

Analysis of the nexus between Human Trafficking and Terrorism.

Author: Arianna Caggiano.

This is a critical commentary of the research paper launched by the OSCE Organization: Trafficking in Human Beings and Terrorism. Where and How They Intersect: Analysis and Recommendations for More Effective Policy Response.

Human Trafficking as a tactic of terrorist groups

Over the years, human trafficking has increasingly become a modus operandi used by terrorist groups to finance and carry out their activities. To this extent, as human trafficking constitutes a crime that is usually perpetrated by organized criminal groups, some scholars have stressed that the “crime-terror nexus” implies that both criminal and terrorist organizations might cooperate with each other in the furtherance of their respective goals. Despite the increasing use of organised crime-related tactics deployed by terrorists, in analysing the current legal framework in international law when it comes to trafficking in human beings and terrorism there is still no existing treaty or convention dealing with the nexus between the two phenomena. On the basis of the OSCE paper launched in 2021 on the nexus between human trafficking and terrorism, this article will try to critically evaluate from a juridical and legal point of view the analysis and findings developed by the OSCE on this matter.

Comparing Legal and Policy Frameworks of Anti-Trafficking and anti-terrorism Mechanisms

When it comes to the definition of the human trafficking’s legal framework, it is worth emphasizing that it was not until 2000 that a first definition of trafficking in human beings was given in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, better known as the Palermo Protocol. The adoption of the Protocol can be considered as a watershed moment for the legal framework of human trafficking: as of today, it counts 173 signatory States and it can be defined, thus, as almost a universal ratification. A further key role in combating human trafficking is played by regional trafficking treaties, which complement the obligations upon signatory States, especially with reference to victims’ protection. Indeed, as stressed by the OSCE research, a major principle guiding anti-trafficking legislations and policies is the principle of non-punishment of victims of trafficking, according to which Member States are obliged to «assess the individual situation of persons released from the captivity of armed and terrorist groups so as to enable prompt identification of victims of trafficking».

On the other hand, the international legal framework related to terrorism and counterterrorism is considerably more challenging and complex in comparison to the anti-trafficking international legal system. Indeed, despite the existence of a set of treaties, protocols, conventions, Security Council Resolutions, as well as “soft law” and non-binding mechanisms, there is no comprehensive instrument providing a universal and accepted definition of terrorism, as it is the case for human trafficking with the Palermo Protocol.

In analysing the nexus between these two phenomena, it is of utmost importance to emphasize the constituent elements of trafficking used as a tactic by terrorist groups. Pursuant art. 3 of the Palermo Protocol, «Trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force […] to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. […]». This very intense definition provided by the Protocol, shows three main constituent elements of human trafficking: action, means and purpose.

Therefore, as the OSCE outlines, in evaluating the link between trafficking in human beings and terrorism from a legal perspective, a useful approach would be one that analyses these three constituent elements when exploited by terrorist groups as a tactic to recruit individuals. In this regard, the analysis of the current legal framework on the nexus between the two crimes shows that a harmonisation in the criminalization of terrorism and human trafficking as two offences connected has not been reached yet. Indeed, despite the existence of several instruments that recognize the growing links between terrorism and transnational organized crime, the lack of a definition of terrorism still hinders the internationally community to adopt an internationally agreed-upon approach to terrorism matters, while it is not the case for human trafficking.

The legal response that has been adopted so far to address cases where the two phenomena intersects has largely focused on criminalizing all individuals related to terrorist activities and groups. The lack of a definition of terrorism has led States to adopt different measures aimed at only criminalizing terrorists and not identifying and protecting victims. Therefore, as highlighted in the research, this approach has showed to have significant consequences for victims, who have risked being held fully accountable for all the crimes they have committed, even though they are victims of human traffickers. Based on these findings, the OSCE research concludes that a human trafficking lens when dealing with terrorist criminal offences should be applied to contribute to victim identification, assistance, rehabilitation and reintegration, and prevention of re-victimization. Therefore, it would be of utmost importance to apply the principle of non-punishment - that already exists in the human trafficking framework – in the anti-terrorism existing legal and policy mechanism.

Conclusion

This critical commentary has analysed from a legal perspective the comprehensive research carried out by the OSCE organization on the nexus between human trafficking and terrorism. It has highlighted how the application of anti-trafficking mechanisms, including the principle of non-punishment, in the context of terrorism could help leading in a better way prosecution of criminal offences related to terrorism. The OSCE research might constitute the basis for an international and agreed-upon definition that considers both a security-oriented approach to prevent and prosecute terrorist offences and a human rights-based one, ensuring that victims of terrorism – and trafficked persons exploited by terrorists – are not held accountable and can access to their rights.

All in all, the OSCE research offers significant food for thought and, using concrete cases, helps filling the knowledge gap of policy makers, academics, practitioners, and legislators on the nexus between human trafficking and terrorism.

May 19, 2022 — No Comments

“He who accepts… survives”: Tales from Syria

The ITSS Verona Middle East team interviews a Syrian gentleman who wishes to remain anonymous for security reasons. He details his experiences of returning to Syrian after 12 years. He recounts his experiences from collecting his allotted rations, to experiencing the energy crisis currently affecting Syria, and more about life under dictatorship and civil war.

Interviewers: Anna Lorenzini and John Devine.

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