Ukraine Archives – ITSS Verona

May 5, 2026 — No Comments

Euro-American Intel Sharing: Trump’s Second Term Threat

By Elena de Mitri - UK & European Affairs Team

Intelligence cooperation has always been fundamental for allied countries that share similar interests, values, and objectives in order to rationalise resources and expertise. Cooperation is particularly developed among transatlantic allies, including the US and many European countries.

While it tends to be relatively stable, even in the face of disagreements with a partner’s actions and policies, concerns have recently been raised in many European countries regarding the current Trump administration and the stability of such cooperation, due to the fear that the US government could weaponise and politicise intelligence flows and information shared by the partners in order to achieve political objectives. Among confrontational behaviour by the US administration, European partners are learning how to deal with an increasingly risky relationship.

An increasingly shaky relationship?

Soon after the start of the second Trump presidency in January 2025, European intelligence agencies started voicing concerns about the risk of over-relying on US intelligence. Tariffs and frequent political quarrels haven’t helped either as disagreements with the current administration could endanger transatlantic relationships in an unprecedented way. Transatlantic relations have been under strain since then. The changing tide was particularly represented by the March 2025 suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine. Lasted only for a few days, the suspension was enacted to push Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to engage in diplomatic talks with Russia to reach a peace deal. However, such a move also sent a clear message to US allies: lack of cooperation towards US objectives could have grave consequences, including the weaponisation of intelligence.

Other developments have strengthened this view. This year’s Annual Threat Assessment and its dismissal of transatlantic security cooperation, coupled with the unusual appointments of politically aligned individuals as directors of US intelligence agencies, usually reserved for established non-partisan practitioners, has marked a significant change in the country’s policy towards the war in Ukraine, as both moves were partially reflecting Russian positions on the conflict. More recently, the appointment of General Joshua Rudd, who previously served in the Indo-Pacific Command, as head of the National Security Agency, one of the main intelligence agencies in the US, strengthened this shift towards a stronger focus on China. Finally, purges of established US intelligence officers, due to their involvement in cases perceived as anti-Trump, might ultimately undermine established relations among practitioners from allied countries, as trust heavily relies on personal relationships.

Intelligence cooperation has always been upheld through subsequent administrations. However, the instability and opaqueness brought about by the second Trump administration has left allies wondering whether they should become more self-sufficient. After the Signal scandal in March 2025, the denial of any wrongdoing by involved US officials and the grave breach of operations security rules left allied intelligence services wondering whether sharing sensitive information with US government officials remains feasible as its disclosure could compromise sources and operations. Perceptions of unreliability might threaten trust among national intelligence services, which is fundamental to maintaining the current high-level cooperation. As a consequence, many European intelligence agencies showed increased worries that the intelligence they were sharing with the US would either be leaked or, even worse, be shared to non-allied countries without their permission, thus breaking a long-established rule. Some of them, including the Dutch intelligence agencies, have scaled down intelligence sharing with the US due to concerns that the current administration may politicise intelligence and possibly share sensitive information with Russia, in line with the country’s repositioning along Russian narratives of the conflict in Ukraine.

Finally, US increasingly assertive and coercive behaviour towards traditionally allied countries has made European intelligence services even more worried about sharing information with the US. As president Trump was publicly talking about annexing Canada, one of his closest advisers was pushing to remove Canada from the Five Eyes, the most important intelligence-sharing network in the world, in order to pressure the country into becoming the 51st state. While this remained a suggestion, it was reported that US government officials were actively discussing it. On the other hand, after the US government declared its intention to take control of Greenland, which is part of the Danish Kingdom, due to security concerns in the Arctic, the Danish Defence Intelligence Services categorised the US as a threat to the country, amid alleged demands from the US government to gather intelligence on Greenland.

The importance of transatlantic intelligence cooperation

Intelligence cooperation has long been fundamental to achieve security objectives, especially as the nature of the current threats has become increasingly transnational. Intelligence agencies face numerous, complex threats and resources are usually too scarce to effectively deal with threats by themselves. As a consequence, cooperation among intelligence agencies of countries with similar objectives and values has greatly increased since the Cold War, in order to combine resources and fill expertise gaps. This is especially important nowadays, as current threats are increasingly ambiguous, murky and well-concealed. Cooperation is quite consistent in areas such as terrorism and transnational crime, in which reaching shared goals is relatively easier.

Continued cooperation relies on and reinforces a shared worldview and perception of current threats. It is no surprise then that US and European intelligence agencies have developed a strong relationship in this field. The US has currently various levels of partnerships with European countries, dating back to the Second World War. While some countries are considered privileged partners, other are "less important" so information sharing with them is more limited. However, they remain critical partners for the US due to their easier access and specific expertise, including linguistic expertise. Moreover, multilateral forms of cooperation with other European partners happen in the context of specific alliances, such as NATO, or informal organizations.

Even when transatlantic allies were involved in disputes and fights about each others’ foreign policy and trade policies, intelligence sharing was upheld. As a matter of fact, when European countries disagreed with US military actions during the War on Terror, they would still provide important intelligence to help the US government achieve its objectives. This continued cooperation has highlighted how strong relations and shared interests, including especially the fight against terrorism, allowed intelligence agencies to overcome political disagreements. However, the behaviour of the current US administration has been threatening these relationships in an unprecedented way. This has brought European countries to discuss the possibility of reducing their cooperation with the US, in order to protect their national interests.

Prospects for a more independent Europe

Replacing the US intelligence contribution is not an easy task. While European countries have advanced tools and capabilities, they lack the scale and coordination role that the US possesses. Such scale allows US intelligence agencies to provide more timely and higher quality assessments, as they can benefit from the use of big data techniques and artificial intelligence. As a consequence, if the US was to stop or greatly limit intelligence sharing, European countries, along with Ukraine, would have to rely on a lower quantity and quality of information. Indeed, replacing US capabilities would require long term investments in human capabilities and advanced tools.

President Donald Trump poses for a family photo with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine and European leaders before their multilateral meeting, Monday, August 18, 2025, in the Cross Hall on the State Floor of the White House. (Official White House Photo by Andrea Hanks)

However, it is not an impossible task. In January 2026, it was reported that France was providing a growing amount of technical intelligence to Ukraine, likely referring primarily to satellite imagery. Such intelligence was previously mostly provided by the US, but the March 2025 suspension of intelligence sharing and the subsequent pause in some weapon shipments to Ukraine prompted European countries to take a more prominent role. While intelligence sharing was quickly restored, this suspension amplified already existing worries about the politicisation of intelligence by the US government. Amongst calls to replace resources and capabilities offered by the US and work towards European independence in the security sector, progress tends to be quite slow. A key factor in this struggle is the size and structure of actors in the field. No actor, including the European Union, possesses the same financial resources and in-house capabilities as the US, the latter requiring a long time to be developed.

At the same time, the Trump administration is also seeking to reduce its involvement in the continent and has openly taken a more hostile approach to its European allies. As a consequence, European intelligence services are expanding cooperation among them, with important steps taken at the EU level. As prominent officials from European intelligence agencies have started giving more importance to EU-wide agencies and the number of intelligence officials embedded in representation offices in Brussels has grown, internal pushes to develop autonomous capabilities have been growing, although emphasising the importance of maintaining cooperation with the US. Some are instead calling for the creation of an intelligence cooperation agency dedicated to the European Union to make better use of intelligence provided by member states. However, such an agency would have to overcome numerous challenges, including the voluntary nature of intelligence sharing in the European block, which leaves critical information in the hands of member states that have repeatedly been wary of sharing too much. Moreover, some European countries are widely considered untrustworthy due to their ties to third party countries such as Russia and China. As a consequence, cooperation will likely include a limited group of countries that share generally stronger ties, including in security. This is already happening inside NATO, as more and more intelligence is now being shared on a smaller scale rather than with all the member states. Bilaterally, cooperation among key countries, including the UK, France and Germany, has already been strengthened in order to deal with the instability caused by the current US administration. This strengthened cooperation will likely mark an important, and possibly permanent, shift from the critical role that the US attained until now.

Conclusion

Relations among European and US intelligence services have been described recently as generally good, as high ranking officers of European intelligence services have stressed the importance to keep up cooperation with the US. However, evolving and multifaceted tensions between the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean are increasingly affecting transatlantic relations, especially in regard to security. The shift towards the Russian narrative of the conflict in Ukraine and frequent disagreements between European countries and the US have positioned the latter as a riskier alliance for European countries. Such repositioning might impact intelligence sharing, which is considered fundamental in many fields. While some countries are reconsidering their intelligence ties to the US, others have already started scaling down sharing, especially in areas of particular concerns. European intelligence officials have openly stated that cooperation in this field hasn’t stopped and that the US remains an ally, as US intelligence agencies are trying to ease European worries. However, further transatlantic tensions might have an unprecedented impact on security relations.

July 10, 2025 — No Comments

Leadership styles: How Trump, Putin & Macron shape negotiations

By Camilla Braito (Russia Desk) & Vismantė Ežerskytė (European Affairs and UK Desk)

Introduction

As of today, negotiations involving the United States, Russia, and the European Union over the war in Ukraine remain ongoing but face substantial obstacles. Ukrainian and Russian delegations met again in Istanbul for a second round of peace talks focused on securing a ceasefire to bring an end to the conflict started in February 2022. This scenario highlights the vital role of leadership- the ability to make decisions, earn trust, and pursue common goals, especially in non-routine matters like war and peace. Incorporating leadership analysis into the study of negotiation dynamics enriches traditional explanations that rely solely on military power or systemic constraints. This piece examines how leadership styles influence negotiations regarding the war in Ukraine through two key frameworks developed by Margaret Hermann and Joseph Nye, as well as Ilana Zohar's work on the leadership skills necessary for effective negotiations in times of crisis.

Leadership Styles in Theory

Building on earlier typologies, Hermann identifies four leadership styles based on handling constraints, processing external information, and motivation: activist, strategic, pragmatic, and opportunist. Each includes two subtypes, from power-seeking expansionists to consensus-building accommodators, reflecting varying openness to internal challenge, context, and goal orientation in shaping leadership behaviour.

Nye’s framework defines leadership through inspirational, transactional, and contextual competencies. Leaders vary by goals (transformative or conservative), influence (transforming or directive), and power use (soft or hard). Inspirational leaders attract through vision and values; transactional ones rely on coercion. These categories often overlap as leaders adjust according to evolving environments.

For our analysis, it is also essential to understand what negotiations entail. These are voluntary processes to resolve conflicts through communication, either one-time or ongoing. Negotiations involve various tactics - brutal, time-related, authority-based, persuasive, and soft - and styles: competitive, cooperative, and integrative. Effective negotiators adapt tactics, manage emotions, and choose principled or positional approaches to seek mutually beneficial or win-lose outcomes.

Leadership and Negotiation in the Ukraine War: Trump, Putin, Macron

Since 2022, the war in Ukraine has revealed how leadership styles influence the direction of conflict and the viability of negotiation. Donald Trump, now back in office, exhibits a directive-pragmatic style in Hermann’s framework, personality-driven, disregardful of institutions, and focused on personal control over outcomes. According to Nye’s classification, he is transactional and relies on hard power, threat-making, and media optics. In his 2024 campaign, Trump stated he would end the war ‘within 24 hours’ through direct talks with Putin. When no progress was observed, he revised his position, claiming the war “belongs to Biden, Zelenskyy, and Putin.” His White House press conference with JD Vance and Zelenskyy drew significant media attention and controversy with Vance attacking the Ukrainian president while Trump stood by. Although relations were later smoothed at the Vatican, the episode showcased Trump’s preference for performance over diplomacy. He later revealed a call with Moscow, only to suggest that Putin might not want to end the war, adding to strategic ambiguity rather than offering a solution-oriented direction. His style has been viewed by some analysts as prioritising personal visibility over institutional coordination.

Vladimir Putin, meanwhile, operates with an activist-expansionist orientation, challenging domestic constraints, filtering external data, and pursuing goals often described as ideological and revisionist. Since 2022, he has instrumentalised hard power and coercive diplomacy to destabilise Ukraine and reshape European security. Though he publicly agreed to a ceasefire in 2024, Russian forces continued striking Ukrainian cities. Putin consistently denied these violations, instead accusing Ukraine of breaking the truce. His approach fits Nye’s transactional category, using strategic escalation and blame deflection to control the narrative. In one instance, Putin was onstage at a public event when informed that Trump was on the line. He calmly told the moderator he wasn’t in a hurry, signalling self-confidence and dominance in contrast to Western volatility.

Emmanuel Macron presents a starkly different model. Classified as pragmatic-consultative by Hermann, he values institutional process and contextual understanding. In early 2022, he made multiple high-profile visits to Moscow and Kyiv, attempting to keep diplomatic channels open even as tensions escalated. Though criticised for engaging with Putin too long, his efforts showed commitment to negotiation, de-escalation, and European agency. His leadership style aligns with Nye’s transformational vision—forward-looking, cooperative, and rooted in values-based persuasion. However, its effectiveness has been limited by the dominance of zero-sum postures from both Trump and Putin.

Leadership styles and negotiation tactics: recommendations based on the analysis

Different leadership styles shape negotiation approaches and can explain friction in trilateral or multilateral talks. While Trump and Putin focus on dominance and short-term gains, Macron pursues calibrated, integrative solutions, making him a diplomatic outlier.

To advance negotiations to end the Ukraine war, it is vital to tailor tactics to these leadership profiles. Putin’s coercive, revisionist style requires a mix of firm deterrents and incremental principled negotiation. Early hard measures help set boundaries, but must avoid provoking defensiveness. Active listening is key, not to legitimise propaganda but to uncover underlying strategic goals. Indirect or mediated talks, like the June Turkey talks, can reduce zero-sum dynamics and ease tensions.

Unpredictability, delays, and unilateral moves mark Trump’s transactional, anti-institutional style. Negotiations with him should combine persuasion (offering symbolic wins) with cooperative, face-saving compromises. Building a personal connection while appealing to national pride and political advantage is crucial.

In contrast, Macron’s transformative, institutional leadership supports integrative strategies grounded in shared values and multilateral legitimacy. His willingness to listen and build consensus helps counterbalance more confrontational styles.

Conclusion

This analysis shows that while Trump and Putin are both directive and goal-driven, they diverge significantly in approach: Trump’s leadership is pragmatic and transactional, shaped by optics and personalism; Putin’s leadership is often described as activist and expansionist, using centralised authority and assertive tactics, with expansionist elements. In contrast, Macron is described as a pragmatic-consultative leader who emphasises transformational goals through diplomacy, institutional cooperation, and long-term reform.

Recognising the dynamic interplay between leadership styles and negotiation phases allows for better timing and selection of moves, hopefully informing more effective crisis resolution. Especially in ongoing, high-stakes international negotiations such as those regarding Ukraine, success depends less on fixed rules and more on contextual intelligence, emotional regulation, and the strategic capability to adjust tactics according to the counterpart’s motivation and behaviour patterns beyond surface-level display of force and hardline rhetoric.

June 3, 2025 — No Comments

Dr. Arūnas Molis on Energy Security and the War in Ukraine

In this episode of the ITSS Verona Member Series, Dr. Arūnas Molis talks about the changing landscape of European energy security in the context of the current war in Ukraine, with special focus on strategic lessons for the Baltic region.

Specifically, Dr. Molis discusses how energy can be weaponised, used as a tool of political pressure, and financial power in the context of hybrid warfare. He explores Russia’s energy leverage, attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure, and lessons from the Baltic states’ path to energy independence.

Dr. Molis is a policy analyst in Lithuania and has previously held key positions at Klaipeda LNG and NATO Energy Security Center of Excellence.

Interviewers: Alexandra Tsarvulanova & Sara Pastorello - Russia and Post-Soviet Space Desk

March 20, 2025 — No Comments

Italy’s Geopolitical Tightrope: Meloni’s Leadership, EU Dynamics, and the Transatlantic Balancing Act

By Christian Gaole & Alberto Trame - Italy Desk

Meloni's Geopolitical Challenge: Bridging Continents, Balancing Powers

Italy occupies a pivotal yet precarious position in today’s global landscape, straddling its deep-rooted commitments to the European Union (EU) and its long-standing transatlantic partnership with the United States (US). Under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who has led the country since October 2022, Italy faces a confluence of geopolitical risks, security challenges, and strategic opportunities. As a Mediterranean nation, Italy serves as a bridge between Europe and Africa, a role that amplifies both its vulnerabilities and its potential. Meloni’s leadership, marked by a blend of pragmatism and ambiguity, is central to navigating this complex terrain. This article examines Italy’s geopolitical risks, security issues, and opportunities within the EU and in relation to its transatlantic ties, spotlighting Meloni’s role in shaping the nation’s path forward.

Italy’s Geopolitical Risks: NATO, Ukraine, and Economic Strain

Italy’s geopolitical risks stem from its position within a fracturing NATO alliance, economic pressures exacerbated by global shifts, and domestic political instability. The ongoing war in Ukraine has strained NATO’s cohesion, with diﬀering views among members on how to respond to Russia’s aggression. Italy, a founding member of the alliance, has aligned itself with the Western eﬀort to support Ukraine through military aid and sanctions. However, this stance places it at odds with internal coalition dynamics and economic realities. The conflict has driven up energy costs and disrupted trade, hitting Italy’s export-driven economy hard. Reports indicate a significant GDP decline, with the burden of supporting Ukraine adding to fiscal woes at a time when Italy’s public debt remains among the highest in Europe.

Economic challenges are further intensified by external pressures. The EU’s push for rearmament, aimed at bolstering defenses against potential Russian threats, demands increased military spending from member states. Italy, currently spending below NATO’s 2% GDP target, faces calls to ramp up its defense budget. This comes as the country grapples with the fallout from potential US tariﬀs, which could target Italian exports like machinery and luxury goods, vital to its economic stability. These economic strains test Meloni’s ability to maintain national unity while meeting international obligations, a task complicated by the fragile coalition she leads.

Domestically, political instability poses a significant risk. Meloni heads a right-wing coalition that includes parties with divergent views on foreign policy. Her deputy, Matteo Salvini, has often leaned toward populist and nationalist rhetoric, occasionally clashing with EU directives and NATO’s unified stance. This internal discord threatens to undermine Italy’s ability to project a coherent foreign policy, weakening its influence in Brussels and Washington. Meloni must tread carefully to hold her government together, balancing coalition demands with the need to assert Italy’s role on the global stage.

Security Issues: Mediterranean Vulnerabilities and EU Dependence

Italy’s security challenges are most pronounced in the Mediterranean, a region that encapsulates its strategic importance and its vulnerabilities. The sea serves as a conduit for migration from North Africa, a persistent issue that has fueled domestic political debates and strained Italy’s resources. Alongside migration, the Mediterranean is a hotspot for terrorism and a critical artery for energy supplies, with Italy heavily reliant on gas pipelines and maritime routes. These threats demand a robust security framework, yet Italy often finds itself shouldering the burden with limited support from its EU partners.

The EU’s fragmented approach to Mediterranean security exacerbates Italy’s challenges. Northern member states tend to prioritize eastern threats, like Russia, over southern concerns, leaving Italy to advocate alone for greater focus on migration and regional stability. Meloni has sought to elevate Italy’s role as a Mediterranean power, pushing for EU- wide policies to address these issues, but progress remains slow. This north-south divide within the EU underscores a broader problem: the bloc’s lack of strategic autonomy. Dependent on the US for defense through NATO, the EU struggles to act independently, a dynamic that leaves Italy exposed to shifts in American priorities.

The transatlantic relationship, while a cornerstone of Italy’s security, introduces its own risks. The US has long provided the backbone of NATO’s military might, but potential changes in American leadership — particularly a return to a more isolationist or transactional stance — could disrupt this arrangement. Such a shift would force Italy and other European nations to increase defense spending, a daunting prospect given Italy’s economic constraints. Moreover, a reduced US presence in Europe could embolden adversaries, heightening security risks in the Mediterranean and testing Italy’s ability to respond eﬀectively.

Opportunities: The Piano Mattei and Transatlantic Leverage

Amid these challenges, Italy has opportunities to strengthen its geopolitical standing, notably through the Piano Mattei, a strategic initiative spearheaded by Meloni’s government. This plan seeks to deepen ties with Africa and the Indo-Pacific, positioning Italy as a key player in fostering economic and security partnerships. Unlike traditional aid models, the Piano Mattei emphasises mutual benefit, aiming to address migration and energy security at their roots while opening markets for Italian firms. By leveraging its geographic proximity and historical connections to Africa, Italy could secure alternative energy sources and reduce dependence on volatile suppliers, all while enhancing its influence in a region of growing global importance.

*Source: President of the Council of Ministers Giorgia Meloni at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council -licence*

The success of this initiative, however, depends on international backing, particularly from the US. As a superpower with interests in countering China’s expansion in Africa, the US could view the Piano Mattei as a complementary strategy, oﬀering political and economic support to amplify Italy’s eﬀorts. Meloni has worked to strengthen Italy’s transatlantic ties, recognising that American endorsement could unlock resources and credibility for her ambitious plan. This alignment also positions Italy to benefit from US priorities within NATO, such as maintaining stability in the Mediterranean and supporting broader Western interests.

Italy’s transatlantic relationship oﬀers additional leverage within the EU. By aligning closely with the US, Italy can enhance its stature as a reliable partner, potentially gaining greater sway in shaping NATO and EU policies. This is particularly valuable in the Mediterranean, where Italy’s security concerns align with American strategic goals, such as countering terrorism and securing energy routes. Meloni’s government could use this partnership to push for a more balanced EU security agenda, one that addresses southern challenges as seriously as eastern ones, thereby reinforcing Italy’s role as a bridge between continents.

Meloni’s Role: A Balancing Act Amidst Complexity

Giorgia Meloni’s leadership is defined by her ability to navigate this intricate web of risks and opportunities. Her approach often hinges on strategic ambiguity, a tactic that allows her to adapt to shifting dynamics without fully committing to any single path. Within the EU, she balances Italy’s obligations — such as supporting Ukraine and increasing defense spending — with domestic calls for economic relief and sovereignty. In the transatlantic sphere, she cultivates a strong relationship with the US while preparing for potential changes in American policy that could alter Italy’s security calculus. This balancing act is not without its challenges. Meloni’s coalition remains a weak link, with internal tensions threatening to derail her agenda. Salvini’s influence, for instance, pulls the government toward a more Euroskeptic stance, complicating eﬀorts to deepen EU integration or meet NATO commitments. Economically, Meloni faces the daunting task of reviving Italy’s growth while contending with external pressures like US tariﬀs and EU rearmament costs. Her ability to implement the Piano Mattei hinges on maintaining domestic stability and securing foreign support, a tall order given these constraints.

Meloni’s leadership is also shaped by the broader transatlantic context. The US remains Italy’s most critical ally, but its future direction introduces uncertainty. A potential return to a more pragmatic, America-first policy could align with Meloni’s conservative platform — particularly on issues like migration and energy — but it might also reduce US engagement in Europe, forcing Italy to shoulder more responsibility. Meloni must position Italy to benefit from American support while preparing for scenarios where that support wanes, a delicate dance that requires foresight and flexibility.

Conclusion: Navigating Uncertainty with Strategic Foresight

Italy stands at a crossroads, its geopolitical risks and security challenges matched by significant opportunities. The war in Ukraine, economic strains, and Mediterranean vulnerabilities test the nation’s resilience, while the Piano Mattei and its transatlantic ties oﬀer paths to greater influence. Giorgia Meloni’s leadership is pivotal in this equation, her ability to balance domestic pressures with international demands determining Italy’s trajectory.

To secure Italy’s future, Meloni must harness strategic foresight, leveraging the country’s unique assets — its Mediterranean position, historical ties, and EU membership — to carve out a stronger role in a multipolar world. The Piano Mattei could redefine Italy’s relationship with Africa and beyond, while a robust transatlantic partnership could bolster its security and economic prospects. Yet, success requires adaptability, as Italy navigates the uncertainties of EU cohesion, US policy shifts, and coalition politics. With careful stewardship, Italy can transform its challenges into strengths, ensuring its place as a key player in an evolving global landscape.

December 21, 2024 — No Comments

Should the U.S. Back Zelensky’s Victory Plan? | Elina Beketova Explains

Elina Beketova discusses if Washington D.C. should support Zelensky's 'Victory Plan,’ where Trump may support the plan, and what can be expected from Biden in these last few weeks of his administration.

Ms. Beketova is a democracy fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis in Washington D.C., where she researches temporarily Russian occupied territories in Ukraine. She also has extensive experience as a journalist where she reported in Crimea, Kharkiv, and Kyiv, which included prominent international high profile interviews.

Interviewers: Samuel Dempsey - USA Team

November 25, 2024 — No Comments

The Impacts of Trump Presidency on Global Economic Relations

by Miguel Jiménez, Ingrid Heggstad, & Dan Ziebarth - Political Economy, Development, & Energy Security Team

Introduction

It was announced on Tuesday, November 5th that Donald Trump, the candidate for the right-wing Republican Party, had won the 2024 Presidential Election in the United States of America and would officially become the President-Elect. Kamala Harris, the left-wing Democratic Party candidate, conceded defeat in a speech on Wednesday, December 6th, urging voters to accept the election results. While Harris and her vice presidential running mate, Time Walz, received significant party support ahead of the election and were seen as a new phase for the Democratic Party, the party will be weakened following the election results. Even though during the campaign she lacked a compelling economic narrative and often avoided answering how to fund any proposal she brought to the table, in terms of global economic relations, a Harris presidency was expected to maintain continuity with the current Biden administration's approach largely.

The second Trump presidency is expected to have major ramifications for global politics, particularly global economic relations, particularly as Trump has been a vocal proponent of protectionist trade policies. The Republican Party, led by Trump, will also control both chambers of the legislature, while conservative justices make up 6 of the 9 seats on the Supreme Court of the United States. These conditions could give Trump a strong mandate for policy change. In particular, economic relations with China, the European Union, and Russia are expected to be affected by a second Trump presidency.

China

Trump has announced that, if re-elected, he will impose a 10–20 per cent across-the-board tariff on imports into the United States, with an additional 60 per cent tariff on all imports from China. Trump has also pledged to terminate the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) passed by the Biden administration, which would be expected to increase domestic production and reduce Chinese imports. This is in contrast to what would have been expected under a Kamala Harris administration, where the usage of tools to inhibit the arrival of Chinese goods would have come from domestic policies with the continuation of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the single largest climate investment in American history. Based on building domestic champions in the field of energy transition, which is currently dominated by China, being the world’s leader in clean energy production and the refinement of the majority of mineral inputs.

European Union

The second Trump presidency could challenge Europe through an “America First” trade policy, focused on reducing the U.S. trade deficit, with tariffs as high as 20 per cent on imports and even more on Chinese goods. These tariffs would increase costs for European exporters and consumers, impacting the EU’s economy. Ongoing disputes from the Biden era, such as steel and aluminium tariffs and green subsidies, may also escalate, while the expiration of paused EU retaliatory tariffs in 2025 and the Airbus-Boeing subsidy conflict in 2026 could further strain EU-U.S. trade relations, adding to Europe’s economic uncertainty. It is noteworthy that during his tenure as president, Donald Trump's imposition of tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from the European Union and China resulted in the implementation of retaliatory tariffs on U.S. agricultural products.

Russia

A renewed Trump presidency could also impact global economic relations with Russia. In his 2024 campaign, Trump promised to swiftly resolve the Ukraine conflict, asserting he could achieve peace within 24 hours through negotiation. However, if Russia resists a settlement, Trump has signalled he would impose tougher economic sanctions, potentially targeting Russia’s central bank and curtailing energy exports to key markets like India and China. This intensified economic pressure, coupled with increased US energy production to lower global prices, would squeeze Russia’s vital oil revenue.

Additionally, Trump’s scepticism toward ongoing US aid to Ukraine, which has amounted to $92.7 billion since 2022, raises concerns over a potential reduction in support, which could compromise Ukraine’s defence and shift the regional balance in Russia’s favour. Trump has also suggested that Europe should shoulder more responsibility for its security, which may lead to a reevaluation of US commitments to NATO. It is possible that a reduction in the US role in NATO could have the effect of weakening collective defenses, which might in turn expose Europe to greater tensions with Russia. This approach indicates a shift toward a more isolationist US foreign policy, with strategic economic measures as leverage to influence Russia's actions.

Additionally, Trump’s expected policies in oil and gas could intensify competition with Russia and reshape global energy markets. Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska has predicted that Trump’s support for US oil production might drive global prices down to around $50 per barrel by 2025, creating pressure on Russia’s oil-dependent economy. Trump’s approach would likely include promoting US LNG exports, reviving paused projects, and further challenging Russia’s position in Europe’s energy market.

His stance on projects like the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which he previously sanctioned to limit Russia’s influence, suggests he might continue efforts to curb Russia’s global LNG ambitions while supporting policies to maintain affordable oil prices for US consumers. By influencing OPEC+ to stabilise prices favourable to the US, Trump could further impact Russia’s revenue, potentially reducing its leverage in Europe and heightening competition in the global energy sector.

Conclusion

Taken together, based upon a previous presidency led by Donald Trump and his recent claims on the campaign trail, global economic relations could become increasingly tense between the United States and other nations and political unions.

In particular, trade relations between China and the United States are expected to worsen, with major increases in tariffs on Chinese goods entering into the United States possibly leading to retaliatory tariffs and an intensification of trade competition between the two countries. The European Union could also be affected by the competition between the United States and China, as well as the possibility of increased tariffs on goods from the EU going into the United States. The conflict in Ukraine also casts a shadow over Trump’s second term and whether the Trump administration continues to provide funding to Ukraine and keep sanctions on Russia in place will affect both the war in Ukraine, as well as economic relations between the United States and Russia.

These considerations will all have ripple effects across the entire world, meaning it is important for policymakers, scholars, and citizens alike to continue watching the effects of the second Trump presidency on global economic relations.

June 4, 2024 — No Comments

US Military Aid to Ukraine: A Pivotal Move Amid Ongoing Conflict and Global Implications

By Maida Pollinari - Russia Team

The war between Russia and Ukraine, now in its third year, continues to be intensely volatile and dynamic. Recent developments, particularly the approval of a significant US military aid package, mark a critical juncture in international support for Ukraine. This article delves into the US decision, its ripple effects across Europe, and the broader implications for all parties involved.

US Military Aid Package to Ukraine

On April 24, 2024, US President Joe Biden approved a substantial $61 billion aid package for Ukraine. This decision concluded prolonged and intense negotiations within the US Congress, characterised by a bipartisan struggle. Notably, Republican Mike Johnson, initially a staunch opponent, reversed his stance after a confidential briefing, citing the existential threat posed by an "axis of evil" comprising Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Iran. Johnson emphasised that supporting Ukraine was crucial to US national security and a testament to American leadership in defending democracy.

Strategic and Political Motivations

Analysts suggest that this aid package is not only a pragmatic political move but also a strategic necessity. The aid aims to stabilise Ukraine's frontlines, mitigating fears of a Russian breakthrough or Ukrainian collapse. This stabilisation is crucial as it sets the stage for potential Ukrainian offensives in the coming months. Furthermore, the timing of this aid is significant given the approaching US presidential elections. Prolonging the conflict could adversely affect former President Donald Trump's approval ratings, possibly benefiting Biden among undecided voters.

European Response

The US decision has resonated strongly across Europe, prompting several nations to announce their own aid packages. On April 23, 2024, during a visit to Warsaw, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak unveiled the UK's largest military aid package to date for Ukraine, worth £500 million. Sunak underscored the importance of defending Ukraine not just for regional security but for the entire European continent, warning that a victorious Putin would not halt at Poland's border.

Similarly, Sweden has committed 13 billion kronor ($1.23 billion) in military aid, marking the largest Scandinavian contribution. The Czech Republic has pledged to deliver at least 1.5 million artillery shells by year's end, part of a covert supply strategy involving unnamed countries, likely including some BRICS nations like India and South Africa.

Broader Implications and Russian Reaction

The widespread European support highlights a unified front against Russian offensive and a collective effort towards Ukraine's post-war reconstruction. However, the approval of the US aid package has not been well-received by Russia. Kremlin spokesman Dmitri Peskov condemned the decision, suggesting it would enrich the US at Ukraine's expense and result in further Ukrainian casualties. Former Russian President Dmitri Medvedev expressed hostility, wishing for internal US turmoil, while President Putin acknowledged the increased costs of Russia's military operations and committed to record war spending of 6% of GDP in 2024.

Economic and Military Considerations

Despite current economic stability, bolstered by domestic fiscal policies and import substitution, Russia's financial sustainability remains uncertain. Continued Western support is vital for Ukraine, especially given the critical timing of arms deliveries and their deployment on the battlefield. This window of delay provides the Russian military with opportunities to target Ukrainian infrastructure, particularly its energy sector. Moscow's propaganda leverages these delays to project Western disunity and ongoing internal US discord, which Russia finds reassuring.

*Source: Image by Beverly Lussier from Pixabay*

Future Outlook

The conflict's trajectory remains uncertain, with the upcoming US presidential elections poised to influence future dynamics and support for Ukraine. The sustained cohesion and determination of Western allies are essential for Ukraine's long-term resilience against Russian aggression. The new aid package from the US represents a pivotal moment, demonstrating substantial international support for Ukraine with profound implications for the global power balance and the conflict's future.

Conclusion

In summary, the approval of the $61 billion US military aid package signifies a crucial step in international backing for Ukraine. The response from European nations further consolidates a collective stance against Russian offensive, highlighting a significant geopolitical shift. Meanwhile, Russian reactions underscore the persistent challenges and the importance of continued, coordinated support for Ukraine. The coming months and years will be decisive in shaping the conflict's outcome and the broader geopolitical landscape.

May 17, 2024 — No Comments

U.S. Ukraine Aid: A Part of a Larger Strategy

U.S. Ukraine aid needs to be part of a larger strategic vision that aims for Russian defeat in Ukraine.

Author: Samuel Dempsey - USA Team

Four days after President Biden approved the $61 billion in military aid, on April 28, 2024, Ukraine received the first wave of anti-armor rockets, missiles, and 155-millimeter artillery shells. While Ukraine welcomed the needed U.S. aid, it came months late considering the on-the-ground requirements of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. As a result, much of this aid package is attempting to make up for lost time and reinforce the depleted defence supply chain.

In H.R.815 - Making emergency supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2024, and for other purposes, $23 billion of the aid supplement replenishes military stockpiles, enabling future U.S. military transfers to Ukraine; $14 billion is designated for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which allows the DoD to buy advanced new weapon systems for Ukraine directly from U.S. defence contractors; $11 billion will fund current U.S. military operations in the region, and about $8 billion goes to non-military assistance through a loan to the Ukrainian government to cover basic operating costs.

The supplement comes at a time when Russia is increasingly exerting pressure across the 600-mile front line. Ukrainian brigades are spread thin, with little time for recuperation or new training, and much of the aid, including separate packages from the U.K. and Germany, will take months to arrive to truly bolster Ukraine’s defences on the ground.

As Jack Waltling, an expert in land warfare at RUSI, discussed in Foreign Affairs, at present Russia has a “ten-to-one advantage over Ukraine in available artillery,” and with the new U.S. aid package, this is projected to shrink to “three to one in some regions.” This is a substantial improvement, but he argues that current Western support has only come in time to “stave off a Ukrainian collapse.” As Eugene Rumer at the Carnegie Endowment observed, the calculations vehemently demonstrate that even with support from the U.S. and allies, “the size of Russia’s population, economy, stocks of military hardware, and defense-industrial base far exceeds those of Ukraine.”

The new supplement's legislation acknowledges this reality and emphasizes the need to agree on a new multi-year support strategy "to hasten Ukrainian victory against Russia's invasion forces." This U.S. supplement is very likely the only piece of Ukraine aid that will be able to take effect before the next U.S. presidential election, and despite having aspirational goals for greater support, it has focused on buying more time. Given the possible change in U.S. administration and the confidence and firmness with which Russia is continuing this illegal invasion, even recently allegedly conducting an assassination attempt against President Zelenskyy, the question is: how does this supplement fit within a greater Ukraine strategy of the United States?

U.S. Stated Goals

The April 24 Ukraine supplement was the Biden administration's fifty-sixth allotment of DoD inventory equipment to Ukraine since August 2021. Post-Russian invasion, the Biden administration has stood behind Ukraine, with the official Department of State position being that the U.S. and allies are “united in support of Ukraine in response to Russia’s premeditated, unprovoked, and unjustified war against Ukraine.” The U.S. has demonstrated this by asserting that Kyiv will determine the war’s outcome. As Alexander Ward at Politico pointed out, this has resulted in a strategic misalignment, where the U.S. perceives its support as a means to either force Russia back or negotiate a settlement with Russia, while the Zelenskyy administration maintains that Ukraine will not relent until it reaches its pre-2014 borders, including Crimea. According to Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, "only Russia's defeat and the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity will guarantee stability and peace," and "the Black Sea must become a sea of NATO, peace, and stability."

After the recent U.S. supplement passed, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated that Ukraine throughout the rest of the year will have the capacity to “hold the line” and “to ensure Ukraine withstands the Russian assault,” with the chance to enable Ukraine in 2025 “to move forward to recapture the territory that the Russians have taken from them.” Concurrently, Avril D. Haines, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, told Congress that, in addition to the anticipated Russian offensive this month, Russia has the means to break through the Eastern Ukrainian front lines. According to Director Haines’ statements, the current U.S. strategy may now come up short, and according to Sullivan’s statements, the U.S. strategy has postponed any possible Ukrainian counteroffensive to 2025. Even then, numerous analysts, including Olga Tokariuk at Chatham House, have stressed that any future Ukrainian military offensive or even the ability to maintain a stable frontline is contingent upon a “steady flow of Western military assistance,” including with approval from the White House.

If the U.S., regardless of administration, wants to back Ukraine’s goal of the Black Sea being "a sea of NATO peace and stability," a clear articulation of its own political goals is required to ensure a sound strategic vision.

A U.S. Strategy for Ukrainian Victory and Russian Defeat

“Russia can lose. And it should lose, for the sake of the world — and for its own sake,” wrote Timothy Snyder, a Levin Professor of History at Yale. Snyder, in his CNN opinion piece and while lecturing at the University Club of New York, articulated the four principal reasons for which a Russian defeat is necessary in Ukraine: (1) For an imperial power to restrain its imperial ambitions, defeat is necessary. Snyder argued that the European project itself is only the result of lost imperial wars around the world after WWII. (2) If Russia wins, it not only affirms its imperial ambitions but also demonstrates to the rest of the world that imperial conquest is an option. (3) Historically, the most effective Western policy towards Russia is an effective U.S. policy towards Ukraine, i.e., supporting their self-determination and strategic objectives that align with Western values and systems has positive indirect impacts on developments in Russia. (4) Russia's history is replete with defeats; the Crimean War in 1856, the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, World War I in 1917, the Soviet Union's defeat by Poland in 1920, by Nazi Germany in 1945, and Afghanistan's decade-long invasion in 1979 are just a few examples. Snyder argues that in each case, Russia lost without existential risk.

In addition, Snyder emphasizes that Russia’s greatest successes in its invasion of Ukraine (still minor in total scale) occurred in the last six months when the U.S. “was delaying Ukraine aid rather than supplying it.” As Jack Waltling also emphasized, a Ukrainian defeat would also signal to Russia that it has and can defeat the West through prolonged exhaustion.

To develop a cognizant and successful strategy towards Russia, the U.S. must first articulate the requirement of a Russian defeat in Ukraine.

*Source: Image by MotionStudios from Pixabay*

Strategic Steps to Russian Defeat

As Rob Lee, a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program, wrote over X, Ukraine’s three primary hurdles are: ammunition, manpower, and fortifications. Lee, alongside colleagues Michael Kofman and Dara Massicot, propose a strategy “premised on three central elements: hold, build, and strike.” The strategy and commentary do an excellent job of articulating how the Ukrainian Armed Forces can, in the face of Russia’s growing manpower, distribute and train current brigades, absorb Russian offensives, and create challenges for Russia “far behind the front lines.”

Creating threats and challenges deeper behind the front lines is an immediate way in which the U.S. can support Ukraine’s ability to hold the front and fortify further. As Mark T. Kimmitt, the former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, wrote, the U.S. and allies must loosen restrictions on military aid that inhibit cross-border attacks and prevent Ukraine from targeting Russia in the Black Sea. Loosening these restrictions will immediately add a new dimension to Russian risk, giving Ukrainians more space and time to develop a successful counter-offensive. Any alleviation of pressure from the front will provide the currently stagnant and exhausted Ukrainian brigades with the necessary resources for recuperation and training.

A key area of support could be a financing strategy that enhances Ukraine's ability to acquire munitions. Recent Ukraine aid legislation allows for the potential use of frozen Russian central bank assets for reconstruction efforts. Building on the Council of Europe proposal that references U.S. initiatives, the international community could explore the establishment of a multilateral legal mechanism to manage these assets. This mechanism could potentially provide compensation for reconstruction costs and free up Ukrainian resources for munitions procurement. Allies and partners hold approximately $300 billion in frozen Russian assets, with the U.S. holding at least $38 billion. Additionally, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has proposed a $100 billion fund for Ukraine's defenses, although this proposal faces internal opposition within the Alliance. Such a fund could facilitate greater coordination of security aid for Ukraine.

After the signing of Ukraine aid and in the lead-up to a challenging election, the Biden administration may be inclined to place Ukraine on the back burner of political communication. Yet, the discussion and growth of a larger Ukraine strategy must be articulated not only on the international stage but also communicated to the general American public. “It’s the president’s responsibility to make the case to the American people why Ukraine and our support matter. While he has done this a few times, the narrative has not been clear enough to most Americans,” said Alina Polyakova to Politico, president and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis. At the NATO Washington Summit this July, the U.S. has the opportunity to hone its strategic vision and make these initiatives a primary agenda while presenting its case to the American people as to why the United States should support Ukraine and ensure Russian defeat. Whether it's Trump or Biden in the Oval Office come January 2025, Ukraine will need assistance, and the American people will need to know why.

March 18, 2024 — No Comments

Dr Rosario Formicola on F-16 as a game changer in Ukrainian War

Dr Rosario Formicola active duty aviator Italian Air-force talks about on the potential change in the situation on the frontline in Ukraine with the transfer of F-16 aircraft to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Dr. Rosario Formicola delivers a presentation on the importance and specifics of the transfer of F16 aircraft to Ukraine. The specificity and importance of this factor in changing the balance on the battlefield and its impact on the security system in Ukraine and Eastern Europe. The advantages, problems and potential benefits for the Ukrainian Armed Forces are described. Due to the specifics of his duties, the doctor does not disclose some technical data, but gives a clear picture of the consequences of the transfer of F-16s to Ukraine.

According to the expert, the transfer of F-16s to Ukraine will significantly strengthen the troops, will be a big obstacle and challenge for Russia, but unfortunately the needs of the frontline in Ukraine require not only a much larger number of aircraft but also a huge effort to build the necessary infrastructure for maintenance. For obvious reasons, the doctor does not disclose specific figures or technical specifications, but gives an assessment of the implications and issues of this issue.

Interviewers: Igor Shchebetun - Russia Team

January 2, 2024 — No Comments

The fragile unity of Europe after the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Authors: Federico Alistair D'Alessio and Alessandro Spada - UK & European Affairs Team.

EU’s response

The European Union has firmly condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, calling for an immediate ceasefire, military withdrawal and the respect of Ukrainian independence and territorial integrity.

European institutions have repeatedly denounced Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine, especially the indiscriminate attacks towards civilian infrastructures, hence accusing Russia of violating international law. Member states have thus strengthened both individual and economic sanctions against Russia while providing Ukraine with military equipment, humanitarian aid and financial support. For fear of an expansion of the conflict, several European governments have also significantly increased their own military spending.

While the Kremlin’s actions were unanimously condemned, the EU approach was not warmly welcomed by everyone in the European community, including the unconditional military support for Ukraine.

Division within the EU

Three apparent factions have emerged. Northern and post-communist member states fiercely supported Ukraine in the war, fearing a Russian victory that would threaten their national security. Western European countries such as France, Germany and Spain insist on vigorous diplomatic efforts and have adopted a more cautious approach. Lastly, the third bloc is composed of those members who have refused to send weapons and have expressed a rather ambiguous stance on the war, such as Hungary and, to a lesser extent, Bulgaria.

Among the first group, the Baltic states and Poland have been the most loyal partners of Ukraine for obvious historical and geopolitical reasons.

Baltic states

The firm reaction of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia did not come as a surprise, given their past experiences with invasions and annexations by the Kremlin. Their warnings on the threat posed by Russia in Central and Eastern Europe were mostly ignored or downplayed by their partners and accused of Russophobia by the Kremlin.

The Baltic States substantially increased their military spending and gradually abandoned their dependence on Russian energy after the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea. Since the 2022 invasion, they have actively supported Kiev with military and humanitarian aid as they feel the fate of their nations is tightly linked to Ukraine.

They believe the only way to achieve peace is to help Ukraine win the war and force Russia back to its borders, as stated by Estonian PM Kaja Kallas. In addition, the Baltics have regularly called for stronger EU and NATO action, fearing that their allies would lose the momentum to stop Russia once and for all. As of December 2023, all three Baltic states rank in the top five GDP contributors of government support to Ukraine.

Poland

Likewise, Poland declared not only full military, financial and humanitarian support for Ukraine, but also the intention of defeating Russia on all fronts as a way to achieve peace. Growing anti-Russian sentiment is evident among Poles, with a peak of 94% viewing Putin as a serious threat post-Ukraine invasion. This sharp rise has consequently brought to more positive attitudes (around 90%) towards the US, NATO and the EU.

In addition to welcoming over 3 million Ukrainian refugees, the Polish government has also mediated between Ukraine and the US, advocating for adequate protection and high-end military equipment. Moreover, their push for Ukraine's EU and NATO integration has significantly reduced EU criticism regarding the rule of law in Poland.

Nevertheless, recent grain embargo disputes have strained relations with Ukraine, leading to a Polish weapons supply halt and a potentially damaging impact on both nations.

United Kingdom

Despite the UK leaving the EU, it is crucial to also analyse the reaction of the British government given its historical role as a security guarantor in Europe. On November 16, 2023, Foreign Secretary David Cameron reaffirmed support for Ukraine against Putin's aggression. The UK, a leading supporter, provides significant military, humanitarian, and financial aid, ranking as the third-largest donor behind the US and Germany. It was the first to supply cruise missilesand depleted uranium munitions to Kyiv and additionally implemented a series of sanctions against Moscow. The British Government advocates for a shorter Ukraine's path to NATO membership by removing the need for a Membership Action Plan, as a result of the summit held in Vilnius last July. Furthermore, secret talks between UK officials and key Russian representatives have reportedly taken place, discussing security matters such as grain shortages and nuclear safety.

France

While President Macron has supported Ukraine since the outbreak of the conflict, he has kept a more diplomatic stance in comparison to other European leaders. A few weeks before Russia's invasion, he attempted to dissuade Putin and emphasised avoiding humiliation for diplomatic solutions. During an April visit to China, Macron urged Xi Jinping for a mediation in favour of a return to the “negotiating table”. Despite fewer arms transfers (data from Sept. 26, 2022, to Nov. 30, 2023) to Ukraine compared to some NATO allies, France ultimately backs Ukraine's NATO accession to increase pressure on Russia and pave the way for post-war negotiations.

Germany

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine forced Germany to reassess its role in the world, shifting from "chequebook diplomacy" to increased military involvement. As the second-largest arms supplier (commitments Jan. 24, 2022, to Oct. 31, 2023) of Ukraine after the US, Germany has invested €100 billion in a military fund for modern weapons and committed to meeting NATO's 2% GDP defence spending target. Chancellor Olaf Scholz also encouraged China to use its influence to promote diplomatic solutions. Germany opposes immediate NATO membership for Ukraine, fearing direct conflict with Russia and citing unresolved border conflicts as a hindrance. Additionally, Germany is pushing for a reform plan where the conditions listed must be met in order to initiate a discussion on the membership.

Hungary

As previously mentioned, Hungary has condemned Russian aggression while adopting a questionable approach to dealing with the Kremlin.

Firstly, PM Viktor Orbán decided to abstain from sending military support to Kiev and even agreed on a new gas deal with Moscow a few months after the invasion started. In addition, state-controlled media outlets have continued to spread pro-Russian propaganda, including criticism against the sanctions imposed on Russia. Orban has also recently requested the EU to reassess their strategy in the war while threatening to halt all support to Ukraine.

This peculiar reaction to the Russian invasion reflects the local population as well. According to a recent poll, only 33% of Hungarians consider Russia a major military threat. Another vital figure to mention is the Hungarian perception of the US and Russia: only 17% believe the United States are an important partner, comparable to the 11% that think Russia is. This data openly displays how divergent Budapest’s attitude is from the rest of the EU.

Conclusion

The EU’s unified reaction was initially seen as an opportunity to create a new and common geopolitical strategy. Despite claims of unity, the EU is increasingly divided between those prioritising peace diplomatically and those insisting on justice achieved solely through a Russian military defeat.

This crisis has also exposed the union’s reliance on the US and NATO in terms of defence and intelligence. This is mainly due to the fact that the EU was conceived as a political and economic institution, rather than a military power. However, given that European cohesion has also emerged thanks to continuous information provided by Washington, this poses the risk of condemning Europe to political and military irrelevance. Historical security leaders, such as the UK and France, face several challenges - with Germany expected to play a pivotal role.

Moreover, debates on EU military independence versus complementarity with NATO face growing divisions among member states, evident in recent controversies and wavering support for Ukraine - such as the case of neighbouring Slovakia. The question remains whether the EU can establish an independent defence system amid increasing uncertainties.

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