Ukraine Archives – ITSS Verona

June 13, 2026 — No Comments

How Russia is Reportedly Replacing Spies with Criminals in the UK

By Isabella Sutherland - Military Strategy & Intelligence Team

Over one hundred and fifty arson and explosive plots across Europe have been linked to Russia between February 2022 and Februry 2026, and very few carried out by Russian nationals^[1]. Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Western security services have documented a sharp increase in Russian intelligence operations conducted through criminal proxies, disposable agents, and deniable intermediaries. R v Roussev & Others and R v Dylan Earl & Others together demonstrate that traditional UK counter-espionage frameworks were not designed to address remotely directed intelligence networks and task-based criminal operatives.

Available evidence suggests that Russia’s accelerated use of criminal proxies in the UK is enabled by multiple interacting factors, including the structural degradation of professional HUMINT capacity through mass coordinated diplomatic expulsions; depletion of Russian intelligence in Ukraine; the ideological contrast from Cold War-style long-term communist recruitment with Putin’s Russia, and the technological infrastructure which has made remote proxy control operationally viable at scale. The 2022 invasion was an accelerant rather than the origin of a new tradecraft.

Double Depletion

Russia’s professional HUMINT presence in the UK had begun to decline before 2022. The Salisbury poisoning triggered the expulsion of 23 Russian diplomats in 2018, the largest of its kind since the Cold War, removing a significant layer of embassy-based intelligence officers. Following the full-scale invasion in 2022, a coordinated Western response expelled over 700 Russian officials across more than 34 countries. The overwhelming majority were intelligence officers using diplomatic cover; this huge capacity cannot be quickly or easily replaced ^[2].

The Ukraine war introduced a compounding depletion. Russia’s intelligence services including the FSB, SVR, and GRU have been substantially redirected toward the war effort, consuming intelligence resources which could have otherwise been deployed in Western Europe^[3]. These combined factors made proxy substitution both preferable and increasingly attractive. [al1]

Why ideology cannot fill the gap

Two main enabling conditions explain why proxy actors seem to have become one of the main instruments of Russia in the UK instead of rebuilding its network of professional officers after the mass expulsions.

First is ideology. The Cold War model of espionage depended on Western recruits motivated by a genuine commitment to Soviet communism. Putin’s modern statist nationalist anti-Western ideological framework may not hold the same appeal _[4]. This is not a temporary gap, but a seemingly increasingly entrenched [al2] feature of post-Soviet Russia; money, coercion, and criminal leverage now substitute this void.

Second is technology in the era of the ‘Gig Economy’ defined by a free-market, predominantly online system where short-term positions common and organisations buy workers for temporary engagements ^[al3]^[5]. Encrypted messaging platforms like Telegram, cryptocurrency payments, and remote tasking are central to this on-demand workforce. It creates the operational infrastructure for control over proxy actors without physical presence. Russian handlers direct the local actors anonymously through digital channels, making attribution difficult and the handler-agent relationship difficult to trace. Without this infrastructure, [al4] the expulsion of embassy-based officers would have significantly reduced Russian capability.

The Hitman and the Arsonist

Six Bulgarian nationals, the so-called ‘Minions Ring’, led by Orlin Roussev and directed through Russian intermediary and fugitive Wirecard executive Jan Marsalek, operated in a networked structured utilising fake passports in a layered principal-agent system. The group conducted semi-professional surveillance on journalists, politicians, and military facilities across the UK and Europe between 2020 and 2023, compiling reconnaissance on targets whom they planned to kidnap and kill.[al5] The defendants were recruited and tasked over Telegram, motivated by reward sums of nearly €1 million. No Russian nationals were directly involved in UK operations. This case demonstrates a structured operation purpose-built for intelligence collection and the closest contemporary example to traditional espionage.

The case of Dylan Earl takes a slightly different form. It was a task based, financially motivated operation with less sophistication. The 20 year old from Leicestershire with international criminal links was recruited on Telegram by a Wagner Group handler and tasked to organise arson attacks on London warehouses storing humanitarian aid and Starlink equipment for Ukraine, and to plan the kidnapping of a prominent Russia dissident. He recruited further assisting agents, none of whom had previously met, creating a layered principal-agent system in which the Russian connection was several steps removed from the physical act. The March 2024 arson caused over £1m damage. Earl and his co-defendant Jake Reeves became the first people convicted under the National Security Act 2023 for activity linked to a foreign state. This new legislation was explicitly designed to capture actors whose operations fall short of traditional espionage. Counter Terrorism Policing described this as a clear example of a Russian-state linked organisation using British proxies to carry out serious criminal activity on its behalf ^[6].

Frameworks need fixing

These cases reveal a core tradecraft shift to the absence of Russian nationals physically present in UK operations. No professional intelligence officers; no embassy infrastructure; no ideological commitment.

The National Security Act 2023 represents a genuine institutional acknowledgement of this shift. By extending criminal liability to actors who assist foreign states without formal intelligence roles, it closes a significant legislative gap posed by the proxy model. However, prosecution after the fact is not the same as disrupting recruitment further up the chain. Traditional counter-espionage frameworks built around identifying and expelling professional officers are necessary but no longer sufficient alone. The UK must engage with digital platforms and financial infrastructure through which proxy recruitment operates and pursue closer cooperation with the private sector, especially at a time when transatlantic intelligence-sharing is under unprecedented strain. The Intelligence and Security Committee’s Russia Report 2020 warned that the UK had failed to fully assess the scope of Russian interference, prosecutions since the full-scale invasion suggest that this assessment remains incomplete ^[7].

Russia’s shift towards criminal proxies is not a temporary adaptation to temporary Western pressure, but the path of least resistance to modernising effective tradecraft. It is a structural response to an irreplaceable HUMINT deficit, a post-ideological recruitment environment, and a digital infrastructure purpose-built for deniable covert action. With the escalation of the Ukraine war, comes the parallel escalation of the ‘shadow war’ which cannot be won by expelling diplomats alone.

^[1]Courthouse News Service. (2025, October 24). Men sentenced over London arson attack masterminded by Russia as part of a wider sabotage campaign. Men sentenced over London arson attack masterminded by Russia as part of a wider sabotage campaign | Courthouse News Service

^[2]Riehle, K. P. (2024). Soviet and Russian Diplomatic Expulsions: How Many and Why? International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 37(4), 1238–1263. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2272216

^[3]Congressional Research Service. (2025). Russia’s foreign intelligence services (IF12865). Congress.gov. Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Services | Congress.gov | Library of Congress

^[4]Snegovaya, M., & McGlynn, J. (2025). Dissecting Putin’s regime ideology. Post-Soviet Affairs, 41(1), 42–63. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2024.2386838

^[5]Richterova, D., Grossfeld, E., Long, M. & Bury, P. (2024). Russian Sabotage in the Gig-Economy Era. The RUSI Journal, 169(5), 10–21. Full article: Russian Sabotage in the Gig-Economy Era

^[6] Counter Terrorism Policing. (2025, October 28). Men jailed for London warehouse arson. Counter Terror Business. Men who organised Russia-backed arson at London warehouse jailed | Counter Terrorism Policing

^[7]Intelligence & Security Committee of Parliament. (2020). Russia (HC 632). Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. HC 632 – Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament – Russia

May 18, 2026 — No Comments

Putin Hints at Ending Ukraine War, Can Russia’s Economy cope?

By Sorin Dojan - Russia Team

Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Saturday (9 May) that he thought the war with Ukraine is “coming to an end”, more than four years after the start of Russia’s large-scale military campaign in Ukraine, which significantly altered European security dynamics and regional trade patterns. Three days later, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said the government now forecasts GDP growth of 0.4% in 2026, significantly down from the 1.3% previously expected.

For many looking at the latest string of data coming from the Kremlin, ending a four-year war that has driven consumer prices higher in the process sounds like the first hurdle in a series of challenges to overcome. These range from stubbornly persistent inflation and high interest rates to a militarised economy losing momentum and a shrinking GDP growth. Russia's economy entered recession in 2022, and the recovery that followed was uneven, marked by persistent declines in retail sales, sluggish income growth in some parts of the country, and regional budget constraints^[1].

Amid the economic disruptions caused by sanctions, certain industries emerged to keep the economy afloat. But the winners that underpinned Russia’s economy during the war could suffer disproportionately from any future economic redress. The challenge for the regime will then be to find alternative paths to growth in a heavily sanctioned economy with limited export strings and partners.

What to do with the military industrial complex?

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the world witnessed a highly coordinated sanctions response, with the West collectively imposing almost 24,000 punitive measures against individuals, entities, vessels, and aircraft as of August 2025, according to Castellum.AI, an AI-powered agency specialising in Anti-Money Laundering (AML).

The Russian economic revival that emerged later was highly volatile and disproportionate, with weapons-producing regions among the war’s economic winners, as evidenced by regional tax collection data. On the other hand, the regions mostly pressured were the ones bordering Ukraine, those specialising in ferrous metal production and places with industries heavily sanctioned by the West^[2].

The Russian military-industrial complex operates differently from its American counterpart. Whereas the US defence industry relies heavily on private investment, Russian companies in this industry largely depend on state subsidies, making the government a major contributor to the military-industrial complex^[3].

There is no doubt that Russia has overinvested in its military to boost production and growth, but above all to replace the hardware damaged in the war. In 2025, the defence sector absorbed 15.9 trillion roubles in 2025, or around 7.2% of the country’s revised GDP forecast for that year. For comparison, its close ally, China, spent around 1.7% of its GDP on the military, according to World Bank data, yet Beijing is not involved in a costly war forcing the state to implement extensive stabilisation measures.

The question that then emerges is what happens to such government spending once the war comes to an end?

One would be tempted to assume a return to the pre-2022 status quo, but that would depend on the West lifting sanctions and allowing Russia’s once-productive industries (particularly Europe-destined commodities) to resume humming at full speed.

There is no guarantee of success. As recently as last week, European diplomats and officials cited by POLITICO said the bloc was getting ready to impose a fresh wave of sanctions, this time targeting Moscow’s shadow fleet of ageing tankers. The EU is also eyeing the opportunity to impose sanctions that were previously opposed by ex-Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, including punitive measures against Patriarch Kirill and other members of the Russian Orthodox Church. French politician and Minister Delegate for Europe Benjamin Haddad said in April that it was not the time to lift sanctions on the Kremlin but rather “step up […] pressure”, namely on the Russian energy sector.

For now, it is expected that Russia will maintain the same level of military investment to replenish military stockpiles and replace personnel lost on the battlefield^[4]. Yet for how long that can be justified is subject to debate. As one Carnegie analyst put it: “Any attempt to rapidly cut spending will result in collapse. But nor can the military machine be fed indefinitely.”

NVO, CC BY-SA 3.0 , via Wikimedia Commons

Defence investment is not necessarily conducive to a thriving economy. According to a RUSI study, defence expenditure plays little role in promoting economic growth; a European Commission report separately stated that “it is impossible to determine if this tendency [to spend more on defence] is favourable or negative to growth.”

It is not hard to imagine why. The military-industrial complex is part of a command economy, largely detached from market forces that drive flexibility and a more efficient resource reallocation. At the macro level, such inflated expenditure is only justified in times of war^[5].

In Russia’s case, being left with an overinflated military-industrial complex that serves as one of the few engines of growth is dangerous to its future economic recovery. Disinvest too soon and you might risk upsetting an overexpanded industrial workforce. But choosing to continue allocating resources toward military procurement rather than civilian economic activity is equally unproductive.

Either way, Putin’s speech in early May signals more than just a willingness to pull out from a war that has cost the Kremlin thousands of lives. Instead, his remarks come against the backdrop of a Russian economy showing signs of “stagflation”. The central bank interest rate stands at 14.5% as of April 2026, significantly higher than the rates in Western economies. Core inflation hovered at 6.3% in Q1 2026, up from 5% registered in the previous quarter.

If Novak’s statement serves any good in this context, it might be that it could force the Kremlin to give peace a genuine chance after four years of sustained military operations with significant economic and human consequences. At what cost could peace come for the national economy? It remains to be seen.

^[1] Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Iikka Korhonen, and Elina Ribakova, War-Induced Economic Convergence in Russian Regions (Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2025).

^[2] Andrey Yushkov and Michael Alexeev. “Russian Regions in Wartime: Fiscal and Economic Effects of the Russo-Ukrainian War,” Post-Soviet Affairs 40, no. 4 (2024): 313–325. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2024.2355047.

^[3] Gorodnichenko, Korhonen and Ribakova, War-Induced Economic Convergence, 6.

^[4] Maria Snegovaya, Nicholas Fenton, Tina Dolbaia, and Max Bergmann, The Russian Wartime Economy: From Sugar High to Hangover(Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2025).

^[5] Dmitry Gorenburg, Samuel Bendett, Ken Gause, Pavel Luzin, Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez, Paul Schwartz, and Elizabeth Wishnick, Crafting the Russian War Economy: The Effects of Export Controls on Russia’s Defense Industrial Production (CNA Corporation, 2024).

May 5, 2026 — No Comments

Euro-American Intel Sharing: Trump’s Second Term Threat

By Elena de Mitri - UK & European Affairs Team

Intelligence cooperation has always been fundamental for allied countries that share similar interests, values, and objectives in order to rationalise resources and expertise. Cooperation is particularly developed among transatlantic allies, including the US and many European countries.

While it tends to be relatively stable, even in the face of disagreements with a partner’s actions and policies, concerns have recently been raised in many European countries regarding the current Trump administration and the stability of such cooperation, due to the fear that the US government could weaponise and politicise intelligence flows and information shared by the partners in order to achieve political objectives. Among confrontational behaviour by the US administration, European partners are learning how to deal with an increasingly risky relationship.

An increasingly shaky relationship?

Soon after the start of the second Trump presidency in January 2025, European intelligence agencies started voicing concerns about the risk of over-relying on US intelligence. Tariffs and frequent political quarrels haven’t helped either as disagreements with the current administration could endanger transatlantic relationships in an unprecedented way. Transatlantic relations have been under strain since then. The changing tide was particularly represented by the March 2025 suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine. Lasted only for a few days, the suspension was enacted to push Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to engage in diplomatic talks with Russia to reach a peace deal. However, such a move also sent a clear message to US allies: lack of cooperation towards US objectives could have grave consequences, including the weaponisation of intelligence.

Other developments have strengthened this view. This year’s Annual Threat Assessment and its dismissal of transatlantic security cooperation, coupled with the unusual appointments of politically aligned individuals as directors of US intelligence agencies, usually reserved for established non-partisan practitioners, has marked a significant change in the country’s policy towards the war in Ukraine, as both moves were partially reflecting Russian positions on the conflict. More recently, the appointment of General Joshua Rudd, who previously served in the Indo-Pacific Command, as head of the National Security Agency, one of the main intelligence agencies in the US, strengthened this shift towards a stronger focus on China. Finally, purges of established US intelligence officers, due to their involvement in cases perceived as anti-Trump, might ultimately undermine established relations among practitioners from allied countries, as trust heavily relies on personal relationships.

Intelligence cooperation has always been upheld through subsequent administrations. However, the instability and opaqueness brought about by the second Trump administration has left allies wondering whether they should become more self-sufficient. After the Signal scandal in March 2025, the denial of any wrongdoing by involved US officials and the grave breach of operations security rules left allied intelligence services wondering whether sharing sensitive information with US government officials remains feasible as its disclosure could compromise sources and operations. Perceptions of unreliability might threaten trust among national intelligence services, which is fundamental to maintaining the current high-level cooperation. As a consequence, many European intelligence agencies showed increased worries that the intelligence they were sharing with the US would either be leaked or, even worse, be shared to non-allied countries without their permission, thus breaking a long-established rule. Some of them, including the Dutch intelligence agencies, have scaled down intelligence sharing with the US due to concerns that the current administration may politicise intelligence and possibly share sensitive information with Russia, in line with the country’s repositioning along Russian narratives of the conflict in Ukraine.

Finally, US increasingly assertive and coercive behaviour towards traditionally allied countries has made European intelligence services even more worried about sharing information with the US. As president Trump was publicly talking about annexing Canada, one of his closest advisers was pushing to remove Canada from the Five Eyes, the most important intelligence-sharing network in the world, in order to pressure the country into becoming the 51st state. While this remained a suggestion, it was reported that US government officials were actively discussing it. On the other hand, after the US government declared its intention to take control of Greenland, which is part of the Danish Kingdom, due to security concerns in the Arctic, the Danish Defence Intelligence Services categorised the US as a threat to the country, amid alleged demands from the US government to gather intelligence on Greenland.

The importance of transatlantic intelligence cooperation

Intelligence cooperation has long been fundamental to achieve security objectives, especially as the nature of the current threats has become increasingly transnational. Intelligence agencies face numerous, complex threats and resources are usually too scarce to effectively deal with threats by themselves. As a consequence, cooperation among intelligence agencies of countries with similar objectives and values has greatly increased since the Cold War, in order to combine resources and fill expertise gaps. This is especially important nowadays, as current threats are increasingly ambiguous, murky and well-concealed. Cooperation is quite consistent in areas such as terrorism and transnational crime, in which reaching shared goals is relatively easier.

Continued cooperation relies on and reinforces a shared worldview and perception of current threats. It is no surprise then that US and European intelligence agencies have developed a strong relationship in this field. The US has currently various levels of partnerships with European countries, dating back to the Second World War. While some countries are considered privileged partners, other are "less important" so information sharing with them is more limited. However, they remain critical partners for the US due to their easier access and specific expertise, including linguistic expertise. Moreover, multilateral forms of cooperation with other European partners happen in the context of specific alliances, such as NATO, or informal organizations.

Even when transatlantic allies were involved in disputes and fights about each others’ foreign policy and trade policies, intelligence sharing was upheld. As a matter of fact, when European countries disagreed with US military actions during the War on Terror, they would still provide important intelligence to help the US government achieve its objectives. This continued cooperation has highlighted how strong relations and shared interests, including especially the fight against terrorism, allowed intelligence agencies to overcome political disagreements. However, the behaviour of the current US administration has been threatening these relationships in an unprecedented way. This has brought European countries to discuss the possibility of reducing their cooperation with the US, in order to protect their national interests.

Prospects for a more independent Europe

Replacing the US intelligence contribution is not an easy task. While European countries have advanced tools and capabilities, they lack the scale and coordination role that the US possesses. Such scale allows US intelligence agencies to provide more timely and higher quality assessments, as they can benefit from the use of big data techniques and artificial intelligence. As a consequence, if the US was to stop or greatly limit intelligence sharing, European countries, along with Ukraine, would have to rely on a lower quantity and quality of information. Indeed, replacing US capabilities would require long term investments in human capabilities and advanced tools.

President Donald Trump poses for a family photo with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine and European leaders before their multilateral meeting, Monday, August 18, 2025, in the Cross Hall on the State Floor of the White House. (Official White House Photo by Andrea Hanks)

However, it is not an impossible task. In January 2026, it was reported that France was providing a growing amount of technical intelligence to Ukraine, likely referring primarily to satellite imagery. Such intelligence was previously mostly provided by the US, but the March 2025 suspension of intelligence sharing and the subsequent pause in some weapon shipments to Ukraine prompted European countries to take a more prominent role. While intelligence sharing was quickly restored, this suspension amplified already existing worries about the politicisation of intelligence by the US government. Amongst calls to replace resources and capabilities offered by the US and work towards European independence in the security sector, progress tends to be quite slow. A key factor in this struggle is the size and structure of actors in the field. No actor, including the European Union, possesses the same financial resources and in-house capabilities as the US, the latter requiring a long time to be developed.

At the same time, the Trump administration is also seeking to reduce its involvement in the continent and has openly taken a more hostile approach to its European allies. As a consequence, European intelligence services are expanding cooperation among them, with important steps taken at the EU level. As prominent officials from European intelligence agencies have started giving more importance to EU-wide agencies and the number of intelligence officials embedded in representation offices in Brussels has grown, internal pushes to develop autonomous capabilities have been growing, although emphasising the importance of maintaining cooperation with the US. Some are instead calling for the creation of an intelligence cooperation agency dedicated to the European Union to make better use of intelligence provided by member states. However, such an agency would have to overcome numerous challenges, including the voluntary nature of intelligence sharing in the European block, which leaves critical information in the hands of member states that have repeatedly been wary of sharing too much. Moreover, some European countries are widely considered untrustworthy due to their ties to third party countries such as Russia and China. As a consequence, cooperation will likely include a limited group of countries that share generally stronger ties, including in security. This is already happening inside NATO, as more and more intelligence is now being shared on a smaller scale rather than with all the member states. Bilaterally, cooperation among key countries, including the UK, France and Germany, has already been strengthened in order to deal with the instability caused by the current US administration. This strengthened cooperation will likely mark an important, and possibly permanent, shift from the critical role that the US attained until now.

Conclusion

Relations among European and US intelligence services have been described recently as generally good, as high ranking officers of European intelligence services have stressed the importance to keep up cooperation with the US. However, evolving and multifaceted tensions between the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean are increasingly affecting transatlantic relations, especially in regard to security. The shift towards the Russian narrative of the conflict in Ukraine and frequent disagreements between European countries and the US have positioned the latter as a riskier alliance for European countries. Such repositioning might impact intelligence sharing, which is considered fundamental in many fields. While some countries are reconsidering their intelligence ties to the US, others have already started scaling down sharing, especially in areas of particular concerns. European intelligence officials have openly stated that cooperation in this field hasn’t stopped and that the US remains an ally, as US intelligence agencies are trying to ease European worries. However, further transatlantic tensions might have an unprecedented impact on security relations.

July 10, 2025 — No Comments

Leadership styles: How Trump, Putin & Macron shape negotiations

By Camilla Braito (Russia Desk) & Vismantė Ežerskytė (European Affairs and UK Desk)

Introduction

As of today, negotiations involving the United States, Russia, and the European Union over the war in Ukraine remain ongoing but face substantial obstacles. Ukrainian and Russian delegations met again in Istanbul for a second round of peace talks focused on securing a ceasefire to bring an end to the conflict started in February 2022. This scenario highlights the vital role of leadership- the ability to make decisions, earn trust, and pursue common goals, especially in non-routine matters like war and peace. Incorporating leadership analysis into the study of negotiation dynamics enriches traditional explanations that rely solely on military power or systemic constraints. This piece examines how leadership styles influence negotiations regarding the war in Ukraine through two key frameworks developed by Margaret Hermann and Joseph Nye, as well as Ilana Zohar's work on the leadership skills necessary for effective negotiations in times of crisis.

Leadership Styles in Theory

Building on earlier typologies, Hermann identifies four leadership styles based on handling constraints, processing external information, and motivation: activist, strategic, pragmatic, and opportunist. Each includes two subtypes, from power-seeking expansionists to consensus-building accommodators, reflecting varying openness to internal challenge, context, and goal orientation in shaping leadership behaviour.

Nye’s framework defines leadership through inspirational, transactional, and contextual competencies. Leaders vary by goals (transformative or conservative), influence (transforming or directive), and power use (soft or hard). Inspirational leaders attract through vision and values; transactional ones rely on coercion. These categories often overlap as leaders adjust according to evolving environments.

For our analysis, it is also essential to understand what negotiations entail. These are voluntary processes to resolve conflicts through communication, either one-time or ongoing. Negotiations involve various tactics - brutal, time-related, authority-based, persuasive, and soft - and styles: competitive, cooperative, and integrative. Effective negotiators adapt tactics, manage emotions, and choose principled or positional approaches to seek mutually beneficial or win-lose outcomes.

Leadership and Negotiation in the Ukraine War: Trump, Putin, Macron

Since 2022, the war in Ukraine has revealed how leadership styles influence the direction of conflict and the viability of negotiation. Donald Trump, now back in office, exhibits a directive-pragmatic style in Hermann’s framework, personality-driven, disregardful of institutions, and focused on personal control over outcomes. According to Nye’s classification, he is transactional and relies on hard power, threat-making, and media optics. In his 2024 campaign, Trump stated he would end the war ‘within 24 hours’ through direct talks with Putin. When no progress was observed, he revised his position, claiming the war “belongs to Biden, Zelenskyy, and Putin.” His White House press conference with JD Vance and Zelenskyy drew significant media attention and controversy with Vance attacking the Ukrainian president while Trump stood by. Although relations were later smoothed at the Vatican, the episode showcased Trump’s preference for performance over diplomacy. He later revealed a call with Moscow, only to suggest that Putin might not want to end the war, adding to strategic ambiguity rather than offering a solution-oriented direction. His style has been viewed by some analysts as prioritising personal visibility over institutional coordination.

Vladimir Putin, meanwhile, operates with an activist-expansionist orientation, challenging domestic constraints, filtering external data, and pursuing goals often described as ideological and revisionist. Since 2022, he has instrumentalised hard power and coercive diplomacy to destabilise Ukraine and reshape European security. Though he publicly agreed to a ceasefire in 2024, Russian forces continued striking Ukrainian cities. Putin consistently denied these violations, instead accusing Ukraine of breaking the truce. His approach fits Nye’s transactional category, using strategic escalation and blame deflection to control the narrative. In one instance, Putin was onstage at a public event when informed that Trump was on the line. He calmly told the moderator he wasn’t in a hurry, signalling self-confidence and dominance in contrast to Western volatility.

Emmanuel Macron presents a starkly different model. Classified as pragmatic-consultative by Hermann, he values institutional process and contextual understanding. In early 2022, he made multiple high-profile visits to Moscow and Kyiv, attempting to keep diplomatic channels open even as tensions escalated. Though criticised for engaging with Putin too long, his efforts showed commitment to negotiation, de-escalation, and European agency. His leadership style aligns with Nye’s transformational vision—forward-looking, cooperative, and rooted in values-based persuasion. However, its effectiveness has been limited by the dominance of zero-sum postures from both Trump and Putin.

Leadership styles and negotiation tactics: recommendations based on the analysis

Different leadership styles shape negotiation approaches and can explain friction in trilateral or multilateral talks. While Trump and Putin focus on dominance and short-term gains, Macron pursues calibrated, integrative solutions, making him a diplomatic outlier.

To advance negotiations to end the Ukraine war, it is vital to tailor tactics to these leadership profiles. Putin’s coercive, revisionist style requires a mix of firm deterrents and incremental principled negotiation. Early hard measures help set boundaries, but must avoid provoking defensiveness. Active listening is key, not to legitimise propaganda but to uncover underlying strategic goals. Indirect or mediated talks, like the June Turkey talks, can reduce zero-sum dynamics and ease tensions.

Unpredictability, delays, and unilateral moves mark Trump’s transactional, anti-institutional style. Negotiations with him should combine persuasion (offering symbolic wins) with cooperative, face-saving compromises. Building a personal connection while appealing to national pride and political advantage is crucial.

In contrast, Macron’s transformative, institutional leadership supports integrative strategies grounded in shared values and multilateral legitimacy. His willingness to listen and build consensus helps counterbalance more confrontational styles.

Conclusion

This analysis shows that while Trump and Putin are both directive and goal-driven, they diverge significantly in approach: Trump’s leadership is pragmatic and transactional, shaped by optics and personalism; Putin’s leadership is often described as activist and expansionist, using centralised authority and assertive tactics, with expansionist elements. In contrast, Macron is described as a pragmatic-consultative leader who emphasises transformational goals through diplomacy, institutional cooperation, and long-term reform.

Recognising the dynamic interplay between leadership styles and negotiation phases allows for better timing and selection of moves, hopefully informing more effective crisis resolution. Especially in ongoing, high-stakes international negotiations such as those regarding Ukraine, success depends less on fixed rules and more on contextual intelligence, emotional regulation, and the strategic capability to adjust tactics according to the counterpart’s motivation and behaviour patterns beyond surface-level display of force and hardline rhetoric.

June 3, 2025 — No Comments

Dr. Arūnas Molis on Energy Security and the War in Ukraine

In this episode of the ITSS Verona Member Series, Dr. Arūnas Molis talks about the changing landscape of European energy security in the context of the current war in Ukraine, with special focus on strategic lessons for the Baltic region.

Specifically, Dr. Molis discusses how energy can be weaponised, used as a tool of political pressure, and financial power in the context of hybrid warfare. He explores Russia’s energy leverage, attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure, and lessons from the Baltic states’ path to energy independence.

Dr. Molis is a policy analyst in Lithuania and has previously held key positions at Klaipeda LNG and NATO Energy Security Center of Excellence.

Interviewers: Alexandra Tsarvulanova & Sara Pastorello - Russia and Post-Soviet Space Desk

March 20, 2025 — No Comments

Italy’s Geopolitical Tightrope: Meloni’s Leadership, EU Dynamics, and the Transatlantic Balancing Act

By Christian Gaole & Alberto Trame - Italy Desk

Meloni's Geopolitical Challenge: Bridging Continents, Balancing Powers

Italy occupies a pivotal yet precarious position in today’s global landscape, straddling its deep-rooted commitments to the European Union (EU) and its long-standing transatlantic partnership with the United States (US). Under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who has led the country since October 2022, Italy faces a confluence of geopolitical risks, security challenges, and strategic opportunities. As a Mediterranean nation, Italy serves as a bridge between Europe and Africa, a role that amplifies both its vulnerabilities and its potential. Meloni’s leadership, marked by a blend of pragmatism and ambiguity, is central to navigating this complex terrain. This article examines Italy’s geopolitical risks, security issues, and opportunities within the EU and in relation to its transatlantic ties, spotlighting Meloni’s role in shaping the nation’s path forward.

Italy’s Geopolitical Risks: NATO, Ukraine, and Economic Strain

Italy’s geopolitical risks stem from its position within a fracturing NATO alliance, economic pressures exacerbated by global shifts, and domestic political instability. The ongoing war in Ukraine has strained NATO’s cohesion, with diﬀering views among members on how to respond to Russia’s aggression. Italy, a founding member of the alliance, has aligned itself with the Western eﬀort to support Ukraine through military aid and sanctions. However, this stance places it at odds with internal coalition dynamics and economic realities. The conflict has driven up energy costs and disrupted trade, hitting Italy’s export-driven economy hard. Reports indicate a significant GDP decline, with the burden of supporting Ukraine adding to fiscal woes at a time when Italy’s public debt remains among the highest in Europe.

Economic challenges are further intensified by external pressures. The EU’s push for rearmament, aimed at bolstering defenses against potential Russian threats, demands increased military spending from member states. Italy, currently spending below NATO’s 2% GDP target, faces calls to ramp up its defense budget. This comes as the country grapples with the fallout from potential US tariﬀs, which could target Italian exports like machinery and luxury goods, vital to its economic stability. These economic strains test Meloni’s ability to maintain national unity while meeting international obligations, a task complicated by the fragile coalition she leads.

Domestically, political instability poses a significant risk. Meloni heads a right-wing coalition that includes parties with divergent views on foreign policy. Her deputy, Matteo Salvini, has often leaned toward populist and nationalist rhetoric, occasionally clashing with EU directives and NATO’s unified stance. This internal discord threatens to undermine Italy’s ability to project a coherent foreign policy, weakening its influence in Brussels and Washington. Meloni must tread carefully to hold her government together, balancing coalition demands with the need to assert Italy’s role on the global stage.

Security Issues: Mediterranean Vulnerabilities and EU Dependence

Italy’s security challenges are most pronounced in the Mediterranean, a region that encapsulates its strategic importance and its vulnerabilities. The sea serves as a conduit for migration from North Africa, a persistent issue that has fueled domestic political debates and strained Italy’s resources. Alongside migration, the Mediterranean is a hotspot for terrorism and a critical artery for energy supplies, with Italy heavily reliant on gas pipelines and maritime routes. These threats demand a robust security framework, yet Italy often finds itself shouldering the burden with limited support from its EU partners.

The EU’s fragmented approach to Mediterranean security exacerbates Italy’s challenges. Northern member states tend to prioritize eastern threats, like Russia, over southern concerns, leaving Italy to advocate alone for greater focus on migration and regional stability. Meloni has sought to elevate Italy’s role as a Mediterranean power, pushing for EU- wide policies to address these issues, but progress remains slow. This north-south divide within the EU underscores a broader problem: the bloc’s lack of strategic autonomy. Dependent on the US for defense through NATO, the EU struggles to act independently, a dynamic that leaves Italy exposed to shifts in American priorities.

The transatlantic relationship, while a cornerstone of Italy’s security, introduces its own risks. The US has long provided the backbone of NATO’s military might, but potential changes in American leadership — particularly a return to a more isolationist or transactional stance — could disrupt this arrangement. Such a shift would force Italy and other European nations to increase defense spending, a daunting prospect given Italy’s economic constraints. Moreover, a reduced US presence in Europe could embolden adversaries, heightening security risks in the Mediterranean and testing Italy’s ability to respond eﬀectively.

Opportunities: The Piano Mattei and Transatlantic Leverage

Amid these challenges, Italy has opportunities to strengthen its geopolitical standing, notably through the Piano Mattei, a strategic initiative spearheaded by Meloni’s government. This plan seeks to deepen ties with Africa and the Indo-Pacific, positioning Italy as a key player in fostering economic and security partnerships. Unlike traditional aid models, the Piano Mattei emphasises mutual benefit, aiming to address migration and energy security at their roots while opening markets for Italian firms. By leveraging its geographic proximity and historical connections to Africa, Italy could secure alternative energy sources and reduce dependence on volatile suppliers, all while enhancing its influence in a region of growing global importance.

*Source: President of the Council of Ministers Giorgia Meloni at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council -licence*

The success of this initiative, however, depends on international backing, particularly from the US. As a superpower with interests in countering China’s expansion in Africa, the US could view the Piano Mattei as a complementary strategy, oﬀering political and economic support to amplify Italy’s eﬀorts. Meloni has worked to strengthen Italy’s transatlantic ties, recognising that American endorsement could unlock resources and credibility for her ambitious plan. This alignment also positions Italy to benefit from US priorities within NATO, such as maintaining stability in the Mediterranean and supporting broader Western interests.

Italy’s transatlantic relationship oﬀers additional leverage within the EU. By aligning closely with the US, Italy can enhance its stature as a reliable partner, potentially gaining greater sway in shaping NATO and EU policies. This is particularly valuable in the Mediterranean, where Italy’s security concerns align with American strategic goals, such as countering terrorism and securing energy routes. Meloni’s government could use this partnership to push for a more balanced EU security agenda, one that addresses southern challenges as seriously as eastern ones, thereby reinforcing Italy’s role as a bridge between continents.

Meloni’s Role: A Balancing Act Amidst Complexity

Giorgia Meloni’s leadership is defined by her ability to navigate this intricate web of risks and opportunities. Her approach often hinges on strategic ambiguity, a tactic that allows her to adapt to shifting dynamics without fully committing to any single path. Within the EU, she balances Italy’s obligations — such as supporting Ukraine and increasing defense spending — with domestic calls for economic relief and sovereignty. In the transatlantic sphere, she cultivates a strong relationship with the US while preparing for potential changes in American policy that could alter Italy’s security calculus. This balancing act is not without its challenges. Meloni’s coalition remains a weak link, with internal tensions threatening to derail her agenda. Salvini’s influence, for instance, pulls the government toward a more Euroskeptic stance, complicating eﬀorts to deepen EU integration or meet NATO commitments. Economically, Meloni faces the daunting task of reviving Italy’s growth while contending with external pressures like US tariﬀs and EU rearmament costs. Her ability to implement the Piano Mattei hinges on maintaining domestic stability and securing foreign support, a tall order given these constraints.

Meloni’s leadership is also shaped by the broader transatlantic context. The US remains Italy’s most critical ally, but its future direction introduces uncertainty. A potential return to a more pragmatic, America-first policy could align with Meloni’s conservative platform — particularly on issues like migration and energy — but it might also reduce US engagement in Europe, forcing Italy to shoulder more responsibility. Meloni must position Italy to benefit from American support while preparing for scenarios where that support wanes, a delicate dance that requires foresight and flexibility.

Conclusion: Navigating Uncertainty with Strategic Foresight

Italy stands at a crossroads, its geopolitical risks and security challenges matched by significant opportunities. The war in Ukraine, economic strains, and Mediterranean vulnerabilities test the nation’s resilience, while the Piano Mattei and its transatlantic ties oﬀer paths to greater influence. Giorgia Meloni’s leadership is pivotal in this equation, her ability to balance domestic pressures with international demands determining Italy’s trajectory.

To secure Italy’s future, Meloni must harness strategic foresight, leveraging the country’s unique assets — its Mediterranean position, historical ties, and EU membership — to carve out a stronger role in a multipolar world. The Piano Mattei could redefine Italy’s relationship with Africa and beyond, while a robust transatlantic partnership could bolster its security and economic prospects. Yet, success requires adaptability, as Italy navigates the uncertainties of EU cohesion, US policy shifts, and coalition politics. With careful stewardship, Italy can transform its challenges into strengths, ensuring its place as a key player in an evolving global landscape.

December 21, 2024 — No Comments

Should the U.S. Back Zelensky’s Victory Plan? | Elina Beketova Explains

Elina Beketova discusses if Washington D.C. should support Zelensky's 'Victory Plan,’ where Trump may support the plan, and what can be expected from Biden in these last few weeks of his administration.

Ms. Beketova is a democracy fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis in Washington D.C., where she researches temporarily Russian occupied territories in Ukraine. She also has extensive experience as a journalist where she reported in Crimea, Kharkiv, and Kyiv, which included prominent international high profile interviews.

Interviewers: Samuel Dempsey - USA Team

November 25, 2024 — No Comments

The Impacts of Trump Presidency on Global Economic Relations

by Miguel Jiménez, Ingrid Heggstad, & Dan Ziebarth - Political Economy, Development, & Energy Security Team

Introduction

It was announced on Tuesday, November 5th that Donald Trump, the candidate for the right-wing Republican Party, had won the 2024 Presidential Election in the United States of America and would officially become the President-Elect. Kamala Harris, the left-wing Democratic Party candidate, conceded defeat in a speech on Wednesday, December 6th, urging voters to accept the election results. While Harris and her vice presidential running mate, Time Walz, received significant party support ahead of the election and were seen as a new phase for the Democratic Party, the party will be weakened following the election results. Even though during the campaign she lacked a compelling economic narrative and often avoided answering how to fund any proposal she brought to the table, in terms of global economic relations, a Harris presidency was expected to maintain continuity with the current Biden administration's approach largely.

The second Trump presidency is expected to have major ramifications for global politics, particularly global economic relations, particularly as Trump has been a vocal proponent of protectionist trade policies. The Republican Party, led by Trump, will also control both chambers of the legislature, while conservative justices make up 6 of the 9 seats on the Supreme Court of the United States. These conditions could give Trump a strong mandate for policy change. In particular, economic relations with China, the European Union, and Russia are expected to be affected by a second Trump presidency.

China

Trump has announced that, if re-elected, he will impose a 10–20 per cent across-the-board tariff on imports into the United States, with an additional 60 per cent tariff on all imports from China. Trump has also pledged to terminate the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) passed by the Biden administration, which would be expected to increase domestic production and reduce Chinese imports. This is in contrast to what would have been expected under a Kamala Harris administration, where the usage of tools to inhibit the arrival of Chinese goods would have come from domestic policies with the continuation of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the single largest climate investment in American history. Based on building domestic champions in the field of energy transition, which is currently dominated by China, being the world’s leader in clean energy production and the refinement of the majority of mineral inputs.

European Union

The second Trump presidency could challenge Europe through an “America First” trade policy, focused on reducing the U.S. trade deficit, with tariffs as high as 20 per cent on imports and even more on Chinese goods. These tariffs would increase costs for European exporters and consumers, impacting the EU’s economy. Ongoing disputes from the Biden era, such as steel and aluminium tariffs and green subsidies, may also escalate, while the expiration of paused EU retaliatory tariffs in 2025 and the Airbus-Boeing subsidy conflict in 2026 could further strain EU-U.S. trade relations, adding to Europe’s economic uncertainty. It is noteworthy that during his tenure as president, Donald Trump's imposition of tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from the European Union and China resulted in the implementation of retaliatory tariffs on U.S. agricultural products.

Russia

A renewed Trump presidency could also impact global economic relations with Russia. In his 2024 campaign, Trump promised to swiftly resolve the Ukraine conflict, asserting he could achieve peace within 24 hours through negotiation. However, if Russia resists a settlement, Trump has signalled he would impose tougher economic sanctions, potentially targeting Russia’s central bank and curtailing energy exports to key markets like India and China. This intensified economic pressure, coupled with increased US energy production to lower global prices, would squeeze Russia’s vital oil revenue.

Additionally, Trump’s scepticism toward ongoing US aid to Ukraine, which has amounted to $92.7 billion since 2022, raises concerns over a potential reduction in support, which could compromise Ukraine’s defence and shift the regional balance in Russia’s favour. Trump has also suggested that Europe should shoulder more responsibility for its security, which may lead to a reevaluation of US commitments to NATO. It is possible that a reduction in the US role in NATO could have the effect of weakening collective defenses, which might in turn expose Europe to greater tensions with Russia. This approach indicates a shift toward a more isolationist US foreign policy, with strategic economic measures as leverage to influence Russia's actions.

Additionally, Trump’s expected policies in oil and gas could intensify competition with Russia and reshape global energy markets. Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska has predicted that Trump’s support for US oil production might drive global prices down to around $50 per barrel by 2025, creating pressure on Russia’s oil-dependent economy. Trump’s approach would likely include promoting US LNG exports, reviving paused projects, and further challenging Russia’s position in Europe’s energy market.

His stance on projects like the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which he previously sanctioned to limit Russia’s influence, suggests he might continue efforts to curb Russia’s global LNG ambitions while supporting policies to maintain affordable oil prices for US consumers. By influencing OPEC+ to stabilise prices favourable to the US, Trump could further impact Russia’s revenue, potentially reducing its leverage in Europe and heightening competition in the global energy sector.

Conclusion

Taken together, based upon a previous presidency led by Donald Trump and his recent claims on the campaign trail, global economic relations could become increasingly tense between the United States and other nations and political unions.

In particular, trade relations between China and the United States are expected to worsen, with major increases in tariffs on Chinese goods entering into the United States possibly leading to retaliatory tariffs and an intensification of trade competition between the two countries. The European Union could also be affected by the competition between the United States and China, as well as the possibility of increased tariffs on goods from the EU going into the United States. The conflict in Ukraine also casts a shadow over Trump’s second term and whether the Trump administration continues to provide funding to Ukraine and keep sanctions on Russia in place will affect both the war in Ukraine, as well as economic relations between the United States and Russia.

These considerations will all have ripple effects across the entire world, meaning it is important for policymakers, scholars, and citizens alike to continue watching the effects of the second Trump presidency on global economic relations.

June 4, 2024 — No Comments

US Military Aid to Ukraine: A Pivotal Move Amid Ongoing Conflict and Global Implications

By Maida Pollinari - Russia Team

The war between Russia and Ukraine, now in its third year, continues to be intensely volatile and dynamic. Recent developments, particularly the approval of a significant US military aid package, mark a critical juncture in international support for Ukraine. This article delves into the US decision, its ripple effects across Europe, and the broader implications for all parties involved.

US Military Aid Package to Ukraine

On April 24, 2024, US President Joe Biden approved a substantial $61 billion aid package for Ukraine. This decision concluded prolonged and intense negotiations within the US Congress, characterised by a bipartisan struggle. Notably, Republican Mike Johnson, initially a staunch opponent, reversed his stance after a confidential briefing, citing the existential threat posed by an "axis of evil" comprising Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Iran. Johnson emphasised that supporting Ukraine was crucial to US national security and a testament to American leadership in defending democracy.

Strategic and Political Motivations

Analysts suggest that this aid package is not only a pragmatic political move but also a strategic necessity. The aid aims to stabilise Ukraine's frontlines, mitigating fears of a Russian breakthrough or Ukrainian collapse. This stabilisation is crucial as it sets the stage for potential Ukrainian offensives in the coming months. Furthermore, the timing of this aid is significant given the approaching US presidential elections. Prolonging the conflict could adversely affect former President Donald Trump's approval ratings, possibly benefiting Biden among undecided voters.

European Response

The US decision has resonated strongly across Europe, prompting several nations to announce their own aid packages. On April 23, 2024, during a visit to Warsaw, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak unveiled the UK's largest military aid package to date for Ukraine, worth £500 million. Sunak underscored the importance of defending Ukraine not just for regional security but for the entire European continent, warning that a victorious Putin would not halt at Poland's border.

Similarly, Sweden has committed 13 billion kronor ($1.23 billion) in military aid, marking the largest Scandinavian contribution. The Czech Republic has pledged to deliver at least 1.5 million artillery shells by year's end, part of a covert supply strategy involving unnamed countries, likely including some BRICS nations like India and South Africa.

Broader Implications and Russian Reaction

The widespread European support highlights a unified front against Russian offensive and a collective effort towards Ukraine's post-war reconstruction. However, the approval of the US aid package has not been well-received by Russia. Kremlin spokesman Dmitri Peskov condemned the decision, suggesting it would enrich the US at Ukraine's expense and result in further Ukrainian casualties. Former Russian President Dmitri Medvedev expressed hostility, wishing for internal US turmoil, while President Putin acknowledged the increased costs of Russia's military operations and committed to record war spending of 6% of GDP in 2024.

Economic and Military Considerations

Despite current economic stability, bolstered by domestic fiscal policies and import substitution, Russia's financial sustainability remains uncertain. Continued Western support is vital for Ukraine, especially given the critical timing of arms deliveries and their deployment on the battlefield. This window of delay provides the Russian military with opportunities to target Ukrainian infrastructure, particularly its energy sector. Moscow's propaganda leverages these delays to project Western disunity and ongoing internal US discord, which Russia finds reassuring.

*Source: Image by Beverly Lussier from Pixabay*

Future Outlook

The conflict's trajectory remains uncertain, with the upcoming US presidential elections poised to influence future dynamics and support for Ukraine. The sustained cohesion and determination of Western allies are essential for Ukraine's long-term resilience against Russian aggression. The new aid package from the US represents a pivotal moment, demonstrating substantial international support for Ukraine with profound implications for the global power balance and the conflict's future.

Conclusion

In summary, the approval of the $61 billion US military aid package signifies a crucial step in international backing for Ukraine. The response from European nations further consolidates a collective stance against Russian offensive, highlighting a significant geopolitical shift. Meanwhile, Russian reactions underscore the persistent challenges and the importance of continued, coordinated support for Ukraine. The coming months and years will be decisive in shaping the conflict's outcome and the broader geopolitical landscape.

May 17, 2024 — No Comments

U.S. Ukraine Aid: A Part of a Larger Strategy

U.S. Ukraine aid needs to be part of a larger strategic vision that aims for Russian defeat in Ukraine.

Author: Samuel Dempsey - USA Team

Four days after President Biden approved the $61 billion in military aid, on April 28, 2024, Ukraine received the first wave of anti-armor rockets, missiles, and 155-millimeter artillery shells. While Ukraine welcomed the needed U.S. aid, it came months late considering the on-the-ground requirements of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. As a result, much of this aid package is attempting to make up for lost time and reinforce the depleted defence supply chain.

In H.R.815 - Making emergency supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2024, and for other purposes, $23 billion of the aid supplement replenishes military stockpiles, enabling future U.S. military transfers to Ukraine; $14 billion is designated for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which allows the DoD to buy advanced new weapon systems for Ukraine directly from U.S. defence contractors; $11 billion will fund current U.S. military operations in the region, and about $8 billion goes to non-military assistance through a loan to the Ukrainian government to cover basic operating costs.

The supplement comes at a time when Russia is increasingly exerting pressure across the 600-mile front line. Ukrainian brigades are spread thin, with little time for recuperation or new training, and much of the aid, including separate packages from the U.K. and Germany, will take months to arrive to truly bolster Ukraine’s defences on the ground.

As Jack Waltling, an expert in land warfare at RUSI, discussed in Foreign Affairs, at present Russia has a “ten-to-one advantage over Ukraine in available artillery,” and with the new U.S. aid package, this is projected to shrink to “three to one in some regions.” This is a substantial improvement, but he argues that current Western support has only come in time to “stave off a Ukrainian collapse.” As Eugene Rumer at the Carnegie Endowment observed, the calculations vehemently demonstrate that even with support from the U.S. and allies, “the size of Russia’s population, economy, stocks of military hardware, and defense-industrial base far exceeds those of Ukraine.”

The new supplement's legislation acknowledges this reality and emphasizes the need to agree on a new multi-year support strategy "to hasten Ukrainian victory against Russia's invasion forces." This U.S. supplement is very likely the only piece of Ukraine aid that will be able to take effect before the next U.S. presidential election, and despite having aspirational goals for greater support, it has focused on buying more time. Given the possible change in U.S. administration and the confidence and firmness with which Russia is continuing this illegal invasion, even recently allegedly conducting an assassination attempt against President Zelenskyy, the question is: how does this supplement fit within a greater Ukraine strategy of the United States?

U.S. Stated Goals

The April 24 Ukraine supplement was the Biden administration's fifty-sixth allotment of DoD inventory equipment to Ukraine since August 2021. Post-Russian invasion, the Biden administration has stood behind Ukraine, with the official Department of State position being that the U.S. and allies are “united in support of Ukraine in response to Russia’s premeditated, unprovoked, and unjustified war against Ukraine.” The U.S. has demonstrated this by asserting that Kyiv will determine the war’s outcome. As Alexander Ward at Politico pointed out, this has resulted in a strategic misalignment, where the U.S. perceives its support as a means to either force Russia back or negotiate a settlement with Russia, while the Zelenskyy administration maintains that Ukraine will not relent until it reaches its pre-2014 borders, including Crimea. According to Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, "only Russia's defeat and the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity will guarantee stability and peace," and "the Black Sea must become a sea of NATO, peace, and stability."

After the recent U.S. supplement passed, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated that Ukraine throughout the rest of the year will have the capacity to “hold the line” and “to ensure Ukraine withstands the Russian assault,” with the chance to enable Ukraine in 2025 “to move forward to recapture the territory that the Russians have taken from them.” Concurrently, Avril D. Haines, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, told Congress that, in addition to the anticipated Russian offensive this month, Russia has the means to break through the Eastern Ukrainian front lines. According to Director Haines’ statements, the current U.S. strategy may now come up short, and according to Sullivan’s statements, the U.S. strategy has postponed any possible Ukrainian counteroffensive to 2025. Even then, numerous analysts, including Olga Tokariuk at Chatham House, have stressed that any future Ukrainian military offensive or even the ability to maintain a stable frontline is contingent upon a “steady flow of Western military assistance,” including with approval from the White House.

If the U.S., regardless of administration, wants to back Ukraine’s goal of the Black Sea being "a sea of NATO peace and stability," a clear articulation of its own political goals is required to ensure a sound strategic vision.

A U.S. Strategy for Ukrainian Victory and Russian Defeat

“Russia can lose. And it should lose, for the sake of the world — and for its own sake,” wrote Timothy Snyder, a Levin Professor of History at Yale. Snyder, in his CNN opinion piece and while lecturing at the University Club of New York, articulated the four principal reasons for which a Russian defeat is necessary in Ukraine: (1) For an imperial power to restrain its imperial ambitions, defeat is necessary. Snyder argued that the European project itself is only the result of lost imperial wars around the world after WWII. (2) If Russia wins, it not only affirms its imperial ambitions but also demonstrates to the rest of the world that imperial conquest is an option. (3) Historically, the most effective Western policy towards Russia is an effective U.S. policy towards Ukraine, i.e., supporting their self-determination and strategic objectives that align with Western values and systems has positive indirect impacts on developments in Russia. (4) Russia's history is replete with defeats; the Crimean War in 1856, the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, World War I in 1917, the Soviet Union's defeat by Poland in 1920, by Nazi Germany in 1945, and Afghanistan's decade-long invasion in 1979 are just a few examples. Snyder argues that in each case, Russia lost without existential risk.

In addition, Snyder emphasizes that Russia’s greatest successes in its invasion of Ukraine (still minor in total scale) occurred in the last six months when the U.S. “was delaying Ukraine aid rather than supplying it.” As Jack Waltling also emphasized, a Ukrainian defeat would also signal to Russia that it has and can defeat the West through prolonged exhaustion.

To develop a cognizant and successful strategy towards Russia, the U.S. must first articulate the requirement of a Russian defeat in Ukraine.

*Source: Image by MotionStudios from Pixabay*

Strategic Steps to Russian Defeat

As Rob Lee, a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program, wrote over X, Ukraine’s three primary hurdles are: ammunition, manpower, and fortifications. Lee, alongside colleagues Michael Kofman and Dara Massicot, propose a strategy “premised on three central elements: hold, build, and strike.” The strategy and commentary do an excellent job of articulating how the Ukrainian Armed Forces can, in the face of Russia’s growing manpower, distribute and train current brigades, absorb Russian offensives, and create challenges for Russia “far behind the front lines.”

Creating threats and challenges deeper behind the front lines is an immediate way in which the U.S. can support Ukraine’s ability to hold the front and fortify further. As Mark T. Kimmitt, the former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, wrote, the U.S. and allies must loosen restrictions on military aid that inhibit cross-border attacks and prevent Ukraine from targeting Russia in the Black Sea. Loosening these restrictions will immediately add a new dimension to Russian risk, giving Ukrainians more space and time to develop a successful counter-offensive. Any alleviation of pressure from the front will provide the currently stagnant and exhausted Ukrainian brigades with the necessary resources for recuperation and training.

A key area of support could be a financing strategy that enhances Ukraine's ability to acquire munitions. Recent Ukraine aid legislation allows for the potential use of frozen Russian central bank assets for reconstruction efforts. Building on the Council of Europe proposal that references U.S. initiatives, the international community could explore the establishment of a multilateral legal mechanism to manage these assets. This mechanism could potentially provide compensation for reconstruction costs and free up Ukrainian resources for munitions procurement. Allies and partners hold approximately $300 billion in frozen Russian assets, with the U.S. holding at least $38 billion. Additionally, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has proposed a $100 billion fund for Ukraine's defenses, although this proposal faces internal opposition within the Alliance. Such a fund could facilitate greater coordination of security aid for Ukraine.

After the signing of Ukraine aid and in the lead-up to a challenging election, the Biden administration may be inclined to place Ukraine on the back burner of political communication. Yet, the discussion and growth of a larger Ukraine strategy must be articulated not only on the international stage but also communicated to the general American public. “It’s the president’s responsibility to make the case to the American people why Ukraine and our support matter. While he has done this a few times, the narrative has not been clear enough to most Americans,” said Alina Polyakova to Politico, president and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis. At the NATO Washington Summit this July, the U.S. has the opportunity to hone its strategic vision and make these initiatives a primary agenda while presenting its case to the American people as to why the United States should support Ukraine and ensure Russian defeat. Whether it's Trump or Biden in the Oval Office come January 2025, Ukraine will need assistance, and the American people will need to know why.

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