November 24, 2025 — No Comments

The end of the New START and the beginning of something new? Game-changing technologies and old strategic tensions

By Camilla Braito and Patrick Haasler - Russia Desk

Introducing the New START     

During the Cold War, nuclear arms control stood as one of the key pillars of international stability and as a guarantor of predictability in statesโ€™ behaviour. Today, that foundation is faltering. The idea of quantitatively or qualitatively reducing nuclear arsenals clashes with a growing global call to rearm, both in the nuclear field and beyond. Nowhere is this tension more visible than in the uncertain future of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).

Signed by the United States and the Russian Federation in 2010 and entered into force on February 5, 2011, the New START replaced the 1991 START I, renewing both partiesโ€™ commitment to verifiably reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals. The Treaty sets three main limits. First, it caps the number of nuclear warheads deployed on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. Second, it restricts the number of deployed delivery systems, including ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable bombers. Third, it limits the total number of deployed and non-deployed launchers and bombers. Within these constraints, each side retains the freedom to structure and modernise its strategic forces at its discretion. A central feature of the New START is its monitoring and verification regime. This relies on the use of National Technical Means (NTM), a shared database updated twice a year with data on the numbers, types, and locations of Treaty-limited systems, as well as two types of on-site inspections to confirm accuracy and proper implementation. This arrangement, however, has already been on life support since 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic interrupted on-site inspections and the two signatories never agreed on their resumption. In February 2023, the situation aggravated when Russia further suspended its participation in the Treaty, citing Washingtonโ€™s hostile policy and support for Ukraine, just weeks after renewed compliance disputes.

Originally, the New START was set to last ten years, until 2021, with the option of a single five-year extension to 2026. Beyond that, no further renewals were envisioned. Within this framework, Moscowโ€™s September 22, 2025, proposal to Washington to voluntarily continue adhering to the Treatyโ€™s limits for one additional year after its expiration has particular significance. Afterย warning in July that allowing the New START to lapse would be highly undesirable, on October 5, Donald Trump responded positively to the Russian proposal, althoughย without making any formal commitment. A few days later, Vladimir Putin confirmed ongoing contacts with the U.S. through diplomatic channels, suggesting that four months should be sufficient to decide on an extension. However, he added that if the U.S. did not consider the continued adherence worthwhile, it would not be critical for Russia, whose nuclear deterrent capabilities continue to advance, most notably with the Poseidon system, a development that poses a game-changing challenge to traditional deterrence.

The delicate balance of incentives and apprehensions surrounding the Treatyโ€™s future sets the stage for exploring the motivation behind Russiaโ€™s proposal for an extension. 

Russiaโ€™s offer in context: strategic motives and technological leverage

Strategic deterrence between Russia and the U.S. has become increasingly tense following the erosion of Cold Warโ€“era nuclear arms control. Following the dissolution of the INF Treaty in 2019, both countries reintroduced intermediate-range systems to Europe, reigniting mutual suspicion. The U.S. development and potential deployment of Tomahawk and Typhon missile systems in Europe - and possibly in Ukraine - has revived Russia's long-standing fears of aย preemptiveย "decapitation strike" that could target its leadership with little warning. Moscow interprets the short flight times and high precision of these American weapons as a direct threat to its command structures, reminiscent of Soviet-era concerns during the 1980s Euromissile crisis. Washington argues that these deployments are defensive and necessary to counter Russian violations and capabilities, such as the SSC-8 missile and hypersonic systems. Nevertheless, Russiaโ€™s leadership views the situation as growing encirclement and has warned of retaliatory measures if U.S. systems move closer to its borders. This dynamic has reintroduced instability into the Europeanย theatre, with both sidesย signallingย andย counter-signallingย under the shadow of mutual deterrence. Thus, the renewed presence of American long-range missiles in Europeย symbolisesย a broader breakdown in trust and the return of Cold Warโ€“style anxieties about nuclear first strikes.

Against this tense backdrop, Russiaโ€™s revised nuclear doctrine, announced in December 2024, broadened the conditions under which nuclear weapons could be employed, including in response to an attack by a non-nuclear state supported by a nuclear power. This is consistent with Moscowโ€™s fear of a potential U.S. transfer to Ukraine of Tomahawk missiles that can be nuclear-armed and for that are considered a direct andย destabilisingย threat, reinforcing concerns about strategic vulnerability and justifying the lowering of its nuclear threshold. The "dirty bomb" alluded to by Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, which, in the event of an attack on the Russian Federation, would render it impossible to differentiate between conventional and nuclear armaments, is regarded by Russia's preeminent security elites as a grave threat to Russian sovereignty. This threat is met with a range of proactive,ย preemptiveย (non-nuclear), and reactive (tactical nuclear) countermeasures.

Assuming that Russia is solely interested in a deal with the U.S. because of the perceived threat posed by the Tomahawks would once again oversimplify the issue. The following brief outline of the latest technical and military developments will substantiate the assumption that Russia is attempting to force the Americans to the negotiating table from a position of strength. Russia has recently increased its pace of development and production of the intermediate-range missileย Oreshnik, with a reported first combat use in November 2024 in the Ukrainian Oblast Dnipropetrovsk, and mass production declared in mid-2025. The system isย characterisedย as mobile, solid-fuel, capable of speeds beyond Mach 10, equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), and capable of carrying submunitions. Due to its rangeย (potentially up to 3,000โ€“5,500 km) and hypersonic speed, theย Oreshnikย missile challenges existing missileย defenceย systems and revives the risk posed by ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) since the collapse of the INF Treaty. Meanwhile, Russia claims that the nuclear-powered cruise missileย Burevestnikย (9M730) has successfully undergone very long endurance tests (14,000 km over 15 hours) and is approaching deployment. Its lower-altitude flight profile and seemingly unlimited range are designed to evade missileย defenceย systems, representing a significant shift in the design of strategic weapons. Even though substantial technical uncertainty remains, particularly regarding the nuclear reactor propulsion unit, post-flight guidance, and operational safety, it can be expected that the missile will undergo further technical improvement and is therefore seen by many experts as a potential game-changer that could put the United States under immense pressure.ย 

Another strand of novel Russian strategic capability is represented by the Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle (nuclear-powered torpedo), which is designed to travel long distances underwater, carry a high-yield thermonuclear charge, and threaten coastal infrastructure and naval bases. Due to the extensive nature of U.S. coastal and marine infrastructure, some analysts describe Poseidon as a "strategy-changer" in the maritime nuclear domain. These systems are important because they have the potential to degrade existing U.S./NATO missileย defenceย and deterrence architectures, and they signal Russian strategic resolve. By introducing weapons that evade or challenge existingย defenceย layers, Russia aims to tip the scales of nuclear and conventional deterrence in itsย favourย and signal a determined position of strength on a tactical and strategic level. The U.S., so far, is lacking equivalent public breakthroughs. Russia's recent tests of theย Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile and Poseidon underwater drone are portrayed as revolutionary, providing unlimited range and the ability to loiter indefinitely, thus ensuring strategic parity for the entire 21st century. These systems are said to blur traditional missile categories, making them nearly impossible to verify or limit under existing arms control frameworks. Overall, the absence of reciprocal control mechanisms and growing distrust could fuel an uncontrolled arms race and heighten global nuclear danger.

All these things considered, it can be argued that Russia is leveraging technological innovation not merely as a means of deterrence but as a political instrument to restore strategic balance and compel renewed engagement from Washington. The shift from perceived vulnerability to technological assertiveness forms the backdrop for Russiaโ€™s new weapons programs and its current approach to arms control negotiations.

What comes next for the New START?     

Three possible scenarios on the New START could unfold after February 5, 2026. In the first, Moscow confirms the proposed commitment, and Washington agrees to reciprocate, allowing both parties to continue voluntarily observing the Treatyโ€™s quantitative limits for one more year, notwithstanding other major divergences, mainly on the war in Ukraine. In the second, the Treaty expires without any time-bound effort to uphold its provisions, and in the absence of a successor arms control arrangement, the two largest nuclear arsenals may go unconstrainedย for the first time in more than three decades. In the third scenario, negotiations begin on a new agreement addressing strategic nuclear arsenals, either bilaterally or with China involved, at least in the early stages. Indeed, Chinaโ€™s growing capabilities provide strategic cover for Russia and reduce the leverage of traditional U.S.โ€“Russia arms control, highlighting the need for a multilateral framework. This final scenario could develop independently or alongside one of the previous two, provided there is sufficient political will to initiate sustained talks. As both parties remain preoccupied with other urgent matters, it is unlikely that such an initiative will advance on its own; rather, it would likely progress in parallel with either an extension or the definitive termination of the existing Treaty.ย 

This range of possible outcomes sheds light on how the trajectory of the New START reflects the state of U.S.โ€“Russia relations, the impasse in Ukraine, and the broader decline in genuine commitment to non-proliferation goals.

Image generated by AI

Conclusion                      

As things stand, the New START remains the only existing nuclear arms control treaty between the United States and Russia. When it expires in 2026, there will be no formal, legally binding limits on strategic nuclear arsenals for the first time in decades. Since a further formal renewal is not permitted under its current terms, serious concerns about the future of global arms control and strategic stability arise.ย 

Russia seeks to extend or replace the New START from a perceived position of strength, leveraging its recent breakthroughs in novel strategic weapons to force the United States back to the negotiating table, preferably on Moscowโ€™s terms. These systems are designed to bypass or overwhelm U.S. missile defences, restore strategic parity after the INF Treatyโ€™s collapse, and counter perceived encirclement by NATO, particularly the potential deployment of nuclear-capable Tomahawk missiles in Europe or Ukraine. By showcasing technically advanced, hard-to-intercept delivery vehicles and broadening its nuclear doctrine, Moscow aims to deter further Western escalation while signalling that any future arms-control agreement must account for these game-changing capabilities and address Russiaโ€™s core security concerns.

More than ever, the not-so-distant prospect of the New START reaching the end of its validity highlights the enduring importance of nuclear arms control for global security. Arms control embodies a paradoxical form of partnership, one in which rivals cooperate to co-manage deterrence and reduce the risks inherent in their competition. In essence, such agreements serve to uphold strategic stability, preserve crisis stability, and prevent the escalation of arms races, reminding us that even limited and imperfect cooperation is preferable to the absence of any attempt at regulation and that the willingness of states to negotiate in bona fide is a precondition for arms control efforts to work out. 

It remains incumbent on the American and Russian leadership to balance technological advancement with diplomatic engagement, seeking paths to stabilise deterrence beyond mere temporary extensions. The coming months are crucial for shaping the future of nuclear arms control and reducing strategic risks in an increasingly complex geopolitical environment.

November 12, 2025 — No Comments

Energy security and regional interdependence: can South Asia collaborate?

By Arslan Sheikh - South Asia Desk

The growing population and economies of South Asia are crucially dependent on its rivers and lands. Major rivers like Brahmaputra, Ganges, and Indus are the main sources of agriculture, energy, and livelihood. The region inhabits about a quarter of the world's population but only around four percent of its renewable waters. Global Environmental Change (GEC) is exacerbating glacial melt and shifting monsoon patterns causing extreme frequent floods and droughts. In terms of energy, South Asia is facing chronic deficiency - infrastructure strain and fuel import dependence have led many areas without reliable power. Experts argue that without new and efficient sources of energy which is causing โ€œenergy and power shortagesโ€, could lead to crises. Altogether, these strains on water, food, and energy, accentuates urgent need for coordinated policies.

The Water-Energy-Food Nexus in South Asia

Water produces energy and is crucial for agriculture which provides food. Water management is โ€œundoubtedly complex and interlinked with other significant challenges, including energy and food security, [and] agricultural productionโ€. Agriculture uses most of South Asiaโ€™s freshwater and its farmers are heavily dependent on groundwater for irrigation. The tubewells/pumps used for the irrigation are run by diesel or electricity, which means energy shortfalls or high costs would adversely impact food production. Reciprocally, thermal power plants need high volumes of water for cooling, so water scarcity can also put strain on energy output. On the other hand, hydropower depends on rivers that also irrigate agricultural lands. In sum, activities in one sector often popple across other sectors. Integrated and coordinated approaches are therefore important for planning.

The stress due to GEC intensifies these interlinked water-food-energy nexus. Glacial melt and extreme droughts may lead to pumping of more groundwater, increasing demands for energy and depleting aquifers. Moreover, extreme droughts or floods can sever power generation. In the absence of cross-sectoral planning, South Asian countries are risking the opportunity to solve one problem, only to worsen another. In view of this, analysts argue that any policies for South Asian โ€œdevelopmentโ€ must take into account these interdependencies.

Transboundary Water Management

Majority of South Asiaโ€™s waters come from the high Himalayas - highlighting the transnational character of these waters. These basins flow across multiple countries, yet formal cooperation is very limited and narrow in scope. No region-wide institution is in place to manage these shared basins with the exception of a few bilateral treaties that cover dozens of cross-boundary rivers. For example, India and Bangladesh, which share fifty-four rivers, have a Joint Rivers Commission and a 1996 Ganges water-sharing treaty. India and Pakistan have the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 - but currently in abeyance. India also has a 1996 Mahakali Treaty with Nepal as well as multiple powersharing agreements with Bhutan. Despite these limited agreements, there is no comprehensive cooperative framework among all riparians, majority of whose headwaters originate in China.

This assortment of water sharing is not sufficient in times of growing demands. Urbanizations and agricultural expansion are exploiting rivers and groundwater unsustainably, putting the region under water stress unless there is any improvement in management. Yet national policies are centred around short-term un-sustainable developmental goals without any consideration of its cross-sectoral and cross-boundary impacts. In these crucial times, countries prioritizing zero-sum games and competition over collaboration highlight how much they are worried about human and environmental security instead of national - ironically achieving neither.

Building of trust among South Asian countries is a constant challenge because of factors not limited to historical rivalries and concerns - which has led to minimal transparency and sharing of crucial environmental data. Increased data sharing and transparency are critical for riparian countries to negotiate equal and sustainable usage of waters. If the riparian countries of South Asia seek shared water security, cooperation over conflict offers a good chance for equitable and sustainable management.

Regional Energy Integration

South Asian countries are exploring cross-border trade of power to fill energy gaps. A World Bank researcher argues that in case of a unified South Asian regional โ€œmarketโ€, untapped hydro resources could nearly double its generation capacity, and adding a moderate carbon tax could raise hydropower output by roughly 2.7 times over two decades. Another analysis highlights that electricity sharing would let South Asian countries exploit complementarities - for example, distribution of surplus peak to deficit area.

Some regional approaches are in process of materializing. Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal are discussing grid connections and energy corridors. For example, plans for an Easter Waterways Grid proposes linking river ports and transmission lines between India and Bangladesh, also connecting Bhutan and Nepal to facilitate trade. This initiative is projected to benefit some six-hundred million people across the sub-region. India has already positioned itself as a power-trade hub - it exports power to Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Nepal, while importing from Bhutan and Nepal. These examples are early steps toward a limited integrated system. If expanded to all South Asian countries, such trading would allow surplus power to flow in deficit regions, smoothing out fluctuations and lowering costs. Achieving sustainable energy security in South Asia is only possible through regional collaboration.

Agriculture, Food Security, Energy

Agriculture is the biggest provider of employment and food security in South Asia. It needs both water and energy, not only for irrigation but also for fertilisation, mechanisation, and post-harvest cold storage. Irrigation uses majority of freshwater in some areas. This means that any shortage in water or power can directly impact the crop production and harvests. Ignoring these linkages could backfire and undermine both food and energy security of the region.

Photo by Tanha Tamanna Syed (Pexel).

As of 2021, nearly eight percent of the people in region lack access to reliable grid-based electricity, an forty-seven percent remain inaccessible to clean cooking fuels and technologies. In addition to this, the existing inefficiencies of the system has given rise to a three-fold challenge - โ€œenergy security, energy equity, and environmental sustainabilityโ€.

GEC-led variability adds complex challenges to the food production. The changing monsoon patterns and decreasing glacial melt in late summer can leave fields parched at important times. Simultaneously, increase in the occurrence of frequent floods are damaging crops and land. A cooperative regional approach could help reducing these risks. For example, sharing efficient practices in irrigation or rural electrification would yield benefits. Coordinated flood forecasting and storage-release policies could improve water use across borders to protect food and power systems.

Conclusion

The potential benefits of collaboration is enormous. For example, the increase in hydropower generation through regional markets could replace the need for expensive fuel-import, reducing carbon emissions and energy costs. An efficient, coordinated, and equitable water management could protect agriculture and industry from instability. The increase in transboundary power trade could also secure energy. Shared infrastructure could improve disaster resilience. Though this article may seem pointing towards a more ideal scenarios, but acknowledging the geopolitical barriers, water-food-energy nexus itself leaves no choice but to accept the fact that share challenges need shared solutions.

November 11, 2025 — No Comments

Is the EUโ€™s fragmented political will weakening its actorness?

By Leif Niendorf and Eline Stensen Gulliksen - UK & European Affairs Desk


Has the European Union aimed too high in trying to establish itself as a multi-dimensional power? And is it a weakening project? As the EU is being put to the test by Donald Trumpโ€™s re-election and a war on the European continent, its identity has once again become a subject of debate. Created as an economic union after World War II, the EU has expanded its power beyond the purely economic sphere, driven by integration and path dependency, into a comprehensive political union with growing militaryย capabilities.


The EU wields multi-dimensional power, manifesting as a normative power, market power, and, notably, an emerging realist power that is currently a significant topic of discussion in Europe. The Unionโ€™s economic power is substantial and is often used to pursue policy goals; it uses its market power as โ€œcarrots and sticksโ€ to influence countries to comply; hence, the EUโ€™s market power can be a tool for achieving normative goals. However, what happens when the two perceptions of the Unionโ€™s identity clash, and the EU must choose between them? What identity wins, and what is the main factor that shapes EU foreign policy?


Having started as a peace project and as an advocate of the rule of law, human rights, and liberal values in Europe and worldwide, it makes only sense that the EU also seeks to maintain its position as a normative power. Since the early 2000s, the EU has also opened increasingly loud debates about its capacities in the realms of security and defence, culminating in the establishment of the common security and defence policy (CSDP). However, it can be argued that ever since Russia started its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Donald Trumpโ€™s re-appropriation of power in the US, traditionally the primary provider of military security for many EU members, it was no longer a mere desire, but an actual necessity to become a realist power as well.


Now, the EU finds itself stuck in a complex situation: it is a market power, wants to be a normative power, and needs to become a realist power. In reality, due to serious inherent obstacles, it is highly challenging to fulfil a credible role across all these interlinked dimensions of power simultaneously.


Not only are there different pledges of allegiance to NATO, strategic cultures, and threat perceptions within the EU, all of which are long-known impediments to the EU as a unified realist power alongside domestic politics, but different foreign policy approaches nowadays even actively undermine the EU's efforts to be recognised as such. The most apparent is this in differing stances on sanctions and weapons deliveries in the context of Russiaโ€™s aggression against Ukraine.


As a realist power, the EU pushes to support Ukraine with military equipment (partly also to sustain its values, thus holding up the flag as a normative power, indicating how intertwined the realms really are), yet Hungary, as the prime example, vetoes such decisions regularly. Simultaneously, Hungary is put under pressure by the EU for its rule of law violations. The situation illustrates the difficulty: Firstly, it underscores the inability of the EU to speak with one voice as a realist power. Secondly, and maybe even more dramatically, it undermines its assumed role as a normative power when Hungary uses its veto to pressure the EU โ€”for example, in the context of funding held back due to the transgression of EU values โ€”and succeeds. If the EU needs to grant exceptions in the normative realm to pursue goals in the realist realm, an inextricable dilemma emerges, where it canโ€™t be both a full normative and a realist power at the same time. In the case of sanctions, a realist tool that market powers can apply, the situation is similar. With Prime Minister Robert Fico in Slovakia and the recent electoral success of Andre Babiลก in the Czech Republic, the number of EU members inclined to torpedo harsh measures on Russia has risen.

Source: illustration generated using OpenAI for visualisation purposes.

Notwithstanding, even outside Eastern and Central Europe, some instances can potentially hamper the EUโ€™s triad of being a market, normative and realist power all at once. For example, did Belgium veto the use of frozen Russian assets to aid Ukraine due to large parts of these currently being custodied in the country? Moreover, Spainโ€™s reluctance to raise its defence budget significantly, as demanded by its allies, given its location far from Europeโ€™s frontlines and strategically contested areas, shows that the perception of urgency is not necessarily equally distributed across Union members.

The picture of the EUโ€™s power is confused in a time that calls for unity and stringent action. How unhandy it comes in presently; at large, it alludes to the complexity that the EU, as an object โ€œsui generisโ€ and with all its heterogeneity, has always lived with. These current, challenging times will therefore be a real test of the extent to which the EU can be a plausible power beyond markets. 

The EUโ€™s evolution into a multi-faceted power highlights both its aspirations and inherent contradictions. Though it seeks to promote normative values worldwide, the situation in Hungary underscores the limitations of these ideals when confronted with complex political and economic realities. Amid the current geopolitical landscapeโ€”characterised by Trumpโ€™s re-election and a nearby conflictโ€”the EU faces a significant identity crisis. Pressures for defence integration and strategic autonomy intensify, but they encounter institutional blockages and varying national priorities.


To exceed its role as merely an economic powerhouse with fragmented political will, it must align its values with its actions and move beyond half-measures. The Union is now at a pivotal point: it can either establish itself as a unified strategic actor or remain a more economically motivated Union with political ambitions. The next few months will reveal whether the notion of being โ€œstronger togetherโ€ is a genuine commitment or merely a catchphrase.

November 7, 2025 — No Comments

The Diplomatic Overreach of Donald Trump

By Anurag Mishra and Pedro Mendes - US desk

Non-interventionism is generally regarded and commonly understood as a foreign policy of political or military non-involvement in the foreign relations or internal affairs of other countries. The United Nations makes the observance of the principle incumbent upon member states by including it in the UN Charter under Article 2.4. Nevertheless, in Morgenthaun's imagination, bigger states arm-twisting or even dominating the external and internal affairs of smaller states is rather unexceptional. The Banana Republic phenomenon may have become an old clichรฉ, yet it remains a metaphorical reality in the present day. In contrast to small, powerless states being dictated by superpowers, there are also instances of more robust and formidable countries having to navigate a more powerful and demanding ally. This diplomatic overreach differs from direct threats or confrontations with adversaries; instead, it involves unsolicited initiatives that may carry consequences.

The rise of Donald Trump to the presidency and the range of diplomatic strategies he employed present a notable example of diplomatic overreach, or, if we may say so, interventionism by other means. Whether this on-camera diplomacy by Donald Trump is a calculated maneuver or simply part of his unconventional approach remains to be studied.

Cases in Point

Alluding to Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and his work, albeit through a different lens than wartime scenarios vis-ร -vis the current context, it is possible to parallel a conceptual imperial presidency that leads to diplomatic overreach. We can observe similarities in the growing presidential primacy in foreign policy, concurrently with the use of unilateral tools, such as cutting foreign aid, exiting international organisations, issuing tariffs, and a considerable number of executive orders.

Under the constant framing of a looming threat, be it economic, migrant related, whether foreign or domestic, this narrative paves the way for this unilateral strategy. Bolstered by the placement of loyalists in institutions, such as the Foreign Service, this executive unilateralism fuels diplomatic overreach such as signaling Canada to become a US state. This example erodes the trust between allies, heightening tariff tensions between the two and giving the impression to other countries that the US may view friendly states as subordinate, reducing its credibility as a partner that respects sovereignty, and further raising security concerns and public perception issues.

This diplomatic overreach can again be exemplified in Trumpโ€™s call for the release of Bolsonaro. Trumpโ€™s public support for Bolsonaroโ€™s release could influence Brazilโ€™s international alignments, including its engagement with BRICS. This raises questions about respect for national sovereignty and undermines the US position when it later invokes non-interference or the rule of law.

Again, the call to the President of Israel to pardon Netanyahu can be viewed as a challenge to Israelโ€™s judicial independence and sovereignty, weakening the alliance between the two. It can strengthen domestic opposition by showing Netanyahu as reliant on foreign assistance. Even if the narrative of โ€œsaving Israelโ€ serves Netanyahu and the US geopolitical interests in the short term, it highlights Trumpโ€™s diplomatic overreach.

Picture: President Donald J. Trump and Vice President Mike Pence participate in an expanded bilateral meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu Monday, Jan. 27, 2020, in the Oval Office of the White House. (Official White House Photo by D. Myles Cullen)

Interventionism V. Diplomacy

In international relations, interventionism refers to the intentional involvement of one state in the internal or external affairs of another, whether through military invasion, economic coercion, or political manipulation, to promote security, values, or influence. Powerful states often use interventionist strategies to secure zones of influence and proactively shape global outcomes. The creation of buffer states, client states, and banana republics exemplifies how interventionism operates beyond overt military force. A buffer state serves as a geopolitical buffer between rival powers; a client state functions under the economic or military dominance of a patron; and the term โ€œbanana republicโ€ describes countries whose economic and political systems are subordinated to foreign strategic or business interests, often accompanied by interventionism.


By contrast, diplomacy ostensibly uses negotiation, persuasion, and representation rather than coercion. However, diplomacy itself harbors a covert element, namely, intelligence gathering, back-channel negotiations, and subtle influence campaigns, which buttress the art of statecraft.

In recent years, Trumpโ€™s foreign policy has illustrated how interventionism and diplomacy merge on the spectrum of influence, giving birth to a lesser-seen phenomenon of โ€œOvert Diplomacyโ€ or โ€œInterference, not Interventionโ€. Interestingly, the countries on the receiving end of Trumpโ€™s interference arenโ€™t meek bananas or clients, but powerful countries and formidable allies.

President Trumpโ€™s attempts in Brazil, where he publicly defended former President Jair Bolsonaro, threatened 50 % tariffs on Brazilian goods if legal proceedings continued, and in Israel, where he intervened in the legal process of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu by publicly calling for his corruption trial to be canceled or pardoned, and reversing sanctions on Israeli settler groups, moves that have been interpreted by some observers undermining judicial independence, put across a rarely seen act of public and overt diplomacy. The reason the American president has chosen to conduct his business in public view is that this unique brand of diplomacy appears to serve both domestic and international political purposes. Such public interventions allow him to project strength, command global attention, and consolidate internal support, even when legal or normative costs mount.

Picture: (Washington, DC - EUA 19/03/2019) Presidente da Repรบblica Jair Bolsonaro responde perguntas da imprensa durante o encontro. Foto: Isac Nรณbrega/PR

Conclusion

The Trumpian model of โ€œOvert Diplomacyโ€ evidenced interesting aspects, merging both appeal and coercion. Usually shielded from public displays, these attempts at interference reverse that trend and have both domestic and foreign consequences, conveying the image of assertive leadership. Aimed not at rivals, but at traditional allies, it walks a fine line, risking old alliances while balancing them with short-term political gains. However, the consequences of this trade-off remain uncertain.ย 

October 20, 2025 — No Comments

Cyber-attacks and drone sightings: How prepared is the West?

By Maria Makurat - Cyber Security Desk

Introduction

Recent months and weeks have shown a significant increase in headlines concerning drones, cyber-attacks, and hybrid warfare in the context of the Russiaโ€“Ukraine war.

The airports of Berlin, Heathrow and Brussels were reportedly hit by cyber-attacks, causing significant delays and safety concerns for passengers. Then it continued with several drone sightings causing disruption at airports such as Munich.  The German Federal Ministry of Interior (BMI) has officially released a statement saying that there is increased concern in the following areas namely: firstly, Russiaโ€™s attacks on Ukraine have prompted Germany and other Western countries to strengthen their security agendas, secondly, cyber-attacks have become an increasing threat since the start of the war making Germany the target for disinformation campaigns launched by Russia, thirdly, Germany must better protect its critical infrastructure against sabotage. With these incidents one can ask the following questions: How prepared is the West to face cyber and hybrid attacks? How should countries react in the future and are there serious concerns for drone warfare? Must the west continue to change its cyber-strategy as well as its hybrid warfare strategy?

Germany and the West against drones

We have seen a significant increase in drone sightings in the past months. Headlines of drones and even balloon sightings disrupting airports have caused concern and heated debates amongst civilians and of course government officials. Munich has been in the focus of the recent drone sightings causing the airport to suspend all flights. Twice the airport saw drones over the airport and had to stop all flights causing around 6,500 passengers to be affected. This has caused the German government to activate the German Military to be involved in battling drones more strongly and be trained in such scenarios. As of yet, it is unclear who is responsible for these drone incidents. However, whether itโ€™s private or a state actor, they have managed significant disturbance and caused the EU and NATO to want to act more strongly to be better prepared for hybrid warfare. In addition, AI is also having a significant impact on how countries are developing weapons and defence against threats causing more uncertainty. 

In international relations there still remains much scepticism and different view points on whether cyber-attacks can be considered to have a โ€˜violent impactโ€™ at all. Lucas Kello (2017) discusses in his work โ€œThe Virtual Weaponโ€ the point that scholars leaning towards the Clausewitzian school of thought do not believe that โ€œcyber operations are not directly violent. Nor do they create significantly collateral damage.โ€1 This may be true on some level if we were to discuss whether the drones had a physical impact on civilian lives but when daring to combine international relations with sociological theories, it always depends on the following aspects: What do we understand under violence? When is an act violent? And who decides when an act is violent in hybrid warfare?

Taking the Munich and Belgium drone incident from September 2025 into account โ€“ with considering what we know and do not know so far โ€“ the following impacts can be identified: it has caused unrest, concern amongst civilians (some surveys by national news outlets indicate that roughly one in two respondents now express concern about foreign drone attacks at home) and officials, a summit in Copenhagen and from the police in Germany to be able to shoot down drones more easily when in sight. 

One could argue so far, no physical violence has been caused however, is unrest amongst countries and cities and heightened security measures that cause unrest also a form of violence? Is the uncertainty over who is behind the drone incidents itself a form of disturbance? Will this add to a certain cyber strategy of ramping up defences? Or is it more of a back-and-forth game of cyber and drone attacks happening and the West reacting with closing defence holes? 

The Copenhagen Summit and hybrid warfare

The summit showed heated debates amongst the countries. As of this moment, there is no concrete evidence that Russia is behind the drone incidents; however, countries such as Denmark have strongly suggested possible Russian involvement due to the recent MiG-31 jet crossing in Estonian airspace. It can be seen as a form of โ€˜pokingโ€™ NATO to see what kind of reaction can be achieved however, caution is advised when drawing conclusions.

 Several other drones were sighted: โ€œDrones have been seen in recent days over Germany's northern state of Schleswig-Holstein, and flights have been delayed in the past week at Vilnius airport in Lithuania and at Oslo airport in Norway because of drone activity.โ€  Western nations may need to strengthen their cybersecurity and defence systems, such as, establishing a โ€œdrone wallโ€. 

Perhaps the EUโ€™s plans for AI Gigafactories can contribute to developing such systems in tackling drones more effectively in the near future: โ€œSectoral flagships including targeted measures to boost AI adoption across 10 key industry sectors and the public sector. The industrial sectors include (โ€ฆ) energy, agri-food; defence, security and space (โ€ฆ).โ€  What Germany plans to invest in anti-drone equipment, which should also be put to use in other countries called โ€œSkyrangerโ€. Furthermore, experts from Universities such as TU Dresden state that one should invest more strongly in protecting critical infrastructure, such as airports, by installing lasers, jammers and radars, to name a few examples, but will this truly help in deterring attacks? Perhaps the aggressor will not see this a true deterrence and defence and will simply continue with โ€˜probingโ€™ or launching drones just to cause unrest.

The Summit has shown that members of the EU and NATO are concerned and are willing to step up their defence in the cyber and hybrid warfare areas. One cannot deny that the drones have targeted so-called critical infrastructure of the West namely: airports. It would be important to focus on all possible critical infrastructure in relation to drones and cyber-attacks such as hospitals, transportation systems, government buildings and energy structures (to name a few). These should be securely protected against drone disruptions as well as cyber-attacks which seems to be no new statement but should be highlighted nonetheless.

Photo by Phil Hearing on Unsplash

What do we know so far and what do we need to ask ourselves next?

Clausewitzian skeptics are wary of cyber-attacks having a physical or traditional war perspective effect. One can conclude that in the last years the landscape of international relations has changed and states, countries and individuals are rapidly adapting with using technology (also drones) to achieve certain means. 

Apparently, reports suggest the drones were targeting specifically critical infrastructure in Germany, checking out important facilities such as energy and even a military site.

As for now, Russia has not claimed responsibility for the recent cyber-attacks and drone incidents,* which adds to the uncertainty* in cyber scenarios. Countries in this new type of โ€˜warfareโ€™ often act based on suspicion and what is discussed amongst scholars,  โ€œtit for tatโ€ and to โ€œcoerce the enemy into acting a certain wayโ€. One cannot say for certain at this moment if this is the intention of all the incidents however, it is certain that action needs to be taken to ensure a better defence and quicker reaction time. It also makes it clear that countries have to continue to rapidly adapt their strategy (also their cyber-strategy) in all directions in order to keep up with the changing landscape of conflicts. 

At present, it cannot be stated with certainty that the cyber-attacks on the airports or the drone incidents had a physical violent impact however, they have significant delays, disturbance and a renewed debate concerning security.  Both cyber-attacks and drones pose a threat to NATO member states and other Western countries and should be taken more strongly into account when investing in defence and a certain โ€˜cyber-strategyโ€™. 

The following questions should guide future consideration: how can the West and the EU defend and react quicker in relation to cyber-attacks and drone incidents? Will the new plans to allow police to shoot down drones have a positive impact or cause further probing? Can AI and the investment in technology allow countries such as Germany to develop defence walls quicker than 2030? 

Developing the so-called โ€œdrone wallโ€ย  represents an initial response and could aid in the defence of countries against probing drones however, it should still be critically analysed who is behind the incidents and additional sanctions could be considered once attribution is established, to reduce uncertainty. The more certain one is of who is behind certain actions, the better a preparation can be put into place. This may add to the strategy in a certain โ€˜hybrid warfareโ€™ but one cannot be for certain how it will develop in the near future since technology is also developing at a rapid speed. Perhaps states will be drawn into an endless โ€œtit-for-tatโ€2 game with implementing sanctions against cyber-attacks or better defence systems against drones however, these questions merit further analysis and discussion to gain a better understanding of how such potential hybrid conflicts could play out.

When one continues to critically ask these questions, then a good strategy can be developed in order to tackle the emerging challenges in cyber and drone incidents. As Richard P. Rumelt notes a bad strategy would be to mistake the end goals as the strategy itself3. The latter is commonly depicted as being the ends, ways and means and when applying this to the current international political landscape, it must remain fluid and multidimensional to adapt to rapidly changing technologies.


  1. Lucas Kello, The Virtual Weapon, Oxford, page 31 โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  2. ย Valeriano Brandon et al, โ€œCyber Strategyโ€ 2018, oxford university press, page 226. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ
  3. ย Richard P. Rumelt, โ€œGood Strategy, Bad Strategy โ€“ The Difference and Why it Matters,โ€ pg 47. โ†ฉ๏ธŽ

October 15, 2025 — No Comments

Giusti on Russian threats to Ukrainian Heritageย 

In this episode of the ITSS Verona Member Series, our members interview Dr Serena Giusti, Affiliate Professor at the Institute of Law, Politics, and Development at Santโ€™Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa.

With a PhD from the European University Institute and extensive expertise in foreign policy analysis, EU-Russia relations, democratisation, and European security, Dr Giusti sheds light on how cultural heritage is being weaponised in the war in Ukraine. The discussion covers Russiaโ€™s policies before and after the invasion, deliberate targeting of heritage sites, the trafficking of stolen cultural items, their use in sanctions evasion, and strategies to counter these hybrid threats. 

Interviewers: Julia Hodgins and Francesco Pagano - Culture, Society & Security Desk

October 14, 2025 — No Comments

The Spectacle of Division: Charlie Kirkโ€™s death and Americaโ€™s war on truth

By Joshua Yow and Shams Jouve - Crime, Terrorism & Extremism Desk

The present state of political violence

On the 10th of September 2025, Charlie Kirk was shot and killed while speaking at an outdoor Turning Point USA event on the campus of Utah Valley University. Tyler Robinson, a 22-year-old, was subsequently arrested by the police and charged with Kirkโ€™s murder.

This killing quickly became a national flashpoint, sparking a broader debate on rising political violence and deepening party polarisation, culminating in a highly publicised and elaborately high-level memorial service for Kirkโ€™s death. 

However, this ongoing escalation of violence in the United States is not an unprecedented phenomenon. Following John F. Kennedyโ€™s death, a wave of violence directly targeting political figures was observed, resulting in the assassination of key political leaders and civil rights activists between 1960 and 1970.

While those events also deepened political divisions, todayโ€™s environment is fundamentally different. Social media has become a defining factor, setting this crisis apart from earlier episodes, with Utah Governor Spencer Cox noting that โ€œsocial media has played a role in every single assassination attempt that we have seen over the last five, six yearsโ€, in a speech reacting to Charlie Kirkโ€™s death. To understand the changes in the state of political violence, this article aims to identify the current modes of violence and the factors that accelerate them.

Social media as an amplifier for polarisation

Currently, online platforms act as a prominent amplifier for political violence following the assassination. Kubin and von Sikorski highlight that โ€œsocial media [...] can exacerbate both ideological and affective political polarisationโ€, playing a key role in polarisation dynamics by fostering online echo chambers. These are a consequence of the design of online platforms and algorithmic engagement strategies, which are intended to connect like-minded individuals and reinforce their political beliefs, leading to increasing engagement while directly fueling political divides. 

Polarisation is further powered by the spread of disinformation and misinformation online. Elites also play a disproportionate role within this dynamic, as โ€œsocial media can provide [them] with the ability to shape their supportersโ€™ opinions and mobilise turnout for elections and political eventsโ€, often by disseminating polarising content. Furthermore, the mediatic and political scene in the US reinforce these existing divisions, privileging the most extreme voices, where โ€œthe incentives that fuel American political life reward the people and platforms that turn up the heat, not those who dial tensions down.โ€ This highly charged  political rhetoric results in a declining faith in institutions, which creates a feedback loop of violence.

Chavalarias notes that though echo chambers can form offline, online processes clearly enable the fast development of tensions directly impacting offline relationships. Thus, political violence should not be confined solely to online dynamics, but should be attributed to a convergence of deeper structural causes like economic insecurity, demographic anxiety, and increasingly provocative political discourses, ultimately contributing to growing fault lines. These ideological disagreements, transformed into personal animosity, have been heightened by social media, as well as the spread of conspiracy theories and personal grievances. 

The methods and meanings of radicalisation

The methods of Tyler Robinson, the accused perpetrator, are also telling of the present climate of political radicalisation. His actions are indicative of a wider pattern of lone-actor or small-cell attacks that erupt out of political grievance rather than from hierarchical, organised forms of gang-related violence or terrorism. Robinsonโ€™s signalling to an online audience, including referential engravings alluding to internet subculture, is not a new phenomenon, but it is one of growing concern. It reflects how extremist communication increasingly panders to these echo chambers present within internet culture. The purpose of these engravings goes beyond the traditional manifesto, instead acting as performative cues to in-group communities that subsequently propagate the act and idea of violence.

These online communities have the potential to โ€œexacerbate both ideological and affective political polarizationโ€, acting as both a stage and an amplifier, which raises the attention rewards for identity-affirming, antagonistic content. 

When this form of political extremism is coupled with a perpetratorโ€™s unhindered access to the internet, this makes sources of online radicalisation much more opaque, which in turn makes the attribution of violence increasingly nebulous by leaving a vacuum of motive, encouraging a partisan narrative-setting after the act of killing.

Research on recent U.S. domestic terrorism exhibits a rise in incidents linked to public political events and reciprocal confrontation between opposing camps, leading to a local security dilemma in which each sideโ€™s self-protection fuels the otherโ€™s escalation. With access to firearms and constant permeation of radical thought, would-be assassins can operate as self-directed agents inside online and offline networks, functioning as individual cells of decentralised radicalisation. Law enforcement and government have also often been the most frequent targets across extreme ideologies, with far-right incidents having more lethal outcomes due to firearms use.

Robinsonโ€™s targeting of a political commentator instead of a government official also signals a shift from attacking positions of formal power towards an attack on rhetoric and identity. Kirkโ€™s confrontational debate style has also made him a visible symbol, inviting division between his supporters and their opponents, while crystallising division within the American population. This reflects how demonstrations and public events have become focal points for violence, evoking the public stage as a site of contest, therefore revealing a nexus between policy and performance, which is present within echo chambers, audiences, and their associated performative cues. 

Ripple effects/ Consequences: What does it mean for American society?

Currently, the ripple effects of Charlie Kirkโ€™s assassination are being felt across the United States and beyond. Against the backdrop of deepening political polarisation and the erosion of a political โ€œmiddle,โ€ his death has triggered a surge of highly charged online discourse, disinformation, and calls for political violence, dynamics that extend well beyond domestic borders.

Source: President Donald Trump takes the stage with Erika Kirk at the Memorial Service for Charlie Kirk at State Farm Stadium in Glendale, Arizona, Sunday, September 21, 2025. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok) - Flickr

One sector feeling the strain is academia. In Canada, for instance, the University of Alberta placed several professors on non-disciplinary leave following threats linked to reactions surrounding Kirkโ€™s death. Within the U.S., the climate for free speech on university campuses has also grown increasingly tense. A 2024 survey found that 27% of students agreed that campuses should โ€œprohibit speech they may find offensive,โ€ up from 22% in 2021.

The debate surrounding Kirkโ€™s death has also reignited broader discussions about First Amendment rights, which safeguard fundamental freedoms such as free expression. In a controversial statement, Vice President J.D. Vance asserted that theย First Amendment โ€œdoes not protect those who celebrated Kirkโ€™s death from consequences.โ€ย His remarks came shortly after the President announced that the Antifa movement would be designated a terrorist organizationโ€”โ€œjust one of many actions,โ€ย according to a White House official,ย โ€œto address left-wing organizations that fuel political violence.โ€

Critics of the governmentโ€™s response to Kirkโ€™s assassination have themselves faced backlash. Some have received threats, others have lost their jobs, and even prominent figures in entertainment have come under pressure. Late-night host Jimmy Kimmel, for example, was briefly suspended by ABC (owned by Disney) after joking that the โ€œMAGA gangโ€ was attempting to score political points from Kirkโ€™s death; the network later reinstated him following public criticism.

Already, Kirk has been enshrined within martyrdom by the Republican Party, shifting the attention away from the root cause of rising rates of gun violence. These party divisions are further capitalised on during the Kirkโ€™s Memorial, blending American Evangelicalism and invocations of nationalism as a rallying platform, reinforcing partisan identity cues. This has been exacerbated by right-wing media figures demanding retribution for Kirkโ€™s death, calling Kirkโ€™s killing a declaration of โ€œwarโ€, illustrating the increase in sectarian escalation. Public spaces are also changing to reflect the heightened tensions, ushering in a deeper level of securitisation. President Trump also showed up to Kirkโ€™s memorial hidden behind layers of bulletproof glass, reflecting the deep paranoia plaguing the event. Therefore, Kirkโ€™s assassination exists within a self-reinforcing cycle of violence in which lone-actor radicalisation, online echo chambers, and performative politics harden sectarian identities while normalising a securitised public life. Breaking this cycle will depend on elite de-escalation and partisan compromise, though whether either will materialise remains uncertain.

As the United States navigates the fallout of this tragedy, the challenge lies not only in addressing immediate security threats but also in rebuilding a digital and political culture capable of disagreement without dehumanisation.

September 2, 2025 — No Comments

Italyโ€™s approach to the Mediterranean crisis: Focus on Libya and Syria

By Francesco Foti & Giacomo Prosperini - Italy Desk

Introduction

Italyโ€™s strategic engagement in the Mediterranean is characterised by the intricate relationship between energy security, migration management, counter-terrorism and regional stability. This is particularly evident in Libya and Syria, where Italian interests intersect with broader European and global dynamics.

In Libya, Italy is confronted with the ongoing challenges of political fragmentation, competing local authorities, and the increasing influence of external powers. These factors constrain Romeโ€™s capacity to fulfil its traditional role. Energy ties, migration control and managing local armed groups remain crucial levers, yet their effectiveness is increasingly undermined by militia activities, institutional deadlock and disruptive behaviour. The Greenstream pipeline and strategic oil and gas fields, for example, highlight the interdependence between Italian energy security and Libyan stability. However, reliance on fragile authoritarian systems carries great risks. Migration flows and criminal networks further exacerbate the challenges to Italian security, exposing the country to ethical dilemmas and limiting the effectiveness of regulatory strategies. In order to navigate this arena of geostrategic interests, it seems essential to strike a balance between short-term priorities, such as ensuring an adequate energy supply and controlling immigration, and long-term objectives, such as promoting institutional reforms to foster stability and coordinating effectively with European partners.

Conversely, the long civil war and ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria have exacerbated Europeโ€™s security and migration challenges. Italy must strike a delicate balance, engaging with the new regime, countering extremist networks and managing refugee flows, all the while coordinating with European partners whose policies are often fragmented and reactive. Iranian and Turkish activities in the region further complicate Italyโ€™s strategic calculations by influencing local governance and regional security dynamics. In response, Italy has pushed for Syria to be included in the EUโ€™s external action agenda, proposing a broader strategy to address the complex challenges arising from the civil war, particularly the pressure on migration routes. However, this effort faces significant obstacles: the lack of a coherent policy from Western partners, coupled with the unresolved nature of the Syrian government, means that Rome must adopt a carefully calibrated approach that tackles the root causes of instability, migration flows and potential terrorist threats in order to mitigate them.

Taken together, these cases illustrate the limitations of a purely reactive or ad hoc approach. Italy should combine pragmatic diplomacy with long-term strategic planning, leveraging its historical ties primarily with Libya, expanding the external action in Syria, an economic presence, and enhancing regional credibility compared to France and the UK in Libya and Syria. The following analysis examines the Italian approach to Libya and Syria, highlighting the key dilemmas, vulnerabilities and opportunities that currently define its Mediterranean policy.

The Italian Perspective on the Libyan Crisis

By Giacomo Prosperini

Photo by Jametlene Reskp on Unsplash

Post-Gaddafi Libya: Fragmentation and Political Deadlock

Among the multiple crises shaping the Mediterranean region, Libya remains a test case for Italy's ability to convert its geographical proximity into tangible influence. Romeโ€™s interests - namely energy partnerships through ENIโ€™s long-standing operations; containment of irregular migration; and broader regional stability - have been persistently undermined by Libya's political fragmentation since Gaddafi's regime collapsed in 2011. However, rather than redefining its strategy, Italy has tended to oscillate between ad hoc crisis management and a reliance on international processes that have produced limited results.

The post-2011 landscape in Libya remains marked by deep political and territorial tensions. Since Gaddafi's downfall, the country has been divided into two rival authorities: the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNA) in Tripoli, backed by Turkey and Qatar, and General Haftarโ€™s Libyan National Army (LNA) in the east, supported by by Russia, Egypt, and the UAE. The existence of these two factions turned the conflict into a proxy arena for regional and global powers. This foreign interference has further weakened Italyโ€™s previously privileged position, highlighting its diplomatic inferiority compared to more assertive external actors. Moreover, the proliferation of several armed groups with tribal and regional roots has created a security environment in which no single actor can guarantee stability.

Despite international initiatives, such as the Palermo Conference (2018) promoted by Italy and the Berlin Process (2020) Libya remains in deadlock. Tensions between historical Libyan provinces, rivalries between revolutionary and pro-Gaddafi factions, and competition over control of resources have undoubtedly fuelled instability. The repeated postponement of elections, most notably in December 2021, exposed the legal ambiguities of Libyaโ€™s institutional framework, as well as the reluctance of key stakeholders to embark on a genuine political transition. The absence of a coherent EU external action in the Mediterranean, coupled with minimal US involvement, has restricted Italyโ€™s freedom of action in Libya. This has contributed to the country adopting temporary policies instead of pursuing a strategic and forward-looking approach.

This persistent stalemate raises uncomfortable questions for Italy: should Rome continue to invest in fragile diplomatic efforts that have yielded little progress, or should it recalibrate its approach by prioritising narrower interests, such as energy and migration management? Either option involves significant trade-offs between short-term stability and long-term credibility.

Italy and Libya Energy Nexus

Italy's involvement in Libya has long been influenced by its reliance on energy ties, with ENI playing a key role in diplomatic engagement and economic influence, particularly in the energy sector through ENI. The Italian multinational oil and gas companyโ€™s operations in the Wafa and El Feel oil and gas fields, directly connected to Sicily through the Greenstream pipeline underline how closely linked Italyโ€™s energy security is to Libyan stability. Yet this reliance, which once gave Rome leverage, is increasingly revealing its fragility. ENIโ€™s strategic assets are at the mercy of Libyaโ€™s internal rivalries and armed groups' bargaining, which turns energy security into a structural vulnerability rather than a source of strength.

The war in Ukraine has further enlarged this paradox. As Europe seeks to diversify away from Russian energy dependence, Libya is seen as a key alternative for Italy and the EU. However, production remains subject to political instability and militia activity, as demonstrated by the blockade of the Ras Lanuf oil terminal in 2023. These events demonstrate that Italian energy policy relies on the temporary support of local groups, which ultimately renders it incapable of influencing the Libyan economy. This vulnerability is worsened by the absence of an EU external action strategy in the Mediterranean, bringing Italy to largely manage these challenges on its own and to take on responsibilities that could better be shared at the EU level.

Italy therefore faces a strategic dilemma. While an approach that prioritises energy guarantees immediate supplies, it risks binding Rome to a model of dependence on fragile authorities and undermining its ability to act as a regional stabiliser. Alternatively, Italy could leverage its presence in the energy sector for diplomatic gain, but only if reforms are implemented to stabilise and transparently manage the country's political and economic affairs. The choice is both technical and geopolitical: Italy can either remain a passive observer of the instability in Libya, or it can take an active role in ensuring security in the Mediterranean through energy diplomacy.

Migration, Security, and Human Rights

Libya remains one of the main departure points for migration to Europe, particularly along the Central Mediterranean route to Italy. Due to its proximity to Italy, the Libyan coast is a key โ€œhotspotโ€ where thousands of migrants and refugees, primarily from Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, attempt dangerous sea crossings to reach Italian shores. For Italy, this influx of migrants is not only a humanitarian concern, but also an increasing security issue.

In response, the country has pursued a containment strategy, supporting the Libyan Coast Guard in intercepting and returning migrants before they reach European waters. However, these practices have sparked widespread criticism from various NGOs and the UN, who argue that Italian support effectively enables the return of migrants to Libyan detention centres, where conditions are described as inhumane and characterised by torture, extortion, continuous violence and abuse. The absence of effective border control, coupled with the fragmentation of the Libyan security apparatus, encourages the mobility of jihadist groups and foreign fighters, especially in southern Libya and across the Sahel. For Italy, the intersection of human trafficking, organised crime, and potential terrorist infiltration poses a multidimensional threat to national and regional security. By relying on Libyan authorities, Italy risks associating its migration policy with serious human rights violations. This tension is augmented by the lack of a unified European approach in terms of migratory policy. The limitations of the Dublin Regulation and the ambiguities of the EUโ€™s New Pact on Migration and Asylum highlight the absence of a true European solidarity system, leaving frontline states such as Italy with a disproportionate amount of responsibility. This tension highlights a deeper dilemma, as short-term containment could come at the expense of international credibility and moral authority.

The suspension of operations for ten international NGOs and the UNHCR by the Libyan Internal Security Agency (LISA) in April 2025 further complicates the landscape. This suspension is a clear sign of Libya's increasingly securitarian and repressive shift, where international cooperation on migration is becoming increasingly subordinate to political and military interests.  Italy and the EU now face a critical dilemma: should they continue to support authoritarian and violent actors in order to contain migration flows, or should they rethink their foreign policy in light of international law and human rights principles? Every path involves trade-offs. Disengagement could lead to uncontrolled migration flows, while continued support could reinforce inhumane authoritarian practices and destabilise the region.

Italian-Turkish Competition

Turkey's military and political presence in Tripoli has greatly challenged Italy's historical influence in Libya. Historically, Italy occupied a dominant position in Libya's European relations, underpinned by its colonial legacy, robust diplomatic and commercial engagement, and its status as the first destination country for Libyan exports.

The 2019 Memorandum of Understanding between Turkey and the GNA Turkey expanded Turkey's territorial waters in the Mediterranean, raising tensions with Greece and Cyprus. This Turkish expansion has created a new geopolitical dynamic in the Eastern Mediterranean, making it more difficult for Italy to assert its influence in Libya. By relying on its traditional influence and bilateral relations, Rome risks being marginalized in decision-making processes affecting both Libya and the wider region. Indeed, Turkey's increased presence in Tripoli means direct competition for control of energy resources, migration routes, and political alliances within Libya. 

Should Italy adopt a proactive approach to limit Turkish influence and risk exacerbating regional tensions, or should it pursue multilateral coordination within the EU and NATO to preserve access and long-term stability? Either way, there are risks. A confrontational approach could provoke retaliation and further instability, while inaction could further erode Italy's strategic influence.

Italy and the Syrian Crisis: A Geopolitical, Security and Migratory Perspective

By Francesco Foti

By FeaturingDallas - Own work, CC BY 4.0

Post-Assad Syria and Impacts on European Security

Following the collapse of the Assad regime, the West has been dealing with the consequences of a new Syria. Southeastern European countries have borne the brunt of the instability caused by the 14-year civil war. Southern EU countries' capacity to process migrants at their first point of entry into Europe has been significantly impacted by it. The disproportionate burden could also be posing a security risk, including instances of radicalisation and terrorism documented in Italy that reverberate at the single EU countryโ€™s level. A fragmented Syria complicates the security crisis. An extremist or ineffectual government that harbours or exports radical violent individualsshould not be ruled out, given the past of HTS and the explosions of violence involving former loyalists, Alawites, Druze, and Christians.

EU Policy Failures on Syrian Migration

At the EU level, inconsistent application and failure to reform or uniform the Dublin Regulation have contributed to the instability in the Mediterranean and impacted Italyโ€™s capabilities, thus signalling a lack of European approach. The refusal to reform the Dublin treaty and the lack of a broad approach to the security crisis by relying only on Libya, Egypt, and Turkey as a way to stem the flow underscore the European limited role in addressing the Syrian issue. The 2016 migration between Turkey and the EU exemplifies the European strategy of exchanging political concessions and funding for assistance in curbing migration flows.

Italyโ€™s Legal and Diplomatic Response to the Syrian Crisis

Italy has temporarily suspended aspects of the asylum registration process under emergency measures, currently contested in court. To help manage migration, the Albania Agreement (2023) served as an option currently under discussion at the European level. The Italian government has passed a restrictive Law n. 187/2024 on immigration, and the annual immigration quota decree. The agreement and the laws implemented have been impugned by the courts which has limited their enforceability. The same impasse is observable across other EU countries.

An Italian geopolitical approach?

Due to European limitations and approach, the Italian position is limited to diplomatic, investment and humanitarian initiatives. Italy thinks that dealing with the Syrian government, whether in the form of Assad or HTS, is the starting point to address the question of immigration from instability. Lifting sanctions was presented as leading to cooperation in terms of infrastructure and business opportunities, which could boost the recovery and bring about stability to address the root causes. Italy should be watching the interregnum phase as this might precipitate another immigration crisis.Italian pragmatism should take into consideration the Turkish role, activism and exceptionalism of which Greece and Cyprus have long been vocal. Italy should clearly demand Turkey halt any unilateral actions in Northern Syria that have not been agreed upon with NATO and EU allies. Turkish military operations targeting the Kurds risk destabilising by triggering artificial resettlement, increased displacement and growth of refugee camps amid deterioration of humanitarian conditions. Furthermore, as shown by the 2020 Turko-Greek crisis, Turkish use of immigration as a hybrid threat exposes European inaction and the limits of the Italo-Turkish partnership in the face of unchecked Turkish militarism. Turkish actions frequently blur the distinction between support for moderates and extremists, thus undermining both the security of Syrian-controlled areas and prospects for the eventual, gradual return of refugees to Europe.

Italy should also reassess its approach to Iranian influence in Syria and the broader Levantine region. A critical component of this reassessment involves evaluating Iranโ€™s use of sectarian dynamics to extend its regional influence, a strategy that has historically contributed to instability and, in turn, increased migration pressures toward Europe. While Iran will still remain an actor to reckon with in Syria, particularly through its support of the Shias and Alewites, the evolving political landscape in Damascus warrants close scrutiny. Italy should remain vigilant to any Iranian efforts to recalibrate its role and maintain leverage in the region, as this may have implications for both regional stability and require Italyโ€™s bilateral relations with Tehran to be re-evaluated.

Israel's recent actions show awareness of the need to ensure Syria does not spiral into all-out sectarianism. However, Italyโ€™s relationship with Israel has come under strain in light of recent developments in Gaza. Unlike countries such as the United Kingdom, France, or Spain, Italy has avoided openly criticizing Israelโ€™s actions. However, it has also refrained from vocally supporting Israeli airstrikes in Syria, which Israel claims are aimed at protecting the Druze minority from government aggression. This ambiguous stance reflects an inconsistent policy line that fails to address the broader challenge of sectarianism in the region.

In light of the Lebanese government's recent call for the disarmament of Hezbollahโ€”a paramilitary Shia organizationโ€”Italy should formally support this initiative as a necessary measure to curb the regional spread of sectarianism from Lebanon into Syria. Such a stance is particularly warranted given Hezbollahโ€™s alignment with the Iran-backed "axis of resistanceโ€. So far, the Syrian government declined to take decisive steps.

A Western response

The West lacks a broad commitment to the Syrian issue, other than previously supporting rebels, much like with Libyaโ€™s Gaddafi and the French-led regime change without clear post-intervention commitment. A cautious approach requires that the EU and US pressure should not be lifted, avoiding a quick diplomatic clout, until the course of Ahmed al-Sharaa becomes clear without ambiguity and sectarianism. A long-term plan comprising stabilisation, limiting the influence of geopolitical rivals and continuous pressure could tackle the root causes for massive immigration to Europe. Activism within the EU framework requires the US to be involved, and the easing pressure not be too speedy, given the uncertain direction of HTS. The Western powers should refrain from arming HTS and pressure others, such as Ukraine, not to overreach.

A new approach?

The Albanian model should be internalised and made into EU law, thus securing funding and being administered by the EU itself, and a quota system approved at the European level. The Italian government should stress the security dimension of the deal to frame it as a public safety tool and a faster, more humane processing. Italy should invite other countries in a joint governance of the centres to share the burden but also show the profits of the model. The EU should have an updated approach to cooperate with the Syrian authorities on repatriations, limit Turkish, Iranian and Qatari influence and pressure them not to engage in sectarianism. Italy should also take centre stage and bring the issue of the future West-Syria relations to the fore to help form a broad Western initiative that should, however, be security-based and geopolitical before focusing on immigration, trade and investment. This requires a new perspective on the actors in the Syrian playground based on the Libyan case that saw the rushed support for rebels that replaced the dictator turning out to breed chaos and new security challenges met inconsistently by the western powers.

Conclusions 

Analyses of the situations in Libya and Syria highlight several key lessons for Italyโ€™s Mediterranean strategy. Firstly, both crises demonstrate the limitations of reactive or ad hoc approaches. Short-term interventions in areas such as energy, migration and security often fail to address the root causes of political fragmentation and the influence of external actors. Secondly, while Italyโ€™s traditional levers, such as energy diplomacy, migration management and engagement with local authorities, are necessary, they are insufficient in contexts marked by instability and unpredictable actors. Thirdly, these cases demonstrate that external influences, such as those from Turkey and Russia in Libya and Turkey and Iran in Syria, can significantly restrict Italyโ€™s ability to act alone, making it essential for Italy to coordinate with other EU and NATO partners. Finally, the dilemmas faced in both countries illustrate the persistent tension between immediate interests, such as energy security and migration governance, and long-term objectives, including institutional reform, human rights protection and regional stability.

In light of these lessons, Italy must reassess its strategy in Libya, taking into account the growing influence of Turkey, the ongoing engagement of Iran, and the persistent institutional fragmentation, while also addressing migration management.  The continuing stalemate between Tripoli and the eastern authorities, the repeated blockading of oil terminals and the fragility of local governance structures demonstrate that the ad hoc diplomatic and reactive intervention-focused approaches adopted after Gaddafi's fall are no longer sufficient. Yet the limited engagement of the EU in defining a coherent Mediterranean policy compounds these challenges, leaving Rome to act in a largely unilateral way. Italy must therefore combine traditional diplomatic tools with innovative approaches, promoting stability in energy production and reforming local institutions. Together with the need to ensure stability and defend human rights, this will require a comprehensive European approach aimed at preventing Libya from becoming a permanent centre of insecurity along the EUโ€™s southern border.

At the same time, there has been a welcome in Italy for the prospect of closer engagement with the new Syrian authorities. However, these proposals must be carefully evaluated. Rome must consider whether the Al Jolani government can realistically unify diverse communities, combat terrorism and curb extremism. Effective engagement will depend on a holistic Western approach combining incentives and pressure to ensure the new authorities commit to inclusive governance, reject sectarian policies and contribute to long-term stability. A coherent strategy integrating political, security and humanitarian dimensions is essential for mitigating migration flows to Europe and for consolidating Italyโ€™s credibility as a stabilising force in the Mediterranean and the wider Middle East.

 

August 29, 2025 — No Comments

PSMCs and Security Sector Reform in African Counter-Terrorism Privatisation

By Ilas Touazi - Africa desk

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the privatisation of security has emerged in response to transnational security threats. At the same time, with the events of September 11, the global security landscape was completely transformed, with the private security sector playing a crucial role in the fight against terrorism, thus initiating a significant shift in the transition from the mere privatisation of security services to the privatisation of counter-terrorism efforts. Given that Africa has become โ€œthe epicentre of global terrorismโ€, the African governments have turned to private military and security companies (PMSCs) as key players in the privatisation process of counter-terrorism and security sector governance, highlighting existing security gaps.

Globalization of Private Security: from the privatisation of security to counter-terrorism privatisation

In the post-Cold War era, the craze for the โ€œprivatisation of securityโ€ has spread globally in response to โ€œtransnational security threatsโ€. This process was associated with efficiency and effectiveness in an international context characterised by numerous failures of centralised โ€œWestphalian statesโ€ overwhelmed by โ€œsecurity dilemmasโ€ of a changing nature, especially with the emergence of intra-state conflicts. Meanwhile, a major development in the state system of international relations (IR) has taken place with the reconfiguration of the roles of the state, which has ceded its position as the only legitimate provider and guarantor of security to private and non-state military security agents. Indeed, the increasing prominence of โ€œprivate security entitiesโ€ as crucial actors in global politics clearly mirrors the transformations in international โ€œsecurity governanceโ€ characteristic of the postmodern era; consequently, โ€œprivate military firmsโ€ and โ€œmercenariesโ€ have evolved into novel types of normative agents that engage in interaction, collaboration, and rivalry, thereby establishing a three-way dynamic of institutionalised security engineering. Nevertheless, this trend results in the breakdown of conventional state governance structures, occurring within a context where the connections between public, private, global, and local domains are being redefined. Simultaneously, the African continent has also been the scene of the interaction between privatisation and the globalisation of security in the midst of the rise of private security providers, going beyond the traditional vision of state authority, which is moving more towards a new complex model of governance involving public and private security actors which blurs the line between internal and external, regional and international security.

The post-September 11 global security environment has offered the private security market a key role in the fight against terrorism; thus, a new turn has begun in changing the path from the privatisation of security to the privatisation of counter-terrorism. However, the formation of public-private partnerships (P3) has intensified with the engagement of private sector security professionals in favour of a broader intersectoral strategy to combat terrorism as part of a standardised approach to โ€œterrorism securitisationโ€ that includes the contribution of private security actors to prevention efforts. On the one hand, the privatisation of counter-terrorism has been undertaken to meet the intense needs of anti-terrorist cooperation operations abroad, with gaps to be filled in terms of toolboxes, whether in terms of resources, forces, or capabilities. On the other hand, private companies after September 11, 2001, had become de facto subcontractors of โ€œcounter-terrorism security operationsโ€ traditionally carried out exclusively by state agencies to avoid any control and direct legal responsibility. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has led to an increased reliance on private security companies while emphasising a โ€œstrategic capabilities-based approachโ€ but also the adoption of a โ€œpreventive counter-terrorism strategyโ€ against an unknown adversary that requires a refocusing of the mission of the armed forces, where the private sector is actively involved in an operational dynamic of โ€œrisk managementโ€ and clearly distinguishes it from previous โ€œthreat-based approachesโ€. Importantly, private security entities have become a crucial tool in the efforts of governments to maintain national security; thus, the privatisation of counter-terrorism takes several forms, namely open, closed, statutory and non-contractual co-option. Undoubtedly, this is manifested through their central roles to play in counter-terrorism surveillance (CTS), in particular in the fight against terrorist financing and in the use of technology to secure infrastructure against cyberterrorism. The private security sector plays an important role both in the prevention and response to critical incidents, including terrorist attacks; moreover, private security personnel provide information, command, control and communications in the management of terrorist risk. This sector has become an effective element of counter-terrorism capabilities and occupies the top level of strategic prevention plans.

The private security and military companies PSMCs in Africa: actors of international security

In Africa, the privatisation of security reflects the major shifts that the concept of security has undergone, moving from the exclusive domain of the State to private actors in a context characterised by hybridity and fragmentation, involving an array of private military and security companies (PMSCs), which have emerged as an alternative path to African security governance, primarily dominated by the erosion of State capacities, with a deficit in the regulation of the security sector. The PMSCs have become regular actors in the African security landscape. Organised as legal corporate entities, they provide a wide range of military and security services, including transport, maintenance, military and police training, demining, intelligence, risk analysis, armed and unarmed protection services, anti-piracy measures, border protection, drones and cyber operations. Indeed, African governments regularly call on transnational corporations (TNCs) to ensure security in areas with limited state status. The PMSCs and non-state actors, notably South Africa's Executive Outcomes (EO), have grown since the end of the Cold War as a result of the state's bankruptcy and the deficit in monopoly and use of power. The intensification of conflicts across the continent has been the driving force behind the privatisation of security, especially since the dynamics of these conflicts remain varied and complicated, and the involvement of the private security sector was a reality even during the post-independence period, due to arbitrary colonial borders and the nature of the post-colonial African state and patrimonialism. In fact, the private security industry also possesses the competence and capacity to conduct conflicts and wars. From this perspective, the increase in conflicts has created a need for private contractors to support and fill operational gaps in United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian aid missions; thus, PMSCs provide the UN with a multitude of services, including logistics, military training, and security sector reform, becoming key international security actors, and Africa is not immune to this.

The use of PMSCs in Africa has evolved from mercenary to undergo a significant transformation in the 1990s, becoming privatised and business-orientated. Whereas historically these non-state actors have been involved in activities related to civil wars and the exploitation of natural resources. With this in mind, Sierra Leone and Angola have been supported by military companies to fight against rebellions and regain control of diamond-rich regions. In addition, Congo recruited the Belgian company Union Miniรจre between the period from 1960 to 1965. PMSCs often resorted to operations related to coups d'รฉtat and the fight against communism, white supremacy and the preservation of quasi-colonial structures in the 1960s and 1970s. The factors that have led to the rapid growth of the private security sector in Africa are generally linked to human insecurities resulting from the failure or weakness of states in the context of globalisation, which facilitates access to the private security sector, particularly with the commodification of the public sphere and the professionalisation of the armed forces and police in search of profit maximisation accentuated by the liberalisation of the arms trade.

The privatisation of counter-terrorism in Africa: understanding the complex and shifting dynamics

The fight against terrorism has become a priority on the agenda of private security companies in Africa. PMSCs actively support African governments primarily in the areas of combating the spread of transnational security threats, particularly in war governance, counter-insurgency (COIN), and counter-terrorism (CT). In this regard, the South African PMC Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment, and Protection (STTEP International Ltd) has intervened against Islamic terrorist groups and Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Sahel region. As a result, in the face of poor governance policies and ineffective management of the terrorist threat and security risks, this has led to the formation of non-state security actors as an intermediate security factor. Security groups like the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and the Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) were established to combat terrorist groups but as complementary entities to the security architectures of the police and the armed forces to help strengthen security functions. Western PMSCs are heavily involved in the privatisation efforts of counter-terrorism, namely the British Aegis Defence Services and Olive Group, the French companies Secopex and Agemira, the German companies Asgaard and Xeless and the American companies Triple Canopy and Advan Fort Co. Already in 2017, according to a Pentagon report, there were 21 private American security firms in the Sahel. All these entities are engaged in providing multifaceted operations to combat the emergence of extremist jihadist organisations. Thus, African countries receive operational training and logistical support in the field of anti-terrorism cooperation. In the current geopolitical circumstances, the fight against terrorism is the argument put forward by African governments that hire PMCs to counter the spread of jihadist groups. That is why new private military companies are operating in Africa, including Israeli private companies, and the UAE-based Black Shield Security.

The Sahel region in Africa has become a โ€œcoup beltโ€, especially since 2020, when military juntas came to power in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea and Niger. Meanwhile, the rapid expansion of militant jihadist groups, led by local subsidiaries of the Islamic State group, namely the Islamic State Province in the Sahel (ISSP) and Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), a branch of al-Qaida, has created a chaotic situation, as a result of which civilian and military governments have been unable to combat the security threats posed by jihadist groups, calling on private military and security companies (PMSCs) as key actors in the privatisation process of the fight against terrorism. In truth, the security vacuum and the inability of successive administrations to restore security order in the face of the emergence of an armed rebellion in the remote regions of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, led by groups linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS), are often instrumentalised by new military governments by promising to deal with Islamist fighters with an excessive reliance on security justification related to growing concerns about transnational insecurity. For example, the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP) in Mali used security gaps in the face of the territorial gains of radical jihadists to defend the military takeover in 2021, while in Burkina Faso, the putsch took place in September 2022 due to an inability to fight an Islamic insurgency. Indeed, the private military and security sector in Africa has recently been redefined, making way for new companies from emerging countries in a context of great power struggle, notably through the Chinese Frontier Services Group (FSG), while the Wagner paramilitary group has adopted a militaristic approach to combating terrorism in Africa. However, most countries in sub-Saharan Africa โ€“ Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania โ€“ have sought military and security support in the fight against the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. This also partly explains the proliferation of the Turkish International Defence Consulting Company (SADAT), which operates in the Sahel region destabilised by endemic terrorism and fragile security policies.

Source: PickPik Royalty-Free photo

African approach in the field of the privatization of counter-terrorism: PSMCs within security sector governance and reform (SSG/R)

Despite the fact that the African private sector plays a key role in counter-terrorism missions, including intelligence gathering, border management, humanitarian assistance and reintegration. The use of PMSCs exposes African states to numerous ethical and moral concerns, particularly in terms of national security and sovereignty, as the reliance on private contractors increases the risk of vulnerability and security gaps due to shortcomings in the field of drone technology innovation and territorial surveillance missions. Even more seriously, this is accompanied by the transformation of the notion of the โ€œcitizen-soldierโ€ looking out for the โ€œcommon goodโ€ into a โ€œprivate mercenaryโ€ seeking โ€œindividual financial gainsโ€ as the primary motivation, which raises the question of the divergence and non-conformity of the interests of PMCs with those of the States in wars and in counter-terrorism theatres of operations. Furthermore, despite attempts to regulate PMSC activities, regional and international efforts are still largely ineffective. In doing so, the use of PMSCs raises a number of ethical issues both in jus ad bellum and jus in bello, as they largely operate outside the effective jurisdiction of national and international law, unlike states and regular soldiers who are subject to a number of laws that restrict the conduct of war under international law. This is why the โ€œMontreux Documentโ€ constitutes the intergovernmental framework that establishes international legal obligations and good practices for states in terms of PMSC operations during armed conflicts intended to promote respect for international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law. 

South Africa was one of the first countries to adopt legislation regarding PMSCs with the 1998 Foreign Military Assistance Regulation Act and the 2001 Private Security Industry Regulation Act, amended in 2013. While at the regional level, there are numerous efforts by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and its successor, the African Union (AU), to eliminate mercenary activities and regulate the PMSC industry that continues to thrive on the continent. Particularly within the framework of the African Convention on the Elimination of Mercenariesโ€™ in Africa in 1977, notably Article 2(c) and Article 4(b); the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, from 1999; and the AU Non-Aggression and Defence Pact, from 2005; as well as the communiquรฉ regarding the withdrawal of foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya to the Sahel and the rest of Africa, adopted by the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) in 2021. The AU plays a key role across the continent in promoting good governance of the security sector. The Political Framework on Security Sector Reform in 2014, related to the regulation of the private security sector, including non-state security bodies, was adopted. The AU deplores the use of PMSCs by AU Member States, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and their international partners, who must comply with international, regional, and national frameworks. The AU also emphasises the need for AU Member States to develop a holistic approach to Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the field of PMSCs to ensure that legal, political, and policy frameworks reflect good governance of PMSCs, making them more effective and accountable, both at the organisational and operational levels, in line with international and regional SSG/R standards.

Conclusion

It is evident that the complex and evolving international context of the post-Cold War era, as well as the events of September 11, 2001, marked an irreversible shift in the global expansion of private security and the fight against terrorism in Africa, characterised by the involvement of private military and security companies (PSMCs) in counter-terrorism operations, increasingly playing a major role in intelligence, counter-terrorism surveillance (CTS), counter-insurgency (COIN), and risk management related to the terrorist threat. Despite this, the involvement of PSMCs in the fight against terrorism poses major constraints regarding security dependence and the loss of national sovereignty since these firms are tied to the foreign policy agenda of their countries of origin and are often an instrument of competition between major powers in Africa. Thus, to address such ethical and moral concerns, aiming to promote respect for international humanitarian law (IHL), the African Union has established an intergovernmental framework that sets international legal obligations and best practices for PSMCs with a holistic approach to security sector reform (SSR).

August 23, 2025 — No Comments

Inside African Maritimeโ€™s Architecture: Integrating, Overlapping, and Concentric Security Strategies through the Prism of International Relations Theories –ย  Part 1

By Leonardo Pesci - Africa Desk

Introduction

Surrounded by the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, the Red and Mediterranean Seas, the maritime domain represents an immense source of wealth for Africa. Yet, African waters remain connected to a series of issues impacting security and all its referent objects: humans, states, environment, society, and economy. In light of these concerns, this essay is the first in a two-part series investigating maritime security practices on the continent. More precisely, they will offer a vision of current strategies addressing maritime security issues through the lens of International Relations and Security theories.

The articles will highlight two, perhaps counterintuitive, tendencies. On the one hand, it will draw on constructivist approaches to International Relations (IR), particularly securitization and regional integration theories, to highlight the internal convergence and cooperation among African States and (sub)regional organizations into a thematic security community. The second publication will employ a specific case study to embed within IR theories, the posture of a single state toward external threats and third states operating in African Waters. The outcome of this two-fold endeavor will underscore how the internal dynamics of integrations are balanced with neorealist approaches towards external states on the continent.

General threats and geographical scopes of maritime security in Africa

For a long time, African understanding of security has intersected with traditional and state-centric issues, including inter- / intra-state conflict, peacebuilding, human trafficking, terrorism, and poverty. Only more recently, the maritime domain has become a compelling issue for the agendas of national governments and regional organizations.

The spectrum of threats is wide, spanning from the notorious cases of piracy off the Somali coasts and the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) to less-known yet relevant issues. These include energetic security, illegal, unreported and undocumented (IUU) fishing, oil theft, armed robbery, and human, weapons, and drug trafficking. Other illicit activities conducted at sea involve environmental degradation, dumping of toxic wastes, and spilling of polluting agents. The costs of these actions have high impacts on the continent, contributing to exacerbating structural vulnerabilities such as economic fragility, food (in)security, political instability, conflicts, and impacting states to control their territory and population. 

To begin with, the West Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea are known for the intense activities linked to piracy. Although the phenomenon has recently decreased, renewed insecurity emerged from the latest Houthi attacks against commercial vessels (133, only in 2023), and the consequent disruption of submarine cables. These latest developments have made the region a new hotspot of insecurity, diverting commercial maritime traffic to the old route of the Cape of Good Hope.

Additionally, Islands and states in the East Indian Ocean are reportedly engaged in fights against the massive increase of criminal networks involved in heroin trafficking. Similarly, the African Mediterranean coasts, primary gateway to Europe,  have long been under international attention for human trafficking and coastal fuel smuggling.

On the other side of the continent, the GoG  - a 6.000 km coastline bordering 19 states -  has become the center of new commercial routes as well as criminal activities. Similar to other regions, piracy reportedly decreased by 90% in 2024. However, serious challenges remain in a region extremely rich in terms of natural resources, maritime wildlife, and the center of new commercial routes.

For instance, fishing activities in the region account for 4% of the global fish supply. In turn, IUU fishing operated by private enterprises and foreign vessels (flagged in Europe and Asia) impacts local economies, food security, and maritime biodiversity. To illustrate the point, it is estimated that IUU fishing accounts for 40 - 65 % of the fish captured in the region. It has been observed that a more sustainable allocation and management of the fishing sector would be worth $2 billion annually for national and local economies.

Cooperation structures: Maritime Security Institutions and (sub-)Regional Cooperation

In the light of these issues, the past decade marked a period of intense development for African maritime architecture. Within the continent, a proliferation of multilateral and bilateral agreements has gradually concentrated and intersected maritime concerns under the attention of old and new institutions leaning towards the formation of an African security community for maritime affairs. The beginning of this momentum coincides with the rising threats linked to piracy in Somalia and the Gulf of Guinea in the late 2000s.

During the decade, new governance practices emerged. Encapsulated in securitization discourses, they encouraged continental integration in the maritime domain, envisioning common solutions to shared problems. The outcome of such efforts has been condensed in the creation of new institutions, renewed engagement in existing ones, new security tools, and joint enterprises reflected in new visions and strategies. Such governance and security practices can be found through charters, meetings, symposiums, conferences, and the constitution or renewal of regional and sub-regional bodies and committees. More practical tools should not be underestimated. These include communication and information sharing platforms, capacity building, joint rescue coordination centers, common juridical frameworks, and published documents and strategies. These developments are coupled with the creation of sub-regional bodies and treaties, declarations, and Memoranda of understanding dealing with maritime security issues.

For instance, North African states have cooperated with Europeans through bilateral agreements as well as in multilateral settings. Worth mentioning is the  5+5 Defense Initiative, whose first meeting took place in 2004 in Paris. Similarly, the Djibouti Code of Conduct of 2009, united states from the Horn of Africa and Western Indian Ocean, established practices under the common objective of fighting piracy and set a shared information and knowledge management system.

On the Atlantic Side, the Yaoundรฉ Protocol, signed by 26 member states part of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), introduced a comprehensive maritime security framework. The architecture has divided maritime areas into โ€œresponsibility zonesโ€ and has broadened cooperation to all sorts of illicit activities conducted in the sea (e.g., money laundering, illegal arms and drug trafficking, human smuggling, maritime pollution, IUU fishing, toxic waste dumping, and the sabotage of offshore infrastructure).

During the same years at the sub-regional level, African organizations developed their maritime visions and strategies. The  Southern African Development Community (SADC) reorganized the SADC Maritime Committee (SMC), adopting in 2007 its first maritime strategy, targeting piracy off the Somali coasts and the Indian Ocean. Simultaneously, the SMC created the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) System, a joint intelligence platform for information sharing on maritime events and trafficking, and has set an embryonic legal framework to deal with piracy. On the other hand, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mentioned maritime security for the first time in 2005, integrating the topic as one of the four pillars in its Security Sector Program.

At the continental level, the African Union (AU) revisited the 1993 African Maritime Transport Charter, publishing in 2007 the first official document dealing with maritime security: the Abuja Declaration and Plan of Action on Maritime Security. Thereafter, the AU Secretariat for maritime issues has worked on a common and comprehensive strategy for the continent, finalized in 2014 as the 2050 African Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS).

The document represents a key moment for the African Unionโ€™s management of maritime spaces, setting the common goal of โ€œdeveloping a sustainable thriving blue economy in a secure and environmentally sustainable manner,โ€ and offering a comprehensive map of security risks and mitigation strategies. AIMS identifies common objectives, stakeholders (including states, civil society, and business groups), main threats, and the measures to mitigate them. It emphasizes the need for cooperation at the national and regional levels to achieve a sustainable and safe maritime environment for states and people.

Furthermore, AIMS 2050 ambitiously sets the rules to harmonize states' legal frameworks on national maritime law to foster judicial cooperation, defining and combating maritime criminality under a unified legal framework.

Drawing on the AIMS 2050, the Lomรฉ Charter (African Charter on Maritime Security, Safety and Development) was adopted in 2016, and the Djibouti framework was expanded in its scope through the 2017 Jeddah Amendment.

Source of the picture: Pexel

Maritime environment through the prism of International Relations and Security Theories

From the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the western Gulf of Guinea, passing through all the African coastlines, conventional and unconventional challenges have compelled states to find collaborative solutions at the national, regional, and sub-regional levels. From this analysis, two major theoretical implications can be drawn. First, the African maritime sector has gradually converged towards a thematic security community. Secondly, over time, it has integrated traditional state-centric security approaches to include other referent objects, such as human, economic, and environmental security.

To begin with, a security community can be understood as a group whose members construct securitization with one another. Securitization, in turn, refers to the discursive act of framing an issue as a security threat to a specific referent. The securitization of a thematic area, hence, passes from the creation and reiteration of new practices and discourses. The process begins with the identification of a shared threat and a collective engagement against it. It continues with the creation of repertoires (e.g., common practices, tools, and technologies such as declarations, strategic documents, and information-sharing platforms), and it ends with a shared enterprise (e.g., common objectives and shared securitization vision). It finally culminates with the creation of a community grounded in mutual objectives and common visions of goals. In this sense, the emergence of crossing and overlapping institutions in the African maritime sector suggests a gradual process of formation of a maritime security community, composed of states, regional and sub-regional organizations, maritime professionals, as well as civil society, sharing a common objective, and establishing common practices under the umbrella of a single security issue.  

Secondly, Christian Bueger has categorized security issues in the maritime domain on four different dimensions: marine and environmental security, economic security, human and state security. Given the interconnectedness of maritime and continental challenges, the literature suggests a substantial reconciliation between the four domains. These syntheses are often explicated โ€“ and visible -  in the documents, declarations, and strategies through the nexus โ€œmaritime security โ€“ sustainability - developmentโ€. In other words, in the African continent, a gradual shift has occurred from an early understanding of maritime security as inextricably linked to the state and sovereignty, to a maritime domain which has become interconnected with the state, human security, wealth, food security, economic development, and political stability.

For instance, the early versions of the Yaoundรฉ and Djibouti codes of conduct were based on negative measures aimed at limiting illicit activities, particularly piracy, to safeguard and prioritize state security. The more recent developments (e.g., AIMS 2050, Lomรฉ Charter, Jeddah Amendment) reflect more positive notions on maritime security. These documents are more oriented towards developing a sustainable and thriving blue economy within a secure and environmentally sustainable framework in African coasts.

Integrating multiple aspects of security, these charters have implicitly attempted to structure an increasing number of institutions into a security community that reconciles human, state, economic, and environmental security under the umbrella of maritime security. They have thus expanded their scope for the development of wealth and a sustainable maritime sector, pushing against all illegal activities conducted at sea (i.e., IUU fishing, crimes against the environment, human trafficking, etc.).

  1. Conclusion

The African Maritime domain has been subjected to substantial transformation over the past decades. It is now embedded within a broader understanding of security, which integrates state, human, economic, food, and environmental concerns. This conceptual shift comes together with an intense proliferation of institutions, frameworks, and strategies that lean towards the creation of a thematic security community. In this context, however, the effectiveness of these efforts will be dependent on the degree of cooperation achieved and the level of implementation of the measures. As the continent continues to confront complex maritime challenges, the consolidation of this security community will be essential to ensuring not only safety and sovereignty but also sustainable development and a resilient blue economy for future generations.