July 31, 2025 — No Comments

The EU’s engagement in Western Sahara

By Angelo Saad Hintermayer - Africa Desk

Introduction

The European Union (EU) has taken a firm stance on the Russia-Ukraine war, unequivocally condemning Russia’s actions since the conflict’s onset, citing violations of international law and human rights. This position portrays the EU as a defender of moral and legal principles. However, is the EU’s commitment to international law consistently applied across all contexts? One particularly compelling case that raises questions about this consistency is the situation in Western Sahara. The EU has entered into agreements with Morocco concerning resources on Western Saharan territory, prompting scrutiny of its adherence to international legal standards. This blog article examines the EU’s involvement in the Western Sahara-Morocco conflict, focusing on the exploitation of natural resources. It begins by introducing the people of Western Sahara, followed by a brief overview of the conflict’s historical development and key actors today. It then outlines the current status of Western Sahara, highlighting the roles of Morocco and the EU, with a particular emphasis on the EU’s engagement in extractivism. Extractivism refers to the process of extracting natural resources, such as minerals, oil, or agricultural products, from the earth, often prioritising economic gain over environmental sustainability and social justice, and frequently involving the exploitation of marginalised communities’ lands without their consent. This article does not delve into human rights violations or the refugee crisis associated with the conflict, as these topics are highly sensitive. Instead, it aims to present the issue from multiple perspectives to foster informed debate beyond academic circles.

People of Western-Sahara

The nomads of Western Sahara are called by the term Sahrawi, which is Arabic for “Saharan”. Sahrawi is sometimes also used as a synonym for “Western Saharan”, but this term goes along with some issues, which are not only related to a semantic problem. The problem implies a territorial limitation in Western Sahara today, even though the term Sahrawi refers in most definitions to an ethnic category rather than to a political-geographic term. There are Sahrawi natives outside of the now known Western Sahara, namely in the South of Morocco, West of Algeria and North of Mauritania. That given, the most convenient definition for the Sahrawi people should rather be understood as “[…] Hassaniyyah-speaking people who claim membership among at least one of the social groupings found in and around the area now known as Western Sahara”.

From colonialisation to a missing referendum and occupation

The Western Sahara conflict began at the 1885 Berlin Conference, where European powers divided Africa. Spain gained control of the region from Cap Blanc to Cap Bojador and, in 1900 and 1904, acquired Spanish-South Morocco near Tarfaya from France. In 1958, Western Sahara became a Spanish colony. After Morocco (1956), Mauritania (1960), and Algeria (1962) achieved independence, they supported Western Sahara’s decolonisation and a 1973 UN referendum. The Polisario Front emerged in 1973 as a key player. Spain planned independence, but Morocco’s King Hassan II launched the “Green March” on November 6, 1975, sending 350,000 civilians and soldiers into the territory. Amid Franco’s impending death, Spain signed the Madrid Accords, ending its rule by 1976 and dividing the region: Morocco took the north, Mauritania the south. No referendum occurred, ignoring Sahrawi aspirations. On February 2, 1976, the Polisario declared the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and fought Morocco and Mauritania. By 1979, the SADR expelled Mauritania, but Morocco seized the south. At its peak, the SADR controlled 90% of Western Sahara and attacked inside Morocco. Morocco responded with fortified walls guarded by mines and soldiers. In the conflict, Morocco gained the upper hand, and the SADR faced heavy losses. In 1991, UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuéllar negotiated a ceasefire, leading to Resolution 690 and the MINURSO peacekeeping mission. Proposals like Baker Plan I and II followed, but the referendum stalled over voter eligibility: Morocco argued Green March settlers should vote, while the Polisario limited it to 1974 residents. The UN recognised the impasse, turning the referendum into a “winner-takes-all” standoff, halting progress.

Extraactivism

Morocco’s 1975 occupation of Western Sahara has driven extensive resource extraction, often violating international law by excluding Sahrawi consent and benefits, as stipulated in a 2002 UN legal opinion. Motivated by the nationalist vision of a “Greater Morocco,” encompassing parts of Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Western Sahara, and the region’s rich resources—phosphates, fish, oil, gas, and metals like gold and platinum—Morocco has pursued a considerable exploitation. Since the 1970s, Morocco’s state-owned OCP has exported 1.23 million tons of phosphate rock from the Bou Craa mine in 2022, generating $655.5 million for importers like India and New Zealand, with plans for a new port despite Western Sahara Resource Watch’s “P for Plunder” reports urging cessation. Industrial fishing, enabled by the EU-Morocco Fisheries Agreement until a 2023 EU Court ruling requiered Sahrawi consent, primarily exports sardines and mackerel, generating significant revenue for Morocco. Oil and gas exploration, which began in the 1950s and intensified after Morocco´s occupation, involved companies like Total, Kerr-McGee, and Kosmos Energy. Total later withdrew, and while Kosmos and Cairn Energy drilled offshore in 2014, they found no viable deposits. Morocco continues to issue exploration licenses to coompanies like NewMed, backed by Delek Group, Deutsche Bank, and BlackRock. Sand exports to the Canary Islands, along with mineral exploration for uranium and gold, and agriculture expansion near Dakhla— covering to 963 hectares by 2016 on land owned by Morocco’s king and companies like Azura— are depleting local water reserves, fueled by EU trade deals. The EU, receiving 64% of Morocco’s exports, benefits from fishing, phosphate mining, and renewable energy projects such as Siemens’ wind farm supporting phosphate extraction. Morocco fears an independent Sahrawi state could destabilise the Sahel and point to the Polisario’s lack of governance experience, proposing autonomy in 2007 while Morocco controlling foreign and defense policies. The Polisario, however, insists on a referendum for full independence. Meanwhile, German and Irish groups advocate for excluding non-consensual firms from trade, though Morocco warns this could increase migration.

Picture by Carsten ten Brink

In October 2024, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that the 2019 EU-Morocco trade and fisheries agreements were invalid because they included Western Sahara without the explicit consent of its people, violating their right to self-determination. The ECJ emphasised that Western Sahara is a distinct, non-self-governing territory, and agreements affecting it must involve consultation with the Sahrawi people through their recognised representative, the Polisario Front. This decision reaffirmed earlier rulings from 2015, 2016, 2018, and 2021, and mandated that products like melons and tomatoes from Western Sahara be labeled as such, not as Moroccan, to avoid misleading consumers. The ruling, a significant victory for the Polisario Front, it has impacted Morocco’s exports, which constitute 64% of its trade with the EU, and affects EU companies involved in fishing, phosphate extraction, and renewable energy projects in the region. The EU has 12 months to adjust the agricultural agreement to comply with international law, balancing its strategic partnership with Morocco, which criticised the ruling as biased and politically motivated. The European Commission is analysing the judgment to ensure compliance while maintaining relations with Morocco, a key partner in regional stability. The ECJ’s decision underscores the legal necessity of Sahrawi consent, aligning with UN principles on the sovereignty of non-self-governing territories over their resources, and may influence future EU trade policies in disputed regions.

Conclusion

The Western Sahara conflict highlights a troubling contradiction between the European Union's actions and its core values and norms. By engaging in trade agreements with Morocco that exploit Western Sahara’s resources—such as phosphates, fish, and agricultural products—without the consent of the Sahrawi people, the EU has apparently contributed to the perpetuation of injustice in the region. The EU’s economic involvement, exemplified by the invalidated 2019 trade and fisheries agreements, has enabled Morocco’s occupation and resource extraction, which violate international law and the Sahrawi’s right to sovereignty over their resources, as affirmed by the 2024 ECJ ruling. This ruling underscores that the EU’s trade practices contravene its commitment to international law and the principles of the UN Charter, which emphasise the self-determination of non-self-governing territories. Furthermore, the EU’s prioritisation of strategic relations with Morocco over ethical considerations undermines its stated values of justice, equality, and solidarity, as outlined in the Treaty on European Union. The EU’s complicity, driven by economic interests and benefiting from 64% of Morocco’s exports, not only marginalises the Sahrawi but also weakens the EU’s credibility as a global advocate for human rights and democratic principles. To align with its normative framework, the EU should prioritise Sahrawi consent in future agreements, enforce accurate labeling of Western Saharan products, and support a referendum for self-determination, thereby addressing its role in perpetuating this longstanding injustice. The revised EU-Morocco agreement is expected to be presented by October 2025, in line with the ECJ's request.

July 22, 2025 — No Comments

Riding the Wave: The Opportunity for AI Collaboration in South Asia

By Dhruv Banerjee - South Asia Desk

Regional Cooperation in South Asia: A Tale of Ups and Downs

South Asia’s struggle to achieve effective regional integration has been well documented. Previously, World Bank estimates have indicated that intra-regional trade accounts for a meager 5 percent of the total trade in South Asia. For context, the percentage for intra-regional trade in South-east Asia is about five times as much, a significant difference. In turn, a combined lack of regional integration and stability has led to a dearth of foreign direct investment flowing into the region. A multitude of reasons have held back regional integration. These include border instability between countries, diverging economic goals, and uncertainty about each other’s intentions. 

Initially, the path to overcoming these issues was institutionally conceived in the form of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), established in 1985. However, since 2014, there have been a total of zero summits, primarily because of increased tensions between India and Pakistan following the 2016 Pulwama terror attack. SAARC’s institutional deadlock was a deeply worrying event with regard to the prospect of regional cooperation in South Asia. SAARC’s failure led to a re-evaluation of neighbourhood policy for countries like India, with the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) now viewed as an alternative institutional approach. The idea was that connectivity along the Bay of Bengal would be a strategically effective measure to spur regional interconnectivity.  

Over the last nine years or so, India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, Thailand, Bhutan, and Myanmar have ramped up participation within the organisation. They have focused on several different areas of cooperation, held frequent meetings, and streamlined the organisational structure. There have been six BIMSTEC summits, the latest one taking place in Thailand in April 2025. A notable exception to collaboration under BIMSTEC, however, is the lack of measures around Artificial Intelligence. This is even more surprising given that technology is one of the key areas of collaboration in the organisation. Thus far, there are no concrete initiatives under BIMSTEC that seek to explicitly address Artificial Intelligence as a means of cooperation. There are no expert groups explicitly seeking to address AI, and no official frameworks, agreements, or MoUs specifically aimed towards AI. Not capitalising on the prospect of strengthening cooperation by focusing on AI would be a big opportunity foregone for BIMSTEC. 

Given the rapid diffusion of the technology, most member states do not yet have comprehensive regulatory frameworks in place. This is actually an opportunity, since they can now coordinate their respective domestic policies, which in turn would reduce the compliance costs for companies in a BIMSTEC state to work across borders. Reports on the Asia-Pacific demonstrate that intergovernmental collaboration on AI can have a two-fold effect of attracting foreign investment and improving public service delivery. Converging AI policies can also improve technical and technological transfer between countries. Certainly, global AI summits and the spread of AI Safety Institutes (AISI) seem to suggest a global consensus that AI collaboration is indeed fruitful. All of this is to suggest something intuitive: It is time for South Asia, and more specifically, BIMSTEC, to focus on collaboration in Artificial Intelligence.

How AI Collaboration Can Be Effective for BIMSTEC

Given the breadth and sheer scale of developments related to AI globally, it can be tempting to try to dabble in every possible policy angle related to AI. However, for a multilateral organisation such as BIMSTEC, with relatively limited funding, it would be prudent to focus on a few specific factors. There are four main considerations with regard to AI cooperation in BIMSTEC. 

Firstly, cooperation on AI could lead to regional economic growth and attract more investment from abroad. This is a sentiment echoed by the BIMSTEC Secretary General, who stated that “regional collaboration on AI standards” was essential in achieving “collective development goals”. Certainly, the conditions are conducive for such growth. After all, the BIMSTEC countries have a young population, and therefore a strong workforce, with a majority of people below the age of 30. Collaboration on upskilling this workforce to be adept at developing and using AI is thus a lucrative opportunity for members. A good way to do this would, of course, be to facilitate cross-border exchange programs and education opportunities specifically designed for AI and related fields, perhaps through a flagship BIMSTEC AI scholars program. Providing a platform to AI companies in BIMSTEC countries in the form of a workshop or a startup summit would further allow cross-order exchange of ideas and facilitate a young and vibrant regional AI innovation ecosystem. 

Secondly, collaborating on AI could help BIMSTEC members collectively address issues in critical sectors. For context, BIMSTEC has 7 priority “sectors” of cooperation, which have further sub-sectors. Coordination between members on the use of AI technologies in key sectors such as agriculture, connectivity, and disaster management (sub-sector under security) would be highly beneficial. The 2nd BIMSTEC ministerial meeting on Agriculture called for coordination in using “new agriculture technology, including artificial intelligence”, and such efforts across each of the sectors would make the Bay of Bengal region a hub for incorporating emerging technologies into critical sectors. This, in turn, would also prove attractive to investors. 

Thirdly, AI safety and cooperation are relatively non-political subjects, making cooperation easier. Naturally, issues related to security or even economic integration tend to be harder to build consensus around, due to the potentially politically divergent objectives of members in these areas. A number of security-related conventions and agreements in BIMSTEC have taken a long time to finalise, or have seen really slow progress. In contrast, AI is a relatively less contentious issue. Agreeing on the broad tenets of AI safety, or technology transfer of low-risk Artificial Intelligence, is unlikely to elicit much opposition. Since all the countries within BIMSTEC are developing nations, they also largely share the dilemma of balancing AI for economic growth with regulation to ensure AI safety. 

Photo by Amar Preciado: https://www.pexels.com/photo/detailed-vintage-globe-showing-south-asia-region-30792665/

Finally, AI-oriented collaboration is logistically plausible if the existing measures under the technology sub-sector can be leveraged effectively. Currently, technology is a sub-sector under the broader science, technology, and innovation sector, which is led by Sri Lanka.  Under this sub-sector, the Technology Transfer Facility (TTF) can be particularly useful in the context of AI collaboration. The mandate of the TTF (defined in an MoA signed in 2022) should be modified to include Artificial Intelligence. Following this, it can run “diagnostic studies” to assess the AI needs of each member state. Then, this information can be used by the TTF to provide targeted recommendations for AI-related technology transfer between member states. Additionally, the BIMSTEC Expert Group on Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) Cooperation, which has previously met in 2023 and 2024, could focus on broader objectives. The expert group should gear its third meeting towards addressing the potential of establishing a BIMSTEC framework on AI safety. This would help harmonise the currently divergent AI regulatory approaches undertaken by member states. In this vein, a prudent area to focus on would be to recommend that all the member states set up AI Safety Institutes to become part of the global AISI network, with India having decided to set up an AISI earlier this year. 

Keeping all of this in mind, it is fair to conclude that collaboration on AI can serve as an effective path to increased regional cooperation in South Asia. In particular, BIMSTEC should consider increasing its focus on AI, in terms of both discourse and funding. After all, coordinating approaches to AI would be beneficial for member states in terms of both economic and security considerations, while also providing a relatively non-political area of cooperation. The future can be a bright one for South Asia, provided it works together to embrace the technologies that define it. 

July 16, 2025 — No Comments

Prosecution, regulation, and jurisdictional issues in the protection of cultural heritage

By Alessia Maira and Francesco Pagano - Culture, Society & Security Desk

Disclaimer: This article edited by Alessia Maira and Francesco Pagano, draws directly from findings of the project “Contemporary Patterns of Terrorist Threats Targeting Cultural Heritage - Mapping Drivers and Trends of Terror Crimes against Cultural Heritage” The text below reflects key insights, data, and recommendations outlined in the report, recently released _[See document]_ offering a synthesised and accessible overview for a broader audience.

Introduction

In recent decades, the protection of tangible cultural heritage has garnered increasing international attention, not only as a matter of historical preservation but also as a pressing political and legal concern. From the looting of ancient artefacts, to the deliberate destruction of monuments during armed conflict, cultural heritage is under threat on multiple fronts. These acts are not only symbolic, as they often represent deeper efforts to erase collective memory, weaken identities, and fund criminal or extremist activity.

Amidst efforts to protect cultural heritage, the challenge of prosecution and jurisdictional issues exacerbate the already complex environment of international and domestic heritage conservation and protection. The global nature of cultural heritage crimes, including trafficking, looting, terrorism, and destruction, further complicates the legal landscape. While the international community has made efforts to address these challenges through conventions and agreements, such as the UNESCO 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property and the UNIDROIT 1995 Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, the implementation and enforcement of these agreements vary widely among signatory states, leading to inconsistent levels of protection and prosecution. In many countries, inadequate legal frameworks struggle to keep pace with the continuous threats, leaving cultural heritage even more vulnerable. Differing national laws and enforcement mechanisms can hinder cross-border cooperation in prosecuting offenders and repatriating stolen artefacts. One prominent example is the difficulty in prosecuting traffickers of looted antiquities, as the illicit trade in cultural heritage often involves complex networks of smugglers, dealers, and buyers operating across multiple countries, platforms, and jurisdictions. This fragmentation renders tracing the origin of looted items and holding perpetrators accountable extremely difficult. Legal loopholes, varying security priorities, corruption, and insufficient penalties in some jurisdictions may fail to effectively deter criminal activities.

Barriers to the prosecution of cultural heritage crimes

Prosecuting individuals involved in cultural heritage crimes poses significant challenges, especially in active war zones. These crimes, which as mentioned include the deliberate destruction of cultural sites, the illicit trafficking of artefacts, and looting, are committed by various actors, including terrorist organisations, insurgent groups, and opportunistic criminals. The seriousness of such offences lies in their impact on the collective identity, history, and values of affected communities. However, achieving successful investigations and prosecutions remains difficult, owing to multiple factors.

Firstly, the complexities of gathering evidence in conflict zones are the most relevant issue. War-torn areas are often inaccessible, making it difficult and extremely unsafe for investigators to collect physical evidence or conduct thorough site inspections. Additionally, the chaotic nature of active conflict zones means that evidence could be easily hidden, tampered with, or destroyed, complicating efforts to build a solid case. Secondly, the investigation of cultural heritage crimes remains insufficient and often deprioritised. Such failures can be attributed to limited resources and expertise dedicated to these cases, sometimes combined with a lack of evidence. Law enforcement agencies and judicial bodies prioritise other pressing issues, such as immediate threats to human life and national security, leaving cultural heritage protection under-resourced.

Trafficking networks and the demand-side of tangible artefacts

The threats faced by cultural heritage are primarily demand-oriented. This demand prompts the formation of creative and discrete networks through which objects are smuggled out of their home territory into the hands of private collectors. The methods and players involved in those collections are diverse. Looters could be terrorist groups like ISIS, organised criminal gangs, or traffickers, helped by facilitators (e.g., unaware or corrupt law enforcement officers who do not prioritise cultural heritage removal and smuggling). Nonetheless, they effortlessly find markets, not only due to the pre-existing demand for these artefacts but also through easily accessible platforms such as eBay and other online marketplaces. These channels, often lacking strict oversight, facilitate the discreet sale of looted items to unsuspecting or complicit buyers. Looted items are smuggled into private collectors’ hands through traffic networks, freeports, and porous borders. Underlying motivations for engaging in the looting and destruction of cultural heritage are often opportunistic, driven by factors such as terrorism, political instability, inadequate legislation, lack of policy prioritisation, or the need to fund political causes and alleviate economic hardship.

The way forward

Addressing the intricate issues surrounding the prosecution, regulation, and jurisdictional challenges in cultural heritage protection necessitates a multifaceted approach. While international conventions like the UNESCO 1970 Convention and the UNIDROIT 1995 Convention lay essential groundwork, their implementation and enforcement remain inconsistent across signatory states. This inconsistency undermines the efficiency of protective efforts, highlighting the imperative to strengthen legal frameworks at both the national and international levels, particularly given the dynamic, transnational nature of cultural heritage crimes and the heightened impact of cyberspace. The complex and fragmented networks involved in the illicit trade of cultural heritage objects demand more robust cross-border cooperation, including harmonised legal frameworks, improved information sharing, and coordinated law enforcement activities. For instance, the difficulties in prosecuting traffickers of looted antiquities often stem from varied national laws and enforcement mechanisms, which impede effective cross-border action. Addressing these discrepancies through stronger international partnerships and agreements can significantly improve the efficacy of global heritage protection efforts.

Pixabay image by Nguyen Hoang Thach

Finally, addressing the demand side of the illicit trade in cultural heritage is essential. Implementing stricter regulations on the procurement and sale of cultural heritage objects, coupled with robust monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, could deter demand, and thus illegal trade. Additionally, promoting research and public awareness about the ethical implications of acquiring looted artefacts could reduce the demand. Education campaigns aimed at collectors and institutions about the provenance and legality of cultural items can play a significant role in curbing the market for illicitly obtained artefacts.

In conclusion, the protection of cultural heritage against illicit trade and destruction requires comprehensive legal reforms, international cooperation, active participation from civil society, and stringent regulation of the demand market. By addressing these multifaceted challenges through a coordinated approach, significant progress can be made in safeguarding the world's tangible cultural heritage for future generations.

July 14, 2025 — No Comments

The last glimmer of democracy extinguished in Mali

By Camilla Biolcati - Human Security Desk

The hope for a political transition toward civilian rule in Mali, already uncertain, now appears increasingly remote. Ranked 9th on the International Rescue Committee's 2025 Emergency Watchlist, Mali, in a national and regional context of profound insecurity and instability, now finds itself on the brink of renewed unrest.

Amid a protracted humanitarian crisis that has plagued the country for decades, recent steps towards the consolidation of military authority have sparked growing discontent among the population, triggering what observers have described as rare and unexpected mass protests. For many Malians already contending with the rising threat of terrorism, forced displacement, economic hardship, and frequent abuses by military forces, the dissolution of political parties is seen as a significant setback for democratic governance and a further postponement of the much-promised return to the ballot box.

Recent developments and the status of political governance

In a series of rapid developments, Mali’s military government appears to be steering the country further away from a possible return to civilian-led governance. On 13 May, through a presidential decree broadcast on national television, General Assimi Goïta dissolved all political parties and prohibited meetings between political organizations. The decree also repealed the 2005 Charter of Political Parties, a fundamental document for the country's multiparty system that outlined legal guarantees for party formation, political engagement, and public financing. With its abrogation, This move has raised concerns about the future of political pluralism in Mali.

This decision followed the country’s first major anti-government demonstrations since the 2021 coup, which erupted on May 3 and 4, 2025. Just days earlier, on 29 April, a national political conference in Bamako, boycotted by all major political parties, named Goïta president with a renewable five-year term and called for the dissolution of political parties. Malians took to the streets in a rare act of defiance. The protests were significant, especially given that the 2020 mass mobilisations had paved the way for the first coup of that same year.

That initial takeover ousted President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, but within a year, Goïta had overthrown the transitional civilian leadership, an event widely referred to as a “coup within a coup”. Among the protest movements that had enabled the earlier transition, was the June 5 Movement–Rally of Patriotic Forces (M5-RFP), whose leadership was largely excluded from the first transitional cabinet. In an effort to broaden support, Goïta appointed Choguel Kokalla Maïga, a prominent M5-RFP figure, as prime minister in June 2021. Yet this quickly proved to be a symbolic and strategic gesture, as Maïga had little real power and was eventually removed once his public criticism of the junta intensified.

Maïga's criticism focused partly on the lack of clarity around the end of the transition period. This is not the first time political activity has been suspended near the end of a transition period. The last such suspension occurred in April 2024, when the elections scheduled for the beginning of that year were cancelled with the pretext of maintaining public order. This pattern has led to observations that the military leadership may be seeking to extend its tenure by limiting political engagement. Other demonstrations, initially scheduled for Friday 9 May, were postponed after the junta issued a new decree on 7 May suspending all political activities ‘until further notice’.

Humanitarian conditions between conflict, climate, and governance challenges

Over the past five years of military rule, the country has not only continued to suffer from insecurity and instability, but the worsening of the humanitarian crisis has become stark and widely reported by international organisations. Contrary to the junta’s claims that blame the United Nations peacekeeping mission, MINUSMA, for failures in counterterrorism operations, data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and the Global Conflict Tracker indicate that attacks by extremist armed groups have doubled since the junta seized power and international peacekeeping forces withdrew.

The 2025 Global Humanitarian Overview estimates that 6.4 million people in Mali are currently in need of humanitarian assistance. According to the latest Displacement Tracking Matrix, at least 378,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) were recorded as of September 2024, showing an 84% increase from the previous year. Meanwhile, over 819,000 people are expected to face crisis-level food insecurity between June and August 2025, according to ACAPS. Climate change has further intensified these challenges: in 2024, unprecedented severe floods affected an estimated 370,000 people across the country.

The suppression of civic spaces

The humanitarian situation has coincided with increasing restrictions on political and civil rights. Recent actions, including the dissolution of political parties and suspension of political activity, are part of a broader trend of reduced civic space. Since seizing power, the military authorities have systematically restricted civil liberties by banning protests, there have been reports of pressure and harassement on human rights defenders, journalists, and civil society actors.

Image by Kaufdex from Pixabay

In 2023, Freedom House classified Mali as “Not Free”, citing serious limitations on political pluralism and civil society, especially due to the country's repeated failure to hold elections, while centralising great power in military hands. The Media Foundation for West Africa reported at least ten cases of harassment or arbitrary arrest of journalists between 2022 and 2024, while Amnesty International, in its latest Annual Report, denounced regular resort to enforced disappearances and unlawful detentions as tools to suppress opposition.

On 9 May 2025, the country’s media regulatory authority banned the French broadcaster TV5Monde, accusing it of making "defamatory remarks" in its coverage of the pro-democracy protests. This followed similar actions against other international media outlets, such as France 24 and Radio France Internationale (RFI), both of which have long been blocked. Journalists working inside the country face similar repression. Alfousseini Togo, for instance, was arrested in April 2025 after publishing a report critical of the Ministry of Justice. He was charged with defamation, disturbing public order, and “undermining the credibility of the judiciary,” and remained in prison until his provisional release on May 12 2025. According to Human Rights Watch, in June 2024, twelve members of the country's main opposition coalition were arrested. Similarly, in December 2024, Ibrahim Nabi Togola, the president of the opposition party New Vision for Mali, was abducted, as was Daouda Magassa in February 2025 a member of the CMSA (Coordination of Movements, Associations, and Supporters of Imam Mahmoud Dicko), which had been dissolved in March 2024.

Conclusion

The latest actions of General Goita's transitional government have raised concerns about the direction of Mali's democratic framework. In line with broader regional developments across the Sahel, the country's trajectory appears to be moving toward a more centralised form of governance, rather than progressing toward an elected civilian administration.

The political transition once promised to Malians is no longer a possibility under the current regime. As the government strengthens its control, concerns have been raised about the implications for key aspects of human security, including freedom, safety, and dignity. The population faces escalating violence, hunger, displacement and economic hardship with no meaningful democratic avenues left to voice their needs. Mali is not only battling worsening insecurity, but also undergoing a systematic erosion of rights that exacerbates the humanitarian emergency. The country's current trajectory, similar to developments in Niger, for example, reflects a regional pattern of military-led governance that presents complex challenges for addressing the needs of citizens and advancing peace and security. Without sustained engagement from regional and international stakeholders, growing public frustration may be met with additional restrictions, potentially intensifying the crisis and limiting opportunities for peaceful political progress.

July 10, 2025 — No Comments

Leadership styles: How Trump, Putin & Macron shape negotiations

By Camilla Braito (Russia Desk) & Vismantė Ežerskytė (European Affairs and UK Desk)

Introduction

As of today, negotiations involving the United States, Russia, and the European Union over the war in Ukraine remain ongoing but face substantial obstacles. Ukrainian and Russian delegations met again in Istanbul for a second round of peace talks focused on securing a ceasefire to bring an end to the conflict started in February 2022.  This scenario highlights the vital role of leadership- the ability to make decisions, earn trust, and pursue common goals, especially in non-routine matters like war and peace. Incorporating leadership analysis into the study of negotiation dynamics enriches traditional explanations that rely solely on military power or systemic constraints. This piece examines how leadership styles influence negotiations regarding the war in Ukraine through two key frameworks developed by Margaret Hermann and Joseph Nye, as well as Ilana Zohar's work on the leadership skills necessary for effective negotiations in times of crisis.

Leadership Styles in Theory

Building on earlier typologies, Hermann identifies four leadership styles based on handling constraints, processing external information, and motivation: activist, strategic, pragmatic, and opportunist. Each includes two subtypes, from power-seeking expansionists to consensus-building accommodators, reflecting varying openness to internal challenge, context, and goal orientation in shaping leadership behaviour.

Nye’s framework defines leadership through inspirational, transactional, and contextual competencies. Leaders vary by goals (transformative or conservative), influence (transforming or directive), and power use (soft or hard). Inspirational leaders attract through vision and values; transactional ones rely on coercion. These categories often overlap as leaders adjust according to evolving environments.

For our analysis, it is also essential to understand what negotiations entail. These are voluntary processes to resolve conflicts through communication, either one-time or ongoing. Negotiations involve various tactics - brutal, time-related, authority-based, persuasive, and soft - and styles: competitive, cooperative, and integrative. Effective negotiators adapt tactics, manage emotions, and choose principled or positional approaches to seek mutually beneficial or win-lose outcomes.

Leadership and Negotiation in the Ukraine War: Trump, Putin, Macron

Since 2022, the war in Ukraine has revealed how leadership styles influence the direction of conflict and the viability of negotiation. Donald Trump, now back in office, exhibits a directive-pragmatic style in Hermann’s framework, personality-driven, disregardful of institutions, and focused on personal control over outcomes. According to Nye’s classification, he is transactional and relies on hard power, threat-making, and media optics. In his 2024 campaign, Trump stated he would end the war ‘within 24 hours’ through direct talks with Putin. When no progress was observed, he revised his position, claiming the war “belongs to Biden, Zelenskyy, and Putin.” His White House press conference with JD Vance and Zelenskyy drew significant media attention and controversy with Vance attacking the Ukrainian president while Trump stood by. Although relations were later smoothed at the Vatican, the episode showcased Trump’s preference for performance over diplomacy. He later revealed a call with Moscow, only to suggest that Putin might not want to end the war, adding to strategic ambiguity rather than offering a solution-oriented direction. His style has been viewed by some analysts as prioritising personal visibility over institutional coordination.

Vladimir Putin, meanwhile, operates with an activist-expansionist orientation, challenging domestic constraints, filtering external data, and pursuing goals often described as ideological and revisionist. Since 2022, he has instrumentalised hard power and coercive diplomacy to destabilise Ukraine and reshape European security. Though he publicly agreed to a ceasefire in 2024, Russian forces continued striking Ukrainian cities. Putin consistently denied these violations, instead accusing Ukraine of breaking the truce. His approach fits Nye’s transactional category, using strategic escalation and blame deflection to control the narrative. In one instance, Putin was onstage at a public event when informed that Trump was on the line. He calmly told the moderator he wasn’t in a hurry, signalling self-confidence and dominance in contrast to Western volatility.

Emmanuel Macron presents a starkly different model. Classified as pragmatic-consultative by Hermann, he values institutional process and contextual understanding. In early 2022, he made multiple high-profile visits to Moscow and Kyiv, attempting to keep diplomatic channels open even as tensions escalated. Though criticised for engaging with Putin too long, his efforts showed commitment to negotiation, de-escalation, and European agency. His leadership style aligns with Nye’s transformational vision—forward-looking, cooperative, and rooted in values-based persuasion. However, its effectiveness has been limited by the dominance of zero-sum postures from both Trump and Putin.

Picture generated by AI

Leadership styles and negotiation tactics: recommendations based on the analysis

Different leadership styles shape negotiation approaches and can explain friction in trilateral or multilateral talks. While Trump and Putin focus on dominance and short-term gains, Macron pursues calibrated, integrative solutions, making him a diplomatic outlier.

To advance negotiations to end the Ukraine war, it is vital to tailor tactics to these leadership profiles. Putin’s coercive, revisionist style requires a mix of firm deterrents and incremental principled negotiation. Early hard measures help set boundaries, but must avoid provoking defensiveness. Active listening is key, not to legitimise propaganda but to uncover underlying strategic goals. Indirect or mediated talks, like the June Turkey talks, can reduce zero-sum dynamics and ease tensions.

Unpredictability, delays, and unilateral moves mark Trump’s transactional, anti-institutional style. Negotiations with him should combine persuasion (offering symbolic wins) with cooperative, face-saving compromises. Building a personal connection while appealing to national pride and political advantage is crucial.

In contrast, Macron’s transformative, institutional leadership supports integrative strategies grounded in shared values and multilateral legitimacy. His willingness to listen and build consensus helps counterbalance more confrontational styles.

Conclusion

This analysis shows that while Trump and Putin are both directive and goal-driven, they diverge significantly in approach: Trump’s leadership is pragmatic and transactional, shaped by optics and personalism; Putin’s leadership is often described as activist and expansionist, using centralised authority and assertive tactics, with expansionist elements. In contrast, Macron is described as a pragmatic-consultative leader who emphasises transformational goals through diplomacy, institutional cooperation, and long-term reform.

Recognising the dynamic interplay between leadership styles and negotiation phases allows for better timing and selection of moves, hopefully informing more effective crisis resolution. Especially in ongoing, high-stakes international negotiations such as those regarding Ukraine, success depends less on fixed rules and more on contextual intelligence, emotional regulation, and the strategic capability to adjust tactics according to the counterpart’s motivation and behaviour patterns beyond surface-level display of force and hardline rhetoric.

July 10, 2025 — No Comments

Dr. Kenneth Schultz on Trump’s approach to peacemaking

Dr. Kenneth Schultz talks about Trump's transactional diplomacy approach to conflict resolution and its effectiveness in addressing complex international conflicts. He analyses how Trump's use of the "peace through strength" doctrine and deal-focused methodology impacts sustainable peacemaking efforts across multiple global conflicts. Dr. Kenneth Schultz is the distinguished William Bennett Munro Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and a leading expert on international conflict and conflict resolution.

Specifically in this session, Mr. Schultz examines the limitations of Trump's transactional approach to peacemaking, particularly how focusing on immediate deals without sustained follow-through may undermine long-term stability. He explores the challenges of Trump's alignment with stronger military actors in conflicts and the complications this creates for genuine compromise and lasting peace agreements.

Interviewers: Clémence Van Damme and Pedro Mendes - US Desk


June 23, 2025 — No Comments

Tobias Belgrano on the Moreno Zone & political change in Argentina

In this episode, Tobias Belgrano speaks about the changing political landscape in Argentina, and what this means for the future of Peronism in the country. Mr. Belgrano is a political analyst specialising in Latin American and global affairs.

Specifically, Tobias Belgrano explores how policies taken by Javier Milei are affecting the Argentine political sphere. He looks at the history of Peronism, both from its inception in the 1940s, and more recently under the Kirchners. He explains the role of Guillermo Moreno as a new actor on the Peronist scene.

Interviewers: Sarah Toubman- Central & South America Desk

June 16, 2025 — No Comments

Beyond Al Shabaab: IS-Somalia’s Bid for Desert Power

By Joshua Yow Yin & Matteo Baldassari - Crime, Terrorism & Extremism Desk

Introduction

In February 2025, US military airstrikes targeting the Islamic State (IS) in Somalia, hit the semi-autonomous region of Puntland in the northern part of Somalia, a branch often overlooked in comparison to other more prominent IS affiliates.  Established in 2015, IS-Somalia’s objective is to extend IS’s self-proclaimed caliphate in Africa, advancing and abiding by IS’s strict interpretation of Sharī'ah law. According to interviews conducted by the International Crisis Group, the organization consists of approximately 500 militants and operates mainly in the Golis mountains and the Bari region in semi-autonomous Puntland. Yet, other sources estimate a significantly higher number, ranging between 700 and 1,500 militants, demonstrating the challenge of accurately estimating the size of a covert and elusive faction.

IS-Somalia has assumed a central role in the dynamics of the Islamic State as a logistical and financial hub for the network in the African continent and beyond. Furthermore, it has proven capable of resisting the offensives of its opponents: the Somali National Army (SNA), the Puntland Security Force, and its jihadist rival Al-Shabaab.

This article seeks to ascertain the trajectory of IS-Somalia’s rise in influence while assessing the potential threat they pose to the Somali Federal Government. A significant portion of existing literature on the topic indicates that IS-Somalia’s menace to the country originates more from its prospective development rather than its present capacity. This article will explore the group's history, the role of its leader, and its tactics.

Historical Background

In October 2015,  a group of defectors in the Puntland region of Somalia led by Abdul Qadir Mumin left Al-Shabaab, an Al-Qaeda-affiliated group, and pledged allegiance to IS — creating IS-Somalia. Despite previous efforts by IS Central to incorporate Al-Shabaab into its network, it appears that the impetus for IS-Somalia’s formation was predominantly influenced by Mumin's aspirations of power and the impediments he faced in ascending within Al-Shabaab as an outsider to the dominant Warsengeli clan.

The group’s first significant attack was carried out in October 2016, when IS-Somalia fighters captured the city of Qandala. In their first foray into governance, IS-Somalia sought to impose its version of Sharī'ah law through administration and taxation. However, on 7th December, a counteroffensive by the Puntland Security Force pushed IS militants to withdraw from the city to the mountains.

Later in 2017, IS-Somalia was elevated to the status of wilaya (or “official province”) by IS Central. By 2018, it was officially designated by the US Department of State as a foreign terrorist organisation. Militant operations continued, with IS-Somalia clashing with Al-Shabaab fighters for the first time. Despite the difference in extent of power between the two groups, IS-Somalia has progressively succeeded in increasing its influence by infiltrating the neighborhoods of Bosasso and Mogadishu to conduct illicit activities, domains previously exclusive to Al-Shabaab. Likewise, since its inception, IS-Somalia has increased the number of militants while attracting foreign fighters. Yet, their leadership continues to stay in the hands of Puntland clan members.

Between 2023 and 2024, IS-Somalia carried out a small number of operations, succeeding in seizing control of several villages from Al Shabaab. Nevertheless, IS-Somalia retains broad ambitions and remains difficult to eradicate due to the geography of the territory where it operates, its connections with local clans, and the difficulties of its opponents in defeating it militarily due to divisions or more important priorities.

Leadership

Abdul Qadir Mumin, the founder and current leader of IS-Somalia, has quickly become a central figure in jihadist circles. In a development that underscores his rising influence, Mumin may now serve as the Islamic State’s global leader, a remarkable shift for what has long been viewed as a relatively marginal offshoot of the wider Jihadist network, though some observers remain skeptical. Born in Puntland around 1950, Mumin’s journey from a regional ideologue to a leader of international significance mirrors both his personal ambitions and broader strategic realignments within the Islamic State's structure. Mumin later moved to the United Kingdom and Sweden in the early 2000s, where he became known for delivering sermons infused with hardline Islamist views — growing his notoriety as a radical preacher within diasporic communities. By 2010, he had solidified his reputation as a staunchly conservative and influential imam.

Upon his return to Somalia, Mumin initially aligned with al-Shabaab and gained prominence within its Puntland branch. However, his upward mobility within the organisation was likely constrained by Somalia’s rigid clan-based political and militant hierarchies, which limited leadership roles to individuals from dominant clans. Facing these barriers, Mumin opted to break away by pledging allegiance to the Islamic State, bringing a small but loyal group of followers with him and formally establishing IS-Somalia in October 2015. Under his guidance, the Somali branch has reportedly gained heightened significance within the Islamic State’s international network.

Tactics and Activities

Conventionally, IS-Somalia has conducted attacks on an asymmetric basis, typically involving close-range assassinations and the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Its operational footprint also includes extorting local businesses and staging small-scale raids to acquire funding and resources in surrounding areas. In recent years, IS-Somalia has refined its strategies and tactics, increasingly asserting itself in Puntland and the broader Horn of Africa.  One of the clearest examples of this shift came in early 2025 with the Shabelle offensive. During this campaign, IS-Somalia orchestrated coordinated and sophisticated attacks on military outposts, notably deploying vehicle-borne and motorbike-based explosives in an assault on the Dharjale base and military positions in the Cal Miskaad mountains. These strikes marked a move toward more sophisticated and synchronised operations in an effort to directly challenge Somalian state authority, while also holding a dual function: testing the resilience of Puntland’s security forces, and concurrently allowing IS-Somalia time and space to reinforce its hold over areas between the Cal Miskaad and Al-Madow Mountain ranges, entrenching itself within this difficult and highly strategic terrain by building a network of fortified positions and supply corridors.

This territorial strategy has been supported by classic insurgency methods. IS-Somalia frequently uses IEDs to harass military movements and disrupt logistics. A clear instance occurred on 20 January, when a roadside explosion claimed the lives of thirteen soldiers. These asymmetric attacks serve to drain government resources and sap the morale of frontline units. IS-Somalia also engages in deliberate terror operations aimed at eliciting overwhelming responses. Suicide bombings, targeted killings against state figures, and drone attacks are employed to provoke military retaliation, which in turn helps the group’s recruitment and propaganda drives. During the Shabelle campaign, IS militants deployed drones packed with explosives: an emerging tactic in Somalia that signals the group's evolving technical capabilities.

An example of an IED built using live ammunition shells, used in Iraq. (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:IED_Baghdad_from_munitions.jpg)

Conclusion

Altogether, these actions reveal IS-Somalia's broader ambition: to transform from a local insurgent faction into a credible rival to al-Shabaab in the Puntland region, capable of destabilising and pressuring the federal government into unsustainable military engagements. IS-Somalia may be positioning itself for a greater international role driven by decentralised warfare and strategic media outreach. At the same time, its broader role in generating revenue and distributing it across other branches of the ISIS network must be closely monitored in an effort to effectively counter the financing of international jihadist terrorism. Even if IS-Somalia may face difficulties in expanding their territorial control, this economic function is likely to ensure that IS-Somalia and Mumin continue to play a pivotal role within the decision-making processes of central ISIS and the wider jihadist network.

June 4, 2025 — No Comments

China and Taiwan’s competition in Southeast Asia and Oceania

In this espisode, Dr. Simona Grano discusses the geopolitical implications of Chinese and Taiwanese influence in Southeast Asia and Oceania, and how this influence is being perceived and addressed by regional actors.

This podcast analyses how China is applying its strategic initiatives to influence infrastructure development and economic integration in Southeast Asia and Oceania examining Taiwan's counterbalancing efforts. It also investigates how regional nations navigate their relations with both China and Taiwan, the function of regional organisations, and the security ramifications of China's growing military might and a potential AUKUS alliance during the Trump era.

Dr. Grano is a distinguished expert in China and Taiwan issues. Dr. Grano serves as the Senior Fellow on Taiwan at the Asia Society Policy Institute's (ASPI) Center for China Analysis (CCA). She is also currently a Senior Lecturer and Director of the Taiwan Studies Project at the University of Zurich.

Interviewer: Kristina Kovalenko - Southeast Asia & Oceania Desk

June 3, 2025 — No Comments

Dr. Arūnas Molis on Energy Security and the War in Ukraine

In this episode of the ITSS Verona Member Series, Dr. Arūnas Molis talks about the changing landscape of European energy security in the context of the current war in Ukraine, with special focus on strategic lessons for the Baltic region.

Specifically, Dr. Molis discusses how energy can be weaponised, used as a tool of political pressure, and financial power in the context of hybrid warfare. He explores Russia’s energy leverage, attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure, and lessons from the Baltic states’ path to energy independence. 

Dr. Molis is a policy analyst in Lithuania and has previously held key positions at Klaipeda LNG and NATO Energy Security Center of Excellence.

Interviewers: Alexandra Tsarvulanova & Sara Pastorello - Russia and Post-Soviet Space Desk