By Marco Malaguzzi - Middle East Team

Introduction

The tumultuous events in northeastern Syria have shifted the media’s attention away from the As-Suwayda Governorate in the country’s south. Nonetheless, the strategic relevance of this area should not be underestimated. As-Suwayda is the only region of Syria where the new administration led by President al-Shara has not yet managed to assert its control. It is adjacent to the Golan Heights and Mount Hermon, key military positions for Israel to defend its northern border. Moreover, the different sectarian and ethnic groups that comprise As-Suwayda’s population have varying political loyalties. Bedouin clans are aligned with the new Syrian government, while the Druzes share sectarian links with their co-religionaries in Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan. This article presents the events that have taken place in the area since the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and outlines how various actors are vying for power both locally and internationally.

Background 

When rebel troops entered Damascus on the 8th of December 2024, long-time president Bashar al-Assad fled the country. His escape brought the regime that had ruled Syria since 1970 to an inglorious end. Syrians looked at the future with hope, and celebrations took place in many cities. However, the divisions caused by a decade of civil war, intertwined with external interventions, did not disappear with the departure of al-Assad. Syria was fragmented into various fiefdoms controlled by armed groups. Moreover, years of conflict had deepened the sectarian and ethnic divisions that have always characterised the country. Finding a political arrangement that reunified the country once more seemed a far-fetched plan. Al-Shara, leader of the militia that had spearheaded the military operations against the al-Assad’s regime, managed to assert control over Damascus. A former jihadist who had fought against the American occupation of Iraq, al-Shara had risen to the position of leader of an Islamist armed group that controlled the province of Idlib in northern Syria. In January 2025, al-Shara assumed the presidency. In his first address to the country, he highlighted the need to rebuild state institutions and maintain peace, but this spirit did not come to fruition. In March, clashes broke out in Latakia, in the west of Syria, between the new government and supporters of the previous regime. The brutal repression that followed, which indiscriminately targeted the local Alawite community, made it clear that the reunification of Syria will be neither smooth nor bloodless.

The events in As-Suwayda  

In an attempt to prevent similar events from taking place in As-Suwayda, where unidentified individuals were setting up armed ambushes and conducting assassinations, the new Syrian government scrambled to negotiate a deal with local notables. On March 12, a memorandum of understanding was signed by Mustafa Bakour, the governor, and various local stakeholders. According to its text, troops loyal to al-Shara would take over the area, salaries to public employees would come from Damascus, and regular consultations between the central government and local dignitaries would be held. Nonetheless, , Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, one of the spiritual leaders of the Druze population of As-Suwayda, opposed this deal. He denounced the extremist nature of the new government and rejected any compromise with Damascus. On the following day, armed individuals raised the Druze flag on government buildings all over the governorate. They were affiliated with the Suwayda Military Council (SMC), a predominantly Druze militia that formed after the collapse of al-Assad’s regime to prevent a security void. These incidents did not lead to a major escalation. However, they were the beginning of an uneasy, and ultimately short-lived, truce. In April, a blasphemous audio which insulted Prophet Muhammad went viral. It was attributed to Marwan Kiwan, a Druze cleric. He rejected all allegations, but the recording was enough to ignite a vicious cycle of violence. According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, 113 individuals lost their lives during these clashes. External powers also played a role. On the 29th of April, the Druze minority in Israel took to the streets to protest against the sectarian violence against their co-religionaries in Syria. On the following day, the Israeli air force conducted a drone strike in As-Suwayda targeting the Syrian security forces, which were converging on the area. Various parties tried to de-escalate the situation. Walid Jumblatt, the political leader of the Druze minority in Lebanon, contacted his co-religionaries in As-Suwayda and the new Syrian administration in an attempt to find an agreement. SANA, a press agency linked to the government of Damascus, announced a ceasefire had been negotiated between the governor and local notables. Nonetheless, the violence continued unabated. On the 2nd of May, Israel dropped a bomb in the proximity of the presidential palace in Syria’s capital, warning that it would not allow the government to deploy forces south of Damascus and harm the Druze population of As-Suwayda . Türkiye, the main ally of al-Shara’s new administration, also got involved. When Israeli planes entered the Syrian airspace on the following night, Turkish fighter jets attempted to jam their communications. After this incident, the situation calmed down because neither Israel nor Türkiye were interested in a military escalation, but one figure, once again, stood out for his opposition to any deal with Damascus: the aforementioned Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri. Distancing himself from the Druze clerics who had negotiated the deal with Damascus, he declared:

“We no longer trust a group that calls itself a government, because the government doesn’t kill its own people through extremist gangs that are loyal to it, and after the massacre claims they are loose forces”

Despite his uncompromising statements, the situation in As-Suwayda calmed down for a few months. However, on the 11th of July 2025, Bedouin gunmen kidnapped a Druze vegetable seller.  Druze militias reacted by taking hostage several members of As-Suwayda’s Bedouin clans. Violence spread quickly, and Bedouin fighters, supported by other Bedouin clans from the Daraa Governorate, began attacking Druze villages with heavy weapons. In some instances, they fought against the Syrian security forces that attempted to de-escalate the situation. In other instances, videos show troops loyal to Damascus joining the onslaught against the Druzes. The arrival of foreign fighters loyal to Syria’s Defence Ministry only exacerbated the fears of the Druze population of As-Suwayda because these units are known for having carried out massacres against religious minorities in Latakia. On the 14th of July, Israel intervened once more, this time by carrying out strikes that destroyed a Syrian Army convoy. On the following day, dozens of Israeli Druze civilians illegally crossed the border with Syria to support their co-religionaries. Moreover, the Israeli air force bombed the Syrian Defence Ministry in Damascus multiple times. Türkiye issued statements in support of Syria’s sovereignty and unity. Nonetheless, this time it did not deploy fighter jets to defend al-Shara’s security forces. On the 16th of July, the Syrian army announced its pullout from As-Suwayda. Thousands of Bedouin civilians also began evacuating the region, fearing that the victorious Druze militias would carry out ethnic violence. Since the withdrawal of Syrian troops, As-Suwayda is administered by the Supreme Legal Committee (SLC), a government body – unsurprisingly – created under the auspices of Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri. On the 23rd of August 2025, the SLC announced the creation of a National Guard, a new force made up of 40 militias, including the Suwayda Military Council. A joint plan announced by Jordan, the United States and the Syrian government to de-escalate the situation has yielded some results. Bedouin families have begun returning to their homes. Moreover, the Syrian security forces and the Druze militias that control the region of As-Suwayda have conducted a prisoner exchange on the 26th of February 2026. However, the reintegration of As-Suwayda into a unified Syrian state seems a far-fetched dream.

As-Suwayda and the regional context

When the government of Bashar al-Assad was overthrown, two regional players began jousting for power in Syria. As shown by the events outlined above, they were Israel and Türkiye. The former occupied the territories surrounding Mount Hermon and played a very active role in As-Suwayda. The latter positioned itself as the closest ally of the new administration in Damascus. Since the fall of the regime, Türkiye has pledged to provide Syria with gas and electricity. Moreover, the Turkish defence ministry has stipulated a deal with its counterpart in Damascus, committing to provide the new Syrian armed forces with modern weapon systems and training. Lacking the economic muscle of the Gulf monarchies, Türkiye is capitalising on the strength of its defence industry and its energy sector. The recent developments in Syria have given the Turkish government an opportunity to expand its role as a regional security provider and transform Anatolia into a major energy hub. Israel’s ambitions in Syria are of a different nature. The actions undertaken by the government of Benjamin Netanyahu show that its primary concern is to enhance Israel’s security by creating a new buffer zone at its northern border. Moreover, Israel wants to ensure that Syria stays weak by supporting groups such as the National Guard in As-Suwayda and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in the northeast of the country. It mistrusts al-Shara because of his jihadist past and close relationship with Türkiye. Repeated American efforts to negotiate a deal between the new government in Damascus and Israel have not led to an Israeli withdrawal from the Syrian territories it occupies, nor to a Syrian recognition of the Jewish state. Nonetheless, Israel’s shipments of military supplies to the Druzes in As-Suwayda have become smaller and less frequent. The lack of an Israeli reaction to the Syrian military offensive against the Kurds in northeast Syria, which stands in stark contrast to Israel’s air campaign when the government of Damascus deployed troops in As-Suwayda, may show the division of Syria into spheres of influence. The Turkish inaction following Israel’s bombing of the Syrian defence ministry in July also points to a tacit agreement between Ankara and the Jewish state. The south of Syria seems to lie within Israel’s domain. The rest of the country, instead, is controlled by the government of Damascus and its Turkish sponsors. Of course, other regional powers also play a role. The Gulf countries have pledged significant investments to rebuild Syria’s battered economy. Russia maintains military bases in Latakia, and the United States remains interested in conducting counter-terrorism operations to contain ISIS. Nonetheless, Israel and Türkiye are the most powerful stakeholders in the country at the time of writing. Following the American withdrawal and the downsizing of the Russian military presence caused by the war in Ukraine, Israel and Türkiye are the only countries that maintain a substantial military presence in Syria. How their rivalry plays out will shape the future not only of As-Suwayda but of the whole country.

The local power struggle in As-Suwayda

Regional dynamics are reflected in local power struggles in As-Suwayda, where the frontline remains blurred, and alliances shift quickly. In 2012, Hikmat al-Hijri became one of three Sheikhs of Reason – the spiritual leaders of the Druze community in Syria – inheriting the position from his brother, who had died in a suspicious car accident many blamed on al-Assad’s regime. For a while, al-Hijri aligned himself with the regime in Damascus, probably having been intimidated by the death of his brother. However, in 2020, as popular discontent with the worsening economic situation grew, al-Hijri distanced himself from Bashar al-Assad. In the meantime, he had sidelined the other two Sheikhs of Reasons and had moved to Qanawat, a small village in the Druze heartland on the mountains of southern Syria, where it was easier to ensure his personal safety. Thanks to his manoeuvring, when the al-Assad regime fell in 2024, al-Hijri could present himself as the leader of the Druze community. However, there were other leaders who also claimed to speak on behalf of the Druze population. One of them was Laith al-Balous, the son of an influential Druze cleric assassinated by the regime in 2015. After his father’s death, al-Balous and his brother founded a militia that clashed with al-Assad’s forces on multiple occasions. Consequently, he has better revolutionary credentials than al-Hijri. When the regime was overthrown, al-Balous immediately aligned himself with the new government of al-Shara in Damascus. As mentioned before, when tensions in As-Suwayda escalated, al-Hijri opposed any compromise. Al-Balous instead was one of the notables who negotiated the aforementioned memorandum of understanding in March. There were two cowboys in town. In May, al-Balous survived a mysterious assassination attempt. Despite his luck, the violence in April and in July made his policies unpopular. Various Druze notables and armed groups distanced themselves from al-Balous, and he was forced to flee from As-Suwayda, where one of his advisors was murdered, and the grave of his father was razed to the ground. Al-Hijri has won the match and is now the undisputed leader of both the National Guard and the Supreme Legal Committee. From his exile, al-Balous has condemned the Israeli intervention in As-Suwayda and plauded Türkiye’s role in preserving Syria’s unity. However, Damascus’s man seems to have lost all his influence on the ground. Al-Hijri’s victory was facilitated by his close relationship with Sheikh Mowafaq Tarif, the Druze spiritual leader in Israel. Tarif exercised his considerable influence to convince Israeli Druzes to take to the street in support of al-Hijri. He also lobbied with the Israeli government to convince them to repeatedly intervene in As-Suwayda. Al-Balous instead could not count on direct support from the Druze communities in the surrounding countries, although his efforts to mediate with the government in Damascus paralleled those of the aforementioned Walid Jumblatt, political leader of the Druze minority in Lebanon. Jumblatt has an adversarial relationship with both Mowafaq Tarif. Moreover, he has criticised al-Hijri for his close relationship with Israel. The undeclared alliance between Jumblatt and al-Balous can even count on a historical precedent. In 2015, Jumblatt condemned Druze clerics who supported the regime against al-Balous’s father. Nonetheless, Lebanese Druzes could not provide al-Balous with military support even if they wanted to. Once a mighty warlord, Jumblatt disbanded his militia after the end of the Lebanese Civil War. 

Final considerations

The situation in As-Suwayda has stabilised in recent months. However, the new government in Damascus seems committed to unifying Syria under its control, as shown by its successful offensive against the Kurds in the northeast of the country. Tension in southern Syria may escalate quickly. There was very little warning before the military operations against the Syrian Democratic Forces. There will be very little warning before a government offensive against As-Suwayda. As shown above, the consequences of an escalation in this region will go way beyond its borders. Israel and Türkiye will be drawn in. They may have a tacit agreement on the partition of Syria. However, in the Middle East, no deal lasts forever, and new developments such as the war between Iran, the United States, and Israel can open windows of opportunity. Türkiye and the government of al-Shara have already surprised the world in the past, with the sudden offensive that overthrew Assad in 2024, and will be eager to exploit any opportunity. If al-Hijri, the uncontested winner of the local power struggle, continues to be uncompromising with the government in Damascus, diplomacy may have little space left for manoeuvre. However, his inflexibility should not be taken for granted. Al-Hijri already changed sides in the past, when he stopped supporting the Assad government. If offered the right deal, he may do so again, and the fortunes of As-Suwayda and its inhabitants will change with him. Undoubtedly, Israel will have a say in any decision al-Hijri takes. However, the importance of local dynamics should not be underestimated. The Druze minority in Syria and beyond is not a cohesive unit. Various leaders claim to represent the Druze community, which spans four countries. How their rivalry plays out will shape the future of As-Suwayda at least as much as the competition between Türkiye and Israel. The events outlined in this article show that religious bonds do not deter Druze powerholders from exercising violence against each other. The government of al-Shara could attempt to find new interlocutors in the two Sheikhs of Reasons who had been sidelined by al-Hijri. In any case, for the reunification of Syria to take place, its sectarian groups must find a way to coexist. Only if the new government in Damascus succeeds in negotiating a deal with the different minorities that make up the population can Syria truly turn the page on the Civil War.