Recent months and weeks have shown a significant increase in headlines concerning drones, cyber-attacks, and hybrid warfare in the context of the RussiaโUkraine war.
The airports of Berlin, Heathrow and Brussels were reportedly hit by cyber-attacks, causing significant delays and safety concerns for passengers. Then it continued with several drone sightings causing disruption at airports such as Munich. The German Federal Ministry of Interior (BMI) has officially released a statement saying that there is increased concern in the following areas namely: firstly, Russiaโs attacks on Ukraine have prompted Germany and other Western countries to strengthen their security agendas, secondly, cyber-attacks have become an increasing threat since the start of the war making Germany the target for disinformation campaigns launched by Russia, thirdly, Germany must better protect its critical infrastructure against sabotage. With these incidents one can ask the following questions: How prepared is the West to face cyber and hybrid attacks? How should countries react in the future and are there serious concerns for drone warfare? Must the west continue to change its cyber-strategy as well as its hybrid warfare strategy?
Germany and the West against drones
We have seen a significant increase in drone sightings in the past months. Headlines of drones and even balloon sightings disrupting airports have caused concern and heated debates amongst civilians and of course government officials. Munich has been in the focus of the recent drone sightings causing the airport to suspend all flights. Twice the airport saw drones over the airport and had to stop all flights causing around 6,500 passengers to be affected. This has caused the German government to activate the German Military to be involved in battling drones more strongly and be trained in such scenarios. As of yet, it is unclear who is responsible for these drone incidents. However, whether itโs private or a state actor, they have managed significant disturbance and caused the EU and NATO to want to act more strongly to be better prepared for hybrid warfare. In addition, AI is also having a significant impact on how countries are developing weapons and defence against threats causing more uncertainty.
In international relations there still remains much scepticism and different view points on whether cyber-attacks can be considered to have a โviolent impactโ at all. Lucas Kello (2017) discusses in his work โThe Virtual Weaponโ the point that scholars leaning towards the Clausewitzian school of thought do not believe that โcyber operations are not directly violent. Nor do they create significantly collateral damage.โ1 This may be true on some level if we were to discuss whether the drones had a physical impact on civilian lives but when daring to combine international relations with sociological theories, it always depends on the following aspects: What do we understand under violence? When is an act violent? And who decides when an act is violent in hybrid warfare?
Taking the Munich and Belgium drone incident from September 2025 into account โ with considering what we know and do not know so far โ the following impacts can be identified: it has caused unrest, concern amongst civilians (some surveys by national news outlets indicate that roughly one in two respondents now express concern about foreign drone attacks at home) and officials, a summit in Copenhagen and from the police in Germany to be able to shoot down drones more easily when in sight.
One could argue so far, no physical violence has been caused however, is unrest amongst countries and cities and heightened security measures that cause unrest also a form of violence? Is the uncertainty over who is behind the drone incidents itself a form of disturbance? Will this add to a certain cyber strategy of ramping up defences? Or is it more of a back-and-forth game of cyber and drone attacks happening and the West reacting with closing defence holes?
The Copenhagen Summit and hybrid warfare
The summit showed heated debates amongst the countries. As of this moment, there is no concrete evidence that Russia is behind the drone incidents; however, countries such as Denmark have strongly suggested possible Russian involvement due to the recent MiG-31 jet crossing in Estonian airspace. It can be seen as a form of โpokingโ NATO to see what kind of reaction can be achieved however, caution is advised when drawing conclusions.
Several other drones were sighted: โDrones have been seen in recent days over Germany's northern state of Schleswig-Holstein, and flights have been delayed in the past week at Vilnius airport in Lithuania and at Oslo airport in Norway because of drone activity.โ Western nations may need to strengthen their cybersecurity and defence systems, such as, establishing a โdrone wallโ.
Perhaps the EUโs plans for AI Gigafactories can contribute to developing such systems in tackling drones more effectively in the near future: โSectoral flagships including targeted measures to boost AI adoption across 10 key industry sectors and the public sector. The industrial sectors include (โฆ) energy, agri-food; defence, security and space (โฆ).โ What Germany plans to invest in anti-drone equipment, which should also be put to use in other countries called โSkyrangerโ. Furthermore, experts from Universities such as TU Dresden state that one should invest more strongly in protecting critical infrastructure, such as airports, by installing lasers, jammers and radars, to name a few examples, but will this truly help in deterring attacks? Perhaps the aggressor will not see this a true deterrence and defence and will simply continue with โprobingโ or launching drones just to cause unrest.
The Summit has shown that members of the EU and NATO are concerned and are willing to step up their defence in the cyber and hybrid warfare areas. One cannot deny that the drones have targeted so-called critical infrastructure of the West namely: airports. It would be important to focus on all possible critical infrastructure in relation to drones and cyber-attacks such as hospitals, transportation systems, government buildings and energy structures (to name a few). These should be securely protected against drone disruptions as well as cyber-attacks which seems to be no new statement but should be highlighted nonetheless.
What do we know so far and what do we need to ask ourselves next?
Clausewitzian skeptics are wary of cyber-attacks having a physical or traditional war perspective effect. One can conclude that in the last years the landscape of international relations has changed and states, countries and individuals are rapidly adapting with using technology (also drones) to achieve certain means.
As for now, Russia has not claimed responsibility for the recent cyber-attacks and drone incidents,* which adds to the uncertainty* in cyber scenarios. Countries in this new type of โwarfareโ often act based on suspicion and what is discussed amongst scholars, โtit for tatโ and to โcoerce the enemy into acting a certain wayโ. One cannot say for certain at this moment if this is the intention of all the incidents however, it is certain that action needs to be taken to ensure a better defence and quicker reaction time. It also makes it clear that countries have to continue to rapidly adapt their strategy (also their cyber-strategy) in all directions in order to keep up with the changing landscape of conflicts.
At present, it cannot be stated with certainty that the cyber-attacks on the airports or the drone incidents had a physical violent impact however, they have significant delays, disturbance and a renewed debate concerning security. Both cyber-attacks and drones pose a threat to NATO member states and other Western countries and should be taken more strongly into account when investing in defence and a certain โcyber-strategyโ.
The following questions should guide future consideration: how can the West and the EU defend and react quicker in relation to cyber-attacks and drone incidents? Will the new plans to allow police to shoot down drones have a positive impact or cause further probing? Can AI and the investment in technology allow countries such as Germany to develop defence walls quicker than 2030?
Developing the so-called โdrone wallโย represents an initial response and could aid in the defence of countries against probing drones however, it should still be critically analysed who is behind the incidents and additional sanctions could be considered once attribution is established, to reduce uncertainty. The more certain one is of who is behind certain actions, the better a preparation can be put into place. This may add to the strategy in a certain โhybrid warfareโ but one cannot be for certain how it will develop in the near future since technology is also developing at a rapid speed. Perhaps states will be drawn into an endless โtit-for-tatโ2 game with implementing sanctions against cyber-attacks or better defence systems against drones however, these questions merit further analysis and discussion to gain a better understanding of how such potential hybrid conflicts could play out.
When one continues to critically ask these questions, then a good strategy can be developed in order to tackle the emerging challenges in cyber and drone incidents. As Richard P. Rumelt notes a bad strategy would be to mistake the end goals as the strategy itself3. The latter is commonly depicted as being the ends, ways and means and when applying this to the current international political landscape, it must remain fluid and multidimensional to adapt to rapidly changing technologies.
Lucas Kello, The Virtual Weapon, Oxford, page 31 โฉ๏ธ
ย Valeriano Brandon et al, โCyber Strategyโ 2018, oxford university press, page 226. โฉ๏ธ
ย Richard P. Rumelt, โGood Strategy, Bad Strategy โ The Difference and Why it Matters,โ pg 47. โฉ๏ธ
By Joshua Yow and Shams Jouve - Crime, Terrorism & Extremism Desk
The present state of political violence
On the 10th of September 2025, Charlie Kirk was shot and killed while speaking at an outdoor Turning Point USA event on the campus of Utah Valley University. Tyler Robinson, a 22-year-old, was subsequently arrested by the police and charged with Kirkโs murder.
This killing quickly became a national flashpoint, sparking a broader debate on rising political violence and deepening party polarisation, culminating in a highly publicised and elaborately high-level memorial service for Kirkโs death.
However, this ongoing escalation of violence in the United States is not an unprecedented phenomenon. Following John F. Kennedyโs death, a wave of violence directly targeting political figures was observed, resulting in the assassination of key political leaders and civil rights activists between 1960 and 1970.
While those events also deepened political divisions, todayโs environment is fundamentally different. Social media has become a defining factor, setting this crisis apart from earlier episodes, with Utah Governor Spencer Cox noting that โsocial media has played a role in every single assassination attempt that we have seen over the last five, six yearsโ, in a speech reacting to Charlie Kirkโs death. To understand the changes in the state of political violence, this article aims to identify the current modes of violence and the factors that accelerate them.
Polarisation is further powered by the spread of disinformation and misinformation online. Elites also play a disproportionate role within this dynamic, as โsocial media can provide [them] with the ability to shape their supportersโ opinions and mobilise turnout for elections and political eventsโ, often by disseminating polarising content. Furthermore, the mediatic and political scene in the US reinforce these existing divisions, privileging the most extreme voices, where โthe incentives that fuel American political life reward the people and platforms that turn up the heat, not those who dial tensions down.โ This highly charged political rhetoric results in a declining faith in institutions, which creates a feedback loop of violence.
Chavalarias notes that though echo chambers can form offline, online processes clearly enable the fast development of tensions directly impacting offline relationships. Thus, political violence should not be confined solely to online dynamics, but should be attributed to a convergence of deeper structural causes like economic insecurity, demographic anxiety, and increasingly provocative political discourses, ultimately contributing to growing fault lines. These ideological disagreements, transformed into personal animosity, have been heightened by social media, as well as the spread of conspiracy theories and personal grievances.
The methods and meanings of radicalisation
The methods of Tyler Robinson, the accused perpetrator, are also telling of the present climate of political radicalisation. His actions are indicative of a wider pattern of lone-actor or small-cell attacks that erupt out of political grievance rather than from hierarchical, organised forms of gang-related violence or terrorism. Robinsonโs signalling to an online audience, including referential engravings alluding to internet subculture, is not a new phenomenon, but it is one of growing concern. It reflects how extremist communication increasingly panders to these echo chambers present within internet culture. The purpose of these engravings goes beyond the traditional manifesto, instead acting as performative cues to in-group communities that subsequently propagate the act and idea of violence.
When this form of political extremism is coupled with a perpetratorโs unhindered access to the internet, this makes sources of online radicalisation much more opaque, which in turn makes the attribution of violence increasingly nebulous by leaving a vacuum of motive, encouraging a partisan narrative-setting after the act of killing.
Robinsonโs targeting of a political commentator instead of a government official also signals a shift from attacking positions of formal power towards an attack on rhetoric and identity. Kirkโs confrontational debate style has also made him a visible symbol, inviting division between his supporters and their opponents, while crystallising division within the American population. This reflects how demonstrations and public events have become focal points for violence, evoking the public stage as a site of contest, therefore revealing a nexus between policy and performance, which is present within echo chambers, audiences, and their associated performative cues.
Ripple effects/ Consequences: What does it mean for American society?
Source: President Donald Trump takes the stage with Erika Kirk at the Memorial Service for Charlie Kirk at State Farm Stadium in Glendale, Arizona, Sunday, September 21, 2025. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok) - Flickr
One sector feeling the strain is academia. In Canada, for instance, the University of Alberta placed several professors on non-disciplinary leave following threats linked to reactions surrounding Kirkโs death. Within the U.S., the climate for free speech on university campuses has also grown increasingly tense. A 2024 survey found that 27% of students agreed that campuses should โprohibit speech they may find offensive,โ up from 22% in 2021.
The debate surrounding Kirkโs death has also reignited broader discussions about First Amendment rights, which safeguard fundamental freedoms such as free expression. In a controversial statement, Vice President J.D. Vance asserted that theย First Amendment โdoes not protect those who celebrated Kirkโs death from consequences.โย His remarks came shortly after the President announced that the Antifa movement would be designated a terrorist organizationโโjust one of many actions,โย according to a White House official,ย โto address left-wing organizations that fuel political violence.โ
Critics of the governmentโs response to Kirkโs assassination have themselves faced backlash. Some have received threats, others have lost their jobs, and even prominent figures in entertainment have come under pressure. Late-night host Jimmy Kimmel, for example, was briefly suspended by ABC (owned by Disney) after joking that the โMAGA gangโ was attempting to score political points from Kirkโs death; the network later reinstated him following public criticism.
Already, Kirk has been enshrined within martyrdom by the Republican Party, shifting the attention away from the root cause of rising rates of gun violence. These party divisions are further capitalised on during the Kirkโs Memorial, blending American Evangelicalism and invocations of nationalism as a rallying platform, reinforcing partisan identity cues. This has been exacerbated by right-wing media figures demanding retribution for Kirkโs death, calling Kirkโs killing a declaration of โwarโ, illustrating the increase in sectarian escalation. Public spaces are also changing to reflect the heightened tensions, ushering in a deeper level of securitisation. President Trump also showed up to Kirkโs memorial hidden behind layers of bulletproof glass, reflecting the deep paranoia plaguing the event. Therefore, Kirkโs assassination exists within a self-reinforcing cycle of violence in which lone-actor radicalisation, online echo chambers, and performative politics harden sectarian identities while normalising a securitised public life. Breaking this cycle will depend on elite de-escalation and partisan compromise, though whether either will materialise remains uncertain.
As the United States navigates the fallout of this tragedy, the challenge lies not only in addressing immediate security threats but also in rebuilding a digital and political culture capable of disagreement without dehumanisation.
By Francesco Foti & Giacomo Prosperini - Italy Desk
Introduction
Italyโs strategic engagement in the Mediterranean is characterised by the intricate relationship between energy security, migration management, counter-terrorism and regional stability. This is particularly evident in Libya and Syria, where Italian interests intersect with broader European and global dynamics.
In Libya, Italy is confronted with the ongoing challenges of political fragmentation, competing local authorities, and the increasing influence of external powers. These factors constrain Romeโs capacity to fulfil its traditional role. Energy ties, migration control and managing local armed groups remain crucial levers, yet their effectiveness is increasingly undermined by militia activities, institutional deadlock and disruptive behaviour. The Greenstream pipeline and strategic oil and gas fields, for example, highlight the interdependence between Italian energy security and Libyan stability. However, reliance on fragile authoritarian systems carries great risks. Migration flows and criminal networks further exacerbate the challenges to Italian security, exposing the country to ethical dilemmas and limiting the effectiveness of regulatory strategies. In order to navigate this arena of geostrategic interests, it seems essential to strike a balance between short-term priorities, such as ensuring an adequate energy supply and controlling immigration, and long-term objectives, such as promoting institutional reforms to foster stability and coordinating effectively with European partners.
Conversely, the long civil war and ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria have exacerbated Europeโs security and migration challenges. Italy must strike a delicate balance, engaging with the new regime, countering extremist networks and managing refugee flows, all the while coordinating with European partners whose policies are often fragmented and reactive. Iranian and Turkish activities in the region further complicate Italyโs strategic calculations by influencing local governance and regional security dynamics. In response, Italy has pushed for Syria to be included in the EUโs external action agenda, proposing a broader strategy to address the complex challenges arising from the civil war, particularly the pressure on migration routes. However, this effort faces significant obstacles: the lack of a coherent policy from Western partners, coupled with the unresolved nature of the Syrian government, means that Rome must adopt a carefully calibrated approach that tackles the root causes of instability, migration flows and potential terrorist threats in order to mitigate them.
Taken together, these cases illustrate the limitations of a purely reactive or ad hoc approach. Italy should combine pragmatic diplomacy with long-term strategic planning, leveraging its historical ties primarily with Libya, expanding the external action in Syria, an economic presence, and enhancing regional credibility compared to France and the UK in Libya and Syria. The following analysis examines the Italian approach to Libya and Syria, highlighting the key dilemmas, vulnerabilities and opportunities that currently define its Mediterranean policy.
Post-Gaddafi Libya: Fragmentation and Political Deadlock
Among the multiple crises shaping the Mediterranean region, Libya remains a test case for Italy's ability to convert its geographical proximity into tangible influence. Romeโs interests - namely energy partnerships through ENIโs long-standing operations; containment of irregular migration; and broader regional stability - have been persistently undermined by Libya's political fragmentation since Gaddafi's regime collapsed in 2011. However, rather than redefining its strategy, Italy has tended to oscillate between ad hoc crisis management and a reliance on international processes that have produced limited results.
The post-2011 landscape in Libya remains marked by deep political and territorial tensions. Since Gaddafi's downfall, the country has been divided into two rival authorities: the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNA) in Tripoli, backed by Turkey and Qatar, and General Haftarโs Libyan National Army (LNA) in the east, supported by by Russia, Egypt, and the UAE. The existence of these two factions turned the conflict into a proxy arena for regional and global powers. This foreign interference has further weakened Italyโs previously privileged position, highlighting its diplomatic inferiority compared to more assertive external actors. Moreover, the proliferation of several armed groups with tribal and regional roots has created a security environment in which no single actor can guarantee stability.
Despite international initiatives, such as the Palermo Conference (2018) promoted by Italy and the Berlin Process (2020) Libya remains in deadlock. Tensions between historical Libyan provinces, rivalries between revolutionary and pro-Gaddafi factions, and competition over control of resources have undoubtedly fuelled instability. The repeated postponement of elections, most notably in December 2021, exposed the legal ambiguities of Libyaโs institutional framework, as well as the reluctance of key stakeholders to embark on a genuine political transition. The absence of a coherent EU external action in the Mediterranean, coupled with minimal US involvement, has restricted Italyโs freedom of action in Libya. This has contributed to the country adopting temporary policies instead of pursuing a strategic and forward-looking approach.
This persistent stalemate raises uncomfortable questions for Italy: should Rome continue to invest in fragile diplomatic efforts that have yielded little progress, or should it recalibrate its approach by prioritising narrower interests, such as energy and migration management? Either option involves significant trade-offs between short-term stability and long-term credibility.
Italy and Libya Energy Nexus
Italy's involvement in Libya has long been influenced by its reliance on energy ties, with ENI playing a key role in diplomatic engagement and economic influence, particularly in the energy sector through ENI. The Italian multinational oil and gas companyโs operations in the Wafa and El Feel oil and gas fields, directly connected to Sicily through the Greenstream pipeline underline how closely linked Italyโs energy security is to Libyan stability. Yet this reliance, which once gave Rome leverage, is increasingly revealing its fragility. ENIโs strategic assets are at the mercy of Libyaโs internal rivalries and armed groups' bargaining, which turns energy security into a structural vulnerability rather than a source of strength.
The war in Ukraine has further enlarged this paradox. As Europe seeks to diversify away from Russian energy dependence, Libya is seen as a key alternative for Italy and the EU. However, production remains subject to political instability and militia activity, as demonstrated by the blockade of the Ras Lanuf oil terminal in 2023. These events demonstrate that Italian energy policy relies on the temporary support of local groups, which ultimately renders it incapable of influencing the Libyan economy. This vulnerability is worsened by the absence of an EU external action strategy in the Mediterranean, bringing Italy to largely manage these challenges on its own and to take on responsibilities that could better be shared at the EU level.
Italy therefore faces a strategic dilemma. While an approach that prioritises energy guarantees immediate supplies, it risks binding Rome to a model of dependence on fragile authorities and undermining its ability to act as a regional stabiliser. Alternatively, Italy could leverage its presence in the energy sector for diplomatic gain, but only if reforms are implemented to stabilise and transparently manage the country's political and economic affairs. The choice is both technical and geopolitical: Italy can either remain a passive observer of the instability in Libya, or it can take an active role in ensuring security in the Mediterranean through energy diplomacy.
Migration, Security, and Human Rights
Libya remains one of the main departure points for migration to Europe, particularly along the Central Mediterranean route to Italy. Due to its proximity to Italy, the Libyan coast is a key โhotspotโ where thousands of migrants and refugees, primarily from Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, attempt dangerous sea crossings to reach Italian shores. For Italy, this influx of migrants is not only a humanitarian concern, but also an increasing security issue.
In response, the country has pursued a containment strategy, supporting the Libyan Coast Guard in intercepting and returning migrants before they reach European waters. However, these practices have sparked widespread criticism from various NGOs and the UN, who argue that Italian support effectively enables the return of migrants to Libyan detention centres, where conditions are described as inhumane and characterised by torture, extortion, continuous violence and abuse. The absence of effective border control, coupled with the fragmentation of the Libyan security apparatus, encourages the mobility of jihadist groups and foreign fighters, especially in southern Libya and across the Sahel. For Italy, the intersection of human trafficking, organised crime, and potential terrorist infiltration poses a multidimensional threat to national and regional security. By relying on Libyan authorities, Italy risks associating its migration policy with serious human rights violations. This tension is augmented by the lack of a unified European approach in terms of migratory policy. The limitations of the Dublin Regulation and the ambiguities of the EUโs New Pact on Migration and Asylum highlight the absence of a true European solidarity system, leaving frontline states such as Italy with a disproportionate amount of responsibility. This tension highlights a deeper dilemma, as short-term containment could come at the expense of international credibility and moral authority.
The suspension of operations for ten international NGOs and the UNHCR by the Libyan Internal Security Agency (LISA) in April 2025 further complicates the landscape. This suspension is a clear sign of Libya's increasingly securitarian and repressive shift, where international cooperation on migration is becoming increasingly subordinate to political and military interests. Italy and the EU now face a critical dilemma: should they continue to support authoritarian and violent actors in order to contain migration flows, or should they rethink their foreign policy in light of international law and human rights principles? Every path involves trade-offs. Disengagement could lead to uncontrolled migration flows, while continued support could reinforce inhumane authoritarian practices and destabilise the region.
The 2019 Memorandum of Understanding between Turkey and the GNA Turkey expanded Turkey's territorial waters in the Mediterranean, raising tensions with Greece and Cyprus. This Turkish expansion has created a new geopolitical dynamic in the Eastern Mediterranean, making it more difficult for Italy to assert its influence in Libya. By relying on its traditional influence and bilateral relations, Rome risks being marginalized in decision-making processes affecting both Libya and the wider region. Indeed, Turkey's increased presence in Tripoli means direct competition for control of energy resources, migration routes, and political alliances within Libya.
Should Italy adopt a proactive approach to limit Turkish influence and risk exacerbating regional tensions, or should it pursue multilateral coordination within the EU and NATO to preserve access and long-term stability? Either way, there are risks. A confrontational approach could provoke retaliation and further instability, while inaction could further erode Italy's strategic influence.
Italy and the Syrian Crisis: A Geopolitical, Security and Migratory Perspective
Following the collapse of the Assad regime, the West has been dealing with the consequences of a new Syria. Southeastern European countries have borne the brunt of the instability caused by the 14-year civil war. Southern EU countries' capacity to process migrants at their first point of entry into Europe has been significantly impacted by it. The disproportionate burden could also be posing a security risk, including instances of radicalisation and terrorismdocumented in Italy that reverberate at the single EU countryโs level. A fragmented Syria complicates the security crisis. An extremist or ineffectual government that harbours or exports radical violent individualsshould not be ruled out, given the past of HTS and the explosions of violence involving former loyalists,Alawites,Druze, andChristians.
EU Policy Failures on Syrian Migration
At the EU level, inconsistent application and failure to reform or uniform the Dublin Regulation have contributed to the instability in the Mediterranean and impacted Italyโs capabilities, thus signalling a lack of European approach. The refusal to reform the Dublin treaty and the lack of a broad approach to the security crisis by relying only on Libya, Egypt, and Turkey as a way to stem the flow underscore the European limited role in addressing the Syrian issue. The 2016 migration between Turkey and the EU exemplifies the European strategy of exchanging political concessions and funding for assistance in curbing migration flows.
Italyโs Legal and Diplomatic Response to the Syrian Crisis
Italy has temporarily suspended aspects of the asylum registration process under emergency measures, currently contested in court. To help manage migration, the Albania Agreement (2023) served as an option currently under discussion at the European level. The Italian government has passed a restrictiveLaw n. 187/2024 on immigration, and the annual immigration quota decree. The agreement and the laws implemented have been impugned by the courts which has limited their enforceability. The same impasse is observable across other EU countries.
An Italian geopolitical approach?
Due to European limitations and approach, the Italian position is limited to diplomatic, investment and humanitarian initiatives. Italy thinks that dealing with the Syrian government, whether in the form of Assad or HTS, is the starting point to address the question of immigration from instability. Lifting sanctions was presented as leading to cooperation in terms of infrastructure and business opportunities, which could boost the recovery and bring about stability to address the root causes. Italy should be watching theinterregnum phase as this might precipitate another immigration crisis.Italian pragmatism should take into consideration the Turkish role, activism andexceptionalism of which Greece and Cyprus have long been vocal. Italy should clearly demand Turkey halt any unilateral actions in Northern Syria that have not been agreed upon with NATO and EU allies. Turkish military operations targeting the Kurds risk destabilising by triggering artificial resettlement, increased displacement and growth of refugee camps amid deterioration of humanitarian conditions. Furthermore, as shown by the 2020 Turko-Greek crisis, Turkish use of immigration as a hybrid threat exposes European inaction and the limits of the Italo-Turkish partnership in the face of unchecked Turkish militarism. Turkish actions frequently blur the distinction between support for moderates and extremists, thus undermining both the security of Syrian-controlled areas and prospects for the eventual, gradual return of refugees to Europe.
Italy should also reassess its approach to Iranian influence in Syria and the broader Levantine region. A critical component of this reassessment involves evaluating Iranโs use of sectarian dynamics to extend its regional influence, a strategy that has historically contributed to instability and, in turn, increased migration pressures toward Europe. While Iran will still remain an actor to reckon with in Syria, particularly through its support of the Shias and Alewites, the evolving political landscape in Damascus warrants close scrutiny. Italy should remain vigilant to any Iranian efforts to recalibrate its role and maintain leverage in the region, as this may have implications for both regional stability and require Italyโs bilateral relations with Tehran to be re-evaluated.
Israel'srecent actions show awareness of the need to ensure Syria does not spiral into all-out sectarianism. However, Italyโs relationship with Israel has come under strain in light of recent developments in Gaza. Unlike countries such as the United Kingdom, France, or Spain, Italy has avoided openly criticizing Israelโs actions. However, it has also refrained from vocally supporting Israeli airstrikes in Syria, which Israel claims are aimed at protecting the Druze minority from government aggression. This ambiguous stance reflects an inconsistent policy line that fails to address the broader challenge of sectarianism in the region.
In light of the Lebanese government's recent call for the disarmament of Hezbollahโa paramilitary Shia organizationโItaly should formally support this initiative as a necessary measure to curb the regional spread of sectarianism from Lebanon into Syria. Such a stance is particularly warranted given Hezbollahโs alignment with the Iran-backed "axis of resistanceโ. So far, the Syrian government declined to take decisive steps.
A Western response
The West lacks a broad commitment to the Syrian issue, other than previously supporting rebels, much like with Libyaโs Gaddafi and the French-led regime change without clear post-intervention commitment. A cautious approach requires that the EU and US pressure should not be lifted, avoiding aquick diplomatic clout, until the course of Ahmed al-Sharaa becomes clear without ambiguity and sectarianism. A long-term plan comprising stabilisation, limiting the influence of geopolitical rivals and continuous pressure could tackle the root causes for massive immigration to Europe. Activism within the EU framework requires the US to be involved, and the easing pressure not be too speedy, given the uncertain direction of HTS. The Western powers should refrain from arming HTS and pressure others, such as Ukraine, not to overreach.
A new approach?
The Albanian model should be internalised and made into EU law, thus securing funding and being administered by the EU itself, and a quota system approved at the European level. The Italian government should stress the security dimension of the deal to frame it as a public safety tool and a faster, more humane processing. Italy should invite other countries in a joint governance of the centres to share the burden but also show the profits of the model. The EU should have an updated approach to cooperate with the Syrian authorities on repatriations, limit Turkish, Iranian and Qatari influence and pressure them not to engage in sectarianism. Italy should also take centre stage and bring the issue of the future West-Syria relations to the fore to help form a broad Western initiative that should, however, be security-based and geopolitical before focusing on immigration, trade and investment. This requires a new perspective on the actors in the Syrian playground based on the Libyan case that saw the rushed support for rebels that replaced the dictator turning out to breed chaos and new security challenges met inconsistently by the western powers.
Conclusions
Analyses of the situations in Libya and Syria highlight several key lessons for Italyโs Mediterranean strategy. Firstly, both crises demonstrate the limitations of reactive or ad hoc approaches. Short-term interventions in areas such as energy, migration and security often fail to address the root causes of political fragmentation and the influence of external actors. Secondly, while Italyโs traditional levers, such as energy diplomacy, migration management and engagement with local authorities, are necessary, they are insufficient in contexts marked by instability and unpredictable actors. Thirdly, these cases demonstrate that external influences, such as those from Turkey and Russia in Libya and Turkey and Iran in Syria, can significantly restrict Italyโs ability to act alone, making it essential for Italy to coordinate with other EU and NATO partners. Finally, the dilemmas faced in both countries illustrate the persistent tension between immediate interests, such as energy security and migration governance, and long-term objectives, including institutional reform, human rights protection and regional stability.
In light of these lessons, Italy must reassess its strategy in Libya, taking into account the growing influence of Turkey, the ongoing engagement of Iran, and the persistent institutional fragmentation, while also addressing migration management. The continuing stalemate between Tripoli and the eastern authorities, the repeated blockading of oil terminals and the fragility of local governance structures demonstrate that the ad hoc diplomatic and reactive intervention-focused approaches adopted after Gaddafi's fall are no longer sufficient. Yet the limited engagement of the EU in defining a coherent Mediterranean policy compounds these challenges, leaving Rome to act in a largely unilateral way. Italy must therefore combine traditional diplomatic tools with innovative approaches, promoting stability in energy production and reforming local institutions. Together with the need to ensure stability and defend human rights, this will require a comprehensive European approach aimed at preventing Libya from becoming a permanent centre of insecurity along the EUโs southern border.
At the same time, there has been a welcome in Italy for the prospect of closer engagement with the new Syrian authorities. However, these proposals must be carefully evaluated. Rome must consider whether the Al Jolani government can realistically unify diverse communities, combat terrorism and curb extremism. Effective engagement will depend on a holistic Western approach combining incentives and pressure to ensure the new authorities commit to inclusive governance, reject sectarian policies and contribute to long-term stability. A coherent strategy integrating political, security and humanitarian dimensions is essential for mitigating migration flows to Europe and for consolidating Italyโs credibility as a stabilising force in the Mediterranean and the wider Middle East.
Since the end of the Cold War, the privatisation of security has emerged in response to transnational security threats. At the same time, with the events of September 11, the global security landscape was completely transformed, with the private security sector playing a crucial role in the fight against terrorism, thus initiating a significant shift in the transition from the mere privatisation of security services to the privatisation of counter-terrorism efforts. Given that Africa has become โthe epicentre of global terrorismโ, the African governments have turned to private military and security companies (PMSCs) as key players in the privatisation process of counter-terrorism and security sector governance, highlighting existing security gaps.
Globalization of Private Security: from the privatisation of security to counter-terrorism privatisation
In the post-Cold War era, the craze for the โprivatisation of securityโ has spread globally in response to โtransnational security threatsโ. This process was associated with efficiency and effectiveness in an international context characterised by numerous failures of centralised โWestphalian statesโ overwhelmed by โsecurity dilemmasโ of a changing nature, especially with the emergence of intra-state conflicts. Meanwhile, a major development in the state system of international relations (IR) has taken place with the reconfiguration of the roles of the state, which has ceded its position as the only legitimate provider and guarantor of security to private and non-state military security agents. Indeed, the increasing prominence of โprivate security entitiesโ as crucial actors in global politics clearly mirrors the transformations in international โsecurity governanceโ characteristic of the postmodern era; consequently, โprivate military firmsโ and โmercenariesโ have evolved into novel types of normative agents that engage in interaction, collaboration, and rivalry, thereby establishing a three-way dynamic of institutionalised security engineering. Nevertheless, this trend results in the breakdown of conventional state governance structures, occurring within a context where the connections between public, private, global, and local domains are being redefined. Simultaneously, the African continent has also been the scene of the interaction between privatisation and the globalisation of security in the midst of the rise of private security providers, going beyond the traditional vision of state authority, which is moving more towards a new complex model of governance involving public and private security actors which blurs the line between internal and external, regional and international security.
The post-September 11 global security environment has offered the private security market a key role in the fight against terrorism; thus, a new turn has begun in changing the path from the privatisation of security to the privatisation of counter-terrorism. However, the formation of public-private partnerships (P3) has intensified with the engagement of private sector security professionals in favour of a broader intersectoral strategy to combat terrorism as part of a standardised approach to โterrorism securitisationโ that includes the contribution of private security actors to prevention efforts. On the one hand, the privatisation of counter-terrorism has been undertaken to meet the intense needs of anti-terrorist cooperation operations abroad, with gaps to be filled in terms of toolboxes, whether in terms of resources, forces, or capabilities. On the other hand, private companies after September 11, 2001, had become de facto subcontractors of โcounter-terrorism security operationsโ traditionally carried out exclusively by state agencies to avoid any control and direct legal responsibility. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has led to an increased reliance on private security companies while emphasising a โstrategic capabilities-based approachโ but also the adoption of a โpreventive counter-terrorism strategyโ against an unknown adversary that requires a refocusing of the mission of the armed forces, where the private sector is actively involved in an operational dynamic of โrisk managementโ and clearly distinguishes it from previous โthreat-based approachesโ. Importantly, private security entities have become a crucial tool in the efforts of governments to maintain national security; thus, the privatisation of counter-terrorism takes several forms, namely open, closed, statutory and non-contractual co-option. Undoubtedly, this is manifested through their central roles to play in counter-terrorism surveillance (CTS), in particular in the fight against terrorist financing and in the use of technology to secure infrastructure against cyberterrorism. The private security sector plays an important role both in the prevention and response to critical incidents, including terrorist attacks; moreover, private security personnel provide information, command, control and communications in the management of terrorist risk. This sector has become an effective element of counter-terrorism capabilities and occupies the top level of strategic prevention plans.
The private security and military companies PSMCs in Africa: actors of international security
In Africa, the privatisation of security reflects the major shifts that the concept of security has undergone, moving from the exclusive domain of the State to private actors in a context characterised by hybridity and fragmentation, involving an array of private military and security companies (PMSCs), which have emerged as an alternative path to African security governance, primarily dominated by the erosion of State capacities, with a deficit in the regulation of the security sector. The PMSCs have become regular actors in the African security landscape. Organised as legal corporate entities, they provide a wide range of military and security services, including transport, maintenance, military and police training, demining, intelligence, risk analysis, armed and unarmed protection services, anti-piracy measures, border protection, drones and cyber operations. Indeed, African governments regularly call on transnational corporations (TNCs) to ensure security in areas with limited state status. The PMSCs and non-state actors, notably South Africa's Executive Outcomes (EO), have grown since the end of the Cold War as a result of the state's bankruptcy and the deficit in monopoly and use of power. The intensification of conflicts across the continent has been the driving force behind the privatisation of security, especially since the dynamics of these conflicts remain varied and complicated, and the involvement of the private security sector was a reality even during the post-independence period, due to arbitrary colonial borders and the nature of the post-colonial African state and patrimonialism. In fact, the private security industry also possesses the competence and capacity to conduct conflicts and wars. From this perspective, the increase in conflicts has created a need for private contractors to support and fill operational gaps in United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian aid missions; thus, PMSCs provide the UN with a multitude of services, including logistics, military training, and security sector reform, becoming key international security actors, and Africa is not immune to this.
The use of PMSCs in Africa has evolved from mercenary to undergo a significant transformation in the 1990s, becoming privatised and business-orientated. Whereas historically these non-state actors have been involved in activities related to civil wars and the exploitation of natural resources. With this in mind, Sierra Leone and Angola have been supported by military companies to fight against rebellions and regain control of diamond-rich regions. In addition, Congo recruited the Belgian company Union Miniรจre between the period from 1960 to 1965. PMSCs often resorted to operations related to coups d'รฉtat and the fight against communism, white supremacy and the preservation of quasi-colonial structures in the 1960s and 1970s. The factors that have led to the rapid growth of the private security sector in Africa are generally linked to human insecurities resulting from the failure or weakness of states in the context of globalisation, which facilitates access to the private security sector, particularly with the commodification of the public sphere and the professionalisation of the armed forces and police in search of profit maximisation accentuated by the liberalisation of the arms trade.
The privatisation of counter-terrorism in Africa: understanding the complex and shifting dynamics
The fight against terrorism has become a priority on the agenda of private security companies in Africa. PMSCs actively support African governments primarily in the areas of combating the spread of transnational security threats, particularly in war governance, counter-insurgency (COIN), and counter-terrorism (CT). In this regard, the South African PMC Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment, and Protection (STTEP International Ltd) has intervened against Islamic terrorist groups and Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Sahel region. As a result, in the face of poor governance policies and ineffective management of the terrorist threat and security risks, this has led to the formation of non-state security actors as an intermediate security factor. Security groups like the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and the Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) were established to combat terrorist groups but as complementary entities to the security architectures of the police and the armed forces to help strengthen security functions. Western PMSCs are heavily involved in the privatisation efforts of counter-terrorism, namely the British Aegis Defence Services and Olive Group, the French companies Secopex and Agemira, the German companies Asgaard and Xeless and the American companies Triple Canopy and Advan Fort Co. Already in 2017, according to a Pentagon report, there were 21 private American security firms in the Sahel. All these entities are engaged in providing multifaceted operations to combat the emergence of extremist jihadist organisations. Thus, African countries receive operational training and logistical support in the field of anti-terrorism cooperation. In the current geopolitical circumstances, the fight against terrorism is the argument put forward by African governments that hire PMCs to counter the spread of jihadist groups. That is why new private military companies are operating in Africa, including Israeli private companies, and the UAE-based Black Shield Security.
The Sahel region in Africa has become a โcoup beltโ, especially since 2020, when military juntas came to power in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea and Niger. Meanwhile, the rapid expansion of militant jihadist groups, led by local subsidiaries of the Islamic State group, namely the Islamic State Province in the Sahel (ISSP) and Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), a branch of al-Qaida, has created a chaotic situation, as a result of which civilian and military governments have been unable to combat the security threats posed by jihadist groups, calling on private military and security companies (PMSCs) as key actors in the privatisation process of the fight against terrorism. In truth, the security vacuum and the inability of successive administrations to restore security order in the face of the emergence of an armed rebellion in the remote regions of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, led by groups linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS), are often instrumentalised by new military governments by promising to deal with Islamist fighters with an excessive reliance on security justification related to growing concerns about transnational insecurity. For example, the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP) in Mali used security gaps in the face of the territorial gains of radical jihadists to defend the military takeover in 2021, while in Burkina Faso, the putsch took place in September 2022 due to an inability to fight an Islamic insurgency. Indeed, the private military and security sector in Africa has recently been redefined, making way for new companies from emerging countries in a context of great power struggle, notably through the Chinese Frontier Services Group (FSG), while the Wagner paramilitary group has adopted a militaristic approach to combating terrorism in Africa. However, most countries in sub-Saharan Africa โ Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania โ have sought military and security support in the fight against the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. This also partly explains the proliferation of the Turkish International Defence Consulting Company (SADAT), which operates in the Sahel region destabilised by endemic terrorism and fragile security policies.
African approach in the field of the privatization of counter-terrorism: PSMCs within security sector governance and reform (SSG/R)
Despite the fact that the African private sector plays a key role in counter-terrorism missions, including intelligence gathering, border management, humanitarian assistance and reintegration. The use of PMSCs exposes African states to numerous ethical and moral concerns, particularly in terms of national security and sovereignty, as the reliance on private contractors increases the risk of vulnerability and security gaps due to shortcomings in the field of drone technology innovation and territorial surveillance missions. Even more seriously, this is accompanied by the transformation of the notion of the โcitizen-soldierโ looking out for the โcommon goodโ into a โprivate mercenaryโ seeking โindividual financial gainsโ as the primary motivation, which raises the question of the divergence and non-conformity of the interests of PMCs with those of the States in wars and in counter-terrorism theatres of operations. Furthermore, despite attempts to regulate PMSC activities, regional and international efforts are still largely ineffective. In doing so, the use of PMSCs raises a number of ethical issues both in jus ad bellum and jus in bello, as they largely operate outside the effective jurisdiction of national and international law, unlike states and regular soldiers who are subject to a number of laws that restrict the conduct of war under international law. This is why the โMontreux Documentโ constitutes the intergovernmental framework that establishes international legal obligations and good practices for states in terms of PMSC operations during armed conflicts intended to promote respect for international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law.
South Africa was one of the first countries to adopt legislation regarding PMSCs with the 1998 Foreign Military Assistance Regulation Act and the 2001 Private Security Industry Regulation Act, amended in 2013. While at the regional level, there are numerous efforts by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and its successor, the African Union (AU), to eliminate mercenary activities and regulate the PMSC industry that continues to thrive on the continent. Particularly within the framework of the African Convention on the Elimination of Mercenariesโ in Africa in 1977, notably Article 2(c) and Article 4(b); the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, from 1999; and the AU Non-Aggression and Defence Pact, from 2005; as well as the communiquรฉ regarding the withdrawal of foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya to the Sahel and the rest of Africa, adopted by the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) in 2021. The AU plays a key role across the continent in promoting good governance of the security sector. The Political Framework on Security Sector Reform in 2014, related to the regulation of the private security sector, including non-state security bodies, was adopted. The AU deplores the use of PMSCs by AU Member States, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and their international partners, who must comply with international, regional, and national frameworks. The AU also emphasises the need for AU Member States to develop a holistic approach to Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the field of PMSCs to ensure that legal, political, and policy frameworks reflect good governance of PMSCs, making them more effective and accountable, both at the organisational and operational levels, in line with international and regional SSG/R standards.
Conclusion
It is evident that the complex and evolving international context of the post-Cold War era, as well as the events of September 11, 2001, marked an irreversible shift in the global expansion of private security and the fight against terrorism in Africa, characterised by the involvement of private military and security companies (PSMCs) in counter-terrorism operations, increasingly playing a major role in intelligence, counter-terrorism surveillance (CTS), counter-insurgency (COIN), and risk management related to the terrorist threat. Despite this, the involvement of PSMCs in the fight against terrorism poses major constraints regarding security dependence and the loss of national sovereignty since these firms are tied to the foreign policy agenda of their countries of origin and are often an instrument of competition between major powers in Africa. Thus, to address such ethical and moral concerns, aiming to promote respect for international humanitarian law (IHL), the African Union has established an intergovernmental framework that sets international legal obligations and best practices for PSMCs with a holistic approach to security sector reform (SSR).
Surrounded by the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, the Red and Mediterranean Seas, the maritime domain represents an immense source of wealth for Africa. Yet, African waters remain connected to a series of issues impacting security and all its referent objects: humans, states, environment, society, and economy. In light of these concerns, this essay is the first in a two-part series investigating maritime security practices on the continent. More precisely, they will offer a vision of current strategies addressing maritime security issues through the lens of International Relations and Security theories.
The articles will highlight two, perhaps counterintuitive, tendencies. On the one hand, it will draw on constructivist approaches to International Relations (IR), particularly securitization and regional integration theories, to highlight the internal convergence and cooperation among African States and (sub)regional organizations into a thematic security community. The second publication will employ a specific case study to embed within IR theories, the posture of a single state toward external threats and third states operating in African Waters. The outcome of this two-fold endeavor will underscore how the internal dynamics of integrations are balanced with neorealist approaches towards external states on the continent.
General threats and geographical scopes of maritime security in Africa
For a long time, African understanding of security has intersected with traditional and state-centric issues, including inter- / intra-state conflict, peacebuilding, human trafficking, terrorism, and poverty. Only more recently, the maritime domain has become a compelling issue for the agendas of national governments and regional organizations.
The spectrum of threats is wide, spanning from the notorious cases of piracy off the Somali coasts and the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) to less-known yet relevant issues. These include energetic security, illegal, unreported and undocumented (IUU) fishing, oil theft, armed robbery, and human, weapons, and drug trafficking. Other illicit activities conducted at sea involve environmental degradation, dumping of toxic wastes, and spilling of polluting agents. The costs of these actions have high impacts on the continent, contributing to exacerbating structural vulnerabilities such as economic fragility, food (in)security, political instability, conflicts, and impacting states to control their territory and population.
To begin with, the West Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea are known for the intense activities linked to piracy. Although the phenomenon has recently decreased, renewed insecurity emerged from the latest Houthi attacks against commercial vessels (133, only in 2023), and the consequent disruption of submarine cables. These latest developments have made the region a new hotspot of insecurity, diverting commercial maritime traffic to the old route of the Cape of Good Hope.
Additionally, Islands and states in the East Indian Ocean are reportedly engaged in fights against the massive increase of criminal networks involved in heroin trafficking. Similarly, the African Mediterranean coasts, primary gateway to Europe, have long been under international attention for human trafficking and coastal fuel smuggling.
On the other side of the continent, the GoG - a 6.000 km coastline bordering 19 states - has become the center of new commercial routes as well as criminal activities. Similar to other regions, piracy reportedly decreased by 90% in 2024. However, serious challenges remain in a region extremely rich in terms of natural resources, maritime wildlife, and the center of new commercial routes.
For instance, fishing activities in the region account for 4% of the global fish supply. In turn, IUU fishing operated by private enterprises and foreign vessels (flagged in Europe and Asia) impacts local economies, food security, and maritime biodiversity. To illustrate the point, it is estimated that IUU fishing accounts for 40 - 65 % of the fish captured in the region. It has been observed that a more sustainable allocation and management of the fishing sector would be worth $2 billion annually for national and local economies.
Cooperation structures: Maritime Security Institutions and (sub-)Regional Cooperation
In the light of these issues, the past decade marked a period of intense development for African maritime architecture. Within the continent, a proliferation of multilateral and bilateral agreements has gradually concentrated and intersected maritime concerns under the attention of old and new institutions leaning towards the formation of an African security community for maritime affairs. The beginning of this momentum coincides with the rising threats linked to piracy in Somalia and the Gulf of Guinea in the late 2000s.
During the decade, new governance practices emerged. Encapsulated in securitization discourses, they encouraged continental integration in the maritime domain, envisioning common solutions to shared problems. The outcome of such efforts has been condensed in the creation of new institutions, renewed engagement in existing ones, new security tools, and joint enterprises reflected in new visions and strategies. Such governance and security practices can be found through charters, meetings, symposiums, conferences, and the constitution or renewal of regional and sub-regional bodies and committees. More practical tools should not be underestimated. These include communication and information sharing platforms, capacity building, joint rescue coordination centers, common juridical frameworks, and published documents and strategies. These developments are coupled with the creation of sub-regional bodies and treaties, declarations, and Memoranda of understanding dealing with maritime security issues.
For instance, North African states have cooperated with Europeans through bilateral agreements as well as in multilateral settings. Worth mentioning is the 5+5 Defense Initiative, whose first meeting took place in 2004 in Paris. Similarly, the Djibouti Code of Conduct of 2009, united states from the Horn of Africa and Western Indian Ocean, established practices under the common objective of fighting piracy and set a shared information and knowledge management system.
On the Atlantic Side, the Yaoundรฉ Protocol, signed by 26 member states part of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), introduced a comprehensive maritime security framework. The architecture has divided maritime areas intoโresponsibility zonesโ and has broadened cooperation to all sorts of illicit activities conducted in the sea (e.g., money laundering, illegal arms and drug trafficking, human smuggling, maritime pollution, IUU fishing, toxic waste dumping, and the sabotage of offshore infrastructure).
During the same years at the sub-regional level, African organizations developed their maritime visions and strategies. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) reorganized the SADC Maritime Committee (SMC), adopting in 2007 its first maritime strategy, targeting piracy off the Somali coasts and the Indian Ocean. Simultaneously, the SMC created the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) System, a joint intelligence platform for information sharing on maritime events and trafficking, and has set an embryonic legal framework to deal with piracy. On the other hand, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mentioned maritime security for the first time in 2005, integrating the topic as one of the four pillars in its Security Sector Program.
At the continental level, the African Union (AU) revisited the 1993 African Maritime Transport Charter, publishing in 2007 the first official document dealing with maritime security: the Abuja Declaration and Plan of Action on Maritime Security. Thereafter, the AU Secretariat for maritime issues has worked on a common and comprehensive strategy for the continent, finalized in 2014 as the 2050 African Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS).
The document represents a key moment for the African Unionโs management of maritime spaces, setting the common goal of โdeveloping a sustainable thriving blue economy in a secure and environmentally sustainable manner,โ and offering a comprehensive map of security risks and mitigation strategies. AIMS identifies common objectives, stakeholders (including states, civil society, and business groups), main threats, and the measures to mitigate them. It emphasizes the need for cooperation at the national and regional levels to achieve a sustainable and safe maritime environment for states and people.
Furthermore, AIMS 2050 ambitiously sets the rules to harmonize states' legal frameworks on national maritime law to foster judicial cooperation, defining and combating maritime criminality under a unified legal framework.
Drawing on the AIMS 2050, the Lomรฉ Charter (African Charter on Maritime Security, Safety and Development) was adopted in 2016, and the Djibouti framework was expanded in its scope through the 2017 Jeddah Amendment.
Maritime environment through the prism of International Relations and Security Theories
From the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the western Gulf of Guinea, passing through all the African coastlines, conventional and unconventional challenges have compelled states to find collaborative solutions at the national, regional, and sub-regional levels. From this analysis, two major theoretical implications can be drawn. First, the African maritime sector has gradually converged towards a thematic security community. Secondly, over time, it has integrated traditional state-centric security approaches to include other referent objects, such as human, economic, and environmental security.
To begin with, a security community can be understood as a group whose members construct securitization with one another. Securitization, in turn, refers to the discursive act of framing an issue as a security threat to a specific referent. The securitization of a thematic area, hence, passes from the creation and reiteration of new practices and discourses. The process begins with the identification of a shared threat and a collective engagement against it. It continues with the creation of repertoires (e.g., common practices, tools, and technologies such as declarations, strategic documents, and information-sharing platforms), and it ends with a shared enterprise (e.g., common objectives and shared securitization vision). It finally culminates with the creation of a community grounded in mutual objectives and common visions of goals. In this sense, the emergence of crossing and overlapping institutions in the African maritime sector suggests a gradual process of formation of a maritime security community, composed of states, regional and sub-regional organizations, maritime professionals, as well as civil society, sharing a common objective, and establishing common practices under the umbrella of a single security issue.
Secondly, Christian Bueger has categorized security issues in the maritime domain on four different dimensions: marine and environmental security, economic security, human and state security. Given the interconnectedness of maritime and continental challenges, the literature suggests a substantial reconciliation between the four domains. These syntheses are often explicated โ and visible - in the documents, declarations, and strategies through the nexus โmaritime security โ sustainability - developmentโ. In other words, in the African continent, a gradual shift has occurred from an early understanding of maritime security as inextricably linked to the state and sovereignty, to a maritime domain which has become interconnected with the state, human security, wealth, food security, economic development, and political stability.
For instance, the early versions of the Yaoundรฉ and Djibouti codes of conduct were based on negative measures aimed at limiting illicit activities, particularly piracy, to safeguard and prioritize state security. The more recent developments (e.g., AIMS 2050, Lomรฉ Charter, Jeddah Amendment) reflect more positive notions on maritime security. These documents are more oriented towards developing a sustainable and thriving blue economy within a secure and environmentally sustainable framework in African coasts.
Integrating multiple aspects of security, these charters have implicitly attempted to structure an increasing number of institutions into a security community that reconciles human, state, economic, and environmental security under the umbrella of maritime security. They have thus expanded their scope for the development of wealth and a sustainable maritime sector, pushing against all illegal activities conducted at sea (i.e., IUU fishing, crimes against the environment, human trafficking, etc.).
Conclusion
The African Maritime domain has been subjected to substantial transformation over the past decades. It is now embedded within a broader understanding of security, which integrates state, human, economic, food, and environmental concerns. This conceptual shift comes together with an intense proliferation of institutions, frameworks, and strategies that lean towards the creation of a thematic security community. In this context, however, the effectiveness of these efforts will be dependent on the degree of cooperation achieved and the level of implementation of the measures. As the continent continues to confront complex maritime challenges, the consolidation of this security community will be essential to ensuring not only safety and sovereignty but also sustainable development and a resilient blue economy for future generations.
The European Union (EU) has taken a firm stance on the Russia-Ukraine war, unequivocally condemning Russiaโs actions since the conflictโs onset, citing violations of international law and human rights. This position portrays the EU as a defender of moral and legal principles. However, is the EUโs commitment to international law consistently applied across all contexts? One particularly compelling case that raises questions about this consistency is the situation in Western Sahara. The EU has entered into agreements with Morocco concerning resources on Western Saharan territory, prompting scrutiny of its adherence to international legal standards. This blog article examines the EUโs involvement in the Western Sahara-Morocco conflict, focusing on the exploitation of natural resources. It begins by introducing the people of Western Sahara, followed by a brief overview of the conflictโs historical development and key actors today. It then outlines the current status of Western Sahara, highlighting the roles of Morocco and the EU, with a particular emphasis on the EUโs engagement in extractivism. Extractivism refers to the process of extracting natural resources, such as minerals, oil, or agricultural products, from the earth, often prioritising economic gain over environmental sustainability and social justice, and frequently involving the exploitation of marginalised communitiesโ lands without their consent. This article does not delve into human rights violations or the refugee crisis associated with the conflict, as these topics are highly sensitive. Instead, it aims to present the issue from multiple perspectives to foster informed debate beyond academic circles.
People of Western-Sahara
The nomads of Western Sahara are called by the term Sahrawi, which is Arabic for โSaharanโ. Sahrawi is sometimes also used as a synonym for โWestern Saharanโ, but this term goes along with some issues, which are not only related to a semantic problem. The problem implies a territorial limitation in Western Sahara today, even though the term Sahrawi refers in most definitions to an ethnic category rather than to a political-geographic term. There are Sahrawi natives outside of the now known Western Sahara, namely in the South of Morocco, West of Algeria and North of Mauritania. That given, the most convenient definition for the Sahrawi people should rather be understood as โ[โฆ] Hassaniyyah-speaking people who claim membership among at least one of the social groupings found in and around the area now known as Western Saharaโ.
From colonialisation to a missing referendum and occupation
The Western Sahara conflict began at the 1885 Berlin Conference, where European powers divided Africa. Spain gained control of the region from Cap Blanc to Cap Bojador and, in 1900 and 1904, acquired Spanish-South Morocco near Tarfaya from France. In 1958, Western Sahara became a Spanish colony. After Morocco (1956), Mauritania (1960), and Algeria (1962) achieved independence, they supported Western Saharaโs decolonisation and a 1973 UN referendum. The Polisario Front emerged in 1973 as a key player. Spain planned independence, but Moroccoโs King Hassan II launched the โGreen Marchโ on November 6, 1975, sending 350,000 civilians and soldiers into the territory. Amid Francoโs impending death, Spain signed the Madrid Accords, ending its rule by 1976 and dividing the region: Morocco took the north, Mauritania the south. No referendum occurred, ignoring Sahrawi aspirations. On February 2, 1976, the Polisario declared the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and fought Morocco and Mauritania. By 1979, the SADR expelled Mauritania, but Morocco seized the south. At its peak, the SADR controlled 90% of Western Sahara and attacked inside Morocco. Morocco responded with fortified walls guarded by mines and soldiers. In the conflict, Morocco gained the upper hand, and the SADR faced heavy losses. In 1991, UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuรฉllar negotiated a ceasefire, leading to Resolution 690 and the MINURSO peacekeeping mission. Proposals like Baker Plan I and II followed, but the referendum stalled over voter eligibility: Morocco argued Green March settlers should vote, while the Polisario limited it to 1974 residents. The UN recognised the impasse, turning the referendum into a โwinner-takes-allโ standoff, halting progress.
Extraactivism
Moroccoโs 1975 occupation of Western Sahara has driven extensive resource extraction, often violating international law by excluding Sahrawi consent and benefits, as stipulated in a 2002 UN legal opinion. Motivated by the nationalist vision of a โGreater Morocco,โ encompassing parts of Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Western Sahara, and the regionโs rich resourcesโphosphates, fish, oil, gas, and metals like gold and platinumโMorocco has pursued a considerable exploitation. Since the 1970s, Moroccoโs state-owned OCP has exported 1.23 million tons of phosphate rock from the Bou Craa mine in 2022, generating $655.5 million for importers like India and New Zealand, with plans for a new port despite Western Sahara Resource Watchโs โP for Plunderโ reports urging cessation. Industrial fishing, enabled by the EU-Morocco Fisheries Agreement until a 2023 EU Court ruling requiered Sahrawi consent, primarily exports sardines and mackerel, generating significant revenue for Morocco. Oil and gas exploration, which began in the 1950s and intensified after Moroccoยดs occupation, involved companies like Total, Kerr-McGee, and Kosmos Energy. Total later withdrew, and while Kosmos and Cairn Energy drilled offshore in 2014, they found no viable deposits. Morocco continues to issue exploration licenses to coompanies like NewMed, backed by Delek Group, Deutsche Bank, and BlackRock. Sand exports to the Canary Islands, along with mineral exploration for uranium and gold, and agriculture expansion near Dakhlaโ covering to 963 hectares by 2016 on land owned by Moroccoโs king and companies like Azuraโ are depleting local water reserves, fueled by EU trade deals. The EU, receiving 64% of Moroccoโs exports, benefits from fishing, phosphate mining, and renewable energy projects such as Siemensโ wind farm supporting phosphate extraction. Morocco fears an independent Sahrawi state could destabilise the Sahel and point to the Polisarioโs lack of governance experience, proposing autonomy in 2007 while Morocco controlling foreign and defense policies. The Polisario, however, insists on a referendum for full independence. Meanwhile, German and Irish groups advocate for excluding non-consensual firms from trade, though Morocco warns this could increase migration.
In October 2024, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that the 2019 EU-Morocco trade and fisheries agreements were invalid because they included Western Sahara without the explicit consent of its people, violating their right to self-determination. The ECJ emphasised that Western Sahara is a distinct, non-self-governing territory, and agreements affecting it must involve consultation with the Sahrawi people through their recognised representative, the Polisario Front. This decision reaffirmed earlier rulings from 2015, 2016, 2018, and 2021, and mandated that products like melons and tomatoes from Western Sahara be labeled as such, not as Moroccan, to avoid misleading consumers. The ruling, a significant victory for the Polisario Front, it has impacted Moroccoโs exports, which constitute 64% of its trade with the EU, and affects EU companies involved in fishing, phosphate extraction, and renewable energy projects in the region. The EU has 12 months to adjust the agricultural agreement to comply with international law, balancing its strategic partnership with Morocco, which criticised the ruling as biased and politically motivated. The European Commission is analysing the judgment to ensure compliance while maintaining relations with Morocco, a key partner in regional stability. The ECJโs decision underscores the legal necessity of Sahrawi consent, aligning with UN principles on the sovereignty of non-self-governing territories over their resources, and may influence future EU trade policies in disputed regions.
Conclusion
The Western Sahara conflict highlights a troubling contradiction between the European Union's actions and its core values and norms. By engaging in trade agreements with Morocco that exploit Western Saharaโs resourcesโsuch as phosphates, fish, and agricultural productsโwithout the consent of the Sahrawi people, the EU has apparently contributed to the perpetuation of injustice in the region. The EUโs economic involvement, exemplified by the invalidated 2019 trade and fisheries agreements, has enabled Moroccoโs occupation and resource extraction, which violate international law and the Sahrawiโs right to sovereignty over their resources, as affirmed by the 2024 ECJ ruling. This ruling underscores that the EUโs trade practices contravene its commitment to international law and the principles of the UN Charter, which emphasise the self-determination of non-self-governing territories. Furthermore, the EUโs prioritisation of strategic relations with Morocco over ethical considerations undermines its stated values of justice, equality, and solidarity, as outlined in the Treaty on European Union. The EUโs complicity, driven by economic interests and benefiting from 64% of Moroccoโs exports, not only marginalises the Sahrawi but also weakens the EUโs credibility as a global advocate for human rights and democratic principles. To align with its normative framework, the EU should prioritise Sahrawi consent in future agreements, enforce accurate labeling of Western Saharan products, and support a referendum for self-determination, thereby addressing its role in perpetuating this longstanding injustice. The revised EU-Morocco agreement is expected to be presented by October 2025, in line with the ECJ's request.
Regional Cooperation in South Asia: A Tale of Ups and Downs
South Asiaโs struggle to achieve effective regional integration has been well documented. Previously, World Bank estimates have indicated that intra-regional trade accounts for a meager 5 percent of the total trade in South Asia. For context, the percentage for intra-regional trade in South-east Asia is about five times as much, a significant difference. In turn, a combined lack of regional integration and stability has led to a dearth of foreign direct investment flowing into the region. A multitude of reasons have held back regional integration. These include border instability between countries, diverging economic goals, and uncertainty about each otherโs intentions.
Initially, the path to overcoming these issues was institutionally conceived in the form of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), established in 1985. However, since 2014, there have been a total of zero summits, primarily because of increased tensions between India and Pakistan following the 2016 Pulwama terror attack. SAARCโs institutional deadlock was a deeply worrying event with regard to the prospect of regional cooperation in South Asia. SAARCโs failure led to a re-evaluation of neighbourhood policy for countries like India, with the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) now viewed as an alternative institutional approach. The idea was that connectivity along the Bay of Bengal would be a strategically effective measure to spur regional interconnectivity.
Over the last nine years or so, India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, Thailand, Bhutan, and Myanmar have ramped up participation within the organisation. They have focused on several different areas of cooperation, held frequent meetings, and streamlined the organisational structure. There have been six BIMSTEC summits, the latest one taking place in Thailand in April 2025. A notable exception to collaboration under BIMSTEC, however, is the lack of measures around Artificial Intelligence. This is even more surprising given that technology is one of the key areas of collaboration in the organisation. Thus far, there are no concrete initiatives under BIMSTEC that seek to explicitly address Artificial Intelligence as a means of cooperation. There are no expert groups explicitly seeking to address AI, and no official frameworks, agreements, or MoUs specifically aimed towards AI. Not capitalising on the prospect of strengthening cooperation by focusing on AI would be a big opportunity foregone for BIMSTEC.
Given the rapid diffusion of the technology, most member states do not yet have comprehensive regulatory frameworks in place. This is actually an opportunity, since they can now coordinate their respective domestic policies, which in turn would reduce the compliance costs for companies in a BIMSTEC state to work across borders. Reports on the Asia-Pacific demonstrate that intergovernmental collaboration on AI can have a two-fold effect of attracting foreign investment and improving public service delivery. Converging AI policies can also improve technical and technological transfer between countries. Certainly, global AI summits and the spread of AI Safety Institutes (AISI) seem to suggest a global consensus that AI collaboration is indeed fruitful. All of this is to suggest something intuitive: It is time for South Asia, and more specifically, BIMSTEC, to focus on collaboration in Artificial Intelligence.
How AI Collaboration Can Be Effective for BIMSTEC
Given the breadth and sheer scale of developments related to AI globally, it can be tempting to try to dabble in every possible policy angle related to AI. However, for a multilateral organisation such as BIMSTEC, with relatively limited funding, it would be prudent to focus on a few specific factors. There are four main considerations with regard to AI cooperation in BIMSTEC.
Firstly, cooperation on AI could lead to regional economic growth and attract more investment from abroad. This is a sentiment echoed by the BIMSTEC Secretary General, who stated that โregional collaboration on AI standardsโ was essential in achieving โcollective development goalsโ. Certainly, the conditions are conducive for such growth. After all, the BIMSTEC countries have a young population, and therefore a strong workforce, with a majority of people below the age of 30. Collaboration on upskilling this workforce to be adept at developing and using AI is thus a lucrative opportunity for members. A good way to do this would, of course, be to facilitate cross-border exchange programs and education opportunities specifically designed for AI and related fields, perhaps through a flagship BIMSTEC AI scholars program. Providing a platform to AI companies in BIMSTEC countries in the form of a workshop or a startup summit would further allow cross-order exchange of ideas and facilitate a young and vibrant regional AI innovation ecosystem.
Secondly, collaborating on AI could help BIMSTEC members collectively address issues in critical sectors. For context, BIMSTEC has 7 priority โsectorsโ of cooperation, which have further sub-sectors. Coordination between members on the use of AI technologies in key sectors such as agriculture, connectivity, and disaster management (sub-sector under security) would be highly beneficial. The 2nd BIMSTEC ministerial meeting on Agriculture called for coordination in using โnew agriculture technology, including artificial intelligenceโ, and such efforts across each of the sectors would make the Bay of Bengal region a hub for incorporating emerging technologies into critical sectors. This, in turn, would also prove attractive to investors.
Thirdly, AI safety and cooperation are relatively non-political subjects, making cooperation easier. Naturally, issues related to security or even economic integration tend to be harder to build consensus around, due to the potentially politically divergent objectives of members in these areas. A number of security-related conventions and agreements in BIMSTEC have taken a long time to finalise, or have seen really slow progress. In contrast, AI is a relatively less contentious issue. Agreeing on the broad tenets of AI safety, or technology transfer of low-risk Artificial Intelligence, is unlikely to elicit much opposition. Since all the countries within BIMSTEC are developing nations, they also largely share the dilemma of balancing AI for economic growth with regulation to ensure AI safety.
Photo by Amar Preciado: https://www.pexels.com/photo/detailed-vintage-globe-showing-south-asia-region-30792665/
Finally, AI-oriented collaboration is logistically plausible if the existing measures under the technology sub-sector can be leveraged effectively. Currently, technology is a sub-sector under the broader science, technology, and innovation sector, which is led by Sri Lanka. Under this sub-sector, the Technology Transfer Facility (TTF) can be particularly useful in the context of AI collaboration. The mandate of the TTF (defined in an MoA signed in 2022) should be modified to include Artificial Intelligence. Following this, it can run โdiagnostic studiesโ to assess the AI needs of each member state. Then, this information can be used by the TTF to provide targeted recommendations for AI-related technology transfer between member states. Additionally, the BIMSTEC Expert Group on Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) Cooperation, which has previously met in 2023 and 2024, could focus on broader objectives. The expert group should gear its third meeting towards addressing the potential of establishing a BIMSTEC framework on AI safety. This would help harmonise the currently divergent AI regulatory approaches undertaken by member states. In this vein, a prudent area to focus on would be to recommend that all the member states set up AI Safety Institutes to become part of the global AISI network, with India having decided to set up an AISI earlier this year.
Keeping all of this in mind, it is fair to conclude that collaboration on AI can serve as an effective path to increased regional cooperation in South Asia. In particular, BIMSTEC should consider increasing its focus on AI, in terms of both discourse and funding. After all, coordinating approaches to AI would be beneficial for member states in terms of both economic and security considerations, while also providing a relatively non-political area of cooperation. The future can be a bright one for South Asia, provided it works together to embrace the technologies that define it.
By Alessia Maira and Francesco Pagano - Culture, Society & Security Desk
Disclaimer: This article edited by Alessia Maira and Francesco Pagano, draws directly from findings of the project โContemporary Patterns of Terrorist Threats Targeting Cultural Heritage - Mapping Drivers and Trends of Terror Crimes against Cultural Heritageโ The text below reflects key insights, data, and recommendations outlined in the report, recently released _[See document]_ offering a synthesised and accessible overview for a broader audience.
Introduction
In recent decades, the protection of tangible cultural heritage has garnered increasing international attention, not only as a matter of historical preservation but also as a pressing political and legal concern. From the looting of ancient artefacts, to the deliberate destruction of monuments during armed conflict, cultural heritage is under threat on multiple fronts. These acts are not only symbolic, as they often represent deeper efforts to erase collective memory, weaken identities, and fund criminal or extremist activity.
Amidst efforts to protect cultural heritage, the challenge of prosecution and jurisdictional issues exacerbate the already complex environment of international and domestic heritage conservation and protection. The global nature of cultural heritage crimes, including trafficking, looting, terrorism, and destruction, further complicates the legal landscape. While the international community has made efforts to address these challenges through conventions and agreements, such as the UNESCO 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property and the UNIDROIT 1995 Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, the implementation and enforcement of these agreements vary widely among signatory states, leading to inconsistent levels of protection and prosecution. In many countries, inadequate legal frameworks struggle to keep pace with the continuous threats, leaving cultural heritage even more vulnerable. Differing national laws and enforcement mechanisms can hinder cross-border cooperation in prosecuting offenders and repatriating stolen artefacts. One prominent example is the difficulty in prosecuting traffickers of looted antiquities, as the illicit trade in cultural heritage often involves complex networks of smugglers, dealers, and buyers operating across multiple countries, platforms, and jurisdictions. This fragmentation renders tracing the origin of looted items and holding perpetrators accountable extremely difficult. Legal loopholes, varying security priorities, corruption, and insufficient penalties in some jurisdictions may fail to effectively deter criminal activities.
Barriers to the prosecution of cultural heritage crimes
Prosecuting individuals involved in cultural heritage crimes poses significant challenges, especially in active war zones. These crimes, which as mentioned include the deliberate destruction of cultural sites, the illicit trafficking of artefacts, and looting, are committed by various actors, including terrorist organisations, insurgent groups, and opportunistic criminals. The seriousness of such offences lies in their impact on the collective identity, history, and values of affected communities. However, achieving successful investigations and prosecutions remains difficult, owing to multiple factors.
Firstly, the complexities of gathering evidence in conflict zones are the most relevant issue. War-torn areas are often inaccessible, making it difficult and extremely unsafe for investigators to collect physical evidence or conduct thorough site inspections. Additionally, the chaotic nature of active conflict zones means that evidence could be easily hidden, tampered with, or destroyed, complicating efforts to build a solid case. Secondly, the investigation of cultural heritage crimes remains insufficient and often deprioritised. Such failures can be attributed to limited resources and expertise dedicated to these cases, sometimes combined with a lack of evidence. Law enforcement agencies and judicial bodies prioritise other pressing issues, such as immediate threats to human life and national security, leaving cultural heritage protection under-resourced.
Trafficking networks and the demand-side of tangible artefacts
The threats faced by cultural heritage are primarily demand-oriented. This demand prompts the formation of creative and discrete networks through which objects are smuggled out of their home territory into the hands of private collectors. The methods and players involved in those collections are diverse. Looters could be terrorist groups like ISIS, organised criminal gangs, or traffickers, helped by facilitators (e.g., unaware or corrupt law enforcement officers who do not prioritise cultural heritage removal and smuggling). Nonetheless, they effortlessly find markets, not only due to the pre-existing demand for these artefacts but also through easily accessible platforms such as eBay and other online marketplaces. These channels, often lacking strict oversight, facilitate the discreet sale of looted items to unsuspecting or complicit buyers. Looted items are smuggled into private collectorsโ hands through traffic networks, freeports, and porous borders. Underlying motivations for engaging in the looting and destruction of cultural heritage are often opportunistic, driven by factors such as terrorism, political instability, inadequate legislation, lack of policy prioritisation, or the need to fund political causes and alleviate economic hardship.
The way forward
Addressing the intricate issues surrounding the prosecution, regulation, and jurisdictional challenges in cultural heritage protection necessitates a multifaceted approach. While international conventions like the UNESCO 1970 Convention and the UNIDROIT 1995 Convention lay essential groundwork, their implementation and enforcement remain inconsistent across signatory states. This inconsistency undermines the efficiency of protective efforts, highlighting the imperative to strengthen legal frameworks at both the national and international levels, particularly given the dynamic, transnational nature of cultural heritage crimes and the heightened impact of cyberspace. The complex and fragmented networks involved in the illicit trade of cultural heritage objects demand more robust cross-border cooperation, including harmonised legal frameworks, improved information sharing, and coordinated law enforcement activities. For instance, the difficulties in prosecuting traffickers of looted antiquities often stem from varied national laws and enforcement mechanisms, which impede effective cross-border action. Addressing these discrepancies through stronger international partnerships and agreements can significantly improve the efficacy of global heritage protection efforts.
Pixabay image by Nguyen Hoang Thach
Finally, addressing the demand side of the illicit trade in cultural heritage is essential. Implementing stricter regulations on the procurement and sale of cultural heritage objects, coupled with robust monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, could deter demand, and thus illegal trade. Additionally, promoting research and public awareness about the ethical implications of acquiring looted artefacts could reduce the demand. Education campaigns aimed at collectors and institutions about the provenance and legality of cultural items can play a significant role in curbing the market for illicitly obtained artefacts.
In conclusion, the protection of cultural heritage against illicit trade and destruction requires comprehensive legal reforms, international cooperation, active participation from civil society, and stringent regulation of the demand market. By addressing these multifaceted challenges through a coordinated approach, significant progress can be made in safeguarding the world's tangible cultural heritage for future generations.
The hope for a political transition toward civilian rule in Mali, already uncertain, now appears increasingly remote. Ranked 9th on the International Rescue Committee's 2025 Emergency Watchlist, Mali, in a national and regional context of profound insecurity and instability, now finds itself on the brink of renewed unrest.
Amid a protracted humanitarian crisis that has plagued the country for decades, recent steps towards the consolidation of military authority have sparked growing discontent among the population, triggering what observers have described as rare and unexpected mass protests. For many Malians already contending with the rising threat of terrorism, forced displacement, economic hardship, and frequent abuses by military forces, the dissolution of political parties is seen as a significant setback for democratic governance and a further postponement of the much-promised return to the ballot box.
Recent developments and the status of political governance
In a series of rapid developments, Maliโs military government appears to be steering the country further away from a possible return to civilian-led governance. On 13 May, through a presidential decree broadcast on national television, General Assimi Goรฏta dissolved all political parties and prohibited meetings between political organizations. The decree also repealed the 2005 Charter of Political Parties, a fundamental document for the country's multiparty system that outlined legal guarantees for party formation, political engagement, and public financing. With its abrogation, This move has raised concerns about the future of political pluralism in Mali.
This decision followed the countryโs first major anti-government demonstrations since the 2021 coup, which erupted on May 3 and 4, 2025. Just days earlier, on 29 April, a national political conference in Bamako, boycotted by all major political parties, named Goรฏta president with a renewable five-year term and called for the dissolution of political parties. Malians took to the streets in a rare act ofdefiance. The protests were significant, especially given that the 2020 mass mobilisations had paved the way for the first coup of that same year.
That initial takeover ousted President Ibrahim Boubacar Keรฏta, but within a year, Goรฏta had overthrown the transitional civilian leadership, an event widely referred to as a โcoup within a coupโ. Among the protest movements that had enabled the earlier transition, was the June 5 MovementโRally of Patriotic Forces (M5-RFP), whose leadership was largely excluded from the first transitional cabinet. In an effort to broaden support, Goรฏta appointed Choguel Kokalla Maรฏga, a prominent M5-RFP figure, as prime minister in June 2021. Yet this quickly proved to be a symbolic and strategic gesture, as Maรฏga had little real power and was eventually removed once his public criticism of the junta intensified.
Maรฏga's criticism focused partly on the lack of clarity around the end of the transition period. This is not the first time political activity has been suspended near the end of a transition period. The last such suspension occurred in April 2024, when the elections scheduled for the beginning of that year were cancelled with the pretext of maintaining public order. This pattern has led to observations that the military leadership may be seeking to extend its tenure by limiting political engagement. Other demonstrations, initially scheduled for Friday 9 May, were postponed after the junta issued a new decree on 7 May suspending all political activities โuntil further noticeโ.
Humanitarian conditions between conflict, climate, and governance challenges
Over the past five years of military rule, the country has not only continued to suffer from insecurity and instability, but the worsening of the humanitarian crisis has become stark and widely reported by international organisations. Contrary to the juntaโs claims that blame the United Nations peacekeeping mission, MINUSMA, for failures in counterterrorism operations, data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and the Global Conflict Tracker indicate that attacks by extremist armed groups have doubled since the junta seized power and international peacekeeping forces withdrew.
The 2025 Global Humanitarian Overview estimates that 6.4 million people in Mali are currently in need of humanitarian assistance. According to the latest Displacement Tracking Matrix, at least 378,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) were recorded as of September 2024, showing an 84% increase from the previous year. Meanwhile, over 819,000 people are expected to face crisis-level food insecurity between June and August 2025, according to ACAPS. Climate change has further intensified these challenges: in 2024, unprecedented severe floods affected an estimated 370,000 people across the country.
The suppression of civic spaces
The humanitarian situation has coincided with increasing restrictions on political and civil rights. Recent actions, including the dissolution of political parties and suspension of political activity, are part of a broader trend of reduced civic space. Since seizing power, the military authorities have systematically restricted civil liberties by banning protests, there have been reports of pressure and harassement on human rights defenders, journalists, and civil society actors.
In 2023, Freedom House classified Mali as โNot Freeโ, citing serious limitations on political pluralism and civil society, especially due to the country's repeated failure to hold elections, while centralising great power in military hands. The Media Foundation for West Africa reported at least ten cases of harassment or arbitrary arrest of journalists between 2022 and 2024, while Amnesty International, in its latest Annual Report, denounced regular resort to enforced disappearances and unlawful detentions as tools to suppress opposition.
On 9 May 2025, the countryโs media regulatory authority banned the French broadcaster TV5Monde, accusing it of making "defamatory remarks" in its coverage of the pro-democracy protests. This followed similar actions against other international media outlets, such as France 24 and Radio France Internationale (RFI), both of which have long been blocked. Journalists working inside the country face similar repression. Alfousseini Togo, for instance, was arrested in April 2025 after publishing a report critical of the Ministry of Justice. He was charged with defamation, disturbing public order, and โundermining the credibility of the judiciary,โ and remained in prison until his provisional release on May 12 2025. According to Human Rights Watch, in June 2024, twelve members of the country's main opposition coalition were arrested. Similarly, in December 2024, Ibrahim Nabi Togola, the president of the opposition party New Vision for Mali, was abducted, as was Daouda Magassa in February 2025 a member of the CMSA (Coordination of Movements, Associations, and Supporters of Imam Mahmoud Dicko), which had been dissolved in March 2024.
Conclusion
The latest actions of General Goita's transitional government have raised concerns about the direction of Mali's democratic framework. In line with broader regional developments across the Sahel, the country's trajectory appears to be moving toward a more centralised form of governance, rather than progressing toward an elected civilian administration.
The political transition once promised to Malians is no longer a possibility under the current regime. As the government strengthens its control, concerns have been raised about the implications for key aspects of human security, including freedom, safety, and dignity. The population faces escalating violence, hunger, displacement and economic hardship with no meaningful democratic avenues left to voice their needs. Mali is not only battling worsening insecurity, but also undergoing a systematic erosion of rights that exacerbates the humanitarian emergency. The country's current trajectory, similar to developments in Niger, for example, reflects a regional pattern of military-led governance that presents complex challenges for addressing the needs of citizens and advancing peace and security. Without sustained engagement from regional and international stakeholders, growing public frustration may be met with additional restrictions, potentially intensifying the crisis and limiting opportunities for peaceful political progress.
By Camilla Braito (Russia Desk) & Vismantฤ Eลพerskytฤ (European Affairs and UK Desk)
Introduction
As of today, negotiations involving the United States, Russia, and the European Union over the war in Ukraine remain ongoing but face substantial obstacles. Ukrainian and Russian delegations met again in Istanbul for a second round of peace talks focused on securing a ceasefire to bring an end to the conflict started in February 2022. This scenario highlights the vital role of leadership- the ability to make decisions, earn trust, and pursue common goals, especially in non-routine matters like war and peace. Incorporating leadership analysis into the study of negotiation dynamics enriches traditional explanations that rely solely on military power or systemic constraints. This piece examines how leadership styles influence negotiations regarding the war in Ukraine through two key frameworks developed by Margaret Hermann and Joseph Nye, as well as Ilana Zohar's work on the leadership skills necessary for effective negotiations in times of crisis.
Leadership Styles in Theory
Building on earlier typologies, Hermann identifies four leadership styles based on handling constraints, processing external information, and motivation: activist, strategic, pragmatic, and opportunist. Each includes two subtypes, from power-seeking expansionists to consensus-building accommodators, reflecting varying openness to internal challenge, context, and goal orientation in shaping leadership behaviour.
Nyeโs framework defines leadership through inspirational, transactional, and contextual competencies. Leaders vary by goals (transformative or conservative), influence (transforming or directive), and power use (soft or hard). Inspirational leaders attract through vision and values; transactional ones rely on coercion. These categories often overlap as leaders adjust according to evolving environments.
For our analysis, it is also essential to understand what negotiations entail. These are voluntary processes to resolve conflicts through communication, either one-time or ongoing. Negotiations involve various tactics - brutal, time-related, authority-based, persuasive, and soft - and styles: competitive, cooperative, and integrative. Effective negotiators adapt tactics, manage emotions, and choose principled or positional approaches to seek mutually beneficial or win-lose outcomes.
Leadership and Negotiation in the Ukraine War: Trump, Putin, Macron
Since 2022, the war in Ukraine has revealed how leadership styles influence the direction of conflict and the viability of negotiation. Donald Trump, now back in office, exhibits a directive-pragmatic style in Hermannโs framework, personality-driven, disregardful of institutions, and focused on personal control over outcomes. According to Nyeโs classification, he is transactional and relies on hard power, threat-making, and media optics. In his 2024 campaign, Trump stated he would end the war โwithin 24 hoursโ through direct talks with Putin. When no progress was observed, he revised his position, claiming the war โbelongs to Biden, Zelenskyy, and Putin.โ His White House press conference with JD Vance and Zelenskyy drew significant media attention and controversy with Vance attacking the Ukrainian president while Trump stood by. Although relations were later smoothed at the Vatican, the episode showcased Trumpโs preference for performance over diplomacy. He later revealed a call with Moscow, only to suggest that Putin might not want to end the war, adding to strategic ambiguity rather than offering a solution-oriented direction. His style has been viewed by some analysts as prioritising personal visibility over institutional coordination.
Vladimir Putin, meanwhile, operates with an activist-expansionist orientation, challenging domestic constraints, filtering external data, and pursuing goals often described as ideological and revisionist. Since 2022, he has instrumentalised hard power and coercive diplomacy to destabilise Ukraine and reshape European security. Though he publicly agreed to a ceasefire in 2024, Russian forces continued striking Ukrainian cities. Putin consistently denied these violations, instead accusing Ukraine of breaking the truce. His approach fits Nyeโs transactional category, using strategic escalation and blame deflection to control the narrative. In one instance, Putin was onstage at a public event when informed that Trump was on the line. He calmly told the moderator he wasnโt in a hurry, signalling self-confidence and dominance in contrast to Western volatility.
Emmanuel Macron presents a starkly different model. Classified as pragmatic-consultative by Hermann, he values institutional process and contextual understanding. In early 2022, he made multiple high-profile visits to Moscow and Kyiv, attempting to keep diplomatic channels open even as tensions escalated. Though criticised for engaging with Putin too long, his efforts showed commitment to negotiation, de-escalation, and European agency. His leadership style aligns with Nyeโs transformational visionโforward-looking, cooperative, and rooted in values-based persuasion. However, its effectiveness has been limited by the dominance of zero-sum postures from both Trump and Putin.
Picture generated by AI
Leadership styles and negotiation tactics: recommendations based on the analysis
Different leadership styles shape negotiation approaches and can explain friction in trilateral or multilateral talks. While Trump and Putin focus on dominance and short-term gains, Macron pursues calibrated, integrative solutions, making him a diplomatic outlier.
To advance negotiations to end the Ukraine war, it is vital to tailor tactics to these leadership profiles. Putinโs coercive, revisionist style requires a mix of firm deterrents and incremental principled negotiation. Early hard measures help set boundaries, but must avoid provoking defensiveness. Active listening is key, not to legitimise propaganda but to uncover underlying strategic goals. Indirect or mediated talks, like the June Turkey talks, can reduce zero-sum dynamics and ease tensions.
Unpredictability, delays, and unilateral moves mark Trumpโs transactional, anti-institutional style. Negotiations with him should combine persuasion (offering symbolic wins) with cooperative, face-saving compromises. Building a personal connection while appealing to national pride and political advantage is crucial.
In contrast, Macronโs transformative, institutional leadership supports integrative strategies grounded in shared values and multilateral legitimacy. His willingness to listen and build consensus helps counterbalance more confrontational styles.
Conclusion
This analysis shows that while Trump and Putin are both directive and goal-driven, they diverge significantly in approach: Trumpโs leadership is pragmatic and transactional, shaped by optics and personalism; Putinโs leadership is often described as activist and expansionist, using centralised authority and assertive tactics, with expansionist elements. In contrast, Macron is described as a pragmatic-consultative leader who emphasises transformational goals through diplomacy, institutional cooperation, and long-term reform.
Recognising the dynamic interplay between leadership styles and negotiation phases allows for better timing and selection of moves, hopefully informing more effective crisis resolution. Especially in ongoing, high-stakes international negotiations such as those regarding Ukraine, success depends less on fixed rules and more on contextual intelligence, emotional regulation, and the strategic capability to adjust tactics according to the counterpartโs motivation and behaviour patterns beyond surface-level display of force and hardline rhetoric.
