News Archives – Page 3 of 21

November 6, 2023 — No Comments

Israel’s Possible War Scenarios: From a Temporarily Restrained Conflict to a Prolonged All-out War

Author: Omri Brinner - Middle East Team

With the beginning of its ground invasion into the Gaza Strip, Israel is at a crossroads it hoped it wouldn’t be in. It can be argued that any route Israel would take in this historic intersection would lead to regional escalation, even if only in the long-run. It is safe to assume, then, that even if there is no immediate backlash to the Israeli ground invasion, another front, sooner or later, will follow.

The most popular Israeli approach in responding to the October 7 Hamas attack is that the IDF’s infantry and armored brigades would invade the Gaza Strip, backed by heavy artillery, actionable intelligence, and preceded by intense aerial bombardment (as is happening). Israel, it has been argued, must respond forcefully, or else it would project to its enemies that it would refrain from war at all costs.

The ground invasion itself is meant to root out Hamas from the Gaza Strip and to disable its military capabilities. The other objective is the release of the 239 Israeli and foreign hostages, most of whom are civilians. Ideally – from Israel's point of view – the IDF would achieve its goals in the Gaza Strip without having to fight on another front simultaneously, as its capabilities in fighting multiple fronts at the same time are limited, and such a scenario will necessitate Israel to change its objectives. However, this is the least likely scenario. Total victory against Hamas is not guaranteed – and even unlikely within the limits of military power – and the ground operation can last for months. What is more likely is that Israel would embark on a limited ground incursion (due to American pressure and the possibility of another front elsewhere), achieve some tactical victories against Hamas, and will force a ceasefire on better conditions – which would lead to the release of some hostages (most likely women, children, and the elderly). However, the restrained war efforts in Gaza will surely be followed by war and terror on other fronts, and possibly simultaneously.

One ongoing front is in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, where Hamas, armed militias, and lone-wolf terrorists take arms against Israeli civilians and security personnel. At the time of the Hamas attack on October 7, most of the IDF was stationed in the West Bank, demonstrating its symbolic and strategic importance to Israel. The latter would have to react forcefully to any significant development there. It is in Hamas’ interest to start a new intifada in the West Bank, and possibly in Israeli cities, in order to destabilize and weaken Israel.

The other ongoing front, where Israel might face a full-scale war, is from the north. Hezbollah, with its arsenal of 150,000 projectiles (of close, medium, and long range) and army of approximately 100,000 soldiers, most of whom are well-trained and with some battle experience, pose a strategic threat – even bigger than the one Hamas poses.

Thus far, Hezbollah – which is backed by Iran and serves as its most strategic proxy in the region – has been reacting to Israel’s limited ground invasion, albeit with restraint. While Hezbollah needs to show it is committed to the Palestinian cause, it aims to avoid an all-out war with Israel.

*Source: https://twitter.com/IDFSpokesperson/status/1721014635623522767/photo/4*

According to Israeli calculation, an all-out war is not fully in Hezbollah’s interests, nor is it in Iran’s. According to this theory, both Iran and Hezbollah would rather open an all-out war with Israel only once Iran guarantees applicable nuclear military capabilities, which, in the long run, seems inevitable. This means that from Israel’s point of view – and contrary to the best-case scenario described above – it would be better for Israel to engage with Hezbollah and Iran before the latter becomes a nuclear power.

Israel, then, might choose to attack Hezbollah and either drag it into the war – and by so eliminating the surprise element of Hezbollah’s reaction – or, if Hezbollah chooses not to retaliate, to reestablish its deterrence up north. While it may seem like an act of self harm, the Israeli public would view a Hezbollah surprise attack as another failure of the government, IDF, Shin Bet and Mossad. In a way, then, these institutions hope to project to the public that Israel is on the front foot, and that if a war with Hezbollah and Iran is inevitable in the long run, then better now than later. It is important to note that while Israel calculates that the two Shia powers would rather avoid an all-out war prior to Iran’s nuclearization, Israel’s working assumption that Hamas was deterred and would have opted to avoid an armed conflict fell apart with the October 7 attack. Therefore, there are no guarantees that any theory that existed before the attack is still relevant.

Would Iran and Hezbollah wait peacefully for an Israeli strike, or for it to finish its fighting in Gaza? Unlikely. From their point of view, Iran and Hezbollah are happy to let Israel keep guessing whether they would join the war or not. From Israel’s standpoint, it cannot afford to be surprised again. While it is less likely that there would be a ground invasion from the north following the one from the Gaza Strip on October 7, an extensive missile attack on central Israel would be just as bad.

But initiating war with Hezbollah – and Iran – would force the US into the conflict, as it would be extremely challenging – on the verge of impossible – for Israel to conduct an all-out war with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran simultaneously. At the same time, if US forces end up fighting alongside Israel, then it is likely that other Iranian allies would occupy the US forces elsewhere in the region (such as in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria). While a recent poll shows that the vast majority of Americans are against US military involvement in the Middle East, the US would feel it has to protect its allies and interests in the region.

It seems, then, that the region is ahead of a long period – whether months or years – of an armed conflict.

November 2, 2023 — No Comments

Airborne Insurgents: the Pluralization of Airpower Through Drones

Author: Michele Puggia - Military Strategy and Intelligence Team

Introduction

The images of the massacre at the Supernova music festival near the Re'im kibbutz at the hands of Hamas are those that, in the public eye, marked the start of the ongoing hostilities between Israel and Gaza. These images are well-known as they are tragic. Even so, some of them, depicting the peculiarity of the attack, might raise some interesting questions concerning the capabilities of violent non-state actors (VNSA). Some of the pictures, along with Hamas's propaganda videos, have, in fact, shown the militants using motorised paragliders to swoop on the festival. While by no means sophisticated in terms of technology, these creative tactics, capitalising on the (limited) use of airspace, might be cause for concern.

Naturally, paragliders are just one small piece of the puzzle. VNSAs have been using air assets for quite some time now. The Tamil Air Tigers, for example, in 2007 used small commercial fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters to conduct successful night raids on Sri Lankan military objectives. But the most relevant "new" tool in air warfare, is undoubtedly the drone.

In another ITSS article by Danilo dalle Fave, the strategic utility of the use of drones by a nation such as Iran was underlined. In this article, the aim will be that of diving into the potential risks that these devices pose when in the hands of insurgents, and violent extremists.

Emerging Threat Scenarios

Commercial drones are cheap and replaceable, they don't require particular training, and radars have a hard time picking them out because of their small size, slow speed, and low flight path. And even when they are identified by an air-defence system, in many cases their destruction requires the use of expensive missiles, that are each worth many times more than a single drone; it then becomes clear how easy it could be to swarm and overload such systems.

Military-grade drones clearly represent a bigger threat in terms of destructive potential, but due to their cost and complexity, they are limited to those VNSAs with a sponsor state; relevant examples of these are Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthi rebels, all of which seem to have received drones from Iran or were aided in their development. Also, procurement of these drones, which are subject to regulations and restrictions, by VNSAs might still prove complex, which limits the main strength of drones such as the Shahed-136, which relies on its high numbers to overwhelm enemy defences.

Broadly speaking, the use of drones by VNSAs has provided these groups with cheap access to intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR), and also to ordnance delivery. ISIL has been particularly prolific in this endeavour. Without sponsor-states providing them with higher-end capabilities, they have been using commercial drones to gather intelligence and create propaganda material since their inception. During the battle of Mosul, for example, they used drones to boost their C2 capabilities by spotting enemy roadblocks and re-directing vehicle-borne suicide bombers to their targets. They had been so effective that US Special Operations Commander General Raymond Thomas admitted that, for a time, ISIL enjoyed tactical superiority in the city's airspace. It seems fair to point out that this, albeit being a successful tactic, didn't prevent ISIL from losing Mosul.

In October 2016, ISIL also managed to kill 2 peshmerga fighters thanks to a booby-trapped drone that had been shot down. Drones have been since also adapted to carry and deliver small bombs, so as not to require the destruction of the drone itself.

These kinds of threats might seriously affect future battlefields. Force protection in insurgencies could become increasingly more complex, limiting troops' mobility and increasing the costs of operations. The impact of unpredictable drone attacks from above on morale would also be considerable.

Nonetheless, these new threats are unfortunately not exclusive to battlefields. Aside from also being able to threaten rear bases and supply lines, drones bring new challenges also to states not at war. Transnational terrorist groups might in fact easily use commercial drones to scale up the number of victims of their attacks against the civilian population. It is not hard to imagine how much more devastating a coordinated attack, such as that of the Bataclan, would be if carried out with a number of explosive drones engaging intervening law enforcement officers. Amateur videos on the internet additionally show the possibility of fitting guns directly on drones. This would further increase the operational spectrum of terrorist and insurgent cells at home and abroad.

*Source:* https://unsplash.com/it/foto/drone-quad-helicoptere-blanc-et-noir-ramqoN2kiuo

Defensive Prospects

One element is important to consider though. Until today, no drone attack, be it terrorist or against military forces, has led to the potentially catastrophic consequences envisioned by many experts. As a matter of fact, a report of the ICCThas found that among all VNSAs in the Middle East that use drones, none have, for example, mounted guns on their drones. "Suicide" and "bomber" drones have managed to achieve always limited results. Hamas has also failed to use its drones effectively against Israel, even when benefitting from Iran's expertise.

This might show that operating even simple commercial drones and rigging them for offensive purposes is more complex than it may seem. Besides, it is important to remember that the resources of these actors are not limitless, and while drones may be cheap, their use, maintenance, and weaponisation would require resources that won't be spent elsewhere, boby-trapping homes, producing roadside IEDs, buying weapons and so on.

Furthermore, millions are being spent on research for anti-drone technology. From directed energy weapons, to jamming guns and electronic warfare systems. And other, already-existing systems have proven to be moderately effective at countering drones without bringing a nation to bankruptcy; Ukrainian flak-guns and American CRAMs are two such examples.

Not all of these tools will fit all contexts, after all, it would be quite picturesque to imagine European landmarks such as Alexanderplatz or the Champs-Elysées protected by patriot or laser batteries. Law enforcement will need different tactics and tools than those needed by deployed military personnel.

The accessibility and unpredictability of drone use by malicious actors remain a relevant threat. As Chavez notes then, it might become more effective to focus counter-drone efforts on intelligence, and supply chain disruption that represent (even if in different forms) tools and pathways available to both the military and the civilian world.

October 30, 2023 — No Comments

Violence against women in the cyber domain – the impact of covid and what still needs to be done?

Author: Maria Makurat (Human Rights Team), with a contribution from Julia Hodgins (Culture, Society & Security Team)

Introduction

Physical violence against women is a topic that is being addressed by several institutions and organizations but what about the cyber domain? Cyber violence is not a new concept but the coronavirus pandemic has brought about new challenges and one has even seen a surge of the issue. This was discussed by UN Women in a report stating that the Covid pandemic had an impact on online harassment. This drew attention to women experiencing online harassment which can have lasting detrimental effects. This article explores the developing issue of violence against women in the cyber-domain by first considering various definitions to then highlighting case studies by looking at reports, literature and case studies in order to suggest possible questions that remain.

Defining violence against women in the cyber domain

Firstly, one needs to define what violence against women in the cyber domain entails. In the past years, there have been several definitions by scholars, institutions and organizations. It makes it challenging since what exactly do “aggression” and “violence” such as “hate speech” in the cyber domain mean? The discourse surrounding finding a definition of online gender-based violence shows that a strong debate exists however, as technology evolves, wider definitions are needed to include all forms of online violence.

When considering violence against women in the cyber-domain, then one automatically wonders what is “violent” in this case? Traditional international relations theories surrounding violence have been around for a while. Finlay for instance points out that one should not only consider “violence” by itself but extend it to “violent agency” with the following components: “defined first by a double intention (1) to inflict harm using a technique chosen (2) to eliminate or evade the target’s means of escaping it or defending against it. Second, the harms it aims at are destructive (as opposed to appropriative).”

Looking further at “aggression” and “violence” in relation to cyber, defining said terms has its challenges. "Defining “aggression” is a complex, in and itself controversial endeavour, as it relates to a tense exchange between at least two actors. Complexity grows as, increasingly often, aggressions become invisible - or blurry at the very least. Complications keep growing when the subject is situated in the scope of gender relations. Still now worldwide, at varying degrees, physical violence against women remains officialised, i.e., state violence exerted by the Iranian Moral Police to ‘rein in’ female transgressors is legal and inconsequential. Complications exponentially increase when translating gender relations into cyberspace, due to both inherent challenges of cyberspace (obscureness, non-territoriality/territoriality, low threshold for entry and exit, easy concealment) and the assumption of cyber being at least gender-neutral, if not male-dominated by default. Nevertheless, constructivism suggests that security is not neutral as social factors (ethnicity, gender, age, nationality, class, etc.) allocate power, and power between actors underpins exchanges, particularly aggressions. To define aggression, exchanges are often de-constructed, and contrasted to a threshold set under the influence of power stances, perceived vulnerabilities, and mindsets about the actors in question."(contribution by Julia Hodgins).

There seems to be growing concern about online violence against female journalists and a need for guidelines on how to monitor, and evaluate this issue. This can be highlighted by looking at the recent guidelines and a report published by the OSCE in 2023 which provides a definition of what exactly “gender-based online violence” in relation to female journalists means: “sexist and misogynistic involving frequently threats of physical and/or sexual violence; sexualized abuse and harassment; digital privacy and security breaches that can expose identifying information and exacerbate offline safety threats facing the target; and networked or mob harassment.” (…) often bound with gendered disinformation.” Furthermore, the OSCE identifies eight features of gender-based online violence: misogynistic, frequently networked, it radiates, it is intimate, it can be extreme, behave like ‘networked gaslighting’, extreme in intersectional discrimination and contains disinformation.

Looking at definitions discussed by scholars, Lews, Rowe and Wiper looked at the issue from a criminology point of view stating that there are gaps in the literature and a “failure to develop a robust gendered analysis, a lack of comparative analysis of online and offline VAWG and a lack of victimological examination of online abuse experienced by women and girls.” A press release by the European Council in November 2021 stated again, that one needs clearer definitions of what online gender-based violence means in order to then have more concise laws put in place. The recommendation states that one should define the issue as “the digital dimension of violence against women.”

The latest definition by UN Women defines online-violence against women as follows: “Technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TF GBV) is any act that is committed, assisted, aggravated or amplified by the use of information communication technologies or other digital tools which results in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological, social, political or economic harm or other infringements of rights and freedoms.” Notably this definition extends the scope in order to include any act in relation to online violence.

As one can see, definitions are still being worked out and this is also an essential process when wanting to put stronger laws in place. States need international definitions in order to also have joint measurements against online violence. In the following, case studies of online violence will be highlighted to discuss the still pressing-issue.

Case studies of online-violence and future concerns

The issue of violence against women in the cyber-domain started very early and continues to be a growing threat and pressing issue today. Gurumurthy and Menon highlighted the said issue in 2009. They point out women (in India for example) having been filmed during rape and then posted on social-media platforms in order to maintain the cycle of violence. Another issue they discuss is that women have committed suicide in Kerala as a result of online harassment causing a stir in discussions.

UN Women released a report in 2015, stating that urgent action needs to be taken in order to combat violence against women in the cyber domain. The report calls out the failure of implementing sustainable goals and achievements in reducing online violence against women and proposes that one needs better sanctions, a sensitization by implementing trainings and campaigns to change social attitudes as well as a more responsible internet infrastructure. Despite these reports, one has seen a significant impact of the corona pandemic on online violence against women. Reports have shown that women experience an increasing amount of online violence: “Cyber harassment and cyberbullying have increased by 50% during quarantine in Australia. Simultaneously, the United Kingdom data shows that the number of complaints about visual sexual harassment doubled in March 2020.”

*Source: Photo by Joshua Gandara on Unsplash*

Online violence against women is very complex and many factors play a role which means, tackling the issue needs sustainable goals that also address several factors. There is growing concern about violence against women working in politics or other public sectors. Women who express their opinions online very often receive violent threats and are coerced into retreating from the public sector and keeping a low profile. Articles and reports state that there is even a concern about women retreating from the political sector. Moreover, there seems to be a relation between crisis and gender-based violence and the consummation of online porn. The Government Equalities Office has released research on the relation between pornography use and harmful sexual attitudes and behaviors. The reports come to the conclusion that pornography is one of the factors that “contribute to a permissive and conducive context that allows harmful sexual attitudes and behaviours to exist against women and girls.”

If one has been developing better definitions and implanting debates, then why does the issue continue to be a growing concern? These concerns and trends show that one needs stronger initiatives, sanctions, and focused debates to tackle the issue at hand. In the following, it will be briefly highlighted what projects have been launched to tackle online violence.

What are some initiatives?

UN Women launched 2020 a project called “Fireflies Campaign against Gender-Based Cyber Violence.” The campaign specifically addressed the issue of online gender-based violence during the coronavirus pandemic and had the goal to specifically use social media to draw attention to the issue and engage the public in the discourse. One of the key findings was that more women (81%) than men (70%) reported online harassment cases.

One major step that has been taken is the UK’s reform of online violence. A press release by The Government of the UK from the 23^rd of June 2023 states: “Abusers who share intimate images without consent to face up to 6 months in prison.” Also, deepfakes were criminalized for the first time which has to be considered for future debate: “For the first time, sharing of ‘deep fake’ intimate images – explicit images of videos which have been digitally manipulated to look like someone else – will also be criminalized.” The reform has the goal to facilitate the prosecution of individuals who publish intimate images without consent. Now it would be the question if other states will follow suit in placing stricter laws against cyber violence. For instance, Germany doesn’t have a specific law against cyber violence yet. They include the offences in the general law of insult or threats.

In countries such as Rwanda and Tanzania, women increasingly (have to) use the internet for work. This has also increased violence against women in the cyber-domain and calls for the need for better laws and safer realms. An initiative called Women@web helps “journalists, politicians, and human rights activists, among others, who have been confronted with various forms of gender-based online violence.” It is stated again that ever since the corona pandemic, they have seen an increase in online violence. Furthermore, studies conducted by Women@web have found out that women often censor their own comments online to avoid “cyberbullying”. In order to tackle this, Women@web offers modules on: “digital rights, digital citizenship, digital platforms, digital security, digital storytelling and digital resilience. Focusing on these topics, regular training sessions are held for women in the four countries. The aim is to increase the overall digital literacy among women and empower them to remain in online spaces.”

Conclusion

These initiatives already draw a lot of attention to the issue at hand however, many questions remain such as whether the UK reform will bring other states to follow suit. Also, social media platforms such as Instagram and TikTok have started becoming stricter in their policies on what people can comment on and what not. Search engines track whether someone posts explicit language or sends explicit images. These are all measures that show steps in the right direction however the question remains, when a new crisis comes (such as the corona pandemic) will it contribute to another surge of online violence? Online violence against women is not a recent new topic but a steady emergent issue. With growing technology, women on the one hand have more access to online help lines and initiatives but on the other hand, are facing new threats such as AI in relation to ‘deepfakes’. This calls for stronger sanctions and perhaps more focused campaigns launched towards a young audience to educate on this issue and its repercussions.

October 28, 2023 — No Comments

From Knowing to the Impossibility of Not Knowing’ – Imposing International Criminal Responsibility on Human Combatants for War Crimes Committed by Autonomous Weapons

Author: Vendela Laukkanen - AI, Cyber Security & Space Team

Introduction

The United Nations Secretary-General and the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) called on States ‘to take decisive action now to protect humanity’, referring to the threat posed by autonomous weaponssystems (AWS).¹ The joint call further referred to the restrictions on certain weapons under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and elucidated the accountability of States and individuals for any violations, since impunity threatens peace and security.² This post will focus on the latter: the principal criminal responsibility of individuals when the acts of an AWS result in war crimes. The discussion will be twofold: the ethical concern of who will bear responsibility in such a scenario, followed by the legal dilemma of an ‘accountability gap’³ in front of the International Criminal Court(ICC). The definition of AI weapons for the purpose of this discussion is:

‘Any weapon system with autonomy in its critical functions—that is, a weapon system that can select… and attack… targets without human intervention’.⁴

Ethical Dilemma

To maintain peace and security, responsibility for the most egregious breaches of IHL is crucial, the bearers of such has thus far been human combatants.⁵ The purpose of criminal responsibility is firstly to ‘deter future violations’⁶, and secondly, to ensure justice for victims. In the case of AWS, the question is where such responsibility ought to be placed to satisfy both factors of criminal responsibility (deterrence and justice): the manufacturer that produced the machine; the combatant deploying the weapon; or the AWS itself?

Proponents of AWS argue that a machine will be better equipped than a human to distinguish between military targetsand civilian persons/objects⁷, it could thus be presumed that if the AWS strikes indiscriminately it is due to a malfunctioning of the system and the manufacturer ought to be responsible. However, as Sparrow claims, if the risk of mistargeting has been acknowledged to the person deploying the weapon, or, if the weapon has sufficient autonomy to act outside of the initial programming, to hold the manufacturer accountable ‘would be analogous to holding parents responsible for the actions of their children once they have left their care’.⁸ The second scenario - holding the combatant that deployed the weapon responsible is neither unproblematic, as Sparrow points out, the distinguishing factor of AWS to other weapons is its ability to choose its targets independently of human control, thus imposing responsibility on the combatant would be unfair.⁹ However, the human deploying the weapon ought to be aware of its autonomous nature -that the machine can be involved in mistargeting is therefore a foreseeable risk, leading to the argument that the combatant accepts that risk when deciding to deploy the AWS. The final scenario is to impose responsibility on the weapon itself. It must therefore be possible to punish the machine and, as Sparrow claims, make it suffer - the purpose of punishment.¹⁰ Whether a machine is able to suffer and feel remorse in a way consistent with the human idea of ‘justice has been done’, refrain from repeating the behaviour and to deter other machines from committing war crimes, is highly questionable.

Legal Dilemma

The ICC’s mission - to fight impunity for the most serious crimes, risks being undermined if AWS are deployed with little to no chance (or risk) of criminal responsibility, such ‘accountability gap’ therefore threatens to increase war crimes and destabilise the laws of war.¹¹ If we are to retain morality in war - the most plausible solution is to hold the combatant deploying the AWS responsible for grave IHL breaches, as with any other weapon. Criminal Law requires proof of mens rea (‘guilty mind’) and actus reus (‘guilty act’). The Rome Statute of the ICC requires intention and knowledge as the default mens rea¹² and the war crime of ‘intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population…’¹³ relates to the IHL rule of distinction. A combatant who intentionally and knowingly deploys an AWS incapable of functioning lawfully would be clear-cut under the ICC regime, - but the combatant deploying the AWS with the lack of knowledge and intention (acts with dolus eventualis) to attack civilian targets bestrides the accountability gap.¹⁴ However, a probative practice that allows a mental element to be inferred from conduct and circumstances with no reasonable alternative exposition¹⁵ may provide a solution. Indeed, ICC case law appears to suggest that intent:

‘...may be inferred from various factors establishing that civilians… were the object of the attack…’¹⁶; and:

‘...lack of discrimination or precaution in attack may constitute an attack against civilian targets…’¹⁷

*Source:* https://www.itssverona.it/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/5a2e5ec681cb80d9c17f3e8af8e252f1-1-e1700696117407.webp

This is also evident in the case law of other international tribunals¹⁸. As stated by the Court itself ‘…it must beestablished that in the circumstances… a reasonable person could not have believed that the individual or group… attacked was… directly participating in hostilities’¹⁹, thus shifting the mens rea analysis from the subjective state of mind of the combatant, to the objective standard of what the reasonable person must have known of the civilian status in the circumstances.²⁰ The accountability gap is therefore mitigated by establishing that it was impossible for the combatant not to have known of the civilian status of the targets, and the combatant that still deploys the AWS must therefore have intended the attack, ‘from knowing to the impossibility of not knowing’²¹.

Conclusion

This post has attempted to briefly discuss the ethical; and legal dilemmas of AI used in warfare. Whilst no simple answers exist, it is clear that if autonomous weapons are to be used in times of armed conflict - humans with the moral capacity to suffer and feel remorse must be the bearers of responsibility for war crimes. The accountability gap may be mitigated by allowing a dolus eventualis mens rea standard at the ICC, which finds support in the case law. After all, the lack of possibility of holding humans criminally responsible for war crimes committed by AWS, calls into question whether the international community is ready to abandon the laws of war and the last 25 years of fighting impunity for the most serious crimes.

¹ ICRC ‘Joint Call by the United Nations Secretary-General and the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross for States toestablish new prohibitions and restrictions on Autonomous Weapons Systems’ (icrc.org, 05 October 2023) <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/joint-call-un-and-icrc-establish-prohibitions-and-restrictions-autonomous-weapons-system s> accessed 12October 2023.

² ibid.

³ Davison, N., ‘A legal perspective: Autonomous weapon systems under international humanitarian law’ (2017) No. 30 UNODA OccasionalPapers 16.

⁴ ibid 5.

⁵ See also: Davison, N., ‘A legal perspective: Autonomous weapon systems under international humanitarian law’ (2017) No. 30 UNODAOccasional Papers 19.

⁶ ICRC ‘Joint Call by the United Nations Secretary-General and the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross for States to establishnew prohibitions and restrictions on Autonomous Weapons Systems’ (icrc.org, 05 October 2023) <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/joint-call-un-and-icrc-establish-prohibitions-and-restrictions-autonomous-weapons-system s> accessed 12October 2023.

⁷ Dawes, J., ‘The case for and against autonomous weapon systems’ (2017) 1(9) Nature Human Behaviour 613.

⁸ Sparrow, R., ‘Killer Robots’ (2007) 24(1) Journal of Applied Philosophy 70.

⁹ ibid 71.

¹⁰ ibid 72.

¹¹ See also: Dawes, J., ‘The case for and against autonomous weapon systems’ (2017) 1(9) Nature Human Behaviour 614.

¹² Rome Statute Art. 30.

¹³ Rome Statute Arts. 8(2)(b)(i), 8(2)(b)(ii) and 8(2)(e)(i).

¹⁴ See also: Davison, N., ‘A legal perspective: Autonomous weapon systems under international humanitarian law’ (2017) No. 30 UNODA Occasional Papers 16; Abhimanyu, G., ‘Autonomous cyber capabilities and individual criminal responsibility for war crimes’ (2021) AutonomousCyber Capabilities Under International Law 8.

¹⁵ See also: Abhimanyu, G., ‘Autonomous cyber capabilities and individual criminal responsibility for war crimes’ (2021) Autonomous CyberCapabilities Under International Law 10.

¹⁶ Katanga trial judgment (n 35) para 807.

¹⁷ Ntaganda trial judgment (n 35) para 921.

¹⁸ Prosecutor v Dragomir Milošević (TC) [2007] International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia IT98-29/1-T [948]. See also, Prosecutor v Stanislav Galić (AC) [2006] International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia IT-98-29-A [132]; Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaškić (TC) [2000] International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia IT-95-14-T [501–12].

¹⁹ Ntaganda trial judgment (n 35) para 921.

²⁰ Abhimanyu, G., ‘Autonomous cyber capabilities and individual criminal responsibility for war crimes’ (2021) Autonomous Cyber CapabilitiesUnder International Law 14.

²¹ Ibid 15.

October 17, 2023 — No Comments

Ecuador’s Dangerous Crossroads: Gangs, Trafficking Pathways and Future Perspectives

Authors: Shams Jouve and Isabelle Despicht - Crime, Terrorism and Extremism Team

Ecuador making headlines: brutal assassinations and increased gang violence

As of today, Ecuador is ranked as the least safe country in Latin America, finding itself in the midst of a bloody turf war, with soaring violence linked to organised crime, civil unrest as well as drug trafficking. Just a glance at the crime rate of 2021 paints a sobering picture of Ecuador's current state of affairs, revealing an alarming 79.79% increasecompared to the previous year. Fast forward to 2023, homicide rates, too, are set to increase up to 40 per 100,000 individuals.

This surge in violence was accompanied by the assassination of at least six political figures, including presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio, whose death made headlines in August 2023. The murder of Villavicencio, who previously worked as an investigative journalist and uncovered corruption cases in the country, serves as a potent symbol of the growing influence of gangs and their willingness to assert dominance and territorial control in Ecuador.

How have Ecuador's geographical location and institutional weaknesses contributed to criminal influence?

Ecuador's geographical features have long played a role in shaping trafficking routes in the region. Ecuadorian ports represent key transit points for drugs, which are then shipped to Europe and the United States. Laura Lizarazo, senior analyst for the Andean region at political risk consultancy Control Risks, explains: "The market is flooded with cocaine and criminal organisations are adapting to explore this over-production". Equally, Ecuador represents an ideal transhipment point for both human trafficking and illegal arms trade.

For decades, Ecuador was shielded from cocaine-related violence that plagued many other countries in Latin America. This was the result of various factors, among others, an agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), one of the most active armed groups in the Andes region. The FARC, a Marxist guerrilla group founded in 1961, underwent extensive shifts to finally become involved with the drug trade in Latin America in the 1990s. By 2016, it controlled a staggering 60% of the world's most productive coca crops.

Despite the aforementioned, the Ecuadorian government remained engaged with the FARC in the 2000s and 2010s. Meanwhile, the 21st century observed a phenomenal expansion of illegal trafficking and Ecuadorian gangs' influence in the area. Initially mainly governed by Mexican and Colombian cartels and mafia groups, working with local criminal entities as intermediaries, the country slowly became a key transhipment point for illegal trafficking.

New players, such as Chinese mafias in the case of human smuggling, emerged. Local criminal groups gained considerable power and organisational capabilities, including control over a considerable part of the prison system, and gang violence led to several prison massacres and an unprecedented homicide rate.

Another significant obstacle is the emergence of protection rackets, which arose out of prison gangs empowered by police intelligence. These illicit webs thrive at developing patronage networks by establishing connections with the government and accessing its resources. They frequently enlist public officials and coerce them, reaping benefits from state dismantlement. Amongst others, they have been recognised for their role in disseminating prison intelligence to purposely misinform the public.

Amid the aforementioned, several government policies over the last decades have participated in declining criminal activity through social inclusion, police reform, and innovative approaches to criminal justice, including the legalisation of several local gangs. However, public institutions remain weakened by endemic corruption, facilitating criminal activities and compromising state integrity.

The state's inability to monopolise the use of legitimate violence, along with its lack of transparency, has highly damaged public trust in authorities. This further compounds the already challenging economic situation, which fuelled a series of protests over a cost of living crisis in summer 2022.

While all these challenges exist, Ecuador currently aims to build a robust and adequate legal framework to tackle organised crime through local, interstate and transnational cooperation. Nevertheless, implementing such legislation appears to be a significant challenge due to insufficient resources and the lack of independence of Ecuador's judiciary.

*Source*: *https://www.pexels.com/photo/the-national-flag-of-ecuador-15652224/*

A wake-up call for Ecuador’s democracy

Juan Papier, Human Rights Watch's acting deputy director for the Americas, considers Villavicencio's death to be "a wakeup call for Ecuador's democracy". Indeed, strong security policies are needed to reinforce public authorities and tackle transnational organised crime.

As part of the Global Programme on Implementing the Organized Crime Convention, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) currently works with Ecuador representatives to establish a National Strategy against organised crime. This partnership aims to reinforce international cooperation and local coordination between representatives of various Ecuadorian institutions. Moreover, the Republic collaborated with the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) "Ecuador SinCero Programme" to tackle Corruption Prevention, Transparency and Citizen Participation between January 2020 and June 2023. This cooperation programme articulated various initiatives, mainly focusing on Public Integrity and the Open Government Model.

Conclusive remarks

While it seems certain that crime and violence rates are still set to rise, recent political events, including Fernando Villavicencio’s assassination, could well represent a pivotal moment for Ecuador. However, to stand ground on these incredibly difficult challenges, measures tackling rampant corruption and promoting judicial independence, transparency and the accountability of perpetrators are needed.

To that end, it is in Ecuador’s interest to seek international guidance in building an effective National Strategy against Transnational Organised Crime and strengthen its collaboration with neighbouring countries. Yet, international cooperation can only complement guidance and concrete domestic efforts. Governmental initiatives must improve public sector management and emphasise civic education and engagement.

In addition, more effective measures should be implemented concerning the protection of local whistleblowers, which still fall short of adequate reporting mechanisms, as demonstrated by the case of Julio Rogelio Viteri Ungaretti v Ecuador, brought before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), in which a member of the Ecuadorian military suffered reprisals for noting irregularities, including acts of corruption within the Armed Forces.

Nevertheless, reducing corruption, strengthening the domestic legal system, improving public sector management, and promoting education and citizen participation will certainly not prove enough to the immense task of strengthening Ecuador’s institutions. Change needs to come from within. Ecuador has an inherent interest in innovating and coming up with solutions that truly allow for this change to be sustainable. Perhaps it could in the future explore the avenues brought by emerging technologies, which may be used, for instance, to reduce human interaction and control corruption within administrative processes.

October 4, 2023 — No Comments

The tension between China and the US also has an impact on the technological world

Author: Francesco Cirillo - U.S. Team

Washington and Beijing have planned strategies to increase semiconductor production with the advent of Artificial Intelligence. For this reason, Washington is somewhat concerned about China's chip production capabilities; the concern increased after the unveiling of the new Mate 60 Pro smartphone by Huawei. The chip component of this product is unique: in fact, semiconductor companies in Beijing and the People's Republic produce them entirely. US analysts think this demonstrates Beijing's technological capabilities and China's ability to become independent in technology production.

It is crucial for many companies, particularly Nvidia, to maintain a steady relationship with the People's Republic; this is a different view for the US government. To slow the growth of the industry, especially the development of the artificial intelligence field, the White House, Congress, and the defence and intelligence apparatuses should implement a containment strategy in the supply chain of the semiconductor industry. The New York Times states that China has used artificial intelligence tools, in particular, to pursue disinformation actions. This, according to Microsoft researchers, indicates that Beijing is eager to use generative AI to produce images and disseminate them online to apply disinformation actions.

For Beijing, one of the ways China could obtain the resources to compete with the US in that area is through the technology race. In a recent report translated by the CSIS (Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP, 2023), At the Seventh Collective Study Session of the CCP Central Committee Politburo, Xi Jinping Emphasized Comprehensively Strengthening Military Governance and Using High-Standard Governance to Promote High- Quality Military Development [习近平在中共中央政治局第七次集体学习时强调全面加强军事治理以高水平治理推动我军高质量发展]. Interpretation: China (originally published 2023), a working group of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, outlines guidelines for the integration of HiTech tools into the Chinese armed forces.

*Source*: https://www.pexels.com/it-it/foto/luce-blu-e-rossa-dal-computer-1933900/

Beijing recently announced the launch of a new approximately USD 40 billion investment fund intending to support the industrial growth of technology companies. The contention between the People's Republic of China and the US has also affected the artificial intelligence sector. The US is trying to impose restrictions on US companies operating and selling technology products to Chinese companies to hinder China's access to the industrial chain.

The Semiconductor Industry Association has stated that China will purchase chips and semiconductors worth around $180 billion in 2022 and only a few companies, including Intel, Nvidia and Qualcomm, have a significant relationship with Beijing. These companies are the only ones authorised by the US authorities to sell chips for Huawei's smartphones. In an economic and technological competition that Washington hopes will limit China's growth and development in the HiTech sector, further trade conflicts could also hurt US companies themselves.

September 25, 2023 — No Comments

The Complex Path to Climate-Neutral Militaries

Authors: Michele Mignona, Iris Raith, Frederik Steinhauser - Defense & Procurement Team

Introduction

As climate change intensifies, militaries around the world are gradually recognizing the need to climate-proof their forces. That is crucial given that climate change has a clear impact on militaries – and vice versa. Transitioning armed forces to be more sustainable and climate-resilient brings important benefits but also poses challenges. This piece explores the advantages of armed forces pursuing climate neutrality. It will also discuss the difficulties like technology constraints that militaries face in greening defences. Next, the approaches of the US, Russian and Chinese militaries will be considered regarding their adaptation efforts to climate change. Finally, the role of organisations like NATO and the EU in driving climate action in militaries will be analyzed. Their target-setting, funding initiatives and interoperability mechanisms influence allied armed forces to mitigate emissions while maintaining operational readiness.

Advantages of going climate-neutral

Transitioning armed forces to be more sustainable and climate-resilient brings significant strategic and operational benefits. One major advantage is increased energy efficiency and cost savings. By reducing reliance on fossil fuels and shifting to renewable energy sources, militaries can significantly cut costs, especially for fuel-intensive operations. For instance, the US military's use of Advanced Medium Mobile Power Systems (AMMPS) in Afghanistan cut fuel consumption by 21%. Moreover, local renewable energy production also reduces the vulnerable supply lines required for transporting diesel and other fuels to forward locations. This increases the self-sufficiency of missions, decreasing dependence on external actors, which may jeopardize a mission’s efficacy.

Furthermore, investing in technologies and infrastructure resilient to climate impacts allows militaries to maintain readiness as operational environments change. Adaptive planning, training and capabilities preserve the armed forces' effectiveness as extreme weather affects theatres of operation. For example, NATO's Cold Response exercises in Norway help prepare troops to operate in Arctic conditions. Additionally, transitioning away from fossil fuels will reduce the major environmental footprint of militaries as institutional polluters. For instance, the UK aims to cut military emissions by 70% through measures like biofuel use. This contributes to global climate change mitigation efforts.

Proactively climate-proofing defences keeps militaries ahead as innovators and standard-setters in a climate-altered world. It also promotes their strategic position compared to adversaries, slower to adapt.

Disadvantages & Challenges

Major global military powers have adopted a diverse energy portfolio, encompassing oil, natural gas, coal, nuclear, hydropower, biofuels, wind, and solar energy. This diversification not only bolsters energy security strategies but also serves as a bedrock for system resilience. Shifting towards a greater reliance on electricity entails an increased dependency on minerals crucial for the functioning of electrical systems. These minerals, predominantly sourced from regions like China and countries where Beijing holds substantial economic and infrastructural sway, present a new set of challenges. This dynamic sets the stage for geopolitical competition among nations vying for access to these pivotal resources, where China has a strategic advantage. Transitioning from a diversified energy mix to one focused primarily on electricity will introduce challenges for a country’s military, like potential cyberattacks and threats to the supply chains.

A key challenge for the military in implementing environmental policies is maintaining long-term commitment and funding, especially in light of pressures to increase military capacity and shifting priorities. The insecurities and challenges within geopolitics, coupled with escalating threats from adversaries, compel nations to prioritize military preparedness. This often leads to reluctant transitions towards climate-neutral armies, as they lack prior experience in this domain.

For instance, Russia’s war in Ukraine has prompted questions about whether the West needs to rebuild its military-industrial capacity in preparation for a large-scale war. Following the Russian invasion, European nations announced increases of nearly €200 billion to their defence budgets. The pressure to spend quickly threatens to entrench further Europe’s dependence on fossil fuels for defence at a moment when policymakers are aiming to shift to climate-neutral forces.

Furthermore, policymakers are concerned about countries or adversaries lacking the necessary financial resources or the willingness to pursue complete decarbonization of their militaries. A recent study conducted by a British officer concluded that, given current capabilities and modes of combat, an electrified land force might struggle to achieve the same levels of firepower, protection, and mobility as a force relying on fossil fuels.

Source: *Image by Robert Waghorn from Pixabay*

The big powers: how China, Russia and the US militaries are adapting

Given the transnational nature of climate change, governments from all over the world have a shared responsibility to address it; however, it is questionable whether the interests of the world's three military superpowers, China, Russia, and the United States, are aligned. They differ in their approaches to addressing climate change and even more so in their views on how it affects the armed forces.

China's leadership avoids tying climate change to military might despite acknowledging its possible security consequences due to its links to the fossil fuel industry of the country, Sino-US rivalry and the consequent “conspiracy attitude” among some Chinese policymakers, and strategic secrecy regarding its military. Overall, there is little information available publicly on China's consideration of climate change, even though it very likely might have a significant impact on its military infrastructure.

Russia acknowledges climate change's security implications but opts for a national approach over international securitization, preferring to wait for the issue to materialize rather than preventing it. Moscow sees economic opportunities with climate change and minimizes the role of the armed forces, except in the Arctic, where defrosting reveals important natural resources.

The US takes the most proactive approach to climate change security, with integrated strategies, risk assessment, Arctic geopolitical competition, and disaster relief efforts, defining this issue as a priority. Clearly, it is common belief that this should not come at the cost of operational effectiveness. However, political divisions affect climate security actions.

NATO & the EU: Towards Climate Security Leadership

Remarkably, organisations such as NATO and the EU are important actors concerning climate security. NATO is intensifying its focus on environmental security, aiming to obtain a pivotal role in adapting to climate change security. It addresses risks to military operations, disaster relief, energy efficiency, and climate mitigation. Annual assessments, adaptation measures, emissions analysis, and collaboration with partners are also central to NATO's 2023 Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment.

The EU is a pioneer when it comes to green policies. However, the military sector has been largely omitted in light of the EU pacifist policies. Nonetheless, things are rapidly changing. In this context, incorporating the military sector into the European Green Deal policies would reduce emissions, enhance strategic autonomy, modernize operations, spur innovation, and boost the EU's credibility in combating climate change.

Conclusion

As climate change intensifies, militaries must innovate to cut emissions while maintaining readiness. Though approaches differ, organizations like NATO and the EU are driving climate action through target-setting and funding initiatives. With visionary leadership, armed forces can spearhead transformative change towards climate-resilient, sustainable societies.

August 18, 2023 — No Comments

Egypt: A genuine effort to end violence in Sudan or politics of symbolism?

Author: Chantal Elisabeth Hohe - Middle East Team

After the Gaza negotiations in 2019 and the COP27 2022 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt once again positioned itself as a diplomatic force within its neighborhood. This time, to address the violent conflict that broke out in Khartoum, Sudan’s capital, this spring and ever since, plagued the country as a whole.

Egypt’s president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi hosted a neighbor’s summit in Cairo on July 13th, inviting the heads of state of all countries bordering Sudan. Namely: Libya, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Chad, the Central African Republic, and Eritrea. After more than three months of violence, it is about time the regional powers undertook a joint effort to prevent the conflict from escalating even further, right?

What has happened in Sudan recently?

After the Sudanese people’s strife for democracy had grown increasingly vocal, in 2019, the authoritarian leader Omar Al-Bashir was toppled. Al-Bashir had been in power for almost three decades, with the SAF (Sudanese Armed Forces) and RSF (Rapid Support Forces) in place to ensure his protection. Especially the RSF, a former paramilitary organization active in the Darfur region, had been essential for Al-Bashir’s safety.

After his removal from power, an interim government was installed, consisting of military and civilian parties. In 2021, this sharing of power between the two military factions and civilian actors failed. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, chief of the SAF, and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as “Hemeti”), commander of the RSF, took to power in Khartoum. A new Prime Minister, Abdulla Hamdok, was installed, but resigned soon after, leaving al-Burhan as the de facto leader since 2022, with Hemeti in his shadow. A crucial detail, as Hemeti never liked being number two.

Ultimately, on the 15th of April, violence erupted in Khartoum — al-Burhan and Hemeti started a power struggle that ultimately led to a violent outbreak and chaos in Sudan’s capital. Since then, the conflict spread, thousands fell victim to the violence, and millions had to flee - around 700.000 to Egypt, living in inhumane conditions and without access to their basic needs such as food, water, and medical treatment.

What was decided at the Cairo Summit?

At the leaders’ summit, Egypt voiced two demands. For one, the regional powers should work towards a ceasefire between the RSF and the SAF, and ultimately initiate peace talks. And second, the warring parties should ensure safe passage for humanitarian aid convoys and facilitate access for international humanitarian workers to the country.

The Cairo Summit was the beginning of a series of ministerial talks to be held in the countries bordering Sudan in the following weeks and months, with the first round of the ‘Ministerial Mechanism’ taking place in Chad and resulting in an action plan created to work towards a ceasefire in consideration of the political sensitivity, the military risks, and the humanitarian facets of the conflict.

Let us look at what happened in Sudan, why Egypt took up the orchestrating role in diplomatic efforts, and what broader context these efforts are situated in.

*Source:* https://newsghana.com.gh/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Sudan-SAF-and-RSF-leaders-2048x1152.jpg

Why is Egypt interested in leading diplomatic efforts?

Having a seat at the negotiating table in Sudan is not merely an act of benevolence, or an effort to end the violence for the Sudanese people’s sake. There is a lot to consider, without delving deep into the workings of Egyptian foreign and security policy. Most importantly, economy and natural resources play an essential role.

Though Egypt still is one of the strongest economies on the African continent, its power has weakened in recent years. The coronavirus pandemic, the increase in energy prices, and an uptick in food prices have taken their toll on the economy and the population. Inflation is high, and Egypt faces a currency crisis, finding itself in need of ever more uncertain international financial support.

Apart from the grim economic outlook, Egypt is in deep water stress. As it derives all of its freshwater resources from the Nile River, it has a strong interest in keeping friendly relations with the countries that sit at the river’s spring - one of them being Sudan. Of course, Egypt is keen on maintaining stability within these countries just as much. Before the spring of this year, Egypt played its part to ensure stability in Sudan by providing military support to the SAF. Now, this could backfire, as the weapons once supplied by Egypt are now used in the power struggle against the RSF, contributing to an escalation of the situation, and causing civilian deaths.

With Sudan collapsing, Egypt’s water supply could become uncertain. For instance, whoever holds the power in Sudan — itself a water-stressed country — could decide to limit the amount of water that crosses the border into Egypt, with devastating consequences for its people and its economy.

Water security and economic as well as political stability go hand in hand. Without the former, the latter will collapse, ultimately triggering a multifaceted crisis that Egypt is unlikely to shoulder, especially considering the current political and economic situation that is already destabilizing the country. Thus, positioning itself in the center of peace efforts in Sudan is likely to help Egypt prevent a domestic crisis of its own.

Where do we go from here?

With the violence continuing, and no peace deal in sight, a different approach might be needed to address the problem. A Berlin-based analyst for Foreign Policy magazine, Mahmoud Salem, has proposed an interesting take on what might help: a bottom-up approach. “Tak[ing] the side of the civilian parties“ as a balanced strategic response. This could help Egypt curb the influx of refugees that it cannot handle (neither economically nor politically). But could this also be the solution to the water struggle and the rivalry between General Burhan and General Hemeti?

It remains open to debate whether this approach is in line with Egypt’s foreign policy agenda, and if so, whether it will be accepted by Sudan’s other neighbors — and most importantly, how the warring parties should be included in this approach. For now, they were not invited to the table. And Egypt’s past with Sudan is not exactly the one of a neutral, diplomatic partner…

July 10, 2023 — No Comments

Iranian Drone Warfare: theory and praxis

Author: Danilo dalle Fave - Article Intelligence and Military Strategy Team

The Iranian strategic doctrine and the role of drone warfare

Iranian strategic doctrine has been influenced by the peculiar nature of its political regime and its history. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 infused in the Iranian strategic doctrine of Shah’s era, inspired by the contemporary Western military doctrines, some elements that influence the current role of drones in Iranian warfare: “holy defence”, export of the revolution, and especially the concept of self-reliance are the ideological foundation of the current Iranian strategic doctrine.

The Iraq-Iran war of the ‘80s has defined the current duality of Iranian armed forces: due to the distrust toward the Iranian army (Artesh), seen as an instrument of Shah’s supporters, the khomeinists developed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a parallel army and the main instrument of their foreign policy. The purges against the high command of Artesh and the lack of strategic doctrines among the pasdarans compelled them to create an ad hoc military doctrine, deeply influenced by their origin as an ideological militia with a revolutionary structure.

The result is a strategic doctrine centred around three pillars: proxy warfare, which means the use of guerrilla groups of Shia communities around the Islamic world used as an instrument for the projection of Iranian influence abroad; asymmetric warfare, a direct consequence of the military and technological superiority of their enemies; the focus on Ballistic missiles, which is caused by the weak Iranian air forces and the foreign dependency for aeronautical components and have compelled to focus on specific arms systems that can provide deterrence and be produced domestically.

Despite being formally a defensive strategic doctrine, the current supreme leader Ali Khamenei has provided also the official state doctrine for external interventions in 2010, the so-called two-wing doctrine: the Foreign Ministry and the Quds Force, the overseas operations arms of the IRGC, have the task to protect Iran and enhance Iranian role in the region. This means that the military instrument is embedded in Iranian foreign policy.

IRGC interventions of the last ten years have shown how foreign operations are usually conducted when certain conditions are met: the presence of a Shia community that can provide the proxy actor (e.g. in Lebanon Hezbollah or the Houtis in Yemen), the weakness of the state actors, like in Iraq or Lebanon, that can allow the strengthening of pro-Iranian forces and provide a logistics pipeline, capable of transfer personnel, weapons and allowing training by IRGC forces.

In this framework, drone warfare is exclusively conducted by the IRGC aerospace force, which also controls Iran’s strategic-missile force. Drones are used to compensate for the weakness of Iranian air forces in the reconnaissance and surveillance domain and the industrial constraints to the mass production of warplanes.

IRGC drones are perfectly suited to match the IRGC view of warfare: in the air domain, drones can be used along with ballistic and cruise missiles to attack enemy positions to strike and rapidly retreat, for reconnaissance and to overwhelm enemy positions. Swarms of loitering munitions can overburden enemy air defence allowing missiles to strike their objectives. The recent use in the Ukraine of Iranian-made drones by Russia is a clear example of how these kinds of saturation tactics can be very effective.
In the sea, the traditional naval swarming tactics, developed during the Iran-Iraq war, can be augmented with unmanned vehicles and balance the military superiority of the US and their allies.

*Source*: https://president.ir/fa/135803

Iranian Unmanned Aerial vehicles and industry

The first family of Iranian drones are the Iranian Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA) Ababil: originally developed by the IRGC-owned Qods Aviation Industries, the Ababil-1 was a suicide drone used during the Iran-Iraq war usually launched by pneumatic truck launchers. Now they developed a specific Unmanned loitering munition drone, the DIO Arash.

This experience allowed the production in the 90s of the Ababil-2 and its different variants: the Ababil-B, a target drone for air-defence exercises, the Ababil-S, the first Iranian surveillance drone, the Ababil-T, a twin-tail variant that can be used for surveillance and as strike munition payloads and has been adopted by Hezbollah and the Houtis. The latter has deployed the Qasef-1 and Qasef-2K, Abadil-2 variants with 30 kg warheads, used as loitering munition against the Saudi-led coalition forces since 2016.

The Ababil-3, suspected to be a copy of the South African Denel Dynamics Seeker, is an Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance (ISR) drone and has been used extensively by Iranian forces during the Syrian civil war. The last member of this family, the Ababil-5, debuted in April 2022 and appears to be a Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle, similar to the American Predator.

The other family of Iranian drones is represented by the Mohajer, the first ISR drone produced in the 80s and widely exported to Iranian proxies. Many Iranian drones are the result of a reverse-engineered version of Western drones, like the IAIO Fotros, IAIO Yasir, HESA Hamaseh, and IRIAF Kaman-22: the most important of them are the Saegheh, an entire family of drones that are the result of the acquisition of US Lockheed RQ-170 Sentinel, downed in 2011, which shows how Iranian industries are capable to copy stealth drones and in general to adapt western technology for internal purposes.

The most important drone family is the Shahed: the HESA Shahed-129, a dual-role drone is deployed for patrols and direct attacks for the Iranian Army and Navy, while the HESA Shahed-136 is a loitering munition designed for swarm attacks against ground targets. The last addition is the HESA Shahed-149, a reusable attack drone capable of launching missiles and bombs and being equipped for electronic warfare.

As previously said, Iran relies on drones in order to overcome the lack of a proper aerospace industry: the cost-effectiveness of drones in production and maintenance avoids the costly traditional aircraft procurement. At the same time, it is also a matter of internal political dynamics. Drone producers are mostly linked with the IRGC which managed to concentrate power in recent years, especially with the current president Ebrahim Raisi. The main consequence of this, apart from a greater role of IRGC in Iranian politics, is the “capture” of funds by the IRGC, leaving the Iranian Air Forces with shrinking resources to develop their vehicles and devices.
That is why Iran relies, as during Shah’s era, on imports: the recent discussion for the procurement of the Russian Su-35, a 4th generation multi-role jet fighter, is a clear sign of the overreliance on imports for traditional aircraft.

Conclusion

Summing up, drone warfare is an important element of the Iranian way to wage war: it reflects Iranian leadership’s preference for asymmetric approaches and the adaptation to Western sanctions that prevented the development of traditional aerospace vehicles. Despite domestic strifes and tensions with the US, Iran can exploit its expertise in drones to obtain technology and know-how in the aerospace field that needs to scale up its military prowess: deeper cooperation with Russia, favoured by the isolation of both countries in the international arena, could augment Iranian aerospace forces, with consequences on the military balance in the Middle East.

June 26, 2023 — No Comments

Cultural Question and Cyber Quandary: Making Sense Of TikTok Bans Worldwide

Authors: Maria Makurat (Cyber Security and AI Team) and Anurag Mishra (USA Team)

TikTok and the “Ban Hammer”

The debate of apps such as TikTok being a security threat to individuals as well as countries has been going on for a while. Several articles, studies and other blog articles have been, and are still being released on this hot topic. One of the main concerns remains: TikTok is collecting data of users against their consent whilst one is also not using the app. Since TikTok is owned by ByteDance, a Chinese-owned company, many Western countries and especially the US are highly sceptical and states such as Montana have even taken the initiative to ban the app altogether. What does this mean for cyber as well as cultural security issues? Many factors and international events surround this debate such as TikTok already being banned in India, the issues of the Chinese state being seen as a spy and whether one can see TikTok as a surveillance weapon? Cyber security as well as cultural issues tie into the debate where we see theories of whether we have a “cyber war” in relation to social media platforms as well as cultural matters if TikTok is having a negative impact on countries. This article explores the issues highlighted above and opens up possible questions that still need to be asked.

Montana Mounts a “Blackout Challenge” to TikTok

Senate Bill #149 of the 68th legislature of Montana, which was introduced by state senator Shelley Vance makes the offering of the app on any application store illegal and prescribes a fine of $10,000 per day for each time someone accesses TikTok, “is offered the ability” to access it, or downloads it. Governor Greg Gianforte, a Republican from Montana, had approved the law on anticipating potential legal challenges. Although the law is not set to be enforced until January 1, 2024, there are doubts about the state's ability to implement it effectively. The impact of this new legislation in Montana is expected to be more significant than the existing TikTok bans already implemented on government devices in approximately half of the states and at the federal level in the United States.

From the outside, the one-of-a-kind ban looks like an assault on ByteDance’s data-gathering exercise but also has a deeper purpose of extinguishing the app’s ability to influence the impressionable youth of America.

One of the major reasons why TikTok became the conservative eyesore and a major cause of worry for parents was the “Blackout Challenge.” Also known as the "choking challenge" or the "pass-out challenge," it involved urging individuals to hold their breath until they lose consciousness as a result of insufficient oxygen. While the Blackout Challenge was the biggest troubling online challenge, causing as many as 20 children to lose their lives, a slew of similar troubling trends made TikTok infamous. "Dry-scooping," climbing on tall stacks of milk crates, removing your own IUD, and eating massive amounts of frozen honey and corn syrup, and the list goes on.

The problem with TikTok does not end there. When juxtaposed with the wider scheme of things, TikTok appears to be one of the many arrows in the Chinese quiver. The issue of Chinese Police Stations coming up on the United States’ territory has landed many in the stew and has made the American government restive. Taking a leaf out of India and some European countries’ books, several states in the US decided to ban TikTok on office/government-issued phones and devices. As of April, 34 American states have banned TikTok on government-issued devices. The idea behind banning the mischievous app has largely been to secure any data leaks. India was the first country to ban TikTok and several other Chinese mobile applications nationwide, citing national security concerns. India banned TikTok as early as June 2020. At first, the ban was seen as a mild yet conclusive response to the PLA’s misadventure across the Sino-Indian border, but as more countries put restraints on the Chinese app, the Indian government’s official position on the ban seems to have been vindicated.

Reservations and concerns abound TikTok and have only gone on to grow in the past three years. Not just the adversaries and rivals but even allies like Pakistan and North Korea have blocked TikTok. The question nevertheless remains whether TikTok is just an online pastime or a phisher.

*Source:* **Unsplash** **https://unsplash.com/photos/PuNW11NRjI4**

Weapon of Mass Surveillance: TikTok and its Cyber Security Issues?

The debate surrounding TikTok being a security issue has been around for a while. Several individuals as well as companies had their doubts but as of around April 2023, one has been seeing a surge in states and countries being serious about banning the popular app. The major concern lies within the fact that TikTok is owned by a Chinese company and several discrepancies have arisen concerning the security of the app. It is being repeatedly “expressed that TikTok and its parent company, ByteDance, may put sensitive user data, like location information, into the hands of the Chinese government.” This together with political tensions between Russia, China and the West in relation to the Ukraine war add to the TikTok debate with companies being concerned that data is being stolen. Countries find themselves recently in much more complicated relations.

One can link this to traditional international affairs theories such as whether we will even have a “cyber war” (discussion by Thomas Rid) and how social media is being “weaponized” (discussed by P.W. singer, Emerson T. Brooking and Dr Andreas Krieg). “In so doing, social media has evolved from a mere distraction machine into a tool of sociopolitical power, galvanising public awareness and civil-societal activism.” It is being discussed that ever since the 2016 elections in the US with Russian interference, that other social media platforms, where TikTok can possibly also be an instrument, can be used to spread false information and not only be used as a tool by itself to collect data. Countries such as Germanyalso increasingly see the issue of social media platforms being used to spread false information as well as collecting data (BIS: Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik). The so-called “Digitalbarometer 2020” released by the BIS, stated that in Germany for the year 2020, every fourth individual was affected by some type of cyber-attack and every third was affected financially. Whilst Germany has not released a law that forbids the use of TikTok, it is being discussed by the Federal Minister of the Interior and Community that one needs to stay alert and be aware of the possible consequences.

This issue is also being discussed very intensely by scholars such as Dr Andreas Krieg (recent work “Subversion - The strategic weaponization of narratives”) and Dr Kathleen Hall Jamieson (Cyber-War : How Russian Hackers and Trolls Helped Elect a President). We see both now in the international affairs academic world as well as the communications and cultural disciplines a debate, on how social media platforms are being weaponized (see also this blog article on hate speech on social media). Now perhaps more than ever, interdisciplinary communication between different academic strands is needed to address the issue. So we see it is not only the issue of TikTok being owned by a Chinese company and the possible spread of false information but also the physical issue of collecting data. We have both cultural/ethical and cyber security issues.

To Ban, or Not to Ban?

To mitigate the goodwill loss and the loss of business that TikTok has encountered, it would be wise for the company to make itself more transparent and even sell stakes, as beseeched by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. The company will also need to come clean on the accusations of data theft and spying. The root of all remains the involvement of the Chinese state in its corporate entities and in the long run, such involvement will not go unnoticed by the countries hosting Chinese businesses. When considering all these factors, open questions remain such as if we will see other countries following suit in banning TikTok and how likely is it that more organisations will take action? Do we see a certain cyber war taking place in the realm of social media or is it more an issue of moral and ethical values? Younger generations still use TikTok in their daily life, especially since this is also linked to businesses (such as Infleuncers as well as big companies) which could prove problematic in the future. Perhaps stronger rules are required that regulate the use of TikTok and its data collection if the app is to be further used. It remains to be seen how this develops and whether individuals will be concerned with the use of the app.

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